MEMORANDUM TO MR. DULLES FROM FNJ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R003200020018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 28, 1951
• Content Type: FORM

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SEJRI11 WORAId11OK
MEMORANDUM TO: Ift, DULLES ~~P
This paper is scheduled for consideration
by the PSB Alternates at their meeting Friday,
30 November, at 2;30 PM.
I
28 November 1951
(DATE)
NSC review(s) completed.
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 NSC review(s) completed.
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SUMMARY
The attached PSB Staff Study on PUBLICITY WITH RESPECT TO NEW OR
"NOVEL" TYPE WEAPONS, and on the establishmen of a gener procedure for the
re ease of information with respect to novel weapons points out that;
The American people must be kept informed to the broadest extent consistent
with national security. Weapons information which must be kept secret for
security reasons should be kept to an absolute minimum.
Tinting, place of release, and source of any public statements regarding new
-weapons should take into account the effect upon foreign countries,
There is need for a concerted governmental effort to carefully calculate
the desirability of any departure from fact in the release of weapons information.
'Whether indiscriminate statements about atomic and other novel weapons pro-
duce any worthwhile effect on the Kremlin may be doubted, but indiscriminate
statements do produce harmful effects in the free world. Terror cannot be used
effectively by US if it desires to retain moral leadership over free peoples.
US statements on novel weapons must be carefully considered, must be based upon
basic US policies, and must take into account the possible and probable effects
upon critical world audiences.
It is desirable that the Director of PSB be informed in advance of pending
high-level statements,
RECONDATIONS.
APPROVE for issuance to appropriate departments and agencies TABS A, B, and 0.
TAB A is draft interim policy-guidance for high-level statements on
novel weapons. It lists questions that should be answered before releasing informa-
tion; states that content must be chosen with the audience group in mind --
primary audience group is West Germany., France,, Italy and the Middle East, and
statements must be based on the policies indicated in the President's reduction of
armaments speech. Interim guidance listed includes: emphasize peaceful purposes of
novel inventions and that novel weapons are being developed for defensive purposes;
de-emphasize the mass effect of novel weapons; we are for control of novel weapons
and against city bombing in principle., etc,
TAB B is interim policy guidance to reduce the panic effect by repetition;
wide pub:Licity, within security limits., of tactical uses for novel weapons; and
wide pub:icity, in optimistic tones, of the state of our air defenses. It contains
also policy guidance to allay widespread panic tendencies when crisis events occur
where war or peace is in the balance.
TAB C is interim policy guidance for area media treatment - Soviet area,
Satellite peoples., strategic Free-World areas, ancsnon-strategic Asiatic nations.
APPROVE the coordinating mechanism proposed in para. lld., page 7, that is,
const Novel Weapons Information Guidance Committee to continually revise
guidance in light of special cases and changes that take place., and to issue
national policy guidance on novel weapons publicity.
ASSIGN to State Department the task of preparing detailed interim guidance
in conform ty with Tabs A. B, and C.
AUTHORIZE the PSB Director to conduct an evaluation of effects abroad of
public s -a ements on novel weapons., using the facilities of departments and agencies
responsible for the
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PSYCEOLOGICAL TI GY BOVLI1)
I1ASEMIMTOr1, D. Co
PSIS D-17
1114 1 oveu.,ocr 1951
STAFF M MY 01 PII3LICI`17 -a i . PT'CT TO i OVDL i 1 1i'0ir 3
1. To determine basic policy ;uidance for the content of Governmental
statements with respect to tiac existence, developzient of, and contei:plated
purposes of netr or "novel" ti a zrcapons.
2. To establish a -Oneral procedure for the release of information
with respect to novel *.rapons.
DPI!IITIOIT
3. For the purpose of this study, novel weapons are considered to in.
clude all %rewpons usint atonic potrer for propulsion or explosion, 1,uidecl.
missiles, new bioloGical, radioloGiccl anc: che;aical weapons, and any other
novel weapons that nay ap+ ear in the future.
iliyd;YSI
1+. There is need for broad policy -,uldance for all appropriate execu?
tive departrients and aC oncies on the reloa ,e of information reCerdinG near
weapons, based on considered appraisal of the relative advantaees and dis?
