AN EVALUATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF U.S. EFFORT IN ITALY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300190049-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: January 6, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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AN EVAUJATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EYJ CT OF U,S. EFFORT IN ITALY
This paper, which is based upon contributions by the Department of
State, Departntt of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency and Mutual
Security Agency, is an attempt to assess the nature, impact and results
of our national psychological effort in Italy from l945 to the present.
It is. suggested that the national psychological. effort be defined as- the
sum total of national policies and programs which, insofar as they have
had an impact upon the psychological climate in Italy, have contributed
or failed to contribute to the attainment of our national objectives
regarding Italy.
Almost without exception, every step we have taken of major importance
in and with regard to Italy during the past seven years, and some that
we have taken on a world scale, have had an impact on the psychological
climate of Italy-usually favorable, sometimes unfavorable. Fbr instance,
The Marshall, Plan,'the North Atlantic Treaty and the American resistance
In Korea have had more positive effect on the psychological situation in
Italy than any purely informational or propaganda effort not based on
actions could have had, However, without the information and propaganda
programs to exploit such actions the net results would have been less
favorable to us than they have been. By the same token, the delay in
Western efforts to secure a pro-Italian settlement of the Trieste
question, and the failure to solve.Italyes emigration problem, have caused
psychological reactions in Italy which no propaganda could have prevented.
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Thercforef, asu:an nt of the national psychological effort swat
be keyed to a ,judgmeas;" of our success in attaining over-all national
policy objectives by all means employed, with primary emphasis upon
the psychological factors involved. Acoordingll this paper is presented
in four sections a brief chronological account of major policies and
developments rc speotin,% Italy since 1945; a more detailed analysis of
the relationship betweet, U.S, policies .-.nd programs axed ,major Italian-
problems of a paychologLeal nature in the military, economic and political
spheres; a discussion o' information, cultural and exchange program; and
a suimnary. evaluation,
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A Chronological Account
1945.16
World War II ended with Allied forces occupying Italy9 which had
been granted the status of co-belligerent following the Armistice of 1943"
It was U.S. and U.K% policy to allow the Italian Government a wide measure
of freedom in the establishment of democratic government and the rehabRili.
tation of economic and social life. Liberated areas had been turned over
to the Italian Government for administration and military government had
been withdrawn as rapidly as possible.
In its first poet-war winter, Italy was faced with the problem of
recovering from tuo paralysing decades of Fascism capped by invasion9
and,, in a senses-civil war. The country had suffered an overwhelming
military defeat, Allied troops were in occupation; the peace treaty was
yet to be negotiated; law and order were yet to be reestablishedl industry
and trade were thorougbly disrupted; and the governmental future was still
unknown. During 1945-46, the Italians staggered through these difficulties
on a day-to-day basis. The government remained in the hands of a coalition
of anti-fascist parties, including the Communists who at that time were
joined in a war created "united front",
U.S. policy at this time had as its long-range objective "enabling
Italy to become a constructive element in a peaceful Europe." Economic
relief proceeded on a piece-meal basis through private organizations,
UNRRA and direct UoS. Government programs for providing essential commodi-
ties. These programs prevented actual starvation9 but did not provide the
basis for real recovery. Moreover9 they did not prevent a sharp deterioration
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in the political climate during 1946. The CommunistsD still in the role
of collaborators, gradually shifted towards outright obstructionism and
denunciation of the allies and the democratic moderate parties., In the
national elections in June 1946, the Communists won some 19 percent of
the votes the Socialist 21 percent and the Christian Democrats 35 percent,,
!iniuioal elections in November showed an accelerated trend to the Left;
The economic situation also worsened rapidly.
