POST-ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R005200300002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 19, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

CONFlDENTAL
Approved MSkFellWarreill99Mere A7go_p
CENTRAL INTELLIGEN:CE AGENCY82
INF NIATION REPORT CD No.
COUNTRY Nicaragua
=mar Fbst,Clection Activities in Nicaragua
N111111111
DATE DISTR.10 Jim 50
NO. OF PAGES 2
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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1.IMINEEMEMMEM Anastasio Somoza and the Liberal
25X1X Party gained a majority of the votes caston. 21 May 29500 However, conditions
were such that an honest and fair election was impossible. An atmosphere of
terror had been built up during the preceding weeks, and it required courage
as well ad an independent income to cast a vote against Somoza or even to
anything favorable concerning his opponent. The Guardia Nacional maintained
Way good order on election day, but instances were noted where Conservative
supporters were stripped of their banners and treated rather roughly by Liberals,
sith the open encouragement of Guardia soldiers. It was considered unwise for
anyone to take SOMOZ8 propaganda off the walls of their onn hames. The last?
and probably most effective, strategem devised by the Somooistas was a small
card stating that the holder had voted for 6OMOZ8 and signed by the poll
attendant, These cards, dubbed "La megnificati by the people, were given to
the voter after he put his cross in the Liberal column. They are new being
sold at varying quotations,
25X1 X
20 The final results announced on 28 May were as follows: Liberal Votes 153,297i
Conservative Votes 490404 Total 202,6980
this total is padded considerably., and that the total number of voters probably
did not exceed 10000000 Maey Liberal supporters voted two or more times and
there was a great deal of abstention on the part of Conservatives. Truck loads
of men were brought into Managua to build up the Liberal lines at the polls
25X1X and thereby impress diplomats and visiting correspondents.
1111.11111MINIMM no serious opposition activities are planned at this time
by the Conservatives. The Party is split and demoralized. After several
heated meetin-s the Junta Directive of the Party agreed to abide by the pact
and enter the gov0Pnment as an opposition group. However, in a manifesto
the Conservatives,frotested that the election was a fraud, The faction which
opposed the pact the first place plans to lie low for a time before making
any plans,
4. Following his election Somoza made many changes in the cabinet and the diplomatic
and consular oorps. Of importance are the naming of Col. Anastasio Somoza,
Jr. as chief of Staff, replacing Col. Francisco Gaitan, and the sending of
Col. Carlos Eddy Monterrey to New YOVA City as Consul. Gaitan has been made
Mininter of War, but his influence in the Guardia will very likely be less
than formerly. Monterrey had been head of the Air Force.
CLASSIFICATION ir CONFIDENTIAL
STATE #
ARMY
NAW
AIR
NSRB
DISTRIBUTION
This document Is hereby regraded tci
CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
letter of 16 October 1978 from the
Director of Central Intelligence to the
Archivist of the United States.
Next
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Major Garcia had said that his awn transfer to New Orleans as Nicaraguan
Consul, and the naming of Colonel Carlos Eddy Monterrey L. as Consul in
New York mere not routine changes, as had been reported in the press.
It is alleged that General Somoza had been informed that Ilenberrey and
Garcia had discussed the necessity of overthrowing Somoza, owing to their
belief that Somoza?s assumption of the presidency again was going to din-
please the other American governments, particularly the United States.
Garcia is supposed to have told General Somoza that ha could not live on
the salary paid, to which Somoza is said to have replied that he was sorry,
but that Garcia could always resign. many restrictions
had been placed on Garcia for the sole purpose of forcing his resignation.
6. According to Garcia, General Somoza was anxious to keep these incidents from
being known, therefore, he did not discharge the two officials, but transferred
them to posts outside the country as the first step in getting rid of them.
Garcia never admitted to his brother-in-law that he and flbnterrey had actually
discussed the overthrowing of the Somoza regime; instead he insisted that the
report was invented by their enemies in the Guardia, particularly Colonel
erancisco Gaiter'', now i`inister of var.
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