U.N. LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00697R000300100004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 1, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN

U.
L Law o the Sea Conference
The Geneva session of the Third U.N.
Law of the Sea Conference is over. After
nearly six years of preparatory work and
over twenty weeks of meeting after meet-
ing in substantive session in Caracas and
Geneva, this, the "largest and most im-
portant" conference yet held by the
United Nations, has once again failed to
achieve concensus on the basic elements of
a new, comprehensive treaty governing
ocean resources and use of ocean space.
The outlook, unfortunately, is for more of
the same: at least two more sessions before
political compromise on all major issues is
even likely. From here we go to New Del-
hi, or Nairobi, or possibly New York, and
then back to Caracas.
It is generally agreed that the Caracas
session of the Conference last summer
made very little progress toward a final
treaty. At least two reasons for this failure
were identified by most observers. First, it
was said that the workload was crushing
(over 100 separate items on the agenda)
and that, since the conference size is the
largest ever (over 145 nations), well-con-
sidered agreement takes time. And second,
also said to be missing in Caracas, was
"sufficient political will to make hard
negotiating choices."
Consequently, when the Geneva session
got under way and more nations than ever
appeared committed to obtaining a treaty,
there was jubilation among some mem-
bers of the U.S. delegation. None-
theless, doubts continued to persist in
Geneva because of the unwieldy size of
the conference and the plethora of poten-
tially divisive issues not yet widely debat-
ed. Most importantly, the philosophical
gulf between the developed and develop-
ing nations on world politics generally
continued to widen as evidenced by the
failure of the Paris consumer-producer oil
meeting. As long as this difference of views
remains far apart, there seems to be little
hope that a common understanding of the
concept of "common heritage of man-
kind" can be achieved. Without. common
understanding, removing the equally great
gulf between developed and developing
nations on the issue of the management of
the international seabed area will be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible.
By now it is clear that the early signs of
hopefulness at Geneva this spring were
somewhat premature. To be sure, issues of
least contention were settled, but those in
greatest dispute still remained as they were
after Caracas. The biggest single stum-
bling block to agreement continues to be
the issue of what to do with the interna-
tional area - the deep seabed - and how
to manage the so-called common heritage
of mankind.
It would be unfair to conclude categor-
ically that the Geneva session resulted in
no progress whatever. On the contrary,
one of our own delegation's progress in-
dicators was actually put together at the
end of the eight week meeting: a single
negotiating text for the treaty. While a
single text has been developed, the Pres-
ident of the Conference made very clear
that it would serve as an informal
"procedural device" and a "basis for
negotiation" only. In short, all the dis-
agreements are now contained in one
piece of paper, but few have been settled.
Chances for the achievement of a com-
prehensive treaty on law of the sea are not
good. Yet never before have the nations of
the world understood so much about
ocean legal rules and about their own in-
terests in ocean space. In the past, the law
of the sea was largely determined by the
practice of maritime nations which knew
quite well the value of freedom of the seas.
This is exemplified by the fact that the
previous law of the sea conferences were
much more like technical drafting sessions
than the political confabs which are now
held. But even before that, the primary
method of setting rules on ocean use was
the process of claim and counterclaim.
This process is still viable as an alternative
to the treaty-making method. It is in con-
junction with this process that the last
several years of international debate will
be of most benefit.
Under the process of claim and coun-
terclaim, one nation takes an action (or
makes a claim) to protect or advance what
it believes fo be its legitimate interests. The
rest of the world. community then
evaluates the claim as to its reasonable-
ness, then accepts or rejects it. This is
especially important on matters which are
either not the subject of a treaty or are the
subject of a treaty to which the particular
nation involved is not a signatory. A classic
example occurred , in March when the
government of Finland ordered its vessel
Enskeri not to dump 7,000 kilos of arsenic
wastes into the South Atlantic because of
the opposition of a number of Western
Hemisphere nations, including the United
States. Conversely, thirteen. years after
President Truman claimed jurisdiction
over the continental shelf of the United
States, the world community codified this
claim in the Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf.
Therefore, one option open to the
United States is properly devised and rea-
sonable unilateral action. Such action is
now being seriously considered and bills
on ocean mineral recovery and a 200-mile
pollution control zone have also been in-
troduced. If carefully drafted to be in. tune
with world thinking, unilateral legislation
may very well serve to better define inter-
national law and may not be found objec-
tionable by the world community.
Another available option is to seek ap-
propriate bilateral and regional interna-
tional agreements on various important
ocean issues, or changes in existing ones.
For example, the United States could
request that all treaties regarding fishing
within 200 nautical miles of its shores be
amended to provide preferential rights for
U.S. fishermen, or that U.S. officials be
allowed to enforce existing treaty provis-
ions within that same distance. Since
most nations now better understand the
issues involved, bilateral agreements with
various nations may be a worthwhile
avenue to settling contentious ocean issues
and protecting U.S. interests.
These are the two most prominent al-
ternatives to a treaty. In addition, it might
be possible to ask for separate treaties on
the less divisive issues, saving the more
difficult problems - such as the deep
seabed - for further Conference action.
JULY 1975 T C_AAWcoyed For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP82S00697R000300100004-2
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