AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP82S002000`0
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DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(THROU6N 16 NOVEMBER 1961
NOVEMBER 1961
5.2601/AP4A
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100060004-4
 Approved For%IGR OaJ MO: GRRQ*QN05 q&M004-4
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NOOTN. ' VIETNAM
THROUGH 16 NOVEMBER 19671
FOREWORD
This report is prepared on a monthly
basis at the request of the, Secretary of
Defense,-'-for- an evaluation of -certain
effects,-of- the ROLLING THUNDER program.
The report-covers three general areas of
concern: 'Effect-,!- on- Military Targets;
Leadership and Public Reactions; and
Effects on the NVN,Ic_- nothThe dis-
cussion of politicaleffectis limited
to those developments within North Vietnam
which relate to Hanoits attitude toward
continuing the war and the effects the
ROLLING THUNDER attack has on civilian
morale in North Vietnam.
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RE - C I N DISSEM
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100060004-4
NORTH VIETNAM
BOMBING APPRAISAL OF
NORTH VIETNAM
16 NOV 67
"-s4- DUAL GAGE
- -4- INOPERABLE
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGH 16 NOVEMBER 1967
SUMMARY
1. (S/NFD) Unseasonably good weather in the northern part of
the country in late October permitted a marked increase of effort
against key targets near Hanoi, Haiphong, and throughout the north-
east area. Poor weather in southern North Vietnam restricted strike
activity in the Panhandle during the entire period. The general
capability of the transportation network declined. The interdiction
of the two key Hanoi bridges over the Canal des Rapides and the Red
River effectively disrupts through rail traffic to Hanoi from
Haiphong, Lao Cai, Dong Dang, and Thai Nguyen.* These interdictions,
in conjunction with the road and rail interdictions around Haiphong,
have created the most serious disruptions to date, forcing the use of
alternate modes to permit the movement of goods. Significant strikes were
also conducted against Phuc Yen and other jet airfields.
2. (S/NFD) On the Hanoi-Haiphong rail line through rail traffic
to and from the port area remained interdicted at the Haiphong Railroad/
Highway Bridge for the entire reporting period. Analysis of photographs
suggests little or no movement of rail traffic from the port area in
Haiphong since September, but that shuttle service is available to the
Photographs of 17 November revealed the Hanoi Highway/Railroad Bridge
over the Canal des Rapides is serviceable for at least limited truck traffic
and that the Doumer Bridge is being repaired.
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Hanoi area. Barge traffic in the port and on principal waterways clearing
the port has been heavy and suggests greater reliance on waterway trans-
port to move goods from the port. All of the permanent highway bridges
leading out of Haiphong remained interdicted during the period. There
were at least 10 ferries and pontoon bridges available to circumvent
the interdicted bridges.
3. (S/NFD) Damage and destruction to transport equipment increased
slightly over the low levels reported in September, but were still
significantly lower than the record levels reported during the summer
period. Aerial photography of 18 October revealed a total of 2,079
units of railroad rolling stock confirming that replacements for losses
are being received. Nearly 1,700 units were located in the sanctuaries
within Hanoi, Haiphong, and the buffer zone contiguous to the Chinese
border.
4. (S/NFD) Seeding of MK-36 influence bombs increased during the
month, particularly along lines of communication between Hanoi and
Haiphong, Hanoi and Lao Cai, and in coastal estuaries of major inland
water routes. Indications of MK-36 effectiveness were reported on three
occasions during the period. Boats were reportedly sunk in the Haiphong
area and north of Vinh. A barrier was reportedly erected by the North
Vietnamese across Route 1A near Vinh shortly after the highway was
reseeded, suggesting rerouting.
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5. (S/NFD) Restrikes on electric power facilities, including the
Hanoi powerplant, held the availability of electric power to a low
level. Only about 20 per cent of North Vietnam's total electric
generating capacity is currently estimated to be operating. The
severity of damage to remaining plants in the network, with the excep-
tion of Viet Tri, will deny even partial operation for periods ranging
from three months to one year, after repair work is resumed. In most
cases complete restoration will require more than a year. The increased
volume of bulk food imported during October apparently is to offset the
below normal rice harvest. Because of adverse weather, lower acreage
planted and disruptions caused by the bombing, it is likely that the
current rice harvest will be 200,000 to 300,000 metric tons below
average -- about equal to last year's tenth month crop deficit.
