PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PROGRAM FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200030029-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: January 13, 1953
• Content Type: MF

ADDRE59 OFFICIAL Approved N For Release 2006/0311f7l .c1 ~orl P, [& Q 7318003200030029-7
YOi 4.HVLV V IIiAL 311CP11 C(V'
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
COPY NO. 1
JAN 13 1953
MF ORANDUM FORS General Waiter B. Smith
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECTS Psychological. Strategy !ro ram for the Middle Fast
1. Pursuant to the Board's decision of December 18, 1952, regarding
completion of pending planning projects, I enclose a copy of the draft
of Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East for consideration
by the Psychological Strategy Board on January 15, 1953.
2. In order to meet the Board's deadline, it has proved neces-
sary to curtail the usual period for co-ordination of agency and PSB
staff comments on the panel draft. Some changes are therefore to be
expected in the present text, and if any agreed revisions are received
before January 15, 1953, they will be transmitted to the Board as corri-
genda to the basic paper. I hope, therefore, that by the time of the
Board meeting, the paper will be in such shape as to permit at least
approval in principle.
3. Considering the pressure on the panel in the last stage of its
work, I feel that the draft has exceptionally high quality, and promises
to become one of PSB's most significant achievements to date in ener-
gizing and co-ordinating, the national psychological effort.
4. In accordance with the request of the panel chairman, I invite
your attention to paragraphs 2 and 4 of his letter of transmittal
dated January 12, 1953, a copy of which accompanies the basic document.
5. It is requested that special security precautions be observed
in the handling of the enclosure and that access to it be restricted on
a need-to-know basis.
Alan G. Kirk
Director
PSB D-22, Psychological Strategy
Program for the Middle East dated
January 8, 1953, Copy No. Id _.
NSC review(s) completed.
s:~ ~eesii hv~i:r- lar1~1u1~
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington, D. C.
13 January 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR; The Honorable
David. K. E, Bruce
Under Seer e nary of State
SUBJECT: Ps yclj ca1 Strata `rogra;n for t1~e Mi d? Ea~a
1, Pursuant to the Boated 4s decision of Do-:iem :)er 1g: 1952,
regarding compl-atiotr of pending piau ing oar. , I enal use a copy
of the draft of Psychological Strategy Program for the Middle East
for consideration by the Psycholcgjcal Strategy Board on January 15,
1953.
2, In order to :meet the Board's deadline, it has proved
ngeesoary to curtail the usual period for eo-ordinat:on of agency
and PSB staff comments on the panel draft:, Some chang3s are, therefore
to be expected in the present text, and if any agietd revisions are
reoe .ved before January 15, 1953,, they will be transmitted to the
Board as corrigenda to the basic pape m I hope, therefot'c, that by
the time of the Board meeting; the paper will be in such shape as to
permit at least approval in principle.
3,, Considering the pressure on the panel in the last stage of
its work, I feel that the dz,aft has exceptionally high gaal1 t v . acid
promises to become one of PSB9,s most significant ac.hievaen;s to date
in energizing and co-ordinating the national p::yehologieal effortq
4,~ In accordance: with the request of the panel chairman, I
invite your at texition to paragrap .s 2 and 4 of his setter of trans-
mittal dated January 12; 1953, a copy of which accompanies the basin
docuumen?t,
5. it is r2gaef3ted tk~a+, spet~ al seer `v pr ' o z be
obsM~voc in the d g- f. 1-18-2-1)
L oaux~ ailct that a.;cam s~ ,c it, be
rr?str, ;cued or. e. nescl?to_.kr pw basis. ,
/S/ Alan G, Kirk
Alan G,, Kirk
Director
:Enclosures Identical memo sent tog
General W,, B., Smith, CIA
PSB D-22$ Psychological Strategy Mr, W., C. Foster, Defense
Program for the Middle &st dated Mee. W" A,. H%.rj-tnan., MSA
January 8, 1953, Brig; Gan. M. C, Young, USAF, JC
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C;,
12 January 1953
MEIQRANDUM
TO : The Director, Psychological Strategy Board
FROM Richard H. -Sanger, Chairman, Panel i'H'"7 M:ddle East
SUBJECT: Psychological Str a+e;gy Program for the Middle East
In accordance with th3 request of the Ps;,chologi.cal Strategy Board
transmitted to we in the memcrardvm of 23 December 1952 from the Exocu-
tive Officer, PSB2 Panel ;'H" has formulated a draft on why.{;h there is
sufficient agreement on content to enable me to forward it to you for
consideration by the Board on 15 January 1953,,
While substantial., informal agency concurrenrn;e on the plan has
been secured on a continuing basis during the drafting, final agency
clearance has not been. reoeivede Therefore it is expected than, corri-
genda will result from agency comment and clearance which will be
coordinated and incorporated in the final polished and approved plan.
