MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY RUSK, MR. BELL, MR. MARK, ADMIRAL RABORN FROM R. W. KOMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100050013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 19, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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D, 6/26/2003
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON April 19, 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Bell
Mr. Marks
Admiral Raborn
Attached is my Saigon report. I am also sending copies to
the other addressees below.
It represents my own, still tentative, views as to the core
elements of a more effective non-military program. I would
be grateful for any reactions you have, and will hope to touch'
base with each of you personally soon.
%"*~
40e, Al.
R. W. Komer
cc: Messrs. Ball
Gaud
Alexis Johnson
McNaughton
W. P. Bundy
Poats
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Subject: Komer Report on Saigon Trip
This more detailed report is confined to my main business -- backing
up our non-military effort in Vietnam. It touches on the military and
political situations only as they bear on the civil reconstruction effort --
which is often. While I still regard myself as a "new boy" on Vietnam,
and my conclusions as necessarily tentative, I stand fully behind them
at this point. '
1. General Conclusions
While our splendid military effort is going quite well, our civil programs
lag behind -- for understandable reasons.
The Mission in Saigon is beginning to bring more order and focus to the
civil side and we can do a lot better, if we concentrate on first things
first.
To achieve the necessary resi}lts, we must ourselves give higher priority
to (and expand) certain key pacification programs, especially Cadres and
police -- if necessary at some expense to the military effort.
Two critical dangers can lead to undermining our whole civil and indeed
military effort -- inflation and continuing political crisis which is sapping
an already feeble GVN.
There.is one major difference between our military and civil programs.
The former is largely self-contained; it brings its own logistic tail and
local security with it, for example. The latter must necessarily operate
mostly through;a feeble GVN. The sheer weakness of the GVN is the
greatest bottleneck of all. Yet feeble though it is, strengthening it as the
preferable alternative to the VC is the purpose of the exercise. We must
try to build up a stable, progressive GVN, rather than (as some suggest
in their frustration) largely taking over the civil as well as military role
in Vietnam. Efficient as this might be, it would probably be self-defeating.
So we must on the one hand accept the constraints of working through the
GVN, while on the other seeking to increase its effectiveness and our own
4h~?
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leverage on it. Porter quite agrees, and we will study ways and means
of using package "self help" approaches despite the risks and frustra-
tions involved.
More can probably be done in this category -- through a combination of
discreetly applied persuasion, inducements, and if need be pressures.
Surely the fact of our rapidly growing investment in Vietnam should give
us some greater influence, even though it makes us more the GVN's
prisoners at the same time.
We must also guard against tr in to doto much too soon, lest we not
do anything well. Concentrating rather than unduly dispersing our effort
in the initial phases (and then expanding) is the key. The answer here is
to sort out our priorities on the civil side, and create the basic building
blocks before erecting too much superstructure. We can spur a socio-
economic revolution in a non-country even during wartime, but it won't
be easy at best. It may be well nigh impossible unless we focus our
efforts and phase them properly. If we can't pacify the countryside and
control inflation, all our other ambitious enterprises may go for naught.
Another reason for cutting our suit to fit the cloth is that of not overload-
ing the GVN. Moreover, the present regime, if indeed it lasts, will be
caught up in the assembly elections and constitution-drafting. So there
is a powerful case for getting at least the minimum essential RD and
anti-inflation decisions out of the GVN before it again becomes utterly
preoccupied with politics.
All in all, Porter and I believe that we need urgently a phased overall
-dan, with a set of meaningful priorities, for the civil side. We see
roughly two phases -- first that of pacification and reconstruction and
later a development phase -- though the two can overlap in some areas.
But some programs, however desirable for the longer term, must be
postponed if necessary should they compete unduly with first phase
priorities. Porter and I are working on a directive (perhaps to be is sued
as a NSAM) for discussion in Washington and Saigon (at Tab is our first
joint draft). Certain key components of the first phase are discussed
below.
II. Pacification (Revolutionary Development). Key aspects of this
problem deserve highest priority -- and greater emphasis. Unless we
and the GVN can secur`'e'..nd hold the countryside cleared by military
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operations, we either face an ever larger and quasi-permanent military
commitment or risk letting the VC infiltrate again.
