INTERIM U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN FOR EXPLOITATION OF UNREST IN SATELLITE EUROPE (NSC ACTION 817-E)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200140004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 22, 1953
• Content Type: STUDY

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SECURI r INFORMATION
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PSB D-45
June 22, 1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
INTERIM U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN FQR EXPLOITATION
OF MMEST IN WA COPE
(NSC Action 87.7-e
1. Problem
To assess the significance of recent signs of unrest in the European
satellites of the USSR, particularly in the so-called German People's
Republic, to estimate U.S, psychological capabilities for influencing
the situation, and to develop a realistic program of coordinated U.S.
psychological operations to exploit rapidly existing opportunities for
furthering U.S. national objectives in the Satellite states of Europe,
while laying the foundations for more ambitious programs in the future
if events should warrant them.
2. The Situation
A dramatic new element has been introduced into the European situation
by the current wave of unrest sweeping satellite Europe. Popular discon-
tent over Communist oppression has flared into open defiance of Communist
authority in Czechoslovakia, where workers' demonstrations of a violence
and temerity hitherto unknown in the Satellite states broke out early
this month. Though these riots appear to have been triggered by resent-
ment over monetary reforms, in Pilsen, at least, they had broader im-
plications. There, by the admission of the governmental press, an angry
mob trampled 'on the Soviet flag and hoisted the American one. Minor
acts of resistance have been reported elsewhere in Czechoslovakia and
in Rumania. For some time, Albania has appeared to be on the verge of
revolt, and a sober U.S. press observer' after a recent visit to Budapest,
compares Hungary to a volcano which could erupt at any time.
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It is in the so-called German Democratic Republic, however, that
the most significant and spectacular developments have occurred. The
anti-regime demonstrations which began in East Berlin on June 16, and
developed the next day into bloody mass rioting, subsequently spread
throughout a large part of the Soviet Zone and were frankly characterized
by the governmental press and radio as a rebellion. Despite the
proclamation of martial law and the deployment of Soviet armed forces in
East Berlin and in several parts of the Soviet Zone, calm had not been
fully restored six days after the outbreak of the uprisings, Several
hundred thousand Germans appear to have participated in the movement.
There were widespread strikes. The rioters were mainly workmen, many of
them from heavy industry and public utilities. Several strategically
important large plants were either destroyed or badly damaged. The
communist press has reported what it termed "murderous assaults" on
Party officials and police or other state employees, and mob attacks on
government offices, jails, Party headquarters and other installations
have been noted,
where
In East Berlin and elsewhere/mass riots occurred, the puppet police
and military forces appeared to be ineffectual, A number of defections
from the Communist police occurred. The pusillanimous behavior of
Deputy Minister Otto Nuschim and other puppet officials did not enhance
the prestige of the regime. The reenforcement or replacement of East
German by Soviet military forces, including tank units, naturally tended
to suppress large-scale mob demonstrations but did not immediately cow
the rebellious workers. A number of audacious attempts to spike the
guns or sabotage the treads of Soviet tanks were reported. Clearly there
was no magic even in the most impressive manifestations of Soviet military
strength. The tearing-down of the huge Soviet flag that has waved over
the Brandenbergev Gate in Berlin since the Red Army first entered the
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city was a symbolic act of tremendous portent.
The drastic and sweeping Soviet repression, involving thousands of"
arrests and a number of summary executions, had not broken the spirit of
resistance in Eastern Germany a week after the beginning of the uprisings.
Official communist statements reported in the Western press on June 22~
declared that many of the "fascist provocateurs"alleged to be responsible
for the disorders were still at large and admitted that even in
factories where work had resumed a number of the workers still exhibited
an embittered spirit. Food shortages appear to be aggravating the
unrest in Berlin.
Efforts of the East German puppet officials to win over the
rebellious population by announcements that workers who were merely mis-
led will not be dealt with harshly, by abject self.criticism which almost
certainly foreshadows a sweeping Party purge, and by promises of drastic
reform and economic relief, seemingly have been even less successful than
the Soviet repression of the rebellion. Though resentment over excessive
production quotas, food shortages and hard conditions of life generally
triggered off the revolts in Germany as in Czechoslovakia, these
grievances were overshadowed by the clearly expressed political
objectives of the rebels. More than anything else the German uprisings
appear to have been a kind of spontaneous direct-action plebiscite in
which the East German masses voted with their fists for free elections,
the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation
forces.