advantaGos of the release of a*.1y particular item of information in the
lir,ht of the folloi-rinG f un r ::e","atel 3rinci Ales:
a. Pu'ol-ic res-omi.-i' ilities
The very basil s of our systei:i of ;overnrient requires that the
people riust be kept inforr:ed to the broadest extent consistent with the
national security. .:ch depar taunt and aGency has its out peculiar respans:L-
bilities, saw of which we statutory, for roportin0 to the ConGress and the
people, for justifyinG requests for appropriations, for the advancer.*:ent of
the public welfare, and for otter purposes,
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Security cons ic.era.tions require that certair::,cc jons infor_ .-
tion rnust be kept secret, '.)v t this catCt ory 5.110 .d xV ke't to un abcolute
c. In -tic i"e~ercusaions
The ;resent interaatio:rnl situation requires that the effect
u.,on :VoreiC;a county^ esp iThether allies, neutral or pote.'.tiul ene:..es,
shoulc be taken into a ccouat ,rit : rc and to the tir: place of release.,
and source of any "public striterae: tS ret, 'y+ din- netr Tre,%moi:s,
d. Fact and fant4 B~r
with respect to fact and Conjecture,, or even vela .~erc.te Fantasy,
there is clearly need for a concerted Soveri' ..iental effort to carefull: cal-
culate the cue .irability of any departure fro. i fact in the rcloa:;e of
srev,,,ons i s'ors:.tion in order to ovc:co :e the inevitable coiffusion a-rhicah :e-
sults fror: independent report, denial, inspiration and elaboration by
vVwious officials.
DIO)C USSIgil
i.
The fact of Lie_ican. atoi:-ic superiority tuu oubtcCly has
deterrent effect on Soviet leaders. '?liet_zcr in: iscy ii. rz;tte stater eats about
atonic and other novel weapons produce any ;ort?.t r ale of f ::ct on the Xrer.ilin
flay be doubted.
Such indisc i:::.mute statements do, ho icver, produce har.;f1c'1
effects in the free world mid i?-:node our effor? s to build a lia lthy inter-
national coLmiunity. They :;eahan co at idencc Zrhich Is neec:.cd for recovery.
They encouxaf;e neutralis, ! and stir late the to stay out of the 73ast-
Uest conflict, They ideatify~ the U.S, crith :rar and. destruction and help
Cor: -- nist ppraaa .rnclists to f c:sten the "~sa:'-no zue ~' level on us,
b e totalitarian nation like tae USS r:ay; effectively use terror
as an instru:_zent o nations l 'policy, rut terror cannot be used of iectively
by the U.S. if it desires to retain r:orw.l leadership over the free peoples
and build a better world?
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c. Within the U.S. itself, ill-considered statements about novel
weapons may create a false sense of security, make it difficult to get
support for conventional forces, lead to expectation of miracles in war and
undermine public willingness to face casualties and sacrifice.
d. It follows that U.S. statements on novel weapons must be care-
fully considered, must be based upon basic U.S. policies, and must take into
account the possible and probable effects upon critical world audiences.
We, should Vaerefore seek to exercise a deterrent effect on the
Kremlin by methods as discreet as possible without involving, our national
leaders in a policy of terror.
We should also present information on novel weapons in such ways
that it will strengthen, not shake, the confidence of the free peoples.
THE POLICY BASIS
6. a. Our national objectives, which basic policy guidance must support
(1)
To build a healthy fret-world community capable of its own
defense.
(2)
To deter the USSR from
(a)
(b)
undertaking general war,
undertaking further aggression short of war.
(3)
To reduce Soviet power.
b. More specifically, basic guidance on all armaments must be
governed by the tripartite disarmament proposal made before t'he'UN General
Assembly. The President's speech on this proposal emphasized:
(1) the good faith of our proposal;
(2) the inter-dependence of novel-weapons and conventional
weapon disarament;
(3) our intention to build strength while always continuing actively
to seek the reduction of armaments under propor..safeguardo.
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(4) Responsibility of the Soviet leaders for continued increase
in world armcr:ients.
It is clear that our statements on novel weapons must be consistent with
that proposal. Therefore, all high level statements on novel weapons should
hereafter be consistent with. the four points above. Emphasis should be
varied by the several media to fit specific target audiences, in accordance
with policy guidance to be prepared by the Department of State,
7. Global treatment
a. Before public statements are made on novel woe or_s, these
questions should be answered.
(1) Does the American Congress or public need this information?
(2) Will this information really help doter the Kremlin?
(3) Will this :information strengthen or weaken the morale of
the free world?
