THE JOINT STUDY GROUP REPORT ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 15 DECEMBER 1960

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 144
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 15, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE JOINT STUDY GROUP REPORT
ON
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
15 December 1960
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DIA review(s) completed.
DOS review(s) completed.
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15 December 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
We present herewith the report of the Joint Study Group
on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Govern-
ment. In conducting this study we have been guided by the
attached terms of reference. We would note, however, that
we inevitably came across matters of national security interest
in the foreign intelligence field not specifically covered in the
terms of reference and that we felt obligated to comment on
these.
In preparing this report we have earnestly endeavored
to consider what is best for the nation. In submitting the
report we recognize that in the time allotted it was impossible
to cover in detail the vast foreign intelligence effort of the
United States Government, but we have endeavored to identify
the major problem areas and have recommended solutions.
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'Lyman B. Kirkpatfick (Chairman)
Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency
Representing the Director of Central Intelligence
Allan Lvana
Special Assistant to the Director of Intelligence & Research,
Department of State
Representing the Secretary of State
L
Gene al raves B. Erskine, USMC
Assistant to the Secretary of fense
for Special Operations
Representing the Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Ma.c
Chief of the International Division, Bureau of the Budget
Representing the Director, Bureau of the Budget
Exe tkitjhe Secretary, National Secitfriyi Council
Representing the Special Assistant to tie President
for National Security Affairs
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APPROVED TERMS OF REFERENCE
JOINT STUDY GROUP
1. To promote the most effective and efficient use
of intelligence resources and to assist the DCI in carrying
out his responsibilities for coordinating the foreign intelli-
gence activities of the U. S. Government, an ad hoc Study
Group is established by agreement of the following principals,
who will be represented on the Group:
The Director of Central Intelligence, who will provide
the Chairman
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities will have a representative sit as an observer on the
Joint Study Group and the Board will be given an opportunity
to comment on the Group's report.
2. The Group, under the direction of the DCI, shall
concentrate its attention primarily upon organizational and
management aspects of the following areas within the intelli-
gence effort. For this purpose all aspects of foreign intelli-
gence shall be within the purview of the Group.
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a. Inter-departmental, departmental, agency
and military service procedures for handling of intelligence
requirements and related guidance to collectors -- with
particular attention to:
(1) Procedures for keeping down the volume
of, and avoiding any unprofitable duplication in,
such guidance, and the feasibility of establishing
a central registry of outstanding intelligence
requirements and of collection responses thereto.
(2) Inter-departmental arrangements for
selective levying of requirements on the most
appropriate collection facility or facilities.
b. USIB arrangements for:
(1) Ensuring rapid adaptation, adjustment or
re-direction of existing collection assets to meet
changes in current priority requirements, and for
deciding upon and supporting expansion of existing
collection facilities or development of new facili-
ties needed to meet new agreed high-priority
requirements.
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(2) Periodic community evaluation (including
the appraisal of dollar and man-year inputs) of
the foreign intelligence effort as a whole -- with
particular attention to improving the total program
balance, from the geographic and functional points
of view, and to increasing efficiency and eliminat-
ing any unprofitable duplication in the utilization
of intelligence resources.
c. The present military intelligence coordinating
machinery and its relationship to the intelligence community --
with particular attention to possibilities for closer integration
under the authority of the Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1958.
d. The effectiveness of current implementation of
intelligence coordination directives and procedures -- with
special attention to the field coordination of overseas intelli-
gence activities, and to community support for the intelligence
needs of senior U. S. representatives abroad, including
military commanders.
e. Present arrangements for coordinating research
and development conducted in support of the foreign intelligence
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effort and for determining the intelligence community interest
in, and providing support to, any R & D for other primary
purposes which may also have significant potential usefulness
to intelligence.
3. The Group shall present, by 15 December 1960, its
findings and recommendations for appropriate action to the DCI
for consideration by the Principals, after which time it shall
be dissolved. Any actions to implement approved recom-
mendations shall be the exclusive responsibility of the heads
of the departments or agencies directly concerned.
14 July 1960
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INDEX
I. INTRODUCTION
Page
1
Decision to Establish Study Group 1
Composition of Study Group 1
Gist of Terms of Reference 2
Number of Meetings 2
Places Visited 3
Approach of Study Group 4
II. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 7
Composition 7
Major Elements 8
Manpower -- Order of Magnitude 9
Overseas Effort 10
United States Intelligence Board Membership 11
USIB -- Subcommittees 13
Provisions of NSCID No. 1 13
USIB as a Deliberative Body 14
USIB Managerial Responsibilities 15
CIA Progress and Energy 16
Department of State Expertise 16
Military Intelligence Specialized Knowledge 17
JCS Organization Promises Stronger Mechanism 18
III. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 19
Department of Defense Intelligence Organization 19
Necessity for Good Intelligence 19
Need for Sense of Urgency 20
Need for Integrated Program 20
Application of Technology to Intelligence 20
Problems of Procurement of Equipment 22
Cost Problems in DOD 22
Suggestion for One DOD Intelligence Service 23
Need for Coordinated System 23
Concept of DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 24
No Limitation on Departmental Missions 25
NSCIDs Need Revision 26
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INDEX
Field Operations
Page
26
Flow of Information Requires Action 27
Necessity to Coordinate Operations 28
Need for Military Clandestine Operations 28
Need for More Counterintelligence Effort 29
Contribution of Military Attache System 30
Problem for Intelligence Posed by NATO 30
Special Security Officer System 30
Strengthen Role of J-2 of Unified Commands 31
Recommendations 31
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 35
Responsibilities of NSA 35
Partnership of COMINT and ELINT 36
NSA Segments Under Service Agencies 37
Cooperation of Military Departments 38
NSA Handling of Requirements 39
Long-range Planning 39
Security Barriers 40
Lack of Qualified Translators 41
Recommendations 42
V. COLLECTION - RESOURCES 43
Overt Collection 43
Foreign Service Reporting 44
Military Attache System 45
Military Assistance Advisory Groups 46
Signal Intelligence 47
National Indications Center 48
Photographic Intelligence 49
Establishment of National Photo Center 51
Espionage and Counterespionage 53
Differences Between CIA and Army 54
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INDEX
Page
Need for Trained Military Intelligence Officers 56
CIA Training System 57
CIA Use of Official Cover 58
Liaison with Foreign Intelligence Services 59
Attention to Counterintelligence and Security 59
Recommendations 60
VI. REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION 63
Present Procedures 63
No Single General Requirements System 63
DOD Screening of Military Requirements 64
CIA Requirements System 64
NSA Requirements 65
Department of State Requirements 65
Requirements Guides -- List 67
Evaluation of Reports 69
Post Mortems on National Estimates 69
The Role of USIB 70
Priority National Intelligence Objectives 70
Misunderstanding of PNIOs 71
USIB Committees' Coordination of Requirements 73
Field Coordination 73
In Embassies 73
Outstanding Problems 74
Lack of Central Coordination
Tailoring Requirements to Assets
Requirements in DOD
Duplication in DOD
Clandestine Requirements
Overlap in Political Reporting
General Collection Guides
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74
76
77
77
80
80
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INDEX
Page
Departmental Requirements 81
Central Body for Reviewing Requirements 82
Recommendations 85
VII. COORDINATION 87
Basic Philosophy 87
Confusion over Coordination 87
Principles for Achieving Coordination 88
Role of DCI in Coordination 89
Separation of DCI from Head of CIA 90
Use of Elements of CIA in Coordination 92
Directives 94
NSCID No. 1, paragraph 1 95
NSCID No. 1, paragraph 2.a. 96
NSCID No. 1, paragraph 2.d. and 3 96
NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3. c. 97
Coordination of Departmental Activities 97
USIB Principal Mechanism to Assist DCI 98
The United States Intelligence Board 99
Coordination Through Committees 99
Managerial Responsibilities 99
Proposed Management Group 100
The Director of Central Intelligence 101
Authority and Basic Powers 101
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INDEX
Coordination Overseas
Page
103
Three Lines of Authority 103
Coordination within Diplomatic Missions 104
Situation in Germany 104
Role of CIA Station Chiefs 107
Real Progress in Coordination 108
National Level: Conclusion 109
DCI Should Continue to be Coordinator 109
USIB Principal Mechanism 109
DOD Coordination 109
Revise Coordination Staff in CIA 110
Overseas: Conclusions 111
More Affirmative Action by Chiefs of Mission
Keeping Chiefs of Mission Informed
Unified Commanders to Coordinate Components
Recommendations
111
112
112
113
VIII. COST OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EFFORT 117
Difficulties in Ascertaining Exact Costs 117
DOD Study on Costs 118
Range of Cost 119
Efforts to Accurately Identify Costs 120
Recommendations 121
IX. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 123
DOD Activities 123
CIA Activities 123
Coordination Between CIA and Defense 124
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INDEX
Problems
Page
124
Automatic Data Processing 125
Storage and Retrieval of Information 125
Mechanical Translations 126
Communications 126
Recommendations 128
X. THE FUTURE 129
Importance of Intelligence to National Security 129
Development of Assets for Future 129
Will Require Great Resources and Leadership 130
Declining Effectiveness of Some Techniques 130
Must Anticipate Technological Developments 131
Importance of CRITIC System 131
Need for Long-range Planning 132
Recommendation 132
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 133
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I. INTRODUCTION
A meeting on 6 May 1960 between the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Director
of the Bureau of Budget, the Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, and the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities resulted in a
decision to establish an ad hoc Joint Study Group to review
specified aspects of the foreign intelligence effort of the
United States Government. By 12 July 1960 the terms of
reference had been agreed upon by the principals and approved
by the President of the United States.
The terms of reference provided that the membership
of the Study Group would consist of representatives of the
Director of Central Intelligence (who would provide the Chair-
man), the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and the Director of the Bureau of Budget. In addition, the
terms of reference provided that the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities would have a
representative sit as an observer with the Group and that the
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President's Board would be given an opportunity to comment on
the Group's report following its submission. By general agree-
ment of the members of the Study Group, the Assistant to the
Director of Central Intelligence for Coordination was invited to
participate with the Group in an observer capacity.
The Group's terms of reference provided that the attention
of the Study Group would be focused primarily on the organiza-
tional and management aspects of the foreign intelligence effort.
More specifically, the Study Group was directed to examine require-
ments, which are the means by which intelligence producers or
researchers request collection; the adaptation of collection assets
to changing needs; the method by which the intelligence community
periodically evaluates its efforts; the military intelligence coordi-
nating machinery, particularly as related to the Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958; the implementation of intelli-
gence directives, particularly as related to providing intelligence
support to field commanders; and the coordination of the research
and development effort of the intelligence community.
Commencing 10 July 1960, the Study Group met 90 times,
for periods ranging from two to nine hours each, and received
briefings or presentations or engaged in discussions with 51 organi-
zations. A total of 320 individuals appeared before the Study Group.
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While the majority of the meetings of the Study Group
were held in Washington, the Study Group traveled to Fort
Meade to visit the National Security Agency on two different
occasions; to San Antonio, Texas, Air Force Security Service;
to Omaha, Nebraska, Strategic Air Command; to Dayton,
Ohio, Air Technical Intelligence Center;
Commander-in-Chief United States Navy Europe
and Commander-in-Chief Near East Lebanon Mission;
and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and United States
European Command; to Bonn, Germany,
to Wiesbaden, Germany, the
United States Air Forces Europe; to Heidelberg, Germany, the
United States Army Europe;
The Joint Study Group concluded its sessions with repre-
sentatives of the intelligence community by meeting with each of
the members of the United States Intelligence Board, except the
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representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Atomic Energy Commission. In these meetings the Study
Group had the opportunity to solicit views on the major pro-
posals incorporated in this report.
The Joint Study Group has made a conscientious effort
to meet as a body each time so that all members would have
the benefit of hearing the same presentations. Each of the
members contributed at least one staff assistant to the Group
who indispensably assisted in arranging meetings, doing re-
search and drafting and redrafting many sections to expedite
the preparation of this report.
The Joint Study Group has tried to examine the problems
of the intelligence community from a national point of view
without reference to personalities or parochial interests. Within
this over-all approach it has made every effort fully to appre-
ciate departmental interests in the fields of intelligence collection,
processing and production. We have endeavored to understand
the history and evolution of U. S. foreign intelligence activities,
and have found in this history both advantageous and disadvanta-
geous aspects. We have tried to capitalize in our recommenda-
tions on the advantages the community has gained from its often
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effective, spontaneous response to the demands of events
and circumstances. We have sought corrective measures for
these deficiencies in the community that reflect lack of ex-
plicitly planned development.
We have reviewed the National Security Act of 1947
(as amended) and other applicable statutes. We have examined
those provisions of each National Security Council Intelligence
Directive and Director of Central Intelligence Directive within
our terms of reference both to determine their appropriateness
and their degree of implementation. We have also studied the
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.
Finally, the Joint Study Group has paid particular atten-
tion to the future, and carefully examined the extent of long-
term planning within the intelligence community.
We particularly want to thank those many members of
the intelligence community who spent long hours preparing
helpful briefing material for the Study Group. In addition, their
very frank discussions of problems and ideas for improvements
were invaluable to us in preparing this report.
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II. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The foreign intelligence effort of the United States
Government centers in the "intelligence community", which
consists of those departments and agencies which are responsi-
ble for the collection of information and production of foreign
intelligence essential for the security of the United States.
The intelligence community includes the Central Intelligence
Agency; the intelligence components of the Departments of
State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, and of the Joint
Staff (JCS); National Security Agency (NSA); the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; and. the Atomic Energy Commission.
