WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT COMMISSION PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PREPARATION OF PAPER ON DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180028-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 21, 1952
• Content Type: PAPER

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WORKING GROUP ON PREPARATIONS Egg
_ftalsi,Invo;ved in Pre
Didolosure and
zol SECRET
bag= Information
DAC D.la
Januar7 21 1952
DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
t on a Dim on
tio
The attached document is being circulated in conjunction with,
and as background .to, DAC D.1, "Proposals for Progressive and Continuing
Disclosure and Verificat on of Armed Forces and Armaments".
Edward G. Platt, jr.
Secretary
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Seouriti.Info tion
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STATE review(s) c:Apprieted.
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January 18, 1952
PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PREPARATION OF
pastrarriamosigt vERIFfciamor
1. PntlpiinaTY.
This paper has been prepared in the Office of United Nations Political
and Security Affairs in the Department of State. It must be emphasised that
it has not been cleared anywhere, even in the office whieh prepared it. It
with
is contemplated that in order to save time it will be dealt)! simultaneoualy
in State, Defense and AEC not as a government position but as a working
piper to be presented to the Disarmament Commission by the United Statesv
Representative acting as an expert and not as a government representative.
2, Timing.
lbs Oeneral Assembly resolution "directs the Commission .....to consider
from the outset plans for progressire and continuing disclosure and verification,
the implementation of Which is recolnised as a further and indispensable step
in carrying out the disarmament proiram envisaged in the present reaolution."
It is anticipated that in vifrodbf the policy directive in NSC 112 the
United States will take the positiozi!that at the outset the newly greeted
commission should deal exclusively with the problem of disclosure and verification.
However, sines both the President and the Secretary of State have said that
we are willing to discuss other phseeill'of the subject we fear that we will not
be able to confine the discussions at the outset to disclosure end verification.
The practical question that is likely to arise is to what extent can we maintain
maxima
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mod= emphasis on disclosure and verification, One thing is completely
clear ? unless we have a constructive and forward-looking paper on that
subject to present to the Commission at the outset, we um not succeed in
our efforts to secure maximum emphasis on disclosure and verification.
We anticipate that the paper must be subbitted abziut Febeilesy 20,
Therefore, the first problem is to organise the preparation's of this paper
in such a manner that we can have a working paper to submit by that date. It
would be satisfactory for the paper to be submitted as a vorldng paper rather
than as an official government position. This was the device utilised in the
submission of the papers to the Collective Measures Committee and it turned
out very satisfactorily both from the standpoint of the Department of State
and the Department of Defense.
3, Relation of em to 1?SC 112.
Any paper on this subject obviously must be in conibrmity with NSA u2.
The proposals which we make must be honest and must be of such a nature that if
'accepted contrery to QUI' expectations, we could live with theca.
The general program set forth in MC 112 is an honest program that we
can live with. It was not too difficult for the President and the Secretary
of State and Ambassador Jessup to justify the broad outliMel.1 of thtie program
on the grounds that it was a morally right prograa.,
When, however, we proceed from the general outline to the problem of
stages of disclosure and verification which is dealt with In Annex A of
NSC 112, we are confronted with a. scmeehat different situation, The
.recommended
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recommended stages stages of dikalosure and verification very properly are based
solely upon the security interests of the United States. In other ivards, the
items to be disclosed in the first stage would be those where the disclosure
and verification by the thited States would be least harmful to its security
interests, and where the disclosure and verification by the Soviet Union
would be most advantageous to the United States. That is entire3y satisfactory
as a hidden objective. However, it is not possible for the United States
Representative in the Commission to justify staging on the ground that it
is advantageous to the interests of the United States and disadvantageous U.
the interests of the Soviet Union. It is necessary in this paper to find a
logical and morally sound and appealing basis for the staging. If there is
'well a basis then it is of no consequence) that the results of such a staging
happen to coincide with the security of the United States, It must be
thoroughly understood however that the security considerations are in fact
paramount, The staging suggested in the paper would in general be satisfactory
from the standpoint of presentation.to the United Nations -- the only aspect
of the situation where UNII has professional competence. We venture no
opinion on whether it adequately protects the security interests of the
United States, this being a matter for determination by Defense and ABC.
