MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL W. BEDELL SMITH FROM ROBERT L. DENNISON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300190009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 25, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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fy to r!r:
^ 4Vr6rd r r Y\,JY
25 February 1952
The President has asked me to transmit to
you a report by Mr. Gordon Gray, dated 22 February
1952, This report deals with the organization and
work of the Psychological Strategy Board.
The President desires that this report be
analyzed and that he be advs_ed regarding the de-
sirability of publishing all or any part of it.
ROBERT L. DENNISON,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
NSC review(s) completed.
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402 East Franklin Street
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
February 22, 1952
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to submit a report on the organiza-
tion and work of the Psychological Strategy Board from the time
of my appointment as Director in July, 1951, until the present
time.
Please accept ny apology for the delay involved, which
has been due rather to pressure of duties than to neglect. I
resumed nZy full responsibilities at the University of North Caro-
lina on January first, and have also continued as a part time
consultant to the Board and Director.
I am happy to inform you that the Board and its staff
have filled a real need in our government and are now working
with considerable promise of success.
In the first months of the Board's existence they have:
1. Stimulated activities within the government
to develop a vigorous and successful psychological effort de-
signed to further our national policies for peace and freedom.
2. Brought together the various agencies of govern-
ment to concert their efforts in support of such policies.
This progress has been made possible by the cooperation
of the Board members themselves and the staffs of the different
departments and agencies, notably the Department of State, the
Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Though this favorable start has been made, much remains
to be done. I have had to leave to the new Director and his staff
many problems of organization and procedure as well as the sub-
stantive problems which will always call for fresh thought and
effort.
The experience to date has also suggested the necessity
of some changes which I strongly recommend that you make at the
earliest opportunity.
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I wish to take this opportunity to record my appreciation
of the help I have received from the officers of many government
departments and agencies and of the loyal cooperation given me by
the members and the staff of the Psychological Strategy Board.
I am indebted to members of the staff for assistance in
the preparation of this report, and especially to Wallace Carroll,
who also served as a consultant.
I would recommend to you publication of the attached
document, other than the annexes, which are of a classified nature.
Gordon Gray
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REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
We face today one of the great convulsions of history.
The world in which we live is being changed by strong currents of
thought and feeling -- currents released by the American and French
Revolutions in the 18th Century, by the Industrial Revolution in
the 19th and by two destructive wars and the Russian Revolution in
our own time. This is no longer the world into which most of us
were born. We may be sure that it will be a far different world
before we die.
In this time of crisis and stress, the American nation has
risen to a new role. We may speak of this role without vanity or
self-consciousness because we did not seek it but rather tried to
avoid it. Our role, as we have now expressed it in our national
policies, is to help lead the nations through this time of turmoil
in such a way that in the end there shall be an expansion -- not a
reduction -- of the areas of freedom and knowledge. Expressed in
another way, our role is to build a fridge over the abyss of con-
fusion and frustration so that humanity may safely cross. If we
can succeed in this role, the peoples of the world may be spared
the sacrifice of human life and achievement which accompanied other
great convulsions of history, and each nation may find release for
its energies and genius in an era of peace and human dignity.
It will not be easy for us to play this role. For apart
from the natural flow of historical forces, we know that the leaders
of another great power have determined to exploit the trials of this
period to the full. Years ago the men in the Kremlin sensed the
approach of this turning point in human affairs. Today they are
working, scheming, to intensify the strains, compound the chaos
and ride the currents of nationalism, social unrest and despair to
their ultimate goal of a world serving the ends of the Kremlin.
Their strategy might be condensed into three words: Ruin and rule.
Our reaction to this drive for world power was slow, but
when it came, it took the form of an idea. This idea -- at first
expressed in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was
basically as simple as this: America will help those who, believing
in freedom, help themselves and help each other. Behind the force
of this idea we put our economic and industrial strength. To the
countries which showed a will to survive and to cooperate, we sent
food, machines to grow more food, and still. more machines to produce
everything from shoes to electricity. We sent them our technical
experts to raise production in their factories and on their farms,
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to drain swamps, to dam rivers, to drive out malaria and other
diseases, to teach the three r's. When the allies and dupes of
the Kremlin spread lies about this effort, we launched a campaign
of truth over the air-..waves, in newspapers, in films, in public
meetings. Then we helped our friends in the free world to raise
a defensive shield over this peaceful effort.
Our economic help, our information program, our defense
effort -- if wisely used -- are indispensable parts of the American
program for bridging this period of upheaval. But the relentless
assault of the Kremlin upon the bridge has demonstrated the need of
another element. This missing element is an integrated psychological
strategy.
There are practical and compelling reasons why we should
make the fullest use of our resources in ideas and imagination, why
we should make certain that all our sacrifices are directed toward
the attainment of clearly defined ends. We must think in terms of
preserving our country's economic, as well as moral, fiber in order
to continue successfully our role of leadership.
