IAC-D-50/3, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7,# December 1951+
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: IAC-D-50/3, National Intelligence Objectives
REFERENCES: A. IAC-M-115, 4 August 1953, item 7.
D. IAC-M-171, 5 October 1954, item 4b.
C. Memorandum frinii the Board, 6 Pecenber 1954.
1. IAC-D-50/3 was prepared by the Board in consultation with
representatives of the IAC agencies and the IPC pursuant to IAC
direction (IAC-M-115, 4 August 1953). Completion of the task was
delayed by the necessity for a thorough re-examination of the subject,
by the priority accorded to required estimates, and by difficulties in
coordination discussed in Reference C. However, if IAC-D-50/3 is
adopted, the proposed annual review of priority national intelligence
objectives will not be so difficult and time-consuming a task.
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SUBSTANCE
2. The present text is fully agreed at the representatives
level, except for the footnote on page 7. The Issue presented is
a matter of vital principle. Inasmuch as the text is that of a
directive rather than an estimate, the issue must be resolved in
one way or the other.
3. DCID-4/2 ensures priority for any military intelligence
collection requirement related to the Soviet Bloc over any other
objective, regardless of their relative importance considered from
an over-all, NSC point of view. NSCID-4 requires that appropriate
priority be accorded to the important nonmilitary intelligence
requirements indicated in NSC 3.62/2 and other NSC documents. The
Service representatives have finally consented to an expansion of
DCID-4/2 as proposed in IAC-D-50/3, Appendix B. The effect of their
footnote on page 7, however, would be to perpetuate the automatic
priority for all matters of military interest over all other national
security inte?ests which is now derived from DCID-4/2.
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4. The Board holds that Category I (highest priority) should
be reserved for the three most critical intelligence problems: the
likelihood of war, the Soviet capability to deliver a "knockout blow"
against the United States, and the Soviet capability to prevent the
delivery of such a blow against the USSR. To generalize the last
two into an all-inclusive reference to Soviet military capabilities,
as is proposed by the Sorvice representatives, would violate the
general principle of discrimination between degrees of criticality
in the determination of priorities. It would also violate the IAC's
explicit instruction to the Board to formulate priority objectives
in such a way as to enable the IAC to determine the priority of
guided missiles in relation to other topics (IAC-M-171, 5 October
1954) item 4b).
5. The State Department representative supported the Board in
this matter, but held that, if the Service representatives' proposal
was adopted by the IAC, item II(b) should also be raised to Category I.
The Service members of the IAC are likely to make this concession to
State in order to enlist its support for their proposed amendment.
The position which Mr. Armstrong would take in such circumstances is
uncertain.
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6. The Board recormien.s that the Director adopt the Board's
position as stated in paragrapri 4 above, and that he carry the
issue to tie NSC, if necessary. T:e Deputy Tiirector for Intelligence
and the Assistant Directors for Current Intelligence, Research and
Reports, and Scientific Intelligence concur in this recommendation.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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2S?4
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
, Jbecember 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: National Intelligence objectives
REFERENCE: IAC,.D-50/3, 30 November 1954
1. IAC-D-50/3, as submitted to the IAC, contains no analysis
supporting its recommendations. The draft adopted by the Board
and submitted to the IAC representatives did contain such an
analysis (attached hereto as Tab A) and two additional recorirmenda-
tions derived therefrom:
a. That the recommended annual review of priority
national intelli once objectives be conducted by
the Board of National Estimates in conjunction
with IAC representatives.
b. That your Special Assistant for Planning and Co-
ordination, in conjunction with IAC representatives,
be directed to review existing provisions for the
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development and coordination of specific information
requirements and collection tasks in conformity with
established priority objectives and to submit recom-
mendations to the IAC.
2. The Board found it impossible to secure general concurrence
in this analysis and these recommendations for reasons discussed
in Tab B. However, the IAC representatives have stated that they
anticipate no objection to the Director's adoption and implementa-
tion of the foregoing recommendations on the Boards recommendation
and his own authority.
