NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE TO THE HOLDERS OF PSB D-21

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200030020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: July 31, 1952
• Content Type: NOTES

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copr NO. 142
July 31, 1952
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE
to the Holders of
PSB D-21
Enclosure No. 4 to this Document, the Berlin Supplement,
referred to in the covering letter of July 29 from the Director
to the Members of the Board (page 1, line 11), is temporarily
withdrawn, pending further consideration. Holders may keep the
enclosure until notified otherwise.
This note will be _attached by the holder to his identically
numbered copy of the document.
) /
'11 4,(AA: vVetAvl 071\
Edmund J. ennett
Major, 'USAF
Acting Executive Officer
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Secuity Information
PSB D-21
July 29, 1952
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
MEMORA1DUM FCR: The Honorable David K. E. Bruce
Under Secretary of State
The Honorable William C, Foster
Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Walter Bedell Smith
Director of Central Intelligence
In accordance with the Board's instnictions of December 20, 1951,
a National Psychological Strategy Picn for Germany has been completed and
is submitted herewith. This ?Ian has boon prepared and unanimously
approved by Panel "F", consisting of designated officers of the Department
of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of
Director for Mutual Security and ry own staff. While fornal chairmanship
of the Panel has been hold first by Henry A. Byroade, then by James W.
Riddleberger, the acting chairman throughout has been Geoffrey W. Lewis,
Deputy Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State.
I submit the Plan with the strong recammund-ttion that Sections I
through VI, and the Berlin Supplement be approved by the B-ard.
Annex A, together with a supporting paper, is attached for information
only and has no authoritative character.
In presenting the Plan 1 should like to draw the attention to the
Board to the following points:
1. Page 23, SLetion V, Paragraph 2 of the Flan makes the
following significant stEtem,nt:
IrUe uust adjust our approach in accordance with the
changes in -ubl3c oninion and with impressions and
ippcts which various political, economic and
cultural issues have on the German psychological
clirate. This will require a major effort of
imagination on the part of the U.S. operating
agencies to develop new and more effective forms of
psychological activities, and it implies a constant
review of existing nrogrars?includod those recom-
mended hereafter?in the :light of their demonstrated
effectiveness or ineffectiveness."
I J4 "J
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July 29, 1952
I particularly welcome this recognition by the Panel of the need
for developing a more imaginative approach in our psychological operations
directed at Germany, and I am satisfied that if the Board approves the
Plan, the coordinating committee, which I propose to set up by suitably
modifying the present Panel, will vigorously stimulate operational
planning along these linos. I am all the more confident of this since I
an informed that the Panel, especially in the last phase of its work, has
developed into a smoothly-functioning and constructively-oriented inter-
agency team. The fact that this team has been formed nay well be more
important in terms of PSE 's over-all mission, than any individual plan it
producos. In any case, the coordination phase of this Plan will be
particularly significant.
2. Page 13, Section V, Paragraph 3 of the Plan stresses the
need for a psychological trtrritou plan for Western Europe into which the
German and other European plans can be integrated. The same point is made
in the Chairman's letter of transmittal, copy of .which is attached. As
I an confident that the Board will y:ive due weight to the Panells
recemmondations on this point, I have raised no objection to the deletion
from the final Plan of various actions applicable to Western Europe as a
whole, which were originally proposed by my representative on the Panel.
I wish, however, to associate myself most vigorously with the recommenda-
of
tions/the Panel since I feel that the objectives of the German Plan can
be achieved only if they are supported by--and conducted within the
framework of--a psychological strategy for Western Europe.
I have already instructed my staff, in consultation with ri.bor
-r.encies, -articulTrly the Department of State, to begin at once a
pre3iminery study to determine the most fruitful approach in framing such
an over-all psychological strategy plrn for Western Europe. I hope in
the near future to be able to submit to the Board a formal recornendotion
for setting up such a planning panel.
Security Informatim
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July 29, 1952
3, As the Board will note) the Plan emphasizes psychological
operations in a narrow sense of the tern and may appear somewhat weak
in the broader aspects of psychological strategy. While recognizing tho
need for propaganda by deed rather than merely by words (Page 14,
Section Vy Paragraph h), it contains few significant recommendations or
suggestions for psychological actions in the political and economic
fields. This is partly due to the deletion of certain actions proposed
by the Mutual Security Agency representative and my own, but again I
have acquiesced in those deletions because I fool that the actions in
question more properly belong in the over-all Western European plan
which I hope the Board will eventually authorize.
4. Questions have arisen during the work of this Panel which
indicate that there is some uncertainty among member agencies as to the
scope of PSBIs responsibilities, The German Panel has wisely concen-
trated on constructive work and given little time to discussing such
problems of jurisdiction, but I feel that future -2SB panels may be
handicapped if their members are more concerned with whether they have a
right to make constructive suggestions than with actually making then.
My own feeling is that PSD panels should be given some fairly general
definition of PSB's mission as a starting point) but that they should
be cattioned against attempting to apply it too rigorously, thus leaving
it to the Board itself to decide what may properly be included in a
PSB plan) and what uso, if any, can be made of recommendations which it
may feel are beyond its competence to approve. Any informal Board
comments on these points would be helpful to me.
5. Panel "F" has been notable for the extensive use it has
made of outside consultants, who I feel have made a valuable con-
tribution, In addition to rather extensive referrals to the field, such
as the State Department's transmittal of working drafts to HICOG, the
consultants utilized by my staff were;
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July 29, 1952
Mr. J. Wallace Carroll Exec, Editor, Journal-Sentinel,
Winston Salem, N.C.
Dr. Hans Speier Rand Corporation
Mr. W. Phillip,' DavAsen
Dr. Stefan P. Possony Georgetown University
Dr. Walter Rostow Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Col, Charles A. H. Thomsen Brookings Institution
Mr. H. Van Buren Cleveland Committee for Economic
Development
Mr. John Haskell Vice Pres., New York Stock
Exchange
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger Harvard University
At our request, Dr. Kissinger, following R recent in to
Germany, has written a memorandum which is attached to Annex A. While
this report is intended mainly as background material for operational
planners in the coordination phase of the Plan, Board members may find
it interesting.
6. The attached Plan represents the first product of a new
working method which my staff has develvIed in conjunction with the
Department of State and other member agencies. Not only has the Panel
been chaired by a representative of the Department of State, but the
major part of the actual drafting has been accomplished by a special
State Department working party under the direction of Dr. Henry J.
Kellermann. The PSB staff role has been a catalytic rather than a
directing one, and my representatives on the Panel have concentrated
largely on attempting, through the use of non-governmental consultants
and in other ways, to discover or develop fresh ideas of possible
application to the Panells task. I consIder that this highly significant
experiment has proved successful in the present case, and feel that major
credit for this success should be given to Mr. Lewis and the members of
the State Department working party. At the sane time, I sh:mld like to
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July 29, 1952
acknDwledge the very substantial and constructive contribution riade by
the CIA members of the Panel.
/
Raymond B. Allen
Filelova ,es:
1. Cy of Letter of Transmittal fr
J. W. Riddleberger, State to
Director, PSD dated 7/30/52.
2. PB D-21 dtd 7/28/52
Working Draft #4, "Psychological
Strategy Plan Prescribing Specific
Courses of Actii with Respect to
Germany." Cy
3. Pa; D-21 dtd 7/28/52 - Annex A
"Summary and Analysis" with
supporting paper entitLd "Notes
on Germany" by H. A. Kissinger,
Harvard University. (Undated)
Cy""".". ?
4. PS13 1 -.4/52
Working Dm. lological
Strategy Pla osbiSpoeific
Courseaction with Res t to
S Harassment of Berlin." '\
1... .
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington 25, D.C. july 30, 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, PSYCKILOGICAI.STRATEGY BOARD
'Subject: Trammittal of pane. "F"Plaq
Ad Hoc Task Panel "F" having completed its pfeparation of a Plan
for Germany in accordance with Terns of Reference (PSB D6.21/1 dated
March 21, 1952) and Staff Memorandum "Organization of Task Panel F",
submits the Subject Plan to the Director, Psychological Strategy Board,
for his consideration.
Annex B (Covert),which is still urder preparation, will be fur..
nished at a subsequent date and should not delay consideration of this
Plan by the Psychological Strategy Boards
The Panel recommends that the Psychological Strategy Board auth?
orize the preparation of a "Psychological Strategy flan for Western
Europe and the Atlantic Community", and that the purpose of this Plan
be closely integrated with the Subject Plan for Germany.
(signed) James W, Riddleberger,
Chairman,
Ad Hoc Task Panel "F"
Enclosures
Working Draft PSD
Copy No. 2
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WORKING DR/4-7, 4 . Se curity Information July Z S 1952
co NO. 142
Considoration'only)
.PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN
Prescribing Specific Courses of Action
with respect to
GERMANY
SECTION I
PROBLEM
To prescribe specific courses of action with respect to: (a) the
integration of Western Germany into Western Europe, (b) the reduction of
Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany, (c) the achievement of German
unity, and (d) the role of unified Germany in the unification of Europe.
'J
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN
with respect to
GERMANY
Table of Contents
PSt
July 26,1952
25X1
Page
SECTION I PROBLEM
SECTION II APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES 2
SECTION III SMEARY AND ANALYSIS (cf ANNEX A)
A. ASSUMPTIONS 3
B. OBJECTIVES 5
SECTION IV TASKS 7
SECTION V DESIRED ACTIONS
A. General Guidance 12
B. Capabilities 15
C. Recommended Actions 17
SECTION VI ADMINISTRATIVE MATTMS 30
-0-
ANNEX A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
ANNEX B COVERT ANNEX (for limited distributiononly)
SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 BERLIN
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WOTIKING DRAFT 1E4 Secialy Information PSD D-21
July 28 1952
SECTION II
APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES
As set forth in NSC 20/4, NSC Actions No. 212, No. 266a, NSC 115,
NSC 68/4 NSC 86/1, and the 'Mutual Security Act of 1951.