A whole melange of forces, organizations and activities have been
engaged in local defense, local security, and getting the countryside
functioning -- Popular Forces, Auto-Defense, Cadres (PATs), police,
etc. There is a strong case for rationalizing this structure by building
up the two most promising elements -- the cadres and the police, while
gradually phasing out the others. Some phase-out would probably be
essential in any case because of the increasing manpower shortage (see
below).
A. Cadre Expansion.. While the RD program has some questionable
aspects, it seems the most promising approach yet developed. The RD
ministry led by Gen. Thang is better than most, and the Vung Tau and
Montagnard training centers are producing 5500 trained men for insertion
in 59-man teams into 93 villages every fifteen weeks. Others besides
myself who visited Vung Tau were also quite impressed.
But Porter" sees even this rate as insufficient to keep up with
"the growing military capability to sweep the VC out of key areas. " He
urges rapid expansion via building another training center (which held
like to get Seabees to build). The aim is roughly to double cadre output
from 19, 000 to 39, 000 trained personnel per year. He thinks this rate
could be reached by end CY 1966. I agree with Porter and will press
this concept at the Washington end.
There is some question as to whether the chief instructor at
Vung Tau (Capt. Mai) may be attempting to indoctrinate the cadres for
sectarian political purposes. Porter has investigated and is satisfied
that this is controllable.
B. The National Police. We are building toward a 72, 000 man goal
by 1967. A promising new concept is the Police Field Forces (PFF),
which are expected to reach 15, 000 of the total. These latter fill the gap
between US/ARVN operations and the return of normal conditions.
Lightly armed and ground mobile, they assure local security in the village
complex after ARVN moves out, by aggressive patrolling action. There
is a case for expanding the PFF -- as well as other police activities --- as
the chief permanent force to maintain local security in Vietnam. Some
Vietnamese officials fa rdr going to 130-150, 000.
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C. Chieu Hoi (Defector Program). This is not strictly RD, but
bears upon it. In any case, there are few programs which produce a
higher rate of return for the piddling sums invested. The March total
of returnees -- 3, 366 -- was the highest yet. I'm most discouraged to
hear that the GVN wants to cut this program back for budgetary reasons.
Let's cut somewhere else if necessary. However, the US hasn't
emphasized enough getting returnees (and refugees) integrated into civil
life.
D. Land Reform. On this Honolulu program the GVN doesn't seem
to be going anywhere fast. Porter regards land reform as primarily a
matter of political timing. Covert resistance of the landlords is the key
problem. Lodge will have to handle this directly with Ky, who has the
legislation and the land available. This might help win votes at the right
time.
E. Area Priorities. We and the GVN are committed to the four
National Priority areas, even though some may not be those where
greatest progress is feasible. As our effort expands, we ought to add
other priority areas. By and large, I favor more attention to those areas
where greatest progress is feasible, perhaps because of the competence
of GVN province and district chiefs, degree of GVN control, etc. We
should back success, and put our resources where they will be best used.
By the same token we may want to withhold resources from those districts
even in National Priority areas -- where because of corruption, incompetence,
etc. , they are not being well used.
I personally favor more attention to the Delta (IV Corps) region,-
which contains eight out of Vietnam's 15 million people and is its chief
rice bowl.
F. Better Coordination of Civil and Military Planning. Clearly we must
dovetail the military's sweep operations and civil pacification. My impression
is that, since the military are moving ahead faster than the civil side, we
need to beef up the latter to get it in phase. There's, little point in the
military clearing areas the civil side can't pacify. On 'the other hand, security
is the key to pacification; people won't cooperate and the cadres can't function
till an area is secure.
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The Mission believes that Lodge's weekly Mission Council
meetings and Porter's weekly Liaison Group sessions will help provide
the necessary coordination. Porter also has an able MACV colonel
-- Hollis -- in his office for the purpose. Porter is now requiring
MACV to come up with a coordinated military plan on who sweeps and
who then shields while the Cadre teams are inserted.
But I suspect that MACV's forward planning has yet to be
adequately complemented on the civil side. The Mission should begin
developing a pacification plan to go along with each of MACV 's campaign
plans as soon as the latter planning cycle begins.