In addition to these departments and agencies, there are
many other elements of the government which collect or
produce information useful in the intelligence process and
which contribute to the foreign intelligence effort; these
elements are brought into community activities on an ad hoc
basis.
The heart of the intelligence community is in
Washington (including Fort Meade), although considerable
activity occurs elsewhere in the continental United States.
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The latter includes the major intelligence elements of the
Strategic Air Command, the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
Fleet, Continental Air Command, Continental Armies,
individual Army headquarters, Strategic Army Corps, Air
Technical Intelligence Center, Army Map Service,
Aeronautical Chart and Information Service, and the Air
Force Security Service. The Army and Navy cryptological
agencies are in Washington. All three military services
maintain regional intelligence offices, largely engaged in
security investigative and counterintelligence work through-
out the United States.
The following table will provide an order-of-
magnitude impression of the location of the nation's foreign
intelligence manpower. Of particular interest are the facts
that more than 80 per cent of intelligence personnel are
related to Department of Defense activities and that over
half of the total manpower is engaged in the signal intelli-
gence effort.
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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANPOWER
(Personnel primarily engaged in the foreign intelligence effort)
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Overseas intelligence operations are mounted largely
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The intelligence community is formally organized under
the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). This Board has
a total membership of ten, of which six represent the principal
producers and processors of intelligence; namely, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force and the National Security Agency. Two
other agencies are not extensively engaged in foreign intelli-
gence activities but sit on the USIB as occasional contributors --
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Finally, there is representation from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS). National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 1 officially lists the USIB membership as
follows:
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The Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State
The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations
The Director of the National Security Agency
The Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the
Air Force
A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation
A representative of the Atomic Energy Commission
The above list suggests certain observations. Three
echelons of the Defense Department are represented on the
USIB -- the Army, Navy and Air Force sit on the USEB as
equals with the representative of the OSD, their civilian
superior, and with the Director of Intelligence, the Joint
Staff, representing their military superiors, the JCS. That
all are not in fact equal is implicit in the requirement that
military services, NSA and JCS representatives are not
permitted to appeal USIB actions without prior review by
the Secretary of Defense. We would finally note that the
USIB has six military member agencies as compared to
four civilian agencies and only two of the latter are major
collectors and producers of foreign intelligence.
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Functioning directly under and in support of the USIB
are 26 committees. Some of these in turn have established
sub-committees or working groups through which they
discharge part of all of their responsibilities. A number
of these committees and their subordinate elements are
concerned primarily with the production of finished intelli-
gence; others deal with the coordination of guidance to
collection and processing activities and with a variety of
reference services and other support activities. The
composition of these committees normally reflects the
membership of the USIB itself. A chart of the committee
and sub-committee structure of the USIB is shown on the
following page.
Any evaluation of the USIB structure must necessarily
start with an examination of the functions of that body.
National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1
indicates that this Board is intended primarily to assist
the Dimector of Central Intelligence (DCI) to achieve an
effectively coordinated intelligence community, and the
Board itself to carry certain coordinating responsibilities.
Its responsibilities cross agency boundaries and convey
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both a policy-making and management flavor. The develop-
ment of program guidance for all agencies, the establishment
of community intelligence objectives, requirements and
priorities, and the provision of a more effectively integrated
national intelligence effort cannot be achieved unless the
Board plays a positive, constructive role in assisting the
management of the community.
Our study has convinced us that the USIB has been
primarily a deliberative body. It has discussed and given
final shape to estimates which are recognizedly the capstone
of intelligence effort, but it has by no means devoted equally
adequate time to its coordinative responsibilities. We are
not aware that the Board has ever provided over-all program
guidance for the entire community. Problems confronting
?
the Board are all too frequently merely noted or referred
to a committee.
We are of the opinion that these deficiences are
rooted in several causes, not the least significant of which
is the size and makeup of the Board itself. Although all
members, except the Chairman, appear to be equal, they
are not of equal status. They do not enjoy like authority
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within their own agencies, nor do they represent similar
types of organization. The three echelons of military
representation have already been cited; here we would only
add that the top Department of Defense echelon commands
no intelligence organization, and the Joint Staff intelligence
component is comparatively small. The heavy weighting of
military representation is itself questionable.
We feel that the Board has slighted its managerial
responsibilities. To assist the Board in remedying this
situation, we believe there should be a USIB mechanism
concerned with management matters. We have particularly
in mind major management problems, usually involving
several parts of the community.
Finally, we feel there is an opportunity to make better
use of the Board's time through more careful screening of
matters coming before it. In making this observation we
are very conscious of the need for safeguards against lower
level groups in effect usurping the powers of the Board.
The Study Group feels that the first purpose of its
recommendations should be to build upon the constructive
and favorable elements in the present intelligence
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organizations and to correct deficiencies. The Study Group
has therefore looked at the major component units in order
to discern in each its generally advantageous and disadvantageous
characteristics. A quick review of these observations is set
forth below as a guide to the over-all direction of the Group's
proposals.
The CIA has made progress in developing a corps of
well-trained, dedicated personnel. It has demonstrated
notable energy in developing projects of common concern
which have been assigned to it. However, this same energy
has in fact led the Agency into some activities that are
competitive with those of other members of the community,
and raised in these members continuing fears of increased
centralization to a degree that hampers the DCI's coordinating
efforts.
The Department of State contributes a fund of
expertise in the understanding of foreign affairs. Its infor-
mation gathering is enhanced by the fact that its collection
goes hand in hand with diplomatic negotiation and repre-
sentation. This same fact, however, complicates the
situation in that embassy political and economic activity,
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being in part policy operation, cannot be brought wholly
within the cover of intelligence coordination, nor can it
easily be separated into the two categories of intelligence
and policy. The Foreign Service still shows an indifference
to intelligence, in part, because the Service thinks of
intelligence in old-fashioned terms as a limited esoteric
operation.
The military intelligence services provide the com-
munity with specialized knowledge and experience in
indispensable areas of intelligence interest. Their dedi-
cation and esprit de corps are of high order. They are
disciplined and responsive to command. Having direct
responsibility for preparing for military action with the
potential enemy, they supply to the community a sense of
urgency that is unfortunately not always matched elsewhere.
On the other hand the participation of three separate military
intelligence services in all community activities makes it
difficult to achieve an over-all military intelligence view.
Further, the frequent rotation of personnel does nothing to
encourage greater depth of understanding or collaboration.
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The JCS organization at present bears promise of a
stronger mechanism for reconciling the service views. Up
to now in the field of intelligence the implementation of the
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 has not
progressed far enough to permit immediate reliance upon
the Joint Staff contribution to solving intelligence community
problems.
The recommendations on problems and issues raised
in this section are presented in later sections where they
are more fully developed.
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III. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
The problems in military intelligence identified by the
Joint Study Group fall roughly into two main categories --
Defense organization and field operations.
Department of Defense (DOD) Intelligence Organization
In attempting to visualize the future role of military
intelligence we note that increasingly powerful, sophisticated
and costly weapons systems of mass destruction are becoming
available to both the United States and the U.S.S.R. in such
quantities as to give each the capability of destroying the other
several times over. In such a confrontation, foreign intelli-
gence regarding a technological breakthrough has great
significance. Policy makers in government will rely increas-
ingly on intelligence to keep them apprised of enemy research
development and over-all capabilities, to insure sound decisions
on weapons systems. Moreover, intelligence must be so organ-
ized as to give advance warning of both general and limited
wars and be able effectively to support U. S. forces. Finally,
intelligence must avoid concentrating so exclusively on military
aspects of the power balance that it overlooks economic and politi-
cal aspects both of that balance and of the free world generally.
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The Joint Study Group believes that in the foreign intelli-
gence area a sense of great urgency must be brought to the study
of and planning for such a future. It is impressed with the need
to make far-reaching decisions now, without further delay, about
the kind of intelligence the United States must have -- its size,
mission, the resources to be devoted to it, and its organization.
To insure that intelligence will be equal to the great
demands placed upon it, it must be viewed as an integrated
program demanding an intense effort, closely coordinated planning,
and the allocation of resources in money and human skills com-
parable to weapons systems of the highest priority and on an
equal footing with them. In view of the importance of intelligence,
we believe the chiefs of the military intelligence services, as
well as those in commands and joint staffs, should have equal
position and rank to their operational counterparts.
More specifically, the kind of future suggested above
will pose for the DOD problems which have already begun to take
shape. For example, advanced technology is being applied
increasingly to intelligence and involves the expenditure of great
sums. In the collection of intelligence information, SAMOS is a
system which is expensive to develop and will continue to be
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expensive in operation. The management of this program will
involve serious and complicated decisions as to the extent and
nature of its use. The operational use of SAMOS will be
principally for intelligence and will involve additional outlays
for the rapid and efficient handling and processing of the data
collected. Two projected photo interpretation centers for
carrying on this work, one in CIA and one in the Air Force,
are now in the early stages of development. The difficulty is
that these agencies have been proceeding without sufficient
reference to each other. While the decisions on use of SAMOS
must be based on other than solely intelligence factors, the
community, probably operating through the USIB, should look
forward to having an important share in the responsibility. This
problem is discussed further in Section V.
In the data processing, storage and retrieval field there
is also great research and development activity. Most of it,
however, has been carried out along strictly departmental agency
lines, and while Defense-wide coordination is progressing under
the direction of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
coordination for community-wide compatibility is less satis-
factory. (See Section IX. )
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In addition to the problems of developing new intelligence
systems, there are difficult procurement decisions regarding the
modernization and replacement of obsolescent equipment involving
considerable cost. For example, United States Air Forces
Europe (USAFE) feels it needs to replace worn out and unsuitable
aircraft with C-130Bs for the collection of high-priority elec-
tronics intelligence (ELINT) data. United States Army Europe
(USAREUR) states that it is in great need of modern ELINT
equipment of all kinds but funds have not been allocated. Develop-
ment of a high performance aircraft which Naval Intelligence
believes it needs for an air platform for photography and signal
intelligence to fill an important intelligence need is not proceeding
because funds have not been allocated.
A continuing serious problem is the difficulty in arriving
at an accurate cost figure for intelligence for the reason that
there is no basis for comparability common to all three military
service departments. For example, funds for intelligence
activities and operations under the jurisdiction of the DOD have
been carried in some 19 appropriation accounts. As is pointed
out in Section VIII, this makes fiscal management very difficult.
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United States intelligence must be a community effort
in fact as well as name, which means that effective coordination
of intelligence as a truly national effort must be achieved. By
far the preponderant part of U. S. intelligence in terms of man-
power and money is that undertaken by the DOD. Great strides
toward a more closely integrated community would result from
improved intelligence coordination within the DOD.
It has been suggested to the Study Group that a positive
solution would be to establish one intelligence service for the
whole DOD, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.
Although this proposal has considerable merit, it is our view
that on balance it would be unwise to attempt such an integration
of intelligence activities so long as there are three military
services having specialized skills and knowledge.
Nonetheless, intelligence management within the DOD
must be organized in such a way as to provide adequately for
intelligence as a coordinated system of highest priority. Besides
increasing JCS responsibility in coordinating over-all defense
substantive matters, there is need to establish and maintain
cognizance of the over-all program in terms of resources of
manpower and money allocated, and to eliminate waste, duplication
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and inefficiency. For this there should be an authoritative focal
point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which should
also be the primary point of contact with the rest of the community.
Among the internal factors influencing U. S. military
intelligence is the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1958. In general, a process of evolution is taking place in
which the strengthened position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
in the command line from the Secretary of Defense is gradually
emerging.
However, it does not appear that the concept of the
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 has yet been fully realized
in the field of intelligence. Essentially the same general
methods and procedures for the control of intelligence opera-
tions and the exercise of intelligence responsibilities that existed
prior to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 are still in
effect today. In fact, intelligence activities of components of
unified and specified commands continue to be as responsive
as formerly to direction by the military departments.
It is clear from the concept of the Defense Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1958 that the JCS can logically assume direction or
control over such intelligence activities as are undertaken in
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support of the strategic mission of the JCS, whether they are
now being performed by the military service departments or
by unified and specified commands. However, it is not so
specifically stated in DOD directive #5100.1. Furthermore,
National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs)
charge the military departments with certain intelligence
responsibilities but fail to do the same regarding J-2 of the
JCS, indicating instead that the military service departments
produce that intelligence required by the JCS.
The JCS publication "Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF)" of 23 November 1959 implements DOD directive
#5100.1 and does not limit intelligence responsibilities of the
military departments to their departmental missions. Further,
departmental missions are not spelled out in sufficiently clear
and unmistakable terms, thereby furnishing latitude for inter-
preting specific intelligence operations and activities as being
in support of departmental missions. In this way the chain of
command is by-passed with resulting lack of coordination to
prevent overlap and duplication and achieve more effective
use of resources.
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It seems probable that the situation described above
cannot be positively corrected unless the relevant NSCIDs are
revised to assign authority and responsibility for military
intelligence activities to the Secretary of Defense who can in
turn allocate responsibilities to the services and JCS as he
sees fit.
Field Operations
In common with other national purposes, U. S. military
intelligence is strongly affected by external factors of major
importance. Foremost among these is the existence of the
cold war, a condition of neither peace nor war which imposes
enormous complications on military commanders who must
maintain, in a world nominally at peace, a posture of full war-
time readiness. Military commanders in these circumstances
quite naturally demand that their intelligence support give
absolute priority to the security of command and early warning.