We sought, however, within the limits of our knowledge to conform the staging
to United States security interests on the following line of reasoning.
The specific staging can be logically justified on the ground first of
proceeding from the least secret areas in the early stages, to the most secret,
and second on the ground of proo,eeding from those areas where verification can
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be accomplished with a minimum degree of interference in the internal life of
each country to those where verification would require greater interference*
't the same time we hoped that the result of such a pattern would be to
accomplish substantially the chief objective set forth in the annexes to
NSC 1120
a) The staging concerning disclosure of atomic energy
recommended by the AEC.
b) The establishment of a system of inspection with
broad functions at the commencement of the first
stage.
c) The postponement of any dledlosure of. novel weapons
until the last stage*
dO The elimination of research and development activities
from the process of disclosure and verification*
40 Adaptation, of Position to the United Nations*
The ultimate arrangements in conneetion with disclosure and verification
will be highly complex. For examples the disclosure of the numerical size of
?
armed forces is probably entirely appropriate for the first stare *waver*
these Danes may be engaged in activities and may utilise weapons which would
be reserved for later stages of disclosure and verilicatione This is merely
one of the swarm of highly technical problems which will ultimately have to
be decided* It mtat be recognised franlely however, that the newly organised
Cormdesion is not an appropriate organ for dealing at the outset with problems
of this nature* Cur general experience with United Nations committees is that
a long process of education ii neesseary to secure international agreement on
complicated programs, In the early stages it is merely possible to scratch the
surface.
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surface, Therefore? it is necessary to prepare& comparatively simple and
straight-forward paper and to avoid overwhelming the .Commission with a Mass
of complicated details?
This objective is accomplished chiefly through the device of presenting
in an extremely generalised form the items to be disclosed and verified in
the respective stages, and postponing the more detailed discussions until
individual countries submit their specific programs. In other words, until
the individual country- programs are submitted the dismission will be confined
to general principles,
50 atsproblems*
Three problems not fitting within the categories set forth above, arose
in connection with the preparations of this paper and should be briefly noted:
a) Research
b) Aerial reconnaissanet
c) Definition of novel weapons,
I) The elimination of research and development activities from the
disclosure and verification besides being in accordance with preferences
expressed in NSC 112 umarbe logically justified on two groundss
i) researah and development in its early
stages does not constitute erns production;
11) research and development is practically
impossible to 'origin
b) It wculd be consistent with NSC 112 to suggest verification through
aerial surveys in all stages* Sueh a result would clearly befit the United
States
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States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, The paper reserves aerial reconnaissance )
for the second and third stages in accordance with the concept that the OUSee
disclosure and verification in the first stage should be in connection vdth
the less secret anima.
The considerations which led us to reach this conclusion were sone..
what different from the reason stated in the paper. It is apparent that
unlimited aerial reconnaissance will be about the most objectionable subject
from the standpoint of the Soviet Union of all those contained in the paper.
3ince the? United States can with some justice be accused of "stacking the deck"
apinet the Soviet Union, it seems to us that the propaganda benefits from
postponement of aerial reconnaissance to the second stage outweigh any .
advantages of including it as part of the first stage.
c) Definition of novel weapons. It will be noted that the novel
weapons reserved for disclosure and verification in the third stage are
those vhich were not im'general use at the end of World War II. This staging
is apparen0y advantageous to the United States in two raopeates (i) the
chances are that weapons in general use at the end of World War II - sueh
as the Norden bomb sight - has by this time become quite well known to the
Soviet Union; (ii) atomic weapons were not in general use at the end of
Woad War II although it could readily be claimed that the production of
fissionable material Wei ceased to be novel. Therelbre this staging in the
field of non-atomic weapons haps to maintain consistency between the staging
in connection with atomic weapons and, that in other areas.
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
UNA :UNP IBGBeshhoefersrp
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ljatkussUR9
DAC D.1/1
February 15 1952
woriolp GRQUP ON A1 ONS FOR
122..mtmarl.p.ma&moit
Plukagre sal ArAtialquo
The attached redraft, including in pmrtioular the annex on stages of
disclosure and verification of atomic armaments, incorporates the sugges-
tion% oV members of the Working Group.
