PROBABLE REACTIONS TO A POSTULATED US COURSE OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100050002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 23, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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Mk lORANDUM
23 March 1966
This paper estimates probable reactions, particularly by the DRV,
Communist China, and the USSR to the bombing program against North Vietnam
postulated in "The Role of Airstrikes in Attaining US Objectives in North
Vietnam," of March 1966, hereinafter referred to as the
"Bombing Study."
THE PROGRAM
The postulated bombing program consists of two phases:
PHASE I calls for the bombing of a, number of selected fixed targets:
POL facilities, the cement plant, military facilities, and prime
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targets on the LOCs. It also includes mining the major harbors.
This phase is to be quick and intensive. It could be completed
in two or three weeks, perhaps substantially less.
PHASE II consists of sustained armed reconnaissance on the LOCs in
the northern part of North Vietnam and restrikes as needed on the
fixed targets. This is to be continued as long as required and
would be accompanied by sustained harassment of traffic movements
and repair activities on the LOCs in the southern regions of
North Vietnam and Laos.
CONSIDERATIONS
1. Part I of this paper discusses the general reactions to the
postulated bombing program and sets forth the principal estimates upon
which the more specific judgments in Part II are based.
2. PHASE I, if successfully carried out according to the postulated
program, would involve about 4,000 attack and flak suppression sorties.
Spread over a two week period, this would be about 2,000 a, week, some
40 percent higher than the peak rate of 1965. The location and nature
of the targets are more sensitive than those attacked in 1965, and the
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program will obviously reflect a new escalation of the US air offensive.
This escalation mould mark an end to the sanctuary status of the Hanoi/
Haiphong area, the Northeast, and the 30--mile strip along the Chinese
border. Mining the major ports would introduce a new element with broader
international implications.
These differences would be seen by all observers as escalation
to another stage. Most would see it a .s. a strong demonstration of US will
to prevail in the conflict. It would also appear to many as a step toward
yet further escalation at a. later stage, and would increase fears of a
Sino.-US war.
1E. The Communist powers involved in the Vietnam conflict would share
these thoughts, but the fact that the pressure had been increased another
notch would probably have no immediate effect on their policies. They
have been expecting such a stap and have prepared themselves as far as
possible to absorb the added pressures.
5. Among the Communists, a decision whether to retrench, continue,
or expand the insurgency in the South will be determined by their assess-
ment of five main factors :
b. the cost to themselves in manpower and material;
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c. the risks to their own security;
d. the viability of the GVN; and
e. the effect of foreign and domestic opposition on the will
of the US to continue.
To varying degrees these factors will look different when viewed from
Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, and the Communist command posts in South Vietnam.
6. Only the North Vietnamese would feel the immediate impact to any
great extent. They would suffer a significant rise in the cost to themselves
and would feel their own security further endangered. The bombing program
has little or no prospect in 1966 of reducing or even of preventing some
increase in the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in the South.
Hence it would not force the Communists to end the insurgency because of
lack of resources. The Communists would probably expect that they could
make enough new propaganda out of "reckless US escalation" and "bombing
atrocities" to generate increased international and domestic pressures on
the US to desist. In this regard, we note that the program includes a
number of targets in moderately to densely populated areas. This would
provide the Communists with casualties and photographs to show foreign
reporters, which would enhance the effectiveness of their propaganda.
7. Probably Communist China is the most strongly determined of the
Communist powers that the struggle must be sustained until the US is
humiliated and driven out. There are many reasons for this, including
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the principles of Peking's foreign policy, its position in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, and, not least important, the fact that so far the struggle has
cost China relatively little. Peking is willing to give greatly increased
material aid and manpower (logistic forces, AAA units, etc.) to support
the DRV's battle, but we do not think that it is willing to take high
risks with Chinats national security for this purpose.
