ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET TO EO/DDA FROM LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00101R000100030017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: December 15, 1977
• Content Type: FORM

^ UNCLASSIFIED ~ ~. ~STEONIY ^ CONFIDENTIAL ^ SECRET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
----~:..
FRAM:
EXTENSION
NO.
Legislative Counsel
~ t
~"~'`~
6D15 H
Q
_
-
DATE
15 December 1977
TO: (Officer design ion room number, and
^'"'
building)
R'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
VE~
F~tI~J~D
I LS
ro whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)
1.
7D18 IIQ
~'~
~; r 1~~y
Concerning Title I of t}le
intelligence charter legislation:
2.
Tab A--Far your informa-
tion, acopy of a memorandum
for the record of the meeting
3.
on Title I Monday, I.2 December.
Tab B--For your review, a.
revised draft of our Title z,
4.
reflecting matters resolved at
the Monday meeting.
Tab C---For your review, arx
s.
issues papex listing and
explaining major pxovisz.olxs
_
in Title I and how theca are
6.
addressed in the E.C., the
SSCI draft, the DOD draft and
the DCI draft. It is contem-
~.
plated that this will be sub-
mitted to the I~SC/SCC, pursuant
to the ?rBrzezinski memo" as the
a. __
basis from which the Director
will develop Administration
ositions; we have not
et
p
y
9.
decided whether to include t}le
DOD provisions. Please provide
an
collmlents b
naon F~?id
y
~,
~
l o.
I6 December, sa t is can e
ina~l3zed to go to the SCC.
ff
T
w
our o
ice earlier
as
11.
provided. a copy of the latest
SSCI drafts of Titles I, III
d
12.
an
IV. Please provide your
comments on Title I by COB
Tuesda 13 Decem er. Thank }Tatz~-
13.
ave your comments on the SSCI
material;. many thanks. If you
have any mare, the}T would, of
14.
caurse, be wet me)
ls.
ASSI.S all egls _a Il7'e ounse3
AT
AT
AT
FORM L~ O ~5E PREV or~ec~~E~~leasf~00~~~'~~~~-~DP816-901g1fRAAQ10003~e 7-UNCLASSIFIED
3-62 U EDITIONS U L.1 USE ONLY
 ? :,:. .
. ~~~' ~'-~ ,?`-,?~- ~ ~~~ :)~? 4 December 1977
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Title I, Intelligence Charter Legislation
1. (U/IUO) A meeting was held with the Director, Morning Meeting
participants and other officers from OLC and OGC on Monday:
12 December 1977, to discuss issues relating to the follawing drafts
of Title I of the intelligence charter legislation: the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 18 November 1977 draft, the
Department of Defense 21 November draft and the DCI draft of ?
5 December 1977. After a short briefing comparing significant
aspects of each of these three drafts, various provisions of the DCI
draft were discussed. Following this discussion, and with the
Director's concurrence, the follawing issues were resolved;
a. The DCI draft will not deal specifically with tactical
or departmental intelligence.
b. The DCI draft will address matters relating to the
?'Director of National Intelligence" rather than Director of
Central Intelligence.
c. Insofar as terms in the DCI draft are defined also
in the draft Executive Order, these will be identical.
d. The DCI draft will not specify duties or functions
of the Deputy Director or of the functional Deputy Directors.
Rather, it will direct that these persons will perform such
duties as the Director may from time to time assign ar
delegate, thereby leaving the Director free to assign or
reassign duties, including as between that person primarily
responsible far managing the CIA and the other Deputies,
as he deems necessary and appropriate.
e. Establishment of the "Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence, ?1 incorporated in the 5 December DCI
draft, will be deleted, thereby limiting the Director's
statutory "organizational power base" to the Cllr.. There was
a consensus that the four functional Deputies---tentatively,
the duties of which are envisaged as encompassing NF.(-~C,
Budget, Tasking and Administration--will, as the Director
determines, respond directly to tasking from the Director.
Moreover, it is envisaged that at least two of these functional
Deputies--Administration and NFAC--will wear hats also a.s
heads of corresponding Agency components.
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2m (U/IUC3) Concerning the directives contained in ?the
memorandum frorxa. Dr. Brzezinski of 6 December x.977 placing
with the Director primary responsibility for developing
Administration position on charter legislation, it was agreed that
we will proceed on the assumption that the Director may "redelegatea'
responsibility for pulling together positions on particular portions
of the charter (e. g. , the FBI title) to other departments or agencies
with the primary interest.
3. (U/IUO) Alsa in reference to the Brzezinski xr~emorandum,
it was agreed that the IC Staff, OLC and OGC will jointly develop
DCI positions on charter issues, including the drafting of other
titles. As a first step, we will prepare an issues paper to present
to the SCC for the Director's use in preparing and presenting an
Administration position on ~'itle I. -This paper will identify those
major issues which are either not addressed by the draft F.O, or
are in conflict with the draft Order; it will indicate the xnaxznex? in.
which these are covered in the SSCI and DOD drafts; and it will state
a DCI position on each of these.