Our aim is peace -- not war. Though a protective shield
is necessary to peace in a world threatened with war, we cannot
indefinitely pour out our resources for economic and military aid,
and presqrve our own ptrength. We must use our ingenuity to find
less costly means to produce situations of strength which will reduce
the possibilities of war and simultaneously serve to shorten the
present conflict.
In doing so, we must make it clear to those who are our
friends, and to those who would be our friends, that we not only
abhor militaristic imperialism, but also that we disclaim cultural
and intellectual imperialism as well. The only rule we seek is the
Golden Rule.
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Toward the end of the first World War, a Russian revolu-
tionary leader conceived the idea of a kind of struggle which would
be "neither war nor peace." That leader was later disposed of by
his-less inventive comrades, but they eventually found merit in his
idea and resolved to adapt it to the convulsive situation which would
follow the second World War. Today the world knows the meaning of
their choice -- an assault which stops short of general war, carried
out under the cloak of an unnatural peace.
That assault began, in fact, before the second World War
was over. As the armies of the Western Allies advanced, the forces
of international Communism set to work in their rear to poison the
minds of the liberated against the liberators, to turn the free nations
against each other, to seize positions of power, and to break down
the prestige of the United States. And while the victorious nations
of the West were disbanding their armed forces, the Kremlin's men in
every country were moving to battle stations in preparation for the
"final struggle" so long foretold in Communist song and fable.
In blaming ourselves for what came after, we often overlook
the fact that the leaders of Bolshevism had been training themselves
in this kind of combat for a good half-century. Within their own
country, they had graduated from the hard school of conspiracy and
revolution. After their seizure of power in Russia, their institutes
of political warfare had schooled foreign fanatics in the techniques
of infiltration, subversion and the conquest of power. Throughout
the world they had built up xiEtworks of agents who would move at
the word of command to,carry out an assassination or foment a civil
war.
There was no great element of genius in the Kremlin's
effort, but that effort had mass and momentum and a fanatical
persistence. And although Communism had lost much of its power
to convert, the Soviets still retained ample power to confuse. The
classic rule of imperialism, "Divide and conquer" guided much of
what they did. Nation against nation, race against race, man against
man -- this was their stock in trade. They knew, of course, how to
take advantage of men's vices, but they found it Just as profitable
to appeal to men's virtues. They twisted honest labor,,shook down
timid employers lured unwary churchmen into furthering their strategy
of confusion. They even found a way to use the word "peace" as a
weapon of assault.
The advantage in&warfare accrues to the aggressor. In the
disillusionment, the weariness, the confusion of the post-war world,
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the forces of Communism advanced confidently toward the ultimate
goal set by the Soviet leaders --- a world responsive to the Kremlin.
Inevitably the leadership of the assaulted peoples imposed
itself upon the United States, for we were the one great power which
had come out of the war with reserves of moral and material strength.
But by temperament and by tradition we Americans were ill-fitted for
this kind of struggle. We eight wars the way we play football. We
want to win, tear up the goal posts and then go home. We found it
hard in 1945 -- we find it hard today -- to comprehend that peace
may be made an extension of war by other means. We called back our
fighting men and returned them to their homes, thus exposing Europe
and Asia to Soviet blackmail. We all but dismantled our wartime
information services, thus opening the world to the Soviet lie.
As a nation we tried to reverse time and rediscover the peaceful
existence of the years before the war.
Thus nearly two years passed before we began to face up to
the responsibility of leadership which had come upon us.
When we did react, we moved one step at a time. First we
pledged our support to Greece and Turkey, two nations which were
holding the gates of the Near East in the face of increasing pressure
from Communism. Then, when the Kremlin strategists shifted the weight ?
of the Communist assault to Western Europe, we launched the Marshall
Plan and brought together 16 nations to work for European recovery.
With the aid of these nations we set Western Germany on the road to
rehabilitation, and when the Soviets set siege to the free city of
Berlin, we and our British allies improvised the airlift and saved
that outpost of freedom. Next we moved to the aid of Yugoslavia,
whose government had defied the Kremlin, and we were successful to
this extent in rolling back the iron curtain. In the following years,
together with our European allies, we began to raise a protective
shield over the work of recovery.
Though we had started out without a long-re~nge plan or
blueprint, the net result of all these efforts was a solid piece of
construction. A wall against Communist aggression was erected from
the Black Sea to the North Cape of Norway.' Even more important for
the long run,'we and our allies had set great ideas in motion -- the
ideas of the Atlantic Community, of European Uhion, of a coal-steel
pool for Western Europe, and of a European ariy.
Balked in Europe and the Near East, the Communist strategists
turned the main force of their assault to Asia. Even there, where
human misery was great and the old order in decay,, the power of
Communism as an idea had to be backed by the force of arms and a
spurious appeal to nationalism. The Chinese Communist armies advanced
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across China until they had conquered the mainland and stood at
the gates of Southeast Asia. At the same time, Communist forces,
ranging from guerrilla bands to mass armies, brought terror to
Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines.