The repeated mob shouts of I'Russki Go Home" and similar slogans gave
the uprisings a clear anti-Soviet character from the start, but it would
be a mistake to view them as pro-Western. Their essential motivation
was nationalist. Unless the Soviets are prepared to come to terms with
German nationalism-:which seems unlikely-.-or to adopt savage measures
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of mass repression.. there seems litt3alik -lihood that the spirit of
resistance in Eastern Germany-will abate. On the contrary,, the partial
victory over the puppet government indicated by the promises of reform
which have already been wrung from it, is likely to enhance the morale
and step up the expectations of the resistance forces.
At the same time the sweeping concessions which the Kremlin has
forced the puppet authorities in Germany to make: or promise., are almost
certain to stimulate demands for similar concessions in the other
where the Kremlin can less easily afford to grant them.
Satellites/ This communist di:lsma0 plus the indications that popular
resentment in all the European Satellites is near the boiling point,
plus the discrediting of the German puppet regime and the revelation that
Soviet power in Eastern Germany has no basis but naked force, plus the
demonstration furnished by the German rebels that defiance of Soviet
authority is not always equivalent to suicidep adds up to the greatest
opportunity for effective U.S. psychological operations to help roll back
Soviet power that has yet come to light,
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30 It 22~ Fsycholoaical Canabi It leg
a. United States capabilities in the Satellite States of
Europe--including European or non-official American organizations
normally responsive to U.S. official influence--are comparatively great,
especially in East Germany. In no other part of the Soviet orbit is
our position so favorable for influencing the thoughts and actions of
large numbers of men. In one area at least.--Eastern Germany--the
population is probably more responsive to U.S. leadership than it is in
many free countries. Our capabilities- are probably lowest in Rumania
and Bulgaria, Yugoslavia however has significant psychological capa-
bilities with respect to Bulgaria which could be used to support certain
U.S. objectives.
(l) The greatest single U.S. capability in Eastern, as in
Western Europe is the personality and prestige of President Eisenhower,
both as an individual leader and as they symbol of America's enormous
power in the service of the cause of human freedom which most inhabitants
of Eastern Europe still regard as their own.
(2) The importance of the President as a U.S. psychological
capability is enhanced by the relative effectiveness of U.S. controlled
mass media in most of the Satellite areas of Europe. This makes it pos-
sible to project U.S. leadership rapidly throughout a large and populous
region, The most important vehicles of U.S. influence in Eastern Europe
are the following radio stations or programs: RIAS, Radio Free Europe,
and the Voice of America. Throughout most of the Soviet Zone of Germany..
RIAS has a popularity and an influence probably unequalled in the history
of psychological warfare, Radio Free Europe is operated by a private
American organization, but its staff will conform their programs to the
national interest. Despite intensive jamming and danger to the individual
in listening, RFE exercises locally a real and important influence in parts
of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. VOA, though heavily jammed, is heard
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throughout most of the region.
PSB D-45
June 22, 1953
b. Apart from the direct U.S. or U.S.-controlled capabilities
listed above, there are significant free world capabilities for support-
ing common objectives in the Satellite areas. By appropriate methods it
should be possible in most cases to stimulate more effective exploitation
of these foreign capabilities and to coordinate them more closely with
U.S. capabilities. Both the DEC and the French national radio system
have substantial listening audiences behind the Iron Curtain and both
could effectively support overt U.S. programs if the two governments
could be persuaded to adopt more dynamic psychological policies. Both the
French and the British have some covert capabilities in the Satellites
which could be exploited more vigorously. The psychological capabilities,
both overt and covert, of the Yugoslav Government are believed to be
substantial in southeastern Europe. U.S, support of, and selective
cooperation with, the Yugoslav programs is of major importance. Existing
West German capabilities, official and non-official, are probably being
exploited to the maximum, or close to it, at present, but they could be
expanded with U.S. help.
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Radio Madrid puts a strong signal into much of the region and
its programs include a good deal of hard-hitting psychological warfare
against the Soviet and puppet authorities in Satellite Europe, It is
said to have a large listening audience,
The Italian Government radio facilities and Radio Vatican have
been developing regular programs for the captive nations of the Soviets
and should be useful in an integrated program.
The Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic churches, particularly
the latter, have politically significant capabilities behind the Iron
Curtain.
