THICH TRI QUANG AND BUDDHIST POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100050011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 20, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THICH TRI QUANG AND BUDDHIST POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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No. 0806/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 April 1966
Thich Tri Quang and Buddhist Political
Objectives in South V1i_e_fH_aii__
Summary
A Buddhist political victory stemming from the
current political crisis in South Vietnam would al-
most certainly entail a temporary setback to US ob-
jectives and programs, but would not portend total
disaster. The professed aims of the Buddhist leaders
stress preservation of South Vietnamese independence
and freedom from Communist domination,
the Buddhists are a potent political factor
Witft which any government must come to terms if it
is to achieve stability.
The political bonzes, such as Thichimeaning
"venerable")Tri Quang, do not necessarily speak for
or represent the true aspirations of all South Viet-
namese Buddhists, but they do have a more effective,
mass-based political organization than anyone else
in Vietnam other than the Communists. The Buddhist
hierarchy is not Communist, although the activities
of its leaders often aid the Communist cause. The
attitudes and behavior of these men, and the Viet-
namese public receptiveness of their political in-
fluence, have been conditioned by complex religious,
political, and sociological factors over the course
of Vietnamese history.
Should the. Buddhists succeed in bringing to
power a government under their control, the US would
be confronted with delicate political problems. Over
the longer term, however, a Buddhist-dominated gov-
ernment could have the effect of stabilizing the
Vietnam situation.
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It is unlikely that a Buddhist government would
deliberately hand South Vietnam to the Communists.
Although the Buddhists desire the eventual termina-
tion of US presence and influence, key Buddhist
leaders recognize that US economic and military sup-
port will be needed for some time. Though they ap-
pear to desire an independent South Vietnam under
Buddhist control, they probably recognize that this
goal cannot be achieved without US support and assist-
ance against the Communists.
A Buddhist-controlled government would be viewed
with resentment and great apprehension by other po-
litical and religious groups in South Vietnam, and
some of these groups might attempt to bring the gov-
ernment down. Faced with a choice between the Bud-
dhists and the Viet Cong, however, most other groups
would probably eventually decide to go along with the
Buddhists, hoping for the best, but expecting the
worst.
Buddhist acquisition of political power would
also cause deep strains within the Vietnamese mili-
tary establishment. Over the short run, the unity
and effectiveness of the armed forces would prob-
ably be impaired. It is at least possible, however,
that the degree of latent support for the Buddhists
prevalent throughout the armed forces could even-
tually result in better military unity and a greater
sense of identity between the army and the populace.
Tri Quang
1. If the Buddhists succeed in toppling the
present government of South Vietnam and installing
a government responsive to their wishes, the net
result will be a victory for Tri Quang, who will
become at least temporarily the most powerful po-
litical figure in South Vietnam. Tri Quang is
highly complex and uniquely Vietnamese. He is vain,
equates "the people's" wishes with his own, and
thoroughly enjoys playing the game of politics for
its own sake. He is nationalistic to the point of
xenophobia, a consummate master of the arts of agi-
tation and pressure, and the most effective poli-
tician now active in South Vietnam. No one really
knows what he wants, in concrete terms, and he him-
self probably could not spell out his positive ob-
jectives with any great degree of precision.
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the need for US support in fighting the Viet Cong
and to the impossibility of negotiating .with the
Communists until they are defeated, there is little
doubt that he desires to see the US out of South
Vietnam at the earliest possible moment. He is
probably capable of allying himself with the Commu-
nists if he considered this advantageous to achiev-
ing his political and religious goals, and he is
sufficiently egotistical to believe he could shuck
them as allies when they had served his immediate
purposes. Often, he has seemed to regard the Viet-
namese Catholics as a greater threat to his con-
cepts of nationalism and Buddhism than the Communists.
Background of the Buddhist Movement
7.