Then the North Korean Communists launched an open attack
upon the Republic of Korea, a ward of the United Nations. This was
a challenge to the United States in the first instance and to the
free world as a whole. If it had not been squarely faced, it would
have opened the floodgates of disaster in Asia. But the United States
faced it, and, backed by the United Nations, repulsed the North Koreans
and the Chinese Communists who had joined them. This military success
may well have been a turning point. It was supplemented by a great
diplomatic achievement in the face of determined Soviet opposition ---
the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan which restored that key
nation of Asia to the community of nations.
So in the five years which followed the second World War
we could look back upon some successes and some failures. We could
also look forward to further - and possibly greater -- trials. Our
economic and defense programs, pursued in cooperation with our friends,
were restoring economic health and raising confidence that peace could
be maintained. Yet, at the same time, they were causing misgivings
in many parts of the world because they seemed to some people to be
manifestations of a new imperialism. In fact, the "reservoir of
goodwill" for the United States which had existed in many countries
was being seriously depleted.
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Early in 1951 a feeling developed within the U. S. govern-
ment that we had to do more than we had done in the past to win and
hold the confidence of our friends abroad and weaken the will of our
enemies,
This feeling was the result of an evolutionary process.
In the departments and agencies of the government a great deal of
reflection had been given to the lessons we had learned in the
struggle and a general desire had developed to concert our efforts
to better effect.
In the years which followed the war, a number of committees
had been set up to coordinate the work of different departments and
agencies in the information and propaganda fields. These committees
had no authority, however, to deal with matters of broad policy or
strategy. They could not, for example, challenge decisions which
might be economically or militarily sound but psychologically harm-
ful. They worked some distance below the top in the chain of leader-
ship and had little influence on policies and decisions. No committee
or agency had the power to develop broad strategic ideas which would
bring forth the highest capabilities of all agencies of government.
Furthermore, there was a diffusion of natiohal power among
departments, conscious of traditional compartmentation of interests
and authority and on guard against intrusion in affairs felt to be
their exclusive concern. The interdepartmental difficulties and
lack of unified leadership denied to the United States the full
value and impact of her bold acts in recent years.
But what was the answer to the problem? Was it possible
to develop a strategic concept which would put more order and drive
into all phases of our effort? And could we present our policies
and acts in such a light that they would strike a responsive chord
in the hearts and souls of men and make them feel that their cause
was our cause?
In seeking an answer to questions like these, some high
officials became convinced that we needed the same kind of unified
leadership as in a military struggle. Accordingly, they proposed
the appointment of a sort of "chief of staff for the cold war"
responsible directly to the President and Commander-in-Chief.
This chief of staff, with an advisory board of high-level officials,.
would work out the broad strategy, fix objectives and priorities,
decide the role of each government agency and direct the over-all
national effort.
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Others in the government found this proposal too radical.
They believed There were sound reasons for the roles which tradition
and the statutes had assigned to each government agency. In their
opinion, the insertion of a "chief of staff" between the President
and the departments would be-.a needless complication, would probably
do harm to our system of government, and would give a warlike cast
to a peaceful mission. They suggested that a coordinating mechanism
high up in the chain of command or perhaps in one of the major depart-
ments might produce a more effective national effort.
The directive which the President issued on April 4, 1951,
was something of a compromise between these views. It did not
appoint a chief of staff for the national psychological effort,
but it did order some of the highest officers of the government to
provide for "the more effective planning, coordination and conduct,
within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological
operations."
To accomplish this purpose, the President directed that
the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence should serve as a Psychological
Strategy Board. Under them there would be a Director appointed by
the President. The Director would have a permanent staff to help
him carry out his responsibilities. A representative of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff would sit with the Board as its principal military
adviser.
The President's order made the Board responsible for the
"formulation and promulgation...of over-all national psychological
objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and
evaluation of the national psychological effort." It was to report
to the National Security Council on its own activities and on the
activities of all agencies engaged in the effort to influence men's
minds and wills.
This was a broad mandate. In setting "over-all national
psychological objectives," the Board would identify exactly what
we were trying to accomplish. Then it would draw up policies and
programs to schieve those objectives. It would bring together all
the government agencies which could play a part in such programs
and find out what they could contribute. It would follow through
and make sure that all the agencies were working together and doing
their part. It would constantly study the progress of these programs
to influence other people in favor of our work for peace and freedom.
It would report to the National Security Council on these programs
and the over-all effort in the field of psychological strategy.
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The Board would have an acute realization that every
significant action in the field of foreign affairs by any
governmental agency has an effect upon the minds and wills of
men. To maximize that effect the government must act in its dif-
ferent spheres according to a common plan which relates all actions
together.
The President's directive did not put the Board into the
.field of operations. The Board would not, for example, manage
the Voice of America or any of the information offices which the
government had set up in other countries. It was to be a high-
level group working in the field of broad strategy and coordination.
The first Director went to work on July 2, 1951. The
Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Centr4l
Intelligence Agency lent him enough help to set up the nucleus
of a staff. This staff was organized in this way:
1. An Office of Plans and Policy. This staff group
works on broad strategic problems, defines the ob-
jectives which we should aim at in our psychological
effort, and draws up, in cooperation with other agencies,
the programs to achieve those objectives.