The continued threat from an implacable and powerful
enemy is a factor which demands an intelligence effort sustained
at close to wartime intensity. The effectiveness of this effort
is limited by the formidable security system which it must
penetrate. The importance of U. S. intelligence operations in
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Berlin and in East Germany is emphasized by the fact that
operations there are considerably easier than elsewhere in
the bloc. Nevertheless, intelligence information is becoming
Increasingly hard to collect even there, and political considera-
tions sometimes further restrict intelligence activity. If the
United States is to be prepared, it must be assured of the best
possible flow of information about enemy strength, disposition,
combat readiness, science and technology, and probable
intentions in sufficient quantity and detail to support the com-
mander's mission.
It cannot be said with any assurance, short of the
actual event, that this flow of information is now sufficient
to provide the desirable warning and security of command,
or assuming that it is now sufficient, that it will not suddenly
dry up sometime in the future. Consequently, only the best
coordinated overt and clandestine efforts will suffice.
The Joint Study Group appreciates the desire of com-
manders to maintain control of intelligence assets which they
deem necessary to assure security of their commands. At the
same time, intelligence operations, particularly clandestine
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intelligence operations, must be closely coordinated not only
to insure efficient operation in meeting this military require-
ment which is recognized as being of high priority, but also
to prevent damage to other operations of high. importance and
to foreign policy objectives. These military intelligence
operations must also be consistent with the requirements of
national policy.
The Joint Study Group believes that a solution lies
in a new approach to coordination in the field. This is dis-
cussed at length in Section VII on Coordination. In brief, this
will involve an alteration of the CIA organization to the extent
that while day-to-day operating coordination would remain a
responsibility of CIA field stations, over-all organization and
planning coordination would be done separately.
For their part, the military intelligence services,
and particularly the Army, must increase their efforts to
improve clandestine capabilities. The Joint Study Group has
not been able to find any authoritative CIA opinion subscribing
to the belief that CIA should pre-empt clandestine operations
as its own exclusive province. There was abundant evidence
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of CIA opinion to the contrary: since the military services
will need to mount clandestine operations in time of war, the
time to develop and exercise the capability is now. Conse-
quently, it is especially important that the military services
raise the professionalism of their intelligence personnel, not
only to increase over-all responsiveness to the imperatives
of security of command and early warning, but to facilitate
coordination within the total U. S. effort and to prevent
compromise and loss of valuable assets.
Other field problems were encountered with respect
to counterintelligence, intelligence activities and organiza-
tion in international commands, security of U. S. classified
activities, and communications.
While considerable progress has been made by U. S.
and allied intelligence agencies to neutralize hostile intelli-
gence efforts against the United States, an even more effective
counterintelligence capability must be developed to meet the
threat. Recent disclosures of the extent and success of Soviet
espionage indicate that maximum effort is required to prevent
serious compromise of U. S. interests.
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The Joint Study Group recognizes the contribution the
military attache system makes to U. S. intelligence. We
believe that this contribution could be enhanced through the
adoption of more rigorous standards of selection, improved
briefing and indoctrination and intensified language training.
This is discussed in greater detail in Section V.
A related problem is the dissemination of intelligence
within the NATO command. Complications arise because of
varying standards of security among the allied nations.
The existence of NATO commands parallel with U. S.
commands generates difficulties in assigning authority and
missions for the various threats our alliance system must be
prepared to meet. The basic problem is that planners must
be prepared for either a NATO war or a U. S. war. This
problem is of critical importance for intelligence, because
of its supporting role both before and during hostilities.
The Joint Study Group is concerned about the Special
Security Officer (SSO) systems on two counts: the comparably
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We feel that the creation of the National Strategic
Targeting Planning Staff will make possible better utilization
of target intelligence, and we are hopeful that comparable
procedures will be developed for the coordination and utili-
zation of intelligence for tactical targeting purposes.
There is a great need for improvement in the role of
J-2 of the unified commands. The Joint Study Group believes
that positive coordination by J-2 of intelligence operations of
the component commands would do much to alleviate many
existing difficulties. We have in mind particularly the need
for coordination by the unified commands of intelligence train-
ing and operations, requirements, relations with non-military
intelligence agencies, and counterintelligence.
It is recommended that:
I. The Secretary of Defense take appropriate action
to bring the military intelligence organization within the
Department of Defense into full consonance with the con-
cept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Toward
this end:
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a. there should be established within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense a focal point for exerting
broad management review authority over military
intelligence programs, and providing over-all
coordination of all foreign intelligence activities
conducted by various Defense components.
b. the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
intelligence coordination and operations should be
strengthened in support of their assigned mission
by such means as:
(1) placing under Joint Chiefs of Staff control
increased intelligence resources to support its
strengthened authority;
(2) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
coordinate the intelligence views on substantive
intelligence matters within the Department of
Defense, notably for estimates;
(3) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
coordinate military intelligence requirements
(see recommendation no. 26 of Section VI);
(4) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
coordinate the intelligence activities of the unified
and specified commands and be the primary channel
to these commands for guidance and direction of
intelligence matters originating with the Depart-
ment of Defense. (see additional discussion and
recommendations on Section VII);
c. National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tives, Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of
Staff directives should be revised in accordance with
the above.
2. The increased intelligence resources required by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands should
be drawn from the existing resources of the military
departments and component commands as appropriate.
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3. Budgeting procedures for intelligence operations
and activities should be brought more closely under the
control of the Secretary of Defense, including clear
identification of the total intelligence costs throughout
all of the echelons and elements of the Department of
Defense.
4. Policies should be initiated that would permit more
rigorous selection and training of personnel assigned to
intelligence activities and operations (particularly mili-
tary attaches) and personnel so assigned should be given
position and rank comparable to their operational counter-
parts.
5. The military services should be encouraged to
maintain and develop a capability for clandestine intelli-
gence collection which would be carried out under the
coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence.
6. The Special Security Officer systems should:
a. avoid duplication of channels to non-military
consumers;
b. be staffed by personnel of rank commensurate
with a courier function;
c. avoid placing their own interpretation on
material transmitted by the Special Security Officer
systems.
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IV. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
The National Security Agency (NSA) is the Department
of Defense (DOD) Agency established by the Secretary of
Defense to carry out most of the responsibilities now assigned
to him by National Security Council Intelligence Directive
(NSCID) No. 6 as the executive agent of the government for
communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronics intelli-
gence (ELINT), as well as certain responsibilities in the
field of communications security. In order that NSA can
carry out both the COMINT and ELINT missions, the COMINT
and ELINT activities of the United States are placed under the
operational and technical control of the Director, NSA. The
exceptions to this policy are the clandestine COMINT and
ELINT activities delegated directly to unified and specified
commands by the Secretary of Defense.
Although the Joint Study Group appreciates the
fact that certain ELINT activities are essential to provide
direct support to the operations of unified and specified
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commands, it doubts whether the major portion of
DOD resources in this field, both in terms of money
and manpower, should be under their control. Such an
allocation of ELINT resources appears to militate
against the concept of an effective, unified organization
and control of U. S. ELINT activities.
The NSA has been given top-level support in
recent years, which has proved most helpful to the
COMINT effort. Ultimately, however, the contribution
of the Agency to the national security must inevitably
depend upon aggressive, dynamic leadership on the part
of the Director, NSA.
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V. COLLECTION - RESOURCES
For the purposes of this report we have divided the
collection of intelligence information into four major fields:
overt, signal intelligence, visual-aerial, and clandestine.
The principal collectors of overt intelligence infor-
mation are the diplomatic and consular officers of the United
States and the military and civilian attaches. Their reporting
is largely based upon official and non-official contacts,
general observation and research. Other overt sources
include the monitoring of open radio broadcasts, the
exploitation of foreign publications, and the interrogation
of defectors and refugees, all of which provide considerable
valuable information.
A secondary source for overt collection involves
United States business organizations and individual travellers
who receive or obtain information from abroad. Similarly
the East-West exchange program has provided the opportunity
to obtain some significant information in recent years.
The Study Group wishes to emphasize that the infor-
mation collected through overt means is the foundation of all
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intelligence and should not be neglected through over-
concentration on less conventional modes of collection.
We anticipate no change in this in the future.
While the Group recognizes the operational responsi-
bilities of the Foreign Service, it does believe that greater
utilization for intelligence purposes can be made of all
Foreign Service Officers serving abroad. This requires,
first of all, improved indoctrination on their role as overt
collectors of intelligence information. In addition, improved
language and area knowledge are essential if the intelligence
reporting of the Foreign Service is to be based on sufficient
depth and understanding of the country being reported on. The
Department of State has made commendable progress in recent
years in basic language training, but greater efforts are
needed to make reporting officers proficient in the language
of the country of their assignment.
At the embassies visited by the Group it was observed
that only those officers assigned to the political and economic
sections are used as intelligence information collectors.
Foreign Service Officers assigned to consular or administrative
duties are not encouraged to engage in intelligence information
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collection and, in fact, are without a reporting vehicle if
they should in the course of their assigned duties come into
the possession of useful information, although it is presumed
that in such an event the officer would pass the information
to the political section. The failure to utilize actively all
Foreign Service Officers as observers or overt intelligence
officers is unfortunate because, for example, consular
officers have contact with the foreign public constantly and
with people from all levels of society, be they government
officials, commercial people or other elements of the population.
The Joint Study Group recognizes the contribution the
military attache system makes to U. S. intelligence. We
believe that this contribution could be enhanced through the
adoption of more rigorous standards of selection, improved
briefing and indoctrination and intensified language training.
Especially in the larger embassies, we believe that the
service attaches should normally be officers with substantial
intelligence experience. In those cases where it is necessary
to assign as attaches officers with specialized experience
in fields other than intelligence, it is very important that
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they be given careful training and indoctination, as well
as clear-cut instructions, before assuming their attache
duties.
We found that briefing of attaches might profitably
concentrate more effort on the activities and relationships
of the embassies, with particular emphasis on ways in which
the attache can best contribute to the country team effort.
In activities apart from his military departmental duties,
the attache himself must come forward and make clear his
interest as well as the special areas of competence he can
bring to the affairs of the mission.
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One serious problem relating to signal intelligence,
but also present in the photographic intelligence field,
results from the security classification system currently
in use. Entirely apart from the well-known tendency
throughout the intelligence community to over-classify,
the special handling required for a very significant portion
of intelligence information has at times deprived key
personnel of information vital to the successful discharge
of their responsibilities. Among United States agencies,
practices vary regarding the granting of special intelli-
gence security clearances.
Even the National Indications Center (NIC) is
sometimes deprived of vital information on security
grounds, despite its assigned role of informing promptly
and fully top U. S. officials on critical events affecting the
national security. The NIC (in the Pentagon) is the central
point which is intended to receive, analyze and transmit
all-source information which may indicate hostile intentions
anywhere in the world. It is staffed by USIB repre-
sentatives and provides intelligence support to the Watch
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Committee, an inter-agency body which publishes a weekly
summary of available information related to the imminence
of hostilities. The extreme importance of these activities
is self-evident. Despite this fact, the Study Group observed
that the NIC on occasion has had to resort to informal
channels and personal contacts to obtain vital information.
A third major source of foreign intelligence is
photographic and other visual-aerial observation. This
is probably the most precise form of intelligence collection,
inasmuch as photographs provide accurate information.
The U-2 program provided what was probably the greatest
amount of valuable information obtainable from any single
source, and the Study Group heard consistent requests
that this program or something similar to it be resumed
at the earliest possible date. The possibilities of aerial
observations from missiles and satellites were examined
and while they have substantial potentialities for the
future, left the impression that accuracy similar to that
of the U-2 will not be obtained for some time.
The Study Group has spent many hours discussing
the problem of processing and interpreting aerial photography
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for intelligence purposes. The CIA., with the active
participation of the Army and the Navy, is administering
an expanding operation which is now in effect a photographic
intelligence center of common concern. However, this
center is still operated today on the basis of informal
arrangements originating at the time of the U-2 which
could be terminated at any time. The Air Force (including
the Strategic A.ir Command) has extensive photographic
processing facilities involving several times the number
of personnel now at the CIA center. Formal understandings
should be reached soon as to the respective roles of CIA
and the Air Force in the photography field to insure that
maximum intelligence value will be extracted at reasonable
cost from the new sources of photography now being developed,
particularly SAMOS.
There is agreement within the community that when
the raw film is chemically processed, the photography should
be distributed immediately to all parties of interest. There
is also agreement in most of the community that a central
photographic intelligence center of common concern should
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be established. Opinions vary, however, as to (a) how
much interpretation and analysis should take place at
such a center, and (b) who should run it.
It is the consensus of the Study Group that a photo-
graphic center of common concern should be established.
It would be responsible for rapid identification of items of
intelligence interest and achieving a quick initial inter-
departmental evaluation of important items.
Personnel of the center representing different parts
of the community would jointly examine the photography,
using collateral information as necessary, only up to the
point where the objects in the picture had been definitely
identified. Based on such identification, the center would
then distribute its initial identification, together with related
collateral information supporting the identification, to
interested parts of the community for more detailed
interpretation by specialists 4J
ioth.14.1&1--
The most difficult problems to determine whether
CIA or the Department of Defense should run such a center.
If the decision is to be based on probable developments in
the near future plus the assumption (which may be invalid)
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that this photography will provide reliable and timely
early warning intelligence, then a strong case can be made
to locate the center in the Department of Defense. It can
be argued that responsibilities of the JCS or the Air Force
for instant retaliation are such that early warning intelli-
gence resources should be under its direct control. Further-
more, various elements of the Department of Defense have
photographic centers anyway in connection with targeting
activities and other related needs, thus suggesting that
it may be more economical for the DOD or the JCS to run
the center. From another point of view, possible
Congressional reaction to further major increases in
CIA's budget suggests caution in expanding CIA's operational
responsibilities beyond current levels.