The
historical development of Buddhism in
Vietnam
has
helped to shape Tri Quang's political
views,
and,
even more importantly, to provide him
with a
large
and potentially receptive audience.
Buddhism was introduced into Vietnam from China dur-
ing the middle period of Chinese domination which
lasted roughly over the first millennium A.D. Along
with Buddhism, the Chinese introduced other religious
ideas and doctrines, including Confucianism and
Taoism, which underwent considerable fusion in Viet-
nam with the animism and spirit worship which were
prevalent, particularly among the rural population.
8. Virtually all ethnic Vietnamese adhere to
the Mahayana sect, an essentially northern branch
of Buddhism. The ethnic Vietnamese originally in-
habited the area that is now North Vietnam, and ex-
panded southward only gradually over the course of
several centuries to conquer what is now South Viet-
nam from the Khmers, or forerunners of the modern
Cambodians. There is still a large minority Khmer
population in the delta provinces of South Vietnam,
who practice Theravada Buddhism (the Hinayana or
"Lesser Vehicle" sect), a more orthodox form intro-
duced from India and Ceylon. Although both the
Mayahana and Theravada sects have a loose formal
alliance today, the impact of South Vietnam's pres-
ent Mahayana Buddhist leadership in the southernmost
provinces of South Vietnam is still comparatively
limited.
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9. Buddhism had little political significance
in Vietnam until the Ly Dynasty, which lasted from
1009-1224, officially sponsored the religion. This
period of close political and religious cooperation
between emperors and the Buddhist clergy was the high
point of Vietnamese Buddhism, and the religion there-
after fell into a decline until recent years. This
ancient period of glory, however, gave Buddhism in
Vietnam something of a legendary "nationalist" aura
which persists today. The decay of Buddhist influ-
ence in Vietnam was already well advanced when the
French arrived. The imposition of French political
authority in the 19th century was preceded by the
introduction of Jesuit missionaries some two cen-
turies earlier, The churchmen who followed eventually
made their own alliances with Vietnam's contending
power factions. In time,support--including armed
mercenaries--from French Catholic prelates actually
helped to install the Nguyen Dynasty, whose last
emperor Bao Dai was deposed in 1954. The involve-
ment of the French clergy, and their Vietnamese
followers, resulted in calls for increasing support
from the French Government, leading in turn to French
military intervention, and ultimately to the estab-
lishment of French political control over all-of Indo-
China.
10. The French ruled Indochina largely through
Vietnamese officials guided by French "advisers.'.'
The majority of these Vietnamese were at least
nominally Catholic, partly because the education
requirements for the Vietnamese administrative class
were mainly available in church-controlled French
schools. The French also found it advantageous, in
order to maintain their control, to encourage re-
gional and local loyalties, political factionalism,
and parochialism among their Catholic and non-Catholic
subjects. They did little to discourage the existing
divisive tendencies in Vietnamese Buddhism. Thus,
traditionally, and not without some justification,
non-Catholic Vietnamese have tended to identify
Catholicism with the European foreigner, and with
foreign domination.
11. In the 1920s, a period of Buddhist resur-
gence began, roughly coinciding with the emergence
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of the anti-French nationalist movements in Vietnam,
including the Communist movement. The Buddhist re-
surgence reflected not only a xenophobic nationalism,
which is in itself a pronounced Vietnamese trait, but
also the deep-seated historical animosities between
Catholic and non-Catholic Vietnamese. The replace-
ment of French colonialism in South Vietnam by the
regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, even though Diem was an'in-
tensely anti-French nationalist, tended to perpetuate
the control of the Catholic mandarin class which had
prospered under the French. Although Diem did not
officially discriminate between Catholics and Bud-
dhists and did not suppress freedom of religion, the
mainstays of his political support were mostly Catho-
lic, either politically organized supporters from
his native central Vietnam, or militantly anti-Com-
munist refugees from North Vietnam. As Diem's gov-
ernment developed increasingly autocratic tendencies,
it acquired an increasingly tight political control
mechanism largely dominated by Catholics, and the
groundwork was thus laid for a "religious issue" on
which the Buddhists could capitalize and criticism
and opposition to Diem could focus.