8. Our considered judgment of Chinese intentions is that Peking
hopes and intends to avoid war with the US. This view is supported by
many of Chinats official statements, by the caution which marks Chinese
behavior, and by the logic inherent in the disparities of Chinese and US
military power. We believe that the Chinese fear nuclear bombardment by
the US, are not confident that the US would refrain from such bombardment,
and are not confident of Soviet support in such a contingency. We think
that Pekingwould also be mindful of other possible US war measures well
short of nuclear bombardment, such as a blockade cutting off imports of
food. We, recognize the. possibility that Mao may think a Sing American
war inevitable, and as well fought sooner as later; he may identify
Chinese interests more closely with the military fortunes of North Vietnam
than we appreciate; he may take a view different from ours of the military
capabilities of the two sides. But we continue to believe that China will
not be lightly provoked, and it is this estimate which underlies the
consideration of specific contingencies in PART 21 of this paper.
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9. Hanoi has policy convictions and ambitions as urgent as those of
the Chinese, and among the Communist powers it would reap the most immediate
gains from a Communist victory in the South. But it is the DRV and the
Viet.Cong that are paying most of the price for continuing the conflict.
There also is almost certainly some worry among the DRV leaders regarding
the persistently increasing Chinese presence in North Vietnam and the
prospect that the conflict might grow into a Sino-US war with North Vietnam
as the battlefield. We would expect, therefore, that any key break in the
Communist determination to press on with the war would come earlier in
Hanoi or among the Viet Cong than in Peking.
10. The USSR is clearly not enthusiastic about the Vietnam conflict.
Moscow is not eager to see such a Communist victory in Vietnam as would
redound to the credit of Mao and increase Chinese influence in Asia and
in the world Communist movement. It is concerned to limit the damage to
US-Soviet relations and, more fundamentally, to prevent the Vietnam war
from escalating to the point of a US-Soviet confrontation. At the same
time, Moscow's claims to leadership of the Communist world inhibit it
from actions which Peking could portray as part of a Soviet-US deal to
sell out the Communist cause in Vietnam.
11. On balance, these basic attitudes of the Communists powers add
up to a strong likelihood that they will persist in the Vietnam struggle,
for some time at least, even if it demands a considerably increased price.
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There is little or no prospect that the outside Communist support of the
insurgency in the South can be physically stopped. Therefore, a change in
Communist policy in Vietnam favorable to US interests is likely to occur
only-through impact on the Communist will. This could follow from a
collapse of morale of the Communist forces in the South in the face of
constant hounding by US/Allied ground and air forces there; or it could
result from a, conclusion by the DRV leaders that the trend of the conflict
in the South no longer justified the price being paid by the DRV. The
two are, of course, much interrelated. In any case, the erosion of the
enemy will is likely to be a long process.
Non-Communist Reactions
12. In most cases, non-Communist reactions to the postulated program
of US attacks would probably follow the general patterns of reactions to
past US courses which raised the level of hostilities. There would be
increased concern with possible widening of the war, along with increased
determination to avoid military involvement and to keep any economic and
social involvement in South Vietnam to lowest feasible levels. The
exceptions to this general pattern would be principally among those countries
already directly involved; they would favor the course of action. No nation
would be likely to make significant changes in its policy toward the US or
the Vietnam war as a consequence of this course of action. However, the
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mining of Haiphong harbor would cause certain political problems for the
traditional maritime powers and would probably evoke protests from some
of them. The initial spurt of attacks on previously exempted targets,
producing civilian casualties magnified by DRV propaganda, would agitate
those who already disapprove of US involvement, but this effect would
subside over time.
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PART II: ANALYSIS OF DECISION POINTS AND PROBABILITIES
Early ' React ions
13. At the onset of the proposed bombing program, US air attacks on
critical targets on the main LOCs to China and, more particularly, in the
Hanoi/Haiphong area would confront the North Vietnamese leaders with a
difficult decision: whether or not to use their air force in defense,
against great odds.
a. They might use their air force only sporadically, as at
present.
b. However, the chances are at least even that, feeling compelled
to offer what defense they could, they would see little
point in conserving their air force, and would commit it in
considerable strength against US aircraft.
