DRAFT OUTLINE PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALINS DEATH PART I INTRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003400020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1953
• Content Type: PAPER

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3. Assumptions
a. It is assumed that the fundamental objectives of the United
States with respect to the Soviet system remain as stated in the relevant
National Security Council papers, namely, NSC 20/4, NSC 68, NSC 114, and
NSC 135. In essence, these fundamental objectives ares
(1) To bring about a retraction of Soviet power and influence
from the satellites and Communist China and thus a reduction of Soviet
power and influence in world affairs;
(2) to bring about a fundamental change in the nature of the
Soviet system--wb.ich would be reflected above all in the conduct of inter-
national relations by the Soviet regime in a manner consistent with the
spirit and purpose of the United Nations Charter.
b, It is assumed that the United States Government intends to exploit
to the full the opportunities presented by Stalin's death and the difficulties
inherent in the transfer of power to make progress toward these ends.
c, It is assumed that the United States Government will undertake a
comprehensive and decisive program of action--involving wh=stever diplomatic,
political, military, and economic measures are appropriate and are within
our capabilities--to make real progress toward our national objectives and
that this plan for psychological operations, as revised from time to time
is part of this massive and integrated campaign.
d. Finally, it is assumed that the initial major move in this national
campaign will be a Presidential speech outlining a United States program for
peace /and possibly-.prozzsixag_an early igh..leval noeti: g-te eonsdd.er-certain
ma_~o . outstaud.in : a,ssuesj This will be intended as a serious move which
Will, we hope, lead to serious negotiations for adjustment of these issues..
It follows, therefore, that the move must be treated and built up as a
serious effort on the part of the United States to make progress toward a
peaceful world.
OSD & DOS review(s) completed.
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4.
syychological Estimate of the Situation'
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a. It has long been estimated that one of the most promising oppor-
tunities to make real progress toward our national objectives with respect
to the Soviet system would arise following the death of Stalin, The in-
escapable necesst y of transferring power to new hands, no matter how care-
ful the preparations for it, has created a time of crisis for the Soviet
Union and the Soviet system as a whole. We should not be misled by the
apparently smooth transfer of power. A despotism can be ruled only by a
despot and history is strewn with unsuccessful efforts to replace a tyrant
with a committee. There is a real question whether Nalenkov (or anyone else)
will be able to bring or maintain all of the power factors under his iron
control as Stalin did,
be Among the faces which have already emerged, the following are of
particular significance in developing a program of psychological operations
designed to support our national effort to make progress toward our objectives:
(1) The accession to power of the new regime has been executed in
a dramatically rapid and apparently resolute manner. This development and
the announced changes in governmental structure, indicate careful preparation
and premeditation.
(2) The reorganization of the party and governmental apparatus
is on lines almost identical to the organization employed during World War
IIm This points clearly to an effort to concentrate power in a manageably
small number of hands and to present., both internally and eternally,, an
impression of hardness and unity and continuity at the top.
(3) The following three features of the reorganization deserve
special mention. Firstp Zt-he net, Laegime-is eleapl.' et-paia7 it continues
an effort under way for some t3me4 to strengthen its control over the
military and to bid for its loyalty., fs-is seen-b-- *,he prem&nen4 role
OI'hi.s g~nuld e , ea in on, unction with the Special. Intelligence Estimate
or the situ tic)
IL -
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given-to military-men-and-pertieuiap3,r by-t1e-Zhu eseigreestj7 Second,
the recently criticized internal security apparatus has been consolidated
and placed for all to see in the hands of the most experienced and ruthless
policeman of them a1.--Beria. Third, there has been an extensive regroup-
ing and consolidation of industrial and transportation and economic
ministries, with control being placed in the hands of a few lieutenants.
(4) The initial pronouncements by the new regime stressed the
leading role played by the Great Russian people. 5hfs-s%ggeete Chet-the
regime-will eOHt&nae-te baee-i4s-pkyeiea;6 and #deologi a strength-on the
Great RueslaBs-aed-tkat7 The funeral speeches emphasized the multination
character ogthe USS . u the regime may fear that the non-Russian
Republics as well as the satellite states are of doubtful reliability and
may have to be held in line by increasingly tight measures of repression.
The fact that Stalin was a Geargian and Malenkov is a Great Russian may
have symbolic significance in this connection, However, the peoples of
the Soviet on are deft
.
or role in the situations
(5) Beyond this, there is nothing at the present time which sug-
gests a change, or the nature of a change if one is contemplated, in the
conduct of foreign and domestic policies, Barring the drastic intensifica-
tion of interna4 or external strains there appears little likelihood of
such changes at an early date*
o. On the other hand, the very rapidity with which the transfer of
power has been effected, the nature of this change, and the stringency of
the controls that have been imposed, together with the speed with which
Stalin is to be interred and the warnings against "disorder and panic"
(an extraordinarily revealing quote from r yd )' suggest that nervousness
and concern over the stability of the new regime are prevalent at the
highest levels and that, as regards Ma3..enkov particularly, the effort to
consolidate both the power of the regime and his control over it is the
overriding preoccupation.