2. An Office of Coordination. This staff group helps
tie together the efforts already under way in the
psychological field and follows through on plans and
programs approved by the Board.
3. An Office of Evaluation and Review. This staff
group obtains from other agencies of the government
the intelligence estimates which the staff needs for
its work and prepares evaluations of the effectiveness
of American psychological operations,
4, An Executive Office for administrative matters.
In recruiting the permanent staff the Director was handi-
capped at the start, not only by the normal difficulties of recruit-
ing able men in the government, but also by the shortage of experts
in psychological strategy and operations. Within the government
there were able administrators and specialists for the normal
problems of peace. In the armed services could be found many able
officers trained in the arts of war. But nowhere within the
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government -- nor for that matter in the nation -- was there
any considerable number of men trained to cope with a situation
which was "neither war nor peace." As we Americans had never
dreamed of-forcing this kind of conflict upon the world' we had
made no preparations for it.
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Perhaps more serious than any staffing difficulties was
the lack of a body of thought on psychological strategy. Because
of this there was a great deal of confusion regarding the role of
the Board and its staff. Serious apprehensions developed in the
minds of people in the established departments and agencies with
regard to a possible surrender of traditional authority and re-
sponsibility. The result was that they viewed the creation of the
Board with something less than unrestrained enthusiasm,
There were also many misconceptions which threatened to
hamper the work of the Psychological Strategy Board. Perhaps the
most widespread of these was the idea that the Board was to concern
itself only with "word warfare", Those who believed this felt that
the Board should confine its activity to explaining -- or explaining
away -- the decisions or actions of our government in the foreign
field. They denied that the Board should have any interest in the
decisions or actions themselves. It had to wait until the govern-
ment moved, and then, for the benefit of foreign peoples, it would
put the best possible interpretation on the move. The diplomats
would make the political decisions, the military would make the
military decisions, the economists would make the economic decisions
-- and the Board would make the best of it.
At the other extreme was the belief that the mandate of
the Psychological Strategy Board covered just about everything --
everything from the decisions of the President to the hourly bulle-
tins on the Voice of America. Those who favored this belief wanted
the Board to be a super-agency which would make foreign policy,
develop strategic programs to influence other nations, carry out
propaganda operations, and in general have command authority over
all government agencies.
A third major obstacle to the Board's early efforts was
the deep-seated idea that it is impossible to plan an integrated
strategy for our activities to influence the minds and wills of
others. The officials who held this view contended that, because
of constant international change, it was not practicable nor wise
to attempt to put down on paper an adequate statement of our policies
and objectives in other parts of the world, which could serve as an
accurate and dependable guide. It followed that we could not hope
to draw up plans and programs to carry out our national policies
and reach our objectives. The situation was much too fluid to
permit this. We had to wait and see what our opponents were going
to do; then we could improvise a response,
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A fourth impediment to the Board's work was the contention
that our intelligence from certain parts.of the world was not pre-
cise enough to permit effective psychological planning and activity.
A fifth was the idea that we could not risk a bold initiative
to improve our position in any part of the world until we had com-
pleted our military build-up. In the minds of those who held this
view, the sound concept of building "situations of strength" had
become distorted to mean "situations of military strength.". Until
we had achieved military equality with, or preponderance over, the
Soviet bloc, we could not do much to change the situation in the
world to our advantage.
A sixth was the contention that any kind of "strategic
planning" must necessarily be military planning.
But perhaps the greatest misconception of all was the
widespread impression that the struggle in which we are engaged
is a "cold war" -- a remote conflict which may go on for ten, fifty
or a hundred years without our being able to do very much to bring
it to a successful conclusion.
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In the course of their work the Director and his staff
reached a number of conclusions on these matters.
In the first place, they quickly made up their minds that
the Board's mandate covered a great deal more than word warfare.
The task of the Board, they believed, was not to explain -- or
explain away -- events but to help shape events. For this reason,
they felt that the Board, though not primarily a policy making
body, should strive to obtain wise policies and develop sound
programs which would establish an identity between our aims and
those of other free nations.
On the other hand, the Director and staff did not accept
the view that the Board should concern itself with "almost every-
thing." They felt, particularly, that their instructions to stay
out of operational matters were sound. As they saw it, if the
Board became entangled in day-to-day decisions and tried to inter
vent in all fields of government activity, it would soon cease to
be a strategy board and would become a "Board of Improvised Tactics."
In the third place the Director and his staff became con-
vinced that it not only is possible but imperative to plan our
efforts to influence men's minds and wills. When a nation projects
its budgetary outlays at the rate of $200,000,000 or more a day,
it canfafford to make up its policies and programs as it goes along.
And when it is facing a ruthless opponent who has given half a century
of thought to this kind of conflict, it must buckle down to the grim
business of trying to think ahead of him. In the opinion of the
Director and his staff, the U.S. has the capacity to make plans
which will retain the psychological initiative for the free world
and pin down our opponents on the defensive.
