THE 'SUMMIT' FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000600140001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 162
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 2, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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JOne 2, 1955
MUM
TO, Nr. Robert Amory
CIA
SUBMITS The 'Summits FOur4ower Conference
NOs??
Attached is the material prepared for pea by the Spocisl
Prejeote Staff of the OCB for possible use at the coming Big
Four Conference.
fro,
P
AU of' of the chapters have been declassified excepts
This is wholly the thinking of members
of Wecial Projects Staff. This paper is classified
'Secret' and thodld remain so elaJsified. if by the
time of the opening of the Conference it is desired to
have the Whole beak handled on an unclassified basis,
please remove Part I.
steno's This brief carries
the elassifloetion dential'. Authority for declassi-
fication of this mate el is expected from the FBI by
3 Alms.
IX,00111 Nommpnipt True, T1910ions ndoChine.
This draft carrion" the classification of ecretw. A
final draft has been Checked with other Agencies and
has been decleesified. I hope that the new version will
be substituted by 3 June when comments from other Depart-
ments and Agencies have been introduced into the text.
Attachment :
Chief, Special Projects Staff
As stated, cow nth II
tvlORI/CDF pp6-11
*Not Referred to NSC Per NSC litCRET
Waver* *NARA/Library To
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THE "SUMMIT" FOUR POWER CONFERENCE
The Forthcoming Summit Four Power Conference
Soviet Tactics; U. S. Themes; U. S. Strategy and Tactics
II
Information Briefs in Support of U. S. Themes
1. Communist China and Formosa
(a) The Republic of China on Taiwan (Formosa)
(b) Sine-Soviet Alliance
2. "The Neutral Belt"
(a) Communist World-Wide Control Mechanisms
(b) East-West Trade
3. U. S. "Threats"
(a) Communist World-Wide Subversion and Sabotage
(b) "Peaceful Coexistence" - Soviet Style
(c) Soviet Subversion and Espionage in Germany
L. Austria and Germany
(a) East Germany -- A Soviet Colony
(b) East German Militarism - 3oviet Inspired
(c) "Free German Elections - Communist Style
(d) Slave Labor in East German Uranium Mines
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5. Disarmament
(a) Treaty and Truce Observance - Communist Style
6. Korea and Indochina
(a) Violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement
(b) Communist Truce Violations - Indochina
(c) Communist Detention and Imprisonment of United States
Personnel - 1955
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THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT FOUR POWER CONFERENCE
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June 1, 1955
THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT FOUR POWER CONFERENCE
This background material in the psychological and communica-
tions fields was assembled for the "Summit Conference" primarily
to assist U. S. representatives in taking an aggressive stand.
The estimates of the course of action presented are based on the
best intelligence available. The proposed U. S. tactics were
suggested by intelligence and by experience in connection with
previous conferences. The discussion is arranged in three
sections.
A. Soviet tactical themes.or "lines" expected
to be used before, during and after the
conference.
B. Suggested U. S. themes and intelligence support
available for these themes.
C. Suggested tactics for the exploitation of U. S.
themes.
A. Soviet Tactics
According to existing intelligence, the tactical "lines" sub-
mitted below are likely to be used by the Soviets. It is not
possible to indicate which will be used or in what order they will
be presented. It is important, therefore, to prepare for con-
tingencies.
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General
The present moves of the Communists in Europe, including the
summit conference, will be designed to conceal or gain their ob-
jectives in Asia, where the advance of the international Communist
movement is having its greatest success. The neutralization of
Germany is a strategic objective. Any concessions by the West
will assist the Soviet's strategic planning which includes the
neutralization and absorption of Germany and Japan into the
Soviet orbit. Revolution in Asia is their present tactic; the
tactic is a stepping stone to "world revolution", which means the
introduction everywhere of Soviet Communism directed by the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.
It is believed that long-range Soviet maneuvering at the con-
ference will be aimed at a Four Power Foreign Ministers' conference
after "summit" to discuss Far Eastern problems. Out of the Foreign
Ministers' meeting Lll evolve a discussion of Formosa by a Ten
Power conference, including the United States, Communist China,
and a group of neutal countries. Nationalist China will undoubtedly
be excluded. Any concessions by the West on Germany, disarmament,
East-West trade, and a possible neutral belt will be mere windfalls
since the Soviets' present objectives are in Asia, Asia as spelled
out by Quemoy and Matsu, Formosa, South Vietnam, Thailand, Korea
and Japan.
The Neutral Belt
As early as 1951, Pravda stated that the practical value of
neutral tendencies in Germany, India, and the Arab countries must
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not be ignored. Since then, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Scandinavian
countries and Italy have been added to the list. Also, as early
as 1951, Pravda predicted that neutralists would join the Soviets
in demanding the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, the
ending of the Korean War, and a Five Power peace pact. Early in
1954, during the Berlin Conference, the neutralists' "line" took
on a new slant, that of the Soviet-sponsored All-European Collective
Security Agreement. The 1955 version is the creation of a neutral
belt. This neutral belt tactic, however, is directly tied to the
peaceful coexistence campaign. The Soviets want the European nations
gradually to limit their commitments to NATO oi maintain a Western
European alliance outside of NATO. This desire has led to the
Warsaw Conference and the subsequent U.S.S.R. Satellite Treaty of
Mutual Assistance as well as the Austrian Treaty.
Communist China and Formosa
At the summit conference the Soviet omnibus items, i.e.,
recognition of Communist China, entry of Red China into the UN and
the need for Five Power Foreign Ministers' talks will be introduced.
The primary objective, however, will be a future conference on
QUBMT, Matsu and Formosa which would include the United States,
Communist China as major participants and a group of neutral countries
as moderators. The end goal, of course, will be the surrender of
Quemoy and Matsu, and the neutralization of Formosa. The German
issue will also be a cover to induce the West to agree to further
conferences. The initial request for the Five Power Foreign Ministers'
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meeting will be watered down to a Four Power meeting, provided
Germany and Formosa are agenda items. Indochina and Korea will
be included as diversionary items.
Germany
Where Germany is concerned, reunification will be the main
bait. Much of German opinion is fascinated by the prospect of
Austria regaining its freedom and by the withdrawal of the Red Army.
Communist propagandists are now tirelessly expounding the theme of
the Swiss and Austrians whose example Germany would be wise to fol-
low. Some of the German Social Democrats in West Germany have
swallowed the bait. Ulbricht, Secretary General of the Social Unity
Party (SED) of East Germany, stated in Leipzig:
"The two great power blocs should at least be separated
by a broad belt of neutral states. The conclusion of the
Austrian Treaty adds a further link to this belt. Only a
reunified Germany is still missing".
There are two glaring exploitable flaws in this Soviet "line"?
one in the realm of theory; ohe in the realm of reality. In the
realm of theory the Soviet aims are not neutralization of any group
of countries but a temporary tactical move, fitting present conditions,
that would lead to the eventual absorption of these countries into
the Soviet orbit. In the realm of reality, the Germans are being
asked to come to terms with the Soviet-puppet regime of East Germany.
A genuinely democratic Germany would be worth nothing to the Soviets.
4 reunited but contaminated Germany, which could be subverted by pro-
Soviet forces, would be invaluable to the U.S.S.R., especially if
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Western Europe were so weakened as to insure ultimate Communist
domination of the Continent.
If the Soviets cannot foresee early unification on their
terms, they will fall back upon their old argument of postponing
elections until after reunification. This will be the least awkward
way of rejecting Western proposals on Germany.
Austria
The Austrian Treaty was aimed primarily at German public opinion.
This is readily apparent if the significance of the Russian military
withdrawal is examined. The U.S.S.R. signed an 11,ustrian Treaty and
withdrew its occupation troops without substantially reducing its
military strength in Europe, impairing the security of its satellites
or reducing the effectiveness of European Communist-front organiza-
tions. The Soviet forces in Austria total 31,000 troops (two
divisions) and 2,500 security troops in contrast to a force of
Wo,000 troops (22 line divisions) and 15,000 security troops in
East Germany. The Soviet air force has 6 jet fighter regiments in
Austria in contrast to 20 jet fighter and 6 jet light bomber regiments
in East Germany. The ratification of the Warsaw Agreement setting
up a unified Eastern European military command will give the Soviets
a pretext of keeping their troops in the satellite states. The
Austrian Treaty abrogates the "line of communication" security
provision by which the Soviets have stationed troops in their
satellites. The Warsaw Agreement will be used to refuse any request
to withdraw their troops.
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If the Soviets cannot foresee early unification along their
terms, they will fall back upon their old argument of postponing
elections until after reunification. This will be the least awk-
ward way of rejecting Western proposals on Germany.
The U.S. "Threatening" .ttitude
This is one of the omnibus themes likely- to be used by the
Soviets to postpone discussion of Germany, to avoid Western chal-
lenges, to split the allies, and to conceal embarrassment. A variety
of sub-themes can be played: (a) U.S. "neglect" of the problem of
prohibition and control of atomic weapons, (b) U.S, world-wide
military bases, (c) alleged U.S, subversive 'activities in Eastern
Europe, (d) U.S. alliance with "Hitlerite" generals, (e) aggressive
character of NATO, SEATO and Paris agreements. The slogans currently
being used to highlight the above are "peaceful coexistence", "the
U.S. does not want to reduce international tensions", and "SEATO
is nothing more than military plotting of the colonizers."
Disarmament
The latest Soviet disarmament proposals are nothing more than
a clever tactic to confuse and obstruct any real settlement. All
proposals would work to the detriment of the Western powers while
the Soviets would be allowed to continue their aggressive activities.
Their proposals, if agreed to and carried out to the letter, would
bring about: the halting of freedom of information on Communist
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activities; the dismantling of U.S. overseas bases; the withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Europe and the Far East; the surrender of
Formosa; and the elimination of restrictions on East-West trade.
All the above would be carried out prior to any effective dis-
armament or inspection system. The methods, techniques and pit-
falls of "Inspections ". Communist Style" have been demonstrated in
Korea and Indochina.
Korea and Indochina
The unification of Korea and Vietnam will be the main themes
of the Soviet "line". Korea will be treated as of passing interests
since the Communists are not ready to renew hostilities. War, in
Soviet dialectics, is the final coup when the success of the revolu-
tion is assured. The present strength of South Korea and the U. S.
and the willingness of the UN to fight if the Communists break the
truce will preclude any aggressive acts.
In Vietnam the main theme will be unification and elections.
Events are now progressing along lines favorable to a Communist
victory. Unless the situation begins to change sharply in favor of
the South Vietnam Government, conditions will continue to deteriorate.
They will claim the success of the Korean and Geneva Agreements and
back a continuation of the truce inspection commissions. The continua-
tion of the truce will give them a respite in order to strengthen
their subversive activities which they consider preparation for the
Itrevoluti on".
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D. U. S. Themes
The themes reviewed hereafter can be used as part of United
States strategy or in countermoves inspired by Soviet tactics.
gom_unEl_1?zlAtagand Formosa
The German issue will be used by the Soviets as a lead
to a: . discussion on Far Eastern issues. This means that the
United States must be prepared to counter any developments
which might weaken the position of the Western allies in the
area. At the same time they should exploit Far Eastern
vulnerabilities of the Soviets. Since the main issue will be
Formosa, the Sino-Soviet Alliance should be aired and reasons given
for the United States commitment to defend Formosa against
Comnunist attack, The United States should reaffirm its com-
mitment to defend Formosa and explain the reasons for the program
of military assistance to the Government of the Republic of
China.
"Neutral Belt"
The purpose of this Soviet theme is to weaken or destroy
NATO, SEATO and the Paris Agreements. Its main objective is
the neutralization of Germany and eventually Japan with the
subsequent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and the Far
East. Since the "neutral belt" is a tactic designed to achieve
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strategic concepts, the best defense is an offense, ire should
strike hard at the theme of neutralization of the satellites.
The counter-offensive should exploit the Soviet control mechanisms
over the satellites, including both political and economic,. The
iron curtain and slave labor in the satellites are secondary themes
which can be utilized.
The U. S. should make clear that what the Soviets propose is
put a neutral position between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,' but a
weakening or many countries by destroying their alliances with
the United States,
"Threats"
Soviet "line" on any of the so-called "threats" will be an
obvious propaganda maneuver designed to conceal their true objec-
tives and will also be part of their over-all "Hate American
campaign. The countermove on this item should give evidence of
Soviet subversion and espionage throughout the world and especially
Soviet subversion and espionage in Germany. An explanation of the
significance of the term "peaceful coexistence", as used by the
Soviets, would be effective in clearing up confUsion on that sub-
ject.
Austria and Germaia
The Soviets will attempt to propagandize the Austrian Treaty
and use it as a bait for similar neutralization of Germany. The
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appeal will be aimed at the German people. The U.S. countermove
to the German problem is to explain the fact that Germany differs
from Austria in that there is no comparison in their size and
strength, and in that the Germans are being asked to come to
terms with Soviet puppets of the Ulbricht type. In order to
expose the fraudulent nature of Soviet pronouncements, the true
facts should be brought up on the following issues3
(a) East German militarism
(b) "Free" German Elections - Communist style
(c) East Germany - a Soviet colony
(d) Forced Labor in East Germany
Disaymament,
Soviet disarmament proposals are merely propaganda designed
to attract the neutralists and play on mants desire for peace.
On close examination they are all seen to be based on the same
Soviet objectives; i.e., to find a cover for the real intent of
Soviet Communism; to achieve the withdrawal of troops from Europe;
to secure the dismantling of U.S. overseas bases; to eliminate
trade restrictions; to neutralize Formosa; to secure recognition
of Communist China and to win disarmament before inspection.
The main item that will be exploited by the Soviets is that of
atomic weapons. This will lead to the inspection item which has
bogged down all previous disarmament conferences. The United
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States countermove should center around the point of inspections
and in particular should expose the Communists' use of inspec-
tions to gain advantage over their foes.
Korea and Indochina
The Communists will claim success for the Korean and Geneva.
Agreements, both of which have been flagrantly violated. Their
main theme will center around reunification, but this will be a
propaganda cover. The issue of electionsand inspections will
arise. This should be exploited by an exposure of Soviet truce
and treaty violations to include actual violations of the Korea
and Geneva Agreements.
C. U. S. S_m.,tz.tEImr....alcl_Tjabjs2
Since the date for the summit conference has not been definitely
agreed upon, this affords us time for preparations which Etould
include (a) moves to counter Soviet tactics; (b) moves to push
ahead toward U.S. strategic goals. Although we cannot prepare in
detail for all Soviet moves, our position should be flexible enough
so that we can counter any Soviet tactic to the advantage of 1112
United States,
Our over-all plans should envisage a defeat of Soviet strategic
moves and not tactical maneuvers. Soviet strategic goals are:
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14 Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and the Fur East.
2. Neutralization of Germany, Japoriand Formosa.
The tactical moves of the Soviets can best be countered by an
exposure of their over-all policy as guided by their theoretical
teachings, This will expose their highly publicized peace and
disarmament campaigns. It will also reveal the true nature of
Soviet Communism.
To assist U.S. media it is imperative tn have United States
strategy planned in admam. We must not under any circumstances
allow the Soviets to gain the initiative or allow them to lead us
toward their strategic goals.
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II
INFORMATION BRIEFS IN SUPPORT OF U. S. THEMES
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TIE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAI os A
The Republic of China on Taiwan (Formosa), aided by military and cconomic
programs in which we are participating heavily, stands literally and
figuratively as a rallying point for all Chinese who oppose the Communist
oligarchy which aims to keep the Chinese people in bondage and use them
for the further attainment of their evil objectives. The Chinese Government
and its people on Formosa are redoubtable members of the confraternity of
free peoples who are ready to take their stand against further Communist
conquests.
In view of the limitations imposed by relatively small geographic,
manpower and economic resources, care must be taken not to overestimate
14461 that government's material capabilities. The strongest force they can muster
and support is none too large for the threat they face. In the no less
important moral and psychological spheres their value to the common cause
is enormous. The Government of the Republic of China is essentially with us.
It is a government with which we can negotiate on a rational plane. We are
dealing with it on a sane basis of give and take.
We are rendering substantial help to this government without inter-
vening in its domestic affairs or otherwise infringing on its sovereignty.
We are helping a beleaguered people to help themselves and the common cause.
It is a program from which we can derive some satisfaction. It is our purpose
to continue to back this government.
We believe that it is the only Chinese Government which represents in
any measure the authentic aspirations and the bona fide national interests of
%1?0'
the Chinese people,
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Disillusioned though the mass of the Chinese may have been with it
in the dark days of 194840, its record on Formosa makes it look better
and better to the Chinese people on the mainland by contrast with the
ruthless exploitation which they are suffering at the hands of the regime
of Mao Tse-tunge There is reason to hope that the government at Taipei
will continue to grow in strength, in devotion to the cardinal principles
of democracy, and in international prestige, and that its base of free
Chinese support will steadily be broadened so that it will be enabled to
raise ever higher a standard around which all Chinese may rally who wish to
save from extinction Chinese freedoms and the ancient and distinctive
Chinese traditions.
The overwhelming majority of the American people do see this issue in
proper perspective. But an articulate though small minority in our own
country, and more in some other countries, sometimes seem to fail to dis-
tinguish friend from foe. Some of our friends in various parts of the world
confuse Couuriunist imperialism with bona fide nationalism.
Nonrecognition of Communist Regime
?Since recognition doesn't signify approval, why don't we 'accept
reality, and recognize the Chinese Communist regime which is in full con-
trol of the country?I
To start with, let us take a look at the four generally accepted
criteria which a new regime ordinarily must meet before its recognition as
a legitimate government and its acceptance into the sisterhood of nations.
These four criteria are (1) effective control over the territory of the
country; (2) sovereign independence; (3) truly representative character--
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something in the nature of a mandate from the people governed, or at least
their consent without coercion; and CO acceptance of its inherited and
generally recognized treaty and other international obligations and ad-
herence to a pretty well established minimum standard of decency in its
treatment of foreign nationals and interests within its borders.
1 Of these four criteria it would seem that the Peiping regime meets
only the first and that is perhaps the least essential of the four.
Repeatedly we have recognized governments in exile which could not meet
the first criterion. But it would be a serious matter to overlook the other
three tests.
The Chinese Communists do not measure up under any of than. They are
subservient to hoscow and international communism; they impose an alien
minority rule by force and falsification on an intimidated, isolated and
misinformed populace; and they openly flout every Chinese treaty obligation,
every principle of the U.N. charter, and every clause in any reasonable
formulation of human and property rights for aliens.
Apart from the horrors wantonly inflicted on millions of Chinese since
1949, the story of the flagrant abuse of scores of American citizens is one
which rightfully causes us to burn with wrath.
The shocking crimes against humanity of recent years have blunted world
sensitivity to mass sadism so that we no longer seem to express the full
measure of our moral indignation against these great wrongs. But we cannot
lightly dismiss the agony of our fellow citizens arrested by Chinese Com-
munists on trumped-up charges; held incommunicado for months or years without
access to friends or legal counsel and often without knowledge of what offense
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if any is charged against them; and in many cases subjected to physical
or mental tortures aimed at extorting false confessions that can be used
in the vicious hate-America propaganda campaign, a campaign which unhappily
may in time turn a new generation of Chinese against America and Americans
by a systematic poisoning of their minds against this country beginning in
childhood.
On grounds of international law, the case against recognition is very
strong. On practieal grounds, the argument is equally strong.
Recognition has assumed a political and psychological significance which
is new. It has become a symbol. Recognition in this case would mean in the
eyes of millions, especially in Asia, not necessarily approval but acceptance,
accommodation, and reconcilement.
Nonrecognition means refusal to accept the Communist triumph as
definitive. It means to many that the will to resist Communist expansion
is alive; that communism is not the inevitable "wave of the future" for Asia;
that communism is not assured of acceptance and legitimation in every country
where it may gain a beachhead; that our Asian friends who have the courage
to stand up against communism will not have the ground cut out from under their
feet if communism should attempt to subvert or take over their native land.
Some may be unable to see why the recognition issue should signify
all this; but the fact is that it does to many Asians, including numbers who
are "on the fence." Many an Asian has told me that American nonrecognition
of the Communist regime in Peiping has had much to do with checking the
impetus of the Communist advance in Asia.
Even Chinese who are not particularly in sympathy with the Chinese
National Government tell us that recognition of the Communist dictators in
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Peiping would be the greatest single nonmilitary triumph for the Communist
eause and the hardest psychological blow against the will to resist the
further spread of eommunism that could be devised.
