UNITED NATIONS THIRD CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA SECOND SESSION FIRST COMMITTEE PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00697R000300020016-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 22, 1974
• Content Type: SUMMARY

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Chairman:
Rapporteur?
Second Session
FIRST COMMITTEE
PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING
Held at the Parque Central, Caracas,
on Tuesday, 20 August 1974, at 4 p.m.
CONTENTS
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UNITED NATIONS
THIRD CONFERENCE .
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA,
PROVISIONAL
For participants only
A/CONF.62/C.1/SR.15
22 August 1974
Mr. ENGO United Republic of Cameroon
Mr. MOTT Australia
Economic implications of sea-bed exploitation (continued)
Organization of work
Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the four working languages
(English, French, Russian or Spanish), preferably in the same language as the text to
which; they.r,efer. Corrections should be sent in quadruplicate within fifteen working
days to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, Department of Conference
Services, room LX-2332, United Nations, New York N.Y. 10017, USA, and also incorporated
in one copy of the record.
AS THIS RECORD WAS, DISTRIBUTED ON 22 AUGUST 1974, THE TIME-.LIMIT FOR'CORRECTIONS
WILL BE 13 SEPTEMBER 1974.
The co-operation of participants in strictly observing this.time-limit would: be
greatly appreciated.
C-5461
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ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SEA-BED EXPLOITATION (A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3, L.6, L.7, L.8
AND L.9) (continued)
Mr. IGUCHI (Japan) said that working paper A/CONF.62/C.l/L.9 did not represent
the final position of the Japanese Government on the conditions of exploration and
exploitation of the resources of the international sea-bed area. His delegation was
submitting that paper now in order to observe the deadline for proposals on that item,
so that it could be studied in connexion with the three other proposals
(A/CONF.62/C.1/L.6, L.7 and L.8) before the Committee.
The basic conditions governing the exploration and exploitation of sea-bed
resources must be determined in advance and embodied in the convention so as to ensure
the efficient and effective operation of the sea-bed activities to enrich the world
community with the fruits of the common heritage of mankind. It would be undesirable to
leave the decision on basic conditions to the future international machinery.
No country wished there to be anarchy, instability or inefficiency in the
exploitation of the common heritage of mankind, and consequently there was a need to
establish objective criteria for selecting eligible entities, defining objectives and
the various phases of activities, determining the nature and content of rights and
duties, establishing international standards, and choosing among competing applications
from contractors. It was essential to draft basic norms to govern such matters in order
to establish a stable relationship between the authority and entities engaging in
exploration and exploitation activities. The effective mobilization of managerial,
scientific technological, and financial resources of existing enterprises was the key to
the success of the international regime, and conditions of exploitation should be
established to induce enterprises to work under the international regime for the benefit
of the international community. The Japanese working paper had been drafted with that
consideration in mind.
His delegation welcomed any further suggestions for improving or supplementing its
working paper since it had not had sufficient time to examine all aspects of the various
complex issues involved.
In the Japanese working paper the activities of exploration and exploitation had
been divided into three phases, namely, general survey, evaluation and exploitation.
Scientific research, processing, transportation and marketing had not been included.
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(Rix?? Ig~~chi, Japan
The first, phase, general survey, should be as free and open as possible and
therefore a system of registration which gave rise to a.non--exclusive.right renewable
every two years had been adopted.
The second and third phases9 evaluation and exploitation, would be conducted on
the basis of legal contracts concluded between the authority and eligible entities.
The authority should be willing to enter into a contract whenever a proposal for
efficient and effective exploitation of resources was made in accordance with
established rules and regulations. The. selection of contractors should not be arbitrary.
However, in the case of competing applications, the authority should choose one
contractor on the basis of the two objective criteria proposed in the Japanese working
paper.