It is requested that you call to the attention of the Board the
fact that with the exception of a reference to Iran in this connection,
no recommendations are made in the plan concerning coitrses of action
should the Comxmmists succeed in over-runiAng the major part of the
area, This results from the Panel t s understanding that covert planning
on this is already going forward under proper authority, rather than
from any belief by the Panel that such planning is unnecessary,
It is further requested that.you call the attention of the Board
to the strong feeling of the Panel. that the bac;ic U;,S, psychological
ob jec tot's as set forth in this Program for Iran , Lgypt; and the Arab
States and Israel cannot be achieved until e+ubs?tantial p?-ogress has
been made toward settlement of (1) the British'-Iranian d:;:spute, (2)
the British-Egyptian controversies over the Sudan and -sz, and (3)
the Arab-Israeli conflicts Weer. eas from the psychological point of
view it appears that U., S. policy in regard to the British-Lranian
dispute and the British=Egyptian controversies is moving forward
constructively, it is also the opinion of this Panel that our psycho-
logical objectives cannot be achieved in any real measure in the
absence of a thorough review of our policy toward Israel and the
Arab States,
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PSB D-22
8 January 1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
A PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
PROGRAM FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
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DRi SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-22
SECRET 8 January 1953
OUTLINE OF PLAN
1. Psychological Objectives
2. Basic Tasks Including Illustrative Actions
3. General Guidance:
a. Scope and Magnitude
b,
Timing and Phasing
Special Considerations
d. Administrative
Amex A
Analysis of Choice of Psychological Objectives:
NSC Governing the Area
Assumptions
Strategic Situation
U.S. Capabilities
Feasibility Factors
Communist Opposition
Conclusions- Objectives
Conclusions Tasks
-Annex
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PSB D-22
8 January 1953
1. Psychological Object ves
Within the frame of reference of approved U. S. National Objectives,
the following should be the basic U. S. psychological objectives for they
Middle East area.
(a) To strengthen confidence in the integrity of the U. S., in
the principles for which it stands, and in the sincere friendship
which the U. S. has for the peoples of this area.
(b) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the
Middle East of the identity of their interests with the free world.
(o) To promote a realistic awareness of the threat to the
aspirations and self-interests of the peoples of the Middle East
that is posed by Communism, Soviet imperialism and Soviet-inspired
revolution.
(d) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the
Middle East countries that the only chance for adequate defense of
their countries is through cooperation with the West; and that the
determination of the United States, Great Britain, France and
Turkey to make such defense successful, will not result in the
imposition of a new form of imperialism,
(e) To encourage thinking of progressive elements so that
they will advance constructive programs for the improvement of
economic and social conditions which will produce a political
stability better able to combat the twin extremes of Communism
and anti-Western politico -religious fanaticism.
(f) To develop an attitude in the leaders and opinion-forming,
groups of the area that it is to their advantage to take steps which
will facilitate the resolution of those international and intra-
regional controversies which now weaken the security and stability
of the area.
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PSB D-22
8 January 1953
2. Basic Tasks
The following tasks are suggested as possible courses of action
through which the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and
the Central Intelligence Agency might be able to implement programs in
support of the psychological objectives of this Plan. Under some. of
the tasks are listed,.f'or illustrative purposes, possible specific
courses of action. These illustrations are not all inclusive, but are
designed to suggest guidance to the various agencies in the formulation
of their support plans.
(a) To strengthen confidence in the integrity of the U. S..,
in the principles for which it stands, and in the sincere friendship
which the U? 3, has for the peoples of this area.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(1) To convince the Middle Eastern leaders and opinion-
farming groups that 1 U. S.: opposes aggression as a basic
policy; supports the Tripartite Ibclaration and will take
effective action in support of the Declaration to prevent
aggression; has the determination to assist the states of the
area in defense of their territorial integrity against aggres-
sion from outside, and are willing to share positive responsi-?-
bility together with the states of the area to this and,
(2) To demonstrate that the U. S; pursues independent
policies governed by U. S. basic principles.
(3) To insure that Middle East peoples believe that the
U. S. has respect for their sovereignty.
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(4) To enhance the value of U. S. informational
activities by insuring that all U. S. psychological opera-
tions are conducted in a manner which gives appropriate and
careful consideration to the basic cultural, social, and
psychological. factors of the people of.the area:
(k,) to insure that the "American Way of Id.fe"
theme is appropriately tailored to the needs and
capacities of the area;
(b) to insure that propaganda emphasis is
focussed on
concrete actions rather than on abstract
principles of Western political democracy;
(e) to publicize Point Four programs on a
localized basis revolving around the theme of per-
sonal advantage to a given group or connunity;
(d) to set up machinery for promoting coopera-
tion of business representatives including motion
picture distributors so that they will not present
ideas or engage in action.- abroad which are injurious
to U. S. prestige.
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(b) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of the
Middle East of the identity of their interests with the free world.
(1) Greatly to expand the principle of consultation with
Middle Eastern leaders on regional, international, and United
Nations issues.
(2) To emphasize the mutual community of principles which
exist between the Middle East and the West, including respect
for religion, respect for the individual, freedom from state
control, respect for private property, and the sanctity of the
home and family.
(3) To demonstrate the "godlessness" of the USSR as
opposed to the mutual religious principles of the Middle East
and the West.,
(4) To increase exchange programs including:
(a) encouraging visits of religious, particularly
Muslims,, leaders to the U. S. and of American churchmen
to the Middle East;
()
(a)
supporting the colloquium plan for September 19:53;
increasing the number of lecture visits to the
Middle East countries of persons of M;.-Idle Eastern origin
and U. S. personalities exploitable for counter-propaganda
purposes; and increasing the number of visits of Middle
Eastern cultural leaders to the U. S.;
(d) initiating a program of stimulating visits to
the U, SO, by selected anti-Western elements, particularly
journalists and important political figures, with a view
to modifying or influencing their current attitudes;
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(g) increasing materially the number of fellowships
available under Point Four or other auspices;
(f) developing a more effective orientation of
students while in the U. S. with particular emphasis on
the basic American principles, character, and spiritual
values,.