I:egotiation of the Peace Treaty., which imposed many sacrifices upon
Italy was bitterly resented by many Italians who felt that their -share
in the defeat of Germany had not been taken into sufficient account.. The
R.S. attempted to counteract the developing mood of anger and despair by
increasing its diplomatic support of the Italian governments by receiving
an official visit from DeGasper?ig by concluding a commercial agreement with
Italy and by continuing eeonanic aid, However, the current seemed strongly'
againmt use
1941-48
The year 1947 marked the low point in Italy's postwar fortunes,
DeG.speri, goaded beyond endurance by Communist tactics, finally managed
to eliminate them from the Government in Mgr. The Communists. thereupon
launched a nationwide campaign of strikes, riots and individual and col-
lective violence designed to sabotage recovery$ destroy public confidence
and prepare the way for a legal or possibly violent overthrow of the Govern-
ment., in this campaign they were considerably strengthened by their control,
over all organized labor, cemented at the first post-war convention of the
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uniffed labor organization, the COIL, in ?W. Also helpful 'to the Communists
was the mounting inflation and, in December, the withdrawal of remaining
Allied troops in accordance with terms of the treaty,
Despite certain counteracting developments,-such as a split-off of
A minority of Socialists from the Communist-led "'tited fronts,"---a halt
the. n tion9 spiral brought about r massive imports and sweeping
zredit. restricti_ona, approval of the new Constitution and U.S. oorsideration
of the European Recovery Program,-circumstances led to a oiogound fear
late in 19117 both in Italy and abroad that the Communists had a very good
chance of winning power in the spring elections of 1911.8,,
.Zn this situation, the U.S. Government determined that it should do
whatever it could to bring about the economic recovert, of Italy and a
rapid rise in her standard of living in order to! (1) preserve the
existence of Italy an an independent, democratic state, friendly to the
U.S. and capable of effective participation in the effort to withstand
Soviet expansion and Communist Infiltration; and (2) support the current
non-Communist government in maintaining public order and authority against
the extreme lefts, and prevent a Communist?Socialllst bloc victory in the
elections or the seizure of power by these forces,
Actions in pursuance of these policies included stopped-up visits
of American warships to Italian ports; official statements stressing that
Italy would not receive u.s. economic aid should the Communists come to
power; clear indications of support for moderate anticommunist political
forces, and assistance to Italian police forcee~ Private group, in the
U.S. " with official encoura
gerrentA helped through gift-package
campaigns, letter-writing campaigns, and radio broadcasts,
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Additiotally, the U0So9 Uo4o, and Frame joined in a Declaration to
the effect that the provisions of the peace Treaty with regard to Trieste
had proved ur rkah .e and that the entire Free Territory should be returned
t italy., All of these actions, together with a massive campaign by the
r dorate parties and Catholic lay groups in Italy, helped to give the
moderates a resounding victory in the April elections.. Combined, they won
65 percent of the popular vote, the Christian Democrats alone receiving
nearly 50 percent. ,
1948-52
Italian confidences however, did not assert itself until, in the
wake of the elections,, the Government proved itself capable of handling
any Communist resort to violence. Disorders and a national strike engineered
b ! the Communists following the attempt on Togliatti es life on July 14
served to demonstrate that the goavernmentas security forces were in most
cases able to keep control, and that the workers would not follow the
communists blindly in semi-insurrectionary strikes. It was than that
Catholic dissidents broke away from the CGIL to establish an anti-Communist
labor organisation,, the CISL0 Finally, Congressional approval of the
Marshall Plan assured the Italians of substantial economic aid.
With the consolidation of the democratic victory., U.S. policy evolved
in terms of the following main objectivesz
1. Maintenance in power of a broadly representative, moderate anti-
communist democratic government friendly to the U.So
2. Encouragement of friendship for the UoSo, and solicitation of the
support of the Italian government-and the majority of the Italian people
for basic U.S. foreign policy.
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3. Encouragement of economic and political integration of Italy
into the European and North Atlantic Communities-
tra nitg of the potential of the Italian armed forces within
of the Peace Treaty.
#i ouragement of Italian economic recovery and of certain laatirg
F'cuc'd is and !social reforms essential to making Italy a viable economic
ard,t and to the establishment of long-run stability in Italy.
r a all Plan contributed substantially to Italian economic
oa? ry and thus achieved in large part its chief objecctive. Italian
production surpassed the 1939 level as did the standard of living for
the 11ally a mployed. However, unemployment and under-employment have re-
mained chronic throughout the period, and the Italian govermaent's various
efforts to deal with unemployment have succeeded only in preventing its
irarease. Progress on basic economic and social reforms has likewise been
extremely limited,
International developments also contributed to the consolidation of
Italian confidence that the communist threatsboth external and internal
was not beyond control.. Yugoslavias defection from the Communist bloc
early in 1944 relieved the immediate threat from the East,, although sub-
sequent developments led to new difficulties in Italian-Yugoslav relations.
Creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including Italy, come'
milted the U0S0 to defend Italy in the event of Soviet aggression. The
military aid .program beginning in 1950 and the removal of certain restrictive
military provisions of the peace treaty in 1951 laid the basis for the
beginnings of an Italian defense structure. Approval of the Schuman Plan
signaled a mare toward greater European integration which might bring Italy
both economic benefits and increased security.
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Internally, the communists ret rred to tactics of moderation and
legality, preserving their dominant position in the labor movement and
gradually increasing their support at the po3-1s4 The fovea rent refrained
from taking strong measures against the Communists, although with the
approach of the 1953 elections and the intensification .of Communist agitaa
Lion, I)eGasperi demonstrated a greater willingness to press for anti-
Communist measures.