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COPY NO.
March 13, 1953
DRAFT OUTLINE
PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S DEATH
PART I INTRODUCTION
Px'oblom,
ao The problem is to devise a plan of psychological operations as
one part of a comprehensive and decisive program for the exploitation of
Stalints death and the transfer of power to new hands in order to make
real progress toward our national abjectiveso
b. No once-for--all psychological plan is possible in the present
situation. Psychological operations1 like other actions,, must be capable
of rapid and flexible adjustment to changes in the situation, Therefore,
a strong, high--level,, continuing interdepartmental working group should
be especially constituted to keep psychological plans and operations under
continuous review and in harmony with national policy-)
Late cci nextl; a "L'he T~epe men~~wishes to ask what the terms of reference
of the Id hoc group would be and whether the group would work in accor-
dance with the regular coordination procedures which have been established
in coax ection with oth r SB panelsnl;
2. Basic ConsideratLv~Uq
a. Psychological operations by themselves cannot have sufficient
impact on the Soviet system to produce those changes which we would regard
as real progress toward our national objectives. They can only contribute
to the success of diplomatic, political1 military, and economic actions
taken by the United States Goverment, or aggravate stresses which emerge
within the Soviet system itself. They should be fully geared into a compre-
hensive and decisive program for the exploitation of Stalin's death?
b. It is beyond the scope of this paper to say what the elements of
such a program should be. However, it has been essential in drawing up this
plan of psychological operations to make certain assumptions about national
policy. The assumptions adopted for the purposes of this paper are set
forth in paragraph 3 below. If these assumptions are in error, the plan
for psychological operations will have to be adjusted accordingly,
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March 1.3, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD:
SUBJECT: Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's
Death.
Transmitted herewith is a revised text of a draft plan on
Stalinv's death for consideration at the Board's meetin,c,_
March 19th. As instructed, I have consolidated written and oral
omnierits in this revision., Since no editing was authorized, the
paper still shows the diffuseness and some of the imperfect
coherence which were due to its hasty preparation.
I would like to stress particularly the importance of
assumption 3 d ~,on pLae 2? It was the thought of the drafting
group that~e main value of the contemplated speech would hinge
upon its embodying a new policy initiative as diti.nguished from
a novel appeal based on e-i.isting policies. Only the most careful
precautions in this regard seem likely to prevent the new offen-
sive from being discounted as "psychological warfare".
George A;: N!organ,
Act3.nq1.. Director.
Draft Outline, Plan for Psychological
Exploitation of Stalinys Death.
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d. It is probably safe to assume, therefore, that the regime hopes to
avoid serious external difficulties until it has consolidated its power or
unless a struggle for power develops in such a way that one aspirant or another
sees an opportunity to advance his interests by pursuing an aggressive and
adventurous course. However, it is also in the nature of such a new regime that
it must display its hardness or, to state it negatively, that it must avoid any
sign of weakness. On balance, therefore, it is concluded that:
(1) the regime is unlikely to undertake any rash actions or dramatic,
new initiatives for some time.
(2) the new rules are likely to be more "royalist than the King" in
adhering rigidly for the time being to the policies laid down by Stalin.
(3) the new rulers will react promptly, sharply, and perhaps even
excessively to any external threats.
e. The evidence available to date suggests that the regime may be parti-
cularly concerned about:
(1) the loyalty and subservience of the satellite regimes.
L2? relations with Communist-China.
L4217 L31 the loyalty of the am y. Z4_317 /. , internal security.
Z44 ,), the attitudes of minority nationalities in the USSR.
j par= control of government and police: close ties between
party ans. poodle.
f. Regardless of its overt attitudes toward the outside world, the basic
concern of the new regime and of Nalenkov in particular is with the consolida-
tion of the internal position. .t-is prebable7 mopeever3 that--barpir4g-serloaas
external-ppoialemo of-sach a eew aharac#ep that-they are ao* eovepe4 by-the
?oliaies-established-by %tallnT sepieus C~rlc4ien-w4thia the pegime-is a3oi-e-l&kelb,
4o-aviae-ovep 4oaeat c-isszaes %han-oven any athev lsaues7 serious-friction
within there ime- over external issues is
1,ely-covered-by policies 1 e d establ ished by Stalin.
are too novel to be adequa
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5, Strat gic Conropt.
a4 The plan for psychological operations must be drawn up within the
context of a strategic concept. Although its formulation is beyond the
scope of this paper, it has been necessary to outline the main features of
a strategic concept as a basis for the psychological plan. If this con-
cept is revised, the plan for psychological operations will have to be
revised accordingly.
b. A In accordance with our fundamental objectives and as the
most promising ways of malting real progress toward these objectives, our
basic aims in the present situation are to use the opportunities presented
by StalinIs death and the difficulties inherent in the transfer of power
to new hands;
Cwith-respect-to the eomm n .st 6yet?m4
414 -to .remote f-iostota within-the-regime at-the top;
(24 -to promote division-between-tlae--soviet Union and Co nist
shim; -
434 to-ppowote-dlvtstoa betwsea the Gusset UhIoa and the ,etern
Rupopean-satellites;
444 to-p oviote-cen.Clict between aa4op powep er.-iaterest- Pos pe
Within-the-Sevtet Untoa;
With-respee,t-to the Cree-werId.:
454 -to promote strength-aid-unity.