(4) Are these weapons inportant enough, and is their completion
date near en(yugh, to justify a statement?
b. High-level statements, as contrasted with media play, have a
global audience. The content must therefore either represent a compromise
between the requirements of different audience groups, or be chosen with the
most critical audience group in mind. The primr.znj audience group is the
strategically important, potentially neutralist group: West Ger:any, France,
Italy, and the Middle East, Additionally, such statements must be based
upon the policies indicated in the President's rec)hiction of arnsrlcnts speech.
c. Taking the above factors into consideration, the following, is
recommended as interin basic guidance:
(1) Er-Zphasize the peaceful purposes of novel inventions, and
the uses to which we are putting then,
(2) Novel weapons are being developed for defensive purposes;
we continue actively to seek ways of reducing armarionts
and controlling armament production.
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(3)
(4)
Novel weapons control and conv&ritiona 1 weapons control
nut go hand in hand.
Do-enphasize the nass effect of novel woayaons and
emphasize the developments in the characteristico of
the weapons permitting greater target selectivity.
(5) We are for control of novel weapons and against city-
boribing in principle, but do not rake statements which
amount to a cornitnent not to use strategic A..bonbing or
which night give Soviet loaders assuranco of izinulity
from strategic attack.
(6) Shift the moral blarie to the Soviet loadersl'.i_i_ , for the
continued uncontrolled development of strategic novel
weapons,
(7) Emphasize that manpower inequalities betwoun the free-
world and Soviet blocs will be greatly ninirlizod by the
devolo1:mont of tactical novel weal ons; and that the free
world can, when these weapons become available, oppose
with novel weapons Carmunist peripheral (cold war)
applications of strength without the need of bring-,in'-', on
general war.
Note: The above guidance is not to be construed as
absolving officials of their responsibility for obtaining
security clearance for statements prepared in'conformity
thereto.
8. Area Media Treatment
Specific areas require special emphasis in media treatment. The
basic effects sought are indicated in Tab C. Department of State should
prepare detailed guidances to achieve these effects.
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9,. The Reduction of Panic Effect
a. Under normal conditions, panic effect is controllable by
adherence to the guidance of paragraph 7, In addition, wide ;-ub? icify in
optimistic tones should be given to the state of our air defenses.
b. When war-crises occur, panic tendencies will probably occur.
A guide to treatment at such times is attached as Tab B.
10. Evaluation
The systematic revision of basic guidance requires continuous
evaluation of the effects abroad of public statel_lents on novel wea;:p:ons,
Such evaluation should be undertaken by the Psycholok cr1 Strategy Board.
11. Mechanisn for Novel;-Wea,-~on Guidance
a. There are at present nany mechanisms for coordinating the
release of information. Nono has, however,, proven adequate for effective
guidance and control of public statements on novel weapons.
b. Policy guidance should be produced by a mechanism which can
take into account the responsibilities of the President and of the heads of
the departments and agencies concerned and which may thus assure the
effective implementation of approved policy. Such a mechanism, furthermore,
should be a continuing medium for timely, constructive policies :lade in on
atmosphere of oarefu:L deliberation of all factors involved insofar as
pos+ible, rather than merely for meeting emergencies or for censorship,
c. Guidance requires ccntinui_~.g revision, to fit:
Special cases.
Changes in the facts about novel weapons,
Changes in security rostrietions.
War-crises?
Basic changes in U.S. policy.
(6) T Mes of novel weapons, A separate guidance for each
may become necessary.
(7) Deception purposes,
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d. There should be constituted a Novel Weapons Information
Guidance Committee to be charged with providing the information indicated
in sub-paragraph c above, as well as with revising, keeping up to date,
and issuing national policy guidance on publicity with respect to novel
weapons. This committee should be chaired by a member from the White
House Staff and should include members from the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, Central. Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, and the
Staff of the Psychological Strategy Board, with the latter member acting
as Executive Secretary. A representative of the Federal Civil Defense
Administration should sit as appropriate with the dommittee for informa-
tion of interest to that agency.
e. Although individuals on the highest level of government are
engaged in operations of world-wide significance the great majority will,
because of immediate pressures, desire, or lack of competent advice, usually
discuss novel weapons in the context of the impact upon the domestic
audience. Statements made for political or budgetary purposes or under the
exhilaration of an audience have been and will continue to be the source
most of the unfortunate effects on our psychological operations. 0
Practice has shown that few individuals can be expected con-
sistently to seek advice from any designated source. No mechanism for clear-
ance of public statements ever has been satisfactory. Consequently, it
should be the constant charge of the Novel Weapons Information Guidance
Committee to remind officials that plans for psychological operations do
exist and that their public statements have an important bearing on those
plans. By this means it may be possible to prevent harmful statements and
to encourage helpful ones.
f. Department of State should prepare detailed policy guidance in
conformity to the PSB guidance included herein or to be issued hereafter.