It would be an unthinkable betrayal of the Chinese Government and its
people on Formosa and likewise a grave disservice to the mass of Chinese
people on the mainland suffering under Communist dictatorship. Our friend-
ship for them shall not waver, and it demands that we shall not strengthen
the hand of their oppressor.
The Communist side is becoming increasingly aware of the immense
political and psychological advantages, as well as the parliamentary ad-
vantages in the United Nations, which could be obtained from general world-
wide recognition of the Peiping regine. Hence we are beginning to see a
series of maneuvers out of Moscow and Peiping designed to force the general
international acceptance of the Mao Tse-tung regime as the legitimate
government of China, entitled to occupy China's seat in the United Nations.
This endeavor must be resisted.
We see in the arrogant, incorrigible, unyielding position taken by
Chinese Communist mouthpieces wherever they appear at a conference how
difficult it is to negotiate even the simplest matter with them. The current
negotiations in Korea are an example, The patience, the flexibility, the
open-mindedness, the reasonableness and resourcefulness of even a con-
summately skilled negotiator are largely wasted.
There is nothing to be gained from diplomatic relations with such a
regime, which believes in the use of diplomacy as a weapon of propaganda and
subversion rather than as a means of constructive diplomatic intercourse.
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The ambitious plans of the Peiping regime to build its industrial
base for war through a comprehensive 5-year economic development plan are
deeply disturbing. There is no reason to believe that its longstanding plans
for expansion in Asia have been imdified,
gXtracts from Department of State Publication 5383, Address "China in
the Shadow of Conununism b Walter P. McConaughyl Director of the
Office of Chinese Affairs.
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TAB
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June 1, 1955
TIE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE
The belief that Chinese Communism is in same mysterious way
different from that of the U.S.S.R. has persisted among many observers
despite the fact that Chinese Communist leaders since 1921 have stated
the closeness of their ties with Moscow.
Thus, Mao Tse-tung, in the major statement of policy he made on
July 1, 1949, entitled "On the People's Dictatorship," wrote:
"Internationally, we belong to the anti-imperialist front,
headed by the Soviet Union, and we can look for genuine friendly
aid from that front, and not from the imperialist front."
Again, on July 16, 1954, at Peiping, the Camander-in-Chief of the
Chinese Communist Armed Forces, Chu Teh (also a member of the Politburo)
1%W said:
"It can be easily seen that the victory of the Chinese
people's democratic revolution is insenarable from the friendly
aid of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union does not exist,
if there is no victory of the anti-fascist second World Jar
under the leadership of the Soviet Union, if there is no such
development as the unprecedented growth since 1944 of the world
democratic peace front under the leadership of the Soviet Union,
the rapid and quick victory of the Chinese revolution as it is
today would have been impossible. Even if we were to succeed,
it would be impossible to consolidate our gains. Is this not
clear?"
Such statements are nothing more than confirmations of a common
bond, and dedication to common objectives of world conquest, that have
existed between the Chinese and Soviet Communists since the early Twenties.
Since the Soviet Union first turned its attention actively to Asia then,
there has been constant intercourse between China and Russia. The Soviet
Union has sent agents to China to aid in the long effort that culminated
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with the capture of all the mainland in 1949. Hundreds of Chinese
who now occupy key positions in the Peiping regime were intensively
trained in the Soviet Union -- always toward the end that they
would think of themselves as agents of the Communist world program
first, and Chinese second. For example, in the Twenties, when
Trotsky blundered in China, it was the present Chinese leadership
that adhered to Leninist orthodoxy, When, in 1935, the Comintern
adopted the Popular-Front line, the Chinese Communists followed it.
When, from 1939 to 1941, Aoscow referred to the war in Europe as
an imperialist war and adopted an isolationist position, the Chinese
Communists slackened their efforts against Japan and intensified
their efforts to build their internal power. When, after June 22)
1941, Moscow renamed the imperialist war a war for freedom and
democracy, Yenan echoed the slogan. And when, after Stalingrad,
the Russians began to set the stage for the creation of the post-
war puppet states in Europe, the Chinese Communists resumed their
drive for the kind of power in China that could lead to power in
Asia.
With this unparalleled history of strict adherence to Soviet
leadership, the Sine-Soviet alliance has now undertaken a major
program to build a powerful, modernized military force, backed by
an industrialized economy as a Aleans of completing the Asian phase
of the program of world conquest drafted in the Kremlin more than
three decades ago. Every aspect of governmental effort in China
is shaped to contribute to this goal. The achievements of the
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Soviet Union are taken as the basic guiding pattern, with only
such modifications as are required by peculiar Chinese conditions.
In addition to the physical goals of the Sino,Sovi t alliance
being made clear, Communist doctrine in both Moscow and Peiping
give evidence regarding the methods whereby these goals will be
achieved. In order to provide time for their program the Com,
munists are adopting such tactics as "united front" arrangements
and "truce" or "armistice" agreements in order to "lessen tensions"
on their periphery. The Sino,Soviet alliance is based on the
realization of the tremendous influence the two parties can exert
on world affairs through close association, and if they can buy
time through the attraction of a "coexistence" tactic their
ideology possesses some hope of surviving in a world of "lessening
tensions".
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TAB
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13 January 1955
Communist World-Wide Control Mechanisms
Soviet Basic Doctrine is aimed at a Socialist (Communist) world
dominated from Moscow. The Moscow-trained Soviet colonists are a mili-
tant group sent to all countries of the world to subvert the existing
forms of government and establish piecemeal the Soviet Socialist
Republics of the world.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
contains the Section for Liaison with Foreign Communist Parties. This
is upually referred to as the Foreign Section of the Central Committee.
The Foreign Section is the only channel for liaison with foreign
Communist parties. Its importance is emphasized by the fact that it was
directed by Mikhail A. Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee. The
Caminform is under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Section as well as the
editorial staff of the Cominform newspaper printed in Bucharest.
Suslovls duties are almost entirely devoted to liaison with foreign
Communist parties. All Cominform meetings, held always in Satellite
countries and attended by representatives of Communist parties from the
non-orbit areas, are conducted by Suslov.
The Foreign Section of the Central Committee directs, controls and
supports world-wide Communist movements. It also directs and controls
Communist-front organizations, VOKS, Anti-Fascist Soviet Youth Committee,
the Anti-Fascist Soviet Woments Committee and others.
Control of foreign Communist parties, espionage nets and various
front units is within the apparat of the Central Committee of the
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Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Control of the Satellites is more
direct and open. The party leaders in the Satellites have in virtually
all cases been trained in Moscow. For all intents and purposes they are
Soviet citizens, completely subservient to Moscow. Army and police
controls are also direct and in most cases overt.
USSR Control of Foreign Communist Parties
During the past thirty years the Soviet control mechanisms have
gone through a series of changes of which the most significant occurred
during and after World War II. These will, for descriptive purposes, be
divided into the 1919-1943 (Comintern) period, the 1943-1951 and the
1951-1954 periods.
a. 1919-1943. - During this period the foreign section of the
Central Committee exercised control of foreign Communist parties through
?the Comintern. The Third (Communist) International was established in
Moscow in March 1919 and signified Soviet control of the international
Communist movement. As set forth in the Constitution of the Comintern,
the Executive Committee was one of the two bodies elected by the World
Congress of the Communist International. The other was the International
Control Commission. The Executive Committee, the leading body of the
Communist International between Congresses, elected from among its members
the Praesidium, a permanent body carrying out all businesses of the Execu-
tive Committee. The Praesidium in turn elected from its membership the
Secretariat, which functioned as the executive body for the Praesidium.
Comintern. - The Comintern was an international organization of
representatives from all Communist parties. It provided policy guidance
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?3?
and integration for the various Communist parties and-Was.directed by
the Soviet Politburo. The headquarters was located in Noscov-and had
between 2,000 and. 2;500 functionaries. It was a powerful instrument into
which men from all countries of the world and frail all the existing Com-
munist parties were integrated. It was directed by the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the USSR and served the Soviet State. But, in
turn; it controlled millions of adherents who received the doctrine of the
"leading socialist country"; the USSR.
The Cominternts Executive Committee was composed of representatives
from all Communist parties of the world, while the Secretariat had rep-
resentatives from only the leading Communist parties. The Comintern's
control apparatus or headquarters was divided into two parts, overt and
covert:
The overt side had a section responsible for the compilation of the
data furnished by the heads of the Communist movements; an information and
press (propaganda) section with the mission of keeping current and briefing
all foreign news throughout the world; a school section; charged with or-
ganizing courses for the political and ideological education of the cadres
of foreign Communist parties; archives; a library with a secret section which
contained all books prohibited in the USSR; and a technical section with
the sole duty of organizing foreign travel to and from the USSR.
The covert side contained a section which exercised direct
contra of Communist cadres by NKVD functionaries; a small secret
Se8tiOn in the informatiOn and Press section which controlled a
serieS' f covert agencies that released sensational news to provoke
giVen situations ih the interest of the USSR; aRd a secret apparatus
. -
whiCh operated under cover of a travel agency; but which contained
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over 50 NhVD members. The covert side maintained contact with
all countries and the Comintern delegates in these countries. The
functions were to receive or send secret material and directives
to secret Comintern agents and to transmit funds.
Members of the Secretariat responsible for the different
sections in the international Communist movement were as follows:
Kolarov Balkans;Iledk - Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria;
Florin - Scandinavia; Togliatti - France and Italy; Andre Marty -
England and the United States; Dolores Ibarruri - Spain, Latin
America and India; a Japanese (name unknown) - Asia. Gottwald
was editor of the Comintern publication titled "The Communist
International."
The Comintern was the "General Staff for World Revolution".
It was headed by Georgi Dimitrov who was controlled by Dmitriy Z.
Manuilski, hanuilsky was, in turn, controlled by the Central Committee
Zhadanov. The cadres and secret sections were controlled by NKVD
members, Shorkin, Bielov and Blagoeva and they, in turn, were con-
trolled by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.
This alpparatus insured that no.foreign Communist Party could function
independently either financially or politically.
b. 1943-1951. - This period was highlighted by the nominal
dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 and the transfer of its func-
tions into the Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee.
The Soviet press and radio general directives were no
longer left to local interpretations. A new entity, the Cominform,
was created in 1947. It was intended to strengthen the Communist
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parties "in their resistance to plane of imperialist expansion and
aggression along all lines - -state, political, economic and ideological."
Direction of Communist parties and fronts still rested with the Central
Committee through the sensitive channel ih the local directorates of the
NGB and Soviet General Staff in each Soviet foreign mission to the local
Communist parties. In other words, little change had taken place except
that the Comintern apparatus was now directly within the Foreign
Directorate of the Central Committee.
Dissolution of the Comintern. -- In early 1943, high-level
Nazi propagandists began a campaign to expose to the Soviet Union's
World War II allies the nature of International Communism, which had
been working through the Comintern. Since these facts were detrimental
to the Soviets, the dissolution of the Comintern was announced as a sop
to the United States and Great Britain. The Second World War, in which
the Soviet Union engaged in a life and death struggle with Nazi Germany,
brought to a temporary halt the Communist plan to Sovietize the world.
Sorely in need of financial and military assistance from non-Communist
countries, the Comintern had to pass through all the phases of a
respectable demise,
Igor Gouzenko, the cipher clerk attached to the office of
the Soviet military attache in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, in a
statement made on 10 October 1945 to the Royal Commission said:
"The announcement of the dissolution of the
Comintern was probably the greatest farce of the Com-
munists in recent years. Only the name was liquidated,
with the object of reassuring public opinion in the
democratic countries. Actually the Comintern exists and
continues its work."
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The reasons advanced by the Communists for this hoax
are:
(1) The Communist International from the first
exposed the real meaning of the anti-Comintern
Pact as a weapon for the preparation of war by the
Hitlerites. Long before the war it ceaselessly
and tirelessly exposed the vicious subversive work
of the Hitlerites, who masked it by their screams
about so-called interference of the Communist
International in the internal affairs of these
states. (This was typical Communist propaganda to
attempt to justify the Comintern activities in the
U.S. and Great Britain, while minimizing its activi-
ties against the non-Communist countries allied with
the USSR during the war.)
(2) The Comintern had outgrown developments, served
its purpose in the first stage of the working class
movement and had become a drag on the further
strengthening of the national working class parties.
(3) Taking into account the growth and political
maturity of the Communist parties and their lead-
ing cadres in various countries, the Comintern frees
their sections from their obligations arising from
the statutes and resolutions of the Congresses of
the Communist International.
Enrique Castro Delgrado, a leader of the Spanish Communist
Party, who fled to Russia in the spring of 1939 after the defeat of
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the Spanish Republic and who became a member of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Comintern at the time of the so-called dissolution, has
the following to say about points (2) and (3) above.
states:
"There exists no political and ideological maturity
in the Communist Parties and therefore any argument
justifying the dissolution of the Comintern is false."
Concerning the nominal disbanding of the Comintern he
"It only altered some of its operating procedures.
The Comintern boss, Georgi Dimitrov, moved his office to
the third floor of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union....
"Other secretaries set up their offices in different
places....
"Those who edited the secret broadcasts served under
Friederick instead of Togliatti. Friederick transmitted
the scripts to Togliatti who in turn transmitted them to
"The chiefs of the foreign delegations continued to
confer daily with Dimitrov....
"The leading figures in the various Communist Parties
continued their activities....
"The foreign reporters of the Communist press con-
tinued to file regular reports with the information and
propaganda section of the tdissolved Comintern'.....
"The secret section of the 'dissolved' Comintern
remained on the main floor of the old Comintern and con-
tinued to receive reports from the foreign Communist
parties, sending one copy to Dimitrov and another copy to
Zhdanov....
"The secret section continued to send Dimitrov's in-
structions to various Communist Parties abroad and to
organize trips to and from Moscow....
"The Comintern agents abroad, such as Cadovila in
Latin America and Browder in North America continued to
go on with their work - as.if the Comintern had not been
'dissolved'."
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The Cominform. -- In October 1947 the Soviet Government es-
tablished the Cominform. This act constituted, in effect, a declara-
tion of economic and political war against the United States and
heralded the beginning of the cold waro
The Cominform is primarily an association of representatives
of the Communist parties of the European satellite countries and is covertly
directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, The Cominform's primary function is to provide integrated
direction to the Communist parties,
Moscow's major problem of foreign policy began in March 1947,
when the United States announced policies of military and economic aid
to Greece and Turkey. In Paris, on July 3, 16 nations proceeded to
implement Europe's role in the Marshall Plan. The Soviets therefore
had to create a specialized Information Bureau which they claimed was to:
(a) Expose and prevent the possibility of new aggression
on the part of Germany and to create prolonged co-
operation of all sides among the peoples of Europe.
(b) Expose the United States, which had an agreement with
England to eliminate competitors in the world market
in order to establish a dominant position for the two
countries,
Thus, the East-West split was formally acknowledged. Communist parties and
fellow travellers often had difficulty in interpreting and analyzing
Soviet policy as set forth by the Soviet radio and press. This was cor-
rected by specialized direction and interpretation from the Cominform.
The difficulties encountered from these general directives were described
by Louis Budenz, former Managing Editor of the Daily Worker:
"The Party bureaucrats are so absorbed in watching what
Pravda says each day, checking the radio for Soviet statements
and trying to decipher what messages are being conveyed, that
they frequently lose sight of American technique. This is not
what Stalin and othel Soviet overlords want or expect,
but it is almost inevitable in any such puppet-like setup as
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the Party leadership. Very conveniently, they do not have
to do any fundamental thinking?they just let Moscow do it
for them. But the constant tension of trying to catch every
hint and order sent from abroad is a man-size job in itself.
And then they have to make sure that they are doing everything
according to the specification of the order.
"...When the line changes, as one shrewd and out-
standing comrade said in an unguarded moment, we have to
beat our breasts and pretend the last line was carried out
badly in order to hide the fact that we act on word from
across the sea."*
c. 1951-To Date. - Traditionally, the intelligence directorate of
the Soviet General Staff served as the liaison and communications link
with foreign Communist parties, even before World War II and the dis-
solution of the Comintern. In 1951, by a decision of the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet Union, the responsibility for liaison with the foreign
Communist parties was taken away from the intelligence directorate of the
Soviet General Staff and turned over to the Foreign Intelligence Directorate
of the then hGB. The Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee does not
have any permanent representatives abroad. In special cases a representa-
tive may be sent on a flying visit, but normally liaison with foreign
Communist parties is effected through the representatives abroad of the
foreign intelligence directorate of the MVD.
Correspondence with Moscow on Communist Party matters is given
special security handling. Even within the foreign intelligence directorate
representation abroad there is an effort to conceal the existence of any
liaison with local Communist parties.
The present specific tactical direction of foreign Communist
parties is from the Central Committee's Foreign Directorate, through
MVD channels. The foreign intelligence directorate operates through
*Louis F. Budenz - This is My Stoa, p.221.
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its representatives in the Soviet missions abroad. An MUD line also
extends into the Soviet Satellite missions operating abroad. When the
Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee sends a representative to
foreign Communist parties, he is likely to be a par:ty man with MVD train-
ing, since an MTD man can be expected to have greater familiarity with the
craft of covert contact.
"Legal" representatives of the foreign intelligence directorate
as well as Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel abroad are categorically
forbidden to recruit Communist Party members without special permission from
Moscow. Both overt and covert elements of foreign Communist parties collect
information and pass it through MVD channels to the Central Committee,
which is the primary customer for all important intelligence reports.
This new streamlining of contacts makes detection of Communist
agents extreioely difficult. The prime interest in exploitation is no
longer intelligence to be forwarded to the Army, Navy or Air Force,
but information to be forwarded to the policy makers, the Central Committee.
Thus a Communist Party member or sympathizer in a policy control position
will be contacted only by IND experts and the chances are he will not be
asked to furnish documents, but only to influence policy in favor of Com-
munist policy.
Conclusion
The Soviet press and radio give the general policy line to be
followed by the foreign Communist parties; specific tactical direction is
given through MVD liaison channels. In addition, foreign Communist Party
members are briefed when they visit Moscow. Others are trained in
special schools, but all control, whatever the channel, emanates from
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the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
International front organizations are envisaged primarily as a
means of educating the non-Party masses abroad. These organizations
are rarely exploited as Soviet intelligence organs. Individuals
belonging to these fronts are rarely recruited because their identifi-
cation with the movements do not give them access to worthwhile targets.
The MND does not mix into foreign political matters; its job is to
inform the Soviet Government, not to execute policy. Execution of policy
is left to the Central Committee.
II
USSR Control over the Satellite Countries
Soviet control of the Satellites is based on the Soviet armed forces
stationed in Eastern Europe, on the MVD, on Soviet diplomatic, economic
and military missions in each Satellite and is exercised through the
Satellite Communist parties and governments.
The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, through links
established during training or other prior relationships, controls
members of the central committees of the Communist parties in the
Satellite states. Top party leaders in the various Satellites who have
been trained in Moscow are, for all practical purposes, Soviet men or
women, and are completely subservient to Moscow.
Some control over official activities in the Satellite countries
is exercised through the local embassies of the USSR. The Soviet
ambassadors are in some cases considered direct representatives of the
Central Committee and deliver instructions and other guidance to local
Communist leaders. This channel is used for the transmittal of bulky
printed materials. Personnel of the Soviet representations abroad carefully
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study the local scene in the Satellite country to which they are assigned
and submit reports to Moscow.
Soviet military advisors are posted to the general staffs of all
Satellite countries and therefore are familiar with the nations' war
plans, report all details to Moscow.
END representatives are assigned by Moscow to the Satellite countries,
work closely with the local security and intelligence services, and are
thus aware of all current trends and popular attitudes within the country.
MVD personnel submit reports on their activities to the MVD headquarters
in Moscow. MVD representatives advise the local services in both positive
intelligence and counter-intelligence matters. Joint activities are
undertaken against third countries, especially the United States. The
target of all such activities is ultimately the United States, and the
USSR enlists the collaboration of Soviet Bloc embassies or legations in
support of this effort. (See annex on Soviet World-Wide Espionage.)
In some instances, the latter channel is more effective as a working base
than the Soviet Embassy itself.
Not only are all details of military and security matters concerning
the Satellites known to the USSR, but also all aspects of the political,
economic, and social life in those states are directly or indirectly under
the control of the USSR. Although MOSCOW permits and encourages programs
of cultural, economic and technical collaboration among the Satellites,
the Soviet control system is designed to bind the Satellites individually
to the USSR rather than to one another.