With the attach on Korea, a rew set of conditions developed. U.S.
resistance in Korea helped to convince the Italians that they could count
on us to fit should the Soviets attack Europe., At the same timrje, the
shift in emphasis of our aid program from economic reconstruction to
defense support, with its corollary demand for a sizable Italian defense
effort,, encountered resistance. Economically, the Korep conflict brought
a renewal of inflationary pressures., which served to confirm the Govern-
,rent in its restrictive credit policy.
Currently. the Italian economic picture continues to be dark. Unem-
ployrrent is some 10 percent up fron a year ago, although large offshore
,w~rccurement purchases under the Mutual Security Program are expected to
casntermct this situation some-h, t. The Communists and allied parties
a ?~ r alntained their voting strength and indeed enlarged it, while the
extreme rivhtist raa tie s have grown rapidly, both at the expense of the
.enter, General sopuLxr ussatisf).action with the natio&s lack of progress
rider the current goverment has been the pr mary cause of for this ccfine
n the strength of the r-ioderats coalittonq.
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 ::EGRET
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Major Policies and Problems
POLITICAL DMIAPMENTS
During the past seven years, Italy's internal. political problems have
revolved largely around the Communist issue. In a sense, the Communist
threat has done more to shapeItalian political affairs and U.S. policy
responses than has any other single influence.-
It must be recalled that the Italian Communist Party (FCX) was in a
most favorable psychological position at the end of World War Ii. Communist
partisans had taken a leading role in the war-time resistance movement and
shared with other anti-Fascist groups a general popular esteem, both in
Italy and abroad. As in France, a coalition government including the Com-
munists and their allies among the Socialists seemed at that time to be a
natural development.
Failure to recognize earlier the threat implied in this situation
contributed significantly to the growth in the PCPs poser. During the
period in which they had a relatively free hand, the Communists utilized
every means of infiltrating the government, consolidating their control
over organized labor, subverting Italian Socialism to their authority, and
extending their populaappeal through agitation and propaganda. After
the PCI had shifted from its moderate,, cooperative tactic to one of violent
attacking the Center, the danger became apparent both to U.So and Italian
policy makers. By this time there was grave doubt that the situation
could be saved.
Events leading up to the elections of 1948 carried considerable psycho-
logical significance. On the other hand,, the Communists, who were hewing
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to a nationalist lines played skillfully upon the prevailing mood of
popular despair compounded by the country's economic plight and the damage
done to national prestige by Italy's overwhelming defeat in war and the
terms of the Peace Treaty. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats,
strongly supported by the Catholic Church, made effective use of U.S. moral
and'material support, evidence of the PCI'a subservience to Moscow and the
broad ideological religious argument of incompatibility between Catholicism
and atheistic Communism.
In this situation, U.S. policies and programs had the distinct psycho-
logical objective of contributing to a victory for the moderate coalition
led by the Christian Democratso Uur shows of strengths our promises of
greater economic aid conditioned upon defeat of the Communists and our
various private propaganda efforts can be.credited with a major and perhaps
decisive influence on the election outcome, Our most important action, and
perhaps the only case when psychological considerations actually determined
U.S. policy on an important subject pertaining to Italy, was the Declaration
of March 20, 1948 on Trieste. The statement caused a tremendous sensation
in Italy. and contributed substantially to the Center victory. (see below
for further discussion of Trieste.)
Developments in Italy's internal political affairs since 1946 have
served to urIsrscore certain psychological elements in the Italian scene
which help to explain the continuing strength of the CommUnistso Italy,
with little democratic experience and well-nigh ruined by two decades of
Fascist rule and a devastating war, faces tremendous problems of social
integration Italian life is dominated by the struggle of the poor to.
achieve economic security and of the wealthy to hang on to what they haven
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This has resulted in a nigh degree of class consciousness and division
a may be added the sharp regional division between Northern Italians,,
T 'Joy an in&an ti1.tM z d and reasonably modern socio-economic pattern,,,
and "cut',. i~r-
i,zj is lar sly agrarian and quasi-feudale
c s *01 ;,. ?~? ov*rwholmiugly Roman Catholic, are split by a
r oa tcrac do ? a4? arty velerioalism which asserts itself against the
(hunch: while t1 a latter-,, in its opposition to Communism, takes an inereas-
s ~`iy : cve past in the natsion's political life,,
n this atanos8 a9 the Italian Communist Party has developed into
a mass organization (1,800,000 members) with a fairly broad popular appeal.
