FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPAGANDA BRANCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003600020029-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: May 3, 1946
• Content Type: MEMO

The fo
we roposad by
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IA-RDP80RIES6GTED
time of the Pro
Dix/Information Dates 3 IV 146 "swient No. 3
Col. K1ocko/60
seeit Now 241, ProPeganda Branch tee only tied-
of intelligence. Its primary preoccupation is
items, programs, Illaniala, ti,rt3 and doctrine on
t the wartime lessons learned this important subject
activities of this branch do naturally U sder the
lion Group of MID, but warily under the mission
Training Group of MID. It is felt, moreover, that
step, sines pe pstuatnof latowledge gained through
L nd on the outbreak of next war the necessary rapid
vitiee will be facilitated (either within 0-2 or as a
sectivat
war
and moo
W.D. Special Ste
2. There are,.
Branch of the war Department
functions of the State and Na
national foreign polity, could
of the National DItelligence Au
would insure continuity of plann
propaganda and reyeirllogical
gence Division would retain, with a
deal only with the War Department
(TAB) B).
3. The outline of ftavotionis co
functions now being performed Ny the
flint with nor duplicate thittles of
Pending action on the trans of a portion
Group, it is believed that? hey properly
Branch. Mirthermore, thefts functions deal
propaganda, and for this reason, it is felt
be redesignated the Paydholoacal Warfare Bruno
1
Certain non
hieh because
D4artmrn
t be
E functions if the pt Propaganda
their very *lose &Wanes with similar
and becalm of their &midway UP031
ed by the Central Intelligent* Group
placing of these /Unctions on this level
ordination of operattin of our national
? At the same time, the Military Intolli-
ted charter, a portion of the old Winch to
Of psychological warfare and propaganda
In TAB D is a statement of the dation and
Branch. These blnations neither con-
lier Department Staff Division.
of these duties to the Central Intelligence
ribs the functions of the Propaganda
P570holotrical warfare rather than with
the present Propagaida Branch should
is. It is recampiniided that the A. C. of S.,
f the Can Intent-.
on by CIG on a. above
functions of the Propaganda
oh as stated at Tab Do
(2) Redeeignate Propaganda Branch as Psychologigal Warfare Branch
b. Cr,ordirtationt
Combat Intelligence and Training Group (Col, Rogers, *nat. 5391)
JCS and NSC reviellniroergice?ieRcElease 2
1R003600020te kps
?
CIG (Col. Nicholas, ext. 77606)
RESTR (TR
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C. V. ALLAN
Clloniast
USC
Director of Information
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MID 385
31R0Q4600020029-4
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEUTGENCE:
SUBJECT: Study of Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Activities
1. The proper use of propaganda and psychological warfare as an
instrument of national policy depends upon close integration so as to
insure consistency of policy and planning, continuity of material, and
the proper interrelation of military and civilian aspects of this com-
plicated subject.
2. It appears that the National Intelligence Authority is the
proper agency to integrate those aspects of propaganda and psychological
warfare which are not of separate State, War, or Navy Department :interest.
It is suggested, therefore, that the Central Intelligence Group, through
the instrumentality of paragraph 3 c of the Presidentts letter of 22
January 1946 establishing the National Intelligence Authority, determine the
advisability of absorbing the following propagand and psychological war-
fare functions of the War Department, and similar or related functions of
the State and Navy Departments.
a. Coordination of propaganda and psychological warfare matters
for the State, War, and Navy Departments.
b. Development of plans and policies governing the national
participation in propaganda and psychological warfare.
a. Planning and direction of the analysis of propaganda and
psychological warfare operations against or affecting the national interest
of the United States, whether of foreign or domestic origin.
cl. Review of long range informational and educational material
furnished to United States Forces insofar as these may concern the
psychological or political characteristics of foreign peoples, or may
themselves constitute statements of national policy.
-
e. Formulation of plans, studies and directives for propaganda
world.
and psychological warfare operations involving the other nations of the
3. If this proposal is acceptable, it is desired that Colonel
on preliminary- matters incidental thereto.
p 1 'EU
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be contacted
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ES`114 WIWI)
Inn 912
Policy Ztaft (For C e)
A.G. of 6.0-2 (For Approvel)
Propa.v.nde
STAT
tions of drench are Mit Lbrth ia 400 letters
Aar 321, 18 February 44) (0-6.12mi_ts dated 2 February 1:444. CAB A.)
2. These funotiens are ttasther outlined in lar Department :rioueral
5-2, dated 19 notaer 2.944, abeete nrganszation. (Tab 3.)
3 Tbe Director of Intelligence ie *barged with the reeves
Amor participation in prnpageada and payehnlogical warfare
Paragmkph o (0 (g), Report of Board at Officers on ilrgenisation
moats dated 23 December 1945 7ihich states nSuperfise Ar icr participation
and psychological warfare.*
4 with the mccoption of the tranafer of respeeibility freeth rzopaarnda 2eN
to Civil Affairs Division tor nimfnreetion eontroP in tho oomoied areas Clone from
the Assistant De*ky Chief of Staff to the Assistant Chief of staffs 0.2s and Directors
AD, dated 11 Fliaruary 1946), Crab C.), there has beenni revision of the functdeme and
duties of the Branch to conform to peace-time made and T r ona14o3.
5. In TUFO of the experiences in all theaters of o9oraticas w'.th ptiiCt1
,arters and propaaanda there is a Teat need for odecatilons Iuminings icat0fl,
and planning in order to avoid the difficulties Inwavad and mIstekee eemmitted lii
Airld Jar I and repeated in Jarld jar II.
6. The word aPropateinde dom nIt adequately describe .
and, in additions carries a onnLatatian of acorn end the rind of
Americans tanzr and civilian alike.
II. :0Tinti REOrILABOND
1 That the Branch be redesignated
That the proposed statement of &atlas and A:notions flr t4e
fare Drench as outlined in Tab D be approved and incorporatoa -Ln current tmnotional
charts.
taf
h.
oFT
Cciinel 'l
Tab B Chiefs It7tar
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Tab D ?Roo,..AL7
1
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Director fo ion Col R6 Ko Wright 10 Apr 46 2
Col Huston/6508
SUBJECT: Functions of the Propaganda Branch
Request your comment based on following considerations:
to If Propaganda Branch can contribute to the production of intelligence,
it should be placed under Chief, Collection Group,
b. If Propagande Branch cannot contribute to the production of intelli-
gence, it should be eitherteactivated or transferred to OPD or CIO.
IBM
FEW: Ckdef, Ocillecti on Group ts Way 40 Gaillfkr 3
051 acherlateraifte
1. propaganda involves two aspects' (1) the dissemination of U. S. information
to foreign countries in the interests of the U. S. and (2) the-collection and analysis
of propaganda promulgated from one foreign country to other countries, including the U.S.