4. (U/IUO) It appeared to be the sentiment that we would amend
the 5 December DCI draft to reflect the positions stated in paragraph 1
above, with a view toward making ~t?-ava~able to the SSCI at the
earliest opportunity after sendin~'it to th.i~~SC:C' anr~ nnTl
c ing egis a ive .ounsel
cc: Morning Meeting Participants
STAT
AT
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACT OT? 197$
TITLE I -- INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Tuesday - 13 December 1977
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TITLE I ~- Intelligence Activities
Sec. 101. Statement of Purposes
Sec . 102. Definitions
Sec. 103. Director, Deputy Director cif National Intelligence
and Functional Deputy Directors
Sec. 104. General Authorities and Responsibilities
Sec . 105.. Authorities and Duties of the Director of National
Intelligence
Sec. 106. Requirements Relating to Appropriations for
Intelligence Activities
Sec . 107. Special Activities and Sensitive Collection Operations
Sec . 108. Reporting an Violations; Intelligence Oversight Board
Sec . 109. Reporting to the Congress
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TITLE I - - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
STATEMENT OF PURPOSES
Sec. 101. It is the purpose of this title --
(a) to grant authority and assign responsibility for
intelligence activities to ensure that the Government shall
have the intelligence information and analysis necessary
to make informed decisions regarding the national security
of the United States;
(b) to ensure that intelligence activities of the United
States are properly and effectively directed, regulated,
coordinated, and administered;
~ (c) to authorize and provide effective oversight for special
activities in support of national foreign policy objectives, and
to ensure that such activities are properly approved and
effectively directed;
(d) to provide for the effective oversight of intelligence
activities of the United States , and to ensure that such activities
are conducted in accordance with the Constitution and laws
of the United States; and
(e) to provide for the appointment of a Director, a Deputy
Director of National Intelligence and functional Deputy
Directors, and to establish the authorities and duties of
the Director.
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Sec . 102. As used in this title --
(a) The term "intelligence" includes:
(1) "Foreign intelligence" which means information
relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign
powers, organizations or persons, but not including foreign
counterintelligence except for information on international
terrorist activities; and "
(2) "Foreign counterintelligence," which means
information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against espionage and other clandestine intelligence activities,
sabotage, international terrorist activities or assassinations
conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations
or persons, but not including personnel, physical, document
or communications security programs .
(b) The term "intelligence activity" means any activity
undertaken by an agency within the Intelligence Community
relating to the collection, processing, analysis , production,,
coordination or dissemination of intelligence, and any
activity in support thereof .
(c) The term. "Intelligence Community" means:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) The National Security Agency;
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency;
(4) Offices within the Department of Defense for the
collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through
reconnaissance programs;
(5) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State;
(6) Intelligence elements of the military services;
(7) Intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation;
($) Intelligence elements of the Department of
the Treasury;
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(9) Intelligence elements of the Department of
Energy;
(10) Intelligence elements of the Drug Enforcement
Administration; and
(11) Such other entities as may be engaged in intel-
li.gence activities and as designated by the President in
Executive Order.
(d) The term "international terrorist activity" means
any activity which:
(1) involves:
(i) killing, causing serious bodily harm to,
or kidnapping one or more individuals, or
(ii) violent destruction of property, or
(iii) an attempt or credible threat to commit
acts specified in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) above; and
(2) appears intended to endanger a protectee of the
Secret Service or the Department of State or to further
political,. social or economic goals by:
(i) intimidating or coercing a civilian popu-
lation or any segment thereof,
(ii) influencing the policy of a government
or international organization by intimidation or
coercion, or
(iii) obtaining widespread publicity for a
group or its cause; and
(3) transcends national boundaries in terms of:
(i) the means by which it is accomplished,
(ii) the civilian population, government, or
international organization it appears intended to
coerce or intimidate, or
(iii) the locale in which its perpetrators
operate or seek asylum .
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(e) The term "intelligence sources and methods?Y means
information concerning (1) methods of collecting foreign
intelligence or foreign counterintelligence; (2) sources
of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence,
whether human, technical or other; or (3) methods and
techniques of analysis and evaluation of foreign intelligence
or foreign counterintelligence; regardless of its origin,
that is classified or designated pursuant to the provisions
of a statute or Executive Order, or a regulation or a
rule issued pursuant thereto, as information requiring
a specific degree of protection against unauthorized .
disclosure for reasons of national security ar in the
interests of the security of the intelligence activities of
the United States.