On the other hand, strong doubts have been expressed
as to whether, for example, SAMOS would provide enough
reliable and significant early warning information to justify
the very high cost of collecting and processing photography
at frequent intervals for the same areas. Regardless of
who runs the center, the Strategic Air Command would
receive the raw take immediately for a quick screening
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for early warning indications. Second, use of high-level
aerial photography to date has shown that, while it provides
intelligence information of high operational value to the
Air Force, it also provides vital information for other
members of the community. Future photography from
sources such as SAMOS will even concern others besides
the Air Force for it will cover the globe and thus provide
intelligence information of general value to the entire com-
munity, and requiring collateral information for analysis
which is available only at the seat of government. Third,
CIA has already demonstrated its ability to run an inter-
agency photographic center.
The Joint Study Group believes that a decision on
the executive direction of such a center should be determined
by consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense and thereafter a new National
Security Council Intelligence Directive issued.
The last form of collection is that by clandestine means
through espionage and counterespionage. This, however, is
one of the most difficult forms of collection and requires a
considerable expenditure of manpower carefully trained
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We doubt that the military services will or can
achieve the needed level of clandestine operational
competence without instituting something resembling a
career intelligence service. This does not mean that an
officer's service should be confined exclusively to intelli-
gence assignments but that he be returned regularly to
such assignments in accordance with a constantly broadening
career plan. The return periodically to general duty
assignments is essential to keep the officer in touch with
the over-all mission of his service and its needs for
intelligence. This arrangement in the military intelligence
service should of course be supplemented by their use of
career civilians.
The CIA has developed a good training system, and
we feel that its facilities and training courses should be
made available to all, agencies running clandestine operations.
We do not think that the CIA has any trade secrets which
should be hidden from other U. S. clandestine agencies
and urge a mutual sharing of the skills, experiences and
operational knowledge by all concerned. The military
services should eventually discontinue their own clandestine
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training programs. In such combined training courses,
personnel from different agencies could gain common
understanding which would facilitate later cooperation.
In the opinion of the Study Group, the CIA relies
too heavily on
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our concern is more with quality than with quantity of
information. Accordingly, we feel that having a reliable
source in the right place at the right time is more
essential than developing a regular flow of low priority
information.
Considering the effort expended in obtaining it, we
believe that intelligence obtained through CIA liaison with
foreign intelligence services is most worthwhile and should
be encouraged. We see in these liaisons an extension of
our foreign intelligence coverage with savings in human
and material resources.
The Joint Study Group gained the impression that
too little attention is paid to counterintelligence and security
efforts. The Department of State has worked extensively
in the field of technical and physical security. In the
premises occupied by U. S. personnel overseas the appli-
cation of standards of physical security is weak. Likewise,
efforts to indoctrinate personnel in security precautions
were inadequate.
One of the difficulties confronting security is its
high cost. Bluntly put, good security costs money.
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The Study Group did learn that the agencies concerned
are now endeavoring to improve their security through
more frequent "sweeps", better equipment and secure
communications rooms; we urge continuation of these
efforts.
We were impressed in several instances by the
intensity and scope of Communist efforts to penetrate U. S.
classified operations overseas. In some cases studies
on this subject are neglected; in others, known facts
appear to be disregarded. We doubt that clandestine
operations will ever reach the desired level of effective-
ness without more stress on counterespionage; in this field
the Director of Central Intelligence should focus more
positive attention on this problem through the United States
Intelligence Board. Lacking this, many operations will
continue to be "blown", almost before they get started.
It is recommended that:
11. The Department of State place greater emphasis
on intelligence responsibilities in the indoctrination
of its personnel.
12. Military departments should concentrate more
effort on career management by developing programs
of constantly broadening assignments in intelligence
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for qualified and specifically designated officers,
which will gain the benefits of a career intelligence
service without isolating the officer from contact
with the general mission of his service and its
operations.
1.3. The Central Intelligence Agency should open
its clandestine training facilities to other agencies
as a service of common concern.
14. The United States Intelligence Board should
review existing compartmentation of sensitive infor-
mation with a view to achieving more uniform practices
and ensuring that essential security safeguards do not
result in vital information being withheld from officials
and organizations with urgent national security responsi-
bilities.
15. The United States Intelligence Board should
review the situation in the National Indications Center
to determine the adequacy and level of its staffing and
to assure that all information pertinent to the National
Indications Center's mission (including highly classified
and sensitive information now withheld) will be trans-
mitted to the Center promptly on its receipt.
16. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence should consult preparatory to the
early preparation of a new National Security Council
Intelligence Directive designed to provide authority and
assign responsibility for the establishment of a National
Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC).
17. The Central Intelligence Agency should place
more emphasis on the establishment of unofficial cover
throughout the world.
18. The Director of Central Intelligence should focus
community attention on the important area of counter-
intelligence and security of overseas personnel and
installations and assign responsibility for periodic reports
to the United States Intelligence Board.
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20. The Central Intelligence Agency should increase
intelligence support to unified and component com-
manders by direct dissemination of all information
reports from pertinent field stations.
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/"(rI. REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION
Present Procedures
The Joint Study Group is concerned with the inade-
quacy of current mechanisms within the intelligence com-
munity for the guidance of collection efforts by selective
levying of requirements, and subsequent evaluation of the
intelligence generated by these requests for information.
While we acknowledge that considerable decentralized effort
is being expended by the various departments and agencies in
these fields, we believe that the effort is frustrated through
lack of coordination and that the total personnel assigned to
this work is excessive in relation to the results achieved.
Within the intelligence community in Washington
there exists no single general requirements system, and no
single place where an analyst or agency may determine if
needed information has already been collected and how it
may be located for exploitation, or if a requirement for the
same information is outstanding on the part of an analyst from
a second agency, although some approximation exists in
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Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Office of Central
Reference. This same lack of central reference exists
in the field.
In Washington, the three military intelligence
organizations and J-2 maintain separate units for the co-
ordination of requirements and evaluation of intelligence
reports. There is no place within the Department of Defense
for centralized reviewing and screening or for the coordina-
tion of all military requirements.
Each military intelligence organization prepares and
issues to its field collectors its own guide-type collection
manuals, statements of interest, long-range requirements
and ad hoc requests for information. In general, each mili-
tary intelligence organization does its own evaluation of reports
received from its field collection effort.
The same situation prevails within CIA notwithstand-
ing the existence of the Office of Central Reference, which
was created for the purpose of centralizing and coordinating
all Agency requirements. Each major component of CIA
maintains its own requirements office as well as requirements
personnel at division and branch levels. Requirements for
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clandestine collection by CIA are included in general terms
in their country "Related Mission Directives". These
requirements are developed by the Interagency Clandestine
Collection Priorities Committee (IPC). These country
directives are supplemented by ad hoc requirements as
necessary.
Requirements levied on the National Security Agency
(NSA) and the service cryptologic agencies are controlled
by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) through its
communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronics
intelligence (ELINT) committees. Additional specific re-
quirements are passed to NSA for collection through NSA's
requirements unit which maintains liaison with other members
of the USIB for this purpose.
Requirements within the Department of State are
coordinated on a geographical basis by the various policy
desk officers through whom flow all requirements to the
respective embassies and consulates. An Intelligence Col-
lection Division within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
coordinates all formal requirements from or to other mem-
bers of the intelligence community and coordinates interagency
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evaluations of Foreign Service reporting. The same
organization prepares country statements of guidance
for each embassy or principal post as an aid to
political, sociological, scientific, and in some instances
economic reporting. Owing to the Department of State's
extra burden of responsibility to the numerous other non-
intelligence departments active in the economic field,
economic requirements on countries outside the Sino-
Soviet bloc are handled by a special division of the Depart-
ment, the Foreign Reporting Staff. This staff coordinates
economic intelligence requirements of the community into
the Current Economic Reporting Program. It thus does
program planning for the economic collection effort, and
coordinates community evaluations of Foreign Service
economic reporting.
In the main, each department or agency involved
in intelligence collection formulates its own specific and
general requirements based primarily on its needs to meet
its production responsibility on its own behalf and on behalf
of the community. These requirements may be divided into
standing, serial, or ad hoc requirements, and are sent to
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the field in the form of guide-type all-inclusive shopping
lists requesting basic information about a country or
subject, or more selective but still general "statements of
interest" or, as last mentioned, as special requests for
information. The following lists the various standing and
serial-type requirements publications of the member agencies
of USIB involved in the collection of foreign intelligence; i. e. ,
requirements chiefly of the comprehensive guide-line type.
Air Force
Priority Air Intelligence Requirements (PAIR)
1 - Soviet Missiles and Astronautics (99 pp.)
2 - Soviet Long-Range Aviation (66 pp.)
3 - Soviet Air Defense System (20 pp.)
4 - Geodetic Data (9 pp.)
Current Air Intelligence Requirements (CAIR)
1 - USSR-European Satellites; Communist China (78 pp.)
1 - Supplement on Communist China (170 pp.)
2 - Western Europe; Middle East; Africa (67 pp.)
3 - Southeast Asia and Pacific (34 pp.)
4 - Western Hemisphere (47 pp.)
Intelligence Collection Guidance Manual - Electronics (178 pp.)
Soviet-Satellite Electronics Equipment Identification
Guide (175 pp.)
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Army
Department of the Army Intelligence Plan (DAIP) (17 pp.)
Department of the Army Long-Range Intelligence
Requirements (DALRIR) (171 pp.)
Navy
U. S. Navy Intelligence Collection Instructions (42 pp.)
Naval Intelligence Requirements -- Periodic Summary (102 pp.)
Navy Intelligence Requirements Memorandum No. 100
(priority intelligence requirements on the Soviet Navy (30 pp.)
Port Collection Guides (12 pp.)
State Department
Foreign Service Manual (191 pp. of which 98 are on intelligence)
Current Economic Reporting Program (25 & 30 pp.)
Central Intelligence Agency
Requirements for Clandestine Collection in Support of
Priority National Intelligence Objectives (78 pp.)
Intelligence Collection Guides (on special subjects) (35 & 7 pp.)
Periodic Reporting List on Current Intelligence Require-
ments (114 pp.)
National Intelligence Survey Standard Instructions (73 pp.)
Joint Publications
Coast and Landing Beach Intelligence (jointly produced by
Army and 1sTayy1 IA? 111")
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Evaluation of reports is closely tied to collection
requirements because evaluations serve as encouragement
to the collector, as well as a form of guidance. Raw intelli-
gence reports are evaluated by Washington end-users on a
request basis and provide a spot-check of the usefulness of
the reports. However, collectors feel that there are too few
evaluations of their reports. On the other hand, consumers
find the task of evaluating reports burdensome and time
In any event, the present decentralized system
for the evaluation of field reports fails to provide an adequate
means for an over-all assessment of the responsiveness of
field collectors to levied requirements or to the quality of the
information submitted.
Finished intelligence is evaluated in a more systematic
manner. The Board of National Estimates conducts periodic
reviews or post-mortems on National Intelligence Estimates,
including assessments as to gaps in existing information.
These post-mortems are in turn reviewed by the USIB. Some
of the USIB committees also evaluate intelligence in specific
areas. A generally useful committee in this regard has been
the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC), which
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not only analyzes capabilities for intelligence collection,
but also actually stimulates collection mechanisms,
primarily in the field of missiles.
The Role of USIB
The USIB as an important part of its responsi-
bility for managing the national intelligence effort is charged
with the establishment of appropriate intelligence objectives,
requirements and priorities. One of the principal means by
which the USIB meets this responsibilities is its annual state-
ment of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNI0s)
which set forth specific subjects "requiring priority atten-
tion and effort". The introduction to the PNIOs states,
"...the following list of Priority National Intelligence Ob-
jectives is established as a guide for the coordination of in-
telligence collection and production".* The nature of these
objectives is importantly qualified in the same introduction:
"Although a given subject may be Listed as a matter of
priority, not every bit of information relating to it will be
required with equal urgency and some may be procurable
by routine means. It is therefore incumbent upon research
personnel to exercise discrimination in allocating analytical
*Underlining added
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resources and in formulating information requirements so
as to accord priority only to those aspects of the listed
subject which actually require a priority research or col-
lection effort". Again, in identifying the criteria for
selecting these objectives, the Directive states: "Most of
the intelligence required in the formulation and execution
of national security policy will be the product of normal
intelligence collection and research. Priority National In-
telligence Objectives should be limited to those critical
factors which require special attention and effort". It is
clear that the PNIOs are not intended to replace or exclude
broad regular coverage of the world. Indeed, the PNIOs
would be ineffective without such background.
The Group found that these limitations on the ap-
plication of the PNIOs as stated are not generally under-
stood. It is worth noting at this point that one of the diffi-
culties observed by the Group was a tendency among collect-
ing units to concentrate heavily upon some central area of
concern at the expense of matters within their responsibility
which, although of minor interest to them, are yet of high
priority value to one or more other agencies. This finding
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combined with the tendency to give exclusive authority to
the PNIOs has had serious effects in distorting the
collection of intelligence information. It is common
practice for individual requirements prepared and levied
through the decentralized mechanisms described above to
claim a priority derived directly from the PNI0s. The
main complaint of this practice is that a requirement
related to a "first priority" objective is not necessarily
more important in itself than another requirement related
to a "second priority" objective. Further, it is illogical
to suppose that every single item of information has an
importance proportionate to the importance of the priority
objective on which it bears, however remotely. It should
be noted that USIB likewise has responsibilities in the field
of evaluation under the provisions of NSCID No. 1, that it
shall "Ensure that the pertinence, extent and quality of the
available foreign intelligence and intelligence information
relating to the national security is continually reviewed
as a basis for improving the quality of intelligence and
the correction of deficiencies".