The Present-Day Buddhist Movement
12. The number of devout, actively practicing
Buddhists. in South Vietnam is about 2-2.5 million
as compared with 1-1.5 million practicing Catholics.
Most other Vietnamese in the South are religious
eclectics, adhering to a vague mixture of animism,
ancestor worship, and Confucian ethical precepts.
However, since the overwhelming majority of Viet-
namese are non-Catholic, the Buddhist movement has
provided them with a vehicle for voicing their oppo-
sition to politically powerful Catholicism. Bud-
dhism also provides a means for the expression of
nationalism by non-Catholic Vietnamese, as well as
a focal point for opposition to a particular gov-
ernment in Saigon,
13. Prior to World War II, the Buddhists made
several efforts to launch regional or national
associations. In the upsurge of Asian nationalism
after the war, a General Association of Vietnamese
Buddhists was formed in 1951. This organization, a
loose federation of regional Buddhist associations,
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was designed to permit an exchange of views and to
foster some sense of unity among Buddhist sects.
Essentially, however, Buddhist loyalties were still
centered around the monks in a particular pagoda or
sect, or among the ranking monks in urban areas.
The policies and practices of Diem--and particularly
the events of May 1963 in Hue, which catapulted Tri
Quang into national prominence--acted as a catalyst
for pushing the Buddhists, and particularly the monks,
into the political scene. In the ensuing months of
conflict with the Diem government, the Buddhists dis-
played hitherto unsuspected organizational and po-
litical talents, using the shell of the General
Association of Buddhists for their purposes.
14. The struggle against Diem, culminating in
his overthrow by the military, gave the Buddhists
a new sense of unity and their leaders an appetite
for power. A Vietnamese Buddhist reunification
congress held at the close of 1963 led to the crea-
tion of a new organization, the Unified Buddhist
Association(UBA), embracing all the main Buddhist
sects including the Theravada sect. The UBA has two
general divisions: a High Clerical Council which is
nominally supreme and concerned with spiritual matters,
and an Institute for the Propagation of the Faith
(the Vien Hoa Dao or VHD) which is the UBA's execu-
tive arm, particularly in secular matters. Under
the VHD, whose chairman is Thich Tam Chau, are six
general commissions which bear a striking resem-
blance to shadow ministries in a political party
seeking office.
15. The over-all head of the UBA is Thich Tinh
Khiet, a revered octogenarian bonze who is ostensibly
the "leader" and spiritual head of the Buddhist move-
ment. In fact, he is merely a facade for younger and
more militant bonzes, particularly Tri Quang, who is
secretary-general of the High Clerical Council. There
has long been a rivalry between Tri Quang, repre-
senting the militant Buddhists of central Vietnam,
and Tam Chau, who, while headquartered in Saigon,
draws his power from and is the spokesman for refu-
gee Buddhists from North Vietnam. Chau, approximately
the same age as Tri Quang, is generally regarded as
more moderate. Even though there are apparently some
genuine policy differences between the two men,
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Buddhist intrusions into politics have almost in-
variably ended with Quang calling the shots, and
Chau either falling into step or retreating from
active engagement. Chau is frequently a target--
as Tri Quang never is--of Viet Cong attacks and
charges that he is a "US puppet."