6. (S/NFD) Identified seaborne exports increased from 10,600 metric
tons in September to 25,200 metric tons in October, still well below the
53,300 ton monthly average for the first nine months of 1967. A slight
reduction in average layover times for freighters leaving Haiphong
was observed for the month of October -- 19 days as compared with a
revised estimate of 20 days in September and a peak of 33 days in
August. This was probably due to a combination of lower import levels
and use of offloading facilities at Hon Gai. Ships carrying flour and
rice continue to experience the shortest turn-around-times, while those
with general cargoes experience the longest.
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7. (S/NFD) Attacks against critical railroad/highway bridges on
the lines of communication servicing Hanoi and Haiphong have created
the most serious problems in the distribution of military and economic
supplies to date. Disruption and dislocation of normal transportation
patterns have caused delays and greater use of less efficient modes of
transport. Because the logistics requirements are modest, however, the
North Vietnamese still retain the capability to support activities in
South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased combat levels. The
cumulative effects of the airstrikes have degraded North Vietnam's
capability for sustained large-scale conventional military operations
against South Vietnam.
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Effects on Military Targets
1. (S/NFD) Air attacks in North Vietnam during late October
and early November continued to concentrate on the transportation,
electric power, and air defense systems. Unseasonably good weather
in the northern part of the country in late October permitted a
marked increase of effort against key targets near Hanoi, Haiphong,
and throughout the northeast area. Poor weather hampered operations
in the northeast during November. Weather in southern North Vietnam
restricted strike activity in the Panhandle during the entire period.
The general capability of the transportation network declined with
the successful interdiction, in late October, of the two important
Hanoi railroad/highway bridges over the Red River and the Canal des
Rapides, which had been damaged in mid-August and repaired by late
September. Initial attacks were executed against Phuc Yen airfield
and two major military storage areas near Hanoi. POL storage, military
barracks, supply depots, surface-to-air missile sites, powerplants,
shipyards, radars, and transshipment areas were also struck.
2. (S/NFD) Rail service into Hanoi which had been partially
restored by early October was again disrupted when the railroad/highway
bridges over the Red River and the Canal des Rapides were interdicted
on 25 and 27 October, respectively. The interdiction of these two key
bridges in the Hanoi area effectively disrupts through rail traffic to
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Hanoi from Haiphong, Lao Cai, Dong Dang, and Thai Nguyen. This
requires the North Vietnamese to transship supplies to motor vehicles
and use the various highway bypasses, transship to watercraft that can
move on the extensive inland waterway net, or shuttle freight cars
across the river by using the rail ferries available at each bridge.
A recent report stated that there was bumper-to-bumper traffic on
Route 3 because of delays at the Canal des Rapides Bridge. While
these methods of operation are less efficient than through rail
service, the alternates available can handle the volume of diverted
traffic in the Hanoi area. These interdictions, in conjunction with
the road and rail interdictions around Haiphong, however, have created
the most serious disruptions, to date, in the movement of supplies.
3. (S/NFD) In Haiphong, through rail traffic to and from the
port area remained interdicted at the Haiphong Railroad/Highway
Bridge for the entire reporting period, but there are indications that
the North Vietnamese are engaged in efforts to construct a rail bypass
bridge. Analysis of photography suggests little or no movement by
rail from the main Haiphong rail yard or from the west end of the main
wharf since September. All of the permanent highway bridges on routes
leading out of Haiphong remained interdicted during the period, but
there were at least 10 ferries and pontoon bridges available to bypass
these interdictions. There was increased truck traffic on Route 5 and
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Route 10 leading out of Haiphong. A Western traveler reported almost
bumper-to-bumper traffic moving very slowly on Route 5 near Hanoi.