(1) In this case, US forces might destroy significant
numbers of DRV aircraft in the air. There would of
course be US losses, especially if the DRV aircraft
were equipped with air-to-air missiles. We know
some of their MIG--21s are missile capable, but we
do not know whether they are supplied with missiles.
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(2)
(3) The chances are better than even that additional
replacements would be forthcoming from the
Chinese Air Force. This probability would be
reduced if Chinese pilots were also required.
If loss rates continued high, Chinese replacements
would probably cease.
c. If the US chose to attack the DRV airfields as well as
aircraft, any surviving DRV aircraft would almost
certainly seek sanctuary on Chinese bases. China would
almost certainly grant such sanctuary.
14. At this point the question would be whether Communist China would
let its air bases be used -- either by DRV aircraft or its own -- to attack
US aircraft over North Vietnam.
a. In our view they would probably not allow their bases to be
used for any sustained or extensive commitment because:
(1) It would bring a high risk of US hot pursuit and attack
on Chinese airfields, confronting China with the
question of a major war.
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are also possible. If Peking and Washington both chose
to ignore such an encounter, however, it would not
necessarily lead to further escalation.
b. Chinese Probes. The Chinese might make some penetrations
of the northern DRV to test whether the US could be scared
off and whether China would be treated as a sanctuary.
There are precedents for such probes in the Korean war.
(1) If the Chinese Air Force gave a good account of
itself and the US generally stayed south of the
border, the Chinese would probably gradually expand
their operations over North Vietnam.
(2) If the US inflicted heavy losses on Chinese aircraft
and engaged in hot pursuit but did not bomb Chinese
airfields, China would probably desist.
(3) If the US attacked Chinese airfields, China would
either have to draw back from the air war, suffering
a serious loss of prestige, or expand the war and
accept all the consequent risks. This is a most
difficult case, and we do not know how the Chinese
would react. The chances of disengagement would be
greatest if the US attacks on airfields were prompt
and were clearly a specific and limited retaliation.
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c. A New Chinese Decision. Lastly, the Chinese might regard
the inauguration of the postulated air campaign as
requiring a decisive and high-risk response. We think this
unlikely, but we cannot rule it out. If they engaged US
aircraft over the DRV in this spirit, they would do so on
a large scale and with the hope of forcing the US to
desist through fear of escalation. If the US did not
desist, the Chinese would be prepared to take succeeding
steps toward a wider war, such as mobilizations and
threatening buildups in South China. If these had no
effect, they would then confront the grave choice of
whether or not to launch a large ground intervention. At
this point, much would. depend upon the specific circumstances
of the developing situation; in general, we think the chances
of such an intervention would be less if the US, in the
meantime, had not attacked Chinese air bases.
16. It is possible that the Soviets would offer Soviet air units to
operate over North Vietnam from Chinese airfields. We consider it highly
unlikely that the Chinese would agree to this because:
a. The Chinese have several times voiced their outrage at past
Soviet suggestions for joint bases or Soviet use of bases on
Chinese soil.
b. Peking is dead set against boosting Moscow's prestige
and influence in Hanoi.
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c. It would entail all the risks of US retaliation against
Chinese bases.
17. Mining the major DRV harbors would also bring early decision
points. (We assume the mining would be announced by the US so as to
avoid accidental sinkings.)
a. The immediate Communist response would be loud cries of
outrage and an effort to stir up world opinion against the
mining. Exploratory efforts might be made to test the
minefields and to sweep or otherwise neutralize them.