4e4. -to 4euelop and sainta6n-ten-.4ence to-U? S.-1eade'ship
Of-t#ze-f -ee uo13ld;
474 -to 4iei ateg,sate-Cam waist-strengtla=%
Z'Vers?~ i-oa A :
To in, olve the new Soviet regime in major eid difficult
decisior- of policy calcuL-.ted to e~cploit the differences of interest and
purpose anion those who now hold portions of Soviet power, while avoiding
pressures which would tend to_,unit them,
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(2) To press a clear and fresh vision of American purposes on
the Soviet and satellite peoples designed to associate their aspira-
tions more explicitly with our own.
(3) To unify the Free World around positive and sustained
efforts to seek the peace, and around a clarified conception of purposes
common to our allies, the "neutrals" and our selves,
(4) T provide a new and more firm base within the
for the pursuit of F'+merican interests and objectives.?
-Version B.
(1) To foster any and all divisive forces within the top hierarchy
of the Kremlin with _particular reference to the i'lalenkov-Seria-violotov-
Bulganin situations
(2) To stimulate divisive forces between the Kremlin and the
satellite governments including Communist China.
(3) To maximize the disaffection between the peoples of the Soviet
Union and Malenkov.
(.) To maximize the division between theoeoples of the satellites,
`including Communiht China, and. Malenkov.
(5) To maintain and increase unity between the governmental leaders
of the free nations.
(6) To maintain and increase the unity between the peoples of the
free nations,
(7) To follow through successfully in the Defense wilding of the
U.S. and the other free nations.
(8) To attain a sound economic position for the U.S.
other free nations with widespread confidence in President Eisenhower's
economic leadership.]
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(1) The greatest asset we have for all of these purposes is
the diami effective personality and position of President Eisenhower in
the Ur'ted Ste,
( ) The second greatest asset is the diplomatic leadership we
have in all ,.nternational a.encies, spearheaded by Secretary of State Dulles
and UoNa Representative Dodge,
( ) The third. greater sset is our militarypotential, including
atomie wens with deterring force and feelAng of relative
greater security_t n the part of those who associate with us,
(4) The fourth re3.test asset is our economic strength with our
tremendous producuion and our capanity to assist others,
d, 4~ar raatest liahili.t es are a
{l) A natural tendency on the pert of other free nations to
resent U ,.,S. top any sitiaa0
(2) Di#ficultX in maintaining the impetus of defense building in
the face of understanding desires for lower taxes, less military service,
social security,
(3) Danger of attitude of complete dependence of other free
nations upon U,,S0 defense and economic strength,,
(/) U ,easiness of our associates as to our own long-term economic
agidnolitical objectives..
(5) Our heritage of heavy debts and mistakes from previous years.
ea L,-cc:/ =e~had ~
(1) Main effort; strategy of choice. One of the most significant
means of furtlering the above aims is to confront the communist rulers
with difficult major choices in a way that tends to isolate them and
divide their counsels, while uniting humanity, especially the free
world, with us. The Presidential speech assumed above, should serve this
purpose.
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(2) Supnortifforts,
With respect to the communist world;
(a) We should overload the untried regime with other
stimuli apt to provoke internal. arguments--e.g., occasions requiring
decision,, or failures leading to recrimination -- but avoid threats k,.,r
sabre-rattli.ng,.
(b) We should p2-ague it with doubts--e.g., about
reliability of key individuals and groups.
(c) We should foster internal a.nta onisM. by other
suitable means, such as fostering nationalistic feelings,
(d) We should combine "cs.ri?ot" and "stick" both in
direct support of the main ef''art and in executing the other supporting
efforts. An essential feature of the strategy of choice is a "puish-pull"
situation, combining pressures and inducements which show the disadvantages
of a choice contrary to our interests and the advantages of one which is
favorable.
(e) Fuctuations in direction and emphasis (e.g., between
carrot and stick) should be used is an added means of confusion except
where steadiness of tactics is desirable for a special reason.
(f) Prot g (see d(2) below).
With respect to the free world;
(g) The most promising ways of furthering our aims with
respect to the free world are:
(1) to stress the importance of increased strength
and unity by emphasizing the new elements of danger and opportunity in
the situation.