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July.28 1952 Security Information
SECT,ION III
Supparz and Analypla
(to be supplied in full as Annex A)
A - AS3UMPTIO4S
Our psychological strategy outlined in this paper is based on the fol-
lowing assumptions:
1. Overall stratga:
That our actions in Germany can succeed only if they are con-
ceived as an integral part of overall United States strategy, es-
pecially in the context or a European Community, to build up posi-
tions of strength from which to reduce Soviet-Communist expansion-
ism and aggression.
2. Balance_ pf PoHer:
That Western capability to support this strategy is likely to
increase within the next two to three years, but not necessarily
to a degree which would assure a relationship of forces between
the Western nations and the Soviet Union which would permit suc-
cessful negotiations with the Soviet Union.
3. ,gpl.c1 War :
That the present state or tension between the Soviet bloc and
the West may increase in intensity, and that the Soviet Union will
feel free to employ all. of its capabilities far lures and pres-
sures on the West, short of deliberately provoking general war,
4. Integration:
That the process of integrating the Federal Republic with the
Western European Community through the EDC, the Schuman Plan, the
Contractual Agreements, the Council of Europe, and similar instru-
mentalities will involve continued difficulties, during which rati-
fication of the Agreements and their implementation may be slowed
down and impeded by oppositionist elements within and outside the
Federal Republic, and that the Soviet Union will encourage elements
in. the Federal Republic and other European countries to delayand
otatruct the process of integration,
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5. Contractuals t
That the prelent coalition goverment will honor the Agree-
ments, when they come into f orce, but that it will be subject, by
coalition members and the Opposition, to demands for liberalization;
that there will be continuing pressure for abandonment of reserved
rights; and that, in connection with the 1953 election campaign,
there will be increased demands for a revision of the Contractual
Agreements ani other commitments with the West.
6, Ilrmayi, tit z and the Peace 'Treaty:
That it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to agree
with the Soviet Union on a formula guaranteeing a satisfactory basis
for the unification of Germany and for the conclusion or a peace
treaty; but that the Soviet Union may continue to use diplomatic
and propaganda channels to press for quadripartite negotiation or
a peace treaty as well as East-West German discussions on unity.
7. Berlin:
That the Western Powers will maintain their position in Berlin;
but that the situation in Berlin and in particular the morale and
standard-of-living of the Berlin population nay be severely affec-
ted by the Soviet attrition strategy.
8. Soviet Zone and East Berlin:
That the population of the Soviet Zone will remain fundamentally
opposed ,to comma= but that the Soviet Union, through its East
German puppet authorities will continue to tighten its controls,
isolate Eastern Germany from the West, and proceed with its attempts
to set up a satellite state with an army of its own.
9. Gorton Military --and Ecompip.,pg_terit.ia3,t
That the build-up of an integrated German military force in
the Federal Republic will proceed substantially as contemplated
but will require pressure from the Weet, especially since the re-
quired draft legislation and the actual organization of the forces
will be subject to Continued criticism and resistance by the Opposi-
tion; also that any rearmarnent in the Federal Republic will be
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accompanied or preceded by a builclmup of an East German army,
designed to instill apprehensions of civil war and to cancel
out the Federal Republic's military contribution to Western
defense.
10. Yadan-gME2221
That attempts to promote Federal Republic integration into
Western Europe will be inadecuate unless they are supported by--
and closely coordinated with--parallel attempts to promote the
integration of Western Europe, particularly Fance, into a cam.
munity which will be capable of accepting the Federal Republic
as a partner.
11. ampe:
That the Federal Republic's capability for leadership within
a unified Western European community will be feared by Fiance,
un-
less potential German predominance in a united Europe is compen-
sated by closer and more organic ties between Europe and the United
States within the framework of a developing Atlantic Community.
12. gagjaznEurope:
That the Soviet-orbit countries are firmly under Soviet control
now and will be in the foreseeable future; that their liberation
will come about only as a result of a major change in the existing
relationships between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers; and that
their peoples generally entertain hopes for eventual liberation from
Soviet domination but, especially in Bohemia-Moravia and Poland, fear
a possible renewal of German domination.
B OBJECTIVES.
NOTE: The order of pricrity and emphasis is based on U.S. policies
reflecting the Em1201 world situation.
1. Concerning I& 119Aeral Republic:
a. To maintain and develop friendly and mutually beneficial
relations between the United States and the Federal Republic
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of Germany.
b. To encourage and facilitate effective participation by
a
the Federal Republic on/basis of equality in the European
COnnunity, itself included in a developing Atlantic Community,
and a contribution by the Federal Republic to the political,
oconcnic, and social welfare, as well as to the defenso struc-
ture, necessary to a stron- and durable Europe.
c. In the event of unification on terms acceptable to the
West, the above objectives will apply to all of Germany.
2. Concprnina Wept Der.liq
To maintain and reinforce our political, economic, cultural,
and psycholocical position in the western sectors of Borlin; and to
nullify Soviot eforts to harass the population and to disturb and
undermine the normal life of the city.
3. Concornina tho poviet. Zone dulEast Berlin
To maintain contact with the population in the Soviet Zone and
East Berlin in order to stiffen their spirit of resistance to Soviet-
Caanunist rule and thus (a) to weaken the political, economic, and
military system in the Soviet Zone; and (b) to lay the grourd work
for eventual incorporation in the free Western Community.
4. Concrning German Unitv
To demonstrate U.S. support dr Gorman unity attained by peace-
ful moans; and
To frustrate Soviot-Canmunist efforts to obtain control of all
of Germany and eventually to bring about Soviet withdrawal from
Germany.
5. Concernina Eastern Eurenc
To maintain contact with the people of Germany's Eastern Euro-
pean neighbors in order (a) to stiffen their spirit of resistance
and thus weaken the Soviet system of political, economic, and mil-
itary control of these countries, and (b) to sustain their hopes
for eventual liberation and inclusion in an all-European Commun-
ity free of domination by Gormany, the U.S.S.R. or any other Power,
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SECTIONZ
The following aro the Tasks of our psychological strategy in support of
tho achievement of our objectivesi
1. Conce=ngetbe Federal IlepuAle
a. To facilitate the transformation of the Allied-German re-
lationship on the diplomatic, political, and economic as well as
military level from tho occupation status toward that of equal part-
ners and allies.
b. To foster', =courage, support and facilitate efforts of
the population and the Govornmont of the Federal Republic toward
?
the integrwtion of their political, economic, cultural, and mili-
tary interests with those of the European Community and the Atlan-
tic Community; to help pave the way for acceptance by other govern-
ments and peoples (particularly French) for participation by the Fed-
eral Republic in the development of the European and Atlantic Con-
nunitio s.
c. To support the development in the Federal Republic of dem-
ocratic institutions, and to assist the German democratic elements
in their opposition to authoritarian and extremist elements*
d. To gain the support of the Gorman people and government for
U.S. policico, and to strength= their will to resist and their con-
fidonco in the ability of the U.S. (and the West) to frustrate
Soviet-Communist aggressien.
e. To stimulate maximum Federal Republic contribution to the
development of increased military and economic strength in Western
Europe.
To convince the Germans of the nood to weaken Soviet aggres-
sive capabilities by impeding the flow of strategic materials to East
Germany and the Soviet bloc; and to provide Western markets and raw
materials to the -Federal Republic.
2. Concerning.Ben
0.:4 TO demonstrate to the Soviet Union, the Berliners, the Germans,
and the rest of tho world our right, ability, and
1
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deternination to maintain the Allied and West Berliners' po-
sition in and access to nerlin.
b. To e:goloit the continued e:tistence off a free West Berlin
as a lishow window of denocrac:;11, are as a base of psychologi-
cal operations in the Soviet Zone and beyond it in the Soviet
crbit in order to weaken the Soviet influence throughout Germany,
and particularly in order to encourage and strengthen resistance
to Soviet rule in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin.
c. In order to maintain the morale of the Berlin population
and strengthen their diplomatic, political, cultural, and ?con-
onic ties with the West in the face o: increasing Soviet pres-
sures, to plan and coordinate jointly with the U.K., French, and
the Federal Republic governments, psychological measures to null-
ify the Soviet harassments, and to enlist and build up the active
interest of governmental and private elements throwhout the free
world in support of Berlin's cause as a symbol of free-world
unity of purpose*
de To stimulate and assist the Federal Republic to provide
ma:cinum economic and psychological support for West Berlin.
3. Concerning thc Soviet Zone and East1.1erlin
a. To encourage in the Soviet Zone disaffection towards the re-
gime and defection from the East German military or para-military
forces.
b. To reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet and Communist
addinistrative and control apparatus by conducting in a non.
attributable manner psychological, political, and economic harass-
ment activities in the Soviet Zone, and to prepare, under controlled
conditions, for such more active forms of resistance as may later
be authorized.
c. To keep the population informed of world events and of
U.S. and Western policies, particularly with respect to Cemany.
d* To maintain hope in the Soviet Zone population for a
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unified and democratic Germany integrated within the European
Connunity.
e. To weaken the confidence and ability of the Soviet
authorities and Communist leaders to maintain or expend their
controls in the Soviet Zone, or their influence in Vest Berlin
or the Federal Republic.
