SUGGESTED GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC ASPECTS OF U.S. POSITION ON KOREAN PRISONER-OF-WAR TALKS

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D R A F T SECURITY INFORMATION COPY-NO, 16
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D, C.
PSB D.41
April 3, 1953
SUGGESTED GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC ASPECTS OF U. S. POSITION
ON
KOREAN PRISONER--OF-AJAR TALKS
(FOR BOARD APPROVAL)
DRI/CDF aces 1-9
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D R A F T SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET
COPY NO.
PSB D-41
April 3, 1953
SUGGESTED GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC ASPECTS OF U, S, POSITION
ON
KOREAN PRISONER-OF-WAR TALKS
I.
QUESTION
That is the U. S. position on negotiations for the return of
sick and wounded prisoners of war?
ANSWER
An agreement for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners
of war has been a primary goal of the U. S, Government for nearly two
years.A A proposal for such an exchange was first made by the U. S. at
the beginning of the truce talks on July 11, 1951, From then until
September 28, 1952, the U. S, brought it up at least three times formally
and nine times informally.. On December 13, 1952, the League of Red Cross
Societies in Geneva passed a resolution calling for an immediate exchange
of sick and wounded under the Geneva Convention, and sent copies of this
to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to the U. Si Govern-
ment, and also to the North Korean and Chinese Communist Governments,
The U, S. Government took the matter up with General Clark, and on Febru-
ary 22, General 'Clark sent a communication to the Chinese and North Korean
Communists urging negotiations for a sick and wounded prisoner exchange.
These facts prove the basic American positions nemly, that it
is not the Communists who have taken any initiative in the matter of an
exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, but the U. S. which, as
the culmination of a long series of patient and vigorous efforts dating
back to the initial effort of July 11, 1951, has succeeded in bringing
about a resumption of negotiations on the exchange of sick and wounded
prisoners of war,
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D R A F T SECURITY INFORMATION
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QUESTION
What is the U. S. position on the resumption of negotiations
for a truce or cease-fire in Korea?
PSB D-1.41
April 3, 1953
The U. S. positron is that, once the entire process of exchang-
ing sick and wounded prisoners has been completed., but not before then.,
the US-UN remains prepared, as it always has been prepared, to continue
the armistice discussions,, The U. S. position is further that Chou En
Lairs so-called offer is not a new Communist initiative at all, but is
a very belated response to the US-UN statement made when the truce talks
were adjourned on October S., tlat we would be prepared to resume these
talks whenever the Communists indicated their readiness to present any
reasonable proposalsh
The U. S. stands unshakably opposed to any compromise of our
basic position against forced repatriation. ti{ie will not abandon that
stand, based on the most elementary moral and humane considerations.,
and we emphasize that any resumption of truce talks must be on that
basis.
Apart from our fundamental position that we are glad the Com-
munists have come to their senses and agreed at last to continue the
discussions reasonably., our attitude is that the details of Chou En
Lairs offer are too vague for us to come to grips with them until they
are more clearly delineated, i'any points would require clarification.,
including the nature of the neutral control over prisoners of war. If
agreement is reached on such neutral control., the U, S. will insist upon
certain definite inspection rights in the prisoner-of-war camps to safe-
guard against any undue enemy psychological pressure being brought to
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D R A F T SECURITY INFOR19ATION
SECRET PSB D-141
April 3, 1953
bear upon Chinese or North Korean prisoners of war who have stated that
they would forcibly resist being returned to Communist control. We would
also want effective safeguards against the possibility that the neutral
state or states handling the prisoner exchange might lend unwitting
assistance to enemy pressures.
QUESTION
What is U. S. policy in face of the probability that a con-
siderable number of the sick and wounded American prisoners of
war who are returned will have been Communist-indoctrinated or
brain-washed?
The U. S, policy with regard to returned American sick and
wounded prisoners of war who have bec ape Communist-.indoctrinated is
that they are victims of Communist mental aggression as well as of
Communist military aggression, and that they must first of all have
appropriate hospital facilities and hygienic attention. If conditions
on the spot make it at all practicable, all sick and wounded who return
should be immediately whisked away to hospitals or rest and rehabilita-
tion camps, The press should not be allowed to interview these sick and
wounded prisoners immediately. Consideration might be given to arranging
for interviews after a short period of time has elapsed and after some
screening has been possible to ascertain the degree of Communist indoc..
trination.
This policy can only Eu cceed on three conditionst
1. That the American public be prepared, beginning immediately, to
face the grim realities of the brain-washing process. To achieve this
essential aim quickly, it is proposed that the President himself announce
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n A 7 T SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET PSB D-41
April 3, 1953
the appointment of a number of outstanding scientists in this field to
serve as a Special Advisory Group to the Committee which is studying
the brain-washing problem (a list of such prominent scientific advisors
is under preparation by the Brain-Washing Committee.)
2. Special efforts must be made immediately to enlist the
active cooperation of the American press in explaining this problem in
its true magnitude and perspective to the American people, This should
be done through a special. briefing given, perhaps, through the American
Society of Newspaper Editors, by a group of top-level Government and
military officials, including the President himself, if possible; if
not, then the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Chief
of Staff, and one or more leading psychiatric scientists.
3. The families of the men concerned will, in a sense, be
the main problem, and they must be given the highest priority treatment.