(f) The term "national intelligence?' means intel-
ligence intended primarily to be responsive to the needs
of the President, the National Security Council and other
Executive Branch officials engaged in the formulation.
and execution of national security and foreign relations
policies of the United States, including but not limited
to intelligence collected or produced under the direction
of the Director of National Intelligence by agencies funded
in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. budget.
(g) "National Foreign Intelligence Program" (herein-
after in this title referred to as "NFIP") means:
(1) The programs of the CIA;
(2) The Consolidated Cryptologic Programs, and
the programs of the offices within the Department of Defense
for the collection of specialized national intelligence through
reconnaissance except such elements as the I}irectar of National
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense agree should be excluded;
(3) The elements of the General Defense Intelligence
Program and other programs of agencies within the Intelligence
Community designated by the Director of National Intelligence
and the head of the department as national intelligence activities;
and
(4) Activities of the staff elements of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence;
but not including activities to acquire the intelligence required
for the planning and conduct of tactical operations by the
United States military forces.
4
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~~ e term sense ~.ve intelligence collection operation"
means any intelligence collection activity or activity in
support thereof which the President determines carries a
significant risk of causing serious harm to the national security
or foreign relations of the United States if revealed.
(ij The term "special activity in support of national
foreign policy objectives" means an activity conducted abroad
which is designed to further official United States programs and
policies abroad and which is planned and executed so that the
role of the United States Government is not apparent ar acknowledged
publicly, and functions in support of such activity, but not including
the collection and production of intelligence or related support
functions .
DIRECTOR,, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE AND FUNCTIONAL DEPUTY DIRECTORS
Sec. I03. (a) There shall be a Director of National
Intelligence (hereinafter in this title referred to as
"Director", a Deputy Director of National Intelligence and four
functional Deputy Directors (hereinafter in this title referred
to as "functional Deputy Directors") , all of whom shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate; Provided, that no person may serve
as Director or Deputy Director of National Intelligence for
a period of more than six years unless such person is
reappointed by the President, by and with the consent of the
Senate; and Provided further, that no person who has served
as Director or as Deputy Director of National Intelligence
may be appointed to such position for more than one additional
six-,year term.
(b) The Deputy Director of National Intelligence and
the functional Deputy Directors shall assist the Director
in furtherance of his authorities and duties under this
Act, by performing such functions as the Director may
from time to time assign or delegate. The Deputy Director
of National Intelligence shall act for, and exercise the
powers of the Director in his absence or disability or
in the event of a vacancy in the position of the Director .
The Director shall designate the order in which the
functional Deputy Directors shall act for and perform
the functions of the Director or the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence during the absence or disability of
either the Director or Deputy Director of National Intelligence
ar in the event of vacancies in both of these offices.
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(c e positions of Director and Deputy Director of
National Intelligence shall not be occupied simultaneously
by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether
in an active or retired status; Provided, that at no time
shall more than three of the positions of Director, Deputy
Director of National Intelligence or functional Deputy
Directors be occupied by commissioned officers of
the armed services, whether in an active or retired status.
(d)(1) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces
appointed as Director, Deputy Director of National Intelligence
ar a functional Deputy Director shall, in the performance of the
duties of such position:
(i) be subject to no supervision, cantrol,
restriction or prohibition (military or otherwise)
other than would be applicable if the officer were
a civilian in no way connected with the Department
of Defense, a military department, or the armed
forces of the United States or any component thereof;
and
(ii) possess or exercise no supervision, control,
powers or functions (other than as Director, Deputy
Director of National Intelligence or a functional Deputy
Director) with respect to the Department of Defense,
a military department, or the armed forces of the United
States or any component thereof, or with respect to any
of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this sub-
section, the appointment to the office of Director, Deputy
Director of National Intelligence or a functional Deputy Director
of such officer and his acceptance of and service in such an office,
shall in no way affect any status, office, rank or grade he may
occupy or hold in the armed forces, or any emolument, perquisite,
right, privilege or benefit incident to or arising out of any such
status, office, rank ar grade. Any such officer, while serving
in the office of Director, Deputy Director of National Intelligence
or a functional Deputy Director, shall be compensated from funds
appropriated to the Director, at the rate established for such
position.
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(3) The rank ar grade of any such officer, during
any period such officer occupies the office of Directar,
Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a functianal Deputy
Director, shall be in addition to the numbers and percentages
authorized and appropriated for the military department of
which such officer is a member .
(4) The Director shall be entitled to the same
compensation prescribed by section 5312 of Title 5, United
States Code, for positions at level I of the Executive
Schedule. If a commissioned officer of the armed forces
is serving as Director, he shall be entitled to the difference,
if any, between his regular military compensation (as defined
in section 101(25) of Title 37, United States Gode) and the
compensation prescribed by section 5312 of Title 5 , United
States Code, for positions at level I of the Executive Schedule.