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TAB
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EAST-WEST TRADE 5-26-55
Past and Present
W-92A9.111-Pl-L.P.1"2
Before the war the Soviet Union accounted for less than one per
cent of world trade, and the countries that are now its satellites
accounted for another six per cent, For Western Europe, however,
trade with the nations that now make up the Soviet bloc was more
important that these figures indicate. Over ten per cent of Western
Europe's total imports came frlm the bloc, and for a few commodities.
Russia and the East European countries were a very important source
of supply indeed. This region furnished Western Europe with nearly
twenty per cent of its imports of grain, some fifteen per cent of
its coal and over twenty-five per cent of its timber.
If these supplies were valuable to Western Europe in normal times,
they were a matter of the utmost urgeney in the hungry, dollar-short
years that followed the war. When in 1_948, the West Europeans came
to chart the path to recovery and to calculate how they might,
in the five years allotted by the Marshall Plan, free themselves
of dependence on American aid, one of their central assumptions was
that Russia and Eastern Europe would resume their exports on something
like the pre-war scale.
They were completely disappointed. The accompanying table
shows how feeble has been the performance of the East as a supplier
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in the post-war years. By the middle of 1953* and long after wartime
destruction had been made good, timber exports from the Soviet bloc
were still a small fraction of what this area shipped to the West
before the war. Its exports of coal and gain to the West were still
less than half the prewar rate. Instead of supplying Western Europe
with nearly twenty per cent of its requirements of grain, the bloc
now provides barely ten per cent, and shipments of wheat in
particular have shrunk dismally. A further peculiarity of East-
West trade in grain, moreover, is that Rumania and Hungary, both
large prewar exporters, have until now virtually disappeared from
the grain market. It is the Soviet Union which today does the bulk of
the exporting. Oil is another commodity that until recently had all
but vanished from Eastern exports agreements, and now that it is
once more appearing, it tends to show up not in agreements with
Rumania, the biggest traditional exporter, but in those with the USSR.
Eastern B19.2_Im2Ets to Western Euroll
Hard coal Grain
(million tons) (million tons)
Sawn soft wood
(million cubic
meters)
Prewar average
11 6
(1937-38)
3.9
(1934-38)
7.0
(1935-38)
Postwar maximum
12.4
(1948)
2,2
(1949-50)
2.4
(1952-53)
July 1951-June 1952
, 7.0
2.1
0.8
July 1q52-June 1953
. 6.5
1.4
2.4
In addition to the difficulty of finding goods to import from
the East that are both suitable and on an ample scale, Western
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countries have discovered in the Eastern bloc other defects as a
supplier* Without exception, the satellite countries perennially
fail to supply the quantity of goods promised under trade agreements
with the result that exports from the West must be interrupted or
curtailed until the Eastern country makes good its export promises
or finds other means of payment.
Price is still another source of trouble. Eastern negotiators
lack flexibility and in consequence fail to respond quickly to
changes in price on world markets; long after the sharp decline
in world coal prices, for example, Polish trade missions were demand-
ing for their coal exports the premium that prevailed at the height
of the boom, The USSR has often followed a similar course when
negotiating exports of wheat and barley--a policy that leads either
to outright refusal to buy on the part of the West or to a prolonged
period of haggling while trade comes to a standstill* All in all,
the shortcomings of the East as a supplier have been a major, if not
the major, limitation on East-uest trade in the postwar years*
As a market, too, the USSR and its satellites have been a
disappointment to Western traders since the end of the war. A
great deal has been heard abut the extent to which Western embargoes
have narrowed markets in the East, but less is said about the East's
rejection of the many ceneumer goods that have always been freely
available in the West.
At no time have the Western nations imposed restrictions
that would prevent the East from buying a wide range of consumer
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goods in the countries on this side of the Iron Curtain. In fact,
the Soviet bloc has hitherto shown very little enthusiasm for such
goods. By 1950, for example, East European purchases of Western
textiles were little more than a quarter of their 1938 level.
Before the war the satellites were substantial importers of
Western consumer goods, but nowadays it is clear that the USSR
has forced on them its own policy of holding down consumption to
a bare subsistence level. Even the much heralded new deal for the
inhabitants of the bloc has so far brought few changes in the general
pattern of Eastern imports. Apart from sizeable purchases of butter
Soviet eyes have turned not to Western con?
sumer goods but to the machines with which to make their own goods.
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liandEastGeris_m_amwe
It would be unrealistic in any review of East-West trade to ignore
the position of Germany which before the war played a dominant role in the
economies of the Dalkon countries. Of all the goods that Western Europe
exported to the East in 1938, one-third came from Germany. In the
Period 1930-,37 Germany sent eight and a half per cent of its total
exports to the satellite countries, and another six per cent to the
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Soviet Union. Union, Germany's most important exports, in value, to the East
iron and steel manufactures, chemicals and electrical
products; and in some of these categories the East f'en bought as
much as twenty per cent of Germany's total exports.
The war and the policy that the USSR has since pursued have radically
altered this relationship. Until 1950 West German exports to the
Eastern bloc were scarcely worth mentioning. In that year they reached
twenty-five per cent of their prewar volume but in subsequent years
they again fell. Even the new German-Rumanian trade agreement, one of
the first fruits of the Kremlin's new enthusiasm for East-West trade,
aims to restore trade between the two countries to a mere quarter of
the 1938 level.
The truth is that so long as Russia dominates the satellite countries,
the Eastern markets, as Germany knew them before the Isar, have vanished.
Germany's prewar prominence in these markets was based in part on the
continuous presence of its commercial representatives and in part on
the complementary nature of the two economies. In both respects Germany
has now been displaced by Russia. German commercial hegemony has given
way to Russian bonds that seem unbreakable; not only in the personnel
of many of the key industries appointed from Moscow, but also the
industrial development of each satellite is being shaped to support the
needs and policies of the Soviet Union.
Nowhere is this process more striking than in Eastern Germany.
What was once an integral part of the German ec-momy has become an
appendage of the Soviet economy, a unit in which heavy industry is
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being developed so rapidly that it will shortly act more as a competitor
than a.'S,_a complement to Western Germany. Even if tomorrow all trade
barriers between the two halves of Germany were to be abolished, it
would be found that the old channels and the old bases of exchange had
been destroyed. At the present time Eastern Germany hardly manages to
fulfill its side of the very small trade agreement with the West
Germans; its deliveries are perpetually in arrears which means that
trade is, in fact, sustained only by what amounts to the extension of
credits from the 1Testern partners.
Indeed, the payments problem is the crucial factor in West German
commereial relations with the East. Traditionally, the Eastern countries
paid for German goods in food and raw materials, products that are now
scarce within the Soviet bloc and a glut on the market in the West.
Already the Federal Republic has more than it can do to absorb the
wheat and other primary products with which such countries as Turkey
and Argentina strive to may off their debts to German exporters,
Slme of Germany's industrialists may look wistfully to the
East for export markets, but if the bloc cannot pay in commodities,
then the question of German credits is bound to arise. Even the
generous grant of credits, however, does not inevitably ensure a
smooth path for East-West trade, as can be seen by looking at
experience in the postwar years.
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to suspend all further shipments of iron ore until the Czechs made a
serious effort to settle their bills.
Poland has shown a similar inability to compete on commercial terms.
Its procrastination during price discussions has til.e and again forced
to look elsewhere for coal supplies, with the result that
imports of Polish coal dropped sharply from 4 million tons
in 1948 to 1,4 million in 1953.
II
The Economy of the Soviet Bloc
In 1938 Soviet foreign trade amounted to only one per cent of the
worldls total. However, the countries that the USSR absorbed during and
after the war, or has since come to dominate (the Baltic states, Eastern
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria) were
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more active traders and in 1938 accounted for nearly six per cent of
the world's trade.
As soon as Stalin had consolidated his position the Russian state
began to work unceasingly towards the goal of self-sufficiency, and
from the early !thirties onwards it withdrew further and further
from participation in world trade. For the Communist planners, foreign
trade has always been essentially a political instrument, to be used
only in so far and for so long as it helps the attainment of the prime
objectives of Soviet policy?to create a completely independent Socialist
economy, indestructible in war and insulated from capitalist crisis in
peace.
In a relatively poor country such as the Soviet Union was before
the war, rapid and foreed industrialization seemed the most obvious
route to self-sufficiency. In the eyes of the Kremlin, the develop-
ment of industry, particularly heavy industry, had two further advan-
tages. It served as a basis for an armaments industry as big as any
in the world; it also conformed with a political conviction that lies at
the heart of Marxist philosophy: for enduring Success a Communist revolu-
tion must rest on a vast industrial proletariat,
The inevitable corollaries to this policy are that the urban and
rural bourgeoisie must be eliminated and the peasant herded into col-
lective farms in the hope that his numbers may be reduced, the fruits
of his labor harvested more easily by the State and that eventually
he may be transformed into a kind of rural proletariat. Since the
end of the war the USSR has progressively thrust these same policies In
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the nearby satellite states and is now fast remolding them in the image
of the Russian economy.
The consequences of these two policies--the pursuit of self-
sufficiency and the overwhelming emphasis on heavy industry?have been
calamitous for East-West trade. k'erhaps the most dramatic illustration
is provided by the way in which Moscow has warped the traditional trad-
ing pattern of the Eastern countries under its domination.
Before the war countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
conducted less than fourteen per cent of their trade with what is now
the Iron Curtain community. Within the short space of six years at
least two-thirds of their totaltrade has been forced into Communist
channels.
It often happens that while one communist leader speaks glowingly
of the prospects for East-"est trade, another, indifferent to the contra-
diction, simultaneously boasts of the massive re-direction of satellite
trade and of the achievements of Comecon?the sn-called Council for
Mutual. Economic Aid, Comecon is, in fact, a Soviet-created institution
through which Moscow coordinates the international trade of all the
European satellites and hence, indirectly, their economic development.
Its central purpose has always been to encourage trade within the orbit
at the expense of trade with the outside world.
During the past years the economies of the satellite nations have
been reshaped entirely to satisfy Eastern policies and without regard
for the requirements of trade with the West. Just as in Russia, economic
planners throughout the Eastern countries aim single-mindedly at creating
a large industrial proletariat.
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From 1949 onwards all the Eastern plans have placed primary
emphasis on the development of heavy industry. Each nation's pain-
fully high level of compulsory saving is funnelled chiefly into the
expansion of heavy industry, while agriculture has been more or less
starved of new investment funds, On the average a mere three per
cent of the national product is devoted to capital improvements for
agriculture as compared with an amount at least three times as great
that normally goes to industry.
From time to time changes have been .1tr.odtced in the various
'plans of the satellite countries, but in the past they have invariably
been directed at fixing even higher production targets for heavy
industry always at the expense of both light industry and agriculture.
Added to this neglect there is the restiveness of the peasant, deprived
of consumer goods, compelled to deliver set quotas of produce to the
government and forced against his will into collectives. In the cir-
cumstances it is not surprising that the satellites cannot provide on
the old scale the export surpluses of food and grain with which they
used to balance their trading accounts in the West.
The USSR itself suffers from similar trouble, though perhaps not
so acutely as the satellites. There is little doubt but that through
its own excessive concentration on heavy industry, the Soviet Union
has reduced its export surplus of such traditional products as timber
and wheat.
This lopsided distribution of resources within the Soviet bloc is
reflected in the foreign buying of the orbit as well as in its selling
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policy abroad. Only in periods of acute and threatening shortage at
home or when Western nations make their sales of machinery conditional
on the purchase of cnnsumer goods, do members of the bloc part with
foreign exchange for the products of Western consumer industries. For
the most part their reserves of foreign exchange are spent exclusively
on those items that will fill the gaps in their own heavy industry or
will serve to maintain it?machinery, ships, metals and raw materials.
Still another limitation that Communist policy has imposed on
East-West trade, and one that is inherent in the Soviet system, is
the State monopoly of foreign trade which goes hand in hand with State
planning of the entire economy. This means that responsibility lies
mainly with state officials who fear to make mistakes, indeed dare not
make mistakes, and who consequently prefer the safety of rigiditi to the
uncertainties of expansion and enterprise. Like armchair generals
they are often preoccupied with the commodities and prices of last
year rather than with tLose of the present, let alone the future.
At least one group of British importers is familiar with the
Russian official who came to this country eager to sell plywood.
The price he asked was more than doubl.e that ruling on world markets.
When met with incredulity, he explained that these particular supplies
had been manufactured during the war and hence, as the British traders
must know, were very expansive. The price could not be altered without
upsetting his accounts--and his career.
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Consumer Goods
If the resources of the Soviet bloc are re-directed on any sub-
stantial scale to the production of food and cInsumer goods, then the
tempo of industrialization and the armaments program must be slowed
down. If non-Cnmmunist resources are to work the miracle?that is$
if Communism is to be saved by capitalism--then the Russians must
participate in international trade to a degree never contemplated in
their autarchio plans. This would mean that the Soviet Union would
have to accept, as it did in the 'twenties, the status of a backward
area and apply for credits and grants from the 'bankrupt' capitalist
world. For Russia's own export trades, such as food and timber, are
also its neglected consumer industries.
Much of the Russian excitement over raising consumer standards is
primarily propaganda and only the smallest of marginal improvements
are intended in standards of living behind the Iron Curtain. The
likelihood is that Communist leaders will hold grimly to their indus-
trial targets, while giving the domestic consumer no more than the
minimum increase that will keepltimmderal;ely fit and moderately
willing.
It is unfortunate for the Soviet Union that there should at this
time be demands on its economy from still another quarter, demands that
if met in full and from the Soviet bloc alone will place an enormous
strain nn its resources, Communist China, now in the very early stages
of its own dash to industrialize, has called for fraternal help from
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the USSR. If help is refused there is the danger that China will
be compelled to look elsewhere--to Japan, Germany, 3ritain and even to
the United States.
Chinese requirements are no doubt immense, but failure on the
part of the Soviet Union to deliver the goods could have disastrous
consequences for Russian policy. It would be a mammoth demonstra-
tion to the Asiatic world that more than thirty-five years after
its own revolution, the Communist pioneer was still unable to pro-
duce industrial goods on a scale sufficient to help its less
developed allies. In its disappointment China might well drift
out of the Communist bloc and the Communist movement would lose
much of its magic for the populations of Southeast Asia. The
desire to bind China closely to the Soviet bloc must lend urgency
to Russia's need for Western industrial goods. In so far as the
West provides them, it helps to sustain the Sino-Soviet partnership.
III
22ziptyx2pAgainkl,Perf_orrnamts_ and Aims
Fundamentally, the attitude of the USSR towards trade with the
West has not varied one jot in postwar years from the view it took
in the 'thirties, Its policy is not concerned with the normal
motives that underlie international trade--that is to say, the
effort to secure some division of labor, with each country specializing
in those commodities which it can produce most efficiently.
Bluntly, Russian interest in East-West trade has only two
objectives: the first is to secure from the West the materials
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It still lacks to maintain and expand the armaments and heavy
industry of the Soviet orbit; the second aim is to sow dissension
between the members of the Western alliance. The alleged benefits
of East-l'est trade are exploited in an endeavor on the one hand
to create friction between the Western nations, and on the other
hand, to set Western businessmen against their governments.
From time to time the marginal interest of the Kremlin in
East-West trade has shifted in accordance with its own internal
plans. Roughly four stages can be distinguished in the trading
behavior of the bloc since the end of the war.
Throughout the immediate postwar period genuine two-way trade
was at low ebb because of wartime devastation in all parts of
Europe. During this interval the USSR, though briefly and grudgingly,
accepted aid from UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administratinn) and so, with greater enthusiasm, did the countries
of Eastern Europe. The latter also held out eager hands for sub-
sequent loans from the US Export-Import Bank. This stage came to an
abrupt end when, as a result of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia
and mounting evidence in other directinns that the Soviet Union
intended to t!ghten its grip on the whole of Eastern Europe, the
cold war began in earnest.
The second stage coincided with the Westts initial ban on
the export of strategic goods to the Eastern bloc and with unmis-
takable signs that the USSR had put into practice a more severe embargo
policy of its own. To augment the supplies that they received legally
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through such trade agreements as those with
the
Communists at this point set about organizing illicit trade channels
designed to evade Western export controls. By this means they sought
to acquire, regardless of cost, the materials they needed for their
heavy industrial program: copper, machine tools, alloy metals,
and so on.
Propaganda was used, though not on a very large scale, to support
this very renlistic drive* The more dependable incentive employed by
the Russian and satellite traders was the monetary one?huge profits
were available for the Western business man, the intermediary, the
smuggler or the financier who chose to break the laws of his country.
To obtain strategic materials, the Communists and their Western
accomplices resorted to such devices as forging documents to mask
the true destination and nature of goods, shunting cargoes from
one free port to another until they could be slipped through the
Iron Curtain, and establishing business concerns in the West--
ostensibly reputable but in fact run by servants of the Communist
Party*
These dramatic--even melodramatic?practices have never really
solved Moscow's problem. They are risky, expensive and increasingly
ineffective as the West progressively eliminates the loopholes. It
no doubt grew obvious to the Kremlin that only unfettered, legal
trade could provide the heavy industry of the bloc with key materials
in sufficient quantity and at reasonable prices. Moreover, there was
also the hope that once the initial realmament boom had slackened in
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the West, supplies would become easier and markets more competitive
in the capitalist world. Stirred by these prospects the Communist
world joined to its underground trade program an energetic pro-
paganda drive.
The third phase in Moscow's policy towards East-West trade,
was inaugurated during 1951 with a gigantic propaganda campaign
that culminated in the Moscow Economic Conference of April, 1952,
to which business men and academic economists from all over the
world were invited. To this gathering Communist officials offered
the traditional carrot held out ever since the great depression
--the Eastern market is insatiable; there is no limit to the goods
it can absorb and thus no limit to the relief it affords, both
for capitalist unemployment and for competition between capitalist
states.
To the British business man Communist spokesmen pointed out the
advantage of having German and Japanese energies sidetracked into
the development of Eastern markets. For the Germans and the Japanese
there were tempting reminders of their historic association with
Eastern markets and their added value now that British and American
'imperialists' were squeezing them out of colonial markets.
The underdeveloped areas of the world were not neglected either;
they were told that not only could the Communist bloc absorb all
their surplus supplies of raw materials but also it would in return
provide them with machinery, lunimperialisti technical advise, and
perhaps even with credits. Threughlut the Conference, the keynote
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was that but for American hectoring., Western export controls would
disappear and East-West trade would automatically bourgeon.
Before the eyes of the delegates, the Russians dangled the
famous INesterovt figures. Nesterov was the
official organizer of the Conference and the man whose task it
usually is to welcome and woo 7esterners on these occasions. His
figures gave totals for the volume
Russians claimed could be achieved
its export controls. These totals
to leave the assembled guests with
possibilities of EastrUest trade.
the Soviet bloc amounted to :;;;21400
of East-West trade which the
provided the West abolished
were presented in such a way as
a dazzling impression of the
The outside world's trade with
million (imports plus exports) in
1951; according to M. Nesterov, this trade could be increased in
1953 to about 4,700 million.
It was not quite clear precisely how Moscow intended to
divide its benefactions as between the various eapitalis countries;
was singled out as the probable recipient of at
least 21(') million's worth of orders per annum, while Western
Europe as a whole was told it might expect orders worth 3,_,I730
million over a period of three years. The backward areas were even
more favored--they could expect orders for at least another
;i2-3,000 million over the same three year period. Representatives
from Communist China also expressed keen interest in Western goods
and implied that a fifty per cent increase over the 1951 level of
trade would be welcome,
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There seemed no limit to the goods that the Russians and
their satellites were ready to order. British visitors, for
emample, were convinced that the Soviet Union was prepared
instantly to place enormous orders for British textiles.
The returning business men were particularly elated by the
fact that none of these commodities came even remotely within the
Western embargo lists and orders for such consumer goods auto-
matically earned the approval of Western government officials.
A number of British delegates hurried hone full of optimistic
expectations and set to work. Month after month went by and the
orders still hung fire--with one exception: an order from the
Chinese fer e8.4 nillionla worth of -,3ritish wool tops.
Experience among delegates from other countries was almost
identical. When it came to the point, Communist orders for consumer
goods melted away leaving a hard core of strategic goods, apparently
the sole commodities in which the East was genuinely interested.