(5) To reflect the U. S. increased interest in and
understanding of Middle East cultures.
(6) To influence Arab and Eastern press media personnel
along lines favorable to U. S. objectives.
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(c) To promote a realistic awareness of the threat to the
aspirations and self-interests of the peoples of the Middle East
that is posed by Communism, Soviet imperialism and Soviet-inspired
revolution.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---
(1) To use every possible technique to identify commu-
nism as a cloak for Soviet national imperialism, and to
identify local communist elements as tools of a foreign power.
(2) To demonstrate that communism is a threat to the
cultural patterns and social traditions of the individual,
family, and communityi
) to indoctrinate and utilize Americans serving
in the area in official or private capacities in the
techniques of generating an awareness of the threat of
Soviet imperialism and communist doctrine, and to provide,
for example, a central and coordinated plan by which
personal contacts are utilized towards this end;
(h) to demonstrate U. S. belief that Middle East
institutions are capable of evolving a better and indige-
nous socio-economic pattern than communism, and that the
U. S. is prepared to support such evolution.
(3) To further expose Soviet abuse of USSR Muslims, Jews,
Asians, and other religious and ethnic minorities, tailoring
exposure to fit local groups.
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(d) To convince the leaders and opinion-forming groups of
the Middle East countries that the only chance for adequate defense
of their countries is through cooperation with the West; and that
the determination of the United .States, Great 8 ritain, France,,
and Turkey to make such defense successful, will not result in
the imposition of a new form of imperialism.
(1) To convince the leaders that neutrality does not
guarantee independence and that present defense mechanisms
of the Middle East are totally inadequate to prevent aggres-
sion in the area.
(2) To show the leaders that pending a build-up of
their own strength which w ill require both time and a fuller
socio-econon1o development, their immediate protection depends
on Western military strength.
(3) To show that this dependence on the West dictates
the necessity of making potential Western military support
effective by regional defense arrangements including bases
and troop deployment. To this end:
(e) to develop a state of mind which will permit
setting up a formal regional defense organization in
association with the U. S. and its Allies;
{t!) to develop an attitude or receptiveness for
the stationing of U. S. and Allied troops in or near
the area.
(4) Whenever the psychological impact on Middle East
leaders requires such action, to initiate or expand military
training and. provide token'military equipment, including jet
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aircraft, and technical services.
(5) To demonstrate U. S. military might by:
(a) giving to the peoples who respect power, dis-
plays of power in naval and air shows of available air
and sea units near the area;
(b) exploiting visits of ranking U. S. military
personnel with a view to demonstrating U. S. interest
in the defense of the area;
(.) inviting Middle East ranking military personnel
to observe NATO maneuvers in the Mediterranean area and
selected United States war games, maneuvers, etc., in
the United States or abroad;
(d) watching for targets of opportunity (e.g. Mecca
airlift or locust control) in which impressive amounts of
armed services equipment can be used on psychylogical or
humanitarian missions;
Le) using Air Force and Navy build-ups when neces-
sary to vitiate the psychological impact of border pressure
in any country threatened by the USSR.
(6) To clarify the respective military roles and respon-
sibilities of all non-communist military powers with respect
to the defense of the Middle .Fast.
(7) To persuade the leaders to develop adequate forces
to maintain internal security; and to develop an understanding
among the leaders and opinion forming groups of the Middle East
of the damages to their own interests which may result from all
forms of extremism, whether ultra-nationalist.. xenophobic,
religious, or totalitarian.
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(e) To encourage thinking of progressive elements so that they
will advance constructive programs for the improvement of economic
and social conditions which will produce a political stability better
able to combat the twin extremes of Communism and anti-Western
politico-religious fanaticism.
(1) Develop an attitude which will promote confidence in
the possibility of orderly progress in political, economic,
and social spheres, and the ability to obtain it.
(2) To lend support to progressive leaders by making known
our endorsement of programs of constructive evolution including
sound agrarian reforms (but to recognize the dangers to reform
programs in transition phases and to be prepared to support
such programs at these critical stages).
(3) To persuade Middle East leaders of the value of
regional cooperation through one or more of the following means:
(a) inviting leaders of the region to draft a
regional economic plan for the area to which the U. S,
and possibly other powers could zE.nder support and
assistance;
(b) considering the possibility of lending active
U. S. support to the revitalization of the economic com-
mittee of the Arab league and extending economic aid
thereto;
(g) considering promoting and encouraging the exchange
of information on social reform measures along the line
initiated by the International Islamic Economic Conference;
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(,) re-examiizing the practicability of supporting
activation of the Economic Commission for the Middle East
(ECME);
(e) promoting such other intra-regional cooperation
between states as appears feasible;
() encouraging regional cooperation through the
advisory committee to United Nations Relief and Work Agency
for Palestine Refugees In the Near East, by encouraging
formal Arab participation thereon;
(g) encouraging the development of financial rela-
tionships between states of the area which would permit
the utilization of the wealth of the oil rich states of
the Middle East for the support of economic development
projects in the less rich areas.
(4) To select and support such regional development schemes
as will serve: to demonstrate that material progress can be
achieved through active cooperation with the U. S.
(5) While maintaining support of rural aid programs, to
undertake formulation or intensification of key urban projects.