Av *Irsed in the Working Group meeting of February 8, the paper should
by considered simultaneously in State, Defense, AEG and, if desirable, GlA,
with a view to its allearanos as a working paper (not as a U.S. Government
tioeition) which would be submitted to the Disarmament Gommissien about
Faroi'l le.
Edward G. Platt, Jr*
Secretary
LE.2.31-1
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'C 1:FOUATTC,i
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,
Win
February lito 1952
Prri.2c,8,alt3_ 1r Prarscssiv4. and ConlIeLlia&
7DiscrJeura :ATt-d.Verifical;ri ;f. Armed
or COE DTI' nu, Mal
Introduction
The Ge;4aral Assembly resolution calling for regulation,. limitation
and belarmecl radoction az all armed forces and armamentos directs that the
CamTlesion be ?utded by a number of principles? including the following:
(Operative paravaph 3)
"(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive
dioclotaAre and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces -
including pars-military? security and police forces and all armaments
inelucIng atomic;
"(b) Such verification must be based on effective international
inspoctn to enaure the adequacy and accuracy of the information
discl000d; this inspection to be carried out in accordance with
the decisions of the international control organ (or organs) to
be established,"
Operative paragraph 5 of the resolution reads as follows:
"50 Ltrecta the Commission, in preparing; the proposals referred to
in parsgrapg 3 &bowie to consider frOm the out-est plans for
progrcealve and continuity disclosure and verificationo the
implemeatation of milieh is recognized as a first and indispensable
step in carrying out the disarmament programme envisaged in the
present resolution"0
it is therefore apparent that the General Assembly resolution eontemplate*
that the newly created Disarmaraent Commission should as a matter of priority
deal mith the problem of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification
of armed forces and armaments,
SECRET SECURITY INFORIATION
U0 So 112=114E1.11
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U0S. ProRctsald
The United States proposes the followlng program of progressive and
continuing dine:Loewe and verification of ;mad forces and armaments.
A0 Extent of Dii_tc-14.2m and isritsi
I, The system of disclosure and verifiention must be on a continuing
basis., Disclosure as of a particular date on a "one tills basis" and Rube,*
quont Verification of such disclosure would not meet the requirements eta
oontinuing program for regulations limitation and balanced reduction at all
armed fortes, Therefore it is contemplated that the machinery, which will be
set up should be on a permanent or at least a long term basis, since the
disclosure and verification of armed farms and armaments will be on a
continuing tests?
2. The disclosure must cover all armed ibroes of every. Idnd including
paroodliterya security and police forces end all azweionts including atom100
3 The verification of armed farces and armee ants must likewise cover
armed forces of every kind Including pore-military, security and
police forces and all arman eats including atomise*
Bo Stitges. 2E, Disclosure and Verification
40 Dieclosure and verification must be carried out step by step with
appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next step atm and only when
previous steps have been satisfactorily completed., The reasons for pro.
by Stages are twos
CI) in the minting state of international 'tensions 41 states
mast be protected in the event of a serious violation
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QT SECURITY iNFORUATTON
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system of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments. The
existence of tages gives all states the opportunity over a period of time
to test the good faith of all other states, The mere agreement to enter
into a system for disclosure and verification would give no assuranos that
the parties thereto would actually carry it out in full or at all, With
disclosure and verification in several stages and with each step of one
stage completed prior to the comencement of the next stage, all States
have the opportunity at periodic irtervals of checking the good faith of
other Statue through review of the information theretofore disclosed?
(b) It is oonteeplated that the disclosure and verification would
proceed from the less secret areas mhich would be disclosed and verified
in early stages to the more secret areas, A phasing of this nature in
addition to furnishing the best test of the good faith of all States would
cause the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of each country.,
since the less sensitive information can in fact be more readily verified,
and would, in oases of differences or delays, prevent premature disclosure
of information which many States would like reserved until eekeitsuxtial
cooperation and good faith has been demonstrated?