In every case, there must be a personal letter signed by a really high-
ranking officer of the Army - if possible, the Chief of Staff himself
explaining what has happened, not alarmingly but factually and sympathet-
ically, but nevertheless making it plain that this mental aggression is
one of the new horrors of modern warfare as the Communists wage it. In
addition, it is urgently proposed that wherever possible the families of
these men especially in the case of Communist-indoctrinated sick and
wounded, and of Communist-indoctrinated or brain-washed Arne ricans, who
refuse to return - be visited personally, in addition to the letter, by
a high-ranking officer in that military area who has been especially
trained on how to explain this brain-washing problem.
Iv.
QUESTION
7,11hat is U. S. policy toward American prisoners of war - both
sick and wounded and other - who choose to remain in the custody of
the Communists?
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SECRET PSB D-131
April 3, 1953
ANSWER
The policy outlined in III, above applies fully in this case
as well. The U. S. will make every effort to obtain access to these
prisoners of war with a view to confirming at first hand their refusal
to return and of endeavoring to ascertain what form of pressure or
terror or drugs has been utilized to bring it about, but only on condi-
tions that fully safeguard our position if and when the enemy asks for
the same access to their prisoners.
With regard to sick and wounded prisoners of war who refuse
to return, it is strongly recommended that the U. S? negotiators insist
on the right to interview these disabled prisoners of war?
QUESTION
'.that is U. S. policy with regard to probable Communist propa-
ganda efforts to exploit over the radio, in the press, etc., this
expected refusal on the part of some brain-washed American
prisoners to return home?
ANSWER
U. S. policy is to prepare the public fully, via press, radio,
and television, for this probable development, and to do this in advance
of the expected Communist propaganda attack. This means that the back-
ground material already assembled for the purpose should be released as
soon as possible - either before or during the negotiations on the ex"
change of sick and wounded. It is recommended that this release of in-
formation on brain-washing, etc., be kicked off by the President's an..
nouncement suggested above, so that it will have the greatest possible
impact throughout the country,
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D R A F T SECURITY INFORM ION
SECF T PSB D-Li).
. April 3, 1953
QUESTION
What is the United States position as to press, radio, and
TV interviews with returning prisoners of war upon their arrival
in the States?
ANSWER
In the case of sick and wounded prisoners of war, these should
receive hospital or rehabilitation treatment which will give time for a
de-indoctrination for those who have been brain-washed.
QUESTION
What plans are under way to exploit properly those of our sick
and wounded prisoners of war who can vividly describe the true
nature of the improper treatment received at the hands of their
Communist captors?
The military authorities in charge of the reception of sick
and wounded prisoners are expected, at the earliest moment compatible
with the physical condition, of the returned prisoners, to interrogate
them with a view to making full publicity use of effective information
of this nature.
What defenses do we propose to set up to neutralize any
claims of enemy returnees that they were approached by UN security
officers to act as agents?
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SECRET PSB D-141
April 3, 1953
This sort of problem should be handled by refusing to attribute
any particular importance to it, but at the same time having some appro-
priate spokesman (probably in the UN Command) point out in advance that
this is the sort of thing the Communists are likely to suggest, judging
others by their own behaviours
What should be the U'a S. attitude toward the probability that
the Communists will use their own returned sick and wounded prison-
ers of war for propaganda purposes; parading wounded and maimed
prisoners about and claiming that they provide evidence of alleged
"barbarous" treatment received while in UN prisoner-of-war camps?
It is U. S. psychological policy to prepare for Communist
charges of this sort by warning against them in advance, In fact? it
should be the U, S. tactic in the present situation to, if anything,
overstate the magnitude of the problem and of the enemryts intentions
in this regard, partly to educate and forewarn the American public,
and partly with the idea that if Communist efforts along these lines
fall short of our warning, we will thereby have reduced their impact.
To offset this propaganda tirade, we should start at once a
series of broadcasts, prior to their return, to China, North Korea,
USSR and satellite countries, describing the actual treatment of POWs
from the time they are captured to their repatriation, The second report
of the International Red Cross should be used for quotations showing that
enemy wounded prisoners of war (a) received the same medical treatment as
our own wounded soldiers; (b) exhibit the chart showing that the general
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D R A F T SECURITY INFOR14kTION
SECRET PSB D-t1
April 3, 1953
physical condition of the: prisoners of war has improved since capture;
(c) their weight has increased; (d) those having disease have been
cured; (e) the food they receive is better than the food provided by
their own army; (f) those who wish it are taught a trade; (g) there is
no forced labor except as punishment; (h) no forced indoctrination;
and (i) recreation facilities, including libraries and sports, are
;provided.
Full coverage should be given of prison riots and disturbances,
and use of documented evidence to show that they were instigated by hard-
core Communist cells and directed by the Korean High Command to embarrass
the United Nations and Prison Command.
QUESTION
What is to be the U. S. attitude toward US-UN prisoners of
war not accounted for by the Communists?
United States policy is to be prepared to bring out, at the
most appropriate time, a hard-hitting statement charging the Communists
with murdering or otherwise brutally disposing of these prisoners of war.
It should probably not be brought out in advance, but should be held as
a counterwcIaarge to be made probably at the UN, if and when the Communist
propaganda attack on the prisoner--of--war issue is being pushed intensively.
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PSXC OZ,CGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
April 6, 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
SUBJECT: Imnnediate Psychological Aspects of Renewed
Negotiations in Korea..
At Mr. Kyest suggestion, my staff has pulled together
a check-list of relevant psychological considerations which
the member agencies may find useful in dealing with the
prisoner-of-wrar problem during renewed negotiations in Korea.
Appropriate staffs in member agncies have been consulted,
but there has not been time to clear the resulting text. I
have also consulted the Chairman.
S/ George A. Morgan by M. B.
George A. Morgan
Acting Director
(To be attached to all copies of PSB D-41 and D-42.)
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