DRAFT PAPER ON A STRATEGIC CONCEPT (PSB D-31)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200040002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 20, 1952
• Content Type: MF

ADDRESS OFFICIAL A`Noved For Release 2006/03/17.,: CIA-RDP80R01731 R0.03200040002-5
THE DIRECTOR OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 29. D. C. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
.
August 20, 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
David R. Bruce
Under Secretary of State
The Honorable
William C. Foster
Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Walter B. Smith
Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Draft Paper on a Strategic Concept (PSB D-31)
The attached paper is the result of over half a year's work
by a high-level group under the chairmanship of Vice Admiral Stevens.
The project was initiated on instructions from Mr. Gray. Its
purpose was to produce, if possible, a strategic concept for a
national psychological program.
Compared to the hopes with which the project was launched,
the outcome represents a disillusion which can be salutary, and
corresponds to a similar trend of national policy thinking
reflected in NSC 135/1. The implications would be clearer how-
ever if the paper, instead of struggling on the brink of tautology
to rescue an "interim strategic concept," had simply left it that
under present capabilities a strategic concept is impossible.
That would have highlighted the urgency of acquiring the requisite
capabilities and at least raised the question of how much time
we have.
The positive aspect of the paper lies in its relation to
NSC 10/5, which directs PSB to include in its concept provision
for covert operations designed to achieve 10/5 objectives. To
this end the paper offers some specific emphases and criteria
for cold war 10/5 operations.
For this reason, I recommend that the Board approve the
recommendations after inserting in paragraph 2, page 9, after
"emphasis" the phrase "in those operations," in order to make
clear that particular reference to cold war operations under
NSC 10/5 holds for this and subsequent paragraphs.
NSC review(s) completed.
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Since the paper has already been cleared at fairly high levels
in the member agencies, I propose to bring it up at an early
luncheon meeting unless you prefer to handle it in another manner.
If the latter is the case, please let me know.
Raymond B. Allen
Director
PSB D-31.
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COPY NO. 3
PSB D-.31
August 5, 1952
:w
A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM
AR k- RZFERENCE'TO 0-00 W OPERATIONS
1. Almost all governmental policies and actions have psychological
content in that they bear on the minds and wills of other peoples. An
attempt to formulate a national psychological strategy covering every
intention and action having psychological impact in this sense would
encompass every aspect of governmental activity. This would be an
effort of unmanageable proportions. In order to formulate a national
psychological strategy that will usefully subserve the national policy
it is necessary to divide the task into separate aspects of manageable
proportions. When we ask, "What can usefully be said about ways and
means of bringing about a retraction of Soviet power and influence?"
we have selected one such aspect and have stated it in such a way that
we can perhaps deal with it. The following does not attempt to deal
with the problems involved in the distribution of resources between cold
war operations and preparations in support of overt war.
2. NSC 101S, paragraph 1, app-roved "the intensification of covert
operations designed in general order of emphasis tot
a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power,
including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites and Com-
munist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U. S. and
Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction
and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer
constitute a threat to U. S. security.
* In accordance with Presidential Directive of 1 April 1951, which
establishes the PSB as responsible for the formulation and promulgation,
as guidance to the departments and agencies represented for psychological
operations of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and
programs, and which defines psychological operations as including all
activities under NSC 59/1 and 10/2.
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b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the
peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and
will to resist Soviet domination.
o. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and
guerrilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable ex-
tent consistent with 1?-a. above . . . ."
3. NSO 10/5, paragraph 2, directed lithe Psychological Strategy
Board to assure that its strategic concept for a national psychological
program includes provision for covert operations designed to achieve
the objectives in paragraph 1 above."
Ii. It is the object of this paper to outline a strategic concept
for a national psychological program with particular reference to cold
war operations under NSC 1015. These operations are primarily covert in
to
character, but we believe a paper addressed/such operations will provide
a concept valuable to overt psychological operations under NSC 59/1 as
well, especially those which are concerned with bringing about the re-
traction of Soviet power and influence.
5. The general objective of psychological operations in the cold
war can be Subsumed under the general heading of contributing to the
"retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence" whether by
operations designed to weaken Soviet power in the Communist orbit or
by operations designed to weaken Soviet influence by strengthening the
free world.
6. Our national strategy, as defined in NSC 20/4, paragraph 20,
is to "endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of
war." This national strategy calls for efforts to "encourage and pro.,
mote the gradual retract:Lon of undue Russian power and influence from
the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries .. . .j
to eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influ-
ence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow . ..; (and) to
create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recognize
the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present con-
cepts ..."
7? In the absence of open hostilities, the cold war can be expected
to continue in one form or another as long as the Soviet Union, which is
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to say, the Bolshevik Party, adheres to the aims and methods which it has
pursued ever since its accession to power, within as well as outside the
Party. Recognition of this - particularly public recognition - is neces-
sary for understanding and support of continuity of effort. The over-
throw of the Party by war or successful revolution appears to be the
only certain means of forcing such changes. One is excluded, and the
other so far beyond our current capabilities as to be presently unfeasi-
ble.
8. We are unable at present to propose a strategic concept which
outlines a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold
war because (a) we do not have and cannot clearly foresee the time when
we trill have the capabilities, and (b), because without adequate capabili-
ties the risks involved are clearly disproportionate to the probabilities
of success. The time required to develop the necessary capabilities is
so great that the nature of an acceptable solution cannot be determined
with sufficient accuracy to serve as a guide. As our capabilities in-
crease, flexibility and opportunism in the light of events appear present-
ly more desirable than commitment to too specific a goal.