4. (S/NFD) Waterborne logistic craft activity in the Haiphong
port area continues to increase. This trend was first noted after
the initiation in mid-September of efforts to interdict land lines
of communication leading from Haiphong. Barge traffic in the port
and on principal waterways in the immediate area has been heavy and
suggests greater reliance on waterway transport to move goods out of
the port. The North Vietnamese continue to be plagued with the silting
problem in the Haiphong area. Shippers have reportedly been requested
to send ships with drafts of 22 feet or less to North Vietnam. Depths
alongside wharves have reportedly decreased as much as three to five
feet and some ships berthing alongside rest on the bottom at low
tide.
5. (S/NFD) The Hanoi-Haiphong rail line was attacked inter-
mittently during the reporting period, with the rail facilities at
Hai Duong receiving major emphasis. Available ferries and moveable
spans in the immediate vicinity of the bridges, as well as rail
freight cars observed near these bypass facilities in late October,
indicate that some movement takes place.
6. (S/NFD) On the Dong Dang line in addition to the key inter-
dictions near Hanoi, targets attacked included the rail bridge at
Dap Cau and Lang Son, and the rail yards at Kep, Lang Dang, and Dap Cau.
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Photographs indicate the main bridges at Dap Cau and Lang Son were
unserviceable, but serviceable bypasses were available. The destroyed
bridge at Viet Tri on the Lao Cai line continues to limit through rail
service to the northwest portions of the country. The rail line south
of Hanoi is not useable to through service to Vinh, but shuttle
operations continue between interdicted bridges or heavily damaged
yards. Railroad rolling stock reported destroyed and damaged increased
in October compared to September. Aerial photography of 18 October
revealed a total of 2,079 units of rolling stock confirming that
replacements for losses are being received. Nearly 1,700 units were
located in the sanctuaries within Hanoi, Haiphong, and the buffer
zone contiguous to the Chinese border.
7. (S/NFD) A possible new railroad line in the early stages of
construction was detected during October. The alignment of initial
ground scarrings indicates that the line will connect the Hon Gai
port area to Kep and the rail network. Recent developments in and
around the environs of Hon Gai may presage the use of the port as a
supplement to the more congested offloading facilities at the port
of Haiphong. During October two dry cargo ships proceeded to Hon
Gai, apparently to unload cargo, after waiting two or three days at
the outer anchorages of Haiphong. Photographic coverage of the port
in late October showed one ship offloading at the wharf and three
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others grouped 600 - 1,000 yards away in the anchorage. These
developments, plus a highway under construction from Haiphong to
the China border, would suggest that the Hon Gai area is being
developed.
8. (S/NFD) Truck sightings and damage were lower as poor
weather conditions hampered flight operations. With improved
weather toward the latter part of the month, sightings of large
truck convoys increased sharply, especially along Route lA near
Phu Ly, at the junction of Routes 21 and 10 near Nam Dinh, and
on routes near Quang Khe. Large convoys continued to be sighted
moving toward Laos along Route 15 near the Mu Gia Pass, along
Route 137, and along Route 7.
9. (S/NFD) Throughout the country the number of waterborne
logistic craft reported destroyed was at a level comparable to
September while the number reported damaged increased -- still
considerably lower than the record levels attacked during the
summer months. An indication of a probable change in coastal
movement patterns from Haiphong was noted. Photography of 4 October
showed 11 POL barges off-loading two tankers in the Haiphong approach;
on 7 October, three pilot sightings reported the movement of 11 POL
barges on estuaries south of Haiphong, indicating that some southbound
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movement may be transferred from the inland waterways to coastal
waterways.
10. (S/NFD) Seeding of NK-36 influence bombs increased during
the month, particularly along lines of communication between Hanoi
and Haiphong, Hanoi and Lao Cai, and in coastal estuaries of major
inland water routes. Nearly all key bridges and ferry crossings in
the area between Hanoi and Haiphong have been seeded to impede water
traffic, use of the various bypass facilities, and construction work
on lines of communication. Indications of MK-36 effectiveness were
reported on three occasions during the period.
several "steam boats" in the Haiphong port
market area were sunk by delayed-action bombs. Another source reported
that in an estuary north of Vinh several delayed-action bombs detonated
causing water spouts and that on the following day a junk was sunk in
the vicinity, resulting in subsequent increased water security patrol
activity to keep boats away from the seeded areas. Analysis of the
results of MK-36 bombs on a segment of Route lA in early September
indicated that truck traffic decreased sharply after seeding. Sub-
sequent reseeding six weeks later resulted in the North Vietnamese
placing a barrier across the road, suggesting a rerouting of truck
traffic.