There would be no limit to the size of the area in which a general survey could be
conducted. In the case of evaluation and exploitation for which exclusive rights were
granted, the size of the area would be determined on the basis of the criterion of
effective conservation and utilization of resources. The areas should be defined by
co-ordinates of latitude and longitude. A number of technical factors should be taken
into account in determining the actual size of areas in which permission was granted
for the exploitation of different categories of minerals. His delegation was
provisionally proposing 60,000 square kilometres as the optimum area for the
exploitation of manganese nodules. A system of relinquish~w~ent was also envisaged in
the Japanese working paper whereby a contractor would renounce one half of the contract
area upon attainment of commercial production. Such a system would permit the
reservation of promising mining areas for late-comers and assist the dc%eloping countries
to participate more fully in the development of sea-bed resources.. His delegation
attached great importance to the widest possible participation of nati.ori is of
developing countries in the exploitation of sea-bed resources, and it would do its best
to promote the transfer technology they desired.
The Japanese working paper also included a system of inspection by....the authority
to guarantee that contractors complied with their obligations under the convention m..nd
any other applicable rules. To ensure that areas would not lie unused after the
conclusion of `a contract, the obligation to invest certan'suns of money regularly had
been imposed on contractors Contractors would also have to'comply with other
international standards relating to~ the conduct of operations,' n.avi ,ational safety,
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(Mr. Iguchi, Japan)
preservation of the marine environment and installations and devices. Provisions on
compensation for damage had also been included, and in the case of pollution damage the
liability of contractors or subcontractors was absolute.
Mr. MUKUNA KABONGO (Zaire) said that the question of exploration and
exploitation of the international sea-bed area revealed the basic differences between
the industrialized countries on the one hand and the producers of land-based minerals,
especially under-developed countries, on the other. While the possibility of exploiting
the minerals of the sea-bed was a welcome prospect for consuming countries, it was a
cause of serious concern to developing countries whose economies were largely
dependent on the exploitation of raw materials.
Problems of development concerned the international community as a whole.
Developing and industrialized countries alike had their respective contributions to
make towards the improvement of the human condition, based on prosperity, well-being
and justice, which were the essential conditions of international peace and stability.
The economic implications of the exploitation of the resources of the international
sea-bed area should be viewed from the perspective of justice and the equitable sharing
of the benefits that would accrue. Access to scientific and technical know-how was of
primary importance at a time when an authority with supra-national powers was about
to be established.
Confidence in the international authority would depend on how far agreement was
reached on the principles governing its action. In that connexion, document
A/C0NF.62/C.1/L.7 was of great value both in itself and as an instrument for negotiation.
Given the flexible approach that was the key-note of the Conference's work, negotiations
on that basis should lead to a consensus. The basic conditions defined in document
A/CONF.62/C.1/L.7 was a start towards giving effect to the principle of 'the common
heritage of mankind. That document could stand improvement, which would come from
exchanges of views and future negotiations.
Mr. WUENSCH (German Democratic Republic) said that the Committee had
undoubtedly made progress in the past weeks thanks to the compromises made by many
delegations.
A supra-national organization to which States would transfer all their rights with
regard to the international sea-bed area was not suited to the task of exploiting the
mineral resources of the area, especially since many aspects of deep-sea mining were
new and unfamiliar.
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(Mr. Wuensch, German Democratic Republic)
The right of all States to engage without discrimination in the exploration and
exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed should be expressly recognized in the
convention .
His delegation supported variant 9A of document A/CONF.62/C.l/L.3 with regard to
the question of who might exploit the area.
Although his delegation held different views on some specific issues,
document A/CONF.62/C.1/L.8 was a suitable basis for negotiations aimed at reaching
an agreement satisfactory to all.
His delegation was optimistic about the possibility of reaching agreement in
Caracas and at the next session of the Conference. He emphasized however that both
legal theory and the practice of States confirmed the view that norms,of international
law could be codified only by universal agreement and not merely by the decision of a
majority.
Mr. HARAN (Israel) commenting on the view that the international sea-bed
regime should be a catalyst of a new order of social Justice, said that his delegation
believed that it should also be a catalyst of a new order of distributive justice.
As originally conceived, the international area was to comprise that, portion of
the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond existing national jurisdictions. However, the
contemplated extension of the various zones of national jurisdiction would bestow
increased resources on a number of coastal States and correspondingly reduce the
dimensions of the international area. Many countries such as Israel would not receive
any benefit, or might even suffer, from the extension of marine resource jurisdictions.