(5) The Deputy Directar of National Intelligence shall
be entitled to the same compensation prescribed by section 5313
of Title 5, United States Code, for positions at level II of the
Executive Schedule. If a commissioned officer of the armed
forces is serving as Deputy Director of National Intelligence,
he shall be entitled to the difference, if any, between his regular
military compensation {as defined in section 101(25) of Title
37, United States Code) and the compensation prescribed by
section 5313 of Title 5, United States Cade, for positions at
level II of the Executive Schedule.
(6) A functional Deputy Director shall be entitled to
the same compensation prescribed by section 5314 of 'T'itle 5,
United States Code, for positions at level III of the Executive
Schedule. If a commissioned officer of the armed forces
is serving as a functianal Deputy Director, he shall be entitled
to the difference, if any, between his regular military com-
pensation (as defined in section 101(25) of Title 37, United
States Code) and the compensation prescribed by section
5314 of Title 5, United States Code, for positions at level
III of the Executive Schedule.
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GENERAL AU'I?IiORITIES AND RESPONSIF3ILITIES
Sec. 104. (a) Subject to the provisions of this Act,
and as provided by this Act, the Director and the agencies
within the Intelligence Community are authorized to engage
in intelligence activities and special activities in support
of national foreign policy objectives, under the direction
of the National Security Council; Provided, that the agencies
within the Intelligence Community shall support the Director
in carrying out his authorities and duties under this title.
(b) Appropriate senior officials of agencies within the
Intelligence Community, in discharging their responsibilities,
shall ensure that all activities for which they are responsible
are carried out in accordance with the Constitution and
laws of the United States.
AUTHORITIES AND DTJTIES OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 105. (a) The Director of National Intelligence, under
the direction of the National Security Council, shall be the
principal intelligence officer of the United States, shall
be the principal adviser to the President and to the National
Security Council on national intelligence, shall provide
the President and other officials in the Executive Branch with
national intelligence, and shall be the principal spokesman
to the Congress for the Intelligence Community.
(b) In carrying out his duties under this Act the Director,
under the direction of the National Security Council, shall
be responsible for the coordination of national. intelligence
activities of the Government.
(c) The Director shall head the Central Intelligence
Agency according to the provisions of this Act, and as head of
the Agency, the Director is authorized to employ such persons
as necessary to fulfill his authorities and duties under this Act.
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(d) It shall be the duty of the Director to collect,
produce, analyze, coordinate and disseminate, within the
Government, national intelligence; Provided, that in carrying
out these duties, the Director shall:
(1) have authority to levy analytical tasks on
agencies within the Intelligence Community;
(2) have authority to levy collection tasks on
agencies within the Intelligence Community to fulfill
requirements and priorities established by the National
Security Council;
(3) develop, consistent with the requirements and
priorities established by the National Security Council,
policies, objectives and other guidance for the Intelligence
Community in anticipation of future national intelligence needs;
(4) promote and direct the development and maintenance
of services of common concern to the Intelligence Community; and
(5) formulate policies with respect to intelligence
arrangements with foreign governments , and coordinate
intelligence relationships between the various agencies within
the Intelligence Community and foreign intelligence or internal
security services of foreign governments;
(6) establish, as appropriate and notwithstanding
the provisions of any other law, committees ar other
advisory groups to assist in the execution of the foregoing
respansibiliti.es .
(e) The Director shall, under the provisions of this Act,
ensure implementation of special activities in support of
national foreign policy objectives and sensitive intelligence
collection operations; Provided, that only the Central
Intelligence Agency may conduct such special activities,
except for the military services in wartime and except
where the President determines the objective of such special
activity is more likely to be achieved by another agency
within the Intelligence Community.
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(f) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the
Director may, in his discretion, terminate the employment
of any officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or
advisable in the interests of the United States, but such
termination shall not affect the right of any such officer
or employee to seek or accept employment elsewhere
in the Government if declared eligible for such employment
by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(g) The Director shall have full and exclusive authority
for approval of the NFIP budget submitted to the President
through the Office of llZanagement and Budget and, after
approval by the President, the Director shall present the
budget to the Congress .
(h) The Director shall be responsible far protecting
intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure,
and shall ensure the development and coordination of programs
which properly protect intelligence sources and methods.
(i) The Director shall, on a continuing basis, review
and evaluate all ongoing and proposed national intelligence
activities and special activities in support of national
foreign policy objectives in order to ensure that such
activities are carried out in accordance with the Constitution
and laws of the United States and with Presidential directives.
(j) The Director shall act as the principal spokesman
for the Intelligence Community to the public on matters
concerning national intelligence .
(k) The Director shall participate with the Attorney
General and the legal officers of the agencies within
the Intelligence Community in the development of pro-
cedures required by this Act and by Executive Order
to be approved by the Attorney General governing the
conduct of intelligence activities .
