ON VE DAY --- VJ DAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003600080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 11, 1946
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ON VE DAY --- VJ DAY
Prepared by
Secretariat
Strategic Services Unit
War Department
11 March 1946
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CONTENT
S
I
Functions of the Individual Branches............... 1
II
VE Day: Europe, Afric
a, the Near Ea
st ............. 7
III
VE Day: The Far East.
......... .....
............... 10
IV
VJ Day: Europe, Afric
a, the Near Ea
st ............. 12
V
VJ Day: The Far East .
..............
............... 14
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logical and scientific fields was collected through espionage
and other means not usually open to normal Government pro-
cedure, then evaluated and disseminated to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and to authorized American military and civilian
agencies. Direct liaison for information and training pur-
poses was maintained with Allied secret intelligence services.
2. Counter-Espionage (X-2)
Information concerning the activities of foreign in-
telligence services and clandestine organizations was collected,
lists of subversive personalities abroad were prepared, and
this information disseminated to authorized American military,
counter-intelligence, and Government agencies. Advice and
assistance on the institution of measures necessary to protect
U. S. interests from enemy espionage and counter-espionage
activities were supplied to executive agencies of the U. S.
Government. Direct liaison was maintained with other Allied
and neutral nations' counter-intelligence services.
FUNCTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BRANCHES
INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES
1. Secret Intelligence (SI)
Intelligence in military, political, economic, socio-
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3. Research and Analysis (R&A)
Detailed intelligence studies were prepared embracing
political, psychological, sociological, economic, topographic
and military information required for strategic services opera-
tions or requested by the JCS, the Armed Services and authorized
Government agencies. In addition sections of the Joint Army
and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were compiled, as well
as special map or cartographic studies.
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B, PARA-MI LI TARY BRANCHES
1. Special Operations (SO)
Sabotage of enemy communications and special targets,
support of underground resistance groups and special clandestine
para-military operations were planned and conducted. Indi-
viduals, teams or underground organizations behind enemy lines
were organized, equipped, and trained.
2, Operational Group Command (OG)
The OG was a separate military unit within OSS of or-
ganized, uniformed commandos or guerrilla troops who were ex-
perienced in and spoke the language of their target territory.
Fifteen-man and thirty-man operational nuclei were trained to
aid and direct resistance groups in carrying out guerrilla opera-
tions and to attack selected targets behind enemy lines. The
OG was active in MedTO (as 2671st Special Reconnaissance Bat-
talion), ETO, and FETO.
3. Maritime Unit (MU)
Maritime operations were carried out, including the
conduct of clandestine landings of agents and operatives and
maritime sabotage. Special equipment and supplies necessary
were developed in conjunction with the Research and Development
Branch.
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5. Special Projects
Special operational assignments and missions
special weapons were carried out as approved by the
with
Director.
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6. Field Experimental Unit
New special weapons and techniques were demonstrated
to OSS field missions. Later this unit prepared a plan for
penetration of Korea from the Pacific which was under considera-
tion of the Theater Commanders at the and of the Pacific war.
C. AUXILIARY BRANCHES
1. Communications
Communications required for operations were maintained
and personnel trained and special equipment developed for this
purpose e
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3. Schools and Training
Personnel were trained for strategic services opera-
tions including SI, SO, MO, and MU.
4. Security
Responsible for maintenance of security and security
procedures in OSS personnel and installations in Washington
and overseas.
5. Research and Development
Secret devices and equipment required for special
operations were invented, developed, tested, and camouflaged
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where necessary. Clothing and accessories used for travel
and residence in enemy-occupied or neutral territory were
collected and provided to CSS operations branches. Liaison
with CSRD and other agencies on technical matters was main-
tained.
6. Chief Surgeon
Medical officers not only provided medical care and
supplies, but also cooperated in the field with intelligence
procurement branches collecting and analyzing medical intelli-
gence and data on enemy medical supplies and techniques.
7. Presentation
Charts, graphs, maps, and other presentations were pre-
pared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Theater Commanders, Army
and Navy and other agencies.
8. Field Photographic
Motion and still pictures were produced for Army, Navy
and Government Departments including training, documentary and
historical movies as well as recording 085 operations and
techniques.
D. PERSONNEL BRANCHES
1. Headquarters and Headquarters Det.
2. Naval Command
3. Civilian Personnel
4. Personnel Procurement
E. SERVICES BRANCHES
1. Budget and Procedures
2. Reproduction
3. Office Services
4. Procurement and Supply
5. Transportation
6. Finance
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F. ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCHES
1. Director
2. Assistant Directors
3. Planning Group and Planning Staff
Responsible for formulation of over-all strategic
plans on which OSS operations were based.
4.. Executive Office
5. Secretariat
6. General Counsel
7. Board of Review
A quasi-judicial body to pass on matters of funds
and expenditures.
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Pepro-
duction
Special
funds
Deputy
Director
Services
cter?.. -
nsent
Su
Tronspor-I
Motion I
vio?r?~y
L~ra~jo
6xeeullve
c
Secre aria
Communr
c0trons
Chief
Surgeon
schools ?