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11. (S/NFD) Initial strikes were made on Phuc Yen and Cat Bi
airfields in October. During the strikes of 24 and 25 October at
Phuc Yen, two MIG-21s were destroyed, three MIG-21s and seven
MIG-17s damaged, runways and taxiways interdicted and support
facilities destroyed and damaged. Limited runway serviceability
was probably restored on 28 October. Restrikes on 5 November cratered
the runway. It is estimated, however, that limited operations are
possible by using the taxiway as a runway. As a result of recent
strikes against Phuc Yen, the in-country MIG sanctuary is now limited
to Gia Lam Airfield. This has caused disruptions in the fighter air
defenses. Initial strikes were also conducted against two large
military storage areas; the Hanoi Storage Area, Gia Thuong and the
Hanoi Storage Area, Bac Mai, that jointly contain nine per cent of
the national military storage capacity.
12. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese air defenses were characterized
by intense and aggressive reactions to the increased ROLLING THUNDER
activity in the northeast. During the period over 30 US aircraft
were lost throughout North Vietnam -- nine to SAMs, one to MIG air-
craft, and the remainder either to antiaircraft artillery or to unknown
causes. SAM activity increased with 530 noted. Between 17 October and
13 November there were 17 MIG engagements with two US aircraft downed
and two MIG-21s and seven MIG-17s confirmed destroyed in air combat.
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Photography of 4 October revealed nine Swatow Class PGM gunboats
and three Shanghai Class PFTS deployed along the banks of the Red
River and the Canal des Rapides near Hanoi. It is probable these
boats were moved inland to bolster air defenses near key targets.
13. (S/NFD) Antiaircraft artillery continued to be the primary
air defense weapon system throughout the country and was instrumental
in downing most of the US aircraft lost. Analysis of AAA deployments
indicate a significant shift with marked upswings in the deployments
in southern North Vietnam. The level of firing activity in this
area suggests substantial increases in the number of 85/100-mm guns.
The AAA order of battle confirms 1,438 guns south of Vinh -- approximately
20 per cent of the inventory. This indicates that with the oncoming
bad weather in the north, the North Vietnamese are strengthening defenses
in the south to oppose US air attacks.
14. (S/NFD) Surface-to-air missile activity in the DMZ area
continues. On 29 October, three to four SAMs were fired at a flight
of B-52s, the second such incident. No damage was inflicted, although
Hanoi was quick to issue a claim that one B-52 had been shot down.
Forty-two B-52 sorties were conducted against supply storage and vehicle
areas on Route 15 north of Mu Gia Pass.
15. (S/NFD) Attacks against critical railroad/highway bridges
on the lines of communication servicing Hanoi and Haiphong have created
the most serious problems in the distribution of military and economic
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supplies to date. Disruption and dislocation of normal trans-
portation patterns have caused additional delays and greater
use of less efficient modes of transport. Because the logistics
requirements are modest, however, the North Vietnamese still retain
the capability to support activities in South Vietnam and Laos at
present or increased combat levels. The cumulative effects of
the airstrikes have degraded North Vietnam's capability for
sustained large-scale conventional military operations against
South Vietnam.
Leadership and Public Reactions
16. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese leadership's apparent deter-
mination to continue the war was reiterated in official statements made
in conjunction with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution. In praising the Soviet Union, Hanoi officials
expressed their gratitude for Soviet assistance which "is helping
the Vietnamese people press on to final victory." Party First
Secretary Le Duan, speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 3 November,
reiterated that settlement of the war must be based on the four
points of the DRV and the political program of the Liberation
Front.
17. (S/NFD) Morale in the North appears to be holding up rather
well, although it was reported during recent intensified sttikes
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in the Hanoi area that there were instances of momentary panic. Some
discouragement is evident in recent reports. For example, a high level
North Vietnamese diplomat in Paris, Mai Van Be, reportedly told a
about to visit Hanoi that he might find some
malcontent there. Mai Van Bo said that there was always a "fringe
of dissatisfied people" who were discouraged and critical. Other
recent reports from Hanoi have pointed to the calm manner in which
the populace has adjusted to the air raids and the Vietnamese
ability to keep their composure while going to air raid shelters.