(1) To assist the Director in the fulfillment of responsibilities
assigned in this section, the heads of all Executive Branch
departments and agencies, in accordance with law and relevant
Attorney General procedures and Executive Orders , shall
give the Director access to all inform.atian relevant to the
intelligence needs of the United States .
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REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO APPROPRIATIONS
FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 106. (a) No funds m2.y be appropriated for any fiscal
year beginning after September 30, 1978, for the purpose of
carrying out any intelligence activity unless such funds
have been previously authorized for such activity by
legislation enacted during the same fiscal year or the two
fiscal years immediately preceding that for which they are
appropriated, except that the foregoing limitation shall not
apply to funds appropriated by any continuing resolution.
(b) The Director is authorized toy
(1) Transfer to and receive from other Government
agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of
Management and Budget, for the performance of any of
the authorities or duties authorized under this title, and
any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to
or receive from the Director such sums without regard
to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers
between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Director
in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the.
purposes and under the authority of this title without regard
to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
(2) Exchange funds without regard to section 543
of Title 31; and
(3) Reimburse other Government agencies for
services or personnel assigned to the Central Intelligence
Agency, and such other Government agencies are authorized,
without regard to provisions of Iaw to the contrary, so
to assign or detail any officer or employee for such duty.
(c) The Director shall establish guidelines under which
proposed reprogramming of funds in the NFIP budget shall
require his prior approval; Provided, that the heads of
each agency within of the Intelligence Community shall
advise the Director of any proposed reprogramming falling
within the guidelines; and Provided further, that the Director
shall review each such proposal and his approval shall be
required for any such reprogramming.
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(d) The Director is authorized to maintain a fund to
be known as the Reserve for Contingencies (hereinafter
in this section referred to as the "Reserve11) and to credit
to the Reserve only such newly appropriated monies as are
specifically appropriated to the Director for the Reserve.
The Director is authorized to expend funds from the
Reserve in any fiscal year for the payment of emergency
and extraordinary expenses incurred in connection
with any intelligence activity or special activity
in support of national foreign policy objectives only if:
(1) the withdrawal of funds from the Reserve
has been previously approved by the Office of Management
and Budget; and
(2) the Appropriations Cornrnittees and the Select
Committees on Intelligence of the House and the Senate
are kept fully and currently informed of all withdrawals;
Provided, that the foregoing shall not be construed as
requiring the approval of any committee of the Congress
prior to the implementation of any such activity.
(e} Any monies in the Reserve sa approved far expenditure
under the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section but not
actually expended for the specific purpose for which approved
shall remain in or revert to the Reserve .
(f) Any activity funded .from the Reserve which continues
after the end of the fiscal year in which such activity was
initiated shall be funded thereafter through the regular
budgetary process at the earliest practicable time.
(g) The Director .may expend funds appropriated to him
for objects of a confidential, extraordinary or emergency
nature, and such expenditures shall be accounted for
solely on the certificate of the Director and every such
certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the
amount certified therein .
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SPECIAL ACTIVITIES AND SENSITIVE
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
Sec. 107. (a) The National Security Council, in con-
junction with the Director of National Intelligence, shall
review and make written recommendations to the President
concerning each special activity in support of national
foreign policy objectives (hereinafter in this section referred
to as "special activity") and each sensitive intelligence col-
lection operation (hereinafter in this section referred
to as "sensitive collection operation") or significant pro-
posed change thereto.
(b) No funds may be expended for any special activity,
or significant change thereto, unless and until the President
has made a written finding that such activity or change
is important to the national security of the United States
and is consistent with the foreign policy goals of the United
States .
REPORTING ON VIOLATIONS; INTELLIGENCE
OVERSIGHT BOARD
Sec. 108. (a) The heads of departments and agencies within
the Intelligence Community and their Inspectors General and
General Counsels shall be responsible for reporting in a timely
manner to the Attorney General and to the Intelligence Oversight
Board established by this section, concerning any intelligence
activity brought to their attention which may be improper or
which may constitute a violation of the Constitution or any law
of the United States, or of any Presidential directive; Provided,
that the Intelligence Oversight Board shall keep the Director
informed of such reporting on matters relating to national
intelligence; and Provided further, that the Attorney General
and the Intelligence Oversight Board shall advise the President
of any such activity which, in their view, constitutes a violation
of the Constitution or any law of the United States; and Provided,
further, that the Attorney General, with due regard to his
investigative and prosecutorial responsibilities, shall report
periodically to the Select Committees on Intelligence of the
House and the Senate concerning activities which have been
reported to the President under this section.
