CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE COLD WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003400010021-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 21, 1951
• Content Type: PAPER

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REV1SEDs 21 ikp' 1951
P: YCIIOLOGICAL STRRTEGY BOARD
(D IICEPT OF THI' M GAIIIZATIOU TO PROVIDE
DYIIAIIIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
III TIIT' C" LD WAR
11 To analyze the scope and mission of the Psychological Strategy
Board and the tasks of the Director and the Staf:r; and to derive there-
from the qualifications and approximate compositl.on of the staff.
PACTS BF,A^IIIG OII TIM, PROBIF.TI
2, The pur_:ose of the Executive Directive of 4 April 1951, is
the
"to authorize and provide for/more effective planning,
coordination and conduct, within the framework of
approved national policies, of psychological opera-
tions)
3tl The Psychological Strategy Board is responsible for the
"formulation and prcimulgatioa, as guidance to the
departments and agencies responsible for psycho,
logical operations, of ovor*all national psycho-
logical objectives, olicies and programs, and for
the coordination and evaluation of the national
psychological effort"
tea The is provided a Diroctorl, designated by the President, re-
sponsible under the Board for directing its activities. Ho is assisted
by a staff, the organization, qualifications aixi size of which, within
Units set by the Board, are established by h : to
DI SCU"SIO21
5o The Directive creates no new operating agency, I. results from a
general sense of need for harnessing the disparate resources of existirgy
departments and agencies responsible for executing various psychological
operations and intensifying the national effort. It includes under the
term "psychological operations" a wide spectrum cT overt and covert
activities.- from 'propagation of truthful foreie'a information to sub-
versive operations of both a moral and a physical character?
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6, In face of the peculiar challenge of Bolshevist Russia, the primary
objective of intensifying these unconventional national e, forts IL-- to trio
the cold tsar and prevent declared global war. Failing this, the second-
ary objective is to create c )nc}ition; favorable to our orthodox forces
.n the event of war. If all our resources available for psychological
operations were bro:,.ght to bear consirtent],y, progre -ively and cumula-
tively,, the chances of kee ding the peace or speedily winning the war
taould be iantacasurably increased. If that is true, the establishment of
an organization for exploiting these resources should be consider d a
major national project. It should not be undertaken with half in sores.
7. Psycho log. cal operations are in no manner a substitute for sound
political-diplomatic actions, strong armed forces or alert intelligence.
Psychological operations reflect the strength of all these but will al-
ways be cubcidiary'or supplementary to orthodox governmental operations.
Therefore, the functions of the Psychological Stratedr Board are not in
competition or conflict with normal operations of the departaonts and
agencies, Instead, the Board coordinatee and steers the resources of
their psycholo ical units into profitable channels toward national goals.
0. Soviet Russia and the satellites employ every instrumentality of
governmnt, orthodox and unorthodox, in lighting the cold war, Foreign
offices back up their propaganda; ground, sea and. air forces shift and
naneuver in support of the psychological war. It is di ficult to say
whether orthodox forces supplemont psychological operations or the con-
trary ? which is dog and which is tail. All Soviet resources arc de-
ployed actively or potentially in support of war that is now being waged.
As long as they have the initiative, our conventional planning for a
future declared war is constantly thrown off balance and tends to be con-
fused or unrealistic,
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9. Conventional concepts and plans based q= a L-Day which no man
can predict lead us into the diler a of taro dangerous extrc eso
Either our state of preparedness will be inadequate on the critical
day or over bilization longs dratiur.out mil be economically destruc-
tive, Particularly is this true because var plans are based upon
the assumptioi that the cold war cannot be decisive. Planning would
be more realistic if it xrere assumed that the cold war could be von
axfl if von9 could be decisive, This assumption uduld occasion a
modification of conventional car plans but not in such manner or do-
gr?e as to alter significantly the state of our ]preparedness at any
particular future date. The assumption could, honaver,, greatly enhance
the importance to be attached to currext cold car operations,, enlarge
the concept of such operations and ensure the av..dlabilitsy of both
active and potential national facilitiei!3 (orthocbx as cell as unortho-
dox) in its conduct.
lA? This conceptual background of the Psychological Strategy Board,
the importance of the rtalcea 1.swolved9 ands the scope and variety of
operations to be coordinated -. these all are indicators of the :requi-
site qualifications of the director and h#Ls staff.