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(f) To develop an attitude in the leaders and opinion-forming
groups of the area that it is to their advantage to take steps
which will facilitate the resolution of those international and
intra-regional controversies which now weaken the security and
stability of the ,area.
(1) To reduce tensions and fears between Israel and the
Arab States:
(ja) examine at the highest level the feasibility of
linking some form of international guarantee of Arab-Israeli
armistice lines or de facto boundaries with Middle Eastern
participation in a regional defense organization;
(t) create conviction that the U. S. takes a stand
against expansionism on the part of either Israel or the
Arab States;
(e) demonstrate in practice the theory of imparti-
ality of U. S. national policy towards Israel and the Arab
States, particularly with respect to economic assistance,
and with respect to statements by U. S. officials;
(r) demonstrate to Israel and the Arab States that
it is to their mutual interest to undertake commencement
of economic relations as a start toward resuming relation-
ships normal to neighboring states;
(e) show the Israelis the local political and propa-
ganda value, as well as moral necessity, of repatriating it
certain number of Arab refugees;
(f) urge Israel to compensate Arab refugees for
their properties, and to examine disposition of money
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paid by Germany to Israel with view to determining how it
can best be used to further settlement of the refugee
problem;
25X1
(h) strengthen the influence of the moderate elements
in world Jewry and in Israel who believe that Israelts
survival depends on cooperation and friendship with the
Arab States.
(2) To a eek to instill in key leaders a pride of heritage
which would move them to oppose the petty dynastic rivalries
and other jealousies which contribute to the instability of
the Arab wa 1d.
(3) To seek to promote a better understanding between the
Middle East countries, especially Egypt and Iran on the one
hand and our NATO partners, especially Britain azd France, on
the other:
(aa) to convince the British and French that it is
in their own interests to make their policies and actions
more compatible with local aspirations in order to achieve
orderly prograss in the Middle East and also its orienta?-
tion towards and collaboration with the West.
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3. General Guidance
a, Scope and 14~gnitude
(1) The present scale of U. S. psychological operations in
the Middle East should be expanded, mainly by increasing Pthe
use of indigenous instruments and local channels,
(2) In certain circumstances U. S. personnel in the Middle
East are a source of local friction and misunderstanding, conse-
quently, U. S. Personnel should be held at a minimum, and those
stationed there should be given increased indoctrination as to the-r
individual responsibilities.
b. Timing and ].has rpg,
(1) This p:Lan is to be effective upon approval by the Board..
(2) Long term psychological operations should be directed
towards influencing all peoples of the area, but it is recognized
that most regimes of the area do not necessarily rest on the demo-
cratic will of the peoples, and that the loci of power rest in
special concentrated groups.. Short range emergency programs,
therefore, governing and leadership groups, including the new
urban and intellectual classes, are the primary targets. Addi?-
.tional effort should be made to identify and influence potential
leadership.
(3) Examples of developments which would affect the timing
and phasing of this Flan include settlement of the British Egyptian
differences over the Sudan, the British evacuation of the Suez, the
establishment of the Middle East Defense Organization, or the
partial or complete collapse of Iran.
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(4) Time phasing of certain operations which should be
implemented at a high policy level should be brought to the
attention of the Psychological Strategy Board by the operating
agency concerned.
as Special Considerations
(1) In the Middle East, to an unusual degree, political
action constitutes its own psychological strategy. It must,
therefore, be recognized that pure psychological manipulation
will be of slight, if any, value unless identified with concrete
political, economic, or military action.
(2) In no other area. of the world do personal contacts and
the confidences that result from personal relationships play a
more basic or significant role in international understanding.
Such relationships should, therefore, be encouraged among the
U. S. personnel in the area,
(3) In exploiting psychological opportunities in the Middle
East, special attention should be paid to the fact that underlying
attitudes of basic respect for the principles of the U. S. exists
in the area, and a latent faith that the U. S. will live up to the
principles for wh:. ch it stands.
(4) On the ether hand it should be recognized that this
respect and faith is submerged by suspicion arising out of con-
fusion and resentment caused by apparent differences between U. S.
policy statements and U. S. actions, Confusion and resentment
exist most seriously in the matter of U. S. pro-Arab statements
vs U. S. material support of Israel, and pro-national statements
vs. belief that the U. S. is the source of power behind French
and British policies in the area. Lacking new policy statements
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SECURITY INFORMATION ]TSB D-2
SECRET 8 January 1953
or implementation which would automatically explain these apparent
contradictions, U. S. psychological strategy must minimize these
differences by diverting attention from them or when opportunity
affords by concentrating attention, for example, on those concrete
accomplishments which do prove the sincerity of U. S. declarations.
In other cases we may demonstrate that support of Middle East
nations and support of legitimate and legal U. K. and French
positions are not mutually exclusive.
(5) It is important that U. S. psychological strategy create
the impression that the U. S., in seeking international cooperation,
leads from strength and determination rather than from fear or
uncertainty. The level of military strength which the U. S. is
prepared or may be prepared to maintain in or near the area will
have significant repercussions on the crystallization of such
attitudes in the Middle East. This factor should-be examined
against the requirements of this Plan to help achieve the psycho-
logical objectives.
(6) U.. S. psychological strategy in the Middle East has a
unique opportunity to present the U. S. as the true champion of
social and econoxu.; progress and should, therefore, seize every
means of realizing this opportunity.