Not only did the East fail to expand its trade with the outside
world, but from April 1952, when the Conference was held, its
trade actually declined and continued to do so until by the end of
1953 it had reached ita lowest point since the lean years of 1046-47.
Meanwhile, Western statisticians and economists busied
themselves with an examination of the iNesterovt figures. When
they had fought their way through the mist of inflated ruble
values, generalizations about percentage increases and duplicate
offers, the experts found that the Nesterov program, even if the
orders had been hard, implied a volume of East-West trade smaller
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than the prewar level--in some cases as much as fifty per cent less
than in 1938. So far as increased trade was concerned, therefore,
the Moscow Economic Conference was a fiasco. The Western business
men who had rushed off to Moscow wound up with pleasant memories
of the Russian ballet, and empty order books, while the Russians
failed to loosen the strategic embargo.
But from the Kremlin's point of view the Conference was all the
same a highly satisfactory charade. The average newspaper reader in
the West, glancing through the headlines, grew accustomed to the
notion that vast Soviet trade orders were there for the asking.
Certain business men were so bemused that they blamed their own govern-
ments for depriving them of Eastern orders. Some were even induced
to join organizations sponsored by the Communist Party with the
object of agitating for the relaxation of export controls.
One such organization, whose roots can be traced directly to
the Conference, is the 3ritish Council for the Promotion of Inter-
national Trade. Mr. rden, the British Pratister4-
described this body as 'A Communist front organization...mainly con-
cerned with the dissemination of Communist propaganda'.
It is ironic that Moscow now refuses to have any overt dealings
with this particular group, for once such bodies have accomplished their
propaganda mission and have been discredited for their pains, the
Russians wash their hands of theml preferring to act through more
respectable channels.
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The essential essential dishonesty of the Conference became crystal
clear when it was learned in the autumn of the same year that
Stalin himself had published almost simultaneously a treatise
on economics in which he wrote off the future of East-Mest trade
as it is understood in the West. Stalin pointed out that the
world is now divided into 'two parallel world markets'?one, tha
Communist bloc, has been created under the leadership of Russia and
this leadership has been so effective that Communist countries will
soon have no need of imports from the capitalist countries.
'But the fundamental thing, of course, is not the economic
blockade (the Western embargo), but the fact that since the war
these countries (the Soviet bloc) have joined together economic-
ally and established economic cooperation and mutual assistance*
****The result is a fast pace of industrial development in these
countries* It may be confidently said that, with this pace of
industrial development, it will seen come to pass that these
countries will. not only be in no need of imports from capitalist
countries, but will themselves feel the necessity of finding an
outside market for their surplus products,'
The fourth phase of the Soviet Union's postwar concern with East,*
West trade opened in August of 1953 and coincided with IA, Malerikovts
admission that the masses behind the Iron Curtain needed greater
material encouragement in the form of more food and consumer goeds*
There are, of ceuree, no barriers of Western construction that
prevent the Communists from buying any consumer goods that they can
pay for. However, the fact is that they did not rush to boy women's
hosiery, re-rigeraters and automobiles. Only a feweea very few--con-
sumer goods were acquired from the West. The Russians made twn or three
spectacular purchases of butter, they bought oranges paper, bottling
machinery, and some silk piece goods; but fir the most part they
sought instead the macLines with which to turn out their own con-
sumer goods.
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The fifth and latest phase in the development of East-rest
tra,':e al:pea d with the eclipse of Malenkov in February 1955. With a
return to major emphasis upon the development of basic industry,
the Malenkov thesis of an increase in the availability of consumer
goods has been dropped. With this change the Soviet record in
East-West trade which was so poor in absolute terms and so far
from the promise of 1953, shows indications of becoming even poorer.
Although the banner of increased trade will continue to be waved by the
USSR, the governing clnsideration will continue to be that of Soviet
policy, the most recent change in which would seem to preclude any
great rise in actual East-West trade.
Undoubtedly there was a greater element of reality in these
Soviet approaches. They acknowledged their need for Western goods
more openly and they showed greater zeal in scraping together exports
that the West might be persuaded to buy. Russia produced some
surprising shipments of pig iron and substantially increased its
exports of oil. %mania also came into the market with its first
sizeable offer of wheat since the war. But it was obvious that there
existed in the East an acute shortage of exportable goods and thus
as a last resort the Soviet Union was compelled to sell gold,
platinum and silver?altogether over 1.40 millions worth in the
laLlt six months of 1953.
It can be taken for granted that if the industry and agriculture
or the Soviet bloc could produce an exportable surplus, then East-
"est trade might have expanded at least in the short in and at
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least to its prewar dimensions. But any conceivable expansion
was bound to fall far short of the grandiose . ropnrtions claimed in
Moscow's most recent propaganda drive.
In a series of moves initiated by the USSR towards the end of
1953, a stream of Western business men--French? British and German--
travelled to Moscow to fill their order books, The British delegation
were wined and dined and shown the sights. Meanwhile the Moscow Press
and radio made great play of a Ikabanov figure'--a declaration of the
Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade that the Soviet Union could place
orders to the value of 4,120 million in 3ritain over three years.
Trhen the delegates got down to brass tasks, howevar, they failed
to find a new Eldorado. More than half the items requested by the
Russians were clearly of strategic importance, and the prices
they offered often took no account of the rise in values since early
1950. Simultaneously it became clear that the Soviet negotiators were
window-shopping from country to country throughout Western Europe,
aiming to play off one starry-eyed capitalist against another. The
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assuming that the figure of :a,120 million was fact and not oratory,
claimed for themselves a similar freedom to provide Russia with
strategic goods. At the same time it was made obvious to French
trade negotiators in Moscow that N. Bidaultes loyalty to his Western
Allies in Berlin seriously jeopardized their chances of doing business
with the East.
Iv
T.129-24/19-e-T-0.42
The prewar pattern of trade with China will never return. In the
'thirties, Chinals most important trading partners were first, Hong
Kong, acting as an entrepot for other Asian powers and second. Japan
followed closely by the United States. For most of the nations in the
Nest, China was not a very important market?Britain, for example, sent
less than one per cent of its total exports to China before the war,
Germany slightly over two per cent. However, as a source for certain
specialized products?liquid eggs, soya beans, bristles, raw silk and
tung oil--China did have considerable importance for Western countries.
Hong Kong owed its supremacy in the China trade to its role as
banker and merchant, functions which it still performs but on a greatly
diminished scale. There can be little doubt but that the long-term aim
of the Chinese Communists?they have said so quite plainly--is to
eliminate even the present degree of dependence on the services pro-
vided by Hong Kong. It will be tolerated only so long as it is useful
to the Communist regime?economically as a channel for Western goods that
cannot be obtained from the Soviet orbit and politically as a hostage
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which, it it is hoped, may secure British forbearance toward the new
China's foreign policy.
The traditional trade connect ons between Japan and China
rested in part on the complementary nature of the two economies;
China, a vast and primarily agricultural country seamed to provide
a natural market for a highly industrialized community such as Japan
with a huge and growing population confined to a few small islands.
China imported Japanese textiles and similar cheap mass consumer goods
and in return it furnished Japan with such raw materials as ooal and
iron ore. At the same time Japan's puppet state Manchukuo in North
China was being rapidly developed by its new masters and absorbed an
increasing volume of machinery and transport eauipment.
When today Japanese business men speak longingly of the Chinese
market, they have in mind a client whose role in the Japanese economy
was very similar to that played by the 3alkans in prewar Germany. In
each area there was a degree of political and commercial penetration
that converted both the Jalkans and China into something that resembled
captive markets. Nowadays it is the Soviet Union which occupies this
commanding position.
As soon as the Chinese Communists came to power they set in motion
a series of economic and political policies which have inevitably trans?
formed China's trade relations with the outside world. As rapidly as
possible they eliminated private business--Westarn business men, in
particular, were harshly dealt with, and the regime ostentatiously
broke many of the long?standing ties between China and Western commerce.
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-,)3-
INwpi It has plundered Western firms with a ruthlessness matched only by Nazi
behavior when blackmailing would-be Jewish refugees.
Those firms which have escaped with confiscation may consider them-
selves fortunate, for others are compelled by threats of all kinds to
remain, so that the new regime may exploit them still further. Their
chief value to Communist China is as a source of foreign exchange which they
are obliged to import and hand over on a variety of pretexts--in the
form of a premium payment required before a foreign employee is per-
mitted to leave China, or in order to pay the wages of swollen
staff which they are forced to keep on the payroll long after the State
has denied the firm the right to engage in any remunerative work.
The Communists were hardly in the saddle before they set on
foot plans to expand Chinese industry, particularly heavy industry.
In part this was done in the interest of self-sufficiency. Of equal
importance, howe7er, was the goal of creating an industrial proletariat
on the Soviet model; the new regime was fashioned originally by
peasants and intellectuals, an improper procedure by the light of
Marxist forthodnxy, which postulat)s that the industrial proletariat
shall be the vanguard of Communist revolutions. Still a third character-
istic of post-Communist China has been its preoccupation with building
and equipping a powerful military apparatus both to support its inter-
vention in Korea an to aid insurgent movements such as the Vietminh
in Southeast Asia.
Certain consequences have flowed inexorably from these new policies.
China turned to the USSR for armaments and then for industrial and
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technical personnel; and to most of these transactions the Soviet approach
has boon strictly commercial, Although China is said to be receiving
a substantial amount of ruble aid, there is much evidence to show that
the Soviet Union is a stiff and exacting creditor. Accordi/gy, a
large part of China's export surplus is today preempted by its ideological
friends.
China's ability to buy goods from the outside world is now small.
It has directed more than three-quarters of its trade towards the
Soviet bloc; its own growing industry has first call on the coal and
raw materials formerly exported to Japan; and old customers, discouraged
by the uncertainties of trade with China, have found alternative supplies
of the products it used to sell. It is estimated that without a severe
cut in its exports to Russia and the European satellites, China can spare
no more than 420 million a year for purchases in the free world.
The truth is that China is turning itself into an integrated part
of a Communist economic bloc that stretches from the Elbe to the China
Sea, How far this process has already gone is illustrated by the fact
that the central European satellites have become exporters of Chinese
bristles and soya beans.
Conversely, China now exports Ceylon rubber to the Soviet Union.
Symbolic of this trading pattern is the establishment in East Berlin
of the Chinese Export-Import Corporation, an organization set up by the
Chinese Communists as the focal point for all trade negotiations between
West and China, It is undoubtedly the Communist intention that Chinese
trade commissione-s operating in Europe will ultimately destroy the value
of Hong King as a point of contact and a channel for Western goods.
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At the present time, then, all the basic trends of Chinese policy
make for a reduction not an expansion of East-West trade. The stra-
tegic controls imposed by the free world on exports to China have
undeniably had the same effect. They are the consequence of a United
Nations decision, taken in June, 1951, that China as an aggressor in
Korea should be denied all outside supplies of war-potential materials.
But when and if the embargo of the free world is lifted it will in all
probability be found that the China trade has changed beyond recognition.
China's demands from the West will be concentrated almost exclusively
on the products required for the development of heavy industry. It will
no longer be a market for textiles and other consumer goods; the Chinese
Communists have said flatly that they are not interested in such
Nom. frivolities.
Fundamentally, the position of China as a participant in Fast-
Tiest trade is much the same as that of Russia in the 'twenties. The
ultimate goal is autarchy. To roach that goal the Chinese will be
eager for Western capital goods. They will be willing to absorb
steel, rolling stnck and cInstructinn equipment in large quantities, but
their appetite will be limited by the inability to provide enough exports
in return. Only if the West is prepared to grant them large-scale credits
will there be any large-scale increase in the volume of trade with
China.
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V
Summary and Conclusions
Trade with foreign nations is not an end in itself. Its purpose
and its justification is that it makes possible a higher standard of
living for all participants. This principle is an axiom that most
people are ready to accept when they consider only the immediate
consequences of trade. They are less willing to apply it to some
of the indirect consequences.
If, for example, British exports of machinery strengthen the
military power of a potential ag,!ressor against world peace, and if
the British Government is therefore compelled to Increase its defense
expenditure, then these exports are responsible for a fall rather than
a rise in the British standard of living. In the last resort, the
economics of East-West trade turn on this simple proposition.
But for those who are prepared not only to ignore this principle
but also to run risks with their national security, it is high time to
re-state the obvious facts involved in East-est trade.
The first of these facts has to do with the dimensions of the
potential market in Communist territories, Britain and other nations
that live by trade must pursue vigorously every possible opportunity.
But it is one thing to act energetically and quite another to foster
illusions about the potential scale of the trade in question. The
Soviet bloc and China are not unlimited markets. And the limitations
Imposed on trade with these areas by the Communists themselves are far
more permanent and far more damaging than the controls that the West
has decreed for strategic reasons, Marxist rulers adhere to policies
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\ow' that place self-sufficiency above all else; that, with few exceptions,
exclude consumer goods from import lists; and that cripple the ability
of the bloc to pay for Western goods. There will always be a handful
of ingenious traders who will find some profit in trade with the East,
but by and large the Communists restrictions leave little scope for
exporters interested in broadbased, substantial and lasting commerce.
Second, the possibilities of East-West trade have been greatly
exaggerated. Communist spokesmen have deliberately done so for propa-
ganda reasons and out of a desire to obtain strategic goods. They
hare found an enthusiastic echo in the West among fellow travellers
and also among wishful thinkers who regard East-West trade as a magic
formula that will solve all their marketing problems. Undoubtedly trade
with the East can be expanded beyond the depressed levels of the past
year. There is certainly more trade to be done with the Soviet bloc and
China, but not a groat deal more unless the West cares to finance it.
Third, it is the Communist bloc which is in urgent need of East-
West trade--not the West. It is the Communist economies which are
stretched.: beyond their limits by the weight of inordinate ambitions.
Over the coming years, the Communist bloc plans simultaneously to
industrialize China and provide it with a modern and well-equipped army,
to raise living standards for the masses, and to maintain in Soviet
Europe the present tempo of industrializatinn and military expansion.
By themselves the resources of the Communist world are not equal to all
these tasks.
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These three facts point to one conclusion: that Western credits--
or outright grants--ars the key to any sizeable expansion of markets
in the East.
Once East-West trade is put in this perspective, it becomes simply
a matter for the nations of the free world to determine whether and on
what terms to extend aid to the Communist bloc. Since in the short
term credits imply for the giver a cut in the standard of living, these
nations may well conclude that any initial sacrifice should be reserved
for proven friends, for such peoples as the Asian partners in the
Colombo Plan and such needy members of the free world as the undeveloped
countries of Africa and South America. When their wants are met, the
nations of the West can reasonably be asked to make further sacrifices
only if credits are granted to the Communist bloc on terms that will bring
long-term economic benefits to the democratic peoples--that is to says
credits should be made available on condition that there is a change in
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and China which will lessen the
need for *heavy armaments bill in the 'Test.
The Communist world must first Ove clear evidence that it has
abandoned itS efforts to subvert and dominate other nations, in
particular by promoting so-called 'liberation movements' in Asia.
To date there has been no such evidence. So long as it is lacking,
the logical course for the trading nations of the free world, if they
wish to expand their commerce, is to coneentrate their energies on
eliminating the difficulties that hamper trade witl their existing best
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customers. No one has calculated the growth in trade that would result
within the democratic world alone from such humdrum efforts as the
shortening of delivery dates, the production of better and cheaper
products and above ally the further relaxation of import quotas and
tariffs.
In the long run these are the only durable solutions available for
those business men who are reluctant to cater for anything less than a
sellers, market and also for those who hope that competitive German
and Japanese products can be deflected into Communist markets. Sooner or
later they must all accept the fact that the Communist world has no
abiding interest in Western products and that through trade within its
own borders there still remain tremendous opportunities for raising the
standard of living in the free world. All too often in recent years
traders and politicians have spent a disproportionate amount of time and
trouble chasing the remote, unreliable and politically suspect markets of
the East.
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May 31, 1955
"PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" - SOVIET STYLE
inificance of "Peaceful Coexistence"
The Soviet use of the term "peaceful coexistence capitalizes upon
man's natural desire for peace. The contrast between Soviet pronounce-
ments and Soviet deeds has created great confusion in the minds of men.
To clarify this, it is necessary to examine Soviet policy as guided
by Communist theoretical reasoning. The principle of "peaceful co-
existence" is a smoke screen designed to conceal the true designs of the
international Communist movement as delineated by Marx and Engels, and
later by Lenin and Stalin. It is only one of the methods which the
Communists have been using in a variety of tactics and which reflects a
temporary shift of emphasis in their over-all strategy of fomenting world
revolution.
"Peaceful coexistence" is not new in the program of the Soviet
Government. Emphasis on this policy is dictated by the current position
of the Soviet Union in world affairs. It also conforms with the basic
ideology of Marx as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin. In order to under-
stand the term, a basic distinction must be made between foreign policy
of the USSR and the organized world international Communist movement. The
former is only the tool of the latter.
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Communist Theory and Practice
Official pronouncements made by the Communist parties of the world
and the Soviet Union have, in the past, raised the issue of "peaceful
coexistence" as a program for world peace. Such announcements invariably
raise the question among the countries of the free world of whether a
change of policy is taking place or merely a temporary shift in tactics.
These questions can easily be answered by examining the basic doctrines
of the Soviet Communist Party. Pronouncements are propaganda, but Com-
munist ideology is implemented as militant policy. The Soviet Communist
Party, which sets these policies, regards itself as infallible. To
follow Party policy is both the right and duty of the regime.
Communist theory states that the principal task of the Party is to
follow world events closely, and interpret them correctly, particularly
crises in various countries, in order to seize the right momeut in which
to launch a revolution. Theoretical Communism holds that the class struggle
is inevitable, that Communist principles must be interpreted in a universal
sense and that it is impossible to develop a completely Communist society
until the entire world is Communist.
The Communists regard their ideological heritage as having a more
dominant influence in the formulation of policy than other factors. The
dictates of the Party are, therefore, more important than the decisions
of the policy-making bodies created by the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.
The enlargement of a policy of "peaceful coexistence" at any time, either
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?3
by the Communist parties of the world or the Soviet Union, is no more than
a tactic designed to advance the international Communist movement.
"Peaceful Coexistence" - Soviet Policy
The present
a theme that has
This latter date
Committee of the
act constituted,
fare against the
war". Thus, the
Paradoxical
emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" is the 1955 version of
been dominant in Communist propaganda since late 1947.
is significant for in October 1947 the Soviet Central
Soviet Communist Party established the Cominform. This
in effect, a declaration of economic and political war-
United States, and heralded the beginning of the "cold
East-West split was formally acknowledged.
as it may seem, the "Peace" campaign was a direct sequel
to, and a consequence of, the proclamation of the "cold wee. For seven
years it has been in practice as an instrument of the ',cold war".
The proclamation of Andrei Zhdanov at one of the early meetings of
the Cominform laid down the doctrine of two camps?one headed by the Soviet
Union and the other by the United States and Great Britain. This was no
new doctrine, since it had been stated repeatedly by Lenin and Stalin.
Zhdanov merely made it plain to that body that the universal desire of man
for peace was to be perverted and exploited in an effort to persuade him
to support Communist parties and Soviet policy.
Historical Development
Eugene Dennis, the American Communist, declared that "peaceful
coexistence" was the "bed-rock foundation of the foreign policy of the
10?11.effer,..;???1. ao
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? 4 ?
Soviet State". Since the Communists continue to reiterate this, develop-
ment of this policy must be considered.
During the period of March 1917 to July 19210 generally known as
the development and isolation period", the Bolsheviks seized control
of the state and established the U.S.S,R. Their goal was the overthow
of all existing governments and the establishment of a global Communist
state. In 1919 Moscow became the seat of the world-wide Communist Third
International. One of the main principles laid down during the period
was that no tactical move or policy was inconsistent with Communist princi-
ples, so long as it advances the cause of world revolution. As early as
1919, "peaceful coexistence" was one of the tactics adopted as Soviet
policy.
During 1921-1932, the rapprochement period, the Soviet Union sought
to establish its internal security by treaties and agreements of non-
aggression, non-intervention and neutrality pacts. Moscow subscribed to
international peace movements, but again the widely subversive activities
of the Communist International proved governmental actions as mere tactical
moves made necessary by the weakness of the Soviet State.
The period 1933-1939 was largely characterized by efforts to establish
a system of collective security in the face of the expansionism of Germany
and Japan. The factors regulating Soviet policy were collective security,
peace, universal disarmament and the United Front. But the Communist
International continued to work underground to build a world Communist
society?