The former mission involves functions listed in Tab D; it is operational in
character and aa Duch has no place in the intelligence field. During the war, when
military oonsiderations superseded all others, it was logical to have psychological
warfare activities Closely coordinated with military operations. In peace time civil
(diplomatic) Ponca:me become paramount and psychological activities should be closely
coordinated with the State Department; therefore, no active psychological warfare
activity, except for training, should exist in the War Department during the peace
period.
Reference the second mission above. It is believed that in peace time a
propaganda branch for collection is unnecessary. Propaganda in peace is promulgated by
means of radio, newspapers (or other publications) and sometimes through secret methods.
From the viewpoint of collection, this material can be gathered by our existing collect-
ing agencies. The study of this material for intelligence purposes is properly a function
of the Intelligence Group.
2. It is therefore recommended that the Propaganda Branch as now constituted be
deactivated, but that elements be preserved and transferred to the Combat Intelligence
and Training Group to perform the functions listed in Tab E.
3. Coordination: Combat Intelligence and Training Group (Col. Rogers, ext. 5391).
C. V. ALLAN 41 '4000*
5 Incls
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L
RFS- Chief, Colledtion Group
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ve1114011111101111114~.14
ChiefICI&T Group
WNW
mole:
n/0
!or Comment.
Exeo.Dir.iID
9 Ner 46
Col .?r
I. I. WRIONT
Colonel, GEC
Zreoutive Director, I.D.
7/74970/kp
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r*OT? '117 r,
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CI e Group DATE: 10 May 146 COMMENT NO 5
Co]. Rogers/f2r/5391
a Psychological Section in IntaGligence Training Group by
cit.F.5, and 1 CAP-4 of presen.t Propaganda Branch, and in
24 The tenet d time of Chief, Intelligence Training Group, to
supervise Psychologica1 within the Anse Mould be added to those
listed in Tab nJCS" it" paragraph f of Tab B should be changed to "other gdrvarranent
agencies
3. The added personnel should be in additimi to that reconmanded by Ude Group
under the proposed reorganisation. If not the Psychological Warfare Section should
not be eetablished in Training Group as Inadequate personnel 'mull fore* the saerifice
of functions considered actual responsibilities of the Director of Intelligence*
RECrUMENDATIONSt
It is mom:ended that:
a, Propaganda Brazioh be? inactivated,
b), Psychological Waribre Section be fv id in Int?J1ig1oe Training Group by
transfer of 2 officers, 3. CAP-5, and 1 CAP-14 with a corresponding Increase in ceiling
strength of the iritelligence Training Group,
a. That plartning, policy, and operations be offered to the CIG and the
State Department within their respectiye spheres,
(
P. E. PEABODI
BrIgadier General, GSC
Chief, Onsimet Intelligence &
Training Groffp
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Chief, Propaganda Branch
THRU: Chief, Collection Qroup
Preparation of Staff Study
Branch
Executive Director,
I. D.
by Chief, Propaganda
16May A6
Col Tresay/74970,44
1. Chief, Propaganda Branch will prepare for signature of the Director of
Intelligence a staff study for submission to the Chief of Staff, thru the Director
of information, Operations Division and the Civil Affairs Division, setting forth
the desirability of the establishing of a Psychological Warfare Division as a Division
of the Mkt Department Speoial Staff.
20 The staff study will be a =plots concise analysis of the functions of the
Psychological Warfare Division and will emphasise the fact that many of these functions
are operational in nature and also have important aspects of research and technical
development. The study.mili Include among its conclusions the fact that while the
Intelligence Division has an interest in the activities of the psychological Warfare
Division, such interest is not the primary One.
3. Inowledge of the preparation of this staff study will be restricted to the
minimum number of personnel required in its preparation.
FOR THE A. O. OF S., 0-2:
R. K. WRIGHT
Colonel, WC
Executive Director, I. D.
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WAR DER'..RNENT
Washinzton 25, D. C.
:AG 321 (18 Feb 44)0B-5-B-M
EVH/sc-2B -939 Pentagon
21 February 1944.
SUBJECT: Functions of Propaganda Branch, Military Intelligence
' Division WDGS
, ? ? ?
the Commanding generals,
- -Army Air Forces;
-Army Ground ,Forces;
ArMy'ServiCe forces;
Commander-in-Chief? Southwest Pacific Area,
lbe'dOMManding Generals, '
Theaters of Operations;
Zefense CeMmands' Departmentsi
aS-e'G011imands; '
The Commanding Officers,
-Babe Commands.
1. In accordance with direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff,
the establishment and organization of a Propaganda Branch in the
Military Intelligence Division War Department General Staff, has
been completed. This Branch functions under the direct control of
the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 War Department General Staff.
2, Functions; Propaganda Branch Military Intelligence
Division/ shall:
a, Be responsible for the coordination of all propaganda
functions for the ;lar Department.
b. Be responsible for the preparation and dissemination
of Propaganda items for the use of the Office of 'a,r? Informa-
tion, Coordinator of Inter-,American Affairs and other non-
military and quasi-military organizations.
c. Advise the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-21 War Depart-
ment general Staff of all propaganda problems presented by
Commanding Officers of overseas theaters.
d, Advise and coordinate War Department action on all
propaganda matters brodght before the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and Combined ,Chiefs of'staff.
e. Process all Office of war Informaaon and Coordinator
of Inter-American Affairs Propaganda plans through the Joint
'efs, jStaff,
;
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RESThe invedFAT-521eltsie8299W93.113}j_S,,Will,)FT9PIPAptilli,SpWp0A-Od.)
f, Coordinate its activities with the similar Branch in
the Navy Department.
cr? Coordinate its activities with the State Department,'
-
?thd other intereited agencies of the Government.
By. order of the Secretary of War:
ROBERT H. DUNLOP
Brigadier General ?
Acting The Adjutant General
COPIES FURNISHED:
Assistant Chief of Staff; G-2; War Department General Staff (20);
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff,
Attention: Propaganda Branch (25).
DISTRIBUTION
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AR DE? 4ERAL STAFF CIRCUIAR
Coo
es
WAR DE}'LRTMTT
OFFICE, CHIM? OF STAFF
ashIngton, 19 Oct. 1944
Se Dtviaiov, G-2
of 1ilitsry Intelligence Service)
EXTRACT
*
propaganda_ functions for the War Department*
b. Prepares and sgainates propaganda items for the use of Office of
War informations Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and other non-militarY
and quasi-military organizations.