Over and beyond the advantages it has derived from a disciplined,, conspira-
torial leadership, a sizable pars-military organization, and an ample supply
of fwsiep the 1CI has enjoyed psychological advantages inherent in the
Italian scene. It has capitalised upon Italian laborts traditional vulner-
abtl_1.ty to class appeals and anti-clericalism to consolidate its leading
position among the workers. By its identification with anti-Fascism,
nationalistic goals, the "peaces campaign and, above all, the narrow
economic interest of the average Italian, the iCI has built a broad popular
following which,, though not strongly doctrinaire in its loyalty, regards
the Communist party as a respectable and effective medium for political
actions And indeed as the only effective political force with the worker's
interest at heart,, Since its departure from the Government in 1947 the
party has enjoyed an additional psychological asset in the average Italian's
traditional attitude of hostility to government itself,,
in contrast, the Christian Democratic Party, leader of the moderate
coalition, is not a unified party with a recognizable doctrine but rather
the receiver of those elements in Italy which oppose-eitther'permanently
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12.
or for the time being--the Communist and Fascist extremes. The CD includes
diverse interests whose outlook ranges from liberal to reactionary, and
who are unable to unite on a vigorous domestic program, including positive
measures to destroy the Communist Party. The CD!s identification with the
Church is at once a source of considerable strength and considerable Weak-
ness. Given tho partyle almost exclusive responsibility for the policies
of the present Governnsentp the failure of that Government thus far to
alleviate to any significant degree Italy's grave economic problems and.
to serve a satisfactory solution of the Trieste question has led to a
progressive deterioration in the CD's popular support.
During this period, the psychological impact of most U.S. policies
and programs visa-vie Italy unquestionably helped to maintain the DeGasperi
Government in power and to prevent any greater deterioration in its popular
support. The Marshall Plan led to a degree of economic recovery without
which public confidence in the Government might have collapsed. (see
Economic Developments for a more detailed discussion). U.S. encouragement
of Italian participation in the economic and political integration of the
Western European community, as in our support for Italian membership in
NATO over British oblectionsa helped to restore Italian national pride,
redounding to the Government's psychological advantage. Similarly, our
consistent support for Italy's application for UN membership (blocked by
Soviet veto) and our concurrence in the release of Italy from the restrie
V -ve military* provisions of the Feaee Treaty, added to the Oov+eranent's
popular appeal. All of these steps likewise encouraged Italian fzfendship
for the U.S. and support of basic U.S. foreign policy.
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The most important issue in which U.S. policy since 1948 has had a
negative psychological effect upon our central objective of maintaining
the moderatq democratic coalition in power has been the disposition of
Trieste and the corrolary Yugoslav question. As mentioned earlier, the
joint Declaration of 1948 proposing the return of Trieste to Italy was
greeted enthusiastically by all Italians. Almost immediately thereafter,
however, Yugoslavia defected from the Soviet camp, relieving Italy of an
immediate external Communist threat, yet at the same time complicating the
Trieste issue.
No love is lost between the Italians and the Yugoslavs, who retain a
Otter memory of the Italian occupation during World War II. As develop-
ing strategic requirements caused us to channel increasing economic and
milltaiy aid to Yugoslavia,, Italian resentment and fear for its claims
upon Trieste mounts-d. The Italian Communists seised upon the continuing
failure to tmphemeni. the Declaration of 1948 to denounce both the Govern-
ment and the 'U.S. So strong has been Italian sentiment regarding Trieste
that all parties have climbed aboard the issue. Yugoslavia,, meanwhile,
bas become * no less adamant in its claim upon the territory. Under the
cf roumstances., the U.S. has sought to bring about a compromise settlement,
on a basis of bilateral negotiation. but so far without success. It is
generally accented that failure to achieve a satisfactory settlement will
saddle the DeGasperi Government with a ma3or psychological handicap in
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
As already indtoated, Italy's post-war economic paralysis called
forth a series of U. S. and UNRRA aid measures aimed at countering disease
and unzest. It was not until the U.S. launched the European Recovery
Program in 1948, however, that in undertook a systematic program designed
to get at some of the basic ailments of the Italian economy. Fconmic
recovery, economic cooperation and economic reform were our interrelated
objectives. Subsequently, with the development of the Mutual Security
Program in 1951, emphasis was shifted to provide for the military require..
ments of Western and Italian defense a*ainst possible Soviet aggression,
although in view of the continued severity of Italy's economic and political
problems the development of Italian military strength is even now not the
dominant aim of U.S. efforts.
As noted,, the commodity relief and industrial recovery brought about
by FRP had a considerable salutary impact upon the psychological climate
in Italy. Moreover,, ERP's emphasis upon the cooperative aspects of economic
activity ]aid the groundwork for Italy's increasing support of European
integration and Western objectives in general. The current military phase
of economic assist awe has been less successful in that it has incurred the
resistance of those Italians *o are Use distrubed by ai threat of Soviet
s aggression then by their own eoonoad.o and social pmblem, In general,
however, the psychological impact of our aid program bass been a major feet-or,
t rat. in pre*eneing revolution anl., more recently.. in making it relat#rly
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