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? 5 ?
The period 1939-1946 was occupied by the Soviet Union's war for sur-
vival against the Nazis. During the 1947-1955 period--that of the Comin-
form--the U.S.S.R. has embarked on a vast propaganda campaign for "peace-
ful coexistence", while at the same time engaging in subversion of Czecho-
slovakia, war in China, aggression in Korea, Malaya and Indochina, and
continued subversive activities of the international Communist movement
throughout the world.
International Communist Movement
Daring the entire period 1919 to date, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union covertly directed?as it continues to
direct and implement?Communist basic doctrine, which never changes or
vacillates. Militant groups of Soviet colonists, mostly indigenous to
the country they are to subvert, are trained in Moscow. They are then re-
turned to their native countries and actively engage in activities designed
to destroy the existing forms of government and to establish piecemeal the
Soviet Socialist Republics of the world. Control of the satellites is
more direct and open. Party leaders in the satellites have in virtmlly
all cases been trained in Moscow and to all intents and purposes they are
Soviet citizens, completely subservient to Moscow. Army and police con-
trols are also direct and in most cases overt.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
contains the Section for Liaison with Foreign Communist Parties. This
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? 6 ?
is usually referred to as the Foreign Section of the Central Committee.
It directs, controls and supports world-wide Communist movements. It also
directs and controls Communist-"front" organizations, the Society for
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Anti-Fascist Soviet Youth
Committee, the Anti-Fascist Soviet Woments Committee and the World Peace
Council.
The Communists have used many and varied organizations to throw up
their smoke screen of "peaceful coexistence." One of the principal and
most specialized is the World Peace Council. Its campaigns are supported
by all Communist "Front" organizations. From its headquarters in Vienna,
the Permanent Executive Bureau, composed of 50 members (24 known Communists
and 19 closely associated with the Communist Party), issues resolutions
for approval by "World Peace Congresses." These Congresses adopt resolu-
tions without question. The purpose of all resolutions is to promote the
political aims of the U.S.S.R. by exploiting the universal desire for peace.
Whatever the "front" or vehicle used to promote their peace campaign,
the Soviets keep tightly in their own hands the control and finances of
what is often represented as a spontaneous popular movement. They assure
Communist majorities on all committees and "bureaus" which issue instruc-
tions, draft resolutions and organize conferences?
Communist Party. USA - The Communist Party, USA, in its official
pronouncements has put forward "peaceful coexistence" as a program for
world peace. United States Communist Party leaders by their statements
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? 7 -
have shown that "peaceful coexistence" is a policy of the U.S. Communist
Party and the Soviet Union alike. The duplicity of these statements, on
the other hand, is revealed by their ideological motivation. U. S. Party
leaders openly state that "the first great strength of the Communist
Parties in all countries is their scientific Marxist-Leninist theory" and
that "flexibility in strategy and tactics and orthodoxy in matters of
principle are the Communist rule. This theory has may one objective--
that of turning the wheel forward until the world-wide union of Socialist
Republics shall have been established."
9PecefuJ. -- The Soviet Unionts oxecutive agent
for the advancement of Communism in Asia is Communist China. Peiping has
repeatedly put forward as a basis of "peaceful coexistence" their "Five
Principles":
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty.
2. Mutual non-aggression.
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5.
Peaceful coexistence.
These principles are merely slogans of the official Chinese Comaunist
propaganda machine. If they are examined closely, they all mean very
much the same thing and are the principles which govern normal relations
between most non-Communist states, although they are not set down in
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- 8 -
writing. The Chinese Communist Government evidently considered that
they needed to announce these slogans because their normal conduct of
international relations is so blatantly abnormal.
The Chinese Communists, taking their orders from the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet Communist Party, first issued these slogans after
their aggressive annexation of Tibet in 1950. But during 1950 they were
also engaged in open aggression in Korea and Indochina. This is further
prcof that underlying Communist doctrine and not open pronouncements govern
their policies and practices.
The ?Five Principles" were reasserted in a different context after
the Geneva Agreement when Chou En-lai visited New Delhi and Rangoon.
Again this was overt propaganda while Communist subversion continued.
Mao Tze-Tung, the Chinese Communist leader, openly asserted the Communists1
true principles on the 28th Annivcrsary of the Communist Party of China.
In his dissertation, "The Dictatorship of the Peoplets Democracy", which
still governs their policies, he stated: "It is impossible to sit on the
fence ...no third road exists."
Mao Tze-Tung further elaborated:
"There are social sectors, there are countries which have real
party politics, a democratic life, real civil liberties. In such
places one adopts the Popular Front, to attract the left-wingers
and the leftist groups, good or bad, sincere or not. Tempt them,
each through his particular weakness, as the devil tempts. Help
them to get what they want; put pressure, firt with offers,
later with threats: Compromise them if you can, so that they
can't get away. And this every day, without respite, one after
the :other with as deep a psychological study of each as possible".
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plusion
"Peaceful coexistence" is a tactic in the strategy of International
Communism. The actions which Communists must take in terms of strategy
are basic and never change. Although Communist policy dictates that the
basis of relations with other countries is the "coexistence" of two
opposed systems, they openly admit that the purpose of this doctrine is to
delay war until the Communist revolution reopens in Europe or until
colonial revoluticns come to a head. Until this happens, the maintenance
of peaceful relations is an obligatory task.
In order to bring about these revolutions, Communists operate under
the theory that it is possible to conquer the most powerful enemy by
taking thorough and skillful advantage of every "fissure", however small;
by using every possible means to gain an ally, even though this ally be
temporary and vacillating; and by proselyting for peace they are covertly
carrying out the best defense of the U.S.S.R. The Communists themselves
state that "Those who do not understand this do not understand even a
grain of Marxism and of scientific modern socialism in general".
Therefore, it is obvious that while espousing "peace" and "peaceful
coexistence", the Communists continue a drive toward absolute mastery of
the world. Their tactics are all to be found within the framework of
a carefully constructed and all?embracing plan based upon Marx?Engels as
interpreted by Stalin and Lenin.
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In a relatively short period of 30 years, Moscou-directed colonial
imperialism has met with considerable success. It has fixed an iron grip
on the millions of non-Russians within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R.
It has established rigid domination over the Eastern European puppet
states. It has brought Communist China into its orbit. From China it
has spread out to Korea, Indochina and Southeast Asia. The long arm of
Communism has extended from Moscow through Prague to Latin America,
In all important areas not under Communist rule it has had varying
degrees of success by a subtle and powerful subversion of free governments.
As has been demonstrated to the world, Soviet-Communist leaders
openly preach "peaceful coexistence", while at the same time they expound
the classics of Marxism which teach that in the sphere of theory there can
be no concessions. As a result, the people of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania,
Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, North Korea,
Communist China, and North Vietnam have now been incorporated into the
Soviet orbit against a strident, continuous background of "Peaceful
Coexistence - Soviet Style".
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EAST GERMANY---A SOVIET COLONY
The Soviet High Commission (formerly Soviet Control Commis-
sion) has over 3,000 Russian officials scattered throughout East
Germany in every key unit of government, political activity,
transportation and business. It has agents in all important in-
dustrial plants in East Germany.
The Military Department of the Soviet High Commission under
Soviet army officers controls the East German armed forces, i.e.,
the Alert Police (Bereitschaften), the Maritime Police (Seepolizei),
and the Air Police (Luftpolizei).
Ministries of the USSR issue instructions to East Germany
industrial and trading organizations.
The "Socialist Unity Party" (SED) is a facade behind which the
Communist Party operates to control the other parties which are
forced to participate.
The Political Affairs Administration of the Soviet High Com-
mission issues detailed confidential instructions to all levels of
the Socialist Unity Party. Some political subjects are reserved
to the Soviet organ exclusively.
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June 1, 1955
EAST GERMAN MILITARISM - SOVIET INSPIRED
The illegal remilitarization of East Germany has now proceeded to
the point that the Garrisoned Peoplefs Police (Kasernierte Volkspolizei,
or KVP, the East German "Army") has seven combat divisions. There are
two corps, each containing one mechanized and two rifle divisions, and an
independent mechanized division which may serve as the nucleus for a third
corps similar to the two now extant. The KVP is steadily developing into
a force capable of participating in limited combat operations. Small
naval and air elements have also been developed.
In order to give a semblance of credulity to the fiction that East
Germany has no armed forces, the Minister of Interior, rather than a
defense minister, has charge of the "police" forces. Under him, a Deputy
Minister of Interior heads the Main Administration for the Garrisoned
People's Police (Hauptverwaltung fir die Kasernierte Volkspolizei (HVKVP)
and performs all the functions of a minister of defense. A Deputy Chief
and Chief of Staff of the HVKVP supervises planning and staff work, while
three deputy chiefs of staff directly command the ground, sea, and air
forces.
KVP divisions are organized along Soviet lines but are not yet com-
pletely identical with Soviet rifle and mechanized divisions. The KVP
is supplied with Soviet weapons and equipment, employs Soviet tactical
doctrine in its training, has Soviet-type uniforms, and is completely
Soviet-controlled. The role of the KVP in any combat operation will be
determined, not by Germans, but by the Soviets.
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The planning of international Communism visualized a "Free Germany
INIppi based on Communism" in the early 19201s. The Communists' present policies
are only an interim implementation of steps toward this ultimate goal.
B. Anticipated Formation of East German Army by Soviet Utilization of
German Prisoners of War
The Soviets' long-range plan for a "Free Germany based on Communism"
was a part of their over-all strategy looking toward world domination. When
German soldiers first fell into their hands in 1941, these captives became
important pawns in the game. They were to be exploited and manipulated to
further Soviet imperialism. As a result, the prisoners' legal rights under
the rules of warfare as set forth by the Hague and subsequent Geneva Con-
ventions were largely disregarded by the Soviets. True to their concept
of war as a total struggle in which no aspect of life is immune, they
Initiated a practice in which every prisoner was denied the right to remain
%Ime a neutral, to return to his homeland, or to pursue any policy contrary to
that of the USSR.
The above plan embraced not only the German PW's, but also those of
Japanese and other nationalities captured in World War II. More recently
it was applied to POWs taken by Communist armies such as the Vietminh in
Indochina and it can be seen in the North Korean and Chinese Communist
utilization of prisoners in Korea. The insidious plot is standard, often
effective, and planned to further the ultimate Communist goal of world
domination.
Following their avowed maxim that the end justifies the means, the
Soviets, in the early stages of World War II, began to lay their plans
for the domination of Germany. The prisoners were a very important seg-
ment of this well-planned scheme. Early in the game, the Soviets organized
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the "antifa" committees in Germany and among the German POWs in their hands.
These committees were on a low level. The next step was the establishment
of a National Committee for Free Germany (NKFD) which was composed of
officers and selected NCOs. Next came the German Officers Association
(BDO), composed of selected German Generals and officers. This was eventually
to be used to help firmly establish and support the East German regime and
East German Police under the authority of such veteran Soviet-German Com-
munists as Walter Ulbricht, Erich Weinert, Otto Grotewohl, Wilhelm Fleck and
Mrs. Rubiner. Such prominent personalities in this group as Generals von
Seydlitz, von Daniels, and Graf von Hulsen, still held in Moscow, may one
day be used as political trumps, depending on the turn of events in East
Germany. Field Marshal Paulus, captured at Stalingrad, was returned to
East Germany. Field Marshal Paulus, captured at Stalingrad was returned
to East Germany j late autumn 1953.
Soviet tactics of utilizing and exploiting POWs evolved in the early
stages of World War II. The implementation of this Soviet POW plan helped
in the establishment and strengthening of the now Communist-dominated
state subservient to the USSR. This typical Soviet policy was a unilateral
action, which serves Moscow's purposes and completely disregards agreements
on post-war Germany made by the USSR with its fighting allies at Yalta
and elsewhere.
The POW organizations by which the Soviets sought to consolidate con-
trol of Germany are as follows:
1. "Antifa".
Wen Nazi power was waning, the Communists began organizing
"Antifa" units among prisoners held in the USSR. In the POW camps in the
USSR, evening courses as well as full-time schools conducted regular training
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in order to induce these trainees to return home and cooperate with native
Communists. Until repatriated, graduates of these "anti-fascist" schools
frequently held supervisory jobs in the camps. The "Antifa" units were
also active in Germany. The history of these organizations indicates that
the Soviets planned an integrated function for them.
2. The National Committee for Free Germany.
This Committee was formed in 1943 under the pretext that it was
to be used only for propaganda purposes. When the Western Allies became
alarmed that this group might develop into a Communist-dominated German
Government in exile, the Soviets hastily assured the Allies that it was
purely a propaganda scheme to weaken the German Army and Nazi State. The
later assignments of the POW component groups clearly portray the true aim
of this committee. The membership of the Committee consisted of:
a. A group of 45 selected German officers, many of whom
presently hold positions in the East German Police, Government, and military
establishment.
b. German civilian Communists in the Soviet Union such as
Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Fleck. Some of these people now hold high posi-
tions in the East German Government.
c. German Generals whose names were useful for propaganda in
Germany, such as von Seydlitz and Paulus. The Soviets miscalculated upon
the importance of names and this group was later dissolved.
Expert Soviet psychologists were used to influence this organization.
Daily meetings were held and it was made to appear that this was a group
of unquestionable patriots working together to save the Reich. The oldtine
German Communists maintained control throughout the existence of the Free
Germany Committee.
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3. German Officers' Association.
This was founded shortly after the initiation of the National
Committee for Free Germany. This was the instrument by means of which a
closer and more personal contact could be established with internees of
other camps. From this organization came camp and front line emissaries.
The latter carried on propaganda among German front line units, and the
former were assigned to various camps for work in accordance with the or-
ganization's policies. The Soviets hinted to these groups that, as a reward
for cooperation, they would be given influential positions in the future
German State. At Lunovo another group of Generals under the supervision
of Mrs. Rubiner prepared textbooks for German schools. In this way Com-
munist instruction material was produced for utilization in Germany during the
postwar period - a field in which the Soviets anticipated the Western
powers, although without much success.
4. Activists.
After the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the Soviets dis-
carded their pretense of utilizing and training prisoners for propaganda
reasons and replaced all the emissaries of the German Officers' Associa-
tion with so-called political activists who were staunch Communists. Germans
who belonged to the Communist Party prior to 1933 and members of the former
Communist Youth Movement came to the fore. The camp "Aktivs" completely
dominated the inmates of the POW camps. At this point, Communist "education"
or indoctrination became intense.
With the end of hostilities, the National Committee for Free Germany
and the German Officers' Association disintegrated, since the political
elite of Ulbricht, Fleck, etc., had been dispatched to East Germany. In
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November 1945 the two organizations were formally dissolved in a ceremony
in Moscow in which von Seydlitz and Weinert signed the protocol.
In 1948, forty-one German officers were selected to attend a special
Antifa school at Krasnogorsk and this group was designated as Section III.
Sections I and II were training propagandists and journalists. Section III
was a final training school in which Communist doctrine was re-emphasized
to a special group of students to be repatriated. From this group
emerged such men as Lt. Gen. Vincenz Mueller, Major General Hans Wulz, and
Col. Wilhelm Adam, all of whom now hold high positions in the East
German military forces (OP).
When the "Peoplels Police" (Volkspolizei) was founded in the Soviet
zone of Germany on June let, 1945, it was generally assumed that this was
to become a force safeguarding law and order after the end-of-the-war
chaos. Few people suspected at the time that it would become the core
of a military force shaped after the Soviet army, serving the purposes
of Bolshevism and ready to spring into action whenever its initiators
required.
The KVP-system, which costs the East German taxpayers five thousand
million marks a year (one-sixth of the Soviet zonal budget) has:approxi-
mately 125,000 to 130,000 troops under its command, in addition to the
regular and border police.
The tact that such troops exist and are steadily being_impraved, is
one reason for giving serious consideration to theproblem of -German
.roUnification along democratic lihos.
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TAB
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*TREE" GERMAN ELECTIONS -- COMMUNIST STYLE
Though obligated by the Potsdam Agreement to promote democracy
in the zone of Germany occupied by them, the Soviets have violated
the Agreement flagrantly to conceal Communist weakness. Behind a
smokescreen of confusion the Russians have forced non-Communist
parties into a "coalition" dominated by Communists. Party leaders
who opposed the union either fled to the West or stayed to be kid-
napped and murdered. Craven leaders surrendered to Communist
dictatorship.
The Om coalition was launched publicly at a convention in
Berlin, in April 1946, as the "German Socialist Unity Party" (SED).
From the outset all power was concentrated in Moscow-trained agents.
Receiving daily instructions from the Russians, the Communist dictat-
ors organized a system on the model of the USSR. Communists were
placed in control of every strategic office in East Germany.
To make their puppet government appear "legitimate," the Soviets
organized an "election" for a new parliament in East Germany on
October 15, 1950. The Communist Party was ordered to win this
"election" by whatever means, including force, fraud and deception.
When the results of the alleged vote were published, the National
Front (the Communist ticket) claimed to have received 99.7 per cent
of all votes, with more than 98 per cent of eligible voters participat-
ing. Such numbers are so obviously fabricated that they were con-
sidered ridiculous by everyone.
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Public counting of the votes was forbidden because in the
previous "election" of May 1949 the Communists had been. embarrassed
by thousands of negative ballots, many of them carrying insulting
remarks. Party workers were ordered to explain to all voters that
any voter who was absent from the polls on election day would be
.considered an enemy of peace and unity and subject to deportation
to a slave labor camp. Communist leaders rounded up populations of
whole villages and marched them to the polls, allowing none to escape.
The lmAot was "secret", according to the Communist meaning of
the word. Only one list of candidates was printed on the ballots,
and no mark was necessary to vote the straight ticket. Although
there were a few booths where a voter could mark his ballot secretly,
radio announcements made it clear that anyone who went into a booth
was marking himself an "enemy of peace". Communist spies were present
at all polling places to take down the names of "enemies", who were
subsequently thrown into slave labor camps.
Communist stooges were put on the radio to testify that the
"election" had been by free and secret ballot. Since the counting
(if there was any in fact) was conducted in offices of the Central
Government by Coanunists under direct Russian supervision, no reliable
information is available as to how many East Germans risked their
lives to write objections on their ballots. Moscow radio congratulated
the East Germans for their successful "election", even though every
principle of an honest ballot had been cynically violated under the
personal direction of Soviet officials.
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SLAVE LABOR IN EAST GERMAN URANIUM MINES
The Wismuth Aktiengesellschaft (Bismuth Co., Ltd.) is the
secret Soviet trust that runs the uranium mines in Eastern Germany.
A state within a state, it has its own laws, supply and transporta-
tion, housing, health and social services--and police. The Western
world, and even most East Zone Germans, have known almost nothing
of what goes on behind its barbed-wire boundaries. Last week the
British Control Commission in Berlin issued a 5,000-word report,
compiled by British Intelligence, that unwrapped the details of
Russia's "frantic drive" for the raw material of the atom bomb:
Some 300,000 Uerman men and women are virtual slave laborers
in the mines. The women, who are known as "Erzengel" (a punning
word that means both "arch-angel" and anol of the ore), lay track and
push ore carts underground. Drillers often work hip-deep in water.
Many contract silicosis from the dust, or cancer of the lungs from
the radioactive ore. Few last more than one year underground. Work-
ers lose their regular identity cards and if found outside the mine
areaare returned in handcuffs.
The miners' boss is a Major General Malzev, with headquarters at
Siegmar-Schoenau in Saxony. His organization also includes 15,000
German administrative workers, 5,000 Soviet soldiers and MVD (secret
police) agents, and special German police units.
Mining started at Johanngeorgenstadt near the Czech frontier
in 1946, but has now spread to more than 230 communities in the Erz
Bebirge, Vogtland, Goerlitz district, Thuringian Forest, and Harz
Mountains. Farms and forests are devastated, and whole towns are
evacuated to make room for workers. As many as 40 girls and women
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share a one-room hut. At Meissen, Saxony, a shoe factory is being
converted into a dormitory for babies whose mothers work in the
mines. Families are given home leave no oftener than every three
months.
Men are taken between the ages of 17 and 50; women from 18 to
55. Many are recruited by threats of loss of ration cards.
Factories are often deliberately closed to force unemployed men into
the mines. Some common criminals are put to work in "penal shafts".