Advises the Aaaistant Chief of Staff, 0.2 on all propaganda 2robls
by commanders of overseas theaters*
Advises an and Coordinates War Department action an all propaganda
re brought before the Combined and Joint Chief of Staff.
s all Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-
propaganda plans through the Joiat Chiefs of Staff.
its activities with the similar office in the Navy Depart-
nt, and other interested agencies of the Government.
f aX Branch is Amy member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison with
Information, and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs*
(I) terations Section* Handles adminietrative, personnel, and policy
prepares weekly and other special military guidance for Office of vTar Tofor-
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; maintains lialcon and coordinates
with War Department and other government agencies; selects intelligence
obtains clearaace for use Iv Office of War Information and Coordinator
arican Affairs; and studies aud prepares reports on foreign propaganda.
(2) Research and Analysis Section. Analyzes foreign propaganda and prepares
daily reports and periodic studies of same. analyzes Allied intelligence reports to
determine effectiveness of Allied propaganda*
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TAS
C17.! ;111114 7111.5
SIAM Awl' Fr,
1-1c7
7vz7 co
17 4.&y1746
taking the libel*l of sendinf yo.J. a
al, re6lort on Vayebo1orca1 Airfare
acmiclat 4,ep4rl* Oen* mere zei t. Ar ocpart-
utentt but osaily eleht mot have oleo to your
otter;tion* in* report looks mcm fomidahla
thall it really 1*--Naetua11y the aarratise! tr oa-
nineteen paves.
Icl-J0 you will want to otaid trIn T;o:Tei
bility of lifting ilteho1oL1oal arrare into the
zderltral intelligenee picture* la ny opin
ion1 eholozical 4arfart is teer-Iti61
pi_ftv,-entation Ailitar; inteliii,:enes and 4a,st
studied thorott4;hly in pesos LIMA. ol tLe
reason* in the past -167 we nave nibjudgeU arldea
and peoples is. because we failed to understiind
their temper, xistaology and r..,Int41 teNrrior
2atterna. Ath radio broadcasting an6 dro7ring
of 4ffiga sh,4ets iron the ski, aa Can now coasuni
date vittl our eneaT daily durinA mar* it mould
L) s orinINII hiegiect not tc- r.roperea to tw.
this .tield4
yows,
zonlsr ir
t Areator
cti. InteI-I./genes Oroup
Lew :1;-artment 3uilding
21st and arElaia ,-venne,
Akettagtout G*
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II. no 19146
71EMORANDUU F1 TAB ASSISTA1T CHDF OF SWF, 0-2, AND THE DIRIOTOR
CIVIL LIMBS )TVI
BJECTI Transfer of Coordina ion of Foreign Infoaatiafl FUDOtiOnS
ive on or about 15 February 1946 responsibility for
reign public information functions Is the War
rred from the Military Intelligence Division to
ion, The Astistant Chief of Staff, 0-2, and
A fairs Division will err lige, to their mutual
sat ions the 1 date of traLfer.
Pertinent 0 together with the allotment of personnel and
those individuals perfOrming foreign public information duties within
theMilitarrIntelligence Division will be transferred to the Civil
Affairs Division b) the Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
3. The Civil Affairs DiViziOrt will submit a manning table of
orgnrization and statement of dutaes and responsibilities for approval.
BY DIRECTION OF THE JATUTI CHIEF OF STAFF:
19
H. I. Hedge
H. I. mass
Brigadier General* 0SC
Assistant Dnputy Chief of Staff
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PRO:Mall ,VliCTIMS AND DUTIES OF MB, nu
Adivinee the Dirt .O1 Intelligence on all lawful;
d problems.
2. rdinates all psychological warfare functions for the War Department
with the exception of ninformatiaa control' matters in occupied areas, administer
-
ere by U.S.ltilitaryeevernment, which shall be the primary reeponsibility of
the Civil Affairs Division.
3. Develops plans and policies governing -Jar Department participation
ychologicallearfare and advisee as to existence of conditions involving
peyobalogioa1 warfare.
lane and directs analysis of psychological warfare operations against
or affecting the nilitary intereeta of the U.S. whether 02 domestic or foreign
or
5. Reviews the Federal program of foreign propaganda affeetiug U.S. military
rest and advises Federal agencies on the 'vier Departmaatis views on sueh
ma tore*
6. ews information and education material furnished U.S. forces insofar
as these may concern psychological and political characteristics of foreign
peoples or may themselves constitute statements of national policy.
7. Provides War Department liaison and coordination with other U.S. govern-
ment and allied agencies on psychological warfare matters.
8. Formulates plena, background studiee,-directives and samples for pre-
belligerent or itarttee payob03.0gica1 -warfare against all antazoniste and
potential enemies.
9. Coordinates the preparation of training aide, programs, =annals and
texts on pszrchological warfare for staff and service chools, reserve and national
guard training
10. Coordinates the collections analysis and distribution of information
concseeing technical devices for use in psychological warfare.
U. Furnishes members to Joint Chief.: of Staff sub-committees an pcychclegi-
cal warfare matters.
12. Chief of the Branch acts as Army members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
liaison with the Office of International Information and s'ultural. Affairs (OIC)
of the State Department*
14P
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TAB 1:
USI D
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Partial FunCtione to be Retained by
bp ogioal Warfare Branch, Combat Intelligence & Training Group
a. Formulate training doctrine and coordinate training programs
for military psychological warfare units.
b. Coordinate proourement and distribution of training aids and
literature for training programs of military psychological warfare units.
o. Collect and disseminate technical data on psychologioal warfare
device's.
U. Maintain War Department. liaison with major commands, Staff
Agencies and Services on psychological warfare matters.
e. Maintain liaison with and provide source matorials on
psychological warfare tactics and techniques for Um' military service
schools and hither staff colleges.
f. Furnish War Departnent representation on JCS activities
concerned with psychological warfare matters.
ICAPS
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Brief Summary of War Department Participation in Psychological Warfare
1. In World War I, the Psychologic Subsection of M.I.2, Military
Intelligence Division, was charged with the collection of information
on enemy propaganda, formation of plans for the maintenance of American
and Allied morale, civilian and military, and for the destruction of
enemy morale. It was responsible for psychologic estimates and daily
psychologic reports, from which were prepared studies of German propa-
ganda operations and objectives. It was responsible also for the plan-
ning of leaflet warfare, including dissemination by aircraft or trench
patrols.
2. Interest in psychological warfare was allowed to lapse in the
period 1919-1941, and no provision was made in the organization of the
War Department for army participation in psychological warfare activities.