The situation is somewhat better with regard to resolving competing
{ claims for resources. Here Lodge and Porter seem determined to rule
between civil and military claimants. Here too, however, comparable
forward planning is essential to afford a rational basis for choice. I will
look further into this matter.
Somehow the civil side appears reluctant to call on military
resources, which are frequently the best and most readily available. I put
everyone politely on notice that I would have no such hesitations --
provided that the case was demonstrable -- and that this was at the express
request of the Secretary of Defense.
III. Licking Inflation. This is fast becoming problem No. 1, and is already
as critical as the RD effort. Nothing can more quickly undermine the
already rickety GVN government structure and its popular acceptability
than rampant inflation. The need is now widely understood (Lodge too is
now focusing personally on it). Much thought has been given to anti-inflation
measures in both Saigon and Washington, but not enough has actually been
done as yet.
The relative feebleness of the GVN means that we may have to lower our
sights on what measures we can expect :it to take. This view is shared by
the Mission (TOAID 6657). The GVN's performance to date on the Honolulu
package is disappointing; any likely successor regime may be weaker yet.
This suggests that: (1) while continuing to press for GVN action across-the-
board, we should concentrate on the most realizable measures; (2) we
should design if possible, a package of inducements and pressures to give
us leverage on these; (3,),, we must necessarily also focus on what US steps
are essential -- these at least are within our own ppwer to do.
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Coping with inflation cuts across just about every USG activity in
Vietnam. It is as much a problem of managing military resources as
civilian. We must mount a USG-wide attack on the problem, as one
of our top priorities, and try to regain the momentum lost since
Honolulu.
A. We must carefully screen the whole US military/civil construc-
tion program. Wehrle has calculated that the 1966 military building
program ($20 million a month -- to rise to $40 million) is the same as
a $200 billion construction program in the US -- think of this inflationary
impact on our economy. We should screen -- here and in Saigon -- both
the whole program and each construction project; marginal projects may
have to give, or special techniques (e. g. "turnkey" proposal for new
Hue/Phubai airfield) used to minimize impact.
The same must be done on the civil side. For anti inflationary
as well as priority reasons, certain investment-type projects may have
to be postponed until a later phase, when inflation is under control and
the country more pacified.
B. Port Congestion. I spent much time at Saigon Port and talking
with military and civilian port experts. Wehrle and others see clogged
ports as the key inflationary bottleneck. We have plenty of supply
programmed to meet the demand but we can't get it in and distributed.
Our huge military buildup has saturated a previously inadequate port
system. We must get the military out of the Saigon commercial port area
as soon as feasible. This problem will ease somewhat as new port
construction is completed, but will remain acute through at least mid-1967.
RMK's New Port project for our military outside Saigon won't be com-
pleted till May 1967. So we need a whole series of interim remedies:
1. We may be forced to ask the US military to take over Saigon
port. They're naturally much more efficient than AID, which has to work
through the Vietnamese. Lodge is prepared to do so if necessary and to
ask the GVN to authorize it on grounds of urgent national defense needs.
But AID operations are improving, especially since Gen. Brakestone
arrived. He's optimistic about several new expedients, and I saw visible
improvement.
2. One bottleneck is the slowness of Vietnamese importers in
picking up goods from the port area. A new GVN penalty and confiscation
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system just approved should help. Mann is also high on a big US-run
(or equipped) trucking company, which would take stuff from the port
and dump it on the importer's doorstep if necessary.
3. Westmoreland should be urged to keep giving high priority to
military port work, even after his own logistic problems are eased
(which will be sooner than on the civil.side). Otherwise MACV might be
tempted to shift priorities.
4. Shipping space priorities also need review. Why should all
military cargo take precedence over civil? We now have a MACV/ USAID
shipping group, but this problem needs to be attacked at the Washington
end too.
5. Since Saigon is the worst problem, we should make a maximum
effort to ship directly to other ports. I queried Gen. Brakestone on the
2, 000 tons per day USAID has coming in and then being shipped out; he
said more could be done but that much of this was for the IV Corps delta
area, which had no port of its own. Query - could Vung Tao be used?
C. Deflationary Fiscal Measures. We probably have to shift strategy
and accept some greater degree of inflation. The Honolulu program is
probably too ambitious for a feeble GVN, e. g. its hard to force increased
taxation from a non-government. Wehrle says we'll have to settle for
restraint, not stabilization. Nonetheless we must keep trying hard.