50 In considering the appropriate nuMber of stages, the United States
had as its objective the full implementation of theprogrem of dismlosure
and verification as rapidLy as feasible in the light of the existing state
of international tensions. An excessive number of stages, eadh of which must
be mnOleted prior to the commencement of the next stage, would unduly delay
not only the program of disclosure and verification but also the entire
program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forees
and
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and armnrIt3, Vath this in mind? the United States concluded and is pro-
posing that tho number of stages of disclosure and verification 'should be
four - a figure ir=hich represents the minimum number consistent with the
considerations set forth in the previous paramaph. In each stage* the
disclosure and verification processes will go forward simultaneously on e
wide variety of items in order to accelerate the successful completion of
the program,,
6, Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed forces and
ermaaents (excluding atomic) to be disclosed in the respective stages and
the manner of verification of the information required to be diselosed.
Annex II Liet3 forth the same information with respect to atonic armaments.
The proposals with respect to atonic weapons are rresenteci in a separate
annex solely in the interests of clarity of presentation. Both the problems
involved and the appropriate terminology with respect to atomic weapons
differ so greatly from the problems and terminology With respect to other
weapons that a single annex comprehending both might be confusing. It is
contemplated that all stages of discloser? and Verification cover both
atomic and non-ctomic weapons. In other words, the first stage includes
the items set forth both in Annex I and in Annex II for disclosure .arsi
verification in that stages and the same is true as to all succeeding stars.
7. Without commentin; in detail at this point on the specific items
subject to disclosure and verification in the respective stages, it should
be noted that the armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in the first
stage have three general Characteristics:
SECRM SECURITY INFORMATION
(a) May
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(a)
(b)
They should prove to be the least secret Amigo
in the main, they are most susceptible of verification
by periodic visits of inspection and through reference
to statistical records with the result that verification
van Ulm pltiec with the minimum of interferon.e in the
internal life of the respective countries. Some resort
would nevertheless be required to "writhe-spot" inspections
and reconnaissance would be required in all stages to
assist in Shocking the adequacy of the disclosure.
(o) At the same time, these items reveal se vast a segment
of the military potential of all States that their disclosure
and verification as provided in this stage in and of itself
would act as an indication of good faith and would thus
ixsatly facilitate prowess %awards the ultimate goals of
the entire program of reguImtions limitation and balanced
redaction of all armed forces and anumentso
8. The armed forces and ermamente to be disclosed in the second, third
and fourth stages are progressively more secret and more difficult to verify
exaept through "on-4heu4spot" investigetions in conjunction with extensive
aerial reconnaissanee.
9. The character of the items to be disclosed and verified in the
four stages an outlined in Annexes I and II can in .general be summarised
as follows:
Limit I. A quantitative count in the nature of a report
on existing strength levels of all armed forces and
of the location of instmllatione and facilities concerned
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am II.
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nue CI Detailed disclosure of organization of armed
forces and of installations and facilities coneerned
with the basic materials required for production of
all armanents including atomic?
afge. III, Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel
armaments) fissionable material and installations and
facilities utilized in their production,
Stage IV. Detailed disclosure of novel armaments including
atonia (armainentl not in general use by the end of the
second World War but in volume production today) and
installations and facilities utilized in their production?
Co Imection
100 The system of disclosure and verification is an integral part of
the system of safeguards which must be eetablished to ensure observanee of
the overall program of regutions limitation and balanced reduction of
armed farces and armunents so as to provide for the prompt detection of
violations while at the same time causing the minimum degree of interferon**
in the internal life of each country. It will not be adequate to provide
merely for the verification of disclosed information? In addition provision
must be made for determining the adequacy of the disclosed informations
through broad general pamers of !'on-the..epot" inspections throu& access
to statistical data permitting independent confirmation of required reports
and through aerial surveys?
U. Extensive
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...?611111???=1...?11/.....VVO
1/. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essential to the
verification procedure in order completely to determine the adequacy of
disclosed information. It will be obvious that aerial reconnaissanee
furnishes the easiest method of determining the existence of large undiselosed
facilities and installations. Aerial survey will be essential in all stages
of the disclosure and verification procedure.