16. Of the many other political bonzes in
South Vietnam, the most prominent at present are
Thich Thien Minh, a Tri Quang follower of similarly
radical views, and Thich Ho Giac, a firebrand ora-
tor who generally sides with Tam Chau and who is
one of the few ethnic Vietnamese Theravada bonzes,
having been reared in Cambodia. Another well-known
monk, Yale-educated Thich Quang Lien, is apparently
close to, but not entirely of, the Buddhist inner
circles. Lien's efforts to launch a peace movement
in early 1965, whether or not promoted by the Bud-
dhist hierarchy, were squelched by both the hier-
archy and the Quat government as suspicions arose
that the Buddhists were deliberately playing into
Viet Cong hands. Communist propaganda, however,
consistently denounced Lien's movement as not on
the "correct path," and implied that it was some
form of US trick. A strongly anti-Communist monk,
Thich Duc Nghiep, was active in the Buddhist cam-
paign against Diem, but has since gone abroad.
Nghiep's preoccupation with combating Communism
apparently went far beyond the commitment his col-
leagues were prepared to make, and also appeared to
have aroused their suspicion that he was bidding
for US backing in the rivalry for Buddhist leader-
ship.
Buddhist Political Aims
17, It is frequently conjectured that the demo-
cratic institutions which the Buddhist leaders say
are their goals are to them only the means for at-
taining a Buddhist-dominated state, although not
necessarily a theocracy. According to Buddhist
public statements and their private conversations
with US officials, the Buddhists now desire a uni-
cameral, elected legislature. Although Tri. Quang
has often spoken of the need for a strong central
government, the Buddhists appear to be speaking of
a parliamentary government chosen by and responsible
to this legislature. Quang has also spoken of an
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"interim" assembly, to be composed of representa-
tives named by the provincial and municipal coun-
cils elected in May 1965. This interim body would
draft a constitution and either "confirm" the pres-
ent government in office pending elections, or
choose some other provisional regime. The purpose
of this pre-election procedure is allegedly to give
South Vietnam a "legally" based government as
quickly as possible.
18. The Buddhists say that they could win an
election majority--something probable, but not yet
proven--but that they desire a balanced government
of the best available men. However, the probable
composition of either a provisional or a permanent
government dominated by the Buddhists cannot be
accurately predicted. It is doubtful that any of
the more prominent bonzes, particularly Tri Quang,
'would serve in any responsible executive post.
Some, including Tam Chau, might agree to be a mem-
ber of either an interim or permanent assembly;
Tri Quang, who apparently prefers to dominate from
the wings, almost certainly would not.
19. It is not unlikely that, at least in an
interim government, the Buddhists would invite some
well-known figure, such as exiled General Duong Van
"Big" Minh, to act as chief of state; they have even
indicated that they would accept a Catholic not
associated with the Diem regime in this post. They
might well insist upon some prominent Buddhist
civilian as premier, although Tri Quang has also
indicated that he would accept some nonreligious
figure such as retired General Tran Van Don. In
the case of an interim assembly, the Buddhists
would either press for early elections of a perma-
nent legislature, or try to transform an interim
body, if sufficiently pliable, into a permanent
legislature.
20. Elections held under Buddhist sponsorship
would probably be rigged to produce a Buddhist-
controlled legislature, but some prominent poli-
ticians not under Buddhist control, such as Dr.
Pham Quang Dan, could probably win seats. On the
hypothesis that the Buddhists were able, and would
choose, to install a fully Buddhist government, the
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premier would undoubtedly be some activist Buddhist
lay politician, such as Bui Tuong Huan, the rector
of the Hue University. Ministerial posts would
probably be staffed by younger Buddhist intellectuals
and laymen, and possibly some Buddhist-oriented army
officers. The government's installation would, of
course, be followed by a wholesale change of province
chiefs, as is standard Vietnamese practice.
Catholic and Non-Buddhist Reaction
21. A Buddhist-controlled government would be
viewed with resentment and great apprehension by
other political groups in South Vietnam. The
Catholics, especially northern refugee militants,
would be deeply disturbed. Some Catholic groups,
such as the followers of Father Hoang Quynh and
Father Nguyen Quang Lam, would almost certainly
attempt some form of agitation, at least in the Sai-
gon area, in the hope of bringing the government
down. Faced with a choice between the Buddhists
and the Viet Cong, however, most Catholics would
probably eventually decide, with varying degrees
of reluctance, that they had no choice but to go
along with the new government, hoping for the best,
but expecting the worst.