3. In June 1941, the Special Studies Group was organized by direc-
tion of the Secretary of War under Brigadier General Sherman Miles, then
acting AC of Sp G-2. The group nuts headed by Lt. Col. Percy G. Black,
F. A..- Its mission was to provide's. psychological analysis of enemy
nations, neutrals, and our own people, to promote projects in domestic
and foreign psychology accurately timed to the objectives of war plans,
and to act as War Department spokesman on questions of psychology in
order to coordinate the activities of other government or individual
groups engaged in active propaganda work to the national military ob-
jective. In March 1942, just prior to the reorganization of G-2, the
extreme secrecy concerning the activities of this group was lifted to
the extent of renaming it the Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2.
4. Also in 'March 1942, under directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS 12), the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee was created for the
purpose of planning psychological Warfare in combat theaters and enemy-
controlled areas. The JPWC was to initiate, formulate, and develop
plans for psychological warfare, to act as coordinating agency, and to
integrate psychological warfare with military strategy.
5. In December 1942, tJCS 1551,, divided the responsibility for
Psychological Warfare and propaganda as follows: OSS was responsible
for planning, development, coordination and execution of the military
program of psychological warfare and for the compilation of such infor-
mation as might be required for military operations; Overt propaganda
was to be executed by 04I, and economic warfare by BTI. Theater commanders
were to control psychological warfare in their areas, and the functions
of OSS were restricted to those in suppert of military operations. The
Psychological Warfare Branch was therefore abolished NIS Memo 147, 31 Dec
1944).
6. In March 1943, Colonel H. D. Kehm of Operations Division, ADGS,
was appointed to act as liaison officer between JCS on the one hand and
OWI and CIAA on the other. His duties were:
(0) To sit as member of the Overseas Planning Group0 OWL
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(b) To maintain contact with all planning agencies of the
JCS and to furnish the oai with details of JCS plans, consistent with
security, in order to insure correlation between military and propa-
ganda plans.
(c) To transmit requests from the JCS to the 041 relative to
propaganda activities desired for the purpose of furthering military
operations.
(d) To present to the JCS all basic and special propaganda plans
which require their approval.
7.. -Since this arrangement did not prove satisfactory, in August
1943 the Deputy Chief of Staff directed that the Operations Division and
0-2 jointly submit recommendations on the question of a -gar Department
agency for psychological warfare. In compliance with this directive a
report was rendered in which the recommendation was Made that a War
Department agency be established, preferably under the AC of Sp 0-2,
with the function of effecting the requisite coordination and control
of propaganda, and that the chief of this section be appointed as JCS
liaison officer with -041 and C1AA.
8. Accordingly, by direction of the Deouty Chief of Staff, a
Propaganda Branch was established in the Military Intelligence Division
under direct control of the AC of Sp 0-2, (MID Memorandum No. 78,
15 Nov. 1943, (Tab A).
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C THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
-b Joint Strategic Survey Committee
Washington 25, D. C.
-y
22 December 1945
SUBJECT: Research and Analysis df MB Activities in World Jar II.
TO: Lieutenant General J. E. Hull,
Operations Division, War Department
1. As a result of inquiries .I have made in the War Depart-
ment and other agencies in Washington since I returned from over-
seas, I am unable to determine whether or not any over-all study
is being made of our Psychological Warfare (MB) activities in
World War II. I consider it important that such studies be made
new before personnel experienced in PUB matters are so widely
scattered as to be no longer available for such a task and before
the many lessons learned (and which may or may not be included in
Theater reports) fade from the memories of the personnel who
participated in recent PUB operations.
2. At the beginning of the war our knowledge of Psychological
Warfare was limited to that obtained while observing at a distance
the extremely successful employment of this new weapon by the
Germans in the early phases of the war. However, we knew little
if anything about the techniques or organization required to
fit it into the operations of ourcrn -armed forces. Initially
we leaned heavily on the British, who were still groping for the
proper set-upl but generally we learned by bitter experience. We
soon realized that PWB was a useful and valuable weapon of war-
fare when properly employed but an extremely harmful one if not
used in accordance with principles -which were as clearly defined
as those applicable to the employment of other recognied weapons
of warfare.
3. To avoid a repetition of the MD mistakes we made in
World War II and to take full advantage of the experience gained
in that war, I recommend that a comprehensive study be made of
this subject at an early date with a view of:
a. Analysing all available MB material of world War II,
including particularly the PUB reports from the various theaters
of operations, to establish sound MB principles, techniques, organi-
zation, equipment and procedures for future employment of this weapon.
b. Establishing short courses in our staff schools to
provide future commanders and staff officers with a general under-
standing and appreciation of this new weapon of warfare.
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d. Examining the feasibility of establishing a small PJB
section in the 'Aar Department to provide continuing study of this
subject, or failing that, to assign this responsibility to an
existing section or agency best prepared to assume it.
/s/
L. L. IFITNITZFR
Major General, U. S. Army.
!CAPS
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Itmerpts from Chapters I and II of
"The Psyohologioal War Division, SHARP, An Asoount of Its Operations*
Published by reD. SWF, Bad Homburg* Germany, (*tabor 1945
I. INTRODUCTION
Poychologieal Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary
Force vas a special staff division of SHAW charged with responsibility for the
prosecution of psychological warfare in the area of continental &trope con..
trolled by the Supreme Commander. Unlike the other divisions of MEP, MD had
both staff.-planning and operational functions.
missions of PWD were.
Towage peyohological warfare against the enemy.
(b) To sustain the morale of the people of friendly nations occupied by the
enenv and to cause, the people of these ?pantries to maw-Uwe in the wishes of the
Supreme Commander.
(o) To oonduct soroalled Consolidation Propaganda operations in liberated
friendly countries.
(d) To control laformation services in Alliedrocoupled Germany.
PWD was the agency-which coordinated psyohologioal warfare operations
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Allied eommander. However, it must be
borne in mind that certain civilian apneas* of the British and American govern-
ments dealt in strategic propaganda, which, because of the range of powerful radio
transmitters, entered this theater.
Beyond this, political policy directives underwhich FM operated stemmed orig-
inally from civilian agencies. The political pbliclies of Amerioan and Britain are
developed by the State Department and the Foreign Office. The propaganda &spooks
of these polloiss were developed on the American side by the Office. of War Infor-
mation and on the British side by the Political Intelligenoe Department of the
Foreign Office (PID) and the Ministry of Information (MOI). Directives governing
these propaganda policies reaohed PRD through military channels, however, and
with the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Thus, although the origins
of FWD** direotives were civilian in I:hart/Ater, the operation of PWD itself was
a military one under military command.
Psyshological Warfare Division SHAN? was the first agency, military or
*iv lien, to.eocirdinste successfully in Western Europe the efforts of the numerous
military are. civilian egencies which had waged Anglo-American psychological
warfare since the beginning of the war.