DRV and Chinese (and even Soviet) efforts to neutralize
the minefields would probably be relatively ineffective and,
in any case, the fields could be quickly resown.
b. We think it unlikely that oceangoing merchant vessels
(Communist or non-Communist) would try to run the
minefields.
c. There would be protests from some non-Communist maritime
nations, but we doubt these would be vigorously pressed.
d. The most important Communist response would be to divert
seaborne traffic to other means of transport. Some ships
would unload at Chan-chiang (Ft. Bayard) and Canton, and
their cargo forwarded by rail, highway and coastal shipping.
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Rail traffic across China from the USSR might be increased
(and this might cause further problems between Moscow and
Peking). Some ships could offload to shallow-draft coastal
craft at such minor Chinese ports and roadsteads as Pei-hai.
The coastal craft, which are available in great numbers,
could, thence filter south behind the coastal islands.
They are, of course, on the target list for armed
reconnaissance in the Bombing Study.
Longer-Run Communist Reactions
18. We have estimated above that the Chinese would not take on the
US in an air war in response to PHASE I of the bombing program. The
question remains of Communist reactions to the entire program including
the cumulative impact of PHASE II.
19. Impact on the DRV. PHASE I and the PHASE II followup would
affect the DRV in several ways:
a. There would be dislocations and disruptions of the economy,
especially in the small modern sector.
b. There would be substantial direct and indirect costs
resulting from physical. damage and the efforts at
replacement, substitution, and dispersal.
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c. There would be a substantial added burden on the DRV's
manpower supply for defense and logistic tasks.
d. The diversion of manpower and the disruption of transport
could result in increasing although localized food
shortages. If these shortages became widespread, popular
alienation from the regime would increase.
e. Whatever the effect on popular morale, the regime's controls
would not be appreciably weakened. However, there might
eventually be an aggravation of any differences which may
exist within the regime as to policies to be followed.
f. The movement of men and materiel to the South would become
more difficult and costly, but could be maintained at
recent or somewhat increased levels.
g. However, a ceiling would be imposed on Communist capabilities
to expand their activities in the South, but we cannot
estimate the level of that ceiling.
20. DRV Reactions. As we said in Part I, the DRV would be most
likely to respond by continuing its present policy. This would be true
not only for the first several weeks but probably for much longer. In
more detail the DRV response, much of which is probably already planned,
would include:
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a. Further dispersal of POL and other supplies.
b. Further passive air defense precautions and
dispersal of population.
c. Resort to coastal shipping, primitive
transport, etc.
d. Further construction of by-passes, alternate
routes, underwater bridges, etc.
e. Mobilization of additional repair and
reconstruction forces.
f. Calls on China and the Soviet Bloc for increased
logistic support and maintenance of air defense
capabilities.
g. Diplomatic and propaganda campaigns against the
bombing.
21. However, as the losses and costs accumulated over time, the DRV
might feel forced to make some basic change in policy. The general options
open to it would be:
a. A rapid and large input of PAVN forces to the South or even
an open invasion across the 11Z. We think this unlikely
because:
(1) it would be obviously dangerous to put such large
forces at the end of a difficult and vulnerable
supply line;
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(2) success would be uncertain at best;
(3) it might invite a US/Allied invasion of the DRV.
(4) The chances of greatly accelerated infiltration
would be higher if ARVN seemed near collapse or
there appeared to be an opportunity to inflict a
major military defeat on US forces. The DRV has
sufficient military manpower to provide a substantial
number of additional troops for duty in the South.
b. A marked reduction of insurgency in South Vietnam and/or
agreement to negotiate on terms which the US could accept
as a basis for beginning negotiations. We believe that
Hanoi would not do this unless it concluded that its
chances of winning the fight in the South had become so
slim that they no longer justified the damage being
inflicted upon the North. We cannot estimate when this
point might be reached.
22. Communist China's Reactions. Peking probably would increase its
efforts to maintain or enlarge the flow of essential military supplies and
logistic materials to North Vietnam, although movement of these goods would
become increasingly difficult and costly. Our estimate above (II, B)
that China would probably try to avoid engaging the US in an air war would
continue to apply.