3. The Board believes the implementation of these two additional
recommendations to be essential to the effective implementation of
the recommendations in IAC-D-50/3. Accordingly, the Board recommends
that, following the adoption of IAC-D-50/3, the Director:
a. Inform the IAC that the Board of National Estimates
will conduct the annual review of priority national
estimates, in conjunction with IAC representatives.
b. Request the IAC members to designate representatives
to collaborate with the Special Assistant for Planning
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and Coordination in reviewing the existing pro-
visions for the development and coordination of
specific information requirements and collection
tasks in conformity with established priority
national intelligence objectives and in submitting
recommendations to the I,C regarding their mainte-
nance or improvement.
4. The Board further recommends that you impress upon indi-
vidual members of the IAC the desirability of their being repre-
sented, in the review of priority national intelligence objectives,
by persons broadly informed in substantive intelligence problems
and deeply aware of the interests of the national intelligence
community as a whole.
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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TAB A
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OMITTED FROM IAC-D-50/3
1. NSCID-4
6. NSCID-4, adopted by the NSC on 12 December 1947, requires
the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the
other agencies concerned, to!
a. Prepare "a comprehensive outline of national intel-
ligence objectives applicable to foreign countries
and areas to serve as a guide for the coordinated
collection and production of National Intelligence."
b. Select, on a current basis, under the guidance of the
NSC Staff (now the NSC Planning Board), the sections
and items of this outline having priority interest, for
the priority guidance of national intelligence production.
7. NSCID-4 was adopted seven years ago, when concepts of inter-
departmental intelligence oordanation ., :re r 1 uzvc l and?1.v .~1oped, It
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is faulty in that, instead of assigning a mission, it prescribes
the technique whereby the mission is to be accomplished. An evi-
dent fallacy in the technique prescribed is the assumption that
a catalog of all matters of intelligence interest is prerequisite to
the identification of matters of priority interest.
8. There is no common understanding of the first requirement
of NSCID-4, for a "comprehensive outline of national intelligence
objectives." Reference to antecedent documents shows that the
drafters of NSCID-4 intended that "outline" to be a detailed ana-
lytical listing of all subjects of intelligence interest, in fact
a consolidation of the Army Index Guide, the Navy Monograph Guide,
and other similar departmental collection and monograph production
guides. Seen in this light, it is apparent that this requirement
for a "comprehensive outline" has been met, not by DCID-4/1, which
purports to serve that purpose, but by the NIS outline (NIS
Standard Instructions, June 1951) prepared pursuant to detailed
direction in NSCID-3 (13 January 1948). Inasmuch as the requirement
for a "comprehensive outline" is adequately covered by the provisions
of NSCID-3, the problem, as regards the implementation of NSCID-4, can
be narrowed down to its second paragraph, that concerned with the
determination of priority objectives.
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9. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, particularly
in order to eliminate the awkward and unnecessary prescriptions of
NSCID-4, the Board of National Estimates was inclined to recommend
a revision of that Directive to provide general direction without
prescribing a particular technique. There is, however, a counter-
vailing consideration: it is undesirable to burden the National
Security Council with this obscure matter which, in the light of
NSCID-l, it is undoubtedly willing to leave to the discretion of
the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
10. Conclusion. NSCID--4 is faulty, but, as a practical matter,
it is unnecessary and inexpedient to recommend its revision at this
time. In this case, however, NSCID-4 should not be strictly construed.
II. DCID-
11. DCID-4/1, dated 5 February 1948, is an apparent evasion of
the first requirement of NSCID-4. It lists 15 "national intelligence
objectives" (i.e., general categories of information of intelligence
interest) "generally applicable to all foreign areas." Of necessity
these 15 "objectives" are stated in such abstract terms as to be of
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no practical utility. as a basis for selecting critical or high
priority objectives. Even as a guide to routine intelligence col-
lection and research, DCID-4/1 is manifestly less "comprehensive"
and useful than the NIS Standard Instructions.