22. Other minority elements including the Cao
Dai and Hoa Hao would also be disturbed, although
perhaps less violently than the Catholics; the
"southerners"--those born in the southern provinces
or former Cochinchina--would be additionally re-
sentful of the government on regional grounds,
since Tri Quang and his close Buddhist cohorts
are from the "center"provinces. Areas where the
minority groups are locally strong, as in parts
of the delta, might more or less "secede" from the
central government, although the political conse-
quences would be less severe than the secession of
I Corps.
23. Buddhist acquisition of political power
would cause deep strains within the Vietnamese
military establishment. Some officers, particu-
larly Catholics, would probably be inclined to
coup attempts in order to reassert military con-
trol. Should the Buddhists move quickly to put
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loyal officers into key command positions, the mili-
tary die-hards, like the Catholic community, might
find themselves faced with the unpalatable choice
of the Buddhists or the Viet Cong, and opt for the
Buddhists. Over the short run, under Buddhist rule,
the unity and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese
military establishment would probably be impaired.
How permanent the damage might be cannot be pre-
dicted, but it is at least possible that the degree
of latent support for the Buddhists prevalent through-
out the military, particularly in the lower ranks and
in I Corps, could eventually result in greater mili-
tary unity and a greater sense of identity between
the army and the populace.
24. There is no reason to believe that, once in
power, the Buddhists would be more monolithic than
any other Vietnamese group. There are already obvious
divisions within their ranks. Tam Chau and his pre-
dominantly northern followers are restive over the
primacy accorded Tri Quang and his central Vietnam-
based faction. Many southern Buddhists--principally
lay leader Mai Tho Truyen and his supporters but also
many of the Theravada sect--are not in sympathy with
Tri Quang's present pressure campaign. Although
moderate voices within the Buddhist movement have
tended to be muted in time of struggle, internal
strains and disagreements would undoubtedly reappear
if the Buddhists were in power.
25. A government such as that envisaged above
would probably find it difficult to exert effective
centralized authority throughout the country. It
would be beset with squabbling, irresolution, and
unrealism in its paramount parliamentary body, and
with jockeying for power and position even among
Buddhist factions. The pace and tempo of the counter-
insurgency effort would almost certainly be checked,
at least temporarily, thus placing the burden of con-
taining the Viet Cong almost entirely on US and allied
forces.
26. Many of the weaknesses of a Buddhist gov-
ernment, however, would be those which, in varying
degrees, would plague any new Vietnamese government.
Provided US and allied military strength and related
assistance could prevent the Communists from making
too many inroads during a period of unsettled
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transition, a Buddhist-dominated government might
have some assets not enjoyed by any of its prede-
cessors. A major reason for this is that, apart
from the Communists, the Buddhists currently have
the only effective mass organization in South Viet-
nam. Although the Catholics are similarly, and
perhaps better disciplined, the Buddhist political
structure has deeper popular roots, particularly
in central Vietnam and along the coastal strip
north of Saigon, than any other political body.
Although the extent to which the Buddhists are
capable of marshaling their followers in support
of, rather than in opposition to, a government re-
mains to be seen, a Buddhist government would have
a potentially stronger and broader base than any
of its predecessors.
27. Buddhism, as a politico-religious idea,
has shown itself capable of touching deep emo-
tional chords within large segments of the Viet-
namese population. A sensitively nationalistic
Buddhist government might be something Communist
propaganda would not find easy to attack. The
Communists would also have difficulty finding any
willing allies among such natural opponents of a
Buddhist government as the Catholics who seem un-
alterably opposed to Communism.
Buddhist Domination and US Policy
28. Tri Quan.g, Tam Chau, and other political
bonzes who have discussed Buddhist objectives with
US officials have all implied that the Buddhists
alone can "legalize" the US position in Vietnam.