The real capabilities of the various emigre organizations are
hard to evaluate and the rigid political objectives with which some of
them are identified often impede effective c9ordination. On the other
hand, the unexpected scale and intensity of the current wave of unrest
in Satellite Europe as indicated in Paragraph 2 suggests the possibility
that the emigre groups may have been underestimated. In any case,
an objective unprejudiced reexamination of the role of nationalist
emigre organizations and leadership with respect to Eastern Europe
generally Could be required before the capabilities of these organiza-
tions, either in the Satellites or in the USSR itself,, could be accurately
assessed and a full scale program developed.
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SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-45
TOP SECRET June 22, 1953
11.. Conclusions
a. While the current wave of unrest in the satellite states of
Europe may not foreshadow the beginning of a vast anti-communists and
nationalist revolt throughout the Soviet empire, it does unquestionably
offer the most promising opportunity yet seen for effective U.S. psycho-
logical and political attack upon Soviet power in the area.
b. U.S. capabilities, particularly covert capabilities, are not yet
adequate to foment or support a widespread revolt against Soviet power in
the European satellites, but, despite certain weaknesses, chiefly on the
covert side they should be able to contribute effectively to maintaining
and extending the existing unrest. In view of the limitations of preoont
U.S. capabilities, particularly the lack of substantial military power in
Western Europe, we should be careful not to fan the sparks of revolt in
Eastern Europe to the point where they risk flaring up into mass, open
rebellion.
c. Owing to the lack of adequate intelligence on Eastern Europe, we
cannot accurately predict the development of the situation there, even
in the immediate future. Consequently, our psychological programs to ex-
ploit the present situation should be sufficiently flexible to:
(1) Taper off without loss of conidence or prestige in the eyes
of the local population if the present unrest should die away in a
few weeks;
(2) Permit rapid expansion and intensification if the national
resistance movements in the satellite appears to be gathering momen-
tum;
(3) Not rule out the possibility that despite our efforts to
avoid encouraging premature rebellion, such open rebellions may
actually flare up at any time in the Satellites and even spread to
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the Ulsaine, l3yelo Russia, the Baltic states, or to the other non-
Russian nations of the USSR, thus creating a situation in which
the entire course of history might be favorably altered by bold
and prompt U.S. action in the form of military assistance to the
rebels.
d. In order to increase free world capabilities for vigorous and
coordinated action in Eastern Europe,
I In view of the contingency mentioned
in paragraph (3) above, we should also unc ertake, without delay, an ob-
jective and complete reevaluation of the possible role of anti-communist
emigre and other nationality organizations and leadership, particularly
in relation to the potentialities of nationalism as an anti-Soviet force,
both in the satellites and in the U3SR itself.
5. Ps:rchological Ob cctives
a. For the purpose of this interim plan, our first objective is
simply to stimulate, spread and maintain throughout the European satellites
the spirit of active resistance to communist oppression evidenced in
Eastern Germany, in Czechoslove .:ia and elsewhere. Pursuit of this objective,
however, must be qualified by the following considerations:
(1) We must avoid stirring up resistance to the point of open
rebellion unless or until the United States is willing and able to
give effective milifa'y;'.support.
(2) U.S. measures to encourage the spirit of resistance must not
be so obvious as to throw doubt on the spontaneous nature of the re-
sistance, which we should eploit as a valuable psychological asset.
b. While we should encourage resistance for its own sake as indicated
in the foregoing paragraph, we should also seek whenever feasible to direct
it towards certain targets. The most immediately important target is the
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SECURITY INPOM+ATION PSB D-45
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puppet regimes in all the satellite states. We should seek to discredit
them, to undermine their prestige and authority, and to weaken them in
every possible way. Every time naked Soviet power, military or other-
wise, has to be exercised owing to the failure or unreliability of the
puppet authorities, we should consider this a major psychological
victory, and so exploit it.
c. We should exploit every evidence of significant unrest in the
Satellite states of Europe, as vigorously as developing events justify,
to convince the peoples of the USSR, of Coninunist China and North Korea,
and of the neutralist nations in Asia, that the Soviet empire is begin-
ning to crumble. A sub-target of particular interest for this line of
attack is the minds of nationalistically oriented groups in the
republics of the USSR contiguous to the European Satellites.
d. Finally, we should seek to convince our friends and allies in
the Free World, particularly those in Western Europe, that the love of
liberty and the hatred of alien oppression are stronger behind the Iron
Curtain than they have dared to believe, and that the problem of popular
resistance to ruthless totalitarian authority is less hopeless than they
have imagined.