1.. The Fowler proposals to sop up piasters are worth a good
college try, despite their political unpalatability here. We ought to see
how far the IMF can get.
2. Devaluation will probably be necessary, in Wehrle's view by
summer. He strongly favors a wage increase first, to help keep the poor
civil servants from stocking arms. Devaluation thereafter will perpetrate
a cruel deception, so at least a few months should intervene.
3. Allowing selective price increases on non-essentials is
probably inevitable, if we are to hold the line on essentials.
D. The Rice Problem. Rice is the key staple, and central to
controlling the cost of living. It doesn't make sense to buy it for dollars
in the US or elsewhere'a*Ad ship it in, if we can reduce this need by
liberating more rice in Vietnam itself, especially in the rice-rich Delta.
Another major advantage is that we would deny this rice to the VC.
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First, the GVN needs to control the flow of rice more
effectively. Porter has some imaginative ideas on how to do so via
providing and controlling the bags in which the rice is moved.
Second, we may want to give even higher priority in key cases
to military operations protecting the rice harvest. I was greatly
impressed with the results of the recent 101st Airborne rice collecting
operation in the Tuy Hoa area, which got around 40, 000 tons compared
to 9, 000 last year (if I recall correctly). Rice is a key VC target, so
these operations are militarily justified as well.
Third, Porter is considering setting up rice buying centers to
give the peasant a decent price, and thus an incentive to fight the VC
for his rice.
E. In sum, we urgently need a revised action program of both US
and GVN measures to lick inflation before it licks us. All here in
Washington must focus on this. We also need a detailed negotiating
strategy, including pressures and inducements, to get the GVN signed
on.
IV. Manpower Rationalization. The drain of years of war, VC recruit-
ing and the growth of GVN and US activities is fast creating an acute
shortage of usable Vietnamese manpower. This has reached such pro-
portions that every sizeable new manpower demand must be largely at
the expense of some existing activity. Twice while I was in Saigon, for
example, MACV questioned expansion of civil programs because they
would compete with the planned military expansion.
Contributing to this problem is the proliferation of GVN activities.
There is a bewildering variety of military, intelligence, and civil organi-
zations -- all using up bodies. Misuse of the draft is still a scandal.
One urgent need -- to which Westmoreland fully agrees -- is a rationaliza-
tion of manpower study, perhaps done jointly by the US and GVN. Con-
solidation of various military arms, with consequent reduction of over-
lapping headquarters, may be indicated. As Gen. Krulak told me, this
little country has an incredibly complex chain of command. A caution,
however -- many outfits are personal fiefdoms of Directorate members
and other political, personalities.
Porter regards the Pobraar Forces -- about 130, 000 strong -- as the last
remaining big manpower reservoir. Arguing that the Cadres largely
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overlap their local defense function, he favors robbing the PF for
Cadre recruits. I gather MACV has yet to be convinced.
Query -- are returnees and refugees being tapped adequately?
V. An-Giang Development Showcase. An-Giang in the Delta is probably
the most completely pacified of the 43 provinces -- a stronghold of the
Hoa Hao sect. Gen. Thang has already allocated it for 1966 an RD budget
of 100 million piasters, double that of any other province. Porter wants
to superimpose on this a larger development program now being discussed
in the Mission. This may be a very useful showcase; Porter and I will
pursue it at our respective ends.
VI. Reporting System on the Civil Side. Secretary McNamara stressed
before I left the importance of a firmer and more systematic fix on what
is really happending on the civil side. What areas do we really control?
I hit this hard. Porter was already moving on this problem, and is con-
vinced of the need. The new system of province reporting -- direct to
Porter -- will help greatly. He and I also agreed to examine ways and
means of getting better statistics, more systematic reporting and reliable
indices of progress on the civil side -- Saigon 4051 is one result. Porter
has the action, and I'll keep needling him.
VII. Personnel Matters
It is no secret that we have urgent civil side problems of recruiting,
replacement, working conditions and morale, which have significant impact
on our ability to carry out effective programs. Lodge, Porter and I are
struck by the relative inflexibility of normal USG civilian agency procedures
when-applied to Vietnam. The Mission needs better backstopping on this,
and I propose to help. Clearly we must treat Vietnam as a special. wartime
situation and evolve special procedures which will meet its unique needs.