7roininy
Deputy
Director
/n/el/,pence
Secrirt
Reseorc4 rvrregn
rw/ysis iorw/7he1
,enero/
Counsel
Deputy
Director
Personnel
~rsonne/I
urrnren
Commondin,Offic
oerottona/ Groulo
Command
Boord of
12evieu.
h1f
Ike hmen
Op,ro ' ora,'
Groups
Office
Services
?SECQFT?
Morale
Ooerohons
Special
pro7erts
rie/d
rperinen
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r ,eeiol
s4s5 iatanto
Representetw
Nova/
Command
Deputy
Director
Operations
Security
Special
perofions
Maritime
Unit
Field
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II
VE DAY: EUROPE, AFRICA. THE NEAR EAST
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A. EUROPE ( ETO and MedTO)
1. Reporting on Surrendering German Army Units
Intelligence units which had been deep behind German
lines in Berlin, in Central Germany and in the Redoubt con-
tinued to supply military information and order of battle
of the disintegrating and surrendering German armies. Some
of the teams were over-run by advancing Allied units and re-
ported in person; others maintained contact by wireless or
by direct ground-to-plane ultra-high-frequency radio telephone.
New directives were issued these units to report
also on civilian morale, resistance nuclei or "Werewolves",
and conditions of installations, supplies, roads and railroads,
at the request of Military Government.
2. Occupation Period Intelligence Network Developing
OSS headquarters in Paris and London prepared to
implement detailed plans for intelligence coverage of Germany.
Two operational units, at Maastricht and Luxemburg and such
advance units as the OSS 7th Army Detachment, had already
established operations in occupied parts of Western and
Southern Germany and Austria and made certain key political,
industrial and labor contacts. These were to supply both.
local elements, Military Government, and the occupation forces,
and also SHAEF and Washington customers.
3. Redeployment to Far East Begun
Redeployment of personnel to the Far East was already
well under way for such OSS activities as had completed their
mission in Europe.. The Parachute School and many of the
Operational Groups and Special Operations personnel that had
been active in France and the Balkans were on their way to
new assignments in the China Theater.
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5, Joint Document-Collection Teams
City or "T-Force" Teams composed of X-2, SI, and
R&A personnel working with the 6th and 12th Army Groups were
collecting and evaluating all documents which might show the
capacities or plans of the Japanese or which might have any
connection with Germany either politically or industrially
for particular use in the collection of evidence for
Reparations Commissions, for War Crimes and for the "Safe-
haven" work seeking hidden enemy assets..
6. X-2 Liquidating German Intelligence Service
Counter-intelligence units were maintained in all
the major neutral and allied-occupied capitals of Europe to
assist in the liquidation of the German Intelligence Service
by the use of mobile special counter-intelligence teams and
by participation in the CI War Room. In addition, inform-
ation was gathered on foreign intelligence activities and
techniques and liaison was maintained with the Allied counter-
intelligence services. Captured German intelligence personnel
and agents were interrogated, plans were discovered for
stay-behind networks, the German Intelligence Service itself
was penetrated and plans for its complete liquidation developed.
7. Morale Operations
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8. The Photographic Project Continued
Strategic harbors, ports, railroad yards, factories,
dams, and power installations as well as the coast line of
Western Europe were being photographed in a joint R&A-Field
Photographic intelligence photographic documentation project.
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B. AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST
1. Covert Intelligence Coverage
Virtual peace-time conditions prevailed in these
territories permitting SI personnel to be established fl
2. X-2 Making Security Checks
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X-2 agents were oDeratinel
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V-E DAY: THE FAR EAST
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1. CHINA
Intelligence coverage extended. Directives called for
the r her development of intelligence from China, French
Indo-China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. At this time coverage
of South China was relatively complete, including a coast-
watching network from HongKong to Shanghai maintained for the
U. S. Navy. Coverage of North China Central Government areas
and of northern French Indo-China through'Conununist areas and
of Manchuria and Korea were awaiting Theater approval. Mean-
while, agents were being trained for Korea and an independent
Chinese network had been contacted in Manchuria.
Intelligence data supplied to Theater Command, the 14th
Air Force, and Navy included tactical targets, weather data,
information on shipping and aircraft activity, order of battle
`/ information, operational and situation intelligence. In addition,
R&A prepared special strategic studies for the 14th and 20th Air
Forces, and SI obtained specific strategic intelligence at
Theater request. At this time SI and Field Photographic per-
sonnel sent to Kwangtung Province to make for Theater a survey
of HongKong to Hainan Strait were setting up a coast-watching
system in this previously uncovered area.
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Para-military teams cut enemy lines. SO teams were operating
under a Theater directive to interdict the enemy's strategic
routes of communication in north and south China and northern
French Indo-China, by training, supplying and leading guerrilla
forces in sabotage behind enemy lines.
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Personnel being reinforced. Personnel redeployed from
Europe and others shifted northward from Burma were reinforcing
the China staff to permit further expansion of intelligence and
para-military operations.