On the Amerioan side there had existed for some years in HIS, 0.1. War
perfume, a small Psychological Warfare &option. In the late summer of 1841,
a few monthe before Pearl Harbor, the Office ofthe Coordinator of Information
(COI) was established in Washington. The COI hadvithin it the elements which
later were separated into the Office of Strategio Services (088) mad the Overseas
Branch of the Office of War Information (OW. The COI initiated official
American government short wave broadcasts to enemy and enemy-occupied countries
in the Autumn of 1141.
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On the british side, PI% ROI and the BBC were directing broedosste and
dropping lesiiets on enemy and enemy.occupied countrlee from the beginning of
the war in September, 1930.
In the Autumn of 1942 after the COI was split into 063 and CI the
London Liaison Section of OWI, and PID, agreed to issue each wok a Joint
Psyehologioal Warfare Dirootive to which tho various psychologleal warfare
ageneirs of the two countries would be eubjeot. This was the first major instance
Of praotieal cooperation between the psychological warfare agencies In Britain
and America. This Joint Directive continued as the politisal policy directive for
PND until the end of its operations.
The olosest lineal ancestor of pwpfahnir appeared in November 1942 when,
at the orders of General Nisenhower, a Joint military-civilian Anglo?Aeerioan
Peyohologioal Warfare Chit was attached to Allied Force Headquarters after the
Allied landings in French North Attica, This agensywas known as the Psycho'
logical Warfare Branoh, AFWQ, and it laid many of the foundations on which
rwpfsupp later was to build a much larger and more intricate structure. It was
in PKB/AFK that the. early lessons of Anglo-American civilian/military cooperation
were learned and 'here much of the trial-and-error involved in the new field of
combat psychological warfare operations was undergone. Certain of the personnel
which had had experienoe in PNB,later became a part of PO. Brigadier General
Robert A. McClure, Chief of PWD had been Chief of the Infermation and Censorship
Section of Allied Faroe Beadquarters, of whiohlWB was a branch.
On November 13, 1943, Brigadier 0 neva McClure arrived in London from
OM to assume the duties as (thief of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare
Division. On February 14, 1944 he wee appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, 0.(i,
which was the new designation of the P and PW Division. On April 23 announcement
was made of the distiontinuanoe et the 0.6-Division as a general staff division
of SHAM In its place two special divisions wore announced. One was the
Public Relations Division under Brigadier General Thomas J. DIMAS and the other,
the Pryehologicel Warfare Division under Brigadier General Malure. The SNOW
General Orders announcing the is:wooing also stated that, whore necessary, the
Public Relations Division and the Psychological Warfare DiVi81021 would share
communications and censorship facilities.
Although the internal organisation of PROBASF changed materially through
the months. PWDIs relationship to other Staff Divisions and to the Supreme Allied
Commander remained substantially the same from this point onward until the dis.
solution of SURF.
SUABF was dissolved officially as of 2400 hours 13 July 1946. With tho
dissolution of SHAW. the Anglo-American aspect of FNDIseperation disappeared.
On the British side an organisation know as the Information Services Control
Branoh, Control Commission for Germany, came into being. On the American side,
the successor to PWD was deeignated the Information Control Division, Nes. U.S.
Forces Nuropean Theater, and the Information Control Service, U.S. Group Control
Council. Brigadier !general WoClure was Chief of both of these American
organisations.
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Through st of the Ut. of PO, until the beginning of the German Infer..
nation Control operation, the Chief of Mims 'misted by four deputies, ono
representing each of the four civilian agencies which contributed personnel
to P811, namely, OWL 08$, PID, and MOls For a period there was fifth who served
as the Chef's deputy on purely military matters.* &Imo months before the
German surrender, the civilian deputy representing OSA was withdrawn for other
duties, and later the post of military deputy VAC abolished.
While the four civilian deputies functioned, the various operating sections
were divided among them as their primary responsibilities.
These sections weres
a) Plana and Directives
b) Intelligence
c) Radio
(d) Leaflets
40) Press
g1 Films
(Publications and D
(h) apocial operations
Civilian and military administration, warehousingetransport-supply, and
were plaoed under the Executive Offioe.
In AFHQ, (The prototype of FWD/SHARP) had performed all staff and
operational functions In the field of psychological warfare. A history of all
peyohologioal warfare aotivities in APHQ and a history of FWEAPHQ Gould not but
be the same paper. This eas not literally true of porp/Mmor.
REAR? Operation Memorandum No. 8 dated March 11, 1944, defined the responsi.
bilities for the control, coordination, and operation of psychologicel warfare
within the Allied -Expeditionary Force. In paragraph 51 under the title
"Combat Propaganda," the lemorandum stated that 'combat propaganda will be con.
fined within the terms of directive. issued by SHARP to ARMY GROUPS and, as
moolloary. to Allied Navel Expeditionary Force and Allied Expeditionary Air
Toros.' Paragraph 50 then stated "In order to execute psychological warfare
plans prepared under these directives, Army Groups will raise, administer and
operate psychological warfare field operational units capable of carrying out"
thee* activities.
splay
personnel
Paragraph 8 of the memorandum, titled "Consolidation Propaganda,' stated
that consolidation propaganda would normally be carried out by 3Upreme Heads.
quarters, Allied Expeditionary Form'. When desirable and practicable, taek, will
be deoentralised to Army Groups under special directives.' Finally, paragraph 7
of the memorandum re-emphasised that "the successful outoole of psychological
werfare demands centralised control and coordination of propaganda themes and
aims. Any departure from the principle oan only lead to ineffective or
disastrous results." Sub-paragraph C under paragraph 7 stated that "Amy departure
required by Commanders,in.Chief (Commanding Generals), Army Groups, or sub..
ordinate ?emend-ors from the terms of directives issued to them will be referred
to and receive the prior concurrence of Supreme Headquarters."
* The deputies wet Mr. C. D. Jackson (OWIis Mk. R. H. 3. Grossman (PIO,
25X1 Mt. Dennis. Routh MCI)) (088); Colonel Harold D. Rehm.
Cill
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Thus the oonduct of Combat psychological warfare was removed from PWD SHARP.
the other hand, Consolidation Propaganda operations were made the specific
sponsibility of SNAP. Finally PWW$BARP's policy control of Army Group
sydhological Warfare through directives was established*
Within the context of Operation WomOrandum No* 8, Pp/0HW"e general
funotions MOTO'S
Staff planning*
Issuance of policy directives to Army Groups*
Supply of certain personnel and equipment to Army Group conbatteams.
Supervision of training of personnel for Army Group titans*
Production and dissemination of leaflets by strategic aircraft*
Certain strategic radio.
Consolidation propaganda in friendly liberated countries.
(This was-done by a separate organisation stemming from PeD which was
known as Allied Information Service (AM:).
Operation of captured fixed radio transmitters on the continent*
Liaison assistance in certain circumstances to 0-1 and 0.7.5.