Trade unions and the Free German Youth organization are forced to
deliver monthly quotas of "volunteers". Contracts are generally
for one year, but are often extended without consent. A six-month
contract has had to be introduced to get new recruits. Workers are
promised $56. a month--if they can fulfill an almost impossible
piecework quota. Most earn less than $8. a month.
Financing is a closely guarded secret, but the best information
indicates that Eastern Germany has had to supply all the money for
the project. Preliminary ore grading is done in Germany; the entire
output is exported. The three top directors of the enterprise live
in Moscow and report directly to the Soviet Ministry. "The regime
is, in fact,
IIa most blatant example of
colonial exploitation...for the sole benefit of the Russian war
machine".
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UNITED NNTIONS ILO
REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON
FORCED LABOUR
GENEVA 1953
APPENDIX III: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Existence and Location of Camps and Number
and Compulsory Workers
It had been observed that in the Soviet zone
of Germany, the nazi technique had been taken over
and improved upon. An inquiry undertaken a year ago
showed that the population of concentration camps was
greater at the present time than it had been in 1939.
There was every reason to believe that 200,000 to
300,000 prisoners were interned in the six major and
the six or seven smaller camps....
From the evidence of prisoners, it appeared that
17,000 prisoners at Buchenwald had been sent to
Siberia in April 1947 and that, on 31 January 1948,
47,600 prisoners had been deported from the internment
camp at Feunfeichen for labour in the Kuzbas factories
in Siberia.
Some information had been obtained on the camps at
Bautzen, Jamlitz and tluchenwald as well as on the MVD
prisons at Pirna, Dresden and Muehlberg.
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20, The representative of the American Federation of Labor
spoke of working conditions in the uranium mines and, referring to
information supplied by Dr. Fritz Lowenthal, stated- -
... He himself had seen what was happening in
Saxony. The work there was mainly the extraction
of uranium. Theoretically, only persons of from 18
to 45 years of age could be pressed into service,
but, in actual fact, children of 14 years and men
of 65 and over were put to work. The workers were
obliged, at any cost, to produce the minimum amount
of work demanded by the occupation authorities. The
work was extremely dangerous because the miners worked
underground, inhaling the dangerous products emanating
from radium. Mr. Lowenthal said that there were no
safety devices or health safeguards in the mines.
Accidents had been so frequent that it had been diffi-
cult to replace the male workers. The authorities
had been obliged to introduce forced labour for
women. Even pregnant women and mothers of young children
had been forced to work.
21. ... and alleged that "even if there were no
political purpose behind the establishment of these forced labour
camps, the camps would exist because of the need for cheap and
immediate production along the lines of armament needs." It then
went on to quote, as an example, the working conditions in the
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uranium mines--
The personal testimonies of those who have been
sentenced to work in the Jachymow uranium mines in
Czechoslovakia and the Aue mines...are consistent
in their description of impossible quotas, starvation
diet if the quotas or norms are not fulfilled, of the
tortures which take place and the death rate due to
the lack of protective clothing and machinery and the
lack of sufficient or adequate medical care.
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June 1, 1955
TREATY AND TRUCE OBSERVANCE - COMMUNIST STYLE
The Bolshevik Party has had to change its tactics,
its methods of combat, to shift from legal forms to
illegal ones, to compromise, to make agreements with
other parties, other movements, to dodge, to retreat
in order to advance more successfully later".
Trud, Moscow, November 4, 1950
The foregoing statement is basic Communist Party doctrine
regardless of locale.
It was inspired by Lenin's philosophy
that world power politics and diplomacy can be influenced or
Ao]ded by all sorts of strategems, "maneuvers", "illegal methods",
"evasions" and "subterfuges". This Leninist philosophy is ac-
cepted to this day as basic guidance by the Communist leaders in
the Kremlin. In fact, they have no reason to question it, for
to them it provides the key to survival in encountering world
problems. No leadership dedicated to an ideology could ask for
better logic.
The Soviet Union's record of violating treaties and truce
agreements as a means of expanding its power and influence is
unmatched in the history of modern diplomacy, It is a record
that extends over twenty years of dealings with the United States
and other powers of Europe and Asia, and it involves broken
promises involving no less than fifty treaties.
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Within a few months after the United States extended
diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933 the
Department of State was reporting evidence tending to show
violations of this Treaty. Since that time the record is
replete in instances of active plotting to undermine the
Government of the United States. On agreements concerning
other nations the record of the Soviet Union in violating pledges
to the United States is equally unfavorable. Repeatedly from
1942 until 1946, the Soviet Union promised to guarantee free-
dom and free elections in Hungary, in Bulgaria in Poland, in
Czechoslovakia, and in Rumania. Through- subversive tactics
all. ';hese governments ended up with Communist dictatorships.
In Asia, the Soviet Union by Treaty in 1945 promised to
support the Republic of China and to restore Manchuria, Formosa
and the Pescadores to the Republic of China. In complete dis-
regard to this Treaty the Soviet Union gave unqualified
political and military assistance to the Chinese Communists
which resulted in the removal of the Republic of China from
the mainland of China. Also, contrary to its promise to guarantee
freedom for Korea, the Soviet Union organized a Communist puppet
government in northern Korea, and then masterminded the invasion
of Korea in actual war.
In addition to the major instances of Treaty violations the
Communists have committed a series of military truce violations
extending over a period of a decade and a half achieving great
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military gains in China, Korea, and Vietnam. This method of
tying the hands of a free world military establishment while
Communist armies do as they please is a relatively unpublicized,
but nontheless effective device of conducting War By Cease-Fire.
The Chinese Communists formalized this tactic in 19.8 when they
issued instructions to their military units in the field to
disregard the terms of the truce with the Chinese Nationalists, .
and prepare for the ultimate victory of the Communist military.*
Years later Chou En-lai defined the objective of War By Cease-
Fire by stating that "Truce is the military counterpart of the
political tactic of coalition government. It is a means to an
en, not the ultimate objective".
Students of past wars have learned to look on the truce as
a simple matter. Opposing armies roach a situation where both
sides wish to end the fighting. A brief parley is held, lasting
a few hours or at most a few days. Either a cease-fire is agreed
to or the talks are broken off and the fighting continues. If
there is a cease-fire, a peace settlement follows in due course
and. the war is over.
The words of Chou En-lci foreshadowed a total abandonment
of this idea. Just as coalition government in Communist practice
* The Strategic Road of the Chinese Communist Party --- Chang Hao
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is aimed at the absorption of the coalition partner, so the
military truce is aimed at the continuation of the war by
other means until victory is achieved, This meaning has been
spelled out in the Communist wars of aggression in China, Korea,
and Vietnam*, and today the same concept hangs over the troubled
waters of the Formosa Straits.
* Tabs A, t4=mmid0-44
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TAB A
WAR: BY CEASE-FIRE
The Truce Violations in China
The very ability of the Chinese Communist regime to exist
and grow as a state-within-a-state for twenty years before it
came to power rested in part on a military posture that was half
war, half peace. Since its very beginning this regime, in its
relation to the government it sought to conquer, had followed
an irregular succession of tactics mixing open attack, retreat,
diversion, temporary reconciliation, agitation and guerrilla
warfare.
During the Japanese
developed the truce as a
bilities under the guise
Nationalist Government.
War, however, the Chinese Communists
tactic to improve their military capa-
of a "united front" with the Chinese
The "united front" agreement provided
for separate and agreed areas of occupation for Nationalist and
Communist troops. The Communists, however, in October 1938
issae,' explicit directions to their cadres in the field to dis-
regard the truce rovisions of the "united frcLur and proceed
to reinforce, implementing this directive the
Then with their forces
Communists intensified their recruiting,
expanded by the new influx of Chinese patriot soldiers, the Com-
munist armies began to move outside the areas assigned to them
under the "united front" agreement with the Nationalists, By
1940, clashes began once again between Communist and Nationalist
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troops and the relations of the government with its Communist
rival went from bad to worse. But by this time the purpose of
the truce stratagem had been largely achieved. The armies of
the National Government were confronted with a Communist chal-
lenger far stronger than before.
On January 10, 1946, in an effort to secure Communist co-
operation, and in order to achieve a constructive atmosphere
for political discussions, which were designed to lead to a
coalition government and a nationalization of all armed forces,
fire or truce was agreed to by both sides. The cease-fire order
stipulated:
1. A cessation of all hostilities.
2. Cessation of all movements of troops in China, with
the exception of a provision permitting certain movements
of Chinese Nationalist troops--especially their entry into
Manchuria for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty
there following the Japanese surrender to Soviet forces.
3. Cessation of destruction of and interference with
all lines of communications, and
4. Establishment of an Executive Headquarters in Peiping
for the purpose of carrying out the agreement for immediate
cessation of hostilities.
The events which followed over the ten months of this pretended
truce were a nightmare of confusion and unreality. In Chungking and
Nanking, the wartime and postwar capitals of the Chinese Republic,
peace talks continued-.in theory at least--from January to November.
a cease-
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3
On the battlefield there was no peace, and a truce only in name.
Violations of the truce by the Communists were reported through-
out this period at an average rate of about one every three days.
When the truce was officially abandoned on November 19 the of-
ficial count of verified Communist violations stood at not less
than 91.
In self-defense the Nationalists responded to these viola-
tions by a furious renewal of the war, which spread from Manchuria
throughout North China during the spring and summer. But the
military initiative which the Communists gained by their viola-
tions enabled them to move a long way toward the total conquest
of China.
The most significant violations were directed at strategic
Manchuria, where Soviet forces after their 8-day war had accepted
the Japanese surrender. Over 40 of the Communist truce violations
are accounted for in this Manchurian operation. Brazenly ignoring
the truce stipulation on Manchuria, their regiments and battalions
marched piecemeal over mountain passes from neighboring Jehol
Province until by April they had occupied most of Manchuria includ-
ing the key cities of Changchun, Szepingchieh, Harbin and Tsitsihar.
In each case they entered as soon as Soviet troops had left the city,
conforming perfectly to the Soviet timetable of withdrawal. As an
additional prize the Soviet forces handed over huge stocks of
captured Japanese arms and equipment; these the Chinese Reds were
to use later in organizing and equipping new armies in the final
struggle for power.
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-Li.
But the assist from the Soviets did not stop there. They
largely nullified the Nationalists' right of entry into Manchuria, -
guaranteed by the truce terms, by the simple expedient of closing
the port of Dairen to Nationalist ships. Thus the National Govern-
ment troops were forced to enter Manchuria by air and by difficult
overland routes. The whole Communist operation was beautifully
conceived, smoothly executed, and completely illegal.
After furious fighting for key Manchurian communications
Centers, the most the Nationalists could achieve against these odds
was a military stalemate which -lasted from April to June. In an
effort to break this stalemate omd get on with the peace talks the
Nationalist Government on June 7 ordered a I5-day cease-fire for
its own troops in Manchuria. Later this new cease-fire was ex-
tended to the and of June. But extensive efforts to revive the
peace talks were fruitless.
The Communists rejected the Nation-
alist offer to give General Marshall the power of arbitration.
The sound of guns again drowned out the peace efforts at Nanking.
By summer .Manchuria was mainly in Communist hands.
Meanwhile the remainder of the Communists' strategic plan began
to unfold amid renewed warfare south of the Great Wall, in China
proper. Here, beginning in the spring, Communist truce violations
occurred with increasing frequency, aimed for the most part at a
single objective: breaking Nationalist control of the north-south
rail lines. Early in Juno these violations blazed into a general
Communist offensive in North China and the Central Plain area.
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The Nationalists, determined to reopen the communications system
in North China, answered in July and August with a strong counter
offensive.
The battle for the railroads continued throughout the summer.
On August 3 the Communists began a ferocious attack on Tatung, a
key rail center in northern Shansi* After 45 days the siege of
Tatung was abandoned; but it was the fuse that set off major
hostilities ranging over five provinces of North China--Suiyuan,
Chahar, Jehol, Hopei, and Shantung.
Thus for ten months the Communists in China waged open war
under the flag of truce . At last on November 19 that flag was
lifted by the departure of the Communist delegation from the peace
table at Nanking. The civil war, which the Communists had never
stopped fighting, was now officially resumed.*
Looking back on Communist action in.this period, it is possible
to see with perfect clarity the military strategy they followed. It
was to deny the strategic position and resources of Manchuria to
Nationalist control, and to establish a corridor from west to east
across North China. by the latter move they cut all Chinals main
north-south communications routes and split the Nationalist forces
into isolated commands powerless to launch a coordinated offensive.
* There was another kind of warfare during this period not waged
with bullets--a cold war of propaganda. The United States was pictured
by the Communists as an aggressor in Isia, the imperialist rival and
successor to Japan. Appeals to Nationalist tr,)ops to desert called on
them to join in opposing ilmerioa as they opposed Japan. Mass propaganda
claimed that United States imperialism was more refined and legal than
that of Japan--but more dangerous and deadly because the United States
was stronger. The history of Japanese support of Chinese puppet govern-
ments and warlords was now applied to the relation between America and
the Kuomintang, which was pictured as a puppet of the United States in
Communist propagandat
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At the peace table in Nanking the Communists had found they
could not gain entry into a coalition government except at the price
of "nationalizing" their army--thus losing the base from which they
could later seize full power. So victory by diplomacy was denied
to them. But?they found another road leading to the same goal.
Using the cover of truce and peace talks to surprise and demoralize
their enemies, they carried out vital and illegal military movements
and reaped a strategic advantage which the Nationalists were never
to regain.
It may seem strange that the Communists were able to violate
their pledged word 91 times in this period without effective
hindrance from the authorities. Certainly there was no lack of
efficiency in reporting the violations as they occurred. When a
truce violation was cempl
ained of by either side, the Executive
Headquarters in Peiping sent out a team under U.S. command to in-
vestigate and rectify the violation. After two weeks five such
teams were in the field. By November there were 36 teams. They
inspected verified, reported, and protested each violation. But
they had no means of commanding respect or obedience. The Communists
showed only contempt for their efforts. One team in Manchuria was
met with Communist gunfire. Another, sent to stop a Communist attack
on Pe-ttou-chen in Hopei province, was tricked into leaving the area
while the Communists resumed their attack and captured the town.
Thus the prestige of the truce teams dwindled steadily. One rtierican
official was quoted as saying: ?There have been so many violations
I could not count them".
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The basic difficulty was simple. The only sanction arainst
truce viol'Itions was the very act which was least desired: openly
avowed renewal of the war. Tho irony is that precisely this
sanction was applied in the end-.but not until the Communists had
taken a decisive step toward final victory.
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TAB
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VIMINIOTAS OF THE KOREAN -ARMISTICE A
On 8 June 1953 an Armistice Agreement was signed between the
Commander in Chief, UN Command (CNC), on the one hand, and the
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Commander
of the Chinese People's Volunteore (CPV), on the other hand, concerning
a military armistice in Korea. They agreed to accept and be bound in?
dividually, collectively and mutually by the conditions and terms as
set forth in the articles of the Armistice.
How the Communists abided by these articles can be seen by the UNC
Charges against the Communists from the period 8 June 1953 to 1 June
1954.
1. 3405 UNC and ROK POW's Not Accounted For But Who Nere
Once Held by Communists.
After. three amendments, the UN roster of UNC and Republic
of Korea Army personnel known to have been captured and held by the 0001
munists amounted to 34051 The list contained only names of persons
who (1) spoke or were referred to in broadcasts from Communist radio
stations, (2) were listed by enemy as being captives, (3) wrote
letters from PW camps, or (4) were seen in PV camps. None of these
had been reported by the Dcimmnnist3 as having escaped or died, as
required by paragraph 58a of the Armistice Agreement. They said
part of the 3405 did notwnr.,t, direct repatriation, but that most had
never beencaptured at all. In the 43d meeting of the Military Armistice
Commission (M1C), KPA/CPV called the roster "crudely manufactured" and
"based on no tenable data at all". The Communists said 519 had been
repatriated and that 380 had been accounted for on rosters submitted to
UNC as dead, escaped or released at the front. The Communists presented
a tabulation of these nameo,
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2, yailure of Communists to Report Rotation of Personnel and
Combat Materiel.
The UNC implied the Communists were violating the Armistice
Agreement since they were maintaining a large army yet had not reported
any incoming material except one AA gun. The Communists interpreted
this as a charge that they had stockpiled a large amount of material
before signing the Armistice Agreement. They labeled this as a fabrica-
tion. A Mobile Inspection Team investigation at iliju was unable to
determine conclusively whether or not the Communists were introducing
aircraft in crates into Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement.
The CNC pointed out its more than 700 transaction reports involving
more than 5,000 combat aircraft, over 400 armored vehicles, 65,000
plus weapons and several million rounds of ammunition compared to ?ay
11 Communist reports dealing with 8 anti-tank guns, 40 rounds of anti-
tank ammunition, 2 anti-aircraft guns, 7 reports on spare parts and none
on cimbat aircraft. Communists claimed they had strictly observed the
Armistice Agreement. On 18 March 1q54 UNC again commented on the
remarkable achievement of maintaining an army without bringing in
supplies, emphasizing the Communist protestations that they had not had
bid stocks Of materiel before signing the Armistice Agreement. The
UNC charged that Neutral Nations Inspection Teams were limited in
freedom to inspect while the Communists introduced combat material by
by-passing ports of entry by road and rail. The Communists claimed that
the Uiju inspection proved the UNC charges false and reiterated their
strict compliance with the Armistice Agreement.
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On 9 February 1954, the UNC sent a letter to the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission requesting that three Mobile Inspection
Teams be dispatched to investigate charges that the Communists had
violated paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement by introducing rein-
forcing combat material at nine airfields, via two railroad complexes
and by three rail and road routes. The Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission could not agree to honor the request.
3. Violation of Petram?_is.cerEt.....s_sW_ItForlAremRit,
Three
retaining and Illegally Impress17-: Tnto Their Army/Republic of Korea
Army Personnel Who Escaped on 12212vember 1953.
On 19 November 1953, three former Republic of Korea soldiers
escaped from Communist captivity, taking refuge in an UNC sentry box in
the Security Area of the MAC Headquarters. The Communists refused a
joint investigation and insisted these personnel belonged to their side;
that UNC was forcibly retaining them, and that the three should be
returned. UNC unilateral investigation disclosed true identity of the
three escapees. The Communists continued to refuse a joint investiga-
tion. At MAC meeting 30 the UNC proposed a MAC letter to the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission requesting that a Neutral Nations
Inspection Team conduct an investl.s.ation of both sides, charges. The
Communists rejected this. Tho 1117C invokod paragraph 28 of the Armistice
Agreement and submitted a unilatomi request to the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission. Tho Noutral Nations Supervisory Commission
did not act, since Poles and Czechs held that it could not investigate
a violation which occurred within the Demilitarized Zone. The Com-
munists again refused a UNC proposal for a joint investigation. On
18 January 1954 the UNC requested the Neutral Nations Supervisory Com-
mission to dispatch a Mobile Inspection Team to investigate Communist
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units to determine if PWs were still being forcibly retained. In a letter
of 19 January 1954, Lee Sang Cho, Senior Member of the Communist side of MAC,
denounced the UNC charges and advised the Neutral Nations Supervisory Com-
mission that the Communists could not agree to an investigation of the
charge. This letter clearly influenced the Czechs and Poles, resulting in
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission failure to agree to dispatch the
Team. The UNC was so advised on 22 January 1954. On 26 January 1954 the
UNC requested another investigation of a different unit in a different
locality. Again the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was unable to
agree. In another letter dated 27 January 1954, Lee' Sang Cho stated that
only the Communists could request investigations, whereas UNC had no grounds
to do so. The UNC was advised of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Com-
mission's decision on 12 February 1954.
4. Violation of "Agreement on the MAC Ho. Area. Its Security
and Its Construction."
During the incident (item 3 above) on 19 November 1953 the
Communists introduced into the joint Security Area of the MAC Headquarters
Area a considerable number of armed men in excess of limits prescribed in
paragraph IIc of the Agreement cited in title. The Communists never
answered this charge.
5. 3iolat1aza_g_4guement_g-g2ig-alanr_MAM-PMEationa
(Paragraph 27 and 17 of Armistice A reemeng
Following the incident (item 3 above) in the joint Security
Area of the MAC Headquarters on 19 November 1953, the Communist component
of Joint Observer Team #3 failed three times to meet with members of the
UNC side after having been properly notified through the Secretaries. The
Communists have never replied to this specific charge.