32., Although the Board does not perferia psychological operations', its
responsibility to give impetus to an int ,a,sified psychological effort
implies considerable power of decision in the initiation and control of
major projects. Likewise,, chile the psychological operating units irithin
the dents and agencies caua)t be di by the Board to carry out
its programs, the individual me b?ra of the Board ox officio are of such
prestige as to create the presumption that the amecuti agencies will
conWider guidance aid by thc; members as being in effect mandatory.
F EllET
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12 Kceping in mind this implied authority,, the Board, Director and
Staff should oxorcice functions comparable to both conuiand and staff
even though their explicit authority limits the nature of "conrmiandr
to guidance, Otherwise expressed, the hirector and Staff are re,8pon~-
sibin for the management of the psychological aspects of the national
cold war effort, Since no single individual could have the competence
or time to manage the global campaign,, it seems evident that under the
supervision of the 11rector,, this management must be in part delegated
to staff assistants. A uorkmble arrangeiaent could be to employ for
this puz ose regional and functional specialists, each of wham would
be responsible for assisting in the formulation of and directly
charged frith steering his part of a coordinated global program,
13. Ire precision can notr be given to the role of the Board.,
to the qualifications of the Lector and to the composition and
functions of the Staff,
24. in the specific field of psychological orations the Board
functions begin where the functions of the National Security Council
leave off, The Council promulgates broad national policies and prin-
ciples but its reports are too general to constitute blue-print" for
isiiplementationo The Board on the other hand adopts specific and practiw
cable objectives and initiates action to attain theme The Board ap-
proves limes of action and programs trhich assign workable and coordis'
natod tasks to the operating agencies.
25, The mmubers of the Board will be able to give only limited
pars nal time to the details of management of national psychological
operations, Hoover,, their Mci sions,, when tram ated into dynamic
action programs by the Director and his Staff and promulgated to the
E parfancnts and Agencies,, can give national purpose,, consistency and
continuity hitherto impossible in this field.
~q '
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16. Within the. powers of the Board, the Director should be
bowed a high degree of ird tiative to act promptly and flexibly in those
fast Zoving situations inherent in psychological warfare. He Should
be supported against bureaucratic inertia or obstruction in bringing
to bear, at favorable opportunities, all national psychological. re-
sources in order to maintain the offensive in the cold var.
THE DIRECTOR
a
17. The Director should be a nationally Iowa figure and have
broad back ro,~.nd in internati -nal affairs' Preferably he should have
experience in pore than one aspect of the broad spectrum of activities
comprised in psychological operations an defined in the President's
Directive, He should be rioro a man of action than an intellectual
analyst. He should be capable of quick and bold decisions within his
authority, but methodical in directing long .rye planning by his staff.
By 3ud nont and tact he should be able to inspire tea=sork in operating
departments and agencies.
ISO His task is of'such national importance as to deserve unhesitating
support from the Board and the President himself'
As prescribed by the President's Directive, he ehalli
ao Be responsible for having prepared the programs,
policies, reports, and rec=endations for the
Board's c oa sideration,,
b, sit frith the Board and be responsible to it for
organizing its business and for a:reediting the
reaching of decisions,
co Promulgate the decisions of the Board,
do Ascertain the manner in which agreed upon objoc.
Lives, policies, and programs of -the Board are
being implemented and cu ..rdinated &iong the
departments and agencies concerned,
eo Report thereon and on his evaluation of the
national psychological operations to the Board
together with his recommendations,,
fo Perform such other duties necessary to carry out
his responsibilities as the Board may direct4
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THE STA.