4. Concerniqa Gerpan Ur=
a. To demonstrate our willingness to initiate and enter, jointly
with the French and U.K. Governments, in negotiations with the
Soviet Union for German unification under conditions guarantee-
ing a unified Germany with a democratic government established
by free democratic elections, provided that a reasonable basis
for such negotiations exists.
b. To support any legitimate proposal for action seeking
peaceful solution to existing territorial problems within the
framework of European, rather than national, interests, but to
avoid giving official encouraement to Goin territorial aspir-
ations toward areas external to the Federal Republic, the Soviet
Zone, and Berlin, beyond acknowledgment of the established U.S.
policy that no definitive German frontiers were laid down by
the Potsdam decisions, and that the final determination of ter-
ritorial questions must await the peace settlements*
25X1
de To expose and exploit Soviet moves aimed at permanent
partition of Germany and satellization of Eastetn Germany.
* U.S. note to Soviet Government dated March 26, 1951.
343
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Now ) ? ConcmlinaWcAtern &rpm
a. To enhance popular confidence in
1. the peaceful future of a European Connunity, within an At-
lantic Connunity, which includes the Federal Republic;
ii. the prospect of mutually beneficial relations with the
Federal Republic;
Iii. the deternination of the Western world to strive for a uni-
fied, democratic Germany as a limber of a viable European
calm:unity; and
iv, the intentions of the Western Powers to safeguard the
European Conn-unity aLainst the resurgence of aggressive
Gern-n nationa3isn.
b. To produce allong European leaders and people a realistic awaro.
nos of the deadly nenace of Soviet expansionism and of the strength
accruing to the USSR if Gornany wore included in the Soviet orbit.
c. To stimulate the realization among Europeans that only a tremen-
dous effort of inaginotion, productivity, and cooperation, far our-
passing the present effort of the Atlantic Conramity, including
Germany, will enable theLLto surmount this threat; and to convince
them that the creative energies latent in the free societies, in-
cluding Germany, when fully developed, will not only nulli2y the
onenyto aggressive novos or plans but also raise the Western poo-
pies to unprecedented levels of material and noral
d. To promote the concept of the Atlantic Connunity so that it
nay be used to support and supplenont the concept of European
unity as the dynamic and unifying elenent of our psychological
strategy in Europe.
o. To create among the peoples eC Wstern Europe a sense of pos-
itive participation in the international connunity which is now
emerging.
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6. Concqrning France
In addition to the specific effect desired in paragraph 5 above:
a. To stimulate popular acceptance of:
1. a genuine political settlement with the Federal Republic;
it. the capability of the European Community, within the
Atlantic Community, to develop for the common benefit
German manpower, heavy industry, and steel production
in such a way as to eliminate French fears.
b. To provide reassurance that the distinctive historic mature
of France can vigorously flourish within the framework cif the
European Community, including the Federal Republic.
7, ConcernAng. Eastern ElEas
a. To stimulate popular suspicion df Soviet intentions with
respect to Germany.
b. To persuade Soviet-orbit peoples that a unified Germany inte-
grated into a European Community is a guarantee against the re-
vived German drive to the East.
c. To convince Soviet-orbit peoples that the weakening of
Soviet power in East Germany is a necessary prerequisite for
their own liberation.
d. To sustain the resistance of Soviet-orbit peoples toward the
day when their active participation in their own liberation will
be required.
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SECTION V
DESIRED ACTIONS
Part A ? General Guidance
1. In developing and carrying out the specific actions to implement pre?
scribed tasks, psychological strategy must give attention to the following
opportunities and handicaps Which influence the courses of actions required far
the psychological support of our policies in Europe and especially in Germany:
a. Opportunities.
i. The friendly orientation of large parts of European
nations toward the U.S. and their growing confidence in
U.S. strength;
ii,14. strong sense of cultural and political identification
in Germany with the West and the reservoir of good will
created by U.S. political initiative and by ECA, MBA
and other assistance for German rehabilitation;
iii. The existence in the Federal Republic of a government
and population sympathetic towards the U.S. and its
policies and opposed, largely through personal
experience, to communism and to the policies of the
Soviet Union; and
iv. The steady decline of the strength of the West German
Communist Party.
b. Handicaps.
i. The complexity and fluidity of the European political
situation which has already an several occasions
necessitated major adjustments of the U.S. tactical
positions, and which will continue to require a flexible
strategic psychological plan;
Ii. The present elimination of U.S. influence on European
government and peoples coinciding with the need to
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exert special U.S. pressures to induce Europeans to
take actions which appear to be in their own interests;
and
iii. Allied with thissincreasing sensitivity in Western
Europe to U.S. intervention with the accompanying
danger that at tines strong U.S. political, economic,
or psychological pressures may run the risk of self-
defeat, unless offset by measures which emphasize that
these programs will serve the best interests of the
developing European and Atlantic Communities.
2. In order to gain the most effective support for U.S. policies by the
German public, our approach must be conceived and carried out in a manner which
is both palatable and presuasyve to the German people. We must adjust our
approach in accordance with the changes in public opinion and with impressions
and impacts which various political, economic, and cultural issues have on the
German psychological climate, This will require a major effort of imagination
on the part of the U.S. operating agencies to develop new and more effective
forms of psychological activities, and it implies a constant review of existing
programs--including those reccmmended hereafter--in the light of their demon-
strated effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
3. Our operations in Germany, furthermore, must be closely coordinated
with our psychological strategy in other parts of the world, and to achieve
maximum effect they should preferably be carried out within the framework of an
integrated psychological thrategz plan for Western Europe.
4. U.S. psychological operations designed for Germany and Western Europe
should be guided by the following principles:
a. While supporting programs endorsed by U.S. which promote European
and Atlantic integration, e.g., the Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe,
the European Defense Ccenunity, etc., we should avoid raising false
expectations by committing the U.S. to a fixed timetable.
b. Care should betaken in the application of any official pressure
to primarily domestic issues of European states, in order to avoid the
impression of excessive U.S. intervention.
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c. In official statements or other forms of official propaganda,
avoid aver-extending our psychological objectives beyond established
pclicies, thus arousing false, unlikely, or prmature expectations.
d. Lvoid ertificinlly creating needs or desires for U.S. economic
or financial aid.
e. In the furtherance of U.S. psychological strategy programs in the
Federal Republic, indigenous pressures should be utilized or created that
will parallel and support the attainment of U.S. political objectives,
and at the sane time instill in the Germans a sense of participation in
the achievement of these objectives.
f. In fostering indigenous pressures through official and unofficial
support of private groups and organizations the United States should:
i. in official programs concentrate on those groups and
organizations sympathetic to our policy-objectives which
manifest strong spontaneous motivation and are financially
self-sustaining; and avoid supporting organizations, groups,
and individuals that are unable to win solid indigenous
support;
ii. in psychological programs, concentrate to the greatest
possible extent on established organizations and media,
and limit the use of imaginary sponsors in the Federal
Republic.
g. In order to create a psychological climate in which the new U.S.-
German relationship will be more effective, avoid emphasizing purely
local and formal aspects cf this relationship;
h. Wherever possible, propaganda by deed is preferable to verbal
propaganda. Our propaganda should, therefore, be tied to specific
developments and concrete action designed to implement U.S. policies.
Nereover, we should seek to express our themes, whenever appropriate, in
the form of live demonstrations and special events which will effectively
symbolize U.S. attitudes and intentions. We should encourage increased
emphasis by German or other European organizations on constructive social
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and cultural activities, and on serious research.
i. In supporting German (or other West European) activities in
promotion of European or Atlantic solidarity, we should give higher
priority to these which actually establish institutional links with
other countries than to those which merely publicize the idea within
Germany or any single country.
Part B Capabilities
1. Since psychological stratoa programs involve all United States actions
and means which are able to influence people's attitudes directly and indirectly,
all elements of the United States Goverment and appropriate private U.S.
organizations or conducting activities that affect Germany, dzould be enlisted
in the execution of the United States psychological strategy plan for Germany.
In the Federal Republic the following capabilities already exist or should be
developed:
a. United States State Department representatives in the Federal
Republic including those responsible for the Department's Cultural
Affairs and Information program, will continue to be in a position to
influence the Federal Relublic Government by direct representations and
will also be able to have an indirect influence upon Federal Republic
official in government and the public at large through business and
social contacts.
b. Members of official United States economic and military missions
to the Federal Republic have a corresponding capability for influencing
German official and private attitudes.
c. United States military forces and their dependents stationed
in Germany in fulfillment of United States security pledges to NATO
and the Federal Republic, constitute an important medium for conveying
an impression of American and its people to the German population.
d* The policies and administration of United States military and
defense support programs in the Federal Republic, carried on by the
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Mutual Security Agency, can makea significant contribution to United
States psychological strategy for Germany, and Should be conceived
and directed with this in mind.
e. Official statements of United States policies by recognized U.S.
Government spokesmen in Washington which affect the Federal Republic,.
must be calculated and fully used to further psychological strategy
objectives.
f. Efforts should alsobe encouraged among private firms, agencies,
.associations, etc. A suggestive list of such instrumentalities may be
found in "Inventory of Resources Presently Available for Psychological
Operations Planning" (P.S.:',4-192 Confidential, dated Jan. 5, 1952),
previously furnished to the Derartments and Agencies concerned.
g. In additicn to developing and using the psychological capabilities
of official U.S. Government agencies, instrumentalities, and individuals,
the U.S. Government within its capabilities should continue to use and
further develop other mechanisms (Annex B) in the Federal Republic and
West Berlin which have the greatest potential to. attain U.S. psychological
strategy objectives, and to accomplish the Tasks enumerated in SECTION IV.