(a) to manifest a willingness and desire to cooperate
in developing unity of effort by the free world. In this connection it
will be desirable to approach our allies in a spirit of give and take,
(h) We should exploit the possible weakening of ties
between the Kremlin and Communist parties throughout the world due to
Mal.enkovis lack of stature, experience and ideological prowess as the
new leader of world communism.
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f . L' hasea
(1) Initial sUUrt. During the next few weeks, much risk and
expenditure are justified in order to prolong and make the most of the
condition of nervousness following the sudden transfer of power. The
Presidential speech Is assumed above, specially for this reason.
(2) F21.3_o~a-ug. It is most important that the spurt, particularly
the MainE'fort, should not be left as one-shot operation. Above all,
an adequate "stick" should be ready for the expected Soviet evasion of
the initial "carrot" of the Presidential speech. Every energy must be
employed to make all reeds of disunity ,row. For this purpose, many
actions even if unlikely to produce great effect will. be desirable for
purpose of probing to find out where the seeds are sprouting. If events
evolve very favorably, this phase could eventuate in a
(3) Climax in which the communist system breaks into open
Internal conflict. This third phase in our strategy should begin if
and when such conflict seems near. If it never comes, the strategy
should still have contributed usefully to our basic purpose.
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PART
PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
1. Gen?ral,
a. The importance of psychological pressures in the present situa-
tion is of sufficient moment to warrant not only the concentration of
all psychological media upon the stated objectives, but also the resolute
development of expanded and more effective capabilities. Even more essen-
tial, perhaps, is the determination to seize and consistently maintain
the initiative through psychological operations imaginatively conceived
and dramatically executed. Before it can win the hearts or influence
the intellects of its targets, United States psychological strategy
must capture their imaginations.
b. The major hope of fulfilling the aims of this plan lies in sub-
stantive government acts of psychological significance. The Presidential
speech assumed in Part I, para. M. is the keystone upon which the
present psychological strategy is based. This assumed speech, and the
various official actions which would stem directly from it, need, however,
to be complemented by a series of psychologically significant acts. Jn
Part-III__ia a liat..o# auggasted poasil)1e...aatious...of psychological ualua j*
All but a few of the overt and covert psyc'Liological programs proposed in
the following paragraphs of this section are intended primarily to
exploit, prolong and intensify the psychological impact of various
political, economic and military actionsLeomparable-ii their efifeet--
to-thoise-aestuned- or ouggesteel gn-the-pia
c. For administrative reasons the present plan merely summarizes
the broad outlines of the effort called for in the field of covert
operations, fit it assumes that this effort will be adequate in its
* Should be deleted if Part III is deleted.
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material scale, and sufficiently energetic and imaginative in its approach,
to justify heavy reliance--second only to that placed upon official actions-
upon the clandestine arm in achieving the aims of the plan.
As to general direction, the. covert effort will be guided by the
following general considerations:
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In the situation with which this paper deals, all governments and all
peoples of the world may be assumed to be deeply interested, first, in
accurate reporting and interpretation of events in the Soviet Union and
their consequences and, second, in the relationship of the United States
to the situation and its intentions and its actions with regard to it.
Therefore, a prirry responsibility falling upon official overt informa-
tion media is to provide widespread factual coverage and reliable com-
mentary, from original and attributable sources, on developments, in-
cluding the statement of the President crystallizing the attitude of the
United States. This is the essential foundation upon which effective
propaganda will rest.
Successful use of overt media in the operation will reouire careful
coordination of all media. Of a special importance will be the coordina-
tion of public statements, since such statements are the most effective
weapons for overt use. The watch committee envisaged in this plan must
be specifically charged with alerting overt media in advance to forth-
coming actions and their significance. (For example, should a public
statement be intended to launch a "trial balloon", the overt medtA, should?.
be advised in order to give it maximum dissemination.)
V.. our covert a?w we as out overt ronaa ~p~ fed many
g eras. muchs should be made of the fact that the Soviet_, $tem has st~ff9red
gn irreparable loss of strength thro the deattofSte in and thPt__t big
Is a tin r
Wes.
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f. Edith the ha e_in regime deffeti-c? on deserves a bieh priority
in Loth o ert a d covert-media, Thp principal role of overt media
in this work is, of course, not tlhe direct inducement of defection but
mach indirect ass stance as publicizing defections when they occur.
g Congressional and publication leaders should be taken in on
the operation of the peace offensive and on the imperative necessity of
maintainin our defensebuld_; n impetus.
h. __ Thjs ?plan should be under constant review in light of the
developip situation.
2. Overt Igormation M? is by Areas.
Defe il a co>vne r,t: "The tasks outlined for overt propaganda could be
expanded and could be considerably more aggressive in their approach."
a. To the Soviet Union. In addition to standard themes,
official overt media should seek to accomplish the following tasks;
(1) To throw doubt on the stability of the new regime at the
top. In this connection it will be useful. to cite history and contemporary
experts on Soviet affairs, such as Tito and former Communists, to n___l.ish
rep2rts o ? farmer eac peps who -have been in the Cmm~.inist axararpttus teUJ_ing
EkhjMt former plots agei :it each other between the four ton Kremlin men, to
show that a despotism requires a despot, to suggest that Malenkov has not
brought all the power factors under his control and to indicate that the new
arrangements will not work, with the result that a struggle for power, completf
with purges, is inevitable.