Such countries had an interest in guaranteeing that the resources of the international
area would effectively be made available to mankind as a whole. His delegation would
therefore-evaluate any proposals before the Committee in terms of whether they were
conducive to the effective and rational exploitation of sea-bed mineral resources.
Basic conditions governing the exploration and exploitation of the international
sea-bed area should be spelled out in-the future convention on the law of the sea.
Such conditions would include non-discrimination, security of tenure and a system for
the settlement of disputes to ensure against any arbitrary interference with
exploration and exploitation activities carried out in accordance with existing
standards relating to the prevention of marine pollution and freedom of navigation.
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(Mr. Haran, Israel)
The nationals and companies of many States would not be able to participate in
many sea-bed activities because of geographical, financial or technological limitations.
Therefore, the conditions of exploration and exploitation should take that fact into
account and ensure at least the indirect participation of such persons and companies in
the form of technical training, transfer of technology, and subcontracting. Provision
should be made to facilitate the participation of land-locked, shelf-locked and other
geographically disadvantaged States in exploration and exploitation activities in the
international area. For example, no customs duties should be imposed on the sea-bed
mineral production of land-locked States by transit States.
Steps should be taken to ensure that not all areas of the international sea-bed
area would be distributed at once.
In assigning contracts, the international authority should take into account
whether prospective contractors came from States which had not benefited. materially
from the extension of marine resource jurisdictions. The international authority
should aloo receive a part of the mineral production of the area in kind so as to
accumulate a buffer stock which could be used for purposes of commodity stabilization.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (United Kingdom) said that his delegation understood that
the statement made by the Chairman at the llth meeting of the Committee had been a
personal summary of the debate on the economic implications of sea-bed mineral
exploitation. If that summary was to be reflected in any report the Committee might
make to the plenary of the Conference, he was bound to record that his delegation did
not share all of the Chairman's conclusions. -Although the Chairman referred-to one
of the points made by the United Kingdom delegation, namely that the fears of adverse
economic effects from deep-sea mining upon all States had been greatly exaggerated,
the major point made by his delegation had not been included in that summary, namely
that the sea-bed authority was not an appropriate organization for arranging commodity
agreements. Should such agreements prove necessary, they would have to be made on a
world-wide basis, embracing not only the mineral production of the international
sea-bed area but land-based production as well. The agenda of the Trade and
Development Board of UNCTAD which was meeting in Geneva that same week included an
item on commodity agreements. His delegation reserved the right to make a further
statement on that point after it had been able to study more carefully the
Chairman's personal summary.
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(Mr. Chamberlain, United Kingdom)
In his report on the informal meetings, the representative of Sri Lanka had
referred to. differences in some of the figures included in documents A/CONF.62/C.1/L.6
and L.B. ;Those differences were more apparent than real. In an. endeavour to simplify
the draft.. by. providing, where feasible, identical-conditions for.. hard minerals and
hydrocarbons, the sponsors ofdocument.A/CONF.62/C.l/L.8 had included a provision for
relinquishment in article IX which,.-while well adapted to the. needs of hard mineral
mining, was not so well adapted to the requirements of hydrocarbons. Exploration
for hydrocarbons in the deep sea-bed.. entailed high-cost seismic operations and it was
necessary to.grant..exclusive exploration areas-:of-at least the. size provided for in
document A/CONF.62/C.l/L.8. however.. unlike the hard mineral industry, the nature of
hydrocarbon exploration was,such that it would be reasonable to provide for progressive
relinquishment.at:.two or three year intervals, thus leaving the explorer with a final
right to an.arearor areas totalling about 500 square kilometres. That figure was not
markedly different from the one proposed in document A/CONF.62/C.1/L.6 for the
exploitation phase. With regard to the size of areas for superficial mineral deposits
proposed in document A/CONF.62/C.1/L.8, the originalarea of 60,000 square kilometres
after relinquishment of one third was not very different from the 30,000 square
kilometres proposed in document A/CONF.62/C.l/L.6.
Mr. VANDERPUXE (Ghana) said that his delegation had sponsored document
A/CONF.62/C71/L.7 and supported. it. unreservedly.. The Group of 77. favoured direct
control by the proposed Authority-over all stages of exploitation-operations.