2. Other capabilities of the United States related to the Soviet Zone or
East Berlin are:
a. The U.S. military-mission to the Soviet military command in
Potsdam;
b. U.S. diplomatic and military contacts with Soviet Occupation
authorities in Berlin;
c. U.S. diplomatic relations With the U.S.S.R.;
d. U.S. representation in the U.N.; and
e. State Department information media.
3. In developing our psychological strategy, we should be aware of and
guided by the Changing military and economic factors apt to modify the current
relationship of forces between the Western nations and the U.S.S.R.
? 4. The balance of this SECTION describes and assigns responsibilities for
Nwo, the execution of specific actions to be taken by departments, agencies, and
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instrumentalities of United States Government, in carrying out the psychological
strategy Tasks as stated in SECTION IV, for the Federal Republic, West Berlin,
the Soviet Zone, East Berlin, and Germany as a Whole.
Part C - Recommended Actions
Federal aepublic
1. Transformation of Allied-Federal Republic relationship:
a. Continue to explain to the Germans, with the cooperation of the
U.K. and France, the Federal Republic's new status under the Contractual
Agreements, eg., interpret the reserved powers under the Agreements in a
manner consistent with this new relationship; continue to give appropriate
explanation to such controversial provisions of the Agreements as the
Emergency Clause and the War Criminale issue; and stress the advantages
and prestige accruing to the Federal Republic.
b. Encourage, and where feasible, discreetly plf.)licize actions by
American, French and British diplomatic, military and economic and
cultural representatives in the Federal Republic, and by other nations
which lend substaarc to the new relationship between the Western Powers
and the Federal Repu'llic; also whore oossible stimulate reciprocal actions
by the Germans,
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c. Encourage appropriate behaviour and attitudes on the part of U.S.
U.K., France, and EDC forces and their dependents stationed in the Federal
Republic toward its forces and people, including the reduction of unjusti-
fied special privilege facilities of the defense forces, and the removal
of symbolic reminders of the Occupation such as foreign language signs
(except those required for military purposes) etc.
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d. Encourage where appropriate reciprocal U.S.-Federal Republic inform-
ation, cultural, and technical activities such as exchanges of persons and
media on a quid. 12uro. sam basis, and minimize German antagonisms toward use
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of the Federal Republic as a base for Western operations, by such actions
ae:
i. Continuing and expanding the coordination with appropriate
Federal Republic authorities of U.S. propaganda and the
activities directed toward East Germany; and
ii. Facilitating the development of Federal Republic foreign
information and cultural programs.
2. Federal Republic integration into the Western European and free
world co.ununities.
a. Assist the ,Jovormen of the Federal Republic in developing
psydheloal strcto-Tsr ordened toward obtaining maximum support among
the Germans for 721o:roped/a ii 7-ntion.
b. Keep ali7o and strengthen German understanding and interest in
internat4ona1 cr,orction thr:1_3h participation, when feasible, in appro-
priate irternati_r,al agencies and organizations. Support and publicize
activities of into=nat).onal cTgmizations such as GATT, OEEC, etc., in
which Germany ci-eady par:71 ate and whose aim it is to facilitate the
development of mutua3ly beneficial ficiliUes. (For various reasons, be-
yond U,S.control, Gorman participation in certain international organiza-
tions, e.g.,NATO and UN, is not possible under present conditions. There-
fore, we should avoid stimulating premature expectations in Germany of
early membership).
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c. Through psychological and political media and techniques discredit
and reduce the influence of communist, communist front, neutralist, and
pacifist opposition to integration.
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e. Assist by appropriate support political, economic, religious,
cultural and other groups in the Federal Republic (especially youth) which
are working towards the maxi= identification of Gorman national interests
with those of the European community.
i. Material and other assistance to German information media
working towards the some goal;
ii. Support and publicity for political, economic, religious,
cultural and other activities on an international scale
which are oriented toward integration.
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g. Support and publicize U.S! and other countries' diplomatic and
other efforts to allay fears of Germany, especially in France, and con-
versely efforts by the Federal Republic to accept not only the rights but
also the obligations inherent in an inter-dependent and reliable community
of nations.
h. Support and publicize the exchange of military personnel and
technical military experts between the Federal Republic and other Western
countries through attendance at Allied military schools, exchanges of mili-
tary observers etc.
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j.: When appropriate for a play-back for Germany, encourage the
widest publicity in Western Europe for indications of genuine and
srontaneous non-German pcpular support for Western-oriented German
unification.
3. Development of democratic institutions in opposition to authoritarian
and extremist elements.
a. Through official and private Channels and especially cultural, and
information activities, encourage the Federal Republic Government to spon-
sor democratic educational and governmental practices, and to hinder the
entry by undemocratic elements into the educational system, military
leadership, and Government administration.
b. Encourage and assist the Federal Republic in establishing civilian
control of the Federal Republic's armed forces and their responsiveness to
government policy and the selection for training of officers' and non-
coqnlssioned officers' cadres, oriented to Western democracy.
c. Through psychological and political techniques and medic, as
indicated in Annex D* discredit and weaken the strength and influence of
neo-,nazi and other authoritarian and extremist elements in the Federal
Republic.
*limited distribution only.
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d. Encourage Federal Republic political organizations friendly to the
U.S. to devote high priority to youth recruitment and to the appointment
of qualified youths to positions of leadership.
e. Stimulate and develop deviaticnism within the German Communist
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Party.
f. Lssist German authorities and private organizations with the
development of plans and programs- designed to integrate expellees and de-
fectors into the West German Community, to alleviate current hardships, to
utilize their skills and experiences for the welfare and security of the
Federal Republic, to foster their loyalty to established authorities and
policies, and thus to turn potential elements of insecurity into reliable
supporters of the Federal Republic and of the Western nations.
g. Discreetly support democratic elements in such organizations of
political, cultural, and economic nature as universitiess-veterans' organi-
zations, and refugee groups in order to channel their efforts towards the
constructive stabilization of democracy and opposition to totalitarianism
of either extreme Right or Left,
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h. Assist and publicize developments in civic responsibility, such as
public discussions of cormLunity problems and similar projects; simultaneous-
ly support and publicize actions by the Federal Republic authorities to
control undemocratic elements within the country.
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44 Gain Federal Republic peoplest support for U.S. policies, increase their
confidence in the U.S. and Western ability to frustrate Soviet-Communist
aggression, and strengthen their will to resist.
a. Same Actions as for Tasks Nos. 1 and 2.
b. Through diplomatic and military channels, and through all available
media, stress U.S. determination to honor its NATO commitments in defending
Europe, the growing strength and strategic superiority of the West, and any
weakening of the Soviet political, psychological, and strategic military
position.
C. Demonstrate U.S. anu buropean milltary strength through suitable
military displays, and through excellence of military discipline of U.S.
forces.
5. Stimulate Federal Republic contribution to the development of increased
economic and military strength in Western Europe.
a. of Actions under paragraph 2.
b. Continue to develop and publicize plans for increase productivity
in the Federal Republic.
c. Stimulate organs of public opinion to expose and demand action
against illegal trade transactions.
d. Stimulate Federal Rerublic confidence in the opportunities
for trade with the West and with the free world as a whole.
1 3 4
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Berlin
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e. Develop greater understanding in the Federal Republic of
motives lying behind Soviet trade with non-Communist countries;
e.g. develonment of economic self-sufficiency in the Soviet
bloc in order to make it independent of non-Communist trade.
f. Publicize developments related to the control of East-Nest
trade which demonstrate that the Federal Republic is treated
on the basis of equality.
(Actions being developed in separate: Supplement, to implement NSC 132/1).
1. Encourage disaffection and defection.
a. Through official information media, such as RIAS, VOA, and
disseminate infcrmation calculated to help
create a climate conducive to disaffection by presenting
a favorable picture of the free world and exposing the
Soviet/Communist regime in the Soviet Zone and East Derlin.
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PSD D-21
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3, Inforning Soviet Zone population of world events.
a. Disseminate pertinent information to the Soviet Zone
and East Derlin population on the broadest possible
basis through a 11 available information media.
4,, Maintain Soviet Zone/East Berlin hope for unified democratic
Germany in European Community.
a. Employ all available psychological nedia to convey to
the Soviet Zone/East Lenin population evidence of U.S. and
Western determination to achieve German unity on suitable
terns (see para 4a, P.9) to stress the benefits of such
unity (in contrast to the connunist formula), and to show
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evidences of growing Western strength and Communist
weakness.
5. Weaken Soviet?Communist confidence in their ability to maintain
or strengthen their position in Soviet Zone/East Berlin, or to use this
area as a firm base for operations against the Federal Republic or West
Berlin.
a. Through all available psychological techniques
and media, bring to the attention of Soviet authorities,
the effects of selected activities under Actions 1 and 2
above, which are indicative of growing popular resistance
attitudes and lessening reliability of the Soviat/Cemunist
control apparatus.*
German Unity
1. Demonstrate willingness to negotiate.
a. Through all available psychological and political tech?
niques and media, give the *widest possible play to official
;TEM- Actions 1 and 2 themselves will have direct impact on Soviet/
Com.unist confidence).
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U.S. and Western statements favorable to German Unity.
b. Through official spokesmen and official information
media, convey evidences of U.S. attitude to the German
people.
2. Avoid official encouragement of German territorial aspirations
beyond acknowledgement of stated policy.
25X6 - NSC
a. Official spokesmen and official information media
should not take initiative in raising Oder-Neisse and
Saar issues, but Should stand on previous U.S. policy
statements if forced by circumstances to treat the
subject.
3. ther coverage of Oder-Neisse and Saar issues.