(Continued on next page)
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SECURITY INFQRM ION PSB D-45
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6. U. S. Courses of Action: Phase I.
(Actions which can be launched within sixty days on the basis of exist,
ing U.S. capabilities and within the framework of the estimate of the
situation as indicated in Paragraph 2)
a, Basic Tasks.
(1) Intensify overt and covert U. S. information programs
to the European satellites, including ?astern Germany aimed at stimulating
the spirit of resistance everywhere. In programs to Eastern Germany seek to
convince the poptla.tion that their resistance has already rung promises of
important concesLions from the Soviet authorities and that continued or
increased resistance will produce additional concessions, culmin.,tin( in
the u.-!ithdre.wal of Soviet armed forces and free elections for the unification
of Germany. In other satellite areas--unless or until new major acts of
resistance occur outside of Germany-the emphasis in our overt programs
should be upon rapid, strictly-factual reporting of all resistance-news,
from Germany or elsewhere, with particular attention to successful techniques
of resistance, and to the unquenchable love of freedom from which resistance
springs. In covert information programs outside Germany and to some extent
in the overt ones--great emphasis should be put on the gains won by the
German resistance--particularly the de-collectivization measures and all
relief to peasant land-owners and small businessmen--as indicating the
immediate goals of local resistance activities. (For an extended list of
appropriate themes, see Appendix A).
(a) Creating pressure on the communist authorities for
specific reforms;
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(b) Discrediting or undermining the authority of puppet
regimes in order, Where feasible, to provoke open Soviet
intervention.
(3) 14Lerever possible seek to establish secure resistance
nuclei in the satellite areas capable of further large-scale expansion.
(4) Intensify overt and covert defection programs with
particular emphasis upon inducing the defection of Satellite police
leaders and Satellite military personnel--especially pilots--but with-
out neglecting any opportunity, such as now exists in East Berlin--to
induce defection of Soviet military personnel asrecomrr r,9ed in PSr
D-1 #a/la, dated Jan. 15, 1953 and in PSB D-433 uated June rJ, 1953.
(6) In information programs to the tree Uorid, to the USSR,
to Communist China and Forth :Korea and to the neutralist nations of Asia,
emphasize the themes in Appendix A which relate particularly to the
objectives indicated in 5 d.
b. Special Undertake s.
(1) Through appropriate official statements or diplomatic
acts, emphasize at the earliest possible moment the strong support of the
United States for the unification of Geniany based on free elections to
be followed by a peace treaty.
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(2) Activate the implementation of NSC 143 immediately, and
complete necessary consultations with British Government and the Federal
Republic of Germany as quickly as possible in order to permit early release
of planned official announcement and subsequent psychological exploitation.
(3) Through appropriate procedures, bring the question of
Soviet repression of East German revolt before the U.N.
(4) Launch immediately a world-wide movement to honor the
martyrs of the East German revolt, linking it with the achievements and
sufferings of the Czechoslovd[c resistance forces, but focussing; attention
upon ierlin. The proposed campaign should include, one or more of the
following subsidiary campaigns or actions:
(a) Cash collection, offer of scholarships, presentation
of various gifts, etc. for the widow and children
of Willi Goettling.
(b) Erection of a memorial in Berlin to all heroes of
anti-Soviet resistance.
(c) Annual ceremonies in Germany on each anniversary of
June 17 revolt.
(5) Urge the U.S. Red Cross to ask International Red Cross
to investigate conditions in Fast Germany in wake of Soviet repressions, to
determine the need for,medical supplies, food, clothing and other relief for
victims of thend their families.
(6) Stimulate the international organization of free trade
Miens in 3russels to denounce Soviet repression of East German revolt and
demand investigation of economic and labor conditions which set it off.
(7) Stimulate religious, humanitarian and cultural organizas?'
tigns in the United States--and if possible in other free countries-to
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ccllect funds and gifts for the families of the victims of Soviet repres-
sion In Germany.
(9) Undertake irnmedia.tely a study aimed at identifying
possible gaps in the coordination of U.S. psychological programs
in Europe, with particular emphasis upon improving cooperation where
necessary with Allied governments and with the governments of Spain
and Yugoslavia, and take all appropriate steps to effect rapidly
any administrative improvements which may be desirable for the
purposes of this plan.