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6. Violation of Paragraph 51 of Armistice Agreement by Forcibly
Retaining Two Former Republic of Korea Army Personnel Who Escaped
Communist Captivity on 10 December 1953.
Two former Republic of Korea Army soldiers, dressed in Com-
munist uniforms, escaped from the North and voluntarily surrendered to the
UNC at a point South of the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone.
These persons had been impressed into the military service of the Com-
munists. Their true identity was confirmed by UNC. UNC proposed a joint
MAC letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission requesting in-
vestigation. The Communists called the charge "groundless fabrication" and
"slander" and refused to agree. On 18 December 1953 the UNC made a uni-
lateral request to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to investigate
the charge of forcible retention and impressment. The Poles and Czechs took
the view that the violation occurred in the North, but since the escapees
were at Munsan-ni, an investigation in the South could not reveal what was
going on in the North. On 22 December 1953, the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission informed the UNC that its request was not agreed to. On 18 and
26 January 1954 the UNC made requests for Mobile Inspection Teams to in-
vestigate Communist units in the North. Both requests were aborted by the
response of the Czech and Pole members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission to the views of Lee Sang Cho as expresoed in his letters of
19 and 27 January 1954. (See item 3 summary)
7. fllegal Explanation in Violation of Paragraph 3 and Paragraph
11. Terms of Reference for Neutral Natiors Repatriation Cppmission.
On 20 January 1954, as the Ncutral Nations Supervisory
Commission prepared to return the prisoners of war,
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-6.
the Communists set up public address systems to harangue the prisoners
of war in the South Camps. This message was equivalent to "illegal"
explanations. Also their messages threatened that prisoners of war
who headed South would be killed by Communist fire from the North.
The Communists never answered this specific charge.
8 :stit
the
:es
am of Movement
OZ
ction b
Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.
The UNC charged that the Communists did not permit free
movement of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in any of the five ports
of entry in the North; allowed Neutral Nations Inspection Teams to
inspect only what the Communists report, and did not permit Teams to
examine manifests or shipping documents or to check train schedules.
This obstructed and interfered with Neutral Nations Inspection Team
performance of duty. The Communists narrow interpretation imposed a
minimum freedom in the North compared to maximum freedom in the South.
The Communists said they had strictly complied with the Armistice
Agreement. (See 2 above) (See 9 below).
9. Illegal Introduction of Combat 4ircraft at Uilu.
In October 1953, the UNC requested a Mobile Inspection
Team be dispatched to Uiju to investigate a charge that the Communists were
illegally introducing combat aircraft in crates. The team was dispatched.
The initial inspection of the airfield, conducted on the first day after
arrival, was very limited in scope and was guided by airfield commander*
No evidence was found* The Swiss and Swedes wanted to inspect rail-
ways and highways but the Poles and Czechs blocked this motion. On the
was
7th day a more extensive inspection of the airfield was made. No evidence/
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uncovered. The airfield commander refused to make a satisfactory accounting
for the aircraft present at the field. The Communists interpreted the nega-
tive results at Ulju as a positive indication that they adhere to Armistice
Agreement and that UNC charges were "fabrications". (See 2 and 8 above.)
10. r_ra_:atioirgAlofAuthoizelntefeencewithOeidNewMedi
Representatives.
One of the provisions of the "Understanding of Administrative
Details" in connection with the Displaced Civilians Program was that news
media representatives be authorized to cross the military Demarcation Line
and observe operations in the reception area of the other side. When
three UN accredited newsmen entered the Communist reception area on
2 March 1954 and began photographing the unloading of Koreans being
assisted north by the UNC, the Communists objected and forced the newsmen
to return tqf their vehicle.
The UNC protest in the 38 MAC meeting was followed up in
the 39th meeting by an offer to receive any suggested revision of the
particular paragraphs of the agreement on the Displaced Civilian Program
which would permit the Communists to understand the agreement better.
The Communists replied to the charge made at the 38th
meeting by charging the UNC with violating the same provisions of the
agreement by sending the newsmen across the Military Demarcation Line.
Their reply to the suggestion in the 39th meeting that they might want to
propose a revision of the agreement was to the effect that if the UNC
wanted a change, the UNC could submit it, but that the Communists felt
their concept vas correct.
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11..ung.Jel.Aviliaza.
The Communist charge that the UNC was abducting Kacestn
civilians was countered by a UNC charge that the Communists were
merely covering up for their failure to attract returnees and to carry
out the provisions of paragraph 59 of the Armistice Agreement. Paragraph
59 related to the transfer of civilians between North and South, The
UNC challenged the Communist claim that they had "publicized widely" the
contents of paragraph 59, calling this a relative matter and pointing
out that as of 18 February 1954 Communists had publicized the article
for only six days compared to UNCIs 35 days. The UNC quoted Radio Peking's
report that registration had been completed in the North; explained
that paragraph 59 does not limit the duration of registration; and
called on Communists to repudiate Radio Peking. The UNC charged that
the Communist program had been inadequate giving only "lip service" to
the publicity required by paragraph 59. The UNC said that no genuine
registration procedure existed and the above facts indicated a premed:id-
tated plan to deliberately avoid fulfillment of the requirements of
paragraph 59, and so charged the Communists. The UNC also charged
Communists with brutality and irhumanity in the long marches and imprison-
ment imposed on civilians. At a Staff Officers meeting on 18 February
1954. the UNC gave the Communists a roster of 2,831 Republic of Korea
officials who had been kidnapped from Seoul by the Communists and re-
quested that these 2,831 be informed of their opportunity to return to
the South. In MAC 38 and 39, the UNC asked Communists for an answer
to this request, reminding them that no reply had been received,
The Communists called the UNC charges groundless slanders,
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and maintained that they had complied strictly with paragraph 59.
This Communist attitude continued in MAC meetings 42 and 43, after
the UNC again reminded them they they had still failed to r eply
regarding the 2,831 Republic of Korea civilians.
12. Conspiracy of KPA/CPV. Czechs. and Polp_tio_Rissi_..edit uNg.
The UNC claimed that the Czechs and Poles were endeavor?
ing to whitewash the KPA/CPV and blacken the reputation of the UNC
by deliberate unneutral acts, distortions of facts, confusing simple
reporting procedures, creating disorder, harassing and frustrating
UNC efforts and picking at minuitia, while condoning and protecting
the KPA/CPV procedures in the North.
13. In addition to the above, the allegations of air
and ground violations of the Demilitarized Zone were as follows:
UNC Charges Against Communists
Ground
Charged 11
Denied 6
Admitted 2
Incomplete 3
Air
Charged 40
Denied 15
Admitted
Incomplete 25
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TAB
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June 3, 1955
comurisT TRUCE VIOLATIONS - INDOCHINA
On April 26s 1954, the Geneva Conference met to discuss the
possibility of restoring peace in Indochina.
In July 1954, Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities in
Indochina were issued by the Conference.
By mid-August 1954 protestations of violations of these Agree-
ments by the Communists began to pour into the International
Control Commission.
I.
Viet Minh Violations of The Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities-- Indochina
Reasons. - The Viet hinh has given clear evidence that its activities
are a part of Communist world strategy rather than a local Vietnamese move-
ment. The death of Stalin gave Viet Minh leaders a perfect opportunity to
reassert openly both their allegiance to international Communism and their
aim of establishing an integrated Communist regime based on that of the
Soviet Union and the Peiping regime.
In an article in "The People's Army", Larch 1953, General Vo Nguyen
Giap, Defense Minister of the Viet hinh, quoted President Ho Chi Minh's
oath "always to be strictly bound to the Soviet Union and to follow exactly
the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin." This was only one of
many statements made by top party officials. Viewed in the light of such
utterances, and the experiences in China and Korea, the Viet Minh can be
expected to comply with the tenets of international Communism of which
cease-fire violations are a part.
History. - In Communist doctrine a truce or "cease-fire" is a means
to an end, not the ultimate objective. Therefore, the Communists have no
Nowt
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compunction about violating a cease fire whenever it appears advantageous
to do so. As in China during the political negotiations in 1946, the
cease-fire was (and still is) a means of gaining a respite. The respite
gives the Communists an opportunity to strengthen their forces while their
opponent abides by the "cease-fire rules": relaxes his guard, and loses
whatever advantage he may have pe,sessed. The period of truce Is ac-
companied by a propaganda barrage of "peace" or "coexistence", while a
gradual build-up of Communist forces takes place. Subversive cadres in-
filtrate non-Communist areas and set up their Communist administrations
either overtly or covertly.
The over-all program for Southeast Asia was formalized in Peiping
six years ago (1949). At that time and in that place the World Federation
\se of Trade Unions* sponsored what was ter:Led a Trade Union Conference of
Asian and Australasian countries. Actually, it was a meeting to set up
the usual program of guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity, subversive
"united front" arrangements, labor strife and intensive pro-Communist and
anti-democratic propaganda.
To maintain a facade of peaceful intentions, the Communists depend
largely on infiltration and subversion. These prepare the ground for
"free elections" Communist style and, if the elections fail, the Communists
are prepared to resort to force. The Geneva Agreements have scheduled
*The W'TU which organizes congresses, aeetings and training courses has
provided an opportunity for meetings of Communists and sympathizers all
over the world. At the meetings they discuss the most effective methods
of local application of the directives laid down by the Central Comdittee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
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the elections in Vietnam for 1956. In South Vietnam all conditions for
subversion are favorable, in addition to the fact that the population
has grown apathetic in the face of constant terror and a powerful mili-
tary threat from the North.
In such fertile ground the Communists are busy at one of thcir
favorite tasks, that of absorbing and disrupting by politico-subversive
methods the functions of a government. Contrary to the provisions and
spirit of the truce agreement they have been establishing Communist forms
of government in areas under control of the South Vietnam Government, and
thus are threatening existence of that government.
Politico-Subersive Cadres and Guerrilla erations
Although much publicity has been given to guerrilla operations, the
main threat is in the politico-subversive cadres which establish the under-
ground governments. In Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, these cadres
are guided and controlled by the Lao Dong Labor Party (Communist Party),
while the guerrillas are under the control of the Defense Ministry. Thus
the guerrillas receive orders from the political cadres wham they support.
In South Vietnam the combined politico-guerrilla operations of the
Viet hinh have three primary missions:
1. Establishment of Communist local governmental control
machinery in areas nominally under non-Communist control.
This technique enables the Communists to establish "base
areas" in support of military operations long before the
actual consolidation of the "Revolutionary' government.
2. Support of military operations.
3. Intelligence.
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The steps in the process of forming Communist underground govern-
ments are:
Politico-subversive cadres, organized with great care and detail,
with armed (guerrilla) support are sent into the area to establish
provincial, county and city governments. Governmental functions are set
up. On paper these functions (listed below) give an appearance of
benevolence and efficiency but in practise show up the duplicity and sham
of the Vietminh, the illusory nature of the benefits they promise ending
in the final subjugation of the population for the benefit of the state.
Provisional Peo le's Ommillaalgalampaga
Section Duties
1. Staff Member Guidance
Selects and recommends persons for
appointment in Provisional People's
Committee,
2. Confidential Processes important documents; inspects
districts.
3. Finance
4, Labor
5. Health
6. Purchasing
Education
8. Planning
Taxes, records government property and
issues licenses.
Handles pensions, insurance planning;
settles labor disputes, improves con-
ditions, conscripts labor.
Inspects facilities; distributes relief
planning of medical supplies and sani-
tation.
Purchases monopoly goods for resale to
public.
Establishes primary level schools;
selects, appoints, discharges teachers;
inspects schools.
Compiles and maintains statistics and
records
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Section
Duties
9.
Food Administration
Maintains food rationing system.
1.4
Agriculture Production
Handles agriculture affairs, provides
aid to farmers, taxes farm products.
U.
Lives-tick Production
Improves, immunizes livestock; grants
permission for slaughtering.
12.
Propanda
Explains government policies, conducts
indoctrination, propaganda and agitation.
13.
Forestry
Maintains conservation of forest.
14.
Road and Building
Maintains road and buildings, community
planning.
15.
General Affairs
Miscellaneous affairs not covered in
other sections.
Once the above functions take some semblance of order, the Communists
immediately begin to establish training courses for all new mambers they
found "liberation schools" to indoctrinate the population, orgarize party
programs and newspapers for propaganda purposes. While "investigating"
the problem of land distribution, the Communists actually start distribution
(a favorite Communist tactic) in order to secure popular support. The
peasant who yearns to own land is unaware that upon the completion of the
communization process he will neither own the land nor the fruits of his
own work,
International Control Commissions and Their Problems
A control commission can only be effective if both sides act in good
faith. In Indochina, through its many violations (some of which are men-
tioned in this paper and the annex) the Viet Minh has flaunted the
authority of the Commissions. It has substantially increased the capa-
bilities of its regular army in North Vietnam and has retained a significant
capability for political and para-military operations in South Vietnaml
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to
Cambodia and Laos. The Viet Minh has:
1. augmented the material strength of its armed forces by
shipments of military equipment from Communist China;
2. failed to evacuate all military personnel from South Vietnam
and Cambodia;
3. consistently sought to consolidate administrative and political
authority in areas under the de jure .authority of the governments
of south Vietnam and Laos;
4. failed to permit the free movement of refugees;
5. failed to observe the cease-fire in Laos.
The Commissions are working undcr handicaps which are directly duo to
the provisions of the accord. This was true in China during the cease-
fire negotiations; it was true in Korea and now in Indochina. The com-
position of the Commissions, which includes Communists, makes unanimous
agreement almost impossible on certain questions. In China, Korea and
Indochina, the Commissions have the choice of uncritical acceptance of
assurances given by the Communists or the almost impossible task of carry-
ing out an effective investigation in an atmosphere of terror and deceit.
Communist Reaction to Exposure of Cease-Fire Violations
????Mfaianly.?
The Communists will continue to resort to their usual techniaue of
using a highly-organized propaganda machine to accuse others, especially
the United States, of the type of violations of which they are gully.
Tho Communists have intensified their anti-U.S. campaign to such an extent
that the Viet Minh press is devoting 50 percent of its space to articles
denouncing American imperialism. This technique has been successful in
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the past in propagandizing people under their control as well as in
nautxal countries. Any confusion works to the benefit of the Communists
since they violate the "cease-fire" deliberately for strategic reasons.
Reasons for Communist Violations
The Communists' aim is a united Indochina (including Laos, Cambodia,
North and South Vietnam) under a Communist Government. In a public state-
mont on September 2, the ninth anniversary of the Vict Minh independence,
Ho Chi Minh declared that "victory will be ours." Throughout the speech
the goal of unity, indopendence and democracy was repeatedly emphasized.
Ho reiterated anti-United States and anti-colonial sentiments and appealed
for united opposition. The speech indicates the Viet Minh determination
to gain control of all Indochina. He implied that this control will be
achieved by political action, but that the Viet Minh intends to regroup
their Army and hold it in readiness for any eventuality.
The Viot Minh efforts will continuo to take the following shape in
the three Associated States:
1. Laos. - Expanded Pathet Lao (Communist) forces will continue
to evade and break the truce agreement and to consolidate their
control over Northern Laos. Attacks on the Laotian National
Amy units have been resumed. These will be designed to enlist
popular support by chalking up Pathet Lao successes. (Two
Laotian National Army commando posts were attacked by Pathet
Lao forces on January 12. Tho attacks occurred Just aftor the ICC
mobilo toam loft the area.) Lo rocontly as April 23, 1,000 Pathet
Lao troops attacked the 600-man garrison in Sam Neua Province.
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2. Vietnam. - The Viet Minh will expand underground in the South
using their politico-subversive and terror techniques. They
will be aimed at having do facto control pass to Ho Chi Minh
without too much overt disturbance. If the Communists fail to
win the elections in 1956, a swift coup may be attempted. (On
December 19, 1946, Ho Chi hinh openly broke the then "cease-
fire" agreement with massacres in Hanoi, Tourane and Hue).
3. Cambodia. - The Viet Minh foothold is the weakest in this area,
especially since the strong and successful stand by the Cam-
bodians at Geneva against a Viet Minh regrouping area inside
the state. But once the Communist control all Vietnam and Laos,
Cambodia may be powerless to resist,
IV.
Conclusion
The International Control Commission has been prevented by Communist
delaying tactics and by collusion between the Polish delegation and the
Viet Minh, from investigating and fixing responsibility for major Viet
Minh violations of the Geneva Agreements. But in spite of any positive
results the International Control Commission may achieve, violations may be
the
expected to continue until such a time as/indigenous governments became
considerably stronger, the Communists take over all of Indochina by
politico-subversive methods or there is a resumption of hostilities.
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ANNEX
VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS (JULY 1954) ON CESSATION OF
HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA
This Annex on the violations of the agreements on cessation of
hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia presents evidence of the pre-
meditated pattern of the numerous violations committed by the Communists.
Pertinent examples were chosen from the compilation of violations in
order to illustrate how a "cease-fire" is one of the instruments of Com-
munist policy. The main points of this Communist cease-fire policy are:
1. Strengthening and regrouping of military forces - Articles 15,
17 and paras. 4, 12, Joint Conference Declaration (Vietnam);
Articles 4(c), 13(2), 15 and paras. 3, 4, 12, Joint Conference
Declaration (Laos); paras. 3, 4, 12, Joint Conference Declara-
tion (Cambodia).
2. Establishment of politico-subversive cadres or underground
governments - Articles 14(a), 14(b), 15 (Vietnam); 4(c), 13(2)
(Laos); Art. 4 (Cambodia).
3. Creating an atmosphere of fear and terror by reprisals and
impeding refugee travel - Articles 14(c), 14d and para. 8
(Vietnam).
4. Failure to exchange all prisoners of war and liberate political
prisoners - Article 21.
Art. 4 (Cambodia) deals with the withdrawal of the foreign
armed forces and foreign military personnel from the
territory of Cambodia.
Official estimates at the time of the cease-fire agreement held that
the number of Viet Minh regular and irregular forces in Cambodia totalled
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,000. The Viet Minh, informed the International Control Commission that
4,050 Viet Minh regulars were to be evacuated from Cambodia by
October 19, 1954. Only about 2,700 regulars had been withdrawn. These
evacuees carried a bare minimum of armament far below the actual
strength of the units. The Viet Minh have intentionally left behind
substantial cadres and arms depots for subversive purposes and future
armed dissidence.
In Battambang province the Viet Minh had announced an anticipated
450 evacuees; only 250 materialized.
The Khmer-Viet Minh forces in Cambodia were not disarmed by the Viet
Minh by August 22, 1954, as specified in the cease-fire agreement.
Arts. 4(c) and 13(2) (Laos) deal with the routes for with-
drawal of forces of the ...Vietnamese People's Volunteers in
Laos from Laotian territory which are to be fixed on
the spot by the Joint Commission.
The Viet Minh have utilized secret withdrawal routes to avoid
detection of abducted Laotian personnel. The specific charge against the
Viet Minh, laid before the plenary session of the International Control
Commission on September 29, 1954, was the use of secret routes in the
transport of troops or transport of troops on stipulated routes without
notification to the Commission of the exact time in order to avoid
inspection.*
*The intention of the Pathet Lao Communists in Laos) according to a
captured Viet Minh document, is ostensibly to conform with the cease-fire
agreement but actually to leave cells behind them as they withdraw; to
take with them for training and indoctrination as many young Laotians
as possible; and to build up the Pathet Lao with the intention of
ultimately taking over the country.
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Arts. 14(a) and (b) (Vietnam) state that the conduct of
the civil administration in each regrouping zone shall
be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be
regrouped, and that after transfer and complete evacua-
tion of troops the other party shall assume responsibility.
Provisional Assembly Areas. Most of the Viet Minh areas south of
the 17th Parallel, i.e., the Provisional Assembly Areas of CA Mau,
Xuyen Moe and Plains des Jones, have been technically evacuated by Viet
Minh forces. Repeated and consistent reports reveal that Viet Minh
military-political cadres continue to retain de facto control of the
local administration and to conduct activities designed to maintain the
population under Communist control. In the Plaine des Jones area alone,
only an estimated 14,000 Viet Minh evacuees have been withdrawn from an
announced quota of 200000.
Arts. 14(c) (Vietnam), 15 (Laos), 6 (Cambodia), declare that
each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or dis-
crimination against persons or organizations on account of
their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee
democratic liberties.