Fourthly the Director and his staff did not share the
view that intelligence deficiencies rule out effective psychological
activity. With ingenuity and imagination, they believed, much effec-
tive work can be undertaken on the basis of our present knowledge.
Later, as our information improves, adjustments cqn be made in
aims and methods.
In the fifth place, the Director and staff rejected the
view that effective actions to rally our friends and confound our
enemies must await the military build-up. They recalled that the
Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift and other
successful programs had been carried out when we had barely one
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effective fighting division in Europe. As they saw it, the task
for psychological strategy was to help create situations of strength,
not to wait for their creation.
Sixth, the Director and the staff recognized that military
strategy is a matter for the military, and they welcomed military
participation in the assessment of possible repercussions from our
activities designed to influence the minds and wills of other peoples.
But, they pointed out, we are in a struggle in which we hope that
the application of military power will not be the decisive factor.
Strategic planning must go forward on the broadest lifles and include
all elements of,pressure and' persuasion if we are to succeed in our
national effort to preserve peace and extend freedom.
Finally, all the discussion within the staff pointed toward
the conclusion that this is not a cold war but a war of wills. The
term, cold war, which had been useful in arousing the American
people five years ago, is harmful today because it conveys the
impression of a remote, impersonal conflict which we are powerless
to influence. The Director and his staff believed it is within our
power to influence the course of this conflict. They believed that
leadership could produce the will t the government, the Congress
and the people to turn events in our favor and gradually strengthen
the forces working for peace. Perhaps the greatest test and the
major contribution, of the Psychological Strategy Board will be the
development of such a collective will within the government.
These were some of the convictions which grew out of the
work of the Director and his staff.
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THE, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD TODAY
By the end of 1951, a large part of the staff had been
gathered. The Director had at his disposal an able and dedicated
group of men and women from the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Mutual
Security Administration and from private enterprise. It was
contemplated that the staff would remain small by governmental
standards. Altogether it would number about seventy-five persons,,
including professional, clerical and administrative personnel.
The efforts of this staff were supplemented by panels
of experts drawn from all the agencies of government and by con-
sultants from the outside. These efforts covered a wide field,
plans for worldwide informational activity in connection with
developments in Korea, a broad strategic concept for the war of
wills, a program for helping political fugitives from the iron
curtain countries, an inventory of our resources for influencing
men's minds and wills, a catalogue of useful research projects in
the.social sciences. (A comprehensive list of projects completed
or begun is given in the classified annexes.)
As the work progressed the members of the Board developed
a corporate spirit and a sense of purpose. Formal meetings to
approve new projects and hear reports on projects already under
way were held about every three weeks. Informal luncheon meetings
were held every week for exchanges of views on the Board's problems.
At the meetings each member of the Board came up with ideas for
new activities and each member made his contribution to the reports
which set new projects in motion.
Much spade-work, of course, remains to be done. The first
Director had to leave to his successor many problems of staff pro-
cedure and organization, as well as problems of policy and strategy.
But it can be said that the Psychological Strategy Board is definitely
a going concern. In a little more than half a year's time, the
concept of combined operations, with all agencies of government
concerting their efforts toward a common end, has gained ground.
Much work which might not have been undertaken if there had been
no Board has been started and some concrete results have been
achieved. It still is too early to say whether the Board is the
answer to the problem which it was designed to meet, but it has
made a worthwhile start.
14
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The experience to date, however, has suggested a number
of changes which would strengthen the Board without essentially
altering its structure.
1. The Director should be made Chairman of the
Board, possibly without a vote. This is because
the Director alone is giving his full attention to
psychological atrategy; the three members of the
Board have other responsibilities which take much
of their time and energy. As Chairman of the Board,
the Director would be in a much stronger position to
exercise the leadership which is needed.
2. The Director should sit with the National Security
Council when it considers matters of interest to the
Board. This would permit him to advise the Council
on the psychological dangers or advantages of different
lines of policy.
3. The Director should informallyzeport to the President
at regular intervals. Psychological strategy is -- and
must remain -- an instrument of the President and Commander-
in-Chief. Frequent talks with the Director would help the
President make more effective use of an instrument which
can be valuable to him, and would put the driving force
of his leadership behind our national psychological: effort,
4. The Chairman or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
should sit with the Board as its military adviser. This
would eliminate delays and misunderstandings which arise
when a subordinate officer sits for the Joint Chiefs.
These changes would help the Board to do a better job. For
the moment they appear to be all that is necessary. On the basis
of the experience to date it does not appear desirable to give the
Board a statutory base or to make other drastic modifications in
its charter.
Nevertheless, it must be frankly recognized that a great
deal more than the four adjustments recommended above will be needed
to assure success in the war of wills.
The members of the Board must be determined to exercise
their mandate vigorously and effectively and to make full use of
the available resources. Just as important, the staffs of their
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departments and of other agencies of government must be ready
to participate in the Board work with a sense of the role of leader-
ship which America is called upon to play. This is no time to let
rivalries between agencies or the passion for the lowest common
denominator in ideas determine the scope of our national effort.