12. As long as NSCID-4 remains unrevised there remains a formal
requirement for a "comprehensive outline of national intelligence
objectives." The Board of National Estimates considers that the
NIS Standard Instructions satisfy this requirement and that the
only remaining requirement is for a DCID on priority objectives.
Certain representatives, however, maintain that nonpriority objectives
cannot be given proper consideration without,a DCID covering the:, and
for that purpose have offered, in substitution for DCID-4/1, generalized
statements of objectives which they construe to be the required
"comprehensive outline." The position of the Board is that, if a
general DCID would indeed be useful, it should be adopted without
argument as to whether it is in fact a "comprehensive outline" within
the original intent of NSCID-4.
13. Coiclusions: DCID-4/l should be revised as in Appendix A.
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III. DCID-4 2
14. With evident regard to the second requirement of NSCID-4,
DCID-4/1 contemplated the subsequent issuance of priority listings
of national intelligence objectives by countries and subjects.
DOID-4/2 was the only such listing ever to be issued as a DCID.
15. DCID-4/2 was based on JIC 542/7, "Critical Intelligence
Objectives of the Department of befense with Respect to the USSR,"
approved by the JIC on 22 May 1950. JIC 452/7 identified five
priority intelligence objectives exclusively related to Soviet mili-
tary capabilities. DCID--4/2, issued on 28 September 1950, was sub-
stantially identical except for general reference to Soviet intentions
as well as capabilities and for the addition of two highly generalized
references to political warfare. The order of listing was stated to
be an internal order of priority, with the five military intelligence
objectives listed first. On 12 June 1952 DCID-4/2 was amended to
cover explicitly "the USSR and its Satellites (including Com=ist
China)." The second revision, 4 August 1953, was the insertion of
a reference to clandestine attack with weapons of mass destruction.
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16. The preoccupation of DCID-4/2 with Soviet military capa-
bilities and intentions was a natural consequence of its origin
and of the circumstances of 1950. The determination of Soviet
military capabilities and intentions must remain a matter of
highest intelligence priority in any foreseeable circumstances.
The military emphasis of DCID-4/2 (Second Revision), however, is
not consonant with current estimates that the Kremlin is unlikely
to resort to military action with identifiable Bloc forces, that
the active threat to US security is likely to be a vigorous Commu-
nist political warfare campaign designed to undermine the Western
Power position, and that them; is danger of a weakening of the
unity of the Free World.
17. DCID-4/2 is also not consonant with NSC 162/2, "Basic
National Security Policy," approved by the President on 30 October
1953, which indicates a need for intelligence on Soviet vulner-
abilities as well as Soviet capabilities. Moreover, NSC 162/2
expressly calls for intelligence on probable developments in the
capabilities and intentions of friendly and neutral states as well
as of the USSR.
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18. Any listing of priority national intelligence objectives
should be reviewed, and possibly revised, at least annually. The
most appropriate time for an annual review would be as soon as
possible: after the completion of the major annual Soviet Bloc
estimates now scheduled for the second quarter. On a semiannual
basis, such a listing; slight well be reviewed early in the first and
third quarters.
19. Conclusion.: DCID-4/2 (Second R(:visj.on) should be super-
seded by a new DCID setting forth an expanded list of priority intel-
ligence objectives in consonnance with NSC 162/2. Provision should
be made for the periodic revision of this new DCID.
IV. DCID-
20. Pursuant to DCID-3/5 (1 September 1953) the Board of
National Estimates, in consultation with the NSC Planning Board
and with IAC representatives, prepares quarterly a program of
national. intelligence estimates for the ensuing 12 months. The
latest example of such a prograua is IAC-D-1/9 (7 October 1954).