19. The Staff al ould have responsibility under the Director for
the performance of the follotuing specific functions tthich cannote
delegated to operating agencies:
a. Within the fra metrork of approved national policies,,and
as authorized by the Board, the forr-ulation .and .pr:mulgation in
practical operating terms (not abstractions) of coordinated world
wide and regional
(7L) psychological policies,
(2) psychological objectives,
(3) psychological programs.
by Giving impetus to the detailed planning and execution
by the operating agencies,
c. Continuous evaluation of tha rea_lts of operations
with a view to making prompt addnstmenti in the programs when meexas.
s
d0 The pre lion of requirovi reporte,g
e. Its own secretariat?acbini stratLve duties,
'?2i. The _ore oirg list inadeoquate'j;y reflects activities required
to give vitality-to the conduct of the cold 'warn It does, however,
suggest the indispensability of dy17a,X:: personalities to give flesh
and, blood to the organization. TX the Director and Staff Ave them-
selves up to pondering and planning, t;va shall have succeeded only in
establishing another Ivory Tower. tihi,e they must plan systematically
to the extent necessary to formulate eafund strategic objectives and
practical programs,, the Director and h);s principal assistants should
sense themselves as being full tim "at'? the front" in the cold war as
literally as commanders in orthodox veal,
21d As principal aide the Lirecto-. should have certain regional
and functional chiefs (each with a rew.:assistants) vho should be outer
standing experts in their respeat-&ve ;igraphio-political and functional
areas. These principal subordinates ~.apreeent in a sense the "commanders"
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of the regional operations, gore accurately, as a group they might
approgr3ately be called the,
ppera onai Coors don and aentation Division
The specific regional staff Sections euggestod are:
(a)
Soviet Russia and European satellites,
Cbina, South ??ast Asia and South Asia,
c)
tflddlle and Near East and Nos Lam North Africa,
(d)
(e)
Laidn crag
22,
a,
In intimate personal 13ai.ton Wth the corcrespapding
regional bads of the operutiz agencies, the Chiefs of the fbregOing
staff sections exercise their steeria'coordinatirg function
vit&in the terms of the a_;provod.policies otjecties and pro.
grams formulated by the Strategy. Group and Vie Plans and Programs
Division. Alsop in collaboration frith the Matter staff, they assist
in all steps in the faxvnulation of p,olicies,,, objoctives, and pro?
grans applicable to thAr respectdv3 regLons, They follcrt, the
development of the opt 'ati ons9 evaluate the re maim and k ep the
Director currently infrxmed of nodifications chic b may be ruuquired
in the peso
be; The ragirnal chiefs should be 4* npwwez?ed to f-irniih the
authorized interpretraion to operating agencies of approved policies,
objectives and procram's,
c There should also be provisions for f."uctional speciali.'
zation as appropriate.
23, The other major rosponsibilily of the cttLff s that, of p'.an ii.ng
on the nati nal 1 vo19, that is. the formulation of policies, oo je tives
and procrams as guidance to the operating agencies. These major -livi.'
amens of the staff might be called the Strategy Grou and the Plaa
and. Programs Divi''i.?.n' These staff ,iivi: i onsy should be responsible
for the formulation and cc runication to the apcAtting depcixtuents and
agencies of all tMms of for l L;u tdance required to irritiats the
projects and pur,oses of the Dosrdo
Vrn
0 - - Il U
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Starategrsr CrxvM
26 This gr.up sits at the call of the motor and is chaired
by him, Its permanent membership should consist of the Director,
the Board Desigwes and a wail group of professrional7y stdlled
flil3.' t no consultants. In additions, Regional and Functional Imp-
plementere from the Opcrational Coordination and Implementation,
Division, as well as consultants from operating departments and,
agencies should sit with this group, when the subject of discussion
requires.
25, In addition to routes businase of the Staff, the Strategy
Group considers policies, objectives and projects originated
by the Board as wall as those self-originated, ,hen approved by
the Boards they are passed to the Plans and Programs Division for
formulation into coordinated guidances, plans or programs for
prim ulgation to the aprrating agencies,
26? It is from the Strategy Group perhaps that the most inagi-
native and consecutive tYdnag should emerge. It is hero that
the global psychological aspects of the cold =- are considered as
a whole, The long-range objectives having been formulated,s inter-
nediate objectives are adopted and strategic moves to attain thorn are
continuously studied. The initiative in the cold war is seised! at
each f-vorable opportunity. Tho broad terms of the action required
are decided. Me Plans and Programs Division t1ten works out coordi-
nated guidance or programs required by the operating agencies to
initiate planing or inaeediate action, depending upon the nature
and urgency of the operation.