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PSD Dr21
4. Expose and counter Scviet moves toward permanent partition.
a. Use all available techniques and media to publicize
Soviet measures, aich as border controls, diplomatic
actions, and militarization of Soviet Zone, which belie
Soviet unification pretensions and evidence the trans?
formation of Soviet Zone /East Derlin into a satellite
state.
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b. Use Actions under para 4 above (pe 26) to fUrther this Task.
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SECTION VI
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
Coordipationa Reyiew.? and .Eyaluatien
The Director, Psychological Strategy Board, shall be responsible
for continuing coordination, review, and evaluation of this basic Plan
and departmental and agency supporting plans and operations. The Dir-
eetor, in his discretion, may establish in Washington) D.C., a coor-
dinating panel of interested departments and agencies.
B. atTP9rile
Supporting plans prepared by the Department of State, Department
of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director for Mutual
So eurity shall be submitted to the Dire ct or 2 Psychological Stra to gy
Board, for review and such coordination aa is necessary.
C. Legislative
Congressional support for legislation necessary to further the objec-
tives of this plan will be developed by the Departments and Agencies con-
cerned in accordance with normal programmiir procedures. In addition,
the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board, using the resources
of the PSB member Depart:lento and. Agencies and of other Departments
and Agendas of the Government, will review other current and pro-
posed legislation which impinges on or importantly affects the strat-
egic psychological obje ctives of the United States in Germany and
Nestern Europe. Based onthis revie a, he will recommend such Board
action as seems appropriate and desirable in relation to the success-
ful axe cution of this Plane
D. Public. Pg'2.P_Pati.grl
Where appropriate, U.S. domestic public information programs in
sapport of the general objectives of this Plan will be developed by
the member Departments and Agencies.
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For Pat Consideration Security Information July 28 1952
ANNEX A
SUMMARY AND NALYSIS
(Keyed to SECTION III As ASSUMPTIONS)
Assprmtipnleki.t Over-fill strategy
Within the over-all U.S. world strategy EX building positions of
strengtO, the U. S. strategy for Europe is to build up the strength of
Western Europe through measures to achieve its political, economic, social,.
and military integration with special emphasis on the integration ar Ger-
many into the Western Europe community. Simultaneous with measures to
strengthen Western- Europe to a point where its power is tactically equiva-
lent to Soviet powerin the. Airopean area, the U.S. will seek to bring about
the reduction and eventual elimination of Soviet aggressive capabilities
through weakening its military, economic, political, and psychological cap-
abilities.
A further U.S. objective is to achieve a unified democratic Germany
that is fully integrated into the Western Europe community. This would be
predicated upon a Soviet withdrawal from all of Germany and would in turn
afford a basis for further actions designed to weaken Soviet power and
aggressive capabilities throughout tho remaining Soviet sphere of influence.
Efforts to weaken Soviet aggressive capabilities must, however, be contin-
uously sustained whether or not German unity is achieved in order to
discourage the Soviet Union from precipitating a third world war.
AskumptionqqA_2A_Eglance of Fewer
Western strength may be developed to a point of equivalence with Sov-
iet power following the deployment of the Federal Republic's defense contri-
bution of twelve divisions, provided that the military potential of other
Western European countries is fully developed simultaneously. The Federal
Republic's contribution will probably not be realized before 1954 or 1955.
The Soviet Union will continue to have impressive capabilities for action in
Asia and the Near East, which can be used to divert U.S. and Allied arms
from Western Europe.
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Asspptipn 110,-21_ Cold War
Soviet objectives with regard to Germany will probably continue to be
to gain ultimate control over all of Germany, or, failing that, to prevent
the development and consolidation of Western strength through ratification
and implementation of the Contractual and EDC Agreements. It is probable
Lhab the present tensions between the Soviet bloc and the West will con-
tinue indefinitely and increase in intensity.
There is no doubt that the Soviet Union will employ all of its capabil.
ities, short of deliberately provoking war, to further its aims. Soviet acw
tions may range from diplomatic demarchos to incidents involving the use of
armed forces and military demonstrations, possibly including limited terri-
tory conflicts in which Germany nay be involved but probably short of general
war.
In ihs F,lsral Rcpublic th- USSR, working through the Communist Party
and affiliated frcnt and neutralist orgenizations will probably continue to
capitalize on indigenous West German opposition to European integration, par-
ticularly that of the SPD, nationalists, and neutralist elements, In Eastern
Germany and East Berlin the Soviet Union will probably continue its program
to isolate these areas fret). the Federal Repttlie and West Berlin with
a view to consolidating them into the Soviet satellite system. The develop.
ment of an official East German army and the intensification of controls
upon the East German population will complement the attainment of this ob-
jective,
Assuution Nol_41 Integnation
It is probable that the process of integrating the Federal Republic
with the Western European Community through the EX, the Schuman Plan, the
Council of Europe, and similar organizations will continue, but that ratifi-
cation of these agreements and their implementation will be impeded by opposi-
tionist elements within and outside Germany. Even after the Bonn contractual,
Schumnn Plan, and EDC agreements have been ratified by the several parliaments,
the integration of the Federal Republic into the EDC will
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3e curity IZOrmation July 28 1952
have been achieved mainly on paper. Full realization of intecratien will
continue to be impeded by the followin factors:
(a) Powerful political ,roups in the Federal Republic will con-
tinue to oppose the Zxlenauer government foreign policy, and
popular =port for this policy /iv be b4lath6tie
The SocialiA opposition is the most strongly organized, but
there will also be a threat from the right wins nationalist
croups and even from certain elements oi the government coal-
ition parties. The continued opposition of nationalist
rroups will aggravate the deep-rooted French suspicion of
Germany and tend to undermine the 'estern defense edifice.
(b) The historic rnisunderstandiniss between Germany and France,
particularly on such iE131,10111 as the Saar, may be aggravated
by the propaganda activities of powerful :rench nationalist
or neutralist groups opposed to the :DC program. In addi-
tion, deep-seated French fears that a revived Germany may
dominate the I.,DC or resume its e:zpansionist role may make -
France reluctant to implement Federal Republic int2graticn into
EDO.
kJ sin:11A ion No. .5 Contra ctual s
It is probable that the pro-Adenauer coalition government will honor
the C ontractual and 23DC Agreements, but that these A.greements will be sub-
ject to demands by both coalition members and the opposition for liberaliza-
tion and that there will be continuini::: pressure for abandonment of reserved
rights. A Social Democratic victory in the 1953 elections would logically
incr-ase Western German demands for a revision of the contractual agree-
ments and other commitments to the West.
? Ase_wation ao.t. 6 German 1andPcoTreat
German unification will remain one of the deepest aspirations of the
Ceman people in both 3ast and ::est Germany. 2ven though the intensity
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New of this aspiration may abate somewhat in the face of psychological and
economic realitieS: it affords an, issue which cannot be ignored in the
strategies of either the Soviet Union or the U.S. Any unification in ad-
vance of integration: howevor: would so change the political basis of the
German government as to create broad opportunities for the Soviet Union
to bring about a Russo-German alliance. The psychological problem for the
U.S. regarding the issue of German unity is made more difficult by the re-
luctance of many Germans* including some within the Adonauor coalition:
to realize that integration is a strategic prerequisite, In contrast they
tend to consider intogration: as it has boon prosentcd thus far: as an
obstacle imposed from the outsido to the unity which is their first desire.
Furthermore: many Germans sco neutralized unification as a moans toward ro-
gaining Eastern markets and raw materiala.
It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will agree to German unification
on Western terms: except possibly when confronted with superior Western
military forces* combined with mass resistance in Eastern Germany. Wostorn
efforts to exerted pressures: adequate to bring about Gorman unification
bcforc Woobern strength has reached its 'Doak* would probably hasten a Soviet
military attqck. Howovor: it is conceivable that the Soviet Union would
barter Eastern Germany for a neutralized: unified Germany. In any case:
whether willing or not to pursue such a course* the Soviots will probably
continue to press for German unification on the 'oasis of withdrawal of all
foreign forces from Gorman soil: guaranteed limit of Gorman armament: and
prohibition of "aggressive" alliances. They woad hope thcroby to dampen
Western European and: particularly: French willingness to implement the
European Defense Community and to increase the strains between the U.S.
and its European allies.
Assumption No.2_71 Berlin
It is not believed at this time that the Soviets plan to roimposo a full
blockade of West -Berlin. Presont dovelopments appear to bo primarily part
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of the Soviet intintdation program, designed to prevent ratification eC
the Gon'tractual and EDC Agreements, and, failing in this effort, to impose
serious problems for Western policy subsequent to ratification. At the
present time, the Soviet Union has Capabilities for effectively restrict-
ing ground resupply and comnunication lines between Berlin and the Federal
Republic, if it chooses to do so, and it can temporarily limit the effective-
ness of an Allied airlift. However, it is unlikely fel' the moment that
the Soviet Union will deliberately take steps in Berlin that are calculated
to bring about a general war in Europe. Moreover, it is believed that the
Soviets arc unlikely to impose a complete blockade at this time upon Ber-
lin, because to do so would consolidate liestern, and particularly West
German anti-Soviet opinion and hasten, rather than retard, ratification.
Definitive action on the part of the Soviets is, therefore, likely to await
action on the ratification of the Xgreoments.
A collapse of the Western position in Berlin would have serious ad-
verse psychological consequences in Western Germany, Western Europe, and
throughout the Atlantic Community. In the event of a determined Soviet ef-
fort to eject the Western Powers from Berlin, the French and British Gov-
ernments would probably join in a united agreement to resist by force, if
need be, but at some cost in popular support, especially in the case of
France.