? 12. It is contemplated that "on-the-spotoinspection will take place
in all stages as a part of the verification procedure. Ito Imo however,
will be less extensive in the first than in the later stages because of
the greater ease of verification through other methods of the iteMs
disclosed in the first stage. Certain principles governing limitations
on the right of "on-the...spot" inspaetions in early stages are set birth
in Annexes / and II.
13. Each state at the commenemnent of **eh stage should .*mit to
the COURISS1011 a general description of the nature and location of
fatalities falling within the terms of reference fbr that stage.
Access to such locations, reascnibly sufficient to verify the information
disclosed should be granted to inspectors.
144 It is essential to an effective system of verification that
the international iaspesterso in addition to examining declared installations
and facilities be permitted in all stages to have access to the entire
national territory in order that the Gmaniodonmey determine within
reasonable limits the aecuracy and adequacy of the inibrmation disclosed*
Accordingly.
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Accordinglyt. each ,State should be required daring each stage of the
proeette of di:3c1oaure and verification to permit the international
inspectors such freedom of nioveraent and to give sc,nem access to Mail
installations and facilitiesprecords and data as may reasonably be
required* including the right to inspect physical dimensions of all
facilities and installations wherever situated,
.Each stato should facilitate the activities of the international
inspectoro end. furainh to than such anpietance as they may reasonably
r.wireo
16, Pro2e.tr .hotad be sot up in order to penult a determination
by the Cor.ardetC.,.-41 or the -newssity for -neuection of any facij.itios or
usetee63 to teich is denied to the inspectore and where in the
judgment of the inspectors such inspection is required?
3.70 The inspectors sheeld report to the Cerralesion any information
indicating a major violation of any provizions of the treaties or agreements
respecting disclosure and verification, In the event of a Commission
determination confirmed by the Security Council of such a major violation
during any stage and the failure of the state guilty of violation to repair
the same within a reasonable specified periods other states should be free
to suspend the operations of the disclosure and verillcation WW1*
180 The first stage of disclosure and verification should commence
upon (a) the entry into force of the treaties dealing with the program of
disclosure and verification and referred to in operative paragraph 3 of
the
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the General Assembly resolutions, arid (b) the establishment pursuant to
such treaties of international machinery responsible for carrying out
the prograni of disclosure and verification including the portion of such
machinsry located within the territory of states adhering to the program?
190 Disclosure and verification In all stages subsequent to the
first stage should conrnenee upon a Security Council determination that
the previous stage has been satisfactorily completed?
20. The Security Council decisions set forth in paragraphs 3.7-42v, 19
should be by an affirmative vote of any seven menberso
21, It is not aontenplated that research or developacnt activities
in the field of *memento shall be included within the program of die-.
closure proposed herein unless and until such activities reach the
stage of volume prockiction of arsamentso
Do lii.arallaneous
220 The United Nations should establish concurrently with and at the
time of the adoption of the general principles governing this program the
neeessary inspection machinery to ensure effective verification of the
armed forces and arnarnentee including those involving atomic energy? '
disclosed pursuant to the program. In establishing this asehinerys
consideration should be given to its subsequent utilisation to supervise
the program fir the regulation, limitation end balaneed reduction of all
armaments and armed forces. Ihe maehinery reeommerded in the United
Nations Atomic Energy Plan would presumably be utilised in eonneetion With
the
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the disclosure and verification of armaments involving atomic eery
The problem of appropriate United Nations raachinery both for purposes
of the system of disclosure and verification and for the regulation,
limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments is the
subject of a separate stu.tio
230 It is contemplated that the disclosure and verification processes
with respect to all adhering states dhouLi begin simultaneously and should
go forward at approximately the same tempo.