9. We should continue to develop our capabilities for assisting
revolution and continue to re-appraise the situation. This will require
both the development of further capabilities for the exploitation of
existing techniques and a major program for the development of new techni-
ques and approaches. It is possible that the cumulative effect of re-
traction of Soviet power and influence, together with future events and
the inherent problems with which the Soviet government and the Bolshevik
Party are faced may eventually bring about sufficient change in their
aims and methods to provide an acceptable solution. Efforts to develop
our capabilities and to bring about such a retraction as opposed to a
program for a definitive solution may be regarded as the interim strategic
concept for a national psychological program.
10. Within the limits imposed by the terms of our national strategy
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and the present level of our covert capabilities it is possible to
advance certain general criteria for operations under 10/5, to test
broad fields of possible covert action against these criteria, and from
a combination of the two to give more precise form to the psychological
operations which should be prosecuted in accordance with the interim
strategic concept, and to provide an indication of priorities. Overt
propaganda should give appropriate support in accordance with priorities
as may be determined.
11. The general criteria which present covert operations under the
interim strategic concept should meet are those of effectiveness, feasi-
bility, acceptable risk, and flexibility.
a. Effectiveness: The importance of the effects which success-
ful operations may be calculated to have in reducing Soviet influence and
power or in strengthening; the free world against the exertion of Soviet
influence aid power must be appreciable and must warrant the effort, cost
and risk of the operation. In general, priorities should be proportion-
al to anticipated effectiveness.
b. Feasibility: Our capabilities in terms of trained man-
power or material, and local or international support, must be adequate
to give reasonable promise of success to the operation in the face of
such capabilities as the Communists may have to frustrate it.
c. Acceptable risk: The degree to which the undertaking or
successful conclusion of the operations may be calculated to provoke
military reaction from the Communists must be sufficiently limited as
to be an acceptable risk in terms of our national strategys
d. Flexibility: Operations should be of a type which lend
themselves within reasonable limits to adaptation or modification to
exploit such opportunities or undertake such objectives as may become
possible or advisable subsequent to actual initiation of the operation.
12. There is a wide range of activity currently in process to
bring about the retraction of Soviet power and influence which should
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continue. Many of these activities, although in themselves incapable
of producing clear and incontrovertible gains, are of great value in
supporting overt policies which can be expected to be effective. Omis-
sion from the following discussion of many existing projects, does not
imply that they are not considered of value, but rather that the approved
projects should continue as presently conceived and planned, insofar as
they meet the above criteria.
13? Within the field of cold war covert operations, it is consid-
ered that greatest emphasis should be placed upon the following broad
fields of activity, not necessarily in order of priority:
a. Weakening of Kremlin control over the internal assets of
the Soviet-controlled bloc, and increasingly occupying the Kremlin with
problems within this area.
b. Direct action to reduce wbversive Soviet influence in
those areas of the free world that are most immediately threatened
thereby.
co Covert manipulation of key elements in unstable countries
of the free world to increase the stability and utility to the object-
ives of U. S. foreign policy of those countries.
114. Within these three broad fields of activity, the following
categories meet the criteria outlined above and should be given greater
emphasis than they are currently receiving. Detailed studies may re-
veal that effective action within sane of these categories is beyond our
capabilities. Also, events will undoubtedly indicate the desirability
of concentration on other lines of effort. This will require continuous
review of interim strategic policy*
a. Disintegration of Communist Parties Outside the Iron Curtain,.
Communist parties in the free world are principal vehicles
for Soviet subversion. They are also much more accessible to us thanaare
those within the Iron Curtain. By a combination of covert and overt
action their effectiveness can be appreciably reduced and in some areas
totally nullified. Some of the means that can be employed are (a) reductiixi
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success of the operation. should be appraised.
If such studies continue to indicate feasibility, the State
Department should investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of obtain
ing the acquiescence or the active support of Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy,
together with the practicability of reaching agreements on political ob-
jectives which would preclude such future difficulties as efforts at domi-
nation by these neighboring countries. The necessity of recognition of
such a revolutionary government should be appraised, and the necessity,
feasibility and timing of overt economic and logistic assistance, together
with its amount and costo
c. Breeding Suspicion and Dissension Within the Communist
System"
TL..e inherent suspicion and lack of mutual trust and con-
fidence within the ccenmunist system and our own experience in exploit-
ing them gives grounds for belief that we would be able to increase this
suspicion far beyond what we have hitherto accomplished, to the point
of systematic removal or elimination of personnel in important and effect-
ive positions. The communist reservoir of able and experienced personnel
is not unlimited, and individuals of demonstrated power and effectiveness
would be excellent targets. Many techniques are available to apply to
these ends, but our access to and knowledge of conditions within the
satellites indicate that the best chances of success would be obtained
by breeding distrust among satellite personnel and between those indi-
duals and Moscow, although such efforts within the Soviet Union should be
included to the maximum of our capabilities. It should be noted that
this category involves a narrower objective than broad attempts to dis-
rupt the system by a variety of means other than marking individuals for
suspicion and distrust. It has a definite relationship to and should be
correlated with the defection program,
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described in paragraph 14 above. It is further recaxmnended that where
such studies indicate that the foregoing criteria All be met, the indi-
cated actions be given priority in both national and agency programs
proportionate to their probable effectiveness.
it. It is also recommended that our covert capabilities continue to
be developed with increasing vigor along all lines whose eventual employ-
ment may be expected to b ring about more drastic reductions in Soviet
power and influence.
5. It is also recommended that this interim strategic concept be
kept under continuous reviews, and revised in the light of future develop-
ments at least annually and also as additional categories of action
appear to meet the specified criteria.
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