(Classified) DDI PLANNING STAPP STUDY OF(Classified) TRANSLATION SERVECES, 13 MARCH 1969

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP83-00714R000100270002-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 22, 1999
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
STUDY
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP83-00714R000100270002-6.pdf273.44 KB
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Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP83-00714R000100270002-6 STAB Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP83-00714R000100270002-6 Approved For Release 1999109/24: CIA-RDP83-00714R000100270AG2-6 ST STATSPEC STATSPEC CS ' ::NT a N ODI PLANING STAPP TRA SLATION SERVICES, 13 Marc 1969 I. On reviewing this study, we find it to be a workmanlike job which gives a fairly accurate representation of procedures STATSPEC as they now exist. This evaluation is not intended as cost on the drafter's coepr+ehersion of the subject, but rather a recognition of the unusual complexity of the subject sender review. "Thu initial coresnt is that time would have been saved had the STATSPEC I Planning Staff roles in this exercise been reversed. and we provided a study of this subject for 001 review. any event, since the problem to which the study is addre-sed now has lass pertinency than when the study was undertaken, will be brief and are Intended more to record our views to encourage further dialogue.. 3. Our only disagreement is with the main operatic proposed, namsely, that the exploitation of foreign language publica- tions should be conducted by non-staff personnel. Although this mode of operation works well at our overseas bureaus, it could not, and indeed should not, be anpl,ied on a wide scale to our domestic exploitation program for the following substantive reasons : STATSPEC STATSPEC ntrol over its ions STATSPEC The Tt, report, to which this study is also responding, expressed concern and noted that "much. of the press- exploitation effort in the te,S. depends on translations done by independ ntractors working for M Staff STATSPEC employees in thel"field offices do not have the time or in many instances the talents to check all translations ?STATSPEC Errors have been published, has initiated a pxogran of quality chocks, but spot checks at best will be possible." To turn over also to non-staff personnel the task of selectin what will be translated would significantly and su surely compound the loss of_control. further#STATSPEC contractors are generally individuals who have other. --time jobs and who are located throughout the U.S. Thus, the proposal that "close supervision would provide the continuity and flexibility for effective selection" is not a practical concept. Approved For Release 1999/09/24 :CIA-RDP83=0O1 l4R000100270002-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP83-00714R00010027000e-6 SECRET 25X1A Although the Mcontractor is always a competent linguist, he is not usually directly involved in the flow of information on a given subject or area. Our experience with selection by non-staff officers indicates that it is impractical to attempt to apply this concept on a wide scale. Responsive press exploitation ruires work, contract translators tend either to underselect, which delay* the production of essential information, or to overac lect, which increases costs and passes on to the end user the problem of locating needed information in a. varies by subject category but the fact reezains that if it served as guidance to the collector, he would be responding only to part of the production officer's needs. In the case of Indonesia, for example, only 24 of 93 reequirents would be listed. 4. Statistics can be Interpreted in so many ways that I see no erved by attempting a detailed reanalysis of the per- ited in the report. 'test of them we accept. classified requirements. Lacking this context for their !requent contacts with and users, and a thorough knowledge reful Interpretation of collection guidelines, convinced that most production analysts would share y view. What it consists of, in fact, is only the unclassifl4i entires in the CIRL. The percentage of requirements on Communist, China. I disagree an for contract translation in advance. Annex E of the Bahr was submitted as an example of the adequacy of sanitized monitoring of contract selection requires as much or more staff linguist time as is required to select material Basses of translated paper. Further, retrospective n an ref Ing, however, we differ: STATSPEC is not used for `training, leave, and other administrative house staff officer. I assure you that 32% of such t Some misunderstanding in definition must have occurred between the drafter and our people in designating the distribution of "productive time" (Annex A) of the in- necessities." oour records show that 3 of our overall staff time is on scanning pt., inquiries;, in Ian work done by t trans lated by materials for on classified translation work., 24% ens for relevant information to he slating unclassified lectively reviewing g telephone or other training. STATSPEC Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP83 -0714R000100270002-6 Approved For Release 1999/M/24: CIA-RDP83-00 ffM 0027000.2,6 SEMET I referred earlier to the unusual celerity o overall exploitation program. The natter of costs good exale. For instance, it is unlikely that anyone not directly and deeply involved in the translation effort would realize that in assessing costs in STATSPEC since, in *nany ling-Cages when t' , `ise are translated into English there is an expansion rate of at least 25'%, the total words produced increases by that percentage w your costs ro ain constant, Si ilariy, it is easy to STATSPEC that over 80% of the translations produced pvidee in caera-ready copy and thus need no further processing, whereas, in our London 41) effort, the trap:;lati ns produced must be teletyped to headquarters, a cost not included in the study, a-57 in Headquarters fear Publication. Last:Ly, in assessing P41 costs, we believe that of the staff officers and the clerical group +lered since they are inherent part of the operation. The cost for both staff officers ($52,000) plus the costs of the other six r MU eeployeees ($15,000) would almost double the overall P4U cost figures. Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP83-90714R000100270002-6 SECRET