If failures of this kind should prevent the Board from
effectively discharging its mandate, it will be necessary to recon-
sider the possibility of setting up a more centralized direction of
the national effort in the war of wills.
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The year 1952 is a year of decision.
In some parts of the world the situation may grow worse
before it gets better. We must remember that the government of
the second strongest power in the world is working tirelessly to
make things worse wherever it can.. It is working to permeate the
world with a spirit of hopelessness, futility and desperation. It
is working to turn men's hearts against us, to make men feel that
we Americans are the real disturbers of the peace, that we are
delillerately plotting a new war. It is using the armed force of
its puppets and the threat of its own military power to accomplish
what it could never hope to accomplish by the force of its ideas.
We must meet this'challenge -- but we must meet it in our
own way. Basically, this is not a conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union as nations. It is one of the great
convulsions of history which a band of conspirators in the Kremlin
is,seeking to exploit for its own ends. Our role, as we have seen,
is to lead the peoples who prize freedom through this period of
convulsion so that each nation, in its own way, may be free to
enrich our common heritage in an era of peace and human dignity.
This role of leadership cannot be, met by unplannedimprovisation.
We must remember that in the field of international affairs no major
decision or action can be taken by our government without some effect
-- favorable or unfavorable -- on the hearts, the minds and the wills
of men. Thus it is imperative that the policies we make, the plans
we adopt, the acts we perform should be part of, and conform to, an
enlightened psychological strategy designed to establish a c omrmmity
of interests in the differing aspirations of America and the peoples
who have the will to be free.
Our role of leadership calls for the best in the character of
the American people. It requires of our people 4 spirit of resolution,
a willingness to sacrifice, an effort of understanding and a flow of
generosity -- generosity of the heart even more than generosity of
the purse. Perhaps the truest psychological strategy is that we should
so conduct ourselves as a nation that we shall appear worthy of the
role of leadership which has come upon us.
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1. PROJECTS COMPLETED OR BEGUN
A. Office of Plans and Policy
B. Office of Coordination
C. Office of Evaluation and Review
D. Director's Staff
E. Executive Office
2. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE. APRIL 4. 1951
3. ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD UNDER 4/4/51
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE
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A. OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY
1. Completed plan for psychological operations in the
event of a break-off in the Korean armistice negotiations.
2. Completed plan for psychological operations in the
event of success in the Korean armistice negotiations.
3. Completed report on problems arising in connection
with the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea.
4. Completed guidance for overt propaganda in the event
of general war.
5. Completed organizational plan for conducting psycho-
logical operations during general hostilities.
6. Completed inventory of resources available for psycho-
logical operations planning. Began study of resources available
to counter Soviet bloc blackmail (such as the detention of the
American flyers in Hungary).
7. Began analysis of National Security Council papers and
other documents to determine our national aims, purposes and
approved programs.
8. Completed psychological operations plan for the reduction
of Communist power in France.
9. Began psychological operations plan for the reduction of
Communist power in Italy.
10. Began
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10. Began plan for release of publicity on atomic and
other new weapons.
11. Began preliminary work on plan to undermine the
Soviet position in Eastern Germany and fit a united Germany
into a unified Europe.
12. Began preliminary work on plan to reduce Communist
pressures in Japan and Southeast Asia.
13. In cooperation with other offices, started plan for
psychological operations to exploit the strains and uncertain-
ties among Comrmunists arising from the eventuality of Stalin t s
death.
14. In cooperation with other offices began plan to
derive maximum benefits from defection and disaffection of
Soviet bloc nationals.
B. OFFICE OF COORDINATION
1. Established a pattern of relationships with the Depart-
ment of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency
and other Government offices.
2. Coordinated operational planning in execution of two
plans covering Korean armistice contingencies (see A. 1 and 2).
3. Completed a report and recommendations on efforts
already under way to reduce Communist strength in France and
Italy. (This preceded preparation of long-range plans, see
A, 8 and 9).
4. Completed
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4. Completed report and recommendations on the problem
of defectors and refugees from Iron Curtain countries already
in Western Europe (this preceded preparation of long-range
plan, At 14).
5. Began plan for psychological operations in the field
of East-West trade.
6. Completed first stage of inquiry into social science
research projects which might be useful in psychological strategy.
7. Began coordination with Voice of America of covert
psychological warfare activities.
8. Carried out coordinating and liaison activities con-
nected with completed plans or plans in progress.
9. Began survey of United States overt foreign informa-
tion programs in order to identify major problems.
10. Began development of procedures governing the Board's
responsibility under NSC 10/5.
C. OFFICE OF EVALUATION AND REVIEW
1. Provided initial summary and analysis, with initial
frame of reference, for inventory of resources available for
psychological operations planning (see At 6).
2. Prepared summary and analysis section, including in-
telligence support and analysis of existing situation in France,
in support of psychological operations plan for reduction of
Communist strength in France (see A, 8).
3. Prepared
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3. Prepared summary and analysis section, including
intelligence support and analysis of existing situation in
Italy, in support of the psychological operations plan for
reduction of Communist strength in Italy (see A, 9).