The proposals submitted.'by the United States, (A/CONF.62/C.l/L.6,), and those of
eight European Powers (A/CONF.62/C.l/L.8 and Japan (A/CO1IF.62/C.1/L.9) were..based on the
same concept of minimum control by the Authority in the exploitation of the resources
of the ; area,although those of the United.States were more balanced in that,they
conceded greater control to the Authority in certain stages of the operations..
Article. IV, paragraph 1 (f) and article X of the United States draft appendix
(A/CONF.62L(,'..l/L.6)envisa-ed payment: to the Authority. His delegation did not agree
with that concept since it appeared to affect the title of the Authority to the minerals
in the area envisaged in article 2 of the proposals submitted by the Goup of 77
(A/CONF.62/C.1/L.7). Article V of the United States proposals contained specific
provisions concerning forfeiture and suspension of the right to mine, which were
absent from the working document by the European Powers, which, in fact, allowed
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(Mr. Vanderpuye , Ghana)
the contractor to relinquish its allocation and opt out of the contract without giving
the Authority a corresponding right to suspend the contract or reduce the area
allocated to a contractor. It also allowed assignment of the contract without the
consent of the Authority. Such arrangements were unsatisfactory and unacceptable to
his delegation, as was the size of the contract area envisaged in article VII of
document A/CONF.62/C.1/L.8 and the foot-note to tiara-'raph 6 of section IV of document
A/COHF.62/C.1/L.9. In view of the explanation by the representative of the
United Kingdom, it would appear that that article should be redrafted. Under article IV
of document A/CONF.62/C.l/L.8 an applicant could hold up to six contracts in respect
of each category of resources, or up to 41+,000 square miles, at any given time. His
delegation considered that that area was unrealistically large and rejected that
proposal. In fact it considered that all the proposals in the paper submitted by the
European Powers were weighted in favour ,of the exploiter without providing corresponding
safeguards to protect the common heritage of mankind. Furthermore, all three documents
contained details which were best omitted from a document outlining basic conditions
which were intended as general guidelines for awarding contracts and not as the
specific provisions of a model contract.
The CHAIRMAN, replying to the representative of the United Kingdom, reiterated
that the summary of economic implications which he had provided at the previous meeting
was a personal assessment. If anything had been omitted, it was because he had
attempted not to present a report. When decisions were taken he would ensure that all
the relevant factors, comments and opinions were taken into account.
Mir. HARTIiv (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the proposals submitted
by the Group of 77 were a useful contribution to the work of the Committee. However,
the views of his delegation differed from those of the Group on some aspects of the
basic conditions.
His delegation doubted whether the spirit of the Declaration of Principles required
that title to the area be vested in the Authority as provided in paragraph 1 of document
A/COI1F.62/C.1/L.7. Much would depend on the structure of the Authority which had not
yet been discussed. Article 9 could not be considered independently of the basic
conditions or the structure of the Authority.
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(Mr. Martin, Federal Republic of Germany)
His delegation could not wholly agree with paragraph 3 since it had understood
that the purpose-of-the Authority would be to promote rather than hinder the
exploitation of resources. It also had'reservations concerning the terms of paragraph 5.
In particular, it considered that marketing, which was important to consumer `countries,
was outside the sphere of competence of the Authority. He expressed concern that under
the provisions of paragraph 61(b), a decision by the Authority would be regarded as
final. His delegation had understood that the concept of mandatory dispute settlement
had been accepted in principle. The rules and regulations referred to in paragraph 8
should be discussed at the present Conference and incorporated in the Convention.
He did not intend to comment on the remaining paragraphs of the document, but
that did not mean that his delegation agreed with the proposals it contained. He
preferred to focus on the positive aspects of the Group's proposals, which were not so
much in the wording as in the fact that they represented an attempt to deal with the
future relationship between the Authority and exploitation entities. In particular,
the statements by the representatives of Colombia and Nigeria at the informal meetings
encouraged the hope that negotiations would be fruitful.
ORGANIZATION OF WORK
Mr. DE SOTO (Peru) explained that, at the previous meeting, he had not, as
the Chairman had understood, intervened to reserve the right to call a vote. There
-was-no need to reserve what was a permanent right. He had intervened to suggest that
as a Measure of self-discipline, the Committee should set in motion the procedure
provided for under article 37. The representative of the German Democratic Republic
had stated that decisions should be taken by general agreement and never by majority.