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(b) The heads of departments and agencies within the
Intelligence Community shall formulate and implement, in
consultation with the Director, the Attorney General and
the Intelligence Oversight Board, procedures to discover
and report on intelligence activities that may be improper
or which may constitute violations of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or of any Presidential directive.
(c} Senior officials of agencies within the Intelligence
Community shall report to the Attorney General evidence
of possible violations of Federal criminal law by an
employee of the agency, as well as evidence concerning
such violations by any other person as to those Federal
criminal laws specified in guidelines promulgated by the
Attorney General.
(d) There shall be, under the direction of the President,
an Intelligence Oversight Board (hereinafter in this Section
referred to as the 1?Board") , consisting of three members
appointed by the President from outside the Government;
Provided, that no member of the Board shall have any
financial or contractual relationships with any agency within
the Intelligence Community; and Provided further, that one
member shall be designated by the President as chairman.
(e) The Board shall receive and consider aII reports by
the Attorney General, the heads of any agency within the
Intelligence Community, and the Inspectors General or
General Counsels of any agency within the Intelligence
Community submitted pursuant to paragraph (a) of this
section .
(f) Nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee
of any agency within the Intelligence Community from
reporting any matter described in paragraph (a) of this
section directly to the Attorney General or to the Intelligence
Oversight Board.
(g) The Board is authorized to employ such personnel
as may be necessary to carry out its function under this
section; Provided, that no such person shall have any
financial or contractual relationship with any agency
within the Intelligence Community.
(h) The Board shall, upon the request of any member,
be granted access to all information relevant to any
activity covered by this section in order to carry out
its duties under this Act.
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REPORTING TO THE CONGRESS
Sec. 109. Consistent with all applicable authorities
and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution
upon the Executive and Legislative Branches, and with
due consideration for the duties under law ~to protect
intelligence sources and methods, the Director and heads
of agencies within the Intelligence Community shall:
(a) ILeep the Select Committees an Intelligence
of the House and the Senate fully and currently informed
with respect to intelligence activities, including any signi-
ficant anticipated activities which are the responsibility
of, or engaged in, by such agency; Pravided, that the
Director shall report to the Select Committees an
Intelligence of the House and the Senate in a ti.rn.ely manner
the special activities, and significant changes thereto,
approved by the President; Provided further, that this
does not constitute a condition precedent to the imple-
mentation of any such intelligence activity;
(b) Provide any information or document in the
possession, custody ar control of the agency or person
paid by such department or agency, within the jurisdic-
tion of the Select Committees on Intelligence of the House
or the Senate, upon the request of such Committee; and
(c) Report in a timely fashion to the Select
Committees on Intelligence of the House and the Senate
information relating to intelligence activities that are
illegal or improper and corrective actions that are taken
or planned .
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;~ DEC ~~7~
MAJOR ISSUES RELATING TO TITLE I OF THE CHARTER-
LEGISLATION WHICH ARE IN CONFLICT WITH OR. NOT
ADDRESSED IN THE DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER
(References are to the 18 November 1977 Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Draft Title I, DOD's 22 November 1977 Draft 'l~itle I,
the DCI's 13 December 1977 Draft Title I and the draft revision of
E.O. 11905. }
1. ISSUE: Statutory Director, Deputy Director and Assistant
or Functiona Deputy Directors.
a. E.O. --Not addressed; cannot change present
"Director of Central Intelligence" designation.
b. SSCI--Establishes the positions of Director of
National Inte igence (Level I) and Deputy Director (Level III;
the President may appoint up to five Assistant Directors. AlI
seven of these positions would be subject to Senate confirmation,
The Deputy would assist the Director in carrying out his functions
and would act for and exercise the powers of the Director in his
absence or in the event of a vacancy. The President may transfer-~-
subject to congressional approval--such of the Director's duties
as head of CIA. as he deems appropriate to the Deputy or to any
Assistant(s). There would be a six-year term (with the possibility
of one six-year reappointment) for the Director and Deputy, both
of which positions could not be occupied simultaneously by
military officers. The Director shall B1act as director" of the
CIA.
c. DOD--Similar to provisions in the SSCI draft except:
one and only one of the two positions of Director and Deputy
Director shall be occupied by a military officer; the President
could appoint up to [only] four Assistant Directors; the Director
would "serve as executive head" of the CIA; the Director would.
be Level II and the Deputy Level III,
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d. DCI Position--The Director should be a Level I
appointee and should be given clear authority to "head" the
CIA. There should be a single Deputy Director at Level II
as the Director's alter-ego, and four "functional Deputy
Directors, " at Level III, to assist the Directar as he
deems appropriate (i, e. , no functions or titles specified
in the statute). Since the Director is given certain statutory
duties and authorities, with a Deputy and four functional.
