EXPLOITATION OF COMMUNIST BW CHARGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300190004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 7, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

ADDRESS TOFFICIAL HE DIRECCT017pFt319cf or Release 2006/0[ QF W0-,RDP80R0R003300190004-6
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRAMGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
C`.
VOEL - g wb~
MEMORANDUM
July 7, 1953
TO: The Honorable Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence.
SUBJECT: Exploitation of Communist BW Charges.
I would appreciate any views you might have on my
proposal to use Professor Zirkle. The idea, roughly, is
this: He is a well-known scholar on the subject of Soviet
scholarly production in the field of science--both good and
phony. If a man of his stature attacked this study as
another one of a series of Soviet "phonies", it might have
a desirable impact in the right quarters.
If you agree to the idea of our using Professor Zirkle,
do you believe it is necessary for Sheff Edwards to effect
clearance on him? The International Scientific Commission
report, as you recall, is unclassified. I think I could
handle this in an innocent sort of way without dragging in
any classified material. Thanking you sincerely in advance
for your views--Sincerely yours,
Horace S. Craig
Enclosure:
Memorandum of Conversation, July 6, 1953. Subject: State
Department Exploitation of Communist B'i Charges.
NSC review(s) completed.
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Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: July 6, 1953
COPIES TO:
Participants
This informal meeting was held in order to obtain background information
on past State Department activity and present plans in connection with the
BW issue. Dr. Craig opened by outlining the renewed interest of Ambassador
Lodge, Mr. C. D. Jackson and Mr. Allen Dulles in this question, and noted
that Mr. Dulles had suggested that the UN should be the main forum for con-
tinuing exploitation.
Mr. Kloman then reviewed the history of the BW effort as follows: 25X1
/1?
Until early winter of 1953 a BW Working Grou was active, under P area
chairmanship, reporting to POC and then to PSB.
represented CIA at various times; no CIA scientist wore, rec' the
group but the scientific resources of the Agency F- I 25X1
were sought by the Working Group beginning before the publication of the
Report of the Communist "International Scientific Commission"(ISC). Defense
was represented on the working group by Lee Hargus, OPI.
After the ISC-Report was published, Col. Arthur Long, an Army
epidemiologist, studied the report for several weeks and submitted his
analysis. His conclusion was that the report was a complete fabrication,
but that very few of its particular items of scientific ttevidencett could be
demolished as such. Therefore, he concluded, the attack should be focused
SUBJECT :
State Department Exploitation of Communist BW Charges.
PARTICIPANTS: Erasmus Kioman, P, Richard L. Snider, DNA, State Department;
H. S. Craig and Wallace Irwin, Jr., PSB. btj
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on the fallacious framework of logic underlying the whole report. He drew
up a list of fallacies which was reviewed by a Committee of the National
Academy of Science under the chairmanship of Dr. Bronk.
The HAS (Bronk) committee was originally formed at the instance of the
State Department, working through Dr. Koepfli, State's Science Adviser.
The committee is expected to disband within about a week. It has thus far
accomplished very little of substance. After studying Col. Longs Report
and other evidence, Dr. Bronk finally agreed reluctantly in February 1953
to draft a letter designed for dissemination in the free world scientific
community. The letter followed the recommended "logical" approach of
Col. Long but was pitched in an extremely low key-so much so as to be of
dubious effect. The main points it made were that the testimony reported
in the ISC Report had never been verified
observation or through by the Commission either through
experiments; that the report puts strained and
improbable interpretations on the data reported; that conflicting state-
ments in the Report remained unreconciled; and that there are
gaps
evidence. In any case, whether because of its pallid complexionoriforhe
other reasons, our delegation at the UN decided against using the letter.
State is still negotiating with a member of the National Academy
of Science who has visited Korea, in an effort to persuade him to make
an open endorsement of Col. Long's analysis.
Mr. Kloman noted in passing that the first Communist charges that the
US had used BW-emanating from so-called scientists? and lawyersx groups....
were comparatively clumsy and full of loopholes. We obtained, in fact,
the text of a World Peace Council directive ordering that these first
efforts be improved upon, and we exploited this document in the UN with
some effect. This WPC directive was the origin of the mammoth ISC Report.
The scientists who signed it, politics aside, are highly and their handiwork is difficult to attack except by the logical al competent
metthhodod*
.
On January 19, 1953, State sent a circular airgram, drafted by
Mr. Kioman, to our embassies in all countries whose nationals were repre-
sented on the ISC, The effort was to get a refutation of the report from
a multi-national group of scientists. Further, the airgram urged a strong
counter-offensive(based both on the fallacies of the report and on the
Communist refusal to admit scientific investigation on the spot) designed
to expose the "big lie" technique and thus undermine Communist credibility
on a broad front. State consulted the British Foreign Office in an effort
to persuade them to lead off on this proposal. They were pleasant but did
nothing. When the Seventh General Assembly reopened, State was willing to
settle with the British for a refutation by British scientists alone--but
again without results, presumably because of the prevailing peace-mongering
atmosphere in the GA.