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Certain committees of the USIB devote considerable
time and attention to coordination of collection requirements
on specific subjects or in reference to special types of col-
lection organizations. These include the Economic Intelligence
Committee, the Scientific Intelligence Committee, the Guided
Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Critical
Collection Problems Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee, the ELINT and COMINT, and the Inter-
agency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committees.
Field Coordination
In addition to the above mechanisms for the coordination
of requirements at the Washington level, we noted that each of
the commands in Europe has personnel attempting to coordinate
requirements of the command, requirements received from
Washington, and requests received from other field organizations.
In the embassies visited, the Joint Study Group found
no arrangements in existence for the coordination of all col-.
lection requirements. At no one point within the embassies could
anyone see the complete requirements picture relating to the
country in question. Each of the several agencies represented
in the various embassies handles its own requirements and
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determines for itself whether or not coordination of a given
requirement or program is desirable.
Outstanding Problems
At the Washington level and in the field the Joint Study
Group found numerous problems in the requirements field.
Most are predicated on the lack of central coordination of re-
quirements. The difficulties include some general to the com-
munity at large and others relating to the individual departments
and agencies.
Requirements in general are not sufficiently tailored to
collection assets or resources. It is all well and good to indicate
in basic collection guides a need for the minutes of Presidium
meetings in the Kremlin, but beyond this basic level it is im-
practical to issue requirements for unobtainable information. An
urgent need in the intelligence community today is a much closer
correlation between requirements or needs and collection re-
sources. (See also Section V)
Another general problem is that too often requests
for collection are duplicative, incomplete relative to
community needs, are scattered out to collectors in
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excessive numbers, and too often are without indication
of priority in relation to other outstanding require-
ments of the same general urgency. Field collectors
are anxious to have less requirements, clearer indi-
cation of priority, and more precise requirements.
The unilateral production by the departments and agencies
of collection requirements guides causes further dupli-
cation and excessive numbers of outstanding requirements.
The Department of State is relatively small in
size compared to the other departments and agencies
interested in intelligence collection, and perhaps for this
reason is without serious problems in the requirements
field. The other departments and agencies are not as
fortunate. The Department of Defense has the most people
involved in intelligence and its collection means are the
most diverse among all the members of the USIB, compris-
ing the overt reporting of service attaches and commands,
the clandestine reporting of the three services, and the
signal intelligence effort.
A serious problem exists in the form of barriers
erected between signal intelligence and other forms of
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intelligence. While we recognize the need to protect
communications intelligence, we feel there is need.
for closer integration of signal intelligence require-
ments and evaluation with those of the rest of the
community.
The levying of requirements within the
Department of Defense largely follows patterns that
existed before the Department of Defense Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1958 -- individual mil:itary departments
levy them directly on their overseas components.
There has not yet emerged, pursuant to this
reorganization, a fully established program either
within the JCS or The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) for the development of requirements designed
to support their presently assigned missions, in part
because, as has been pointed out in Section III, the
NSCIDs have not been appropriately readjusted. There
is also no mechanism within the JCS or the OSD for
reviewing and managing military service requirements
which would serve both to assure the most efficient
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utilization of military intelligence resources and
to provide support for JCS and OSD over-all missions.
The Joint Study Group notes the duplication
of requirements levied on military intelligence collectors.
This can be traced to the absence of over-all coordination
within DOD. We have credible information from the DOD
that duplication exists in the areas of space, electronics,
geodesy, nuclear weapons and missiles; among unified
commands there is some duplication in serving requirements
regarding armed forces, missiles and scientific and technical
intelligence; this situation exists both with regard to require-
ments and reporting in political, sociological and economic
areas; among component commands there is duplication in
levying requirements for counterintelligence, guided missiles,
logistics, mapping, scientific and technical, transportation
and telecommunications.
CIA's main requirements problem, as might
be expected, relates to clandestine collection and con-
cerns the great number of requirements served on the
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Agency without benefit of screening to determine
priority or the necessity for clandestine collection.
One of the reasons this problem exists is CIA's own
failure to insist that its customers use the machinery
established to handle the problem, and use it properly.
The IPC is supposed to determine the essential
foreign information requirements whose fulfillment
necessitates clandestine collection. The USIB specifies
that these requirements must be of such a nature that
they cannot normally be covered by non-clandestine
collection methods. The committee is required to pre-
pare requirements lists and to provide special guidance
to CIA to meet unusual, critical or emergency situations.
Each member of the USIB has a member on the IPC, and
these individuals are expected to pay particular attention
to requirements submitted by their respective depart-
ments and agencies for clandestine collection.
One deficiency is that although there is no geo-
graphic limitation in the charter of the IPC, it has limited
its activities to the Sino-Soviet bloc and has left require-
ments for clandestine collection by CIA in other parts
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of the world to be handled on a bilateral basis be-
tween CIA and each of its customers.
With respect to the IPC lists, some participants
believe that their interests are not properly represented
on the lists because they have been unable to get com-
munity agreement on the priority they desire. They have
in consequence too often attempted to short circuit the
procedures.
We believe that the key to this problem is a
more active and across-the-board use of a coordinating
mechanism. In addition, it would improve the effici-
ency of all clandestine collection if the same mechanism
also addressed itself to the requirements levied on the
clandestine collection elements of the military services.
Clandestine requirements too often reflect a failure
to recognize the relatively long period of time required
to recruit, train and place an agent. Requirements for
clandestine collection are most effective when they are
geared into planned operational programs. Ideally, the
customer should indicate a target area long enough in
advance to permit the development of an asset, but should
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refrain at that time from flooding channels with useless
detailed requests regarding that area. Only when an
agent is in place is it time to come forward with
specific requirements which can then be tailored to the
asset.
While there remain some instances of dupli-
cative activity in a given field of collection, the Group
found none that could not be cured by normal coordination.
One case deserves special mention. Both State and CIA
do overt political reporting, and there is an overlap
between them. The Group found, however, that as part
of State Department's adjustment to the growth of CIA
Another problem is the large number of require-
ments that results from the inclusion in general collection
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guides of everything that everybody wants to know. Ideally
such statements of interest might better be called "programs"
and the word requirement reserved for short-term specific
ad hoc questions. In any case, while some such program-
matic statements are needed for general training and orderly
planning, it should be possible to reduce the number and
overlap of these guides. We believe that all collection
requirements manuals should be integrated into a compatible
series of coordinated guides. Further, the Group urges
the creation of integrated requirements guides which on a
country-by-country basis would set forth the specific col-
lection requirements and responsibilities of each department
and agency concerned.
Although departmental production and collection
responsibilities have been allocated in terms of subject,
geographic and functional, such as world military, or Soviet
bloc economic, there cuts across this allocation an overlay
of requirements labelled with the term "departmental".
This term is frequently interpreted to include everything
a department decides to be necessary or desirable to
support its mission. It should be clearly understood that
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departmental intelligence must lie within the subject fields
allocated to the departments by the NSCIDs. At the present
time these subject fields need to be more clearly defined
by the NSCIDs especially in the military areas. A depart-
ment's collection efforts should normally be confined to
those subject fields so allocated to it.
The Joint Study Group believes that the described
individual efforts of the members of the intelligence
community to handle their own requirements and evalu.a-
tions are inadequate to properly coordinate the collection
activities of the community, and that the USIB must, as
a part of its management responsibility, require that
coordination be done on a community-wide basis, both at
the Washington level and in the field.
At the Washington level, we believe that there
should be a central body for reviewing requirements,
manned by top quality experts from the intelligence com-
munity representing all the agencies which either produce
intelligence reports or collect intelligence information.
This would in effect become a central clearing house for
the most effective tying together of all requests for
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information with all resources for collecting that information.
We recognize that this is a large undertaking and therefore
suggest that its development be evolutionary. We would
suggest that such a center for the time being concern itself
with collection by clandestine and signal intelligence assets.
In such a center the agencies would endeavor to
identify their assets in the collection fields indicated and
to select or stimulate relevant requirements. Therefore,
this center would concern itself basically with two aspects
of collection: first, modification and correlation of the
basic collection guides; second, the handling of current
requirements. The collection resources would be tabu-
lated on performance. There would also be a tabulation of
relevant requirements. We would suggest that an inter-
agency clearing house be established representing each of
the collection and production agencies, which would review
all requirements when received and determine which collection
medium is best adapted to satisfy the requirement Such a
facility using available resources should reduce the number
of personnel engaged in requirements work.
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Such a center should be very closely tied in to the
CIA Office of Central Reference (OCR) in which there should
be a record of all of the information collected through intelli-
gence media. The first effort of such a clearing house
would naturally be to check the available information in OCR
and the usual public repositories and insure that the required
information is not already available in Washington.
In order to insure that the center be kept apprised
of new assets and be informed about every form of col-
lection resources, it should be manned by high-level, ex-
perienced and fully cleared professionals from each agency.
These professionals should be thoroughly acquainted with
all of the collection resources of their respective organizations
to assure that their requirements are not unnecessarily directed
to other agencies. Consequently, it would be most important
that they spend a considerable amount of their time with their
own agency as well as in the center. Finally all collection
requirements in the indicated fields should be screened by
the center prior to issuance to the collectors.
We believe that the center should be responsible
for reporting to USIB any failure to act upon assigned
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requirements. Finally, the proposed clearing house would
develop data on collection that would assist USIB in carrying
out its assigned management responsibility.
We strongly urge that the USIB in its annual
evaluation of community effort prepared for the NSC pay
specific attention to collection. This evaluation might be
associated with periodic evaluation at embassy and command
level of collection requirements and collection assets.
It is recommended that:
21. The United States Intelligence Board es-
tablish a central requirements facility, initially
to coordinate all requirements levied for clandestine
and signal intelligence collection, and if successful,
subsequently expand its operations to other types
of requirements. Personnel assigned to this facility
should be drawn from existing requirements personnel
of the member agencies.
22. The new central requirements facility use
the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Central
Reference as its reference facility.
23. The United States Intelligence Board establish
a program for the integration of all collection require-
ments manuals into a compatible series of coordinated
guides; likewise, the creation of integrated require-
ments guides on a country-to-country basis setting
forth the specific collection requirements and responsi-
bilities of each department and agency concerned.
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24. The chief of mission or principal officer
in each overseas area should be given affirmative
responsibility for coordination of all overt and
clandestine intelligence requirements concerning
that area.
25. The United States Intelligence Board in
its annual evaluation of community effort prepared
for the National Security Council pay specific
attention to collection, and request similar evalua-
tion from each chief of mission and military command.
26. All military requirements at the Washington
level be coordinated by the Department of Defense
so as to prevent duplication or concentration on.
low priority targets.
27. Chiefs of mission and the Central Intelligence
Agency chiefs of station arrange for political infor-
mation overtly acquired to be transferred to the
mission's political section for transmission as ap-
propriate to Washington.
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VII. COORDINATION
Basic Philosophy
Much effective coordination has been accomplished in
the dozen years that the intelligence community has existed
as a recognized entity. The Study Group finds, however,
that two major elements of misunderstanding and confusion
in regard to the philosophy of coordination have impeded and
continue seriously to impede the growth of much needed
further coordination. There is, on the one hand, no common
understanding of how coordination should be achieved. On
the other hand, there has been a lack of clarity regarding
the relation of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
and of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the responsi-
bilities of coordination. Finally, throughout the government
the philosophy of coordination ranges from a concept of
command to one of persuasion.
Confusion over how coordination should be achieved
arises in large part because many people see need for a
different degree of coordination in the clandestine field as
compared with most other areas of intelligence activity.
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Thus, the term "centralized direction" appears in No. 5
alone among the National Security Council Intelligence
Directives (NSCIDs). Although in that directive, the term
is equated with coordination, the Study Group sees no reason
to doubt that coordination in the clandestine field should be
more mandatory than in other fields. The Group feels
that while "centralized direction" by the DCI cannot mean
outright command in relation to the intelligence activities of
independent departments, coordination should tend toward
"direction" in clandestine intelligence, and focus more on
leadership, initiative and cooperative action elsewhere.
We feel that adequate coordination can be achieved
by the coordinator following the list of principles below:
1) Leadership in developing and adapting new intelli-
gence programs;
2) Initiative in identifying problem areas and
instances of duplicate effort or missing effort;
3) Investigation of these problem areas, if necessary
through use of the right to survey intelligence activities;
4) Solution of these problems to the extent possible
by agreed cooperative action of relevant parties under
leadership of the coordinator;
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5) Recommendation of solutions to higher authority
when common agreement is not promptly forthcoming, with
indication of the position of the various parties.
The Joint Study Group is confident that if all members
of the intelligence community were to become convinced
that the coordinative authority envisaged in the basic laws
of the community were of the above nature much of the
reluctance and apprehension that now remain would disappear.
If one obstacle to full development of coordination has
been uncertainty about the nature of coordination itself, the
second major obstacle has been uncertainty about the nature
of the coordinator. There is, of course, no doubt anywhere
that the coordinator is and must be the Director of Central
Intelligence. The media through which he is to practice
coordination are less clear. The Joint Study Group is aware
that the Director of Central Intelligence has several responsi-
bilities, one of which is to command the CIA, and another is
to coordinate foreign intelligence activities both within and
outside the CIA.
We have given lengthy consideration to the possible
separation of the role of the DCI from that of the head of the CIA.
