PROGRAM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION FOR STALIN'S PASSING FROM POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200040020-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 1, 1952
• Content Type: PAPER

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SECURITY INFORMATION
NSC review completed
DOC. NO. D-2b
DATE Nov. 1, 19"42
COPY NO. 4S
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington
PSYCHOLCGICAL PREPARATIC l FOR E;TALIN'S PASSING FRCS! POWER
(THIS IS AN APP]tOVED PAPER)
NSC review completed
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, .Sec-
tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
MORI/CDF ppl-4
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? Security Informations Nov. 1, 1952
PROGRAM
PSIOHGLOGIOAL PREPARATIO STAsLINIS PASSING Fall- R
1. National polio' calls for placing "maximum strain on the Soviet
structure of power," reducing Soviet power, and bringing about "a basic
change in the conduct of international relations by the government in
power in Russia" (NSC 20A, para. 19 , and h, 21 e; of. NSC 10/5, para. 1 g).
2. One of the most favorable occasions for furthering these objec-
tives may be Stalin's passing from power. This event, however, has
important relations to practically every aspect of the Soviet problem.
it may touch off a split in the top leadership. It may also lead to
the crystallization of present dissatisfactionis among various groups
in the Soviet population which feel themselves discriminated against.
3. This paper is also relevant to strains that may emerge before
Stalin has fully passed from power. For example, since rivalries must
be presumed to exist already in the top leadership and Stalints control
may be relaxing as be grows older, it is conceivable that the death of
one of the principal aspirants to the succession might upset some
delicate equilibrium and precipitate a crisis, arising perhaps out of
Stalin's efforts to restore balance. It is also conceivable, though
unlikely, that Stalin's death may be concealed, both from us and from
the people, for some time after the event,
4. There is only a chance, not a certainty, that conflicts related
to Stalin's passing from power will bring major changes, and if they do
the changes need not be favorable to U.S. interests. The successor
regime may be worse than Stali.n's$ and among remoter possibilities lies
general war as well as general collapse.. In any case? those conflicts
have such weighty potentialities that they call for active preparation
on our part. It may also be possible to pave the way, to a modest
extent, for their eruption in desirable forms.
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Nov. 1, 1952
5. There are many uncertainties in this field, but three points
stand out as landmarks: (1) Stalin must die somatirne; (2) strains must
be presumed to exist between individuals and groups closely connected
with the problem of succession, even if the problem as such is never
mentioned; (3) apart from strains now directly connected with the prob-
lem of succession, there is evidence of group dissatisfaction throughout
the population of the Soviet Union.
Recommendatians
6. In the psychological field, preparatory work should be five-fold:
a. Existing information and intelligence should be i ventoried,
all that is likely to be additionally useful collected,
and the results brought to bear on factors likely to in-
fluence strains in the top leadership and their modes of
expression, Consideration should be given to using certain
non-attributable operations to provoke Soviet press or
other reactions which may throw further light on this subject.
b. In the light of such insight and within the context of the
more probable patterns of future events in general, the
principal ways in which importa%t conflicts might develop
should be analyzed and corresponding psychological courses
of action sketched, as a repeated staff exercise designed
to make possible prompt and judicious decisions when the
time comes. Since Stalin may the any time, this task should
not be delayed for the completion of further work under
6 a above.
To avoid uncoordinated action in case of sudden death, an
agreed Government position should be prepared at once,
as a basis for stand-by instructions for the period imme-
diately following this contingeney.
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Nov. 1, 1952,
d. Ways of enhancing top-level conflicts in a useful manner
before Stalin's passing should be continuously studied,
developed if promising, and employed when considered
feasible and desirable by the members of PSB. This task
should envisage not only conflicts as such but also those
contributory factors which might eventually shape events
in directions favorable to U.S. interests. Particular
emphasis should be put upon exploring the possibility of
developing psychological operations aimed at influencing
the minds of top-level Soviet leaders in such a manner as
to enhance decisively present or potential conflicts among
then.
e, In connection with other programs oriented toward the ob-
jeotives cited in paragraph 1, exploitation of salient
vulnerabilities in the Soviet or Orbit control apparatus
should be integrated with any operations developed under
paragraph 6 A relating to the problem of succession in
order to (1) feed probable strains at the top or make it
easier for them to spread out from there eventually, and
(2) make use of hopes and anxieties which cluster around
the points mentioned in paragraph 5.
7. Each Member Agency and the Director of PSB is requested to
name one staff member as principal point of contact concerning the
work outlined in paragraph 6.
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