Assuivtion_ No. St Soviet "ZollkePrIclE4st_BPr.klm
The Soviet Union is attempting to create a communist satellite in East
Germany, and to make East German resources available to increase Soviet cap.
abilities. It is probable that the population of the Soviet Zone will re-
main fundamentally opposed to communism. So long as this opposition exists,
Soviet control in Eastern Germany will have to rely upon military occupation
or use the MGB-conmunist terror apparatus. Although it is probable, there-
fore, that East Germany will constitute a psychological liability for the
Soviet Union, it is to be noted that the Soviet Zone is the second most. in-
portent industrial area in the Soviet bloc outside of the U.S.S.R., and
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providos a major base for Soviet operations against Western Europe.
It is probable that further steps will be taken to complete the
isolation of Eastern Germany and East Berlin from West Germany and West
Berlin, and that the development of an Eastern German army will be fur-
thered by the Soviet Union.
Au141214,011Nc.9_21. FqApral Repub,14-c lalitarz and Economic Potentigl
Creation of the planned Federal Republic military force (equivalent to
12 ground divisions plus tactical dr and naval patrol forces) must await
not only full ratification of the EDC treaty, which is not aTected before
late 1952, but also the organization of economic and industrial support,
both within the Federal Republic and from abroad.
The trained military manpower and untrained manpower pool available in
the Federal Republic are ample for the creation of the planned force within
two or three years of ratification.
Economic end industrial support for this force in the Federal Republic
must await the development of machinery uithin the Bonn Government for plan-
ning and programing the economic aspects of the defense effort. Given the
creation of this machinery and adequate outside support, the Federal Repub-
lic's potential will make pessible an economic contribution to the defense
of the West far more than equivalent to the materiel requirements of her
own forces. The Federal Republic will be barred, for themsent, by the
EDC Agreement and other commitment; rom making certain categories of items,
e.g. atomic weapons and civil aircraft.
Domestic opposition to the reouircd legislation for the military force,
and to the actual or of the forces, will stem generally from the
same sources opposing the integration policy (see Assumption #4 and discus-
sion). However, opposition is likely to be more bitter in the case of
conscription and industrial conversion, which adversely affect or threaten
the personal fortune of large groups for the sake of a policy which many
Germans see as imposed by the United States against their country's interests.
12.14PRET
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ielsi.rieiTE?.,,iSdicilsr RVSaasned2Vrifel Regfuli?Fogg:-RWQ34?...9e9PRATRa-Pr
French attitudes toward the German problem are characterized by two
basic fears the fear of domination by a Germany once more powerful,
and the fear of war through action in Germany which night provoke Soviet
military retaliation. If those fears apply to the integration and remil-
itarization of the Federal Republic, they apply still more to any attempts
to bring about German unification, except, perhaps, on a basis of neu-
tralization and demilitarization. The margin by which France is likely to
accept the lesser ricks of integration is small enough to suggest that any
serious attempt to promote German unification against Soviet opposition
would adversely affect French relations with NATO and might bring to
power a neutralist government in France.
Frenchanxieties over the German problem prompt France to seek greater
unity and strength in Western Europe and greater and more reliable support
from the Atlantic Community as a whole, especially the United States and
the United Kingdom. All such developments would tone to balance the ap-
parent threat to France from both Germany and the Soviet Union. In this
sense the French attitude depends on such factors as the course of the
war in IndoChina; the strength of United States and British forces on the
Continent; the rate of development of French economic and military power;
the firmness of United States and British support for the integrity of the
EDC; and the degree to which the Federal Republic can convince the French
of its firm adherence to the integration policy.
Assumption 112.1_12: EasterD_Enzma&
There is no indication that any of the countries of the Soviet Orbit is
capable of breaking away from, or achieving a significant relaxation of,
Soviet control in the foreseeable future, short of a great weakening in the
power of the U.S.S.R.
Generally, the peoples of the Soviet Orbit countries hope for eventual
liberation, Exception must be made for those classes which benefit directly
from participation in the hierarchy of control; for the Bulgarians, to the
extent that anti-Russian feeling historically is far less intense in
Bulgaria than in other Orbit countries; and for some economic classes,
mainly poor peasants, which have improved their lot under the Soviet-
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Fear of renewed German domination is most intense in BohemiaMoravia
and Poland, which experienced the worst of the Nazi conquest. In Slovakia
considerable pro German feeling survives, partly reflecting the mildness of
tho puppet regime which governed there during World War II. Pro-German
feeling is also considerable in the Baltic States. In the Western
Ukraine, despite the Nazi excesses of the war, there may remain a latent
good will for the Germans, reflecting strong antipathy for the Soviet
regime. Hungary and Rumania are both characterized by much more intense
hatred and fear of the Russians than of the Germans.
The above sentiments toward Germany are only partly conditioned by
Soviet propaganda, which paints the Bonn Republic as the "heir of all
Hitlerian atrocities" and the "slave of Wall Street", while East Germany
is portrayed as a workers' state and therefore, by definition, peace-
loving. The latter impression has been reinforced by East Germany's
public disavowal of any territorial ambitions toward the Oder-Neisse lands.
In the event of German unification, it may be assumed that the Soviet
propaganda line in Eastern Europe would shift to unqualified anti-Germanism.
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Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University.
I. Bacicgrpund.
The importance of Germany in Europe hardly requires re tatement. It
is t1-e7 most highly industrialized cauntry on the Continent; its disciplined
labor forces and its deposits of raw materials mnke it in many respects
the keystone of Aelerican efforts in Europe. It was hoped that the signing
of the Peace Treaty would transform Cormany into a willing partner of the
Atlantic community; its contribution all the more meoningful be cause freely
given. It was assumed that a feelin, of satisfaction would greet the
achievement of quasi-sovereignty only seven years after unconditional cur-
render culminating a remarkable recovery inconceivable as late as 1948.
Such has not been the case, however. This writer spent several weeks
in Germany at a period coinciding wi h the signing of the Peace Treaty.
During this time he was in n noeition to visit various sections of Germany
and to talk to a wide range o: individuals. German reaction to the Peace
Treaty and to U.S. policy in general can best be summed up as "hysterical".
Whether 07:pressed as the refusal by the Laender of Adonauor's re( uest that
the Peace Treaty be celebrated by school holidays and by the exhibition of
flags on public buildings; whether revealed in newspaper editorials or in
conversations of leading figures, the Peace Contract and its companion in-
struments have led to an outburst of anti-American feelin-g totally out of
proportion to the specific criticism advenced. No indigenous advocate of
the U.S. position has yet appeared. Even Adeeauer and, more m'rl-edly, his
supporters tend to support the Peace Contract as making the best of a bad
situation and advocate its ratification merely because it exists (See F.E.
Adelanuer's interview with l'riedlaender, the T.1ditor of Die eit.). Pnder
these circumstances the ccnseeuences of the Peace Treaty may be totally
different from -hat had been hoped. It is certain that in the Present psy-
chological climate a Ger:lan contribution to the Jet European Defense Force
will be of doubtful usefulness. T.Ihae is the source of this German distrust
of the U.S. e-tencline over all sections of the population and threatening
to ruin the whole German policy of the U.S.?
II.
German criticism of the U.S. focuses on the Peace Treaty, on rearmament
an( on the problem of German unity. 'Specific criticisms teed to vary with
.he interests of the group concerned, but it is fair to state that they are
eencral and are reducible to one underlying cauee: A pervasive distrust
of the U.S.
The criticism of the Pace Contract takes many forms, most of it dir-
ected aeainet the U.S. The decartelization clause is considered by many
an infringement of the very sovereignty the Treaty attempts to reetore. The
industrialists naturally deplore the clause for Obvious reasons. But it is
opposed almost as violently by the SPD as another example of U.cl. encourage-
ment of "reactionary free enterprise capitalism". The provision regarding
the review of sentences of war criminals has aroueed the violent opposition
of veterans' groups. Many individuals who really have a vented interest in
rearmament balk because of this alio-0d slur on the honor of the German army.
The former Glie.7 of Staff of the German High Caonand expressed a general
nttitude to the writer when he stated: "If I am going to be asked about the
staffing of the G-rmanOfficers1 Corp, shall recommend that its personnel
be drawn from the ranks of the lawyers, so that they will knorhow to behave
after The war."
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Teese criticisms may be unreasonable and would probably be much
lees effective had Soviet propaganda not succeeded in stimulating a two-
fold fear: a) that the Peace Treaty perpetuates (or in the words of a
loading FDP politician "eternizes") the division of Germany, and b) that
rmtment will make war inevitable. Soviet propaganda has succeeded in
eh:lc:tins tho onus for the division of Germany on the U.S. The apparent re-
jection of the Soviet proposal for a four-power conference has made ratifi-
cation of the Peace Treaty by tho Bundestag extremely difficult. The pros-
suns for unjfication is powerful and cannot be assuaged by a priori asser-
tions of Soviet bad faith. A lending member of Adenauerts party told this
wr5ter that the bad faith of tho Soviet Union could not have hem better ox-
posed than through a four-power conference; that in his opinion a peace
treaty should havo been advertised ae a last resort not as tho beginning of
a new era in European policies. This is undoubtedly the motiviation behind
the recent advocacy of a four-powor conference by Jacob Kaiser, Adenauerto
Minister for All-German Affairs, who is certainly an ardent anti-Communist.