IAC approvals of these successive revisions and extensions of the
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estimates production program are in effect determinations regarding
national intelligence objectives. They are not, however, identical
with the determination of critical objectives contemplated in Section
III above. For one thing, the estimates program will include some
estimates scheduled on a basis of current interest or long-term
significance rather than on a basis of immediate or continuing
critical importance. For another, the estimates program itself will
not identify the critical factors in the estimates scheduled. Never-
theless, the identification of critical national intelligence objec-
tives and the programming of national intelligence estimates are
closely related subjects.
21. The actual initiation of specific estimates is accomplished
through terms of reference prepared by the Board of National Estimates
in coordination with IAC representatives to serve as a basis for con-
tributions. These terms of reference do analyze the information re-
quired for the particular estimate and consequently afford a basis
for a priori identification of critical factors in the situation to be
22. The critical deficiencies in available intelligence which
become apparent in the course of preparing an estirate are the subject
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of post-mortem vreview by the Board and IAC representatives in
important cases (see IAC-D-57 and -65), it is now agreed that
such a review shall be conducted semiannually (IAC-M-151). As an
effective means of identifying intelligence deficiencies, post-
mortem findings are an important contribution to the forriulation
of priority national intelligence objectives. They are not to be
taken, however, as in themselves a statement of such objectives.
23, Conclusion: The Board of National Estimates, in consulta-
tion with the NSC Planning Board and in coordination with IAC repre-
sentatives, is the appropriate body to develop and maintain the pro-
posed DCID on priority national intelligence objectives, subject to
DCI and IAC approval of each periodic revision.
V, CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
(This section, as amended, was incorporated in IAO-D?-50/3 as
Appendix C.)
VI. SUPPLEMENTARY ACTION REQUIRED
31. IAC adoption of a statement of priority national Intelligence
objectives would not obviate the need for the estimates prograrmming,
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terms of reference, and post-mortem procedures now in effect. These
procedures should be continued, and the resultant estimates programs,
terms of reference, and post-mortem findings should be regarded as
supplementary guidance for intelligence collection and research.
32. The translation of priority national intelligence objectives
into specific information requirements and the translation of such
requirements into specific collection tasks requires action by re-
search and collection personnel.. Existing provisions for the accomplish-
vent of these tasks, especially those for interdepartmental coordination
with respect thereto, should be reviewed for the purpose of recommending
improvements as necessary. Such a review is essential to ensure the fall
effectiveness of any system for determining priority national intelligence
objectives, but is outside the scope of the present problem. Moreover,
the Board of National Estimates is not the appropriate body to conduct
such a review.
33. Conclusion: The Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning and
Coordination, in collaboration with IAC representatives, should be
directed to review existing provisions for the development and coordination
of specific information requirements and of specific collection tahks,
and to submit recommendations to the IAC.
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TAB B
FACTORS AFFECTING THE COORDINATION OF IAC-B-503
1. The problem presented in IAC-fl-50/3 is, essentially, how
to provide long-term guidance from policy planners (the NSC Planning
Board) and intelligence estiriators (the Board of Notional Estimates
and the IAC representatives with whom it normally collaborates) to
intelligence collection and research. It is axiomatic that collection
and, research personnel need such guidance and are not in a position
to supply it to themselves. For years it has been their complaint
that no effective means have been devised to provide it for, them,
despite occasional earnest efforts on the part of several full-time
intelligence planning staffs. Reference of the problem to the Board
of National Estimates implied an IAC desire for a radically new ap-
proach from a more comprehensive point of view than that of those
who had hitherto failed to solve it.
2. The Aoard reviewed the history of the subject since 1946,
and, although not eager to add to its own burdens, concluded that
estimates personnel (itself and its colleagues in the departmental
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agencies) were in the best position to translate planners'
intelligence requirements into priority national intelligence
objectives through the identification of the critical substantive
intelligence problems. At the sane time, the Board recognized
that intelligence objectives, as thus determined, could not serve
as the final formulation of specific collection requirements. In
the Board's concept, it would be the function of estimates personnel
to translate planners' requirements into intelligence objectives,
the function of research personnel to translate such objectives
into specific information requirements, and the function of
collection personnel to translate such requirements into specific
tasks of collection. Thus each would have his appropriate function
in the over-all plan -- but it was essential to the concept to
recognize that the formulation of intelligence objectives is not
a proper function of collection personnel.