There have been no indications that difficulties associated with the
bombing have been sufficient to force the regime to alter its policy
on the war.
Effects on the Economy
18. (S/NFD) The interdiction of the two key bridges in the
Hanoi area added to North Vietnam's economic difficulties. Restrikes
on electric power facilities, including the Hanoi powerplant, inflicted
additional damage and held the availability of electric power to a
low level. The increased volume of bulk food imported during
October apparently is to offset the below normal rice harvests.
19. (S/NFD) Only about 20 per cent of North Vietnam's total
electric generating capacity is currently estimated to be operating.
Within the main power grid, only about 7 to 10 per cent of prestrike
capacity, or 10,000 to 15,000 kw, is believed to be serviceable. Of
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the nine powerplants and one key substation in the main grid, all
but two, Hanoi and Nam Dinh powerplants, are known to be out of
service. Restrikes during the period were carried out against four
powerplants -- Hanoi, Nam Dinh, Uong Bi, and Hon Gai -- and the sub-
station at Dong Anh. The Hanoi powerplant currently is estimated to
be operating at 30 to 50 per cent of installed capacity. Continuous
efforts undoubtedly will be made to restore additional capacity.
The results of an October restrike at Nam Dinh -- which had been put
into partial operation in September -- are not known. The severity
of damage to remaining plants in the network, with the exception of
Viet Tri, will deny even partial operation for periods ranging from
three months to one year, after repair work is resumed. In most
cases complete restoration will require more than a year. Repairs
in evidence at the Viet Tri powerplant have progressed to the point
where partial operation may soon commence. There is evidence of an
intention to fragment the central power grid and to forego extensive
reconstruction of powerplants. This is suggested in the removal of
transformers from a number of network substations and the lack of
repair activity at some heavily damaged powerplants. Some powerplants
have remained unchanged from the immediate post-strike conditions for
periods up to six months.
20. (S/NFD) The harvesting of the tenth month rice crop -- which
contributes about two-thirds of North Vietnam's total annual rice out-
put -- has begun and the regime has called for an all out effort to
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finish the harvest rapidly and to prepare for the next fifth month
crop. This year's tenth month harvest is behind schedule because of
delays in planting caused by adverse weather. To ensure an adequate
supply of manpower to harvest the current crop, and to plant the next
crop the regime has called for the use of nonfarm labor, such as
students, cadre, evacuees, and members of the armed forces, to
supplement the main labor force of the cooperatives. Because of
adverse weather, lower acreage planted and disruptions caused by
the bombing it is likely that the current rice harvest will be
200,000 to 300,000 metric tons below average -- about equal to last
year's tenth month crop deficit.
21. (S/NFD) The partial evacuation of Hanoi and Haiphong may
have caused the dislocation of over 400,000 persons during the past
two years. The urban area of Hanoi contained about 475,000 people in
January 1965, while the urban area of Haiphong contained about 220,000. A
report in mid-June of this year stated that one-half of Hanoi's population,
mostly children and old people, had moved to areas between 10 and 60 kilo-
meters from the city. Haiphong has been reported as much as 75 per cent
evacuated. Evacuees have, for the most part, found it difficult to
obtain proper food, employment, shelter, and other necessities.
22. (S/NFD) During the reporting period attacks against dispersed
tank and drum sites probably resulted in the loss of small amounts of
petroleum. Identified imports of petroleum during October amounted to
12,500 metric tons -- an increase of 7,000 metric tons over imports in
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September but still significantly below the total average monthly
volume of 19,700 metric tons observed to date in 1967. Consumption
during the month is estimated to have been about 19,500 metric tons.
Stocks on hand at the end of October amount to 55,000-60,000 metric
tons -- about 90 days of supply at current monthly consumption rates.
23. (S/NFD) Identified seaborne imports of all commodities
increased 18 per cent over September to 88,500 metric tons, but were
nearly 25 per cent below the average monthly volume of 113,500 metric
tons imported during the first nine months of 1967. The volume of bulk
food imports increased to 58,000 metric tons, more than twice the
September total, and well above the monthly averages for 1967. There
were no imports of fertilizer during the month for the first time since
the inception of the bombing program in 1965.