(2) To provide useful advice to Soviet citizens on how to survive
in this dangerous and unsettled time, thus contributing to the psychology
of individual caution impairing the efficiency of the system.
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(3) To exploit the fact that the reorganization of the Soviet
government and the Communist Party closely parallels that during World
War II and to question why this is necessary in view of the Soviet claim
to have the overwhelming support of the Soviet peoples. This theme
should not to used in any way suggestive of a danger that a general war
may soon break ovt,;
Stage conunent: ''T.h'.s should. lshould. now be reconsidered with a view to doter-
mining whether these tasks should be imids:-taken covertly and might be
contra-productive if u1de. taken overtly. 1
(4) To convey an impression that the attitude of the United
States Government is one of "sharp watchfulness" and of awareness that
the situation contains new element's of danger which, if they materialize,
we will meet firmly, and possibly of new elements of hope, justifying a
careful review of United States policies.
(5) When an approach to the Soviet Government by the United
States Government is made public, to exploit it intensively in order to
portray the serious purpose behind this action to achieve a lessening
of international tensions and, in the event that it is not successful,
to place the responsibility squarely on the USSR.
(6) To exploit the fact that there has been an obvious'effort
on the part of the new Soviet regime to buy off the military by giving it
more and higher representation than it had before and to cast doubt on
the success of this effort.
(7) To report factually suggestions from American and Western
military men and other prominent persons (but not top administration
officials) who have had experience with the Soviet military that perhaps
it may be easier to come to sensible arrangements with a regime in which
these men have enhanced power and influence. (Such suggestions might
be covertly elicited.)
State cosnueiats "This should now be reconsidered with a view to deter-
mining whether these tasks should be undertaken covertly and might be
contra-productive if undertaken overtly."
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(S) To place increased emphasis upon the role of the United
States and other free nations in providing sanctuary and a new life of
opportunity and freedom to escapees from Soviet communist tyranny. The
idea that the present may provide the best opportunity to escape should
be addressed particularly to the Russian-speaking audience in Eastern
Germany and to Soviet officials outside the Soviet orbit. Pe alert for
n immed ately publicize in,dramatic extensive terms all defections of
Lad Army peruopngl antic Communist P arty members and widgly herald their
escape across the line w ? th, picture and intervieys.
(9) To implant doubt of the loyalty of the satellite leaders
to the new Moscow regime.
(10) To report factually any indications of divergence of policies
or interests between satellites or Communist China and the Soviet Union.
(Stich indications might be the result of covert operations, provided these
operations produce plausible indications.)
(11) Play up apparent personal coolness between Malenkov and
Mao in such a way as to suggest that they dislike each other so intensely
that the two leaders are loath to meet each other.
Stag e comment: "This should now be reconsidered with a view to deter-
mining whether these tasks should be undertaken covertly and might be
contra-productive if undertaken overtly."
(12) To provide renewed evidence of the peaceful intentions of
the free world by exploiting expressions of friendship for the Soviet
peoples and such offers as may be made for the peaceful resolution of
outstanding differences.
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b. To th_ e Satelli es of Eastern Europe.
In the light of factual reporting and reliable interpretation
of the events in the USSR and their consequences elsewhere, official
overt media should carry out in the satellites of Eastern Europe the
following tasks:
(1) To maintain and to invigorate the profound national,
including religious, sentiments that have been stimulated by the events
in the USS t.
(2) To recollect in detail the indignity and the exploitation
to which the peoples of the satellites have been subjected as the result
of their subjugation to the interests of the Kremlin, together with the
encouragement of the belief that their lot will be harder rather than
easier. under the new, inexperienced and insecure regime.
(3) To portray the United States as a strong, reliable power,
whose official declarations are to be taken as being serious, weighty
proposals for advancing the cause of freedom without general war,
(4) To maintain in the minds of the leaders of the satellites,
all proteges to one degree or another of the dead tyrant, doubts as to
their relationships with the new masters of Kremlin, together with
encouragement of the consideration that their survival may depend upon
a new regard for popular nationalist sentiments.
(5) To recollect the successful deviation of Tito, the success
ful'collaboration of Yugoslavia as an independent state with Greece and
Turkey and with the powers of the West and the potential significance
of a Balkan Entente.
(6) To suggest to subordinate officials that an opportunity
may soon be at hand to advance their personal ambitions at the expense
of their superiors.
. Tt'P:SECRE'T
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(7) To remind that the United. States does not return escapees
from countries behind the Iron Curtain.
(8) To discourage excessive hopes and consequent rash actions
on the part of the general population that might expose patriotic citi-
zens to vigorous reprisals at the hands of uneasy leaders.