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This separation could be accomplished in two different ways;
first, by separating the DCI and a. small staff of personnel
assistant; second, by separating the DCI plus estimating,
current intelligence and planning and coordination staffs.
Such a separation would eliminate objections raised
to an arrangement whereby the DCI commands one of the
agencies he is responsible for coordinating. Furthermore,
through such separation the DCI could spend more time on
coordinating foreign intelligence activities.
Although the potential advantages outlined above for
separation are impressive, such a step has a number of dis-
advantages. The President could no longer look to one man
to brief him across the board on intelligence and covert action
matters. Furthermore, if the DCI were separated as proposed,
there is the danger that he and his staff would tend to get out
of touch with the practical operational problems of the com-
munity. In addition, if he is assisted by only a small
staff, he may in fact be able to achieve less coordination of
the community than is possible under present conditions. It
is also possible that the result would be that the DCI would
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end up with a large staff but with little or no offsetting
reductions in CIA or elsewhere in the community. Finally,
it is noted that such a separation would require a change in
the basic law for the CIA.
The Study Group feels that included in this report are
recommended actions which should help to eliminate objections
to the present organization arrangements for the DCI. For
example, it is proposed that the DCI use a staff drawn from
the entire community and attached directly to his office to
assist him in his coordinating purposes. Corrective actions
are recommended which lead to resolution of the Army-CIA.
dispute over clandestine collection.
In summary, the Joint Study Group feels that the
actions recommended in this report should go a long way
toward removing impediments to the success of the present
arrangement, and should be given a fair trial. If after a
reasonable period of time the role of the DCI is still in
question, then serious consideration should be given to
complete separation of the DCI from CIA.
However, the representative of the Secretary of Defense
on the Joint Study Group does not agree with the above views
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and believes that some of the arguments against separation of
the DCI and the CIA are invalid. He would note that the present
system has been in existence for ten years and has failed
to achieve proper coordination. He would recommend making
a separation at this time, in accordance with the second
alternative proposed above.
The fact is and has been that the DCI has used elements
of the CIA as instruments of community coordination. Since
August of 1957 he has had a staff of three officers within the
CIA charged with improving coordination within the national
intelligence effort which has worked primarily on the revision
of the NSCIDs and their implementing Director of Central
Intelligence Directives (DCIDs), but has been unable to
devote any major effort to day to day coordination in the
intelligence community. Furthermore, the community has
never had occasion to look upon this staff as anything other
than a part of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Clearly from the first the CIA has been engaged in
coordination. To take one of the conspicuously successful
examples, the work of the Office of National Estimates (ONE)
in coordinating community knowledge and views in the
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National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) is surely one of the
activities that derives from the Agency's specific responsi-
bility under the National Security Act of 1947. The CIA
chairmanship of a large proportion of the United States
Intelligence Board (USIB) committees is another aspect of
the same recognized responsibility.
At headquarters just as in the field, this essential
coordinating activity of the CIA has meant that the other
agencies found themselves being coordinated by an organi-
zation which from time to time appeared as a vigorous
competitor of theirs. In the process of developing the
agreed areas of action, the CIA has also raised apprehensions
in other agencies. It does appear that some of the assigned
functions of CIA have been expanded to the point where there
is overlap with the activities of other agencies, e. g.,
collection of overt political information, production of
certain technical publications. In all fairness it should be
noted that some of these CIA activities were originally
requested by other agencies or were mounted to fill gaps.
In considering this situation as of the present and
future, the Joint Study Group concludes that the community
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has by now matured, and has reached an understanding of
functional responsibilities sufficiently stable to permit a
frank facing of the problems involved. In consequence the
Joint Study Group believes that there are two kinds of
coordination which can be practiced separately. Although
the familiar operating elements under both the Deputy
Director/Plans and the Deputy Director/Intelligence of
the CIA must more than ever look upon their substantive
relations with the community as factors in over-all coordi-
nation, there is need for a different unit, apart from the
CIA operations and which, responding immediately to the
DCI may work on major problems that arise in the over-all
management of the community. It is these prospects that are
discussed in this section.
Directives
The duties assigned by Congress to the CIA under
the National Security Act of 1947 and by the National Security
Council (NSC) to the DCI and the USIB under the provisions of
NSCID No. 1, are for the declared purpose of coordinating
the intelligence activities of the several departments and
agencies in the interest of national security.
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In the preamble of NSCID No. 1, the NSC enunciates
the philosophy that the intelligence effort of the United States
is a national responsibility; that it must be organized and
managed; that it must achieve maximum exploitation of the
available resources of the Government; and that it must
satisfy the intelligence requirements of the NSC, and of
the departments and agencies of the Government. To realize
these intentions, the Directives set forth a basic purpose
of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
departments and agencies, and to accomplish this basic
purpose the NSC has provided for a variety of actions and
conditions which are all a part of and equally essential to
the achievement of effective coordination:
Coordination in terms of a specific action responsi-
bility -- "The Director of Central Intelligence shall
coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States...." (NSCID No. 1, paragraph 1.)
Coordination in terms of the governmental framework
in which it shall be accomplished -- "To maintain the relation-
ship necessary for a fully coordinated intelligence community
and to provide for a more effective integration of and guidance
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to the national intelligence effort, a United States Intelligence
Board (USIB) is hereby established under the directives of
the National Security Council and under the chairmanship of
the Director of Central Intelligenc:e. " (NSCID No. 1,
paragraph 2. a.)
Coordination in terms of corporate participation in
the development of rules and procedures -- NSCIDs are to
be based upon recommendations made to the Council by the
DCI, in each case indicating the concurrence or non-concurring
views of those members of the USIB concerned; detailed
implementation of the NSCIDs is provided for by the DCIDs,
which have been agreed to by the USIB under the same
procedures as are used for resolving the content of the
NSCIDs. The DCI may issue them unless a dissenting member
requests referral to the NSC. (NSCID No. 1, paragraphs 2. d.
and 3.)
Coordination in terms of authority -- NSCIDs having
been approved by the President in consultation with the heads
of the departments chiefly concerned, shall, as applicable,
be promulgated and implemented by the intelligence depart-
ments and agencies; within the framework of these directives,
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including the implementing DCIDs, decisions of the USIB
shall be binding, as applicable, on all departments and
agencies of the Government.
Coordination in terms of management responsibility --
the USIB is directed to establish policies and develop
programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies
concerned; the DCI is authorized to make such surveys of
departmental intelligence activities of the various depart-
ments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection
with his duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence
effort of the United States. (NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3. c.)
Some members of the intelligence community,
especially the military services, believe that the coordinating
authority of the DCI is qualified by the clause in the National
Security Act of 1947 permitting each department and agency
to collect, produce and disseminate departmental intelligence
required to support its mission. We believe, however, that
it was the clear intent of the Congress and the NSC that it
is the departmental intelligence activities of the several
departments and agencies which are to be coordinated.
Furthermore, it was clearly not the intent of this clause
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that these activities be exempted from coordination:
notably, for example, the allocation of substantive
responsibilities in NSCIDs No. 2 and No. 3; and the
general principle that an agency look to other agencies
for any intelligence it needs that lies in their fields of
responsibility.
We believe that the authority and responsibility
assigned to the USIB make that body the principal
mechanism for assisting the DCI in coordinating the
foreign intelligence activities of the United States. The
Board participates in the development of the directives
under which the intelligence community operates. The
Board in its own right is directed to establish policies and
develop programs for the guidance of all departments and
agencies concerned. Decisions of the Board within the
National Security Council Intelligence Directives in which
the heads of departments participated are binding on all
departments and agencies. A first step in detailed exami-
nation of community coordination should therefore be a
consideration of the USIB.
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The United States Intelligence Board
On the national level formal coordination is achieved
through the meetings of the USIB and its 26 standing committees.
Many of these committees in turn have sub-committees, working
groups and other ad hoc groups which are again forums for a
comparison of views and the development of procedures where
inter-departmental or other types of joint action are required.
Among the most active USIB organisms in the field of coordi-
nation are the Watch Committee, the Guided Missiles and
Astronautics Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee, the Communications Intelligence Committee, the
Electronics Intelligence Committee, the Economic Intelligence
Committee and the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance.
These committees have, in addition to their responsibilities
for producing inter-departmental intelligence, in some instances
coordinated requirements for collection, and in other instances
developed common activities.
An important task of the USIB is the managerial
responsibility assigned to it under the terms of NSCID No. 1,
paragraph 2. a. (1), to "establish policies and develop
programs for the guidance of all departments and
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agencies concerned." We feel most strongly that the intelli-
gence programs developed by the individual member agencies
of the community, especially their planned allocations of
effort, should be reviewed by the USIB for consistency and
guidance prior to the submission of budget estimates within
the departments and agencies. However, we do not believe
that the USIB is now organized in such a way that it can
achieve truly effective management.
We suggest that the USIB establish a group composed
of senior officers of USIB members for purposes of (a) more
carefully screening matters and papers to be presented to
the Board other than estimates and substantive intelligence
matters, making decisions themselves on matters of lesser
importance to save the Board's time; and (b) staffing out
major management problems for the Board's consideration.
This group should also review the USIB committee structure
and functions for purposes of stimulating more regular and
worthwhile reporting to the Board, generating more interest
in management problems, and determining if there can be
any worthwhile consolidation or rearrangement of the com-
mittee structure.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The key to the coordination problem in the intelligence
community is the role of the DCI. We have previously dis-
cussed the position of the DCI as the coordinator.
We believe that the Director's authority to command
is limited to the CIA, including those services of common
concern assigned to the Agency by the NSCIDs. However,
under the terms of the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, NSCIDs, and the Executive Orders of the President,
the Director has a combination of authority and responsibility
which we believe enables him to achieve through the normal
command channels of the departments and agencies concerned
the practical coordination effect of strong centralized direction
of all foreign intelligence activities. In this connection he
has the following basic powers:
he can make such surveys of departmental intelligence
activities as he may deem necessary (although he has
never used this important authority);
he can make recommendations to the National Security
Council with or without the approval of the intelligence
community, his only obligation in this regard being to
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transmit a statement indicating the concurrence or the
non-concurring view of those members of USIB concerned;
his recommendations to the NSC, when approved by
that body and specifically by the President, are issued as
NSCIDs and, as applicable, shall be promulgated and
implemented by the departments and agencies of the
Government;
he acts for the NSC when issuing DCIDs to provide for
the detailed implementation of the NSCLDs and these
directives, when approved by the USIB and/or the NSC,
are required to be promulgated and issued through the
normal command channels of the departments and agencies
concerned. Although the DCImust have the concurrence
of the USIB before he can directly issue a DCID, dis-
senting members cannot block the action, because any
non-concurrence in the USIB may be referred either by
the DCI or dissenting members to the NSC for final decision.
We believe that the DCI now has ample authority to
carry out his assigned role as coordinator of the foreign
intelligence effort of the United States to whatever degree may
be required to ensure the effective coordination of'depart-
mental intelligence activities.
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We are convinced that the DCI and the USIB together
have a combination of assigned authorities and responsibilities
which enable and require them to exercise a stronger role in
improving the management of the foreign intelligence activities
of the member agencies of the intelligence community. The
effort of the Joint Study Group has been to suggest means of
more fully carrying out these responsibilities.
Coordination Overseas
The DCI has over-all responsibility for the coordination
of United States foreign intelligence activities. The NSCIDs
provide three lines of authority for achieving coordination of
intelligence activities overseas:
under NSCID No. 2 the senior U. S. representative in
each country is responsible for the coordination of all
collection activities not covered by other NSCIDs;
under NSCLD No. 6 coordination of signal intelligence
overseas is accomplished through operational and technical
control of the Director, National Security Agency.
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We believe that chiefs of mission generally should take
more positive steps in connection with their responsibility
to coordinate overt collection and reporting activities. To
do so would not entail any great problem with respect to
these activities being conducted by those U. S. personnel
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directly connected with an embassy. However, there are
complications with respect to the coordination of overt
collection and reporting activities conducted by military
commands which have areas of responsibility which cover
many countries and therefore involve a number of chiefs
of mission. This problem is further complicated by the
somewhat confused situation concerning the coordinating
responsibilities of unified commanders with respect to the
intelligence activities conducted by their component commands.
The component commands at present appear to receive most
of their guidance and direction directly from their respective
service departments at the Washington level.
The implementing provisions contained in the NSCIDs
and the DCIDs are consistent with the concept that intelli-
gence is a function of command; i. e., these directives are
required to be promulgated and disseminated through normal
command channels. Therefore, it would appear that unified
commanders should, at least, coordinate the intelligence
activities of their component commands and be the primary
channel to them for guidance and direction on intelligence
matters, including that originating in the service departments
at the Washington level.
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Especially in the field of clandestine collection, and
across the board in those countries where the CLk repre-
sentatives in the field also act for a chief of mission to
coordinate overt activities as well, there is a very real
conflict of interest problem. Some members of the community,
particularly the military services, do not believe that the
same individual can be an operator and a coordinator at the
same time; in simplest terms the coordinator is then in the
position of being both pitcher and umpire.
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None of these considerations, of course, affect the principle
that day to day coordination of operations in detail by case
officers must continue to be a responsibility of CIA stations
at the working level.
(In Washington the day to day coordination of clandestine
collection matters is carried on by staff personnel under the
Deputy Director/Plans who is, on behalf of the DCI, responsible
for all of CIA's clandestine operations.)