In an atmosphere which is becoming increasingly inflexible because
of the pressures of both the SPD and extreme right-wing groups the govern-
ment coalition finds its position al]rest untenable if it constantly is forced
to defend itself against charges of being an instrument of the Allies (see
Schumacherls description of Adonauer as Chancellor of the Allies). Much of
the anti-American bitterness of particularly the FDP in duo to their belief
that American policy puts them before impossible alternatives; Either to
leevo the governmont coalition or to vote for unpopular masures ana conmit
political suicide. On tho day of the ratification of the Peace Treaty this
writer dined with the hod cC the Foreign Policy Commission of tin: FDP. He
was greeted by his host with the nerds, 'Why did you do this to us?"
The psychological effect of tho Peace Troaty is further reduced by
the fact that it was tied to a Defense Pact. Even more than in Japan, this
is construed as a form of blackmail, as granting sovereignty to achieve
eeeentiery Ancricen ends in tho U.S. stratogy against Russia. But reerna-
m-Pt is opposed for other reasons as well. The younger gornration is cyni-
c4 and bitter. Having witnessed the collapse of Germany after fighting
e tepolese war for several years, they arc disillusioned and "neutralist".
In conversations with university youth a pacifist strain with religious
overtones appears) net eesily overcome by a leadership with as little
prestige as the present 'Jest German government. Others oppose rearmament
on the basis or military consteerations. They emphasize the indefensibility
of the Elbe, Allied troop dispositions which point to a stand at the Rhino
an to thc futility of fighting 1 rear-guard action which will again leave
Germany tl.ovastod mcl many hostages in Soviet hands.
In. PEL.c.1.11-21e9jeJ P;41.1.P.;te
The ahem?, remarks are perhaps one-sided, The empathies of many, if
not most, Germans are with tho West. But they are not vocal. Their feel-
ings are not organized and however opposed to the Soviet Union, they are
often as distrustful of the U.S., though not as afraid. Tit real dilenma
of the U:S, position in Germany does not derive from the specific complaints
advanced, but from a germ mal leek of confidence in tho U.S. which prevents
the creation of a psychological climate for the execution of integrated,
long-ranee policies and which prevents the Germans from seeing such meas-
ures as the Atlantic Peet in tore of their own interest.
It is, of course, unfortunate Lh-t it should have boon the Peace Con-
tract which became the focal point of the fmustration and resentments
of tho past fifteen years. Perhaps it would. have boon wiser to sign a Peace
Contract only after the failure of a rour-powor conference; to keep the
Pe, ce Contract very short and to leave such details as docartelization and
1,hc disposition of war cririmle for negotiation with a sovereign West
Germany as an implementins instrument of the Peace Contract. Rearmament,
too, would be psychologically much norc meaningful were it negotiated by a
;ov,J cal lent already sovereign, rather than by on seemingly accoptins it as
the price of sovereignty.
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except as ptons of a noro funeamental resentment. Indeed an at-
tempt to meet specific criticisvs by ied hoc measures would probably worsen
ratIler than improve the situation in two ways: a) they would be taken as
CLO..!luf SyllDt0I1 of Amoricen weakness aid encouraeo tho notion that intransi..
nce is the bust bargaining weapon in eealing with the U.S. This seen-
ine weakness would make the Cernens all the more nervous since it would be
interpreted as the reverse side of Soviet streireth. b) Any concessions,
alth, u :h they would remove specific criticisms, would probably raise others
as has proved to be the case throueh the past tour years. They would, if
nnething, increase the existine bitterness by intensifying the prevalent
self-riehteousness and fructration. They would be taken as one more indi-
cation that the U.S. never understands what really moves the German people;
the. it is talking about local instruments while the Germans describe an
his experience.
This Lives v traeic and almost inextricable quality to American-Gorman
relations. The Germans have )xperionced three upheavals in ',.he past thirty
years: the collapse of the Empire, of the Weimar Republic, of Nazi Ger-
many.' The older generation is of a cynicism that knows only one impetus:
to hos by all mens, on the winning side mxt tine. The younger generation
is confused and 'roping. Amoricen invocations of a Communist peril seem to
than all too reminiscent of the propaganda of Geobbels and all too shallow
in terns of their own experience with the Soviet Union.
Germany, too, is just =erring from the shod k of defeat and of denazi-
fication and demilitarization, and from the expulsion of millions of its
cities from East Germany and from economic chaos. Denazification has
created a sense of identi.tication anon many former party members and de-
nazification is ascrned, rightly or wrongly, to the U.S. A leading civil
servant told this writer that up to the American Occupation and his own
imprisonment he had considered the SS sub-human, but that the internment =up
had taught him their qualities. The memory of a period when America was
speaking of "reeducation", of the villainy of German militarism and authori-
tarianisn is still pervasive and is constantly invoked in conversations.
The sudden shift of American policy in 1950 is considered by most Germans
not as magnanimity but as utter cynicism. Above all, the Germans are weary
and almost neurotic and any exhortation is apt to be resented because of
its very existence. The fear id a new ware new bombings, and new occupation
is pervasive.
Americans attonpt to deal with those frustrations with an open-minded
matter,of-factness. They examine the "objective" merit cf individual com-
plaints; more often than not they meet German objections. They speak of
the evils of Connunisn4 but not in terms which mean anything to the Germans--
and, therefore, they compound German bitterress, German self-righteousness
and the feeling that Americans simply are incapable of underetanding. The
editor of a leading German cultural ane political review, a former inmate of
a concentration camp, a man of considerable influence in intellectual cir-
cles told this writers "If an Ame. :ican visits my friends or myself, we al-
ways have a very pleasant conversation. But afterwards we feel like throw-
ing the nearest convenient object against a wall. Pe simply cannot stand
this rGodeanned American good-will, any longer. We would like to talk about
things that novo us, whose solution, I assure you, is not to be achieved by
good will."
It is this feeling of impotent frustration with Americans that accounts
for the present stalemate in Germany. The ratification of the Peace Con-
tract will not remove it; on the contrary, it will intensify it and cause
the election not year to be fought on issues of narrow nationalim and
freedom from subservience to the U.S. One should not count much on the often-
expreseed dislike of the Soviet Union. To be sure, the USSR is disliked,
and even hated, but it is also respected and feared--and this may suffice far
the neutralization of Germany. It is significant that Rener, who in the U.S.
,one called General Clay a petty criminal (Helunko) has not used similar epi-
thets against Soviet commanders?even from the safety of the Western zones.
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of a disdain for the U.S. There has crown up a stereotype e the Aneritan
a3 arreoant, brutal, inconsiderate, without sensibilities an: anlioated by
a s'olllow cynicism. A recent survey by the Institute fur Social-Forschunc
in 1,1c-oL':ort illustrates this noint. A sample of Germans in the Western
zones of Germany were asked to compare the national characteristics cf Ger-
no, Rmsians, and Ara:)ricans on the points mentioned above. In every
inst-nco the Germans were eredictably considered most favorably (least
ar'o,uat, least Lrutelletc.), but surprisin,ly on every point the Americans
appe).red as worse than the Russians. (More people thouc.ht Americans were
brutal or arro :ant, than Russians.)
Another e-:am)le nay be pormissiblo. A loading German intellectual
told the folloyin story to this writer. Durr: the non-fraternization
pond Cardinal Fullhabor met the Connanclin:: General of the U.S. troops
occupying Ilurich and entondod his hand as a oreetiog. The American General
refused to accept it. At the se:to tine, the '25shep of Trier net a French
General. He, too, 0::tended his hand but the French General, obedient to
his orders, refused to shako it. An hcur later, a French civilian visited
the dishop of Trier and daionstr,Avely e:tended his hand. It was the
French Gonord. The story, this writer's acquaintance points out, was apo-
cryphal, ')ut it was plausible. To Ger_ans, he added, would nsver believe
it wore an Lm. lean substituted for the; Frenchman.
Those attitudes are the real source of U.S. dif. iculties in Germany, if
not inXu.-ope. They f-cilitato Soviet propaanda b.lc_un'e they make oven the
most outra-eous abrication poyclolo icclly Dl%usible. The attacks on Gen-
eral Aid,oway as General Microbe may not convince 7urope:,ns that the U.S.
le -nto.:inc; in ,i;erm warfare in Korea. They do add to the picture of an
overbe,rint U.S. buryin't small nations. The lack confidence in the U.S.
Nor ral.es (-von friendly 'ovrnmeLts ,entsytive in their defense of measures they
inwardly aoree to. No in:lioenouc advocates rriL'e to defend U.S. policies
with oven a fraction of the fervor of their critics. This puts the bin-don
of defense soyarely on oroars officially identified with the U.S.: the
Voice of =as Ti America Houses, and American-sponsored public tions
such n.5 the pon?t anC 22ic A6d, in this manner, poncies ouch
as rearmament and the P co4 Treaty are ev-n more clearly labeled as Amelicsn,
net as German, policies and become oven more vninergble.
The Gorman situ-.tion is critical; net because Germany is apt to -o Com-
munist?there is preldc.11y no C.,moer ai this. The real throat is that a
n-tiona:list re cbion fed on a C,o(,matic anti-Aericanism may bring to power
a :overnnen,, which will letn on the USSR to achieve its inlependenoo from
the Uost whrtever i6S idooleical differences. This reverse Titoism is by
no means impossiae ana may be encoura'od by the violent debate the Peace
Contract ane ref.rnament are certain to evoke.
IV- A P5TV:oulP:?icol.P02rcan
The fundamental cause of the dif icultics of the U.S. position in Ger-
many can be suclparized as follows: The U.S. has attempted to create a frame-
work o: le, al relationships and neglected the psyc%oloicc.1 climate which
wotld make these relationships effective. In attontin to do so, the U.S.
has fro, uently acted as if German p-rticio-tion in the Western Defense Com-
munity de:)en,led on its approbation of the U.S. It has consocuently attempted
to meet specific compJaints. The 3ovi,Th'6 Union, on the other hand, has pur-
sued its minimum objective, the neutralization of Germany by emphasizing the
German interests involved/ with little regard for approbation. Indeed, Ger-
man hatred of the Soviet Union may be a Soviet asset/ *ca.. it is based on a
for which paralyzes all action. fly aCvocatim., German unity, by playinc..;
on Thrman fears of rearmament, by ennh. 3izing the devastation of Korea, they
are coeLtin the conditions of a neutralism which seems achievable only by
ol:;)(nition to the U.S.