Plane and Programs _ Dir~r rrr ri ~uurr~
27. This is the pla ning unit of the Staff which performs the
mechanics of program planning, Its functions are tti incorporate into
coordin-nod guidances, plans or programs the strategic decisions and
courses of action approved by the Board and to promulgate them to the
operating agencies. In their f4 nO form these guidances, plans and
program:, while of broad national scope and in a global framework,
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should constitute basic blueprints for action an the part of
one or more of the operating agencies. They should not be per-
mitted to degenerate into abstractions or generalities, but
should be formulated only in terms of prccticab1D tangible ob-
jectives.
20. A key nucleus of the Plans and Prograas Division should be
recruited from the only area of gaverm went where systematic and
coordinated planning is really understood and. practiced, namely,
the armed services. These key planners c.ul1 establish a patUm
and instruct specialists, dratm from ,sycholoical operating
agencies, in the essential nochanics of program ngo Plans and
programs should be kept realistic by intimate collaboration on
an ad hoc or task basis of regional and funct.oral specialists
from the operating departwnte and agencies and from the operational
Coordin-tion and Implementation Division,"
SUI3111RY OP Q IlcEPT
29. Planning and operational coordination should be based
on the assumption that the cold uar can be void. As a secondary
responsibility only, should the Board permit the energies of the
Staff to be diverted to planning varUme programs as distinct from
current operations. A small nucleus of planners night appropriately
be set apart for progr a, national plans for psychological uurfars
in uart3sie,, but major consideration should be g:van to the current
opor,%t ions of the global conflict.
30. Ronbering the IDDDay for the cold war occurred several years
ago, the plans and programs crith which the board zri;Irl be primarily
concerned are for a campaign being fought nou. The Board and Its
Staff should conceive itself to function as the oomLnd and staff
of an army in combat rather than as a department of defense preparing
sEe
E T
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.~9v
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POSSUM 0RGAHM=ON
and DIRECTOR
Coard? t Speech Co-
Regional & motor
Function. q
sa v r~.ns is wa ileb1,e in ttie aperating
r rcn the Government or private life e
3,LuE t use to be made of reji saga- mctia.
depe aments and a , es
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Denignees
Aill au4/or? par t? co nirdt rr Va
I Division Miefs and operational
i Coordinator9G
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COMMENTS OF MR. HOWLAND SARGEANT ON
"CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE DYNAMIC
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE COLD WAR"
The subject paper is a personal expression of General Magruder
designed to be helpful in the establishment of the new Psychological
Strategy Board. While most of the concepts in the paper are ones
with which I would heartily agree, there are a few points to which
I would take exception. These differences are mainly matters of
degree rather than of kind, but it may be useful to try and express
them.
The following principles seem to me to be basic to the success-
ful operation of the Board:
1. Our psychological program will succeed only as personnel
and offices responsible for detailed planning and implementation
perform their functions with greater and greater efficiency. To
impose a large super-structure on top of them and to remove many
of their functions in whole or in part would, I believe, introduce
new requirements for coordination and liaison activities, deal a
serious blow to the morale of persons now engaged in psychological
operations, and in the end result in diminishing rather than
increasing the efficiency of their work. Activities of the new
PSB staff can result either in stifling the initiative of lower
echelons or in inspiring them to greater efficiency. Every effort
should be made to see that the latter result is achieved.
2. With respect to psychological programming, the principal
need which the new Board and its staff can fill is that of formu-
lating very broad government-wide policies, especially such policies
as are presently beyond the competence of any single department or
agency. The application of these policies to concrete operating
situations should be entrusted to the individual agencies. It
should be noted that the tendency in many administrative structures
is to secure the services of competent experts and then to overload
them with details to such a degree that they are unable to devote
more than a very few minutes of their time to the larger picture.