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The Service agencies, however, treated the formulation
of national intelligence objectives as though it were primarily a
collectors' problem. Although the Board communicated with them
through their respective estimates staffs (its normal. channel),
the matter was referred internally to their chiefs of collection,
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who initially appeared as agency representatives. Subsequently
certain of these representatives were replaced by front office
personnel, but the collection element continued to dominate
consideration of the subject in the Service agencies. This
circumstance had a severely adverse effect upon coordination.
Li. None of the IAC representatives with whom the Board had
to deal in this matter had ever acted with it before in the pre-
paration of a paper for IAC consideration. At the first meeting
with them it became apparent that the confidence in mutual good
faith which has been developed among estimators since 1950 was
altogether lacking at the collectors' level. The atmosphere was
like that which prevailed generally before 1950: the Service
representatives frankly assumed that any proposal by an element
of CIA must ipso facto be designed to entrap them. The tone of
discussion improved materially when front office personnel replaced
certain of the collectors as IAC representatives -- that change
alone made possible such progress as was achieved with respect to
the subject -- but by that time the Service agencies' position had
been strongly prejudiced, so that it was never possible to secure
candid consideration of the Board's draft in its entirety.
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5. DCID-4/2, in effect, assured priority to any collection
requirement proposed by a Service agency,. regardless of its actual
importance in relation to national security considered from an NSC
point of view. Service collection personnel were naturally loath
to impair the monopolistic position which they thus enjoyed. How-
ever, any review of DCID-4+/2 in the light of NSCID-4, and consequently
of NSC 162/2, necessarily entailed an expansion of priority national
intelligence objectives to assure appropriate consideration for non-
military matters of major importance in the broader view of national
security. The Board understood that that was precisely what the IAC
had directed it to do. The original Service representatives, how-
ever, emphatically refused to rake any significant change whatever
in DCI D-4/2. The front office personnel who replaced them withdrew
from that untenable position and accepted the Board's draft of
Appendix B as a basis fcc coordination, but their footnote on item
I(c) is a manifest attempt to maintain the advantage enjoyed under
DCID-4+/2 while acknowledging that other matters not mentioned in
DCID-4/2 are worthy of some secondary consideration.
6. The Service representatives were not well qualified to
discuss the relative importance of the items listed in Appendix B
as substantive intelligence problems within the context of over-all
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national security interest. Consequently their consideration of
relative priority was governed almost entirely by calculation of
procedural advantage or disadvantage for their respective agencies,
and the over-all national interest when by default except insofar
as it could be maintained by the ward with some support from State.
7. The Service representatives, in effect, refused to act
on the analysis presented by the Board in support of its recommenda-
tions, except that they accepted a portion of it as Appendix 0.
Their objections to the remainder took the form of flat denial of
demonstrable historical fact and of questioning the relevance of
matters which the Board supposed the IAC would wish to know about
in acting on the subject. The underlying objection, however, was
probably to the tendency of the analysis to demonstrate that the
previous directives had been grossly inadequate, that estimates ?.
personnel are best qualified to formulate priority national intelligence
objectives, and that procedures for the application of established
priority objectives should be thoroughly reviewed. The Board considers
the specific objections raised to have been ill-informed and invalid,
but deemed it expedient not to prejudice such constructive action as
was possible by prolonging a hopeless argument.
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8. Although it may cover corresponding substantive objections,
the position taken by the Service representatives with respect to the
additional recommendations presented in the covering memorandum was
strictly legalistic: that it was inappropriate 221, IAC representatives
to make recommendations involving the assignment of tasks to component
elements of CIA. Having taken this position, they could not object
to the Board's direct submission of these recommendations to the
Director. They anticipated no IAC objection to the Director's
adoption and implementation of them on his own authority.
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