In general, our first need is to attract and retain top people. Second, and
related, is to keep high morale in the field.
A. The Talent Drain. This is perhaps the most serious. I'm told we
have a better top team in Saigon now than ever before. It certainly seemed
impressive tome. But all the key people except Porter and Mann -- to
wit Wehrle, Habib,, Wilson, Zorthian, Condon, Jorgenson -- are leaving in
the next several months.
These are dedicated men, and many of them would extend were it
not for the difficult family and leave arrangements, which are doubly
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onerous because of the pressure conditions under which these men live
and work. Moreover, an unconscionable amount of the time of top people
is spent arranging how to get to Bangkok or Hong Kong to see wives, etc.
B. Getting Better People for the Provinces. Lodge wanted me to
tell you that he is organizing the civil side to keep programs going in the
provinces regardless of top level changes in the GVN. To this end we
need more direct contact with the provinces to get a better line on the RD
effort, and probably more US people there. Lodge also thinks the quality
of our province reps (especially AID) is low; he says only 20% are any
good; Porter (who knows) says it's more like 50%. Since top notch province
people are essential to success of our expanding RD effort, this is a top
priority for special recruitment. The Mission favors seconding able young
FSOs and field officers (Major Lt. Col.). With 7-9, 000 men rotating
home monthly from Vietnam, we ought to be able to screen out a few
talented, dedicated people who'd be willing to stay. Mann is charged by
Porter to set up a screening procedure.
C. Visitor Burden. The burden on a wartime theater is grossly
excessive -- 1400 VIPs and 3700 senior officials in 1965. The curve is up
for 1966. Another aspect is that the cost per visitor is an estimated
$4, 000 without counting security protection.
Everybody recognizes the problem, but not enough is being done
about it. Lodge and Porter understand the political importance of
Congressmen, Governors, and certain other VIPs, but say can't we cut
back the entourages and the lesser officials. They can read the cables.
We need a real screening system, or rather one for the military and one
for the civil side.
D. Understaffing and Replacements. While in general we should be
chary of too many Americans in Vietnam (4, 700 non-military there
already), enriching the civil side would be a drop in the bucket. Mann
says AID is understaffed, especially in the. Controller's office and CIP
branch -- both important. We also need a more systematic long-term
replacement scheme.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS.
As a result of my Saigon visit, Porter and I intend to focus on the
following as matters of urgency, -- in close liaison with Washington
agencies and our mission in Saigon:
A. Develop an overall non-military plan of action, with proper
phasing and realistic priorities, to complement our forward military
planning and buildup.
B. Give effective top priority to expansion of key pacification-type
programs -- RD. cadres, perhaps police, etc. -- adding or diverting
resources from other programs including the military where needed.
C. Develop and put into effect soonest a revised anti-inflation
package, including control of US resources as well as GVN stabilization
measures.
D. In this connection, pay special attention to port congestion, now
a key bottleneck on the civil more than the military side.
E. Work out ways to coordinate our civil and military programs
more effectively, and in which our military can help the civil side.
F. Work on rationalizing the use of GVN manpower, first in terms
of.a US set of priorities and then of selling this to the GVN
G. Develop more effective leverage on the GVN to get it to do the
necessary.
H. Get a handle on the top level civilian' talent drain in Vietnam and
help develop more effective personnel and replacement procedures for
this unique wartime situation.
I. Firm up the necessary data base and progress report system to
give a better picture of what's really going on in the non-military sphere.
lei
R. W. Konpr
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DRAFT NSAM
Civil Reconstruction in Viet-Nam.
1. From the time of the Honolulu Declaration it has been our national
policy to give emphasis to civil reconstruction comparable to that given
military operations. Indeed, the two must go hand in hand, for there
is little lasting value in defeating VC main force and sweeping rural
areas if the VC move back in again after military operations are com-
pleted.
2. So first principle must be to carry out a concept whereby civil
reconstruction keeps pace with those military operations which clear
areas and, more importantly, the government commits itself to perma-
nent defense of population within cleared area. In some cases, when
large-scale military operations unnecessary, civil reconstruction may
be first priority. V
3. Second principle must be to carry out rural reconstruction -- indeed
all military and non-military programs in Viet-Nam -- in manner which
minimizes growing inflationary risk to a fragile Vietnamese economy.