(9) To disparage the stature of current leaders in the USSR
and the satellites on the ground that Mae has now become the leading
theoretician and revolutionary leader of international cormnunism.
c. To Communist Chin.
In addition to standard themes, official overt media should
carry out the following tasks:
(1) To promote friction at all. levels and eventually fission
between Chinese and Soviet communist leadership by indicating, among
other things, that the Chinese Cornmtunists are tools of the Kremlin.
(2) Specifically to promote rivalry and friction between
Chinese and Soviet Communist Party apparatuses in Southeast and Southern
Asia..
0) To foment disunity between Moscow and Peking regarding
the continuation of the Korean War, portraying a growing determination
in the United States to bring the Korean War to an end, by force if
necessary: by planting doubt whether the Soviet regime, in the period
while it is trying to consolidate its power, will back up the Chinese
Communists in the event the United States takes more forceful action
to end the Korean War, and by planting doubt about the stability of
the new Soviet regime and particularly about I !ia.lonkov's ability to gather
all the power factors under his control and to give ideological leadership.
(4) To exploit ideological differences and rivalry between
Mao and Moscow.
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(5) To play up Maots conception of Malenkov as an ideologi-
cal inferior and build,u..Mao. as the real heir of Lenin.
(6) To create doubt of validity of agreements and convnitmonts
made by Stalin to Mao--especially as regards aid for the Korean War, this
based on theory that Mao was Stalints man.
(7) To encourage the belief that the Soviet Union is holding
back material assistance in order to keep the People's Republic militar-
ily and economically dependent.
d. To Yiz, slavia,
In the light of the experience of Tito with the 'oviet regime,
his defection in 19,5, and his implacable hostility not simply to the
dead tyrant but to the whole system embodied in the Kremlin and the Com-
inform, small need exists for official overt media in output to YugoslaviG
to labor the significance of events in the USSR. At the same time, the
example and the posture at Yugoslavia at the present moment are extremely
significant, particularly to the satellites of Eastern Europe and to a
loss degree to Corerennmi,^t China, and recollection of the successful devia-
tion, the increasing collaboration with other free states on a basis If
mutual respect and independence and the potential of Balkan Entente may
be effectively exploited among them. With regard to Yugoslavia itself
official. overt media have the following tasks:
(1) To encourage the pride of the Yu.oslav: in the fact that
they escaped the doininr.tion of the Kremlin and the disagreeable conse-
quences at present events in the USSR,
(2) To recall the mutually beneficial results of past collab-
oration with the United States and other free nations and to develop con-
fidence in the security to be derived from similar collaboration in the
future.
(3) To develop assurance in the power, the reliability and the
seriousness of the United States as the loader of the free world in the
situation now created.
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e. To Western Euro (including Germax,,, j) a
Overt media to Western Europe should have primarily the following
tasks:
(1) To emphasize that the throat to the free world has not been
(2) to stress the need for prompt ratification of EDC and other-
wiso furthering NATO objectives.
(3) to point out the ~ese#bls-e~axge~/wc^ak ess in a situa-
tion whore Malonkov is no Stalin in political experience, ideological
leadership or party and state authority and control, v if he is or
Jiocomos the no1tt cal os h~,.i, not high ?or os . (Caution: Do oo
imply that there is immediate danger of war).
(4) to raise questions concerning the stability of the new regime.
(5) to stimulate confidence in the steadiness and reliability of
the United States in its role of leadership in the free world.
(6) to question whether local communist parties can now look to
Moscow for anything. Malenkov is a product of the Soviet bureaucracy with
little or no knowledge of foreign countries who cares nothing for the fate
of the communists there,
(7) to ask who is now the preomLnent theoratioian =d opckesman
for world communism--Mao or Malenkov.
(8) to cite the decay of the arts, science and culture of the
USSR during Malenkov' s rise to power.
f. To re TdP and Mi4 le Ea9t.
In view of the lack of appreciation generally prevailing in the area
concerning the menace of Soviet Communism, official overt media in output
to the Arab States have the following tasks:
(1) To emphasize that while the tyrant is gone, the tyranny with
all its imperial ambitions remains.
(2) to demonstrate that the national aspirations of the nations of
the area will not be furthered by a cessation of pressure from the USSR)
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even if it took place, but only thro tt termination of the disputes in the area,
elimin- tion of sources of internal tensions, adjustment cf differences with the
West and the building of adequate defensive strength.
43) to exploit. the confusion and the uncertainty that is likely to
beset Communist organizations and affiliated bodies in the area.
(4) to seize every oppotunity to enhance the repute and the standing
in the area of the United States and, as appropriate, its allies.
(5) to stressthe Soviet record with minority groups, including factua
material on Moslem purges of the t3Ots.
g. To, Free Asia (Ind,as Pakistan. Ceylon, Burma., Indonesia,. Malaya,
IndoChina, Korea, Formosa and 3a n .