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23. The Chinese leaders are vigorous advocates of "protracted struggle,"
and a prolonged stalemate in the Vietnam war would be acceptable to Peking.
It is conceivable, however, that such a stalemate might lead by gradual
stages to a Sino-US war. Already there are large numbers of Chinese in
North Vietnam working on LOCs and air defense, and the postulated US
program would almost certainly cause these numbers to rise substantially.
Most of the weapons used by the PAVN and many other essentials now come
from China. As the conflict develops, it is possible that step by step
it will become less Hanoi's and more Peking's war. In time, China could
become the chief antagonist by almost imperceptible increments.
24. Apart from this, Peking could avoid a definitive decision on war
or peace for China until such time as the US/Allied effort appeared to be
prevailing in North and South Vietnam and there was a prospect that,
despite Peking's urging, Hanoi would seek negotiations and/or cut back the
Viet Cong insurgency. At this point, the Chinese would have to decide
whether to accept this serious setback or to intervene directly in force
against the US and Allied forces. By the time this point had been reached,
many other changes in the situation would have occurred, making prediction
highly speculative. We believe, however, for the reasons discussed in
paragraph 8, that confronted with this dilemma the Chinese leaders would
prefer a setback, which they would consider temporary, to a war with the US.
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25. If the Chinese did choose to enter the war with large forces, they
could put US and Allied forces under serious pressure. Yet their capabilities
would be subject to certain significant limitations:
a. The formidable Chinese military machine is not geared to
project Chinese power a great distance from China's
borders.
b. To move large numbers of troops to South Vietnam and
support them there would present problems quite different
from those of the Korean war. The limitations of
geography rule out an operation on the Korean scale.
It seems probable to us that if the Chinese decided to
intervene with large ground forces they would enlarge
the area of conflict to include more of Southeast Asia.
c. Chinese naval power, including the air units attached
thereto, is slight in comparison with US naval strength in
the area. Nevertheless, it might attempt to attack one or
more major US units.
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Soviet 11ea,ctions
26. The postulated bombing program and the mining of ports would
pose new and continuing problems for the Soviets. Generally we estimate
that they would seek to discourage further escalation by both sides. At
the same time, they would feel obliged to maintain, and even increase,
political support and material aid to Hanoi, although the difficulties of
accomplishing the latter would be far greater than at present.
a. With direct sea suppl yr largely cut off, the flow of supplies
to Hanoi would be almost entirely under Chinese control.
(1) This would weaken the Soviet position in Hanoi.
(2) It would allow China to observe and control delivery
of all Soviet aid.
(3) It would enable China to challenge the USSR to open
up the sealanes.
b. The US air campaign would in itself be a demonstration of
the ineffectiveness of Soviet-supplied air defense to deter
the US, thus putting further pressure on Moscow to do
something.
27. Moscow's most likely responses would be along the following lines:
a. It would almost certainly offer more SP.Ms and fighters to
the DRV and would provide them if China agreed to tranship
than.
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b. The Soviets might provide equipment and technicians to try
to neutralize the minefields. Failing in this, they would
be highly unlikely to risk their ships.
c. They would take a harsher line with the US.
28. Beyond this, the Soviet response would depend greatly on the DRV's
policy. The Soviets would prefer that Hanoi turn toward negotiations, but
failing this they would probably have to consider more decisive action to
support the DRV.' It is difficult to conjecture what measures the Soviets
might hit upon as reasonably effective and yet reasonably safe. Moreover,
some Soviet actions might require Chinese agreement or cooperation. Among
the more extreme measures might be supplying offensive weapons to the DRV
or applying strong pressures on the US in Berlin, though neither of these
appears likely. In general, we believe that the Soviets,for a time at
least, would have to involve themselves more deeply in the war, and US-
Soviet relations would be worsened. It is not impossible, however, that
at some point the Soviets would decide that the USSR's best interests lay
in disassociation from the Vietnam conflict.
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