Rampant inflation can destroy social fabric of country as readily as VC
insurgency, and would creme climate in which loss of confidence in GVN
would powerfully assist VC.
4. Third principle must be not to overload fragile GVN with more than
it can do with reasonable efficiency. Major deference between military
and non-military programs in Viet-Nam is that latter must be carried
out primarily through GVN. But GVN is a feeble instrument already
stretched thin -- competition for manpower between different programs,
especially between military and civil programs already intense.
5. All three of above principles clearly suggest a fourth; we must avoid
like the plague proliferation of programs which will (A) compete unduly
with primary short-term objective of rural construction; (B) add unduly
to inflationary pressures; (C) stretch GVN resources too thin. Otherwise
we will be defeating our own primary purposes. In practical terms this
means we must have a clear s ens a of prioritie's r Repeat a clear s ens a of
priorities I The number of things we can and should do to achieve a
socio-economic -revolution in SVN is endless, but in order to lay the in-
dispensable foundations we must do first things first. Repeat we must do
first things first. So'm'e' programs, however desirable in the longer term,
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2
must be postponed if necessary and fitted into a scheme of priorities
whereby they will complement and build on the pacification programs
rather than compete with them.
6. One can distinguish perhaps two phases of effort lasting over
several years, and both going on simultaneously in various areas:
A. Reconstruction Phase.
Restoring normal conditions, getting civil economy going again.
B. Development Phase.
It is recognized that each phase may start at different times in
different parts of Viet-Nam, and that there is considerable overlap
between phases. This precludes a too rigid deferentiation between first
and second phase activities during actual implementation of civil
reconstruction programs. Example would be construction of secondary
school in secure district town in order complement lower level school
construction in outlying areas.
7. In practice this will mean postponing certain otherwise desirable
activities, while (and this is critical) expanding certain'other programs
which are critical to successful completion of the first phase.
A. Priority programs in reconstruction phase.
1 Revolutionary Development Cadre.
2) Administrative improvement of village/hamlet's tructure.
3) Police backup - police field forces,
4) Land reform.
5) Rural economic assistance activities.
A) Hamlet school program
B) Rural health
C) Agricultural programs - Fertilizer, Seeds and Insecticides
D) Self-help
E) Repair of roads and bridges
6) Refugee Assistance.
7) Chieu Hoi.
8) Psywar operations.
(Last three activities - 6, 7, and 8 - also ongoing during military
destruction phase.) or
i
B. Priority programs in development phase.
1) Continuation first-phase a v'
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2) Rural electrification.
3) Accelerated agricultural programs (see Freeman report).
4) Irrigation (E. G. , Dredges).
5) Industrial development.
6) Water supply (E. G. Drilling Rigs).
7) Permanent road and bridge infrastructure.
8) Expanded and improved credit facilities.
9) Technical and secondary education facilities.
10) Increase police forces.
11) Increase training and recruitment of civil servants
and technical personnel.
12) Expand public facilities and plant (E. G.',' Postal, Telephone,
Telegraphic).
C. Practical steps to carry out above plan.
1) Expand number of RD group
2) Increase police support
3) Lick port congestion
4) Other anti-inflationary moves
5) Rllationalization of manpower use
6) Expand Chieu Hoi and refugee programs
7) Agriculture and land reform
D. Relationship of above plan to US Military Program
Better designed to complement military effort. Reserves some
civil programs.for later when military construction tapers off (making
civil programs less inflationary) and when more military resources become
available for civil tasks. Must work out priorities between civil and
military programs, and resources asked of military for.. civil purposes.
E. Relationship of above plan to political situation.
While plan necessarily assumes reasonable degree political stability..
It enhances political stability by better focusing of demands on GVN '
resources and reducing inflationary impact.. But if weaker government
emerges, we have to trim our sails.
F. Relationship of above plan to US objectives in Honolulu declaration.
Above plan provides rational basis upon which Honolulu goals can be
.implemented, In short term, it may lead to postponement or curtailment
of some activities , ,agreed upon in Honolulu.
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