To the extent that the belief spreads in Free Asia that conditions within
the USSR may Zea;ase a Feiaxatien-off Ito pressupes,-te the eaiae-eaten / lead it
to be less aggressive, support may diminish for the measures necessary to
LFFeseou4e-the-cen9li_c%s7 fight communists in Korea, in Indochina and in Malaya.
A special problem may arise with regard to the Overseas Chinese, outside Formosa
who, to the extent that they may be led to believe that the change in the USSR
weakens ties between it and the Chinese Communist regime, may be inclined to loot
more favorably on Mao, as 12 "n a nationalist leader rather than Las-oRe-par4ner
&n-a-gi:oba1 aox3mani:s% soaspirasy7 a tool of Moscow. Another special problem may
arise in connection with Communist Parties and their affiliates in the area; in
sowing doubt and confusion among them, care must be taken to avoid causing other
/.to-coma/ to 5ega&d_the:a as-peper-t1ger-0 consider the communist menace less
serious than it has been,
The following major tasks therefore fall on official overt media in output
to the area:
(1) Emphasizing that the change of command in the USSR involves no
change in the character, the capabilities or the intentions of the regime.
(2). emphasizing that, although the Loi---7 attitude of Mao may be
changed by events in the USSR, proof of it will be shown by deeds in Korea, in
Indochina and elsewhere, including Communist China itself, and not by words,
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(3) Emphasizing that national aspirations in the area will not
be achieved as the result of fortuitous events elsewhere, but only by hard,
etvonuous effort by each nation ir! the area and by individuals within it*
he , , t n Amcr,ca
In Latin America evidence of doubt, confusion, and distrust caused by
events in the USSR and In Carnrzunist parties elsewhere may be exploited
to ombarrass the Communist parties and their affiliates in the area.
Official overt media therefore have the following taskss
(1) To emphasize the continuing character of the Soviet regime,
regardless of its leadership, especially its lust for power, its ignorance
of the world, its abasement of culture, its perversion of education, its
scorn of religion and its utilization of anti-Semitisn, ,
(2) to identify and expose Communist and fellow-travelers making
early pilgrimages to Moscow.
(3) to expose evidence of subservience to the Kremlin on the part
of cultural, professional and labor organizations, especially of an inter-
national character.
(4) to identify and expose political leadership subservient to
the Kremlin.
to exhort the non-Communist and non-Extreme-Leftist ennosition
JU) tDfLrt, os tea estir therisolves because of the nrcbablc confusion in the local
_Corpmuni st high c- a d.
(6) to exhort the non-Corsnunist and non-Leftist rcgino sore of
w. ioh anno r to be 1n nrecvxiou$ resiticn to a how C.-T in t,-Corr:nunis
- t e th kin measl1rosthat hey r, t have b c afraid to take Pr o to
?talin's death.
to faster doubt anion the Con ,~u ist and Left st ou them -
selves as to the solidity of the present Co stn i~ csLIPlalenkov nay be
. 2l
the al ti az ass but he is not the high t and Co _ilur ist c e 11 s not
ag r on the Stalin ti e a o anything se and that raMILque is gone
To n ou a o a3 d comfort i tiz n law-az idin ec -
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ont uou o R .s is it if or Russi ontellitos, do iondod for
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NOTES ON POSSIBLE COMBINED POLITICO..MILITAI'Y..ECONOMTC ACTIONS
SIGNIFICANT TO TRY, PROGRAM FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OIER.ATIONS
IN EXPLOITATION OF THE DEATH OF STALIN
tat e Comment: "With respect to Part III, which suggests a sharp height-
ening of cold war pressures, the Department believes that such a course
at this time would not be advantageous as a means of exploiting Stalin's
death because it would tend to assist the regime in consolidating its
position. The Department believes that Part III should be dropped from
the paper and decisions along the lines suggested should be considered at
such time as heightened pressure is determined to be desirable". (Note:
Paragraphs underscored in Part III have been proposed since this comment
was made.)
On the assumption stated in Part I above, that the United States is
prepared to develop a major program to make progress in the attainment of
its objectives during the period immediately following Stalin's death, there
are certain actions which are either not normally classifiable as psycholo-
gical or which have inherent in them such Policy considerations as to place
them beyond the scope of the basic program. A number of such actions, howeve
are considered to be of sufficient psychological importance if undertaken,
that their consideration on psychologicra.l grounds seems merited. In any case
their psychological impact should be affirmatively considered in the develop-
ment of policy decisions concerning them. A preliminary list of such opera-
tions would include the following:
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1. 01aerations Invo vin National Security Policy.
Probably the greatest psychological impact we can produce on the
Soviet regime is that derived from decisions on United States preparednesse
Apparent acceleration of our military buildup, stepped up training schedules,
larger field exercises, the unofficial issuance of statements of pride on
military readiness, or reassignment of military units in a pattern suggesting
a readiness move, would all tend to convince the Soviet regime of our firm-
ness and the danger of a "bold" Soviet policy. To avoid disturbing our allies
such statements and moves would have to be directed to limited areas, and
should not be blatantly aggressive.