(10) Undertake the special study of emigre and nationality
U.S,
organizations suggested in paragraph 3.b. unde/Psychological
Capabilities.
(11) The announcement by the President of allocation of
specified funds to MA for the alleviation of the suffering of
escapees to Germany should be vigorously exploited.
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(12) The chief of state of some country with vast under-
populated areas such as Brazil' should be induced to make a public offer
to re-settle large numbers of escapees who have fought against tyranny
and have been forced to flee their homelands,
at a eas ' .e,
(14)/ an effort should be made to appropriate a Sovie t or
satellite tank or other military vehicle and bring it to this side of
the Iron Curtain, preferably at night. The impression should then be
given that its "crew's have just escaped with it. Identities of the
"crews" would be concealed "in order to protect friends and relatives back
home." The materiel could be returned to the Russians in due course.
(15) A one-shot handbill operation should be staged where
covert capabilities exist, giving the impression to the Soviet and
satellite officials and personnel of the armed forces that the hour is
late and all opportunities for escape should be seized at once.
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7. U.S. Courses of Action: Phase Ii.
(Actions requiring lengthy preparation, or contingent upon developments)
a. Casio Tasks.
(1) Wherever feasible, organize, train and equip underground organi-
zations capable of launching large-scale raids or sustained guerrilla war-
fare when so directed.
(2) Through appropriate overt and covert information programs
develop and sustain the confidence of resistance forces to wear down Soviet
control by constant harassment; emphasize the argument that when the right
time comes synchronized uprisings at many widely scattered points will over-
tax the capabilities of the Soviet army and play up particularly any con-
firmed symptoms of disaffection, disunity or demoralization, both in the
Soviet armed forces and among the civilian population of the USSR.
(continued on next page)
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(3) Intensify defection programs aimed at the Soviet Armed
Forces, and launch a general attack through overt and covert information
programs on every vulnerable point in Soviet morale, seeking to convince
both the Soviet occupation forces and the %ome population that they are
control
engaged in hopeless struggle in trying to maintain Sovie/ over the Satel-
lites against the growing resistance of the whole population; appeal to
workers and peasants in the Soviet army not to fire on workers and peasants
in the Satellite countries; seek to convince non-Russian elements in the
Soviet Union that successful national liberation movements in the Satellites
will hasten the liberation of the non-Russian republics from the ibccovite
yoke., or at least oblige the Kremlin to modify its present false nationality
policies.
b. Special Undertakings.
Consider the feasibility and desirability of indicating
(1) /through appropriate official statements or diplomatic acts
at the suitable time the desire of the U.S. Goverment for with-
drawal of all foreign forces from Germany, Austria and the Satellites,
holding of free elections in the Satellites as well as Germany, and the
association of the Satellite states with the West European Community with
emphasis on economic cooperation and rehabilitation.
(2) Encourage the expansion of e:: sting radio programs to the
Satellites, whether official or ;private, to increase coverage of the whole
area and to emphasize the free cooperation among the various national
resistance movements as foreshadowing a free European commonwealth of
independent but associated states.
(3) Consider the feasibility and desirability of developing new
covert organizations, with suitable radio or other outlets, based on the
following concepts:
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(a) A conspiracy of Soviet army officers to save the tISSR
from the blunders of the Kremlin by liquidating the
Party leadership and establishing a regime which
would make peace with the Hest on honorable terms
protecting legitimate national interests.
(b) A "Promethean" program specifically dedicated to
promoting cooperation between Satellite resistance
elements and "bourgeois nationalists" in the non-
Russian Soviet republics in order to destroy the
tyranny of Moscow by coordinated revolutionary action.
(o) A high-level ITU ESC0"-type appeal to Soviet intel-
lectuals attracted by Western culture which could
be used to spread subtle defeatist propaganda and
to discredit individuals.
(4) Consider the feasibility and desirability of launching
Phase II of the Volunteer Freedom Corps program to include nationals of
the USSR.
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Appendix A
PSB D-45
June 22,1953
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR OVERT AND COVERT INFOPJ ATION PROGRAMS
NOTE: The following list of themes is not to be considered
exhaustive or mandatory in all. circumstances but is intended
to indicate some of the major ideas which, with various adap-
tations, should be recurrently stressed from time to time to
give coherence and direction to our information programs
aimed at exploiting unrest in the European Satellites.