Despite the problems indicated above, a great deal of
effort has gone into coordination of foreign intelligence
activities and real progress has been made over the past
ten years. There is still need in our diplomatic missions
for a more standard pattern of coordination and, on the part
of the senior officials concerned, a more thorough under-
standing of the problems involved and their responsibilities
to achieve coordination. In the clandestine field the problem
of the conflict of interest is the most serious one. However,
from an over-all standpoint the key factor as we see it is that
coordination in every case is being done by individuals who
have other important duties.
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National Level: Conclusions
The DCI should continue to be coordinator of all U. S.
foreign intelligence activities and directly responsible to
the NSC and the President.
The USIB should continue to be the principal mechanism
for assisting the DCI in carrying out his coordination responsi-
bilities. However, we believe this Board should be reorganized
so as to become more efficient and assume a stronger role
in the management of the foreign intelligence activities
conducted by those departments and agencies which comprise
the intelligence community. (See page 100 of this section.)
We have recommended in Section III that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff be given a stronger role in substantive military
intelligence matters, and that a focal point be established in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for improved manage-
ment of military intelligence activities. In phase with
implementation of these changes, the size of the USLB should
be reduced to four members. The reorganized Board should
include the Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman), and
one representative each of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with
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ad hoc representation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Atomic Energy Commission. Such a reorganized
Board should assume a stronger role in the management of
the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, in
addition to their substantive responsibilities. The three
military service intelligence chiefs and the Director of NSA
should serve as advisors to the two representatives of Defense,
as appropriate.
To provide for including full-time professionals
into the field of coordination and minimizing the conflict of
interest problem, we propose that the DCI organize under
his Assistant for Coordination and as part of his personal
staff, a full-time group of intelligence professionals owing
primary allegiance to the intelligence community rather than
to any one member agency. Membership on the staff would
be drawn from the foreign intelligence community-at-large.
We believe that this coordination staff should be
charged with assisting the DCI in his community-wide
responsibilities for the coordination of U. S. foreign
intelligence activities, including the surveys of departmental
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intelligence activities authorized in NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3. c.
The staff and its entire membership should be responsible to
the DCI as coordinator and they should be separated from any
operational responsibility of the CIA or other department or
agency.
Overseas: Conclusions
Chiefs of mission should more affirmatively exercise
the responsibility for the coordination of overt collection
activities assigned to them by NSCID No. 2. At the smaller
posts the chief of mission can usually assume full responsi-
bility himself. Where this coordination problem is more
complex he should delegate this responsibility to the deputy
chief of mission and, if it requires full time attention, a
special officer for coordination should be assigned to the
post to carry on these duties on behalf of the chief of mission.
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IIn foreign areas where major
military commands are stationed, the CIA station chief
should keep the senior U. S. military commanders or their
designated representatives thoroughly informed of clandestine
intelligence activities conducted by CIA in support of those
commands.
With respect to military intelligence activities over-
seas, we have recommended in Section III that unified
commanders should exercise a more positive coordinating
authority over the intelligence activities of their component
commands and should be the primary channel through which
the latter receive advice and guidance on intelligence matters,
including requests that originate in the service departments
at the national level.
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The unified commanders should work out with the
chiefs of mission concerned an appropriate plan for the
coordination of those overt collection activities of the
component commands which are subject to coordination by
the chief of mission under NSCID No. 2. In addition, there
are overt collection and intelligence liaison activities conducted
by military elements overseas who are directly responsible
to the service departments at the Washington level; chiefs
of 'rnission responsible for areas in which such activities
are being conducted should ensure that these activities are
included in their over-all coordination plan.
In submitting the following recommendations, attention
is again invited to recommendations particularly in the
Sections on Military Intelligence, Collection - Resources,
and Requirements and Evaluation, which also deal with
coordination matters and are not repeated here.
It is recommended that:
28. The Director of Central Intelligence should take
action to achieve more effective coordination within the
intelligence community using the normal command
channels, as distinct from staff channels, of the depart-
ments and agencies concerned.
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29. The Director of Central Intelligence should be
supported in taking leadership and initiative to develop
solutions for the problems of coordination by the establish-
ment of a coordination staff, under his personal supervision
and separate from any operational responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency or other department or agency.
This staff should seek to identify at the earliest possible
time and promptly recommend solutions to coordination
problems, especially through surveys of intelligence
activities as authorized by National Security Council
Intelligence Directive No. 1. *
30. In phase with the organizational changes in the
Department of Defense recommended in Section III, the
membership of the United States Intelligence Board should
be reduced to four members who shall be the Director
of Central Intelligence (Chairman), and representatives
of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with ad hoc representation from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy
Commission.
31. To strengthen its role in management of the
intelligence community, the United States Intelligence
Board should establish a management group which would
analyze and propose solutions to non-substantive com-
munity problems of an administrative or management type.
This group would be composed of one senior representative
of each member of the United States Intelligence Board.
32. The United States Intelligence Board, through
the recommended management group, should review the
future plans and programs of each member of the intelli-
gence community for consistency and proper allocation
of effort at the beginning of each annual budget cycle. Its
views should serve as a basis for guidance and coordination
to the intelligence community and for reporting to the
National Security Council annually.
* - See page 91 for dissent regarding separation of Director of
Central Intelligence from Central Intelligence Agency.
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33. The management group referred to above should
review the functions and activities of the several com-
mittees and sub-committees of the United States
Intelligence Board. This review should include
consideration of possible changes in the committee
structure and improved reporting procedures.
34. Intelligence guidance and instructions to com-
ponents of unified commands originating in military
departments should be transmitted to these commands
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-2).
35. Unified commanders should exercise control and
command over the intelligence activities of their component
commands and be the primary channel to them for guidance
and direction on intelligence matters including any
instructions that originate in the service departments.
36. Chiefs of diplomatic and consular missions
abroad should take positive steps to effectively coordinate
all overt intelligence collection and reporting activities
within their assigned areas of responsibility.
37. The Central Intelligence Agency's stations and
bases should continue day to day coordination of clandestine
activities at the case officer level. The Director of
Central Intelligence should relieve them of the authority
to veto another agency's proposed operation. Before a
proposed operation or activity is rejected, it should be
referred to the Director of Central Intelligence.
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VIII. COST OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
The Group has been unable to ascertain with any degree
of accuracy the cost of the foreign intelligence effort for the
following reasons:
1) Accounting systems differ in the departments and
agencies concerned with the foreign intelligence effort and
are not designed to separately identify and measure the total
intelligence costs.
2) There are varying interpretations within those
departments and agencies as to what should be included or
excluded from any foreign intelligence costing effort.
3) Certain activities are of a mixed nature which
makes it difficult to distinguish intelligence from non-
intelligence elements.
4) Intelligence receives direct or indirect support,
such as communications and transportation, which is hard
to separate out as intelligence cost.
5) Some new and expensive projects are initially
justified as being primarily in support of the foreign
intelligence effort but later turn out to be primarily or
exclusively operational activities.
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Even after the best available figures have been put
together there remain certain complexities involved in the
analysis of the cost of intelligence. The total cost cannot be
appraised exclusively in terms of the output of finished intelli-
gence because the costs cover important and expensive
activities of training and operations of units designed largely
to maintain an essential capability for wartime. Furthermore,
some of the research and development expenses attached to
intelligence projects have valuable by-products in other areas
of the government and even in the private economy; e. g.,
communications security devices, automatic data processing.
The above problem is best illustrated by a recent
study made in the Department of Defense (DOD). Taking the
DOD contributions to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)
report on estimated foreign intelligence costs for fiscal year
1959 as a base, the report indicated the effect of adding in the
cost to the DOD of its ferret flights, counterintelligence
activities and the development work on Advance Research
Projects Agency (ARPA)-controlled projects, like SAMOS,
which have intelligence significance. When these items are
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added in, the estimated cost of DOD's foreign intelligence
activities for fiscal year 1959
The DOD report also points out that there are other
research and development and procurement costs which are
primarily connected with the procurement or handling of
foreign intelligence information. The Air Force's proposed
system 466-L (automatic data processing) accounted for
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reconnaissance satellites, photographic interpreting, crypto-
logic efforts, mapping and automatic data processing. Beyond
a doubt, the bulk of these costs arise from the procurement
of very expensive intelligence hardware. We feel that these
costs will continue as long as our national security requires
the use of short-lived hardware for the acquisition of large
quantities of information on prohibited areas. We recognize,
of course, that costs of intelligence operations and the value
of intelligence obtained therefrom are frequently not directly
related, and therefore urge that the USIB, in its annual
evaluation of agency programs, consider this relationship
and attempt to issue appropriate guidance regarding the
allocation of the nation's total intelligence resources.
The Group urges the vital importance of carrying
through to the best feasible result in the continuing process
of cost accounting for the intelligence effort.
In recent years progress has been made in developing
procedures for determmg annually the order of magnitude
A
of the costs of the foreign intelligence effort. The Study Group
feels the time has now arrived to refine these estimates and
develop cost breakdowns which would provide a better basis
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for USIB coordinating and guiding the efforts of various parts
of the community. Specifically, we believe the cost report,
in addition to the present breakdown by functional category,
should indicate a geographical breakdown by country, and
one by unit, such as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Army, 513th Military Intelligence Group, etc.
It is recommended that:
38. In order to achieve a more effective system
for utilizing cost and manpower data in the entire
foreign intelligence effort, the United States Intelligence
Board should refine and improve its process for pre-
paring and appraising such data by the following means:
(a) the United States Intelligence Board's
making a clear and specific determination as to
those activities which properly are foreign intelli-
gence and thus subject to the coordination of the
Director of Central Intelligence and the guidance
of the United States Intelligence Board.
(b) based on this determination, the United
States Intelligence Board should continue to evolve
an improving pattern for the development of cost
and manpower data so that the resulting figures
will be comparable and will permit the United
States Intelligence Board to review and coordinate
the effort expended on foreign intelligence activities
by the several departments and agencies, especially
through the review referred to in Section VII,
recommendation no. 32.
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IX. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Research and development activities for intelligence
purposes are conducted primarily by the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Within the DOD, these activities are conducted by the
three military departments and the National Security
Agency (NSA). All of these defense activities, as a result
of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, as amended, are
under the general supervision of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, and the Assistant to the Secre-
tary of Defense for Special Operations participates in this
review. In the case of research and development for
signal intelligence purposes, the Director of NSA performs
a number of functions on behalf of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering. As a result of the above steps,
a more effective coordination of research and development
activities has been achieved within the DOD.
Within CIA research and development is conducted
primarily by two units, the Technical Services Division
and the Office of Communications. In addition to the above
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two, the Photographic Intelligence Center conducts
research and development in the broad field of photography
directed both at better cameras and better processing.
These three units of CIA work closely together in coordi-
nating their activities in the field of intelligence.
Current coordination of research and development
activities between the CIA and members of the Defense
Establishment varies according to the subject under review.
It ranges from close coordination on signal intelligence
matters at the operational level to informal exchanges of
information on other matters, sometimes by means of the
USIB committee structure. While the Joint Study Group
believes that the intelligence community should develop a
better system for exchanging research and development
information, it also notes that such exchange of information
is no effective substitute for coordination. In view of this
fact, DOD and the CIA should seek means for effecting
better coordination.
Several problems of special concern to the members
of the intelligence community were revealed in the course
of the general review conducted by the Joint Study Group.
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These included: (1) the general problem of automatic data
processing and handling; (2) current efforts in the field of
information storage and retrieval; (3) mechanical translation
projects; and (4) research and development projects in such
related areas as communications and operational support.
At the risk of over-simplification, we make the
following observations on these problems:
1) In regard to automatic data processing and handling,
it is believed that the capabilities of the equipments being
developed are often ahead of the techniques and procedures
for utilizing these equipments effectively. These equipments,
for example, are viewed in some areas primarily as reservoirs
of material rather than as filters, in spite of the fantastic
increases in the volumes of material to be processed or
handled. The Joint Study Group urges that the intelligence
community promote the use of such machines as selective
filters rather than mass reservoirs.
2) Major efforts are currently being expended to
develop automatic systems to store and retrieve information.
However, it is the feeling of the Joint Study Group that these
efforts have not always been coordinated as effectively as they
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might have been. Furthermore, the concept of the compatibility
of automatic systems appears to have been occasionally over-
looked as new systems were being developed. The USIB Com-
mittee on Documentation (CODIB) should examine this situation
and report promptly to the USIB on the compatibility between
the various systems.
3) In the field of research and development on
mechanical translation we have heard evidence of eleven
projects but we have not examined any one of them for its
utility. We have the impression that the research effort
is at a reasonable level.
4) There is considerable research in the intelligence
community, together with the communications branches of the
various departments and agencies, in the field of communica-
tions. The Group has been impressed with the progress made
by the DOD and the CIA in improving the existing CRITIC
system within available resources. However, it believes
that additional research and resources are required to insure
the timely transmission forward of CRITIC communications
data. In addition, the intelligence community is concerned
with the cryptological aspects of communications, for which
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NSA has exclusive responsibility, and with agent communica-
tions, for which CIA has primary jurisdiction. We do not
believe that in these specific areas of communications there
are major problems. We are concerned, however, that due
Finally, CIA conducts research and development in
the field of operational support. Here are unique fields such
\ However, there does appear to be considerable
room for improvement and intensification of effort in the field
of research and development, of operational application of
Because of its importance, the member agencies of the
intelligence community should provide strong support to
the efforts initiated in the
field
by the National Security Council Special Committee on
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It is recommended that:
39. The Department of Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency should seek means to effect
better coordination of their respective research and
development activities for intelligence purposes.
40. The United States Intelligence Board should
monitor efforts to develop automatic systems to store
and retrieve intelligence information and the extent
to which compatibility of systems is assured.