The U.S. will not be able to remedy its position until it emphasizes ',,he
psycholocical component of its political strate,;y. This is al the more true
as the power to influence events directly is rapidly slipping out of the hands
of the U.S. It shouad be the aim of any U.S. -)sYcholorical effort to create
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indisenous pressures which perellel the main lines of U.S i policies; This
prorem involves a technical and a substantive aspect: a consideration of
the conceptions underlyins U.S. psychological stratosy and a discussion er
its form and content.
American propacanda in Germany has stressed a mass appeal and official
auspices: the Voice of Americas officially sponsored publications, and
isserice Houses. But this inevitably compounds U.S. difficulties. Twelve
years of Nazi rule and seven years of military occupation have left a resi-
due of distrust of the printed word, particularly from official sources. In-
deed the more unofficial the source, the greater is credibility; the more
obscure a rumor, the etronser its impodt. Officially-sponsored publications
moreover suffer from the very inhibitions they attempt to remove; they tend
to reach only those who are already convinced. This di trust of official
sources, in particular those identified with the Occupation, is best re-
vealed by the difficulty faced by former staff members of the Nem. Zeitunss in
finding new employment. The Voice of America asain aims a mass appeal.
Its impact on the opinion-forming sesment of the population seems doubtful.
It is, however, precisely the openion-makins element of the population
(loading intellectuals, political fisuresh, editors, etc.) who are the
source of U.S. difficulties in Germany. It is their distrust of U.S. inten-
tions which creates an atmosphere of risidity for policy makers. This dis-
trust is all the more pervasive because this croup on the whole knows ex-
tremeles little about the U.S. Throusheut his travels this writer met a gur-
prisine number of influential Germans who had had almost no contact with
Americans. It is fair to say that German reaction to U.S. official person-
nel, both HING and Army, is extremely mixed. Typical attitudes wore that
they represented "second-rates" or that they constituted a moans to relieve
unemployment in the U.S. The writer is in no position to pass on the merit
of thee complaints; on the other hand, their existence is an objective fact
of considerable importance.
For those reasons neither official sources nor official personnel arc in
a position to fundamentally a-fect the psychological climate. It is there-
fore important to create a basis of underetandin' on an unofficial basis on
all levels by sendins a few, hishly selected individuals to Germany, to
sive them a "cover" which will permit them to travel widely and to establish
contects. A university, large foundation, newspaper and similar organizations
would seem most suitable. Neny doubts could well be resolved in such a man-
ner and on an unofficial basis; many questions could be answered before they
become political issues. Above all, it is important to engage Germans and
Americens on cooperative projects so that by workins together a con unity of
interests might be created. This could take the form of study groups, cul-
tural congresses, exchange professorships and intern programs, wherever pos-
sible under non-governmental, auspices.
z
Exchange programs are undoubtedly useful. On the other hand, the German
youth would be even more effectively reached through a number of young Amer-
icans strategically placed into key universities. Their selection as of all
personnel for 'slid.= programs should not be on the basis of' paper qualifica-
tions but should stress unCerstandins of German conditions, personality and
inward aliveness. It is, above all, crucial to find individuals who can
assiet in removins the German feeling that America never "understands," that
it is cynically sacrificing weaker nations to its overall purposes.
There exists in Germany a large undercurrent of hatred of the Soviet-
Union kept alive by expellees from Eastern Germany, by former prisoners of
war in Russia and by Russian behavior in :astern Germany. Nevertheless, this
feeling caanot gain expression because it is unorganized and lacks a focus.
It should be possible to encourage German structures to channel these feel-
ings: associations of former war prisoners (probably existing clandestinely
In my case) misht provide excellent vehicles.
There exists also the problem of gaining some influence over veterans
groups. This all the more important because their power is constantly
growing. In this task the army in Germany might help by inviting German
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offiwoyeowpetioarA,N9,4/9xvipeREtP?Aq24Piwp*pqm99,46atinG U.S.
equipment, by inviting someaddressea and similar measures. Many eV these
measures may appear unpalatable. Nevertheless the U.S. hardly has a
choice. If the U.S. does not use these groups, they will be infiltrated
by the Communists.
V. A.P67c1140'ico*PrPgram - ?Ps4N-e.PP0PROP4a ItasurPP
American propaganda in Germany has at various times employed the fol-
lowin-; themes: a) The Soviet danger is exaggerated and German fears are
therefore unfounded. b Soviet bad faith is so self-evident that it need
hardly be discussed. c The Peace Contract and rearmament are logical
concomitants or. "containment," d) The Soviet Union is so strong that the
defense of Europe will be impossible without German divisions and the U.S.
may be forced to abandon Germany without a German Defense contribution.
Almost none of these appeals has proved effective, because they tend
to intensify Cernen fears and leave unanswered the real German doubts.
The German fear of the Soviet Union, born out of historical experience,
cannot be assuaged by propaganda and should be frankly faced. Up to now
it has had a paralyzing effect on German public opinion because the alter-
natives have been incorrectly stated : Either a German defense contribution
and a U.S. defense of Europe or a "neutral Germany" to be perhaps occupied
but not fought over. This has enabled the SIT, the rieht wing group and
Soviet propaganda to play on German tiredness of warp the constant reiter-
ation of which has become increasingly effective. It is clear that this
feel- cannot ce overcome l_ar niniinizinf, the Soviet danger; the Germans know
better--or think they know hotter, which in this case amounts to the same
thing. Nor can it be dealt with by constant exhortations and calling atten-
tion to ;he need for a Carman defense contribution. These exhortations
merely confirm German fears about the weakness of the U.S. and its Gan
impotence vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.
The alternative should be differently posed: Either a German contri-
bution to the defense of Germany and therefore some voice in its destiny
or a defense of Germany, in any cases but as an impotent object of policy.
In his conversations with Germans this writer posed these alternatives in
somewhat the following torus; The najor problem for Germany is not to
avoid war, since that decision will depend on many factors outside Germany's
control, primarily on the Soviet Union's estimate or the existing total
power relationship, The major problem for Germany is to gain some voice in
its deotiny and in case of war some power to affect events. It was not
certain whether Germany could survive another war; but it was quite certain
that it could not slarvive a generation as impotent object of other policy.
This approach always proved extremely effective,
Similarly, it is useleee to defend the Peace Contract and Rearmament
as easy, because "logical" decisions. It would be much wiser to show
some compassion lrith the turmoil Germany is undergoing internally. Ameri-
can officials and American propaganda should state that we are well aware
of German difficulties and hesitations; that the Peace Contract and rearma-
ment are not easy measurosp but that policy cannot wait for the coincidence
of psychological receptivity and historical or political necessity; that Ger-
many's spirituel contribution to the W-st at this stage may well consist of
underooin, this spiritual turmoil and overcoming it. It is said in Germany
that American officials advocate ratification of the Peace Contract to keep
Senator Taft and isolationism from the Presidency. This could hardly con-
stitute a reply to German fears.
The above arguments are obviously desi,ned for the opinion-making seg-
ment of the population. For the majority of the population simple themes
are necessary. The U.S. amid not hose its appeal on the self-evidence aC
Soviet had faith. Rather it should attempt to constantly reiterate it -
not in abstract terms of anti-Comauniet polemic but reinforced by concrete
issues and grievances; treatment of prisoners, expulsions, standard of liv-
ing, etc. These should not be reserved for occasional U.N. sessions but be
constantly kept alive through posters, slogans, nucleus groups, etc. Above
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all, the U.S. should attempt to wrest the initiative in the psychological
struggle from the U.S.S.R. AU advantages in this effort are on the side
of the U.S. German unity should not be permitted to be preempted by the
3oviet Union. If the U.S. appeared as its advocate, much wind would be
'eakm out of the sails of the SPD, right-wing and Soviet propaganda.
Carman youth is still uncommitted. Its skepticism will make it die-
trustful of slogans, but its latent idealism causes it to seek new values
end new commitments. European unity eemrcises a powerful Appeal on the
C-cr-lan youth, though not in the form of economic and military integration.
Here the spiritual unity of the West, advocated by individuals of high
calibre, would provide a valuable focus of psychological efforts; to be
complemented by oreanizational structures outlined above.
On another plane, the billeting procedures of the Army have provided
a constant source of irritation. It hits hardest the very segment of the
population potentially most friendly to the U.S., the middle class. By
taking houses and barring the entry to their owners, the Army is creating
bad feeling totally out of proportion to the importance of bill,ting. An
attempt should be made to have the Amy construct its own billeting facili-
ties which could, after the Occupation, be turned over to the Germans. In
this manner the presence of the Army could be considered a boon, instead
of as at present, a blight.
The above measures represent only an outline of possibilities. No for-
mal statement of a program can guarantee success. This is all the more true
since our difficulties in Germany stem not from had policies, but from
bad timing and not from ill-conceived propaganda but from superficial imple-
mentation. There is no easy recipe for reaining confidence; there is no
technical, pat solution to recapture the initiative in the war of ideas. It
is elear, however, net a new approach is needed in Germany lest the latent
anti-Americanism determines the shape of events and lest Germany be swallowed
up by the Soviet orbit.
Henry A. Kissinger
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