1. Not Only Bread, But Freedom
Emphasize the real nature of the "German Revolt," following on
the heels of the Czechoslovak uprisings, as a dynamic demonstration
of the pent-up feelings of a people longing for freedom from com-
munist tyranny. The spark which set off the original spontaneous
riots in East Berlin--workers' demands for lower norms--should be
played secondary to the major theme of general demands for with-
drawal of Soviet troops, free elections, unity, etc.
2. Return To Europe
Promote the "Return to Europe" concept as a driving force
within the countries now behind the iron Curtain and cut off from
.Europe, pointing to integration moves in the 'Jest, appropriate
statements at Strausbourg, and the activities of the "European
Union" as manifestations of this force; describe the "Return to
Europe" idea as a thread which can bind together all peoples of
Eastern Europe in their efforts to throw off the Soviet yoke.
3. Soviet Power Is Running Down
Prevalence of irrepressible resistance in satellite Europe
should be treated as further evidence that "Soviet power is over
the hill and running down," and that popular uprisings such as
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June 22,153
these in East Germany are further proof of the inevitability of
victory for the democratic forces.
ne
4. The Too-Thin Red-Li
Tn output to the Soviet Union especially, the Kremlin's ability
to deal forever with. these recurrent break-outs in its tenuous empire
should be severely questioned, and in covert programs Soviet criticism
of the Kremlin's self-defeating strategy should be emphasized.
Fear The Russians Dearin L Gift Ridicule the Soviet propaganda line about the "warm and enduring
friendship" between the non-Russian. satellites and the USSR, capital-
izing on every strike, every riot, every overt evidence of unrest as
a sign that history, tradition, an(' fundamental differences such as
race, religion, and mores are really at the core of the trout:>le--
that these uprisings are simply ex!)ressions of much.. more deep-seated
resentment of Soviet oppression.
6. 14S Again?
Explore the connotations in different areas of the revolutionary
movements of 1345; to determine whether the symbol "48" can be used
effectively to crystallize resistance today. Wherever the results
of the study are negative, choose other historic parallels which
are locally appropriate.
7. Pilsen--The ITew Cradle Of Liberty
Special programs directed to Czechoslovakia should give credit
to the Czechs, especially in Pilsen, for having taken the lead in
showing real resistance to the Soviets. Programs to Germany which
might be overheard in Czechoslovakia should emphasize the "common
bond" of freedom from tyranny which no man-made borders can block,
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but we should avoid giving the Germans credit for sparking these
outbreaks. An effort should be made to assuage the "guilt complex"
reported running through the people of Pilsen now, for not having
followed through. This double-play of credit must be discreetly
and carefully handled because of the German-Czech antipathies and
the likelihood that one audience may well eavesdrop on what is
being said to the other,, The real point is to give credit where
credit is due, avoiding any implications t,:at either party failed
to act as perhaps it might have, and emphasizing the deep-seated
community of interest which joins people of all oppressed nations.
8. Freedom And rood
9.
We should stress the better standards of living in West Berlin,
than in East llerlin especially with respect to food. In this con-
nection, we could contrast the West Berlin food stockpile with the
scarcities in the East (as long as they last) made worse by the
"Workers' Army" drain on what little there is there. We could
imply that the food stocks in the West are not packaged in party
politics--that this food could be available to the East Berliners
if the Soviets would grant the peoples' demand to unify the city,
instead of sealing it of wits tanks and armored columns. We could
also imply, if not actually recommend, that West Berlin could pro-
vide food relief stations in 7ast Berlin if the barriers were down
and proper safeguards were guaranteed.
88 , t3 9rovoeatetrs
Every opportunity should be taken to refute the Soviet charges
of U.S. instigation of the uprisings in Germany, without over-pro-
testation and with diversive counter-suggestions wherever possible,
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June 22,1953
The news itself should be used to disprove these allegations: We
should ridicule the charges being made by the Soviets concerning
the U.S. by pointing to the uselessness of our providing saboteurs
and rebels--thare are obviously millions of home-made insurgents
churning through Germanr today with a lot more at stake than a
U.S. agent could possib1Nr have.