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2. Q erg ions nvolving Military Relations with Allied and Friendly
Countries.
a. Second only to decisions and actions with reference to the United
States Military Establishment, joint decisions and actions with our allies
to increase our readiness to meet any new dangers will have a profound
psychological impact in the Soviet regime. New staff talks with the
Yugoslavs, Greeks and Turks, increased shipments to NATO, etc., would
require most careful consideration in the Kremlin.
b, A fleet visit and aerial demonstrations in the immediate fu
for the Near and Middle. Eaa ~._ o ~~ d have psychological impact. Specifically,
United States forces could pass through the Suez Canal and pay courtesy
calls on such men. as Naguib. The fleet could proceed to conduct similar
visits throughout the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf area.
c. Consideration being given to the assignment of even token forces
to the Near and Middle East would if effected have a favorable ps chological
impact within this area itself, and would also pose a problem to the Soviet
regime.
0 era.tions Involving United Nations Actions in Korea.
a APormt ?miRelepms2Q MG t d Cis- 0tZ31$ 63dGOti2eaOxle&l.in, and
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(3) to step up noticeably preparations for an offensive in Korea
during the next several months with overt acts, such as expanded training
exercises, stepped up probing actions, by publicized movement of forces if
possible, apparently expanded logistics supplies to Koreas, the reinforce-
ment of Naval forces in local waters, and further public discussion of
extended air actions.
This concept of action need not pre-suppose that they must be con.-
sumrnsted in the sense of enlarging the Korean war. They are conceived
as methods of suggesting or implying pressures on the Soviet Orbit in Korea,
and are designed to confuse, overload and delay the policy machinery in the
Kremlin and in China.
b. Increased harassment of Soviet or Chinese shipping for its psycho-
logical effect could also be considered. Legal attachment of lend lease
ships engaged in traffic to Far Eastern ports when in neutral ports would
add to the burdens of the regime.
4. Operations Involving Political Considerations.
a. The establishment of a Volunteer Freedom Corps, whose ranks are
open to all those who oppose tyranny, and who are willing to accept the
leadersbip of the free nations of the world in determining when and whether
resort to force is required, would pose another problem.-
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b. The Supreme Commander'Allied Powers Europe, could propose the estab-
lishment of a world-wide fund drawn from contributions from military personnel
for the erection of a suitable memorial commemorating the dead of both sides
in World War II to be erected at the site of the signing of the World War II
armistice in Paris or Berlin.
The memorial could be described as a shrine to peace, sponsored by those
who have the best reason to wish for peace-the military. The Soviets should
be invited to participate perhaps through a direct appeal from senior United
States officers to their acquaintances in the Soviet Army, and when the memor-
ial is erected they should be invited to attend the dedication. If this offer
is accepted the United States will have an opportunity to seize the initiative
in the peace campaign, and if rejected, the Soviets mpy be embarrassed on a
world-wide scale.
e. The United States Delegation to the United Nations could urge the
directors and governing bodies of specialized agencies, particularly UNESCO,
WHO, and FAO to issue appeals for return or active participation of the Soviet
Union to these humanitarian and peaceful organizations. The directors of these
organizations could be encouraged to attempt to visit Moscow for this end. The
United States might also give consideration to sponsoring a resolution to this
effect in the General Assembly.
d. The United States could urge Nehru to send a high-level representative
to Peiping-or if possible to go himself-to explore the possibilities of a
Korean settlement. Or the United States could urge some neutral, such as
Nehru, to propose anew complete cease..fire in Korea on land, seams and air;
and new conference;? to-which the T r .ted States could promptly reply and enures
willingne ss to do so.
5. Operations Involving Diplomatic Activity with the Soviet Regime.
a. The United States could officially propose, perhaps upon the occasion
of the assignment of a new ambassador, that both nations remove their restric-
tions on the travel of diplomatic personnel.
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e. At4.some uture_ ate?,,,,_,,e ere arye could in,
in_Berl n between Beria and the Under Secretary of State and the Director
safe conduct and orderly __passe of
for r the purI?ose .. . of arranging for the
those who wish to'leave the Soviet Union to come out into the Western World
and there beq absorbed with aWmulti =nation economic refugee planBeria! ss
leavint,_, the_center of power,,_ andMe yen the consid,eration of it, would in-
crease w uneasiness and suspicion. and at the same time the humanitarian
interes-t_?_in re'e eewith its special appeal to many_grous _inthe free
nations. are all apparent.
6. EconomiOperations
a. The? TnitEZ States mightannounce new economic as istance for
certain countries in the Middle East.
Comment Mr, C?nI Jackson:
Economic warfare deserves a high priority in both overt and covert
fields, There are many thingq that can and should be done.
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