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g. High-level statements on novel weapons should ho prepared in
conformity to Department of State guidance, It is desirable that the
Director of the Psychological Strategy Board be informed in advance of.
pending high-level statements.
RECOMME 1DAT IONS
12. a, That Tab IAA B. and C be approved for issuance to appropriate
departments and agencios.
b. That the coordinating mechanism recommended in sub-paragraph
11 d above be approved, organizing action to be undertaken by
the PSB staff.
c. That the Department of State be assigned the task of preparing
Tab B
a detailed interim guidance in conformity with Tab A/and Tab C.
d. That the members of PSB authorize the Director to conduct an
evaluation of the effects abroad of public statements with
respect to novel weapons.. using the facilities of the depart-
ments and agencies responsible for the conduct of psycholo;_;ical
operations.
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TAB - A Interim Novel a~21 Policy dance._for .IiLft {ve. State Mrits
1. a. Statements and releases on novel weapons should be held to a
minimum. Before anything is released, these questions should be answered:
(1) Does the American Congress or public need this information?
(2) Will this information really help deter the Kremlin?
(3) Will this information strengthen or weaken the morale of the
free world?
(4) Are these weapons important enough, and is their completion
date near enough, to Justify a statement?
b. High-level statements, as contrasted with media play, have a
global audience. The content must therefore either represent a compromise
between the requirements of different audience -groups, or be chosen with
the most critical audience group in mind. The primary audience r7roup is the
strategically important, potentially neutralist group: West Germany, Dance,
the p.rLddle East,
Italy anc/ Additionally, such statements must be based upon the policies
indicated in the President's reduction of armaments speech.
c. Taking the above factors into consideration, the following con-
stitutes interim basic guidance:
(1) Emphasize the peaceful purposes of novel. inventions, and
the uses to which we are putting them.
(2) Novel weapons are being developed for defensive purposes; we
continue actively to seek ways of reducing armaments and
controlling armament production.
(3) Novel weapons control and conventional weapons control must
o hand in hand.
(4) De-emphasize the mass effect of novel weapons and emphasize
developments in the characteristics of the weapons permitting
greater target selectivity.
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(5) We are for control of novel weapons and against city-bombing
in principle, but do not make statements which (a) euzount to
a commitment riot to use strategic A-bombing, or which (b) might
give Soviet leaders assurance of immunity fro:i strate,ic attack.
(6) Shift the moral blame to the Soviet leadership for the
continued uncontrolled development of strrytegic novel weapons.
(7) EYnphasize that'manpower inequalities between the free-world
and Soviet b,oes will be greatly minimized by the development
of tactical novel weapons; and that the free-world can, when
these weapons become available, oppose with novel weapons
Communist peripheral (cold war) applications of strength
without the need of bringing on general war,
Note: The above guidance is not to be construed as absolving
officials of their responsibility for obtaining; security
clearance for statements prepared in conformity thereto.
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TAB - B Interim Novel Weapons Pclicvv Guidance - The Reduction of Panic Effect
1. a. The panic effect of statements about novel weapons can be
reduced by:
(1) Repetition. This can be accomplished. under policy controls
by authorizing low-level government officials to make
frequent statements, in accordance with national policy
guidance.
(2) Wide publicity, within security limits, of the tactical uses
for novel weapons.
(3) Wide publicity, in optimistic tones, of the state of our air
defenses?
b. The public willlecome accustomed, in nov:,ia]_ periods, to the
fact of novel weapons. However, i,ihen crisis events occur where war or peace
is in the balance, there will probably be widespread panic tendencies which
will have a crippling effect on freedom of policy decision if not controlled.
At such times, high-level statements must be ::lade, which:
(1) Re-assure about the quality of our air defenses (with
secondary deterrent effect on the USSR).
(2) Assure that the USSR will attack only military targets.
(Thus heightening the moral guilt should they violate, while
at the same time reducing panic fear).
(3) Assure !%rest European audiences that defense Plans call for
the selective uscc of novel. weapons in Fast :Europe, for
holding as far to the east as practicable.
(4) Statements which vaguely imply (without commitment) that we
will bomb only military targets, and will use selective weapons
in congested areas.
