EXPANSION OF RD CADRE PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100050012-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 21, 1966
• Content Type: MF

Execuffrr
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THE WHITE HOUSE
April 21, 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Administrator, AID
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Expansion of RD Cadre Program in Vietnam
Attached is a proposal informally given to me by our Saigon
Mission. Ambassador Porter and I felt we should short-circuit
the usual procedures and prepare the way in this manner, because
of the urgent need for quick USG decision if action is to be com-
pleted in 1966.
The proposed doubling of the cadre program is one of the programs
which Porter and 1 believe should stand at the top of our non-
military priority list in Vietnam. Despite certain weaknesses the
cadres are the best technique we've developed yet for the pacifica-
tion of the countryside behind the shield of USIARVN military
forces. But at the present rate of cadre output, pacification will
continue to lag behind our military capability.
Porter recommends rapid construction of a new training center to
.enable an increase in the annual training rate from 19, 000 to
39, 000 per year by the end of CY 1966.
To do so, it will be necessary that
A. We give this program manpower priority for recruitment,
if necessary at the expense of the Popular Forces. MACV may
have some reservations, but I gather that the Washington sense
of priorities is clear.
B. CIA continue as supervisory, control, and planning agency
because of the urgency of the matter. We can't afford to change
horses in midstream.
State Department, NSC reviews completed
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C. USG agencies, and this probably means largely the
military, make available promptly to CIA any personnel and
material needed for the new training center, particularly a
Seabee unit and shipping facilities.
Given the high priority of this program, I would appreciate your
reactions and if possible agreement in principle as soon as
feasible.. Could I ask for a reply by 26 April.
R. W. Komer
Special Assistant
to the President
cc: Messrs. Vance
Gaud
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MEMORANDUM
April 6, 1966
To: Robert W. Komer,
S:,Lcial Assistant to the President.
From: William J. Porter, y
Deputy Ambassador, Republic of Viet-Nam.
Subject: Proposal for Rapid Increase in Number of Revolutionary
Development Groups.
1. T"ne present training camp at Vung Tau is producing
approximately eighty 59-man RD groups every fifteen weeks.
The Montagnard school has a capacity of 13 teams in the same
period. This program aims at insertion of 5500 trained men
(93 teams) into their village areas every fifteen weeks, or, in
terms of three and one-half such cycles per year, our current
input is approximately 325 59-man teams.
2. A breakdown of team-functions demonstrates clearly
the impact this program should have on the Communist organi-
zation in the village areas. Each team breaks down into the
following components:
1. One 33-man PAT (People's Action Team) plus one
leader. Role: Defense, Ideological Action, General
Assistance to Village, Organization of Village
Self-defense.
2. Three 6-man teams, plus leader. Roles: Admini-
strative, Economic and Social Welfare Assistance
in reconstruction and reorganization of village.
3. One overall leader, with one Psywar assistant, one
Intelligence assistant, and three medics. Role:
General direction of team effort, plus specialties
indicated.
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3. Substantial as it is, the present output of these teams is
insufficient in that it does not permit us to follow the grow:.
military capability to sweep the VC out of key areas. In other
words, the expanding military capacity to clear terrain is i ;-
creasingly outrunning our ability to insert teams to hold the areas
swept. For this reason we :need a rapid expansion of our capacity
to produce teams through establishment of another training center.
On completion of such a center, as we envisage it today, our
training rate would rise from the present Vung Tau annual rate
of approximately 340 groups to approximately 581 groups. This,
added to an envisaged Montagnard school output of eighty-odd
teams per year, would achieve an insertion rate of some 660
teams. In terms of manpower this would mean roughly 39, 000
trained personnel, per year, as compared to the present level of
approximately 19, 000 trained personnel. I would like to reach
the 39, 000 rate by the end of calendar 1966, which I believe possible
on the. basis of the following assumptions:
.1. That instructor quality can be maintained despite
expansion in numbers;
2. That manpower required can be obtained, and that
COMUSMACV'will join in an effort to obtain release
of necessary manpower from Popular Forces or other
organizations with necessary draft credit for service
in RD groups;
3. That CAS will supervise and control construction and
planning; and that required GVN action and USG support
(as outlined in Attachment A) will be available at an
early date;
4. That the program can be protected from adverse
effects of political changes in SVN.
The choice of CAS as the supervisory, control and planning
agency is based on the urgency of the matter and the fact of ex-
perience gained by CAS in the development of the Vung Tau center.
C- N y'I?DEN-TI AL-
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The same urgency requires that we have access to other agency
resources and personnel as needed, espec:ally those of DOD and
AID.
Nothing in this r;qe ::or,ndu;r, Should be coast ' G. i r
either the need of A. ~S 4~,tera(i`
E Ll) cover 'co the extent
pos:;Ih-e d is project,
nor the planning f~Qr eventual responsibility of A T . V
D d Fcu s sed
y
memorandum to Mr. Mann and Mr. Jorgensen dated March 24,
1966 (copy. attached).
I propose that we commence an effort immediately to obtain
agreement in principle to the points outlined, on your initiative in
Washington as regards the necessary U. S. actions, and on mine
in Saigon with respect to required GVN action; and that we proceed
to irn2lement as rapidly as such agreement in principle makes
possible. I would not, for example, hold up the construction
project until we achieve draft credit, but would continue to work
on the latter aspect while the remainder of the project goes forward.
Attachments :
A. Outline of Required USG Support.
B. Outline of Required GVN Action.
cc:
The Ambassador
General Westmoreland
Mr. Mann
Mr. Jorgensen
DEP:WJPorter:let
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CONFIDENTIAL
ATTACHMENT A
USG SUPPORT RE^C71RED FORE . ANS N OF
RD TRAINING y,A CILITI S ?,; _1
ai M 4 1.i~ y . Y wa~'x
CAS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION,
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF PROJECT. EMERGENCY
RANSF ER OF AID FUNDS IF NECESSARY.
2. USG AGENCIES TO MAKE AVAILABLE AS NECESSARY,
AND ON PRIORITY BASIS TO CAS, PERSONNEL AND
MATERIAL REQUIRED, INCLUDING SEABEE UNIT AND
SKIPPING FACILITIES.
COMUSMACV ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING RELEASE OF
NECESSARY MANPOWER FROM POPULAR FORCES AND
OTHER SOURCES; AND COMUSMACV ASSISTANCE IN
OBTAINING DRAFT CREDIT FOR SERVICE IN RD GROUPS.
ry ..~ "7 r .D E. N .T I ti f
="a
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""N7 DENT'
ATTACHMENT "B
GVN ACTION REQUIRED FC EXPANSI/ `; OF
RD TRAINING FACILITIES IN VIET-NAM
1. ACCEPT CONCEPT OF EXPANSION.
2. MAKE SITE AVAILABLE.
DESIGNATE REQUIRED PERSONNEL FOR SUPPORT AND
LIAISON PURPOSES.
MAKE MANPOWER AVAILABLE.
5. ENSURE PROGRAM WILL NOT BE ENDANGERED BY DRAFT.
C-ONF-IDENTIAL
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