2. SOUTHEAST ASIA
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Det. 101 at climax of operations, Nearing the completion of
the urma campaign, OSS guerrilla forces in Detachment 101, the
only combat forces in this area, were engaged in heavy fighting
endeavoring to clear the enemy from the Shan States in southern
`n+ Burma. Twelve OSS field groups furnished the only intelligence
from this area, maintaining coverage of enemy withdrawals into
Thailand. This was the beginning of the phase of Detachment
101 operations which won the Distinguished Unit Citation.
Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia. Intelligence teams were
providing information on Jap s pp ng and defenses as well as
weather data from peninsular Burma, central Malaya, the Andaman
Islands and Sumatra. The infiltration and exfiltration of agents
from enemy-occupied territory had become a regular procedure,
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VJ DAY: EUROPE, AFRICA, THE-NEAR EAST
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EUROPE
Aid to AMG, Occupation Forces, and Washington
Intelligence directives were revised in emphasis from
the tactical and military situation to strategic political
data for Washington consumption, and a priority objective
became the collection of information on Russian activities
and on events in the other Allied occupation zones.
Intelligence bases continued to supply political,
economic, sociological and industrial information to Military
Government, the occupation forces, and the Political Advisor
with particular concentration on the exploitation of
intelligence opportunities in Germany and Austria.
War Crimes Data Collection
A concentrated effort to obtain War Crimes data was
aimed both in the collection of documentation and in the
interrogation of key Nazi military and political figures.
X-2 Adapting to Lon er-Range Basis
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Liquidation of the German Intelligence Service con-
tinued and new plans were developed
Emphasis was shifted
to long-range strategic coup er-esp onage rather than
strictly military activity.
AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST
Activities being Curtailed
Activities of all Africa stations were being surveyed
and evaluated in order to tighten the organization to meet
budget requirements even at the risk of reducing intelligence
coverage already considered thin in some areas*
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The Near East coverage situation changed little.
Intelligence emphasis focusses on Russian activities and on
political developments.
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V-J DAY: FAR EAST
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Reorientation of objectives upon surrender. Theater placed
primal -responsibility on SS to furnish it basic necessary
intelligence during the re-occupation period. All teams in the
field, both intelligence and pars-military, were placed under
the direction of the chief OSS Intelligence Officer and assigned
to seize enemy documents and to report military, economic and
political intelligence pertinent to re-occupation operations
in their areas. Mercy teams ordered by Theater to rescue
prisoners of war permitted the expansion of intelligence col-
lection into hitherto inaccessible regions. Counter-espionage
activity was re-directed toward the apprehension of enemy agents
in the major Chinese coastal cities.
Retrieval of prisoners of war. Teams composed of SI, SO,
Medical and Communications personnel and interpreters parachuted
into Mukden, Peiping, Weihsien, Keijo in Korea, and in conjunction
with AGAS into Shanghai, Hainan Island and Hanoi. All were suc-
cessful except the Korea mission, which was sent back by the
Japanese and later cancelled. In addition to valuable reports
and intelligence procured, over 250 prisoners and internees,
including General Wainwright, were immediately flown out, and
many other received badly needed supplies and care. For example,
on Hainan Island the team located 400 prisoners of war, most of
them dying from malnutrition and disease, and after radioing for
supplies set up a 200-bed hospital. An additional intelligence
team in Formosa made an intensive survey of the Japanese defenses
of the island even before the official surrender of the large
Japanese garrison there,
OSS the major producer of intelligence in China. By V-J
Day OSS was providing over two-thirds of G-2 and AAF intelli-
gence, at least 40 percent of intelligence on Asiatic shipping
and the bulk of weather information in China. X-2 had compiled
a list of over 15,000 individuals suspected of cooperation with
the enemy. An increasingly large number of requests for specific
information were being directed to OSS by other American agencies
in the Theater. Coverage of the China Theater extended from
Peking and the Shantung Peninsula in northern China to the Tonkin
Gulf area in French Indo-China. Operations planned for areas
further north were awaiting Theater approval.
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Para-military operations harassing the enem until V-J Day.
Guerrillas e by SO men continue attacks against the enemyfs
troop concentrations and lines of communication. Since January
1945 SO teams were responsible for killing over 12,000 Japanese.
Five Chinese Commando units were operating against the enemy,
having made the first combat parachute jumps ever taken by members
of the Chinese Army. Three of these units working together ac-
complished the capture of the Tanchuk Airfield.
Morale operations effective. The distribution of thousands
of subversive items in both north and south China was bringing
about the surrender of hundreds of puppets and the intensification
of Jap counter-measures.
2:. SOUTHEAST ASIA
Intelligence coverage. OSS was supplying the major part of
American G-2 intelligence in the India-Burma Theater. Progress
was being made toward the objective of obtaining both overt and
covert intelligence coverage in Thailand, Malaya, Java and southern
French Indo-China. Teams were sent into key cities in occupied
areas even before surrender terms had been settled. With the
surrender, emphasis of reporting changed to definition of the
w+ Japanese attitudes in Southeast Asia, the ambiguous position of
the Thais, and political and economic information.
Support to Thai resistance. Delivery of supplies and dis-
semination of subversive pub cations had continued until the
surrender. Over 480 prisoners of war were brought out of Thailand
and supplies of food and medicine taken to others.
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