24. The discloaure and verification system must be open for adherenee
by all States and authorities and must be agreed to at least by those States,
and authorities, tho military-resources of which are so substantial that
their-failure to provide information and adhere to the verification aspects
of the system would endanger the progreno The draft treaties or agreements
referred to in Operative Paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution
would include the net of States and authorities the adherence of shish
to the disclosure and verification system would be zuquirsdo
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ANNEX I
PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION
ARMED FORCES AND NON-ATONIC ARMAMENTS
STkGE I
Wales (a) Over-all manpower strength of regular and reserve military
forces and para-military organisations, including training
'establishments and security and police forces, broken
down into each oategory?
CO Location of all operational military installatims?
irei.ja (a) By examination and cross-checks of central records to
include personne4 disbursement, medical and procurement
supplemented by access to and spot diecks of records at
selected installations?
(b) ssy direct examination, location, manpower used, power
input and physical dimensions of installations?
(a) and (b) - inspectOre will have access to entire national
territory to extent necessary to determine that all /Unitise
and installations have been declared? Aerial surveys will be
permitted for same pOrpose and to same extent?
Disclose (a) Organisation, composition and disposition of units making
up over-all.strengths disclosed in Stage ro
(b) Over-all annuircapacity of heavy industry relating to
armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity?
lad&
Approved For Releance13/gialtrfiAtikniffitt31R003300180028-1
a IP
Approved Fokliglitlease 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R0174003300180028-1
SIE,CRT SECURITY INFORATIOL
amarn,".???*
?Verifx
? (L)
-2-
ntitiv riLy3is of records pert._ining to personnels
rtcycro , is unite arid adrinis-:rativo support supplemented
acco:;:i to and spot checks of selected units and
installations,
(b) By cross checks of oartinent statistics and employment
rlcords ? access to plants, and analysis of operation
with respect to latorials
and (b) aerT,a1 survey as statod ia Ltage. I,
SXA( III
Muclot-:ie roserve imint of units making
11 .irritt 31xclon Ad 1 T1 '11:,e gel 8n1 Jj.
eYeept units equipped -lith novel weaponao)
(b) Produ,ction facilities for manufacture of weapons and
heavy equipulmt for units making up over-sell-strengths
disclosed in Stages I and II. (excluding novel weapons),
zi..ring location, type and capacity.
Ve.L.ria (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table
of organisation and equipment, and repair and overhaul
of equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of
selected units and installations.
(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and
examination of records pertaining to consumption of
power and raw material's available labor forces .and
insnces. and by access to and spot checks of selected
unit,a and installations.
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003.3001800.28-1
(a) and (b) by aerial' survey as stated in Stage i.
STAGE IT
Approved Fotlintlease 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP8OR017
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION ?3?
.
STAGE IV
03300180028-1
Disclose (a) Inibrmatien as to equiment of units equipped with novel
weapons to include, biological warfare, chemical warfare,
radiological warfare and atomic weapons.
(b) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.
(c) lantallationa and facilities devoted to manufacture
of novel weapons.
DA& (a) By cross Checks with Stages I and II and quantitative ?
inspection of units disclosed.
(b). By phyaical count or stockpiles of finiahed novel weapons
'oross?chsoked with:information disclosed in Stages I and II
and III.
(o) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and
examination of records pertaining to oonsumption of
power and raw materials, available labor force, and
finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected
units and installations.
(a), (b) and (c) by aerial survey as set forth in Stage I.
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180028-1
Approved FJ111111141ease 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP8OR017*1403300180028-1
S&CRET SECURITY INFOrdAATION
ANNEX II
PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION'
ATOMIC ARHAMENDA
STAOE I
Disclose (a) Location of all.installations directly =owned with atomic
energy, or th9 product of mhich is primarily useful in the
production of atomic energy. Also manpower anployed,
physical dimensions, and power input of each installation.
(b) Uses or functions of these installationa. This 'should be
confined to a statement giving the input material, the
product material and the process used in each instance.
(a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input
and physical dimensions of installations. (Impactors will
have access to entire national territory to the extant
necessary to deternine that all atomic energy installations
have been declared.)
(b) Uses and functions insofar as revealed by external OXIIMilliati011
of all structures and unhoused equipment, Verification or (a)
above will be of value as partial verification of plant use
or function. Detailed interior inspection shalltake plass
in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it
will take place dependLng upon the function of the plant?