Deputies, he should be able to assign and delegate, and re-
assign and re-delegate, such of his duties and authorities
to these subordinate officers as he deems appropriate in his
discretion. It therefore would be inappropriate and unnecessary
to require by statute a Presidential authorization--subject to
congressional approval--for such "transfer" of duties and
authorities. The title of the Director should be changed to
"Director of National Intelligence. "
a. E. ?. --The Director is given 19 separate authorities
and duties, with several specified included authorities and
duties, to exercise under the direction of the NSC.
b. SSCT--The listing of the Director.'s "authority and
duties" covers eight pages of the draft title. Included, for
example, are provisions that direct the Director to review
and report annually to the President, the NSC and the Congress
on "relationships among the national intelligence activities
and. other intelligence and intelligence-related activities";
to review "on a continuing basis ... all ongoing and proposed
national intelligence activities ... to assure that (they] are
properly, efficiently and effectively directed, regulated,
coordinated and administered" and that they provide the
most cost-efficient intelligence; to 11evaluate on a continuing
basis the quality of national intelligence" and to report to
the Congress thereon; and to ensure that "diverse paints of
view are > .. carefully considered and that differences of
judgment ... are fully expressed ... " in the production of
national intelligence. Moreover, the Director would be
required to report to the Congress, among other things, on
use of his termination authority, on proposed "intelligence"
arrangements with foreign governments, and on proposed special
activities or any "exceptionally sensitive or sensitive clandes-
tine collection project, "and he would have to certify that all
national intelligence activities are being conducted properly and
lawfully. The Director is granted "full and exclusive approval
authority over the annual national intelligence budget, "with
a list of directives to implement this authority.
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c. DOD--The Director is specifically directed to
review national intelligence activities to ensure their pro-
priety and lawfullness, to serve as executive head of the CIA,
to coordinate collection of national intelligence (including
three additional implementing authorities), to coordinate
dissemination of national intelligence (with specified imple-
menting directives) to implement special activities, and to
approve liaison arrangements. The Director is given
responsibility far production of national intelligence analyses
(with several specific further directives). The Director also
"shall prepare and present to the Congress the unified budget
for national intelligence activities. "
d. DCI Position--The Director's duties and authorities
should be c~~early 3e'Iineated in general terms; specific imple-
menting directives and organizational considerations are more
appropriately addressed in Executive Order. Excessive detail
in statute mandates requirements that are unmanageable in
practice, and tends to bring about results not intended by height-
ening the probability that activities not proscribed will be
determined to be unauthorized for want of a specific statutory
authority. The emphasis should be on defining and delimiting the
Director's duties and authorities, the most important of which
are that: (1) the Director shall be the principal intelligence
officer and adviser; (2) the Director shall be responsible for
coordinating national intelligence activities; (3) the Director
shall head the CIA; (4) it shall be the duty of the Director to
collect, produce, analyze and disseminate national intel-
ligence and that, in carrying out this duty, among ether things,
he shall be able to levy analytical and collection tasks, maintain
services of common concern and coordinate liaison relation-
ships with foreign governments; (5) the Director shall ensure
implementation of special activities; (6) the Director shall retain
his existing statutory termination authority without being required
to report to the Congress within a specified time frame an the
exercise thereof; (?} the Director shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods; and (8) the Director shall
have full and exclusive authority far approval of the NFIP budget
submitted to the President through OiV1B. Insofar as these
enumerated authorities and duties are addressed in the draft
E.O. , Title I need not and should not conflict substantively
with the Order. However, since in many respects the charter
and the E.O. serve different functions, or at least approach
issues relating to intelligence activities from different per-
spectives, there will be differences. Thus, far example,
much of the organizational detail in the E.O. need not and
should not be in the charter, the language of which must be
as tightly drativn and precise as possible.
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3. ISSUE: Establishment of specialized committees within the NSC.
a. E.O. --Establishes the Special Coordinating Committee
to review sp cie al activities and sensitive collection operations
and to make recommendations thereon to the President. The SCC
also is tasked with developing policy on national foreign counter-
intelligence activities.
b. SSCI-Establishes the following committees within the
NSC and specifies in detail the manner in which they will carry
out their duties within the respective areas of concern: the Operations
Coordinating Committee (special activities and sensitive collection.
operations), the Counterintelligence Committee and the Communications
Security Committee,
c. DOD--Establishes the Intelligence Coordinating
Committee to review and approve special activities, sensitive
collection operations and sensitive counterintelligence activities.
d. DCI Position--The statute should not direct the
establishment of any specific, named organizations to review
and act on particular categories of authorized activities.