(7) Doctrinal warfare per se can be waged in the Middle &st
only among the small, though highly influential, group of intellec-
tuals. Propaganda. activities based on the doctrinal approach and
aimed at the general public should be carefully handled to avoid
a backfire from tLe emnl-ional appeal which communism has for the
uses.. Ra-.ther, strong emphasis should be placed on the
theme of Soviet imperialism and the anti-religious aspects of the
Soviet regime.
SECLR ITY INFORMATION
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DRAFT
SECURITY INFORMATION PSB D-22
SECRET S January 1953
(8) Should the U. S. political and psychological operations
show marked success strong Soviet reaction can be expected.
Soviet psychological strategy and propaganda can be expected to
increase emphasis on the themes of Zionism, peace, and British-
French-U. S, imperialism. In their over-all program the communists
will use all weapons at their disposal; they will probably use the
weapons of assassination, violence and rioting to a greater extent
than they have in Europe. The U. S. must be prepared to meet and
counter this program.
(9) The real. danger that Iran may succumb to communism imzst
be recognized. Contingency preparations for psychological opera-
tions in such an eventuality must be made on a priority basis and
within the terms of NSO 136/1, paragraphs 5 and 6.
d. AdministratLvg
(1) Coordination, Review and Evaluations
The Director, Psychological Strategy Board, shall be respon-
sible for continuing coordination, review, and evaluation of this
basic Plan. The Director, in his discretion, may establish in
Washington, D. C,, a coordirating panel of interested departments
and agencies. The Director may also authorize establishment of a
coordinating panel within the area made up of representatives of the
various chiefs of :mission to the countries concerned, to meet period-
ically in order to coordinate and evaluate psychological operations
and submit progress reports and recommendations to the Psychological
Strategy B oard trough the appropriate member agency.
(2) 5'ura' :- =:a_ :.s s
Support .z;~ plans prepared by the Department of State,
Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director
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SE OURITY INFORMATION PSB D-22
SECRET 8 January 1953
for Ylitual Security shall be coordinated by the Director, Psychological.
Strategy Boa 1.
The strategy of manipulating the timing and phasing of the
programs in support of national objectives will be the responsibility
of the operating agencies. However, in case of necessary changes in
basic assumptions with resultant conflicts between agencies, the
question of coordination will be referred to the Psychological
Strategy Board.
(3) legislative:
Congressional support for legislation necessary to further
the objectives of this Plan will be developed by the Departments and
Agencies concerned in accordance with normal programming procedures.
In addition, the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board, using
the resources of the Psychological Strategy Board member Departments
and Agencies and of other Departments and Agencies of the Government,
will review current and proposed legislation which impinges on or
importantly affects the strategic psychological objectives of the
United States in the Middle East. Based on this review, he will
recommend such Board action as seems appropriate and desirable in
relation to the successful execution of this Plan. Specifically, he
will review recommendations designed to modify existing legislation
governing foreign aid in order to provide agencies concerned limited
discretionary authority to meet emergencies and/or to overcome politi-
cal or psychological obstacles to the acceptance of such aid.
(4) Dome tl.c Public Information:
Where appropriate,. U. S. domestic public information pro-
grams in support of the general objectives of this Plan will be
developed by the member Departments and Agencies.
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Annex A
PSB D-22
8 January 1953
ANNIEDIEXa
NSC 129/1 lists as the ultimate U. S. National Objectives in the
Nfiddle East area the insurance that the area and its resources remain
available to the U. S. and its Allies. NSC 129/1 recognizes as threats
to this insurance I instability within the countries of the area, the
danger of increasing Soviet and decreasing Western influence, a lack of
will and ability to resist aggression, and a feeling of inferiority which
breeds tensions and hostilities within the area and in relationships
with the West. Steps for the elimination of these threats are, therefore,
also listed as objectives of U. S. policy.
In listing the psychological objectives with which to support the
National Objectives it is assumed that there will be no Soviet military
aggression and no local communist or rightist insurrections which would
completely bar the West from the area as a, whole before January 1955.
STRATEGIC SITUATION:
The most immediate threat to attainment of U. S. objectives in the
Middle East comes from within the area itself in the form of dangerous
political and economic instability.
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SECRET PSB D-22
8 January 1953
The Middle East in gens:cal, and Iran in particular, occupies a key
strategic position in the East-West struggle. Because of its geographic
location it is vulnerable to intervention or armed attack by the USSR and
to political sub,'!ers;.one Fla :s':ori Fatly the area and cspavial3tir Lan has
won or malntainhd its preca:rious independence through balance of power
factors.. New factors, however transitory, added to those weighing in
the historic balance now threaten to shift this balance in favor of the
Soviets. These factor. s are: (1) the continuing Arab-Israeli antagonism
kept alive particularly by the refugee problem and bit,er resentment of
the U. S. role in the creation of Israel; (2) the decline of Brit;Lsh
and French influence without the attendant development of responsible
local authority; (3) the British-Iranian dispute over the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company., and to a lesser degree the British-Egyptian distagre-ements
and the French position vis-a-vis Morocco and Tunisia; (4) questions
raised as to U. S. power position by current events such as the apparent
stalemate in Korea; (5) Soviet subversive activities in the area.