SECRET SECURITY INFORMTION
SE XI
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180028-1
Approved Fohalease 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01734303300180028-1
SECRET =min INPDRMATION
STAGE II
ONO.
Disclose (a) Design and operation, including present and past output*
of all those installations or parts of installations concerned
with preparation of atomic energy feed materials (and such
auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water, and berylltai),
from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation
plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce
fissionable or fusionable material?
(b) General design and operational characteristics of research
laboratories involving reactors operating at a level of
1 MN or more, including amounts of radioactive, fissionable
or ftaionable materials produced?
Ltja (a). By direct and detailed '..nspection of all aspects the
installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with
Stage I.
(b) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors,
by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.
STAGE
Disclose (a) Details of design and operation* including present andpast
output of all those atomic energy installations* or parts of
installations, =corned with the conversion of feed materials
to
SECRET SECURITY INRMATION
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180028-1
.4-? ?
?
?
Approved FoWlease 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R0173403300180028-1
?
SECRET SECURITY INFORMAZION
to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation
of radioactive materials in large quantities*
(b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on
hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on
hand or in process.
Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects of the
installations,and.appropriate records. Cross checks with
Stages land II.
(b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or
fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations
for production thereof, and appropriate records*
STAT
Diselose (a) Details of design and operation, including past and present
output of all those atoaic energy establishments and
installations concerned with the fabrication a atomic or
radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials*
(b) Location, nuMbers, and types of atomic and radioactive
weapons on hand.
Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and
appropriate records. Cross checks with Stages I, II and III*
(b) By direct inspection. Cross checks with Stages 19 II and III
and (a) above.
SECHLT SLCURITY INDRMATION
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180028-1
.. .
UNCLASSIFIED . RESTRICTED CONF r6ENT I hi. SECRET
Approved For WILLr iieliaseLAO4Tig :1-6PIP1?-Nk..141.4 0,01731R001
?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
INITIALS
DATE
I
ADSO
2
ADM
3
DD/P
4
5
FROM
INITIALS
DATE
I
DD/P
2
3
SIGNATURE
RETURN
DISPATCH
FILE
any cs
date of
APPROVAL INFORMATION I
I____IACT
I ON DIRECT REPLY 1 1
COMMENT I [PREPARATION REPLY
OF
CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION
REMARKS: Will you please indicate if you have
ment on the attached. Please note suspense
1 March.
..
SEChvnweLcbiPrAillifIE 2oo4m41 6fdff-RoPuEempliFFR3
FORM NO.
. 30.4
SEP 1947
300180028-1
M-
300180028-1
A'UNCLASS4IFIED; ' REsitua cAkkAAA0(4701601130C
Nei-cm/64114i- Releasie a 41311-1?911. 1?'-"A N Or 10 -_,_
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
To
INITIALS
DATE
I
DDA
_
3
4
5
FROk
IN TIALS
DATE
I
DD/I j121iFV
)
.srv
2
3
' 'APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATURE
I IACTION DIRECT REPLY ' RETURN
(--=:=JCOMMENT =PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCH
1_____ICONCuRRENCE 1 RECOMMENDATION FILE
REMARKS: Due to URGENC/ attached draft is being
considered simultaneoulay in State, Defense, AEC and
CIA, with a view to clearance as a WORKING PAPER
(not US Government position) BEFORE 1 MARCH.
'DD/I asked me to pass the attached to DD/P
for his reaction to the draft. DD/I sttesses that
on an informal "OK" (if OK seem a indicated) is
required.
7.-----:--t* , P8OR01731R003:
SEC roven/TPrIficilOvElIPM 1?Iini fillfok-RD UNCLASSIFIED
FORM NO.
30.4
s.P 149 47
1)80028-1
300180028-1
ApprovedRaelya22,04:3:404/2.ei CIAAPP8OR01731R003300180028-1
AD/ fc . review with
AVMs AD/bIs An/sis AD/BR, **Mgt
1Tproved Fsw Release 2003/05/23 : GWRDP80R0171 R003300180028-1
ILLEGIB
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180028-1
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300180028-1