This matter is appropriately addressed in Executive Order;
to do so in law needlessly locks the Executive into a particular
format and procedure. Rather, as in the DCI draft, responsibility
for reviewing and acting on certain categories of activities (i. e. ,
special activities and those collection operations determined by
the President to be specially sensitive) should be placed with the
NSC, leaving the mechanics to Executive Order. This establishes
the appropriate authority and accountability but without interferring
in the President's prerogatives to manage the Executive Branch
within those statutory limits. Further, statutory directives as i.rz
in the SSCI draft as to the material which the various members
(e. g. , the Director and the Attorney General) must provide the
committees, and which the committees must utilize in carrying
out their responsibilities, is unnecessary and would tend to be
extremely burdensome if not unworkable in practice.
4. ISSUE: Restrictions and prohibitions on intelligence activities.
a. E, O. --Places specific restrictions on collection
activities, special activities, experimentation, contracting,
assistance to law enforcement authorities, personnel assigned
to other agencies, indirect participation in prohibited activities,
assassination and dissemination and storage of information.
b. SSCI--Places restrictions on relationships with foreign
governments, use of individuals following religious vocations,
Government grantees and journalists, use of persons as com-
batants in foreign countries, covert military assistance,
certain forms of special activities, and assassination.
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c. DOD--Reserves provisions on restrictions and
prohibitions for inclusion in another title.
d. DCI Position--Restrictions and prohibitions should
not be inc u e in . it e I, which concerns grants of authority
and the structure for the Government's intelligence capability.
In whichever title they are included, the restrictions and
prohibitions should be clearly delineated, should not preclude
voluntary relationships between the Government and other
persons or entities, and should nat attempt to deal with
matters concerning the laws of other countries.
5. ISSUEe Appropriations for intelligence activities.
ao E.O. --Does not address.
b. SSCI--Requires that funds for national intelligence
activities i~ e authorized by legislation before appropriation.
The Select Committees on Intelligence of the House and the
Senate will recommend annually to their respective Houses
what information regarding intelligence appropriations
should be made public.
c. DOD--Requires that no funds for national intelligence
activities may~ae appropriated unless authorized by legislatian.
The funds will be authorized "in a single specified amount, without
further limitation. " The President is directed to make public
such "information regarding the total amount appropriated and
expended ... to the extent required by the Constitution and laws
of the United States. "
d, DCI Position--'The charter inay provide that no funds
for intelligence activities may be appropriated unless previously
authorized. The legislatian, however, should not direct that
any portion of the funds so authorized shall be made public
either specifically, subject to interpretation of any Constitutional
or legal requirements, or as determined by the Congress.
6. ISSUE: Reprogramming of funds.
a. E, O. --Grants the Director "full and exclusive authority
for reprogramming" NFIP funds, subject to OMB guidelines,
appropriate consultation with the heads of affected agencies
and the Congress, and Presidential review.
b? SSCI--Similar to provisions in the Executive Order.
c. DOD--Directs only that reprogramming "or a transfer
of funds to or from" an agency within the IC in an amount over
$2 million must be "in accordance tivith law and on the approval
of the Director and the head of the department or agency to
which the funds were appropriated. "
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d. DCI Position--The Director should be authorized to
reprogram and shoul~be directed to establish guidelines under
tivhich proposed reprogramming require his prior approval.
Meads of other agencies should be directed to advise the
Director of proposed reprogramming within such guidelines
and to obtain his approval,
7. ISSUE: Reserve for Contingencies.
a. E.O. --Does not address.
b. SSCI-Authorizes the Director to establish a
"Contingency~eserve Fund" to which may be credited only
such sums as are 11specifically appropriated to the Director"
for it. Expenditures of funds from the Reserve by the Director
are subject to: prior approval by O1VIB; prior notification to
the intelligence committees of Congress (with a "48-hour-after"
exemption for "extraordinary circumstances"); being used only
for requirements not anticipated at the time the budget was
submitted to the Congress; being used solely for purposes
requiring protection against disclosure; and being used only for
la~~vful activities. There are additional limitations on returning
monies to the fund and on post-expenditure budgeting.
c. DOD--Authorizes the Director to establish a
"Contingency Reserve Fund, "under guidelines similar to
Chase in the SSCI draft, except there are no provisions for
prior congressional notification or. for prior OMB approval.
d. DCI Position--The Director should be authorized to
maintain a Reserve for Contingencies, " to credit to it such
newly appropriated funds as are so specifically appropriated,
and to expend funds from the Reserve for emergency and
extraordinary expenses relating to an intelligence or special
activity. Such expenditure should be subject only to: OMB
approval; keeping the intelligence committees of the Congress
"fully and currently informed of all withdrawals "; unexpended
funds remaining in ar reverting to the Reserve; and subsequent
budgetary process treatment for continuing activities.
8. ISSUE: Expenditure of funds for intelligence activities of
an extrao~nary or emergency nature accounted for solely on the
certificate of the Director.
a. E. O. --Does not address.
b. SSCI--Contains such authority, subject to the proviso
that such expenditures shall be expended only for lawful activities.
The Director would report to the Congress