While Peru was a party to the "'gentleman's agreement" which had been endorsed by the
present Conference, the rules of procedure also provided for other methods. The ideas
he.had put forward at the previous meeting were iA..accordance with those. rules.
With regard to the negotiating group, his delegation considered that. it should
be an official subsidiary organ of the Committee in accordance with the provisions
of rule 50, and that, as such, it should be subject to all the relevant provisions of
the rules of procedure.
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,4r. WALDRON FAMSEY (Barbados) felt that it would be useful to review the
decision to set-up a formal negotiating group. It was impossible to conceive that
in the 10 days left to the Conference such a group could successfully tackle the problems
relating to article 9 in particular, as well as the basic conditions and articles 1 to 21.
Furthermore, the representative of Peru had suggested the possibility of implementing
the provisions of rule 37 of the rules of procedure. Under its present mandate the
negotiating group would have to be a group of the whole.
He considered that it had been procedurally unwise to invite Dr. Pinto to act as
Chairman of a formal negotiating group. The Chairman of the Committee should have been
invited to assume that position in order to enable him to assess the progress of the
negotiations with regard to possible implementation of rule 37.
The Committee should decide at the present meeting whether it was impossible for
the negotiating group to-fulfil its mandate in the limited time available and whether
consequently, the group should be held over to the beginning of the second session;
alternatively it should decide to reduce the mandate of the negotiating group. A
possible solution would be to establish a formal negotiating group under the chairmanship
of the Chairman of the Committee to negotiate exclusively on article 9. The basic
conditions could be considered in so far as they were relevant to those negotiations.
The work of the Committee could not advance until conceptual and philosophical
differences had been resolved.
The proposals submitted by the United States and those in document
A/CONF.62/C.1/L.8, which he regarded as one and the same, were unacceptable to his
delegation. They were based on the concept that the international area was a res nullius
in which the Authority would act simply as a register for mining prospectors, contrary
to the proposals submitted by the Group of 77 which provided that title to the Area
and its resources and effective control over the exploitation of those resources would
be vested in the Authority.
The CHAIRMAN said that he found himself in a somewhat difficult situation
because of the way matters had developed and also because he himself was personally
involved in his capacity as Chairman. he recalled that at the 11th meeting of the
Committee the representative of Brazil had urged the Chair to begin consultations
immediately with members of the Committee with a view to establishing negotiating
machinery on article 9. Subsequently, at the 114th meeting of the Committee, the
representative of Brazil had proposed that a formal negotiating group, presided over
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(The Chairman)
by Mr. Pinto,. . the Chairman of the informal meetings of the Committee, should be
established to negotiate.. articles 1 to 21, with particular emphasis on article 9 and the
basic conditions of exploitation; the Committee had adopted that proposal. Acting on
that,..rdecision, he. had begun consultations with members of the Committee on the
composition of the formai.negotiating_group; he was encountering some difficulty but
would continue consultations and report to the Committee the following day. If, however,
the proposal made by the representative of Barbados was approved, he would have to seek
further instructions from the Committee.
Mr. TRAORE (Mali) asked if any new factors had to be taken into account which
would necessitate a reconsideration of the decision the Committee had taken at its
previous meeting. In particular, he inquired.if the difficulties being encountered by
the Chairman in his consultations concerning the composition of the proposed formal
negotiating group were at the regional group level or whether they involved new elements.
He also asked if the proposal made by the representative of Barbados arose from the
Committee's failure to distinguish between the old and new mandate of the Chairman
under the two proposals made by the representative of'Brazil, or whether new developments
had made the previous day's decision inapplicable.
The CHAIRMAN said that as a crucial point had been reached in consultations on
the establishment of the group, it would be inadvisable to report at the present time
on the status of those consultations. The only new element to be taken into account by
the Committee was the observation by the representative of Barbados that the mandate
of the formal negotiating group proposed at the previous meeting by the representative
of Brazil was too wide, with the result that too many members of the Committee wished
to participate in it.