Control of information services in Germany.
This paper will attempt to describe in some detail all of the foregoing
unctions*
11. BACKGROUND
In the, beginning, Pewee largely without personnel or eqUipment. It was
an idea rather than an operation* In order to pass from the idea stage to the
operational step it.was required that the four civilian agencies detail personnel
and equipmont to FWD Like the other Divisions of SHARP, PRI was to utilise
British and American personnel interchangeably. Beyond this, and unlike the other
Divisions of MAW, PWD, ws to utilise civilian personnel from the four civilian
agencies in both planning and operational functions* It must be borne in mind that
because of the nature of psychological warfare, and in view of the background of
the civilian agencies, civilians at first toned the largest group of trained
operational personnel available to PO.
Despite tho experience gained In PROM, the agencies in London did not
at first comprehend the relationship that was to exist between themand PWD/SHARP
In the western European military operation* This relationship wee, in point of
fact, quits simples all psychological warfare activities against the enemy, and
all oonsolidation propaganda activities conducted in liberated countries were to
be eonduoted or controlled by PWD/SBAEF as the representative of the uproms
Commander* PWD was to be, in effect, the umbrella under which everyone, military
and civilian, engaged in psychological warfare activities woultitlitOtion.' Ths
civilian agencies were to assign personnel to PWD, and so long as such individuals
were On assignment to PO, they were under the immediate direction of the Chief
of PO and not under the direction of the chiefs of the severalagenoies*
Instructions -and directives governing the activities of these individuals did
not reach them directly from their original agencies, but through military
channels and the office of the Chief of FWD.
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It was envisaged. that, when military exigenoies no longer demanded, military
control of COnsolidation Propaganda aotivities and certain of the civilian per?
flannel would be returned to the civilian agencies leach would then take ever,
on a national rather than joint basis, and as oivIlians, the continuing tasks
which had been begun under military control by PWD.
Under the terms of Operation Memorandum No. 8, referred to in Chapter 1 of
this paper, Army Groups began the tank of assembling psychologieal warfare teams
in the early spring of 1944. Only one Army Croup, the 21st, was to be in the
field at the beginning of the Normandy operation. At the same time, the Need?
quarters of a U.5. Ari y Group was located in London. This Army Group was to
beoome operation *hen the Third U.S. Army would join the First U.S. Army
in France. Then the First Am would be withdrawn from 21st Army Grow and a
purely American Army Group would operate beside the British 21st. The 12th
U.S. Army Group Mama* operational in July 1044, and control of the P. W. TOM
Of the First U.S. Army reverted to the Psychological Nrfare Branch of 12th Army
Group.
On the American side, the basis of personnel Per psychological warfare in
the field was a purely military unit known as a Nobile Radio Broadcasting Company
(MRBC), The first WRBC had been assigned to PWD/Am. As time Went on, the
2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th WRBCs operated with the Amerioan armies in ?rano*. Other
personnel, both military and civilian, was attached for the purposes of lift,
administration, etc. to one or another of the MRBCs. On the British side there
was no such unit basis as this and personnel was attached to the Peyohological
Warfare Branoh, Slat Arey Group an an individual basis.
In both Army Growls, the Psychologioal Warfare Branch was ,part of a combined
Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division, similar to that whieh had existed
in SHARP before April 13, 1944, when Publicity and Psychologieal Warfare wire
Separated.
Assignment of personnel by the civilian agencies and by the British and
American forces to MD/SHARP proceeded through the late minter of 1945 and spring
of 1944. When the Staff-planning emotions were complete, pipissur began the
additional task of re-assigning personnel to Army Groups. On the Amerioan side
there was a further re*assigement from the Army Group to First U.S. Army. This
personnel later was to be brought back to 15th Army Group when it became ?porn..
tional.
FWD, with the aid of certain already established British and American
agencies, undertook the *crowning and training of personnel to be offered for
assignment to Army Croups.
At the same time, specific operational planning was going forward within
this: sections of PwOmay. A plan for taking over information services in Burope
under ,nZANKInf CAS C conditions was presented to the Chief of Staff. Later the
PWD plans for .0117212LORD* and other operations mere completed.
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Liaieon was Initiated with representatives of the several exiled Allied
governments in London. Stockpiling of radio, press and publioations material
was +coordinated among the immoral eontributing agencies 17 PWD. The News
Seotion experimented with a special radio nwws file which lets: was to form the
basis of press activities on the Continent.
The leaflet Section undertook to clocirdinate the separate British (pro) and
American (on) leaflet operations, and a joint MAXI printinr.production
direotorate was set up in order to make the most effective use of these facili-
ties in the United KJ dam.
As has been noted previously, the *Voice of SHAW broadcasts began on BBC
and AIM before Di.Day. These were to eontinue throughout the life of MEP and
represented the radio aspeot of the relatively simple basics patternthat all
PWD activities assumed in the Western Buropean operation. PWD, as the artioula-
tion of the Supreme Commander to the people of snowy and enemy.oconpied eountries.
utilised all its available media far the simple purpose of telling the various
'Ludlam'si what the Supreme Commander wished them to do, why they should do it,
and what they might expect if they carried out the Supreme Commander's wishes.
Thus, although PNA/SHASF did net by any means perform all psychologioal warfare
operations in Western ItUrope, its directive control was suffioient to permit it
to coordinate the efforts of the agencies and individuals whIch contributed toward
the total psychological warfare impact and to eoordinate these efforts along the
simple line of the Supreme Commander's speolfie expressed 'wishes. Plimitaar
was the channel that extended back to the political pollopimaking agencies in
London and Washington and forward to the extreme front lines where Psychological
Warfare Teams were in immediate oontaot with the enemy.
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Yeb 44
MEEORANDUM FOR TEE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
Subject: Army Air Forces Psychological Warfare Service
In compliance with the terms of Memorandum for the Command-
ing General Army-Air Forces, JDCSA 321 (5 Jan W dated 5 January 1244,
the Army Air Forces Psychological Warfare Service has been abolished
and necessary action has been taken to rescind outstanding regulations
establishing the service.
The two officers engaed in this work have been made avail-
able for transfer and assignment to the Psychological Propaganda Branch,
G-2.
For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:
/s/ BYRON E. GATES
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Lanagement Control
VDTORANDat FOR RECORD:
On 5 January 19hh Col. O. L. Nelson, GSC, Asst. to the Deputy
Chief of Staff sent the following memorandum to the Commanding General, AAF:
"The need for an Army Air Forces Psychological 'farfare Service is
questioned. The War Department resisted for many months the establishment
of a Psychological Warfare Section in G-2 and finally acceded to the pro-
posal in order to provide one point of contact in the Jar Department with
the Office of War Information and other agencies that have primary interest
in this field. The principal justification for the establishment of such
a section was to eliminate the confusion that had existed by dealing with
many different agencies in the War Department."