Note: the above guidance is not to be construed as absolving
officials of their responsibility for obtaining security
clear .nce for statements prepared in conformity thereto.
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TAB - C Interim Novel Weapons Policy Guidance - Area Media Treatment,
1. Soviet Area
a. The pril-rary aim is to deter the Soviet leaders from further
aggression. Presumably the facts of our atomic superiority arc sufficiently
well known to them to provide a serious deterrent. Presumably, too, there
are discreet ways to keep them impressed with our superiority without resort-
ing to broadside statements which do harm in other parts of the world.
b. A secondary aim is to avoid helping the Soviet leaders rally
the Soviet peoples for war. Indiscriminate use of novel i,ior-;on information
(especially if there is any suggestion of gloating over prospective devastation)
may help the Kremlin exact ereater efforts from the people.
c. A third aim is to make the Kremlin responsible in the eyes of
the Soviet peoples for any calamity which may come upon them.
2. Satellite Peonies
a. In general, the satellite peoples want general war as a means
to liberation, and consequently show little tendency to neutralism resulting
from fear of novel weapons. Hate of the regime submerges their fears. As
general War, however, is contrary to our policy, we must not exploit novel
weapons toward this area in the context of bringing; general war nearer,
b. We should not emphasize novel weapons toward the satellites,
except in ways which keep them aware of our growing strength, and particularly
of our vast economic superiority. For this purpose, wo shou'_tl emphasize the
peaceful uses of atomic energy and the scientific rather than military aspects
of other novel weapons.
3. Straterzic Free T,lorld Areas
a. These include:
(1) The leaders and peoples of strategically important,
potentially neutralist areas:
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(a) France, Italy and Western Germany.
(b) The Middle East
(2) The leaders and peoples of strategic but not potentially
neutralist areas:
(a) British Empire
(b) Turkey
(c) The United States
(d) Japan
4. Treatment Toward Strata c Free-World Areas
a, Toward strategic, potentially neutralist areas and strategic not
potentially neutralist areas, the policy problem is similar except in rel-
ative importance. In strategic, potentially neutralist areas. the panic,
depressant effect of psychological involvement regarding novel weapons could
prove a vital factor in causing decisive adverse shifts in the balance of
power. Attitudes existing in this area toward the role of novel weapons
are probably more vital tc our power position than. in either the Soviet
or satellite areas:
(1) because these areas are strater ical.ly vital;
(2) because they will be the scone of active conflict, and
the presumption is therefore that novel weapons will be
used there;
(3)? because present indications are that this territory will
be fought over twice (occupied and liberated).
b. The strategic, but not potentially neutralist areas are important.-
(1) because the visceral effect upon the leaders of knowledge
regarding novel weapons will exacerbate policy differences,
and impose strains of decision-making:
(2) because the confusion and panic tendencies of the peoples
will have distracting policy influence on the leaders.
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5. The basic -~clicy "uida ce for both these aa: as is therefore;
DE-C'i phasize the nags affect': ravel wea ots, and en;thasiZf-
the developnents in the ch~.r .cteristios' of- the w ea- r;nti er ?.ittin; roator
t.,rgot se iectivi:t, ,
be shift the .jorvj'lane to the Soviet leaG?e.?y:Rti.w:3 for the
continued uncontrolled devclol ant o:? strate is novel. 1,'CCQOns,
c. ;~ahasize that : nnpo: er +aequalities UetA*ecn tY e non-Soviet
and. Soviet blocs trill be rectified bj tactical A-weapons and other novel
trewpons; and that the free -v:*orld can now oppose with novel weapons Com,-
nunist peripheral (cold war) applications of strenGths without the, need
of brin[;inw; on ronera,l taax.
6. i on.'6 rato,ic '^:~ic.'~3c rI ~iozss
r ~r.rrrw ati.a...r~.vr~iw
To::ar Asiatic r tians, we should ai at reducing the effects of
the moral Asiatic: ::lz:~itually fin upon us Lr-
we .e)'~`':f ` >? ~.; 'S. r; ;s c iL:.11 " statenen is to hr: n rr yeas re,;ar?J.nC, novel
be ten stateLznts are required, pass W.e use in
ruzrope, a d the lack of strator c turn ets In Asia',
c. ~.:tphasi~inr the ;aeaceful uses of atot:.ic ener;y.
Note: The a .ove 'uidnncc is not to be construed as absolvinG
officials of their: responsibility for obtaining security
clearance for staterionts pre+aared in conforriity thereto.
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