Underlying many of the factors causing instability is the impact
of Western ideas regarding political independence, economic self-deter-
mination, and the rights of man, plus the impact, however belated, of the
industrial revolutions These ideas and forces have created axrestible
desire for change yet they have fallen in a territory where neither the
social machinery or the leap. rship have been adequate or sufficiently
experienced to utilize or dire ;t them,
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8 January 1953
The area is ripe for revolutionary
change of basic political, social, and economic patterns, There is no
possibility t x ih s or- ngo can be suppressed,, but the change can take
one of three form, (1)' it's can b e channelled into evolutionary forms;
(2) it can take the fort e controlled revoltrti.on favorable to the West;
(3) it can take a revolutionary path leading to chaos, fragmentation, and
eventual Soviet control.
The central problen,ifor the U. S. is to channel these forces in paths
which will further U, S. and Western aims. The ultimate end of U. S.
policy is to insure that the area and its resources are available to
strengthen the free world. To do so requires that the U. S. and its
Allies persuade the leaders of the area to develop and maintain armed
forces adequate to insure internal security. Such forces wou_-1e be in-
adequate for esisting Soviet aggression. The U. S. iiuet, 3 hewefere,
also-create as atmosphere whiela will allow entrance of Allied troops
into the area should such a move become necessary to prevent a Soviet
over-running all or part of the area. This atmosphere can best be
obtained by creation of a Western-Middle East Defense Organization,
But to attain such a situation of strength would require the cooperation
of the Middle East governments, not only militarily, but +,n the basic
?oeavor to eradicate enough of t i ernat and external causes O
unrest to allow desirable political and economic forces to come into
play. The Middle Fast leavers themselves have been unable or unwilling
to create internal seourit;- forces adequate to prevent subversion activi<
ties or to control or to d sect the explosive forces o~"'::'zange into
constructive and evolutionary channels. It is doubtful whether the
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DRAT SECURtTf 61 P .,.fit Annex A
SECRET PSB D-42
8 January 1953
leaders even with the best of intentions -I
I can n bring about the orderly changes desirable
to the West without outside technical and financial assistance. This
assistance they have also been unwilling or reluctant to seek or accept.
Faced with the complexity of their own problems the Middle East leaders
have on the one hand attempted to view the East-West conflict as something
in which they are not directly concerned (but from which they may improve
their position vis-a-vis the Western world), on the other perversely
lashed out at the Vest, the very elements which could guarantee their
r survival.
As-
taking effect for cause the attacks are specifically leveled at the two
most obvious indications of the area's weakness -- the vestiges cf
imperialism and the new State of Israel.
The first step in a strategic psychological plan for the area must
be to create a psychological atmosphere which will force the leaders of
the area to face squarely up to their problems and permit them to cooperate
with Western efforts to prevent the loss of the area to the USSR.. In order
to do this the U. S. must act to remove the symbols used as whipping boys
by the area politicians --- remove them, distract attention from them, or
at the very least, disassociate U. S. actions from them. Most probably
at the present stage of deterioration of U. S.-Middle East relations more
neutralism or disassociation from the situations which are objectionable
to the Middle East will not be of a psychological advantage to the U. S.,
for Middle East emotions and frustrations are such that they will demand
concrete demonstrations of U. S. sentiment favorable to the nationalism
of the area.
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SECRET PSB D-22
8 January 1953
U. S. CAPABILITIES
U. S. prestige in the Midele East is presently low and may even
decline further. However, plans for the attainment of U. S. objectives
in the area are largely based on the assumption that there exists a basic,
deep-seated respect for the U~, S., temporarily eclipsed,'but which, if
properly evoked, will reassert itself and create an atmosphere of
receptivity for cooperation in reform and defense programs.
The U. S. presently has in varying degrees the capability of in-
fluencing the governments of the area to act in a manner which will be
~"''1rr consistent with U. S. objectives. It can counsel, guide, and support
progressive political action. This is presently most notably true in
Egypt where technical support of a reform government definitely takes on
a political hue. The U. S. is, for once, in a position to identify itself
with powerful forces of change and progress -- an identification which in
other parts of the world the Communists have invariably managed to assume.
The communist forces in this area are not now organized to capture this
psychological prize and the U. S., must take every opportunity to capitalise
on the situation.
In passing it should be noted that the U. So can no longer play the
role of the detached middle man or honest broker in political or inter-
national disputes in the area, and that political action involves continuing
political responsibilities.
The U. S. has the capacity through technical and economic aid of
vastly increasing the social and economic well-being of the area.
The U. S. has the capabilities to train and equip adequate internal
security forces within the area.
The U. S. has the capability to increase respect for its armed strength
by demonstrations of power by extant air and sea units, and by commitment
of troops in or near the area,
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SECRET PSB D-22
8 January 1953
The U. S. has long established instruments for attaining psychological,
and through them, National Objectives: (1) it has normal official diplo-
matic, military, and aid missions, the impacts of which can be more immedi-
ately concrete and visible than in, say, the more complicated and sophisti-
cated political and economic structures of Western Europe; (2) it has
philanthropic groups with long records of humanitarian service which can
illustrate U. S. good-will; (3) it has important business groups, sources
of revenue and guidance for the countries; (4) it has in the area ethnic
and religious groups with blood ties in the U. S.; (5) it has a long his-
tory of a non-imperialistic respect for national sovereign equality, racial
and religious tolerance which though temporarily eclipsed in the Arab mind
can re-emerge as a powerful psychological weapon.