4. Initiated preliminary work on plan to undermine Soviet
position in Eastern Germany and fit a united Germany into a
unified Europe; completed preliminary estimate of situation
and began detailed summary and analysis in support of strategic
planning project; contributed to establishment of terms of
reference and strategic concept under which plan is being
developed (see A, 11).
5. Initiated recommendation for preparation of a strategic
plan for Japan, completed study on significant psychological
factors in Japan; prepared initial recommendations as to scope
and impact of Japanese Islands on Southeast Asia and other areas
(see A. 12).
6. Contributed oral and written preliminary estimates for
plan to reduce Communist pressures throughout Southeast Asia.
7. Began preparation of preliminary staff estimate of
significant psychological factors in India with recommendation
that it be considered for immediate action.
8. Assumed jointly with the Special Assistant to the
Director responsibility for the plan for psychological operations
to exploit strains and uncertainties among Communists arising
from the eventuality of Stalin's death (see A. 13).
9. Initiated
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9. Initiated original Board action on plan for the exploi-
tation of Soviet orbit escapees; prepared terms of reference;
provided continuing intelligence and policy support for planning
Phase A (see B, 14). Assumed responsibility for plan to derive
maximum benefits from the defection of Soviet bloc nationals
(see A, 14)?
10. Prepared preliminary staff study of psychological
situation in the Middle East with recommendations as to the terms
of reference, scope, policy, and strategic concept within which
planning should be conducted.
11. Initiated preliminary estimate of the situation, recom-
mendations, and factual support for study of resources available
to counter Soviet bloc blackmail (such as the detention of
American fliers in Hungary).
12. Began evaluation of effectiveness of U.S.-U.K.-French
disarmament proposal in the United Nations.
13. Completed staff study on methods and approaches for
evaluating psychological situations and reviewing strategic plans.
14. Provided intelligence support, including daily oral
briefings for all members of the staff and for all projects.
15. Prepared preliminary staff study with estimate and
recommendations on problems and prospects of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
16. Arranged
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16. Arranged indoctrination of staff members on functions
and obligations of agencies concerned in psychological opera-
tions, including the arrangement of briefings by key members of
those agencies for staff members.
17. Established procedures and relationships with other
agencies to provide intelligence and policy support for PSB
activities.
D. DIRECTOR'S STAFF
1. Began study of a broad strategic concept for the
current struggle.
2. Maintained liaison with the National Security Council
Senior Staff on reports in progress.
3. Initiated re-examination of adequacy of mechanisms
for policies, planning and coordination in field of high-level,,
non-military deception.
E. EXECUTIVE OFFICE
1. Assisted the Director in developing a scheme of
organization for the Staff.
2. Established permanent headquarters of the Board.
3. Worked out with member agencies the means of financing
the operations of the Board, the procurement of supplies and
equipment, and personnel policies.
4. Worked
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4. Worked out a table of organization including all
staff positions.
5. Prepared a budget.
6. Provided administrative support for the Board,, the
Director, and the staff.
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 Ap c12For Release 2006/c/ C Al P80R01731 R003300190009-1
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
April 49 1951
DIRECTIVE TOs The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
It is the purpose of this directive to authorize z.d provide for the
more effective planning, coordination and conduct, withi the framework of
approved national policies, of psychological operations,
There is hereby established a Psychological Straat* y Board responsible,
within the purposes and terms of this directive, for the formulation and
promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencie responsible for
psychological operations, of over-al.l national psychol 4-a1 objectives,,
policies, and programs, and for the coordination and eve cation of the
national psychological efforts
The Board will report to the National. Security Ccu til on the Board9a
activities and on its evaluation of the national peychol gical operations,
including implementation of approved objectives, policia ;, and programs
by the departments and agencies concerned.
For the purposes of this directives psychological, aerations shall
include all activities (other than overt types of econo warfare) envisioned
under NSC 5911 and NSC 1012 the operational planning and izecution of which
shall remain, subject to this directive, as therein sas:: aed,
The Board shall be composed oft
a. The Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secret ry of Defense, and
the Director of Central Intelligence, or, in their abscz~ j, their appropriate
designees;
b.. An appropriate representative of the head of r,,- 'h such other de-
partment or agency of'the Government as mss from time tV time, be determined
by the Board.
The Board shall designate one of its members at Chairman.
A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff *W,'. si.t with the Board
as its principal military adviser in order that the Boar, trey ensure that its
objectives, policies and programs shall be related to aps1 ed plans for
military operations.