Mr. GONZALES-LAPEYRE (Uruguay) agreed with the representative of Barbados
that it was necessary to restrict the scope of the negotiations and to limit the
formal negotiating group to the current session-of the Conference.
Mr. FONSECA (Colombia) said that he was speaking, in the hope of resolving a
difficult. situation so that the Committee could. benefit. from the efforts and
considerable progress it had made in the last few weeks. He believed there was a broad
consensus in the Group of 77 that a negotiating group should be established, with
restricted'membership, but in which any member of the Committee could participate if
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(Mr. Fonsega, Colombia)
he so desired. Since there was so-little time left, he felt the group should
concentrate on article 9 and the basic conditions of exploitation. With regard to the
composition of the negotiating group, he himself agreed with the United States
representative that 25 or 30 members-would be ideal, but he was willing to consider any
reasonable compromise formula. As a compromise formula, he suggested nine
representatives from each regional group, and one representative for each proposal,
namely the representatives of the United States, Japan, Western European States, the
Group of 77, and Australia, giving a total of 50 members. That might seem large
to some, but it was a compromise suggest] which he was making after consultation
with members of the Group of 77.
Mr. WARIOBA (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. TOURE (Mauritania),
Mr. l ITA (Guinea) and Mr. MUKUNA-KABONGO (Zaire) expressed the view that the
Committee should not reconsider the decision it had taken at its 14th meeting.
Mr. ALLOUANE (Algeria) drew attention to rule 36 of the rules of procedure.
He expressed the hope that a ruling by the Chairman would obviate the need for the
application of that rule.
Mr. VANDERPUYE (Ghana) said that, although he did not believe the Committee
should review the decision it had taken the previous day, the terms of reference of
the negotiating group should be restricted to draft article 9 and the basic conditions
of exploitation. The chairmanship of the negotiating group should not be an issue.
The Chairman should continue consultations on the composition of the group and report
back to the Committee as soon as possible. Any negotiating group established should
be carried over to the next session of the Conference.
Mr. BEMAKINWA (iligeria) Said that it would have been helpful if the Chairman
had reported on how far he had proceeded with the consultations on the establishment
of negotiating machinery he had agreed to undertake at the request of the representative
of Brazil at the 11th meeting. He supported the views of the representative of
Barbados that the original procedure suggested should be followed and that the
Chairman should fully explore all possibilities for negotiation, perhaps informally.
Mr. CARAFI (Chile) said he understood that any negotiations should be
handled by the Chairman. The negotiating group proposed by the representative of
Brazil at the previous meeting to be chaired by Mr. Pinto should discuss the items
referred to it and then report back to the Committee.
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Mr. PARK S00 GIL (Republic of Korea) said that the Committee should
abide by the decision it had taken at the previous meeting. The mandate of the proposed
negotiating group.should, however, be defined more clearly; in particular, a decision
should be taken on whether the group should be dissolved at the end of the current
session of the Conference, in which case a small group would be more efficient, or
whether it should be carried over to the next -session of the Conference, in which case
a larger group representing all interest groups, along the lines suggested by the
representative of Colombia, would be desirable.
The CARMAN suggested that, as well as continuing consultations on the
composition of the negotiating group, he should also consult with members of the
Committee on the mandate of the group.
Mr. RATINER (United States of America). said that'he had understood that the
mandate of the negotiating group had been decided by-the Committee. If there was to be
any further consideration, even informal, of its mandate, he would request the
application of rule 36 of the rules-of procedure.
Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados) considered the position taken by the United
States representative untenable, as a formal decision by the Committee did not
preclude informal consideration of that decision.
Mr. RATINER (United States of America) rejected the statement made by the
representative of Barbados, observing that since rule 36 of the rules of procedure had
not been applied to the proposal by the representative of Barbados purely out of
courtesy, the discussion of that proposal should not be continued.
The CHAIRMAN said that the establishment of a negotiating group which would be
able to carry out its functions properly would require the co-operation of every member
of the Committee. He trusted that all members of the Committee would use their usual
good sense in trying to reach a decision on setting up the negotiating group.
The meeting rose at 6.i5 P.m?
Approved For Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP82SO0697R000300020016-8