10. U7ar_caf Ner s
The more information we can play back to the East with facts
and figures the better we should be able to convince the Russians,
or at least stimulate their suspicions, that all their efforts to
control the people have failed. RIAS should be used more and more
to carry on a kind of "nerve war" against the Russians emphasizing
its importance to the people of Eastern Europe as a contact with the
West and reaffirming its credibility and reliability as a source of
the truth. We should maintain the impression, backed up by facts,
that the barriers which the Russians have found necessary to impose
on the East Germans are IM & effective; we are getting the news and
the people who carry the news--and RIAS broadcasts prove it.
11. "Lgy ,.'LLabQrT,4 Slave Tea Lor
Soviet calls to ":Loyal workers" to take over industries crippled
European
by strikes should be played back to all Eastern/targets in the frame-
work of the UN/ILO "forced labor" study, making it clear that we
understand what the Soviets mean by "loyalty" -- labor performed at
pistol-point. This should be described as the low-water mark in
inhumanity and symbolic of the society to which the Soviets have
reduced the people under their control. This should be especially
pertinent if reports of uprisings at the Aue uranium mines are
confirmed since the mines are known to be a forced-labor camp, and
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June 22,1953
"loyalty" there is meaningless.
12. IIJIVM. Go L%_11921
We should never let the Soviets forget their use of armed might
to deal in human relationships. Continued demands by Western author-
ities, both German and others, for an explanation of this show of
force would bring a sorry response, if any, from the Soviets, and add
fuel to the "Ivan, Go Home" line. This could be enhanced by whatever
use the Soviets make of the Wehrmacht officers, if they ever get them:
committing "genocide" against a c;laas of Germans on trumped-up scape-
goat grounds, or turning them into "loyal" servants of the Kremlin,
again at pistol-point,
13. The New Quislings
Otto Grotewohl should be made symbolic of the puppets trying
to act like statesmen all over Eastern Europe, His traitorous con-
duct over the past years, climaxed by his calling on Soviet tanks and
machine guns to bail him out, should be made to stick in the craw
not only of the Germans, who need no help from us in this respect,
but of other Eastern Europeans. The whole concept of "quislings"
in the satellite states should be made a recurrent propaganda line,
and efforts should be made also to discredit all the "junior puppets,"
of the Nuschke variety, who appear anxious to take over if and when
the dust settles on the incumbents. Any encouragement to the people
in Eastern Europe to rid themselves of these puppets will have a
strong psychological, if not actual, impact. Further, the contrast
between uprisings of this nature especially, and the stability and
moral strength of the Western world, will prove the fundamental
validity of our position,
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R an For. Your Life
We should also suggest that if and when the Soviets recover
control in East Germany (and elsewhere, if the uprisings spread
abroad), Kremlin-ordered purges will be initiated to "clean up"
the Armed Forces, the puppet Governments, and other control-
mechanisms. In other words, everyone will face the possibility of
death or slave-labor, no matter how small his role. Events and
rumors both should be used extensively to bolster this line, adding
fuel to the flames of suspicion wherever possible.
15. Snec:i Al is
By covert means, in programs aimed at the Soviet Union, we
should foster distrust in the Army high command, and suspicions of
the uses to which the Army is being put, especially suggesting that
the IND may be manipulating the Army for its own ends. To the en-
listed men and junior officers, it should be stressed that the IND
is afraid to permit them even the off-duty pleasures normal in West-
ern armies. Another line of attack would be to ask the soldier-
audience whether putting down workers' demands for decent conditions
is the kind of duty to be expected of an intensively-trained
"workers' army". In covert programs to ,Utel_? li_te personnel, we should
make it plain that "patriots" who can act for liberty and remain
hidden should do so; those who cannot stay should be assured of asylum
in the West. Lesser communist officials who turn on the regime may
be assured their efforts will be their passport to the West.
16. Free Eleglione
In the political framework, our propaganda should continue to
insist on free elections leading to unification, but without giving
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TOP SECRET PSD D-45
June 22,1953
credence to the Soviet maneuvers to make concessions in Eastern
Germany which would permit anti-European integration forces to
look upon such moves as real accomodations. If we commit the
Soviets to withdraw their forces, they cannot afford to do it)
especially in the light of what has gone on this week. If by
some chance they do call us, we should emphasize that the with-
drawal has been forced by the rebellion, and that in turn makes
it apparent that East Germany is free to vote as it will. We
should be prepared to take immediate steps to promote free
all-German elections, meanwhile continuing to regard the uprisings
in the East and the forced withdrawal of the Soviets as proof of
Western strength, in spiritual rather than in military terms.
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