This is especially true in the field of psychological operations.
To over-simplify the matter, it might be said that more exhaustive
attention is often given comparatively minor matters of detail than
to broad questions of major importance. Consequently, it is of
utmost importance that the staff of the now Board and the Director
himself should not be overloaded with detailed matters of administra-
tion or implementation. This is one of the principal reasons for
keeping the staff small and whenever possible arranging for the
delegation of functions to existing agencies.
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3. The number of individuals in the United States who
are competent to serve on the staff of the new Board is very small
indeed. A few might be obtained from outside the government, but
the majority of them are already occupied in existing agencies. If
we strip these agencies of their most highly-qualified policy personnel,
we will have lost more than we have gained since, as noted in one
above, the ultimate success or failure of our psychological opera-
tions will depend most of all upon the efficiency of the individual
agencies.
There are several points at which General Magruder's paper may
conflict with these principles, although it is possible that the
apparent conflict rests in the manner in which certain passages
are interpreted. The following comments are offered by way of
example:
In paragraph 19 on page 6 it is stated that the staff should
be responsible under the Director for the formulation and promulga-
tion in practical operating terms of coordinated world-wide and
regional psychological policies, objectives and programs. It is
further stated that this function cannot be delegated to operating
agencies. It is my feeling that the staff should in fact delegate
most of the preliminary work in this connection to operating agencies
and should itself be responsible only for the final formulation and
promulgation. Furthermore, this formulation should not attempt to
be in "operating" terms if this means that the needs of each medium
must be spelled out, nor should it be in "regional" terms if this
means that detailed consideration should be given to the differing
requirements of each country. The implementation of policy by
various communications media and the requirements of specific
regions could more efficiently be spelled out in detail by experts
in the existing agencies.
In paragraph 19c, also on page 6, it is said that the staff
should make a continuous evaluation of the results of operations
with a view to making prompt adjustments in the programs when
necessary. My objection may be merely a matter of wording, but I
feel that the words "make a prompt adjustment" implies a degree of
involvement in operations which was not contemplated by the
Presidential directive. Perhaps it would be adequate to say merely
that the staff should recommend such adjustments to the operating
agencies.
Paragraph 20 on page 6 expresses the fear that if the Director
and staff give themselves up to pondering and planning, we would
have succeeded only in establishing another Ivory Tower. Herein,
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I believe, there is a difference only in emphasis, but I believe
that this wording might obscure the fact that at the present time
our detailed planning is often far in advance of our long-term
planning.. Would it not be better to encourage the Director and
staff to "pond- and iDlan" as long as this cerebration is harnessed
to the realities of operations. As stated above, we have not given
our mo6t qualified thinkers an opportunity to think. Let us insure
text some of them at least have an opportunity to do so in. the staff
of PSB.
Paragraph 21 on page 6 suggests that the staff should include
certain regional and functional chiefs who are outstanding experts
in their respective geographical and functional areas. Certainly
i* is to be hoped that personnel can be found for PSB who will have
certain regional or functional qualifications, but PSB should not
try to compete with the operating agencies when it comes to regional
or functional experts.. Instead, PSB policy experts should plan to
rely principally on the regional and functional specialists in the
various agencies.
Paragraphs 23 and 24 suggest the creation of a "strategy
group." It is my feeling that the entire senior staff of the
PSB should be considered such a strategy group and that to create
a special organization so entitled within the PSB staff would imply
that the rest of the PSB staff would be concerned with details which
might more appropriately be left to the operating agencies.
In general, my feeling is that the PSB should strive to
conduct its business with as small a staff as possible and should
attempt to perform only such substantive tasks as are in addition
to those now being performed in the operating departments and
agencies. It may be that this conception is not far removed from
that expressed in General Magruder's paper, but that paper may also
be interpreted as advocating a large staff which would to a large
extent duplicate or supplant certain functions of existing agencies.
These comments, therefore, are intended only to highlight the dif-
fering interpretations which are possible and to assist in their
resolution.
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