If the U. K. and French 'positions on the Middle East are to be con-
sidered as part of U. S. capabilities they must be recognized at the moment
as serious psychological burdens. There is, however, a residue of French
and British social, cultural, political, and economic influence in the
area which if properly utilized may yet count in favor of the West.
Further, the U. K. has the only easily available Western military forces
for the initial protection of the Middle East in case of suddenattack,
These forces, coupled with certain treaty positions, also represent
stability factors in the area. The U. S. must carefully weigh its positicm
vis-a-vis the French and the British in the Middle East on an ad hoc basis
so as to obtain maximum psychological benefit from a position of indepen-
dence or allied solidarity as the case requires.
FEASIBILITY FACT RS
The situations in the Middle East which threaten to deny or lir.'.t
realization of U. S. psychological or National Dhjec+';ree includs~s Arab
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SECRET PSB D-22
8 January 1953
fear of Israeli expansionism, the refugee problem produced by the creation of
Israel, the Anglo-Iranian e!1 issue, the supposed U. S. support of colon-
ialism which has led to an adamant French attitude on North Africa, and,
to a lesser degree, the Anglo-Egyptian differences on the Sudan and the
Suez. Those concrete situations have created among the Arabs and the
Iranians a resentment and an almost psychopathic suspicion of Anglo-French-
U. S. "imperialistic" designs in the area. The U. S. cannot now divorce
itself from these problem, and even an impartial attitude may not prevent
a continuing decline of U. S. prestige in the Middle East world. The
U. S. must take an active part in solving these problems to Addle East
satisfaction if U. S. objectives are to be generally realizedo Within the
present conditions of Arab hostility towards the U. S., routine diplomatic
efforts and
propaganda may realize a limited number of
psychological objectives. However, unless the U. S. can forward a settle-
ment of the Iranian oil and the Sudan-Suez situations; unless the U.. S.
can create the conviction among Addle East leaders that it respects and
will assist in the defense of the sovereign equality and territorial
integrity of the states of the area -- especially vis-a-vis possible
Israeli incursions; and unless the U. S. supports peoples who have
demonstrated their capacity for sovereign independence and to maintain
same by orderly and legal means, Middle East cooperation with the West
in positive efforts to strengthen the defense of the area will not be
forthcoming. If such becomes the case, the danger to U. S. objectives
in the area will be real and immediate.
COMMUNIST OPPOSITION
There is danger of success in any demagogic movement in the Middle
East. Therefore, while in the area eommu.ni.st parties -- with the exception
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SEGRk'T PSB D-22
8 January 1953
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of the Tudeh party in Iran -- are generally weak, they represent a constant
9F1
potential danger.
Comwnznists have, however, been able to exploit certain
situations; the aspirations of the Greek (3rthodox, Gregorian Armenian,
Kurdish minorities and the Iranian Azerbaijani; the Middle East desire
for neutrality and consequent susceptibility to Soviet world wide "peace"
campaigns; increasing Mtdldle East resentment of domestic corruption and
economic exploitations; unemployment; differences between rich and poor;
U. S. support of Israel as contrasted with Soviet opposition to Israel
as a Western "imperialistic" military base.
Communism appeals most strongly and effectively in those areas where
Westernization and education is greatest, where nationalism is strongest,
where urbanization is most advanced, and where minorities are largest. In
many areas the religious or ethnic minorities supply the brains of the
commranist leadership, and in some areas the majority of the following too.
Communist front organizations, notably the Partisans of Peace, have been
more successful than the Party se altrcrugh appealing approximately to
the same groups. These front organizations are instruments of Soviet
propaganda
West. The present phase of communist activities is aimed at evicting
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SECRET PSB D-22
8 January 1953
representatives of the West from the area; take-over plans are probably
several phases in the future.
CONCLUSIONS - OBJECTIVES
Weighing all factors involved -- the strategic situation within the
area, the U. S. capabilities, and factors presently militating against
attainment of U. S. objectives, it is concluded that the U. S. has the
possibility of realizing its psychological objectives. Long-range programs
for the establishment of dynamic stability and economic improvement must
be a basic approach but at the same time it is recognized that 25X1
the Middle East could over-
night produce unpredicted situations calling for a new U. S. approach.
Such sudden developments would not necessarily militate against U. S.
objectives
for example
the unpredicted but salutary events of the
past months in Fgypt, Perhaps as in no other part of the world are poli-
tical targets of opportunity more likely to arise, and U. S, policy must
be such as to allow for rapid readjustment.
For the U. S. to capitalize on a swiftly changing political pattern in
the Middle East or to participate in the less dramatic but Important fight
against e :).ial and economic a rils and cor upta:on which beset the area,
confidence among the loaders concerning the fziendly nature of U. S. in-
25X1
tentions must be revived. The non-imperialistic record of the U. S. belie, 5X1
present Middle East suspicions on that score;
The U. S. must, therefore, specifically make every effort to put into
proper prospective the true significance of U. S. cooperation with the
British and the French; and it must allay fears of Israel, the creation
of which state also has, to the Arabs, imperialistic connotations, and the
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SECRET PSE D-22
8 January 1953
expansion of which looms as a real threat to the Arab world.
The Arab states are immature and lacking in political imagination.
They tend to recognize orriy immediate and experienced political situations
and, therefore, direct their ire at the Western Powers under whose domina-
tion they were until very recently. The mere fact that the Arab states
have never been under Soviet domination automatically makes the Soviet
threat to their independence seem unreal and remote. The U. S. must
demonstrate to the 4rab world that whatever their present differences with
the free world a basic mutuality of Interests exist and that it is the
USSR which presents the real imperialistic threat to their continued
sovereignty. Iran is more awarWof the Soviet threat, but the nature of
its leadership may negate this awareness.