24. (S/NFD) Identified seaborne exports increased from 10,600
metric tons in September to 25,200 metric tons in October, still well
below the 53,300 ton monthly average for the first nine months of 1967.
An increase in the amount of coal exports during October to 14,900
metric tons resulted from an increase in shipments from Cam Pha --
6,500 metric tons compared with 1,100 metric tons in September. Coal
shipments from Cam Pha, however, remain relatively small -- amounting
to only about 10 per cent of the average monthly volume of coal exports
from the port during 1966. Apparently the quality of the exported
coal has also suffered and in at least one case the coal reportedly
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had not been washed sufficiently to meet standards. There continued
to be no identified seaborne exports of apatite, cement, or pig iron.
25. (S/NFD) A slight reduction in average layover times for
freighters leaving Haiphong was observed for the month of October --
19 days as compared with a revised estimate of 20 days in September
and a peak of 33 days in August. A combination of lower import levels
in recent months and the use of offloading facilities at Hon Gai
probably accounts for the small improvements in congestion at Haiphong
during October. Ships carrying flour and rice continue to experience
the shortest turn-around-times, while those with general cargoes
experience the longest.
26. (S/NFD) Cumulative measurable damage attributable to the
Rolling Thunder Program through October is estimated at $372
million (see Tab B). In addition to these measurable losses, there
continues to be many other losses to both the economy and the
military establishment which cannot be assigned meaningful values.
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RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARGETS a/ THRU 11 NOVEMBER 1967
Total Targets c/
National
Capacity
JCS d/
Targeted
Fixed Targets (X 1000)
No.
%
Barracks 443 men
65
41.08
Ammo Depots 112.6 MT
18
100
POL Storage * 133.5
S
13
100
upply Depots 10550 SgFt
29
42.48
Power Plants 192 KW
20
92.1
Maritime Ports 8.2 ST/DY
9
97
RR Yards 49.7
4
78
RR Shops
3
88
Industrial:
Explosive?Plant 1 MT
1
100
Iron & Steel 300MT PIG)
1
100
Cement Plant 600 MT
1
100
Total Targets
Airfields 23
12**
Naval Bases 15
5
Bridges 1561
61
Commo Install 55
5
Radar Sites 210
5
SAM Sites 221
Locks & Dams
Ferries
JCS targets only; does not
include dispersed storage
-TOO
Includes
no
Results f/
n
numbered Armed Recce Sorties
Hoa Lac Airfield Destroyed Damaged
179,125 Vessels 9,172 16,847
Vehicles 5,789 4,978
RR Stock 1,687 2,855
a/ Assessments are based on best information received, will be refined as more accurate
information becomes available.
b/ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this
summary assigned to principal target.
c/ These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and
struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets (i.e., barracks,
supply and ammo depots).
d/ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e/ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f/ Also numerous installations-, AA sites, bridges, etc., attacked and road and rail
cuts made.
Targets
Struck
d/
No.
%
58
35.9
18
100
13
100
26
31 2
15
85.8
7
48
3
54
2
68
1
100
1
100
1
100
% of National
e/
No. of
b/
Strike
Capacity
Destroyed or
i
Attacks
nactive because
Sorties of
i
a
r strikes
396
3172
26.86
116
1385
77.0
91
756
87
.7
92
925
18 98
111
848
81.6
30
292
13.5
88
623
26.8
5
38
27.1
20
126
100
24
281
100
1
57
100
93
1452
% -Of Those Targeted
34.6
30
295
30.4
552
5301
75.0
2
15
20
78
456
87.5
CC CC 11~~~ TAB A
ApprbbeG I X eK000FOR EMNPO EM00100060004-4
Total Sorties: 15,277
 ApprovsV"TaseFfV/01t10:WR%y42 5 ( 00060004-4
Value of Economic and Military Damage
Attributed to the ROLLING THUNDER Program
1965 Through October 1967
Economic Facilities and Equipment
Military Facilities and Equipment
Direct Losses
Million US $
Direct Losses
Million US $
Railroad/Highway Bridges
31.7 a/b/
Barracks
30.0 a/
Transportation Equipment
71.2
Ammunition Depots
5.3 a/
Electric Power Plants
31.7 a/
Motor Vehicle Depots and
Petroleum
7.5
Supply Area Depots
9.8 a/
Manufacturing Facilities
17.9
Airfields
1.4 a/
Railroad Yards and Shops
6.1
Radar and Communications
Maritime Ports and Shipyards
2.6 a
Sites
2.9
Miscellaneous Armed Recon-
SAM Sites
6.3
naissance
Naval Bases
1.9 a/
Aircraft
41.6
Naval Craft
4.8
Indirect Losses
Miscellaneous Armed
Reconnaissance
TOTAL, Direct Losses
120.9
Exports
Agriculture 2/
31.5
39.5
Total
Fishing
9.5
Million US $
SUBTOTAL, Indirect Losses
80.5
Economic
251
Military
121
TOTAL, Direct and
TOTAL
372 d/
Indirect
251.4
a/ Estimate is incomplete because of inadequate post-strike photography.