"In the set up of a Psychological Warfare Section in G-2, it was
contemplated that an air officer would be detailed as a Deputy Chief of the
section. It is not believed that an Army Air Forces Psychological Warfare
Service is needed or is desirable."
"By direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff:"
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Saverpte from
11 Psyehologioal Warfare in the
Southwest Paolfio Area
1944-1948
II. PO ESTABLISMSD
ahortly after the victory of Hollandia, (April 1944), the Commander-inmChief
directed the establishment or a Psychological Warfare Branah.
Psyohological Warfare was new. It had never been taught in our military
sehools. There was no text. Planning, and the technique of presentation were
pioneer fields. Many Wieners and men both at GHQ and in the field doubted**
effeetiveness of Payehologioal Warfare against Japan. Pow believed that the
Japanese soldier 'mid be made surrender-conseicus. Many were oonvinced that
the Japanese voculd fight until they and their oountry were destroyed.
The Office of War Information ((MX) already had established an *Moe in
Sydney, Australia, staffed by expert writers, broadcasters, artists, and publishers.
In June, the ONI steel' vas moved to Brisbane where it joined key unitary personnel
provided by cm. Mut before this group could hops to operate effeetively,
patient study, exhaustive researoh indoctrination, and experimentation mould be
necessary.
*********0
The objective of the Dseio Military Plan for Psychologioal Warfare, approved
26 July 1944? was to further the Philippine Campaign. The plan provided & func-
tional organisation containing Collation, Planning, and Production motions.
With the rapid liberation of the Philippines this plan beoanecntnoded and a now
?newel' approved by the Cenmander-in-Chief, 10March 1946. It Shifted the
primal al objeotive from the Philippines to the Japanese homeland.
Possibly the creel:eat 'wealth of source material on &pan in existenee vas
eveilible. Pim this materiel the Collation &lotion sleeted, extracted
nod separate researches developing each objective. Enemy trends and
ilitiee slowly bow& to emerge. The Planning Sestion, using Collation
prepared a weekly plan, the objective of chioh use to further the milt..
sty effort. Mew/writers used this weakly planning dirsottve as. general guide,
pouring into the fors it suggested significant items from ourrent events, comp
muniques, prisoner of war interrogations, and monitored enemy broadcasts. The
information disseminated was shaped so as to =plait known peyoholegieal vulner-
abilities. A. chart was kept showing planned and actual developments of objeet-
ives. Frequent letters containing Suggestions to Planners from the Military
Secretary oriented the programs tactically and strategically.
In April 12$45 it had beoome clear to Peyohologioal Warfare planners that
all the elements essential for surrender saris*, existed. Japan had lost her
fleet and merohant shipping her air force was booming imiotenti her troops had
been destroyed in the Philippines end key Pacific Islands; her industry was
disrupted. The only obstacle preventing surrender was Peyehologle.
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As our eftbined forest were soon to oonverge upon Japan proper, the
'ComeandereeinsiChiaf called a Psychologioal Warfare Conference in Manna Nay 7
and 8, 1945, to discuss and detarmine oftmon objestives and theater policy.
With tha end of the war in eight, Payshologioal Warfare agencies in the ,
Pacific, and Asiatie Mainland converged upon the Japanesa homeland Seeking
to pierce Japan's mental armor and achiave the oommon objeativa - decision to
surrendsr.
III. PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION
Truthful information was disseminated to the snowy by long, median and
ort-wave radio, loudspeaker, leaflets, news sheets and magasines. Radio broad-
casts to Japan were nada in English and Japan.... Ny the *loft of the war, three
mobile field unit*, salf-oontained, equipped to print, monitor, photograph and
broadcast, were available to the Sixth, Eighth, and Tanta Armies. A total ef
822 million leaflet* end news shoats were produesd prier to T-J Day and far the
month of &weft:bar MS an output of 120 million was sontomplated.
The Par Postern Air Force willingly distributed our leaflets and news 'sheet*.
In addition, PLAP made available tranaport planes to haul /*elate fromilanila
to forward air hafts' at tines as many as ten transports par week were required.
pup personnel had been well-briafed on the objectival' of Psychological Warfare
and on the purpose of each leaflet dropped. Siam, the Commanding ?enema, PEN,
supported our entire programs it never Weans necessary for formal GHQ orders to
be isoued directing these missions.
?
In tactical areas obsarration planes did *Motive spot dropping om
units and a -meal numbar of leaflets were suooessfully distributed by shelr.
IV. TECHNIQUE OF PRESENTATION
**********
The Japanese rosambors Uttar from sight than from sound, which possibly
accounts for unusual faithfulness in heaping a diary picturing innermost thoughts
in Japanese characters. Leaflets used were pictorial and normally expressed
a single thought. Each was based on a readily aoknowleded fast, then advanced
a. logical idea and finally suggested a mE out. Leaflets and news Sheets ware
addressed primarily to the ma3se* and shonal by the millions upon them.
Radio stations in MA could roach Japan by medium and short amvs only.
Although short wave, radio :waivers war* forbidden, a few of the wealthy used
the* clandestinely and the Japanese Governmant was known to monitor our broad-
eases and make limited distribution to senior officials. Consequently, radio
programs were shaped to appeal to the highest officials of the govarnment?
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Ithough taking prisoners in itself might be Wee/sive, development of a
at mind n which soldiers tm: with the idea of surrender le very imper-
n /rogation the menti).obstaoles which prevented surrender wore
d. Then leaflets were disseminated which met logically each mental
ebstasli. Similar appeals by lend speaker more effective.
In Manila a weekly 'Japanese Newspaper known as the Rakkasan (air drop) News
was published. Nach week one to two million copies were dropped on enemy troops
and the, civil population in Japan. Prisoners of war in the Philippines said the
Marksman rows was the only *aurae Of truthful information available to the Jap-
anese soldier from. the Outside world.
*********0
Most planning anticipatory. Leaflets announcing the entry of the Soviet
Union into the. ~were prepared four months in advance. Planners reasoned that
if the Japanese 0oVernment were permitted to make the first announcement, there
would be a fantastic olaim of victory 4. from which the people initially might got
a lift in morale. Wee announced the war first, however, picturing the might
of the Red Army, the psychological blow would stun thepopulation. Seem million
leaflets- rim, Red Army Strikes" were dropped on trepan the day the Soviet Union
declared war.
The Potsdam Deelaration was repeatedly broadcast to Japan. It was tra.n*-
lated into Japanese and millions Of copies showered over the homeland end troops
in the field w.lthin some seventy-two hours after it was received by radio in
Manila.