Mr. Kloman said that the reluctance of scientists, including the
British, to engage in such efforts as these apparently stems from a
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simple distaste for engaging in "propaganda". Luckily exceptions. Mr. Kloman handed us there are a few
Clews, reporter for the copies of a pamphlwritten by John
Bi a (Eng1an Post, with a comparatively
strong foreword by the head of the British Association for the Advancement
of Science. State has bought 2500 copies of this Pamphlet; the British
Foreign Office another 2500
abroad is planned. , and a joint distribution to British and US missions
(I asked Mr. Sneider whether distribution was also being
made through USUN. He said he was not sure but would check.)
Mr. Sneider then continued with an account of action on this subject
in the UN. The Security Council first took up the issue in July 1952, but
the Russians vetoed a move for investigation. We then took up the question
in the second part of the 7th GA (Feb
in the s ctro " (February and March), with two draft resolu-
tio-a one condemning the charges and a somewhat milder one calling
for an investigation. The delegation was instructed to guarantee at least
40 votes before putting any resolution to the test. They could count
scarcely more than 20 for the condemnation, with the British and Arab Asian
bloc unwilling to vote for it. They therefore pressed the more modest inves-
tigation proposal and got 52 votes in favor--which they felt was an excellent
showing in view of the fact that Vishinsky had just returned to New York
from the funeral of Stalin and peace was breaking out all over,
the proposed investigation was made contingent on willingness tHowever,
Com-
munists to admit an on-the-spot commission. Since the om un st he never replied, no commission was ever appointed, and the matter rests there.
In debate, our GA tactic was to avoid a debate on the merits of the
charges lest the Communists invade New York with various exhibits, flea
circuses, etc. We did succeed, however., in
into the record, both ours and those offriendlyid e some excellent speeches
speeches have been made part of the standard friendly kitegations. These
Whether all of this represents a US success or failure is obscure.
Our missions abroad, Mr. Sneider said, report vehemently and almost
unanimously that nobody except standard commie-liners takes the BW charges
seriously. For instance, Embassy Rome reported that the Communist press
had complained of a ttconspiracy of silence" on the part of the Italian
press; and an open poll in France last February seemed to show that the whole
matter was being forgotten and that o
membership) believed the char es. ~Y about 7 percent (equivalent to CP
attacks on the subject will serve oThe Embassies add that continued US
do not press the matter except when ttiskraisede yhsomes ayiel, , they
The
original opportunity, which Mr. Kloman saw, to mount ao unt r-attack which
would destroy Cox-xunist credibility, has not been effectively The net verdict as seen from State is no victory exploited.
ry and no defeat.
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES.
As to State Department plans, Mr. Kloman said that we may instruct
the UN delegation to make a stand in the General Assembly pointing to the
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fact that the US, Japan, and the ROK have all agreed to cooperate in a
UN investigation pursuant to the GA resolution; but that no answer at all
has been received from the Communist side. Then, after a decorous delay,
we would issue a strong blast pointing to this Communist silence as fur-
ther evidence that the whole thing is a gigantic fraud.
In addition, State is seeking an endorsement of the Long Report from
a member of the NAS (as noted above).
Mr. Kloman emphasized, however, that in his mind the main question is
still not one of refutation but of counter-attack on the "big lie". He
doubts, however, whether such a counter-attack is possible in the atmosphere
of the UN.
Mr. Kioman suggested that the most powerful propaganda would be a
refutation of the ISC report by one or more members of the original
Communist commission. If this were impossible, he suggested that an
embarrassing questionnaire, pointed at the most flagrant lies in the
report, could be sent to the members of the commission under appropriate
auspices and their failure to answer could be exploited. (Mr. Sneider
noted that the latter stunt was carried out with some effect in press con-
ferences with the commission members shortly after their return from China.)
Dr. Craig mentioned the idea of getting Dr. Conway Zirkle, Professor
of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania and author of "Soviet
Science" to assist in a full-fledged review of the ISC report.
It was noted in the discussion that CIA possesses some information
about Soviet activity in the SJ field. This might be useful.
Mr. Kloman observed that US policy, while favoring the proposal for an
on-the-spot investigation, does not favor an actual investigation. One
reason for this, he said, is the feeling of the military that an investiga-
ting commission would inevitably come across 8th Army preparations or
operations (e.g. chemical warfare) which, if revealed, could do us psycholo-
gical as well as military damage. This reasoning assumes that the commission
would have authority to examine anything they liked on either side of the
battle line.
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