b/ Of the total, $5.8 million is estimated to have been expended to date on
the repair of damaged and destroyed bridges and $25.9 million is estimated
for complete restoration in the future of bridges damaged or destroyed.
In addition, $1.6 million would be required to make temporary repairs to
presently unrepaired bridges.
c/ It should be noted that losses of agricultural crops are arbitrarily
attributed entirely to the indirect effects of the bombing. An unknown
part of these losses is in fact due to weather and other natural causes.
d/ Excluding the cost of trucks destroyed and damaged in Laos and economic
and military facilities and equipment destroyed and damaged by US naval
operations along the coast of southern North Vietnam.
TAB B DL C
Approv rREIIasebbQ/07(O:REA1PGN2S b.SM00060004-4
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82S00205R000100060004-4
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THE WHITE HOUSE:
Vice President
Gen Maxwell Taylor
Mr. Bromley Smith
1 Cy
1 Cy
5 Cys
DEFENSE:
SECDEF 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (PA) 1 Cy
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 1 Cy
TREASURY (Secretary) l Cy
USIA 1 Cy
AID 1 Cy
NASA 1 Cy
NSA 5 Cys
STATE 24 Cys
AEC 1 Cy
FBI 1 Cy
NIC 1 Cy
ACDA 1 Cy
CHAIRMAN, JCS 1 Cy
DIRECTOR., JOINT STAFF 1 Cy
J-1 1 Cy
J-3 2 Cys
j-4 1 Cy
J-5 1 Cy
J-6 1 Cy
SACSA 1 Cy
NMCC 3 Cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
DCSOPS 1 Cy
ACSFOR 1 Cy
ACSI 1 Cy
ACSI-CI 1 Cy
ACSI-Eastern 1 Cy
STAG 1 Cy
Approved ~br`RRgIe'-2J$99/f69& DPIISc ~~OM0060004-4
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100060004-4
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2 Cys
DNI 1 Cy
OP-921E 1 Cy
OP-922Y1 1 Cy
OP-922Y2 1 Cy
OP-92B1 1 Cy
AIR FORCE:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
ACS,I/USAF 1 Cy
AFNINDE 8 Cys
AFNIEBB 1 Cy
AFISI (Spec Investigation) 1 Cy
AUL (Air Univ Library) 1 Cy
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT 1 Cy
G-2 1 Cy
CINCPAC
CINCPACAF
CINCUSARPAC
CINCPACFLT
COMUSMACV
7AF
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMATKCARSTRIK 'ORSEVENTHFLT (CTF
CINCLANT
CINCSTRIKE
CINCSAC
SAC 544
CINCTAC
AFSTRIKE
CONTIC
CINCALCOM
CINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSAFE
CINCNAVEUR
CINCCONAD
CIA
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
DIA
2 Cys
10 Cys
1 Cy
1 Cy
2 Cys
2 Cys
1 Cy
77) 1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
125 Cys
1 Cy
35 Cys
Approve or ReIease 200910109:'CTA-RDP82& M M100060004-4
 A. OR IiJessHa /c ,Q R A- 2,Qd2 M 0006"' 00'4-44
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82SO0205R000100060004-4
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMM~~