41. The Central Intelligence Agency should direct
additional attention to foreign developments in agent
communications.
42. The United States Intelligence Board should
strongly support the efforts initiated in the counter-
audio surveillance field by the National Security
Council Special Committee on Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures.
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X. THE FUTURE
The Joint Study Group wishes to emphasize the
necessity for policy makers to recognize intelligence as an
instrument not only for use in the probing of areas of current
interest to the United States, but also and especially for
exploring those areas which may be in the future of great
concern to the national security of the United States. We feel
that too often intelligence is used as the handmaiden of cur-
rent operations to the detriment of long-range considerations.
Historically, conflict has been normal to all societies and
although we may strive for more stable international relations
it would be unrealistic and extremely dangerous for the United
States to ignore the lessons of history that conflicts are ever
present and also ever changing. It is likely that conflicts
of the future will not be limited to those with our current
major antagonists. In 1942 few Americans could have fore-
seen our present close alliance with Germany and Japan or,
on the other hand, the current menace of mainland China.
U. S. intelligence should be sharpened as to the
quality of its collection, production and estimates in support
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of current operations. However, at the same time, the
Joint Study Group urges that active effort be assigned to the
collection of intelligence and the creation of assets in those
countries or groupings of countries whose populations and
natural resources are such that future developments might
bring their interests into conflict with those of the United
States and result in danger to our national security.
to.
We foresee no dimianition in the importance of the
role of intelligence in support of our national security. It
will require great resources in manpower and money.
Management of this effort will continue to demand leadership
of the highest order if the intelligence needs are to be met
from resources available.
There is reason to be doubly concerned over the
likelihood of declining effectiveness of certain collection
techniques which in the future may result in less intelligence,
owing to improvements in the sec:urity of the Soviet bloc.
This is a matter of considerable substantive and technical
concern to the entire intelligence community. The community's
concern must go further in that this prospect is indicative of the
heavy dependence which has been placed on particular sources
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despite the likelihood that results from any one type of intelli-
gence collection will wax and wane over the years as techno-
logical changes occur. Collection of overt intelligence is also
subject to dramatic variations.
Intelligence must be careful to take into account
anticipated technological developments. These developments
should be imaginatively utilized by U. S. intelligence itself for
foreign positive intelligence and counterintelligence purposes.
The use of similar developments by other nations will require
constant tightening of our total security in order to frustrate
their espionage efforts aimed at the United States.
A tremendous advance has been made during the past
ten years in the fields of transportation and delivery of
weapons, making it imperative that equal advance be made in
the field of electronic communications. In the future the
existing time lag between collection in the field and the receipt
of intelligence in Washington will be unacceptable if our CRITIC
communication system is to be effective.
All these prospects point to one final conclusion --
that a primary responsibility before the intelligence community
is long-range planning. Both in respect of how to carry on its
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business through processes of management, and in respect
of the area and subjects in which effort shall be expended, the
community is obligated to look forward as far as it can, and
to make the best possible forecasts.
The Group's last recommendation (No. 43) urges
upon the intelligence community that, to a markedly
greater extent than it has done, it should establish
specific arrangements for planning its work, and
anticipating its problems.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
bist6eitAl
uto1. The Secretary of Defense take appropriate action
v-r;-o bring the military intelligence organization within the
Department of Defense into full consonance with the con-
cept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Toward
this end: Page 31
a. there should be established within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense a focal point for exerting
broad management review authority over military
intelligence programs, and providing over-all coordi-
nation of all foreign intelligence activities conducted
by various Defense components Page 32
b. the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
intelligence coordination and operations should be
strengthened in support of their assigned mission by
such means as: Page 32
(1) placing under Joint Chiefs of Staff control
increased intelligence resources to support its
strengthened authority; Page 32
(2) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
coordinate the intelligence views on substantive
intelligence matters within the Department of
Defense, notably for estimates; . . . Page 32
(3) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
coordinate military intelligence requirements
(see recommendation no. 26 of Section VI);
Page 32
(4) requiring the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
coordinate the intelligence activities of the unified
and specified commands and be the primary channel
to these commands for guidance and direction of in-
telligence matters originating with the Department of
Defense (see additional discussion and recommen-
dations on Section VII); Page 32
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c. National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tives, Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff
directives should be revised in accordance with the
above. Page 32
The increased intelligence resources required
he Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands should
e drawn from the existing resources of the military depart-
ments and component commands as appropriate. Page 32
3. Budgeting procedures for intelligence operations
and activities should be brought more closely under the
control of the Secretary of Defense, including clear
identification of the total intelligence costs throughout
all of the echelons and elements of the Department of
Page 33
Defense.
I4. Policies should be initiated that would permit
more rigorous selection and training of personnel assigned
to intelligence activities and operations (particularly mili-
tary attaches) and personnel so assigned should be given
position and rank comparable to their operational counter-
parts. . Page 33
/- itrze,44-(.--
5. The military ervices should be encouraged to
ntain and develop a capability for clandestine intelligence
lection which would be carried out under the coordination
the 'rector of Central Intelligence. . . . . . Page 33
6. The Special Security Officer systems should:
a. avoid duplication of channels to non-military
consumers;
b. be staffed by personnel of rank commensurate
with a courier function;
c. avoid placing their own interpretation on
material transmitted by the Special Security Officer
systems Page 33
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7. The Department of Defense re-examine the
assignment of Defense electronics intelligence resources
to unified and specified commands to determine the feasi-
bility of placing more of these particular resources under
the operational and technical control of the Director,
National Security Agency. Page 42
/8. The Department of Defense review the National
Security Agency concept of partnership with the service
cryptologic agencies in communications intelligence and
electronics intelligence activities with a view to strengthening
the control of the Director of the National Security Agency
over the service cryptologic agencies. . . . . Page 42
9. The Department of Defense reappraise the
adequacy of research and development programs for electronics
intelligence purposes with the objectives of developing more
adequate electronics intelligence equipment at the earliest
feasible ime Page 42
xi
10. The United States Intelligence Board reappraise
the security clearance standards for foreign born translators
to determine whether the current shortage of translators can
be alleviated by modified security procedures and practices.
Page 42
I11. The Department of State place greater emphasis
on intelligence responsibilities in the indoctrination of its
personne,l Page 60
12. Military departments should concentrate more
effort on career management by developing programs of
constantly broadening assignments in intelligence for quali-
fied and specifically designated officers, which will gain
the benefits of a career intelligence service without isolating
the officer from contact with the general mission of his
service a.nd its operations. Page 60
13. The Central Intelligence Agency should open
its clandestine training facilities to other agencies as a
service of common concern. Page 61
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14. The United States Intelligence Board should
review existing compartmentation of sensitive information
with a view to achieving more uniform practices and
ensuring that essential security safeguards do not result
in vital information being withheld from officials and
organizations with urgent national security responsibilities.
Page 61
/15. The United States Intelligence Board should
review the situation in the National Indications Center to
determine the adequacy and level of its staffing and to
assure that all information pertinent to the National
Indications Center's mission (including highly classified
and sensitive information now withheld) will be transmitted
to the Center promptly on its receipt Page 61
1./ 16. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence should consult preparatory to the early
preparation of a new National Security Council Intelligence
Directive designed to provide authority and assign responsi-
bility for the establishment of a National Photographic
Intelligence Center (NPIC). Page 61
17. The Central Intelligence Agency should place
more emphasis on the establishment of unofficial cover
throughout the world. Page 61
V 18. The Director of Central Intelligence should focus
community attention on the important area of counterintelli-
gence and security of overseas personnel and installations
sand assign responsibility for periodic reports to t e United
States Intelligence Board.] I. Page 61
Act.r..04 "to -Cf?AA.,
19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to
encourage the Military Assistance Advisory Groups and
military missions within the limits of discretion to exploit
intelligence opportunities in close coordination with the
military attaches Page 62
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20. The Central Int
intelligence support to un
by direct dissemination of
pertinent field stations
71- iAtAlt
igence Agency should increase
d and component commanders
3information reports from
Page 62
14 3 e.".e. Oq iJ C
1. The United States intelligence Board establish
a central requirements facility, initially to coordinate all
requirements levied for clandestine and signal intelligence
collection, and if successful, subsequently expand its
operations to other types of requirements. Personnel
assigned to this facility should be drawn from existing
requirements personnel of the member agencies. Page 85
s,
(11") r1.422. The new central requirements facility use
the Central Intelligence Agency's Office a Central Reference
as its reference facility. Page 85
? 4 ?
? fit
I 5.1? rA423. The United States Intelligence Board establish
a program for the integration of all collection requirements
manuals into a compatible series of coordinated guides;
likewise, the creation of integrated requirements guides
on a country-to-country basis setting forth the specific
collection requirements and responsibilities of each depart-
ment and agency concerned Page 85
I
24. The chief of mi sion or principal officer in each
overseas area should be gi en affirmative responsibility for
coordinati?. of all overt6. ca clandestine intelligence
reouirerr?s.concerning that area.
fr2-'5. The U ited States Intelligence Board in its
annual evaluation of community effort prepared for the
National Security Council pay specific attention to collection,
and request similar evaluation from each chief of mission
and mili ry command Page 86
26. All military requirements at the Washington
level be coordinated by the Department of Defense so as
to prevent duplication or concentration on low priority
targets. 6,1) ),14,044,?-.4.ill
Page 86
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27. Chiefs of mission and the Central Intelligence
Agency chiefs of station arrange for political information
overtly acquired to be transferred to the mission's
political section for transmission as appropriate to
Washin ton. Page 86
28. The Director of Central Intelligence should take
action to achieve more effective coordination within the
intelligence community using the normal command channels,
as distinct from staff channels, of the departments and
agenci/ s concerned. Page 113
29. The Director of Central Intelligence should be
supported in taking leadership and initiative to develop
solutions for the problems of coordination by the establish-
ment of a coordination staff, under his personal supervision
and separate from any operational responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency or other department or agency.
This staff should seek to identify at the earliest possible
time and promptly recommend solutions to coordination
problems, especially through surveys of intelligence activi-
ties as authorized by National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 1. * Page 114
30. In phase with the organizational changes in the
Department of Defense recommended in Section III, the
membership of the United States Intelligence Board should
be reduced to four members who shall be the Director
of Central Intelligence (Chairman), and representatives of
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, with ad hoc representation from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy
Commission Page 114
31. To strengthen its role in management of the
intelligence community, the United States Intelligence Board
should establish a management group which would analyze
and propose solutions to non-substantive community problems
of an administrative or management type. This group would
be composed of one senior representative of each member of
the United States Intelligence Board Page 114
* - See page 91 for dissent regarding separation of Director of
Central Intelligence from Central Intelligence Agency.
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32. The United States Intelligence Board, through
the recommended management group, should review the
future plans and programs of each member of the intelligence
community for consistency and proper allocation of effort
at the beginning of each annual budget cycle. Its views should
service as a basis for guidance and coordination to the
intelligence community and for reporting to the National
Security ouncil annually. Page 114
33. The management group referred to above should
review the functions and activities of the several committees
and sub-committees of the United States Intelligence Board.
This review should include consideration of possible changes
in the committee structure and improved reporting pro-
cedures. Page 115
34. Intelligence guidance and instructions to com-
ponents of unified commands originating in military depart-
ments should be transmitte4 to these commands t rough the
Joint Chiefs of Sr
A-AA_
NSA e."1M.43
35. Unified commanders should exercise control and
/3R4femand over the intelligence activities of their component
? commands and be the primary channel to them for guidance
and direction on intelligence matters including any instructions
that ori nate in the service departments. . . ? Page 115
36. Chiefs of diplomatic and consular missions abroad
should take positive steps to effectively coordinate all overt
intelligence collection and reporting activities within their
assigned areas of responsibility. Page 115
37. The Central Intelligence Agency's stations and
bases should continue day to day coordination of clandestine
activities at the case officer level. The Director of Central
Intelligence should relieve them of the authority to veto
another agency's proposed operation. Before a proposed
operation or activity is rejected, it should be referred to
the Director of Central Intelligence. Page 115
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/38. In order to achieve a. more effective system for
utilizing cost and manpower data in the entire foreign intelli-
gence effort, the United States Intelligence Board should
refine and improve its process for preparing and appraising
such data by the following means: Page 121
(a) the United States Intelligence Board's making
a clear and specific determination as to those activities
which properly are foreign intelligence and thus subject
to the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence
and the guidance of the United States Intelligence Board.
Page 121
(b) based on this determination, the United
States Intelligence Board should continue to evolve an
improving pattern for the development of cost and man-
power data so that the resulting figures will be comparable
and will permit the United States Intelligence Board to
review and coordinate the effort expended on foreign
intelligence activities by the several departments and
agencies, especially through the review referred to in
Secion VII, recommendation no. 32 Page 121
it
39. The Department of Defense and the Central
Intelligence Agency should seek means to effect better
coordination of their respective research and development
activiti Is for intelligence purposes. Page 128
40. The United States Intelligence Board should
monitor efforts to develop automatic systems to store and
retrieve intelligence information and the extent to which com-
patibili y of systems is assured Page 128
41. The Central Intelligence Agency should direct
additional attention to foreign developments in agent
communications. Page 128
42. The United States Intelligence Board should
strongly support the efforts initiated in the counter-audio
surveillance field by the National Security Council Special
Committee on Technical Surveilla.nce Countermeasures.
Page 128
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43. The Group's last recommendation urges upon
the intelligence community that, to a markedly greater
extent than it has done, it should establish specific arrange-
ments for planning its work, and anticipating its problems.
Page 132
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