The Vietnamese Government has formally charged that on July 31,
1954, the Viet Minh assassinated Le Van Qui, non-commissioned officer
of the regional militia (Bao Chinh Quan) at Ngo Duong Huyen de An -Duong
(Kien An province), North Vietnam. Intellectuals and landowners were
forced to wear military uniforms so their forced evacuation with Viet
Minh troops will go undetected.
The Vietnamese Government has charged that on August 21, 1954, three
members of the Viet Minh, armed with rifles, attacked agents of the Hanoi
Security Service near the Lang Pagoda.
Refugees from the Red River delta asserted that some teachers who
had chosen to stay within the Viet Minh zones and had declared their
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loyalty to the Viet Minh had, nevertheless, been arrested and thrown into
cages for public exhibition. A Viet Minh agent was carrying secret orders
for the assassination of certain Vietnamese in the Phu Tien area prior to
the withdrawal of the Viet Minh forces. The marked men were those believed
to be strongly anti-Viet Minh and possibly aware that the Viet Minh was
leaving behind cells and arms cadres.
Art. 14(d) and Para. 8 of the Joint Conference Declaration
(Vietnam) state that from the date of entry into force of the
present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed,
any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party
who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other
party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authori-
ties in that district.
During October, members of three regular infantry divisions and local
regional forces were blocking, by force, the movement of refugees in the
south zone of the delta. The Viet Minh has been preventing and continues
to prevent evacuation of people from this area by:
1. Intimidation and force. - Refugees encounter roadblocks where
soldiers refuse them permission to pass, separate children from
parents and arrest leaders of groups. Armed Viet Minh junks
patrol the coastal waters to prevent escape by sea, and depart-
ing boats are fired upon.
2. Barring refugees from transportation. - Almost all travel in
the Tonkin Delta requires water transportation, but Viet Minh
officials control passenger boats, ferry boats and bridges-and
prevent their use by refugees. Trucks, busses, and bicycle
carts are forbidden to carry refugees.
3. Economic penalties. - A would-be refugee is not allowed to sell
his property but must forfeit all except that which he can carry.
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Public charges that the Viet hinh was obstructing the free movement
of refugees from North Vietnam were set forth as early as September 250
19541 when Premier Ngo Dinh Diem asserted that Viet Minh authorities were
obstructing the departure of 200,000 Vietnamese from North Vietnam.
The Vietnamese Government has charged that on August 18, 20, and 22,
19541 members of the Viet Minh distributed tracts at Hanoi and Haiphong
maligning the National Government of Vietnam and exhorting the population
not to evacuate.
Flagrant infraction of the Geneva Agreement occurred during late
October and early Novelaber 1954 when, according to some press service
estimates, from 20,000 to 40,000 Catholic and Buddhist refugees sought to
flee the provinces of Nam Dinh and Thai Binh, North Vietnam in the face
of a determined Viet hinh effort to thwart their departure.
On October 30, 1954, representatives of the National Catholic Welfare
Conference in Vietnam reported that "thousands" of Vietnamese desirous of
leaving Viet hinh zones were forcibly being prevented from doing so. Viet
Minh agents and militia, it was said, struggled physically with the refu-
gees; strangled an elderly Catholic to death; fired on boats of refugees
as they pulled away from shore; patrolled the roads leading from the
villages to the beach; forced the inhabitants of non-Christian villages
to come out and grapple with departing refugees and to snatch babies
from refugee mothers so as to force the mothers to remain; and attempted
to prevent refugees from buying food so as
villages from sheer hunger.
On November 61 1954,
to force them to return to their
reported that until October 27,
1954, the Viet Minh sought to thwart refugee departures by any means short
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of the actual use of firearms. On the night of October 27, however, the
Viet Minh machinegunned two sailing boats and wounded several refugees.
French authorities reported at least four instances in which the Viet Minh
had fired on refugees. (As evidence, the Haiphong team of the International
Armistice Commission was reportedly confronted with the wounded refugees
and two boats--one with bullet marks on its side and on one oar, the other
with a bullet-pierced mast.) By November 3, 1954, the Viet Minh was said
to have buttressed its internal efforts to prevent refugee departures
with armed junks that patrolled the Bui Chu coast. Thus, a double barrier
was erected before the fleeing refugees.
On November 9, 1954, Western press services reported that some 4,000
to 5,000 Catholic refugees had managed to reach on November 8 the sandbar
island of Tra Ly, a few miles.orthe coast of Thai Binh province, where
they were stranded and in danger of drowning at high tide.
French efforts to rescue these refugees by sea were met immediately
by strong Viet Minh protests. Their memorandum to the French High Command
on November 10 termed French rescue efforts an "infringement upon the
territorial sovereignty of the Vietnam Democratic Republic" and the
French were warned that they would be held fully responsible "for eventual
incidents if the above-mentioned acts of violation continue." A strong
protest against the Viet hinhis attitude in this regard was lodged with
the International Armistice Commission by the head of the French military
mission in Hanoi on November 10, 1954; and despite Viet Minh and Polish
attempts to delay an investigation of the situation, three mobile teams
were dispatched by the Commission into the area of Nam Dinh and Phat Diem.
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On November 13,
reported that the Viet Midi con?
tinued to treat "intended" refugees with such violences that it was becoming
an "international disgrace." "The Viet Minh have been using physical
violence ranging from bludgeoning to gunfire." Regarding the activities
of the International Armistice Commission's investigatory teams,
reported that a request by the Commission to the Viet Minh for
permission to allow French ships or trucks to evacuate refugees or at least
to permit a mobile Commission team to go by French ship or helicopter to
Tra Ly immediately, was refused. Instead, the Viet Minh is said to have
offered to allow the Commission to go by road to the coast near Tra Ir
after a 24?hour delay for "preparations." The Viet Minh threatened to
fire on any ship or helicopter that approached the area. A Saigon press
release stated that upon Commission intervention, the Viet Minh had agreed
to permit French ships to enter its "territorial" waters if the Commission
was given prior notice each time and if a member of the Commission was
aboard the ship concerned. However, the existence of such an agreement was
denied by the head of the French military mission in Vietnam who stated
that the Viet Minh had thus far refused all such requests.
The Viet Minh has assured the Commission that it would do nothing to
prevent refugee departures. Yet, refugees in Haiphong continued to charge
that they are being hampered by the Viet Minh in their efforts to reach
areas in which the International Armistice Commission team is operating.
It may be significant in this regard that the transportation of refugees
from Phat Diem to the Haiphong permimeter where they were turned over to
French authority was being carried out almost exclusively by water and in
Viet Minh craft. Thus, the Viet Minh has the opportunity at least to
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continue its obstructive tactics during the long river voyage if it chooses
to do so.
It has been ascertained that (1) during the period November 4-11)
French ships picked up approximately 10,000 refugees from the Tonkin delta
coast; (2) the International Armistice Commission teams dispatched to
investigate the Catholic refugee situation have not been given full
freedom of movement by the Viet Minh; (3) members of these teams were un-
able to ascertain the condition of the refugees stranded on the Tra Ly
sandbar; and (4) the Viet Minh, with the aid of the Polish members of the
Commission, have been dilatory and obstructionist to the detriment of the
Commission's efficiency and effectiveness in dealing with the rapidly
evolving refugee situation.
as:
Art. 15 (Vietnam) states that there shall take place a
disengagement of the combatants, transfer of military
forces, equipment and supplies of each party. The two
parties shall permit no destruction or sabotage. They
shall permit no interference in local administration.
The Vietnamese Government has cited truce-violation incidents such
1. The clandestine reinforcement of troops in Quang Tri province
on September 1, 1954.
2. The incitation of popular demonstrations against the authority
of the Vietnamese Government and Army.
3. The organization of guerrilla units below the 17th parallel.
4. The propagation of pro-Viet Minh propaganda below the 17th
parallel.
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Art. 17 (Vietnam) declares that the introduction into
Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types
of arms, munitions and other war material is prohibited.
The Joint Sino-Soviet-DRV Supply and Service Command in Nanning,
China, has moved large quantities of prohibited war material such as
heavy artillery and Soviet rocket launchers to North Vietnam. Since the
cease-fire, artillery, including 105 mm. cannon, was sent across the Sino-
Vietnamese border. Material received since the Armistice represents a
substantial increase in the inventory of Viet Minh artillery pieces, bazookas
and mortars. New items in Viet Minh hands include tanks and 88 mm. anti-
aircraft weapons. Aside from these, military-type aircraft have boon
sighted at Hanoi.
The Viet Minh Regular Forces have been expanded. Reorganization of
their forces indicates that up to nine new division have been or are now
being formed, including three artillery divisions and six infantry divisions.
These increases are the result of transfers from regional and popular forces.
In addition, support elements of existing units are being augmented to
include a larger proportion of organic artillery, heavy mortar, and
recoilless gun components at divisonal and regimental level. The expansion
and reinforcement of unit firepower was made possible by continuing large
shipments of Chinese Communist supplies.
Arts. 21 (Vietnam), 16 (Lao), 8 (Cambodia) deal with the
liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and
civilian internees within 30 days.
The Vietnamese Government as of September 3, 1954, charged that the
Viet Minh had failed to liberate the chief of the sub-district of Luang Duong
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(Thai Binh province): North Vietnam.
Officials in Saigon have estimated that at the end of hostilities,
55,000 members of the French Union forces were unaccounted for. Of this
number 25:000 were of Vietnamese nationality. By September 44 1954,
the Viet Minh claimed to have returned 11,882 prisoners (537 officers
and 11,345 other military personnel), of whom 8,082 were of European or
African origin, 5 of U.S. origin and 3,795 of Vietnamese origin. The
French Union High Command, however, claimed that only 11,706 were released.
The Viet Minh returned only 3:795 of the Vietnamese Army personnel
captured by them during the war. Although some of the men not officially
returned are either still interned as "politically-dangerous" or have been
clandestinely released after indoctrination, the major portion have been
removed from the category of prisoners of war and integrated into the Viet
Minh forces.
The presence of a camp near Nom Dau holding French Union prisoners
has been reported. The Viet Minh, however, claimed that these POW's are
French Expeditionary Corps deserters who have rallied to its side.
Hundreds of Legionnaires and North Africans have returned to Europe and
North Africa via Communist China and the Soviet Union. This method of
releasing European POW's to their home country is a prominent aspect of
Viet Minh POW policies.
Another favorite Communist practice is to sentence large numbers of
prisoners of war as war criminals.
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Paras. 3 and 12 of the Joint Conference Declaration (Laos)
state that in their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam, the Viet Minh will respect the sovereignt., in-
dependence and territorial integrity of the above-mentioned
states.
As early as August 27, 1954, the Laotian Government protested to the
Joint Armistice Commission for Laos that Viet Minh units in Laos were
forcing young men in the villages to join Viet Minh forces and move to
northern Laos for military training.
Official Laos reports on October 17, 1954, asserted that through
threats, intimidation and false promises, the Viet Minh had forcibly taken
away between 4,000 and 5,000 persons.
On January 31, 1955, Viet Minh elements crossed the Lan border into
Laos to reinforce the Pathet Lao (Communist).
In addition to the above violations of which only certain examples
are listed, there have been violations of Articles 10, 11 and 15c (Attacks
Against Vietnamese Army and Militia Units) violations of Articles 1, 2a,
4d and 19 (Attacks Against Laos National Army Units); violations of
Articles 2 and 4(4) (Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia); and violation
of Article 5 (Demobilization of Khmer Resistance Forces).
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TAB
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April 11, 1955
COMMUNIST DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL
2,215.
On November 24, 1954, the Chinese Communists announced over the Peiping
Radio that a Chinese military tribunal had imposed long prison sentences
on 11 American flyers and two other U.S. citizens who were in the employ
of the U.S. Army.
The announcement concerning the 13 Americans had far deeper significance
than was realized by the Western World. It calls for a reappraisal of Com-
munist motives in detaining and utilizing prisoners of war and a re-
appraisal of Communist law and legal proceedings as interpreted by their
nadministrators."
Policy of Detention and Exploitation
Since the cease-fire in Korea the United Nations Command has asked for
South
an accounting of 470 United States and 21410/Korean prisoners of war known
to have been in Communist hands. In addition, 15 United States fliers are
held in China; 41 United States civilians are being held by the Communists.
Information recently available has revealed that U.S. prisoners were taken
to Siberia in late 1951 and 1952. U.S. prisoners were observed during this
period at Man Chou Li, which is the transfer point on the border of Manchuria
and the USSR. Two trainloads of prisoners were transferred from Chinese
trains to Soviet trains on the Siberian side of the border. Among the
prisoners were large numbers of Negro troops.
The calloused and inhuman policy of the Communists, Soviet and Chinese,
toward prisoners of war in Korea resulted in the disappearance of 65,000
men of the United Nations Command. Of this number, 11,600 were victims
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of war crimes. During the truce negotiations the UN Command asked the
Communists for an accounting of 53,000 Republic of Korea soldiers captured
by the Communists. The Communists claimed they had been "released at the
front." Since that time thousands of these soldiers have escaped to South
Korea and have revealed that the term "released at the front" is a cover
phrase employed by the Communists to hide forcible impressment into their
armies or in prisoner-of-war slave labor battalions.
The utilization of these prisoners falls into two chief categories--
one for the soldiers of the Republic of Korea, the other for those of the
United States and other countries of the United Nations Command.
1. The Republic of Korea.
a. Forced impressment into the North Korean Armed Forces.
b. Impressment into labor battalions in support of the Com-
munist war effort and international goals.
c. Training for espionage, sabotage or other subversive
activities.
d. Purposes of propaganda.
2. U.S. and other UN countries.
a. Selected prisoners of war for propaganda work (some of those
in the Soviet Union will be used as radio announcers of which
there is a shortage in the USSR).
b. Converted prisoners of war, screened by the Soviets, will be
trained to be illegal residents in the U.S. or other countries
where they can live as Americans.
c. The identies and biographies of dead or even living prisoners
of war will be used in preparing legends for Soviet agents.
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Those prisoners of war who are found to be unsuitable will rarely be
released because they will have learned too much about Soviet handling
techniques and the Soviets would be condemned for withholding UN prisoners
captured in Korea.
History
The exploitation of prisoners of war by the Communists is not new.
It is an important aspect of their struggle for world domination in which
they use every illegal and even legal opportunity to further their own
ends. Enormous economic, military, and propaganda advantages were and are
drawn by the Soviets in using these men.
In the Korean War the same policy of exploitation was put into effect
by the Chinese Communists under the supervision of the Soviets. This time
it included all countries under United Nations Command,
The Soviet advisory system which in Korea exerted direct control
over all important policy-malang departments, extended to matters dealing
with prisoners of war. This resulted in a control-system in prison-of-war
camps in North Korea dominated at the top levels by Soviet officers.
Current Detention - Prison Sentences.
The events behind the current detention of the 11 U.S. fliers and
2 U.S. Army civilians, as broadcast by the Peiping Radio, are a matter of
record. The fliers, officers and crew of a B-29, flying a United Nations
leaflet dropping mission, were shot down on January 12, 1953 over North
Korea. It was not the only plane shot down by the Chinese Communists, but
it happened to carry a sufficient number of high-ranking officers to
supply propaganda material for the mock trial that had been taking place--
a type of trial with which the world is now, unhappily, only too familiar.
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The detention and illegal use of prisoners of war is deliberate Soviet
policy. Long standard Components of the Communist overall strategy,
they are insidiously planned to achieve a far-reaching goal. The Soviets
have successfully instructed the Chinese, North Korean and Viet Minh
Communists in their own techniques of exploiting prisoners of war for
political, psychological and subversive reasons. Having learned their
lessons well, the Chinese Communists then claimed that all United Nations
prisoners taking part in the "unjust war" were war criminals. The Chinese
told the captured soldiers that they of the United Nations Command had been
duped and misled by their reactionary rulers and that therefore certain
prisoners should not be executed but would be given the opportunity to
repent for their crimes.
In light of this policy, the sentencing of the U.S. airmen and
civilians did not come as a surprise. The move was a premeditated propaganda
move, planned as far back as July 3, 1952. Neither were the actual sentences
resulting from the trials in doubt. The question was purely one of proper
timing for political expediency.
On July 3, 1952, six months before the plane containing the sentenced
crew was shot down, another RB -29 photo-reconnaissance aircraft was shot down
over North Korea. On January 25, 1953, the crew under the command of
Lt. Theodore R. Harris was taken to Mukden, Manchuria. For more than
8 months, Lt. Harris and his crew were subjected to every device known to
the Chinese from moral pressure to extreme physical torture. Following this
a mock trial was held in Mukden which clearly showed the Communists, disregard
for all rules and regulations of justice as known to the Western world. To
quote some of Lt. Harris' own words:
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"I remained in this cell Tproximately 6 weeks. During this
period I was brought almost daily before what was explained to me
as a 'military court' to sit in judgment of my case. I repeatedly
asked by what authority I was held by the Chinese People's military,
and by what authority I had been removed from Korea. I never received
any answer or reason. On one occasion I asked that if this were a
court and I was being tried, why was I denied counsel. I did not
receive a satisfactory reply.
"Throughout the course of this so-called trial whenever I
attempted to speak out in my own behalf or to refute any of the
questions or charges, the officer-in-charge would fly into a rage
and in most cases would break off the proceedings. During much
of this mock trial I was forced to stand at rigid attention while
the questions were asked. Most of the questions asked during this
trial were irrelevant, but there was emphasis on the bacteriological
warfare charges, espionage, psychological warfare, and violation
of the sovereign territory of the People's Republic of China. Con-
siderable emphasis was given the charge that I had repeatedly violated
the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union. I was told that I had
to confess and if I confessed, the Chinese People's Republic would
forgive me and thereafter treat me as a prisoner-of-war instead of
a war criminal."
On January 12, 1953, a B-29 carrying Col. John K. Arnold was shot
captains
down over North Korea. In the aircraft wore a full colonel, a major, two/
and two lieutenants. The Harris crew was returned to Korea and later re-
patriated while the Arnold crew was taken to China. The higher ranking
officers--and the crew--of the Arnold plane were better fodder for the
propaganda trials than were the staff of the Harris plane.
Soviet-Chinese "LeFal" ProstqAma.
The Soviet textbook on international law, published by the Institute
of Law of the Academy of Science of the USSR (Moscow 1951), contains a
section on "Scouts and Spies" which reads: "A serviceman in uniform who
penetrates into enemy lines and the rear of the enemy cannot be considered
a spy." This section is international window-dressing, torWilenever it
suits their purposes) the Soviets disregard their own textbook promulgations.
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The Chinese Communists have followed in the footsteps of the
Soviets. The 11 U.S. fliers and 2 civilians were "convicted" by the
so-called Military Tribunal of the "Supreme People's Court of the People's
Republic of China." The chief judge was Chia Chien, a committee member
of the "Supreme People's Court." The defendants were prosecuted by
Yao Lun Military Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate of
the People's Republic of China."
The above Soviet type of "court" and "procuratorate", sham and
political in nature, has become standard with the Chinese Communists
and is used to give sOMB semblance of legality to whatever strategy they
are about to implement. Most criminal of these facades-of-justice
operations were those conducted by the Communist regime during 1950-54
when some 20,000,000 Chinese were slaughtered in 7 gigantic terror cam-
paigns.
These political courts and the judicial officers concerned with
carrying out the policies and programs of the Peiping regime, used the
judiciary as an instrument of oppression. In all civil and criminal
cases, the judge is guided by the orders and directives of the Communist
regime and the decisions of earlier Communist trials, unless some policy,
recently changed, makes it expedient to render a different decision.
These decisions are handed down by the political and legal committee
under the State Administration Council which is the policy-making
organization in the Peiping regime for all judicial matters.
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Propaganda Tie-In
Well timed with the Peiping radio farce was the release of John
Helmouth Noble and two other U.S. civilians from the Soviet Ilion. Ob-
viously the Communist brethArn were attempting to create an impression of
magnanimity in order to make the free world believe that they were not in-
transigent in their dealings with prisoners of war. The conclusion, they
hoped, would be that the 11 fliers were genuine spies. Dy releasing the
three Americans, the Communists also hoped to further a number of their
political and propaganda maneuvers: the embarrassment of the United States;
the Red Chinese claim to Formosa; the justification of the entry of Red
China into the United Nations; diversion of attention from their subversive
moves in Southeast Asia.
To recapitulate?the exploitation of prisoners of war is a regular
component of Communist policy. Until such a time as the United States and
the United Nations destroy the usefulness of "prisoners of war" as a Com-
munist weapon, the Comlaunists will continue to utilize them to further
their far-reaching objective of world domination.
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