They claim that they are anxious for continued US
support, that they want with US assistance to pur-
sue the work of social revolution, and that they
realize the impossibility of accommodation or nego-
tiation with the Viet Cong under present circum-
stances. By implication at least,they claim that
they want to prosecute the war. The sincerity of
these claims is perhaps open to question, and the
way that professed Buddhist objectives would be
translated into concrete government programs cannot
be confidently predicted.
29. It is possible, however, that the responsi-
bilities of power would be as sobering to the Buddhists
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as to many other successful revolutionaries. The
intelligent and sophisticated anti-Communism that
the Buddhist leaders profess to endorse might be
reinforced if, once their followers were in power,
the Buddhists discovered that Viet Cong elements
who have succeeded in penetrating the Buddhist-in-
spired "struggle movement" were unwilling to sus-
pend agitation and disruptive activities. The
excesses of Communist penetration in various "struggle"
groups have already given anti-Communist elements
grounds for openly expressed concern.
30. While it is arguable that the Communists
might lie low to encourage the possibility of
fruitful negotiations with a Buddhist regime, the
Communists will not necessarily reason and act in
this fashion. The net result of their continuing
disruptive activities, and possibly even of the
present "struggle" movement, may be to implant in
Buddhist circles a heightened awareness of the need
for combating the Communist menace. If the Bud-
dhists were to become totally engaged in the anti-
Communist fight, they might be a more potent po-
litical adversary than any the Viet Cong have yet
faced.
31. There is little question that the Buddhists
emotionally resent the present extent of US involve-
ment in Vietnamese affairs and the sheer physical
magnitude of the current US military presence, with
the side effects it inevitably entails. There is
no doubt that the Buddhists would ultimately like
to see the Americans leave, a goal certainly not
imcompatible with US objectives. Whether the Bud-
dhists would attempt to force an early US withdrawal
in a manner which would result in inevitable Commu-
nist victory remains to be seen. There is some
danger that, even if this is not their immediate
intention, their shortsightedness may prompt them
to act in ways which would risk just this result.
32. On balance, it seems unlikely that a Bud-
dhist government would deliberately deliver South
Vietnam into the hands of the Communist regime in
Hanoi. Tri Quang probably desires an independent
South Vietnam, but under Buddhist control and not
under Communist political dictation. He probably
recognizes that these goals cannot be achieved
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without US support and assistance, but preoccupation
with his own cleverness and with immediate objectives
could lead him into courses of action and alliances
which he could not reverse.
33. A Buddhist government, particularly one ac-
quiring power in conditions which caused severe loss
of face to the Vietnamese military, would almost
certainly essay a different approach to the war and
related pacification programs. The actions and
policies of such a government would soon clarify
whether Tri Quang is a pro-Communist neutralist, as
some American and Vietnamese observers contend, or
the anti-Communist nationalist he himself claims to
be. In any event, there would inevitably be some
period of dislocation, during which US and allied
forces would have to bear much of the burden of con-
taining Viet Cong incursions and attempts to profit
from a disruption of central authority.
34. Over the longer term, however, a Buddhist
government might prove to have deeper roots in Viet-
namese traditions than any of its predecessors.
Such a government's relations with the US would be
delicate and difficult, particularly since a Bud-
dhist government would be touchily nationalistic,
and would have a different style of operation from
its more Western-oriented predecessors. A Buddhist-
dominated government would perhaps be more concerned
with the purity of its revolutionary concepts than
with the practical details of political administra-
tion or with concrete problems such as inflation
requiring concrete solutions. Nevertheless, a gov-
ernment in which the Buddhists had a predominant
voice could produce a focus for emergent Vietnamese
nationalism which, eventually, could give the whole
non-Communist nationalist structure a stronger founda-
tion than it presently enjoys.
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