? The broadcasts from the U.S.A. if Captain Zieharlas, USN. IWO lo well-
prepared,:tiMely and authorative that we not only repeated them over the Manila
radio but printed and sir-dropped them on Jepan.
The Imperial Resoript announcing the end of the war was printed, flown to
Japariand air-dropped to the masses. Many &panes* first learned of the surrender
in this wanner.
That Pspoholog
tary operations.
IN. CONCLUSIONS
potent only when furthering successful mill-
That effective Psychelogioal 'Warfare requires ocmprehenelve grasp of the
temper and plychologioal traits of the peoples against teflon the program is
directed.
That based on per :maws in the Pacific, Psychological Warfare is a
powerful dimeniion of modern combat which assists int
Strengthening our morale
Reducing- our battle easualties
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rurthering our deeeption operations
/nfluencing friendly people,
. Lowering enemy morale
Xnducing enemy soldiers to surrender
Hastening the *new decision to sue for peace
Faoilitating unitary ocoupation
That ifl planni military security, it la of paramount importance that
the Milted States exploit the, potentialities of Pgyehol leal Warfare.
X. RECOMMENDAT/OW
!ht his report be forwarded to the War Department reoommending"
That Psychologioal Warfare Courses be included in our
=i3.tt*."y instruotion.
That a yohologioal Warfare Notion be inoluded permanently
in the War Department General KUM
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HIEZIMGTED
ICAL IIARFARR !MAWR PUMTI0NAL CHART, INPA
*UZTART mimy
Prepares basis plane, annexes amd,gireetives to implement
poliey of Comander?in..Chief. Coordinates PRI with military
effort. Meets liaiekcirthh other theaters, confers with
combat- eeenandere & 11 personnel in the Acid.
usuurns
Xilsm.nts policy as directed. Supervises administration;
000rdinatest work among section chiefs and field unit*.
COLLA?/01
Gathers psychological
~fare data produeod
by existing military
intelligemee agencies,
'determines enwR, PlYnho-
llogical vulnerabilities
and presents them in the
fern of (agar cut object..
lees to Planning Motion.
PLANNING
Prepares weekly direct..
tve to Production Sec-
tion so that programs
will be *hyped, timed
and localised so as beet
to further the military
effort.
PRODUCTION
in Collation See..
tion data, plans by
Planning Section, and
suggestions from MI-
Itary Secretary, produce*
newscasts, leaflets,
news sheets and maga..
sines.
Bupplyi production
materials field unit
equipment, packaging
and shipment. Teohe
nil maintenance;
personnel; finance;
transportation.
PAX BAST AIR
Provides printed infor-
mation for dimming's..
tion by air drop to
4113111111117.
each attached to
& 10th Andes,
self contained
equipped to monitor
yeast, print & photo..
nriEZTEDTTED
Approved For Release 2006/03/1?: CIA-RDP80R01731R003600020029-4
frraPhe
Approved For Renee 24 V.E: II I
r- 3)1731M:102.600020029-4
[
PSTOROLOOICALMRPARR BRUM ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, BIWA
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1 NCO (WAC)
1 RW
two
UT 171
5 Officers
5 NCO.
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S Officers
2 NCOs
2 NCO (IAC)
1 CWI:Civilian
PUBLICATION I RADIO
3Officers I NOOs
2 NOOs I Civilians 17 ONI Civilians
12 ON
PRI FIELD UNITS
5 Officers
311001 -
4 RNA
10 OI Ctj1ins
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22 Eli
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1 Officer
2
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VIE
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1 Officer
MCOs
2 NCO,
1 ?Meer
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1 Officer
1 NCO
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ApGpROUP
r Lived For"geisorse 2006/03/17 : CirRERNROlf341AiN360c8861MLI
DISPOSITION yoRm
FROM
TO
DATE
FROM
TO
DATE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF, CENTRAL REPORTS STAFF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, C. I . G. ?
W. Europe?Africa Branch
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR
E. Europe?USSR Branch
X
5/27
SECRETARY, N. I . A.
Middle East?India Branch
Far East?Pacific Branch
,
CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL SERV ICES
Western Hemisphere Branch
X
CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
Policy & Review Branch
Personnel Branch
Information Branch
Budget & Fiscal Branch
Intelligence Branch
Administrative Services Branch
Security Branch
Central Records
Support Branch
Security Branch
REFERENCES:
ENCLOSURES:
X
ACT ION
RECOMMENDATION
SIGNATURE
INFORMATION
RETURN
PREPARATION OF
DIRECT REPLY
'
DiSpOSitidn Form
From Col. Fortier
.to the Director,
enclosing Report
on Psychological
Warfare in S. W.
Pacific Area,
1944-1945.
COMMENT
FILE
NOTE
MAIL
-
REPLY
REMARKS:
? The enclosure is transmitted herewith for action as
recommended in the 2nd paragraph thereof.
(Continue "Remarks" on back, if necessary)
JAMES S. LAY, JR
Secretary, N.I.A.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : gb9,-BRIAOR013INR003EL0941MLLIMA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, GROUP
Approved Forokkipese 2006/03/17 : cig-FeETR019-34R1403668MSTAL
DISPOSITION FORM
i4A
24 U 3M'4
FROM
TO
DATE
FROM
TO
DATE
x
I
1-1L
1
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF, CENTRAL REPORTS STAFF
21
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, C.I.G.
W. Europe?Africa Branch
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR
E. Europe?USSR Branch
SECRETARY, N.I.A.
Middle East?India Branch
Far East?Pacific Branch .
.5- 3
CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL SERVICES
Western Hemisphere Branch
/A
;IC
CHIEF, CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
Policy & Review Branch
Personnel Branch
Information Branch
Budget & Fiscal Branch'
Intelligence Branch
J
Administrative Services Branch
Security Branch
Central R- cord
Support Branch
Security Branch
REFERENCES:
ENCLOSURES:
ACTION
RECOMMENDATION
SIGNATURE
INFORMATION
RETURN
PREPARATION
DIRECT REPLY
COMMENT -
FILE
NOTE
MAIL
OF REPLY
REMARKS:
I am forwarding herewith a letter from Brig. General Bonner Fellers, Headquarters,
Army Forces in the Pacific, as well as his report on psychological warfare in
the Southwe*t Pacific Area.
I recommend that this report be foryoarde4,t9_the Central Planning Staff with a
view to investigating the advisability of future planning for psychological war-
fare.
2 Enclosures
o one
Assistant Director
(Continue "Remarks" on back, if necessary)
et1
Approved For Release'2006/03/17 : cb9,-WAVIOR013NEFf003e0R1421474,
25X1
RESTRICTED
(216?S)