There is established under the Board a Director wh6: shall be designated
by the President and who shall receive compensation of `: _,000 per year The
Director shall direct the activities under the Boards 7; a; hg out this
responsibility, he shall
S E C R E T
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so Be responsible for having prepared the programs,, policies, reports,,
and recommendations for the Boardes consideration,
bo Sit with the Board and be responsible to it for organizing its
business end for expediting the reaching of decisions,
c, Promulgate the decisions of the Board,,
do Ascertain the manner in which agreed upon objectives, policies,,
and programs of the Board are being implemented and coordinated among the
departments and agencies concerned,
e, Report thereon and on his evaluation of the national psychological
operations to the Board together with his recommendations,
f, Perform such other duties necessary to carry out his responsibilities
as the Board may direct,
The Director, within the limits of funds and personnel made available
by the Board for this purpose,, shall organize and direct a staff to assist in
carrying out his responsibilities. The Director shall determine the organiza-
tion and qualifications of the staff, which may include irdividuala employed
for this purpose, including part-time experts, and/or individuals detailed
from the participating departments and agencies for assignnt to full-time
duty or on an ad hoc task force basis, Personnel detailed, for assignment to
duty under the terms of this directive shall be under the control of the
Director,e subject only to necessary personnel procedures within their respective
departments and agencies,
The participating departments and agencies shall afford to the Director
and the staff such assistance and access to information as may be specifically
requested by the Director in carrying out his assigned duties,
The heads of the departments and agencies concerned shall examine into
the present arrangements within their departments and agencies for the conduct,
direction and coordination of psychological operations with a view toward re-'
adjusting or strengthening them if necessary to carry out the purposes of this
directive, The Secretary of State is authorized to effect such readjustments
in the organization estaklishsd under NSC 59/l as he deems necessary to
accomplish the purposes of this directive.
This directive does not authorize the Board nor the Director to perform
arW "psychological operations,"
In performing its functions,, the Board shall utilize the mwdmum extent
the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies,
/a/ Hare Truman
S E C R E T
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 6" UK
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a , ai u:la all dapnrtmants and aj enof.es engage i in oporationa having pvyth
;r w sai '.ng to such departments and agencies the preparation of? pey'cbological opera i'.ona=
P"eaa try .rry out any part of such overall atr ,tsgic plane ee to which no psychological oP, a:tiona1
710, f:' .a d .; t na been initiated;
1% by review'.ing all peychological operational ,plane already initiated by depart ente a.n i agenoi et.
Y;dity to assn that they are consistent with such overall strategic planap determining t;aoae piano:
vll .,~4:a ny be left to the initiating departments and agencies without further aotion by than 11*ard and
;, ae to zrhiob the Board should take some further action.
y a /~ q o ca c rv~. n
1 i ~) 1! 4~yJ,}i !'~.F }~ ' of + ". 4~g 1?~F~ ~ vo 4J .~6i O'C"holg i FF~ GY{:. .?N+~~'
'Is. win determine as to the various peychologiosi operations a plans a (1) empbaete,
pa.ce.
5 71:,.4 oarMj will coordinate the execution by departments and agencies of an ouch plans ua t "C &D
.i~ ;ri,'~.; y'?.: .`~l. 4f varfLl . atra,Yegic plans.
The Board ill evaluate the programs of departments and agencies and their execution thrzt ?h.
1!1!"---;> ,10; f,-:i op- atiO al plan.rt, in terms of effective accomplishment of the national poyohologicryl.
hi h eke moot ,rtant to the attainment of nat: on~l
a
ti
on u
1 actin ~^ r~'ra: axis and plans for evalua
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 4& vWIer rwase Luuoiusri i : L.iM-rcuruurcu-11s1 r:uus4R mtNW ;L-x
Following is the Directive of the President establishing the
Psychological Strategy Boards
"DIRWtIVE T0e1 The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
It is the purpose of this directive to authorise and provide for
the more effective planning, coordination and corenduct, within the framework
of approved national policies, of psychological operations.
There. is hereby established a Psychological Strategy Board responsible,
within the purposes and terms of this directive, for the formulation and
promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for
psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives,
policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national
psychological effort.
The board will. report to the sational Security Council on the
Board's activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological opsrs
tions, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and program by
the departments and agencies concerned.
The Board shall be composed of,
a. The Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
and the Director of Central Intelligence, or, in their absunae,
their appropriate designees;
b. An appropriate representative of the head of each swab other
department or agency of the Government as spy, tram time to
time, be determined by the Board.
The board shall designate one of its members as Chairman.
A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall sit with the
board as its principal military adviser in order that the board may emu*
that its objectives, policies and programs shall be elated to approved plans
for military operations.
There is established under the Board a Director who shall be designated
by the President and who shall receive compensation of $16,opO per year.
The Director, within the limits of funds and personnel made available
,y : -io Board for this purpose, shall organise and direct a staff to assist in
carrying out his responsibilities. The Director shall determine the organisation
and qualifications of the staff, which may include individuals employed for this
purpose, including part-time experts, and/or individuals detailed from the
participating departments and agencies for assignment to full-time duty or on
an ad boo task force basis. Personnel detailed for assignment to duty under
the terms of this directive shall be under the control of the Director, subject
only to necessary personnel procedures within their respective departments and
agencies,
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IK4RDIAT6 RRLEAn (Cont'd)
participating departments and agencies shall afford to the
ha staff such sssistaoae and access to information as W be
'
a R
.
is '_ 1y r q eted by the Director in carrying out his assigned duties.
The he4e of the departuants and agencies concerned shall exasr