Certain road blocks on the path to ILddle East-U. S.. cooperation are
then clear and recognizable. When these external "causes" of middle East
hostility are alleviated or relegated to the background, Arab leadership
confidence in U. S. intentions may be renewed. When leaders can be con-
vinced that their own safety and interests -- if nothing else -- depend
on adequate defenses for the area and on the urgent correction of the
economic and social ills, active cooperation with the West will follow,
and from cooperation will come economic advancement and greater stability.
The people, with the promise of better living levels, will in turn have a
stake in their own destiny and a consequent willingness to cooperate in
the preservation of their freedom,,
CONCLUSONS__:_,TASKS
Given the weaknesses and strengths above, U, S. psychological tasks
must be such as to insure that: the garernments of the area keep the
organizational capacities of the outlawed communist parties low; the
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SECRET PSB D-22
8 January 1953
pro.-Western elements win over and keep the new educated urbanized groups;
appropriate minority groups are persuaded of the truth of real Soviet
attitude towards aspirations of minorities; the extreme right is prevented
from collaborating with the communists or from effecting its programs; and
all classes are persuaded in specific and concrete terms rather than by
generalities that the USSR is the real imperialist threat to the Middle
East, and that only with the U. S. can the Middle Fist attain realization
of peace, freedom, and advaneemento
The initial U. S. psychological effort in the Middle East is designed
to soothe wounded Middle Last ego, and conciliate N ddle East opinion. It
would, however, demonstrate a lack of understanding of the Middle East mind
if, in order to effect conciliation, U. S. political concessions and
material assistance were given freely without conditions. The Middle East
mind would not understand it and would not respect it. The U. S. must
demonstrate sympathy for the :fiddle East aspirations but at the same time
the U. S. must impress on the Middle East leaders its unequivocal deter-
urination, by any means at its command, including military action, that
the area will remain freet of Soviet control.
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 ADDRrDS uFFICIAL-cO.wL7UN1CA`IT a TOO
THE DIRECTOR OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
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PSYCHC)LOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON
MAR 111953
MEMORANDUM FOR : The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: Implementation of PSB D-22, A Psychological
Strategy Program for The Middle East
1. Section 3 d (1) of PSB D-22 provides that "The Director,
Psychological Strategy Board, shall be responsible for continuing
coordination, review, and evaluation of this basic Plan. The Director,
in. his discretion, may establish in Washington, D. C., a coordinating
panel of interested departments and agencies. The Director may also
authorize establishment of a coordinating panel within the area made
up of representatives of the various chiefs of mission to the countries
concerned, to meet periodically in order to coordinate and evaluate
psychological operations and submit progress reports and recommenda-
tions to the Psychological Strategy Board through the appropriate
member agency."
2. Section 3 d (2) further provides that "Supporting plans pre-
pared by the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and the Director for Mutual Security shall be coordinated
by the Director, Psychological Strategy Board."
3. In discharging these responsibilities may I suggest, on the
basis of our past experience with regard to follow-up work on other PSB
approved plans, that the Central Intelligence Agency designate a substan-
tive officer at a responsible level to work with the designees of the
Department of State and the Department of Defense and with an officer
of the PSB staff, in coordinating the implementation of this plan.
4. Under this procedure, the officer designated by the Central
Intelligence Agency would have the responsibility of:
(a) Being fully informed concerning the preparation
of the Central Intelligence Agencys supporting plans, and
acting as the principal point of contact between the Central
Intelligence Agency and the representatives of the Department
of State and the Department of Defense, as well as of PSB
Staff, in the coordination of the supporting plans called for
by the Middle East Plan.
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(b) Meeting occasionally - only when circumstances re-
quire - with representatives designated by the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, and by me.
5. These consultations would be for the purpose of:
(a) Resolving contradictions or conflicts which may
develop among supporting plans, and closing gaps which may
be found to exist;
(b) Agreeing upon priorities among and phasing of these
operational or supporting plans;
(c) Agreeing upon the timing and type of periodic
reports to the Director of PSB on progress in implementing
PSB D-22;
(d) Considering the advisability of establishing in
the area a field coordinating panel, and if such a panel
is established, reviewing reports on its activities with a
view to assisting in further coordination between Washington
and the field.
6. If you are in agreement with the above suggestions, I would
appreciate it if you would designate at your earliest convenience,
an appropriate Central Intelligence Agency representative.
Cegr e A. Morgan
Acting Director'
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SECURITY INFOIMATION
MAR 211953
:t r :i.o i ti .t:ic r o t P"P D 2,. P al In *ir a1
Pro xa or +A,* '"M1e 'svt
'trch 1953
1. ecei? t of your ,,.. - _r of I.
25X1
25X
2.1
he'emy
officer in c or l . .tir ' the i?a slar auts.tior of D-
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Originator:
Approved For
Psych<
PP/PP/PL/TME':bir 16 Mar. 53
Distribution:
Copies 1 & 2 - PSB
3&4-ER
5 & 6 - PP/PP/ I'L
" WNW
Acting Chief, Plans 3ranch
Plans & Programs, PP Staff
T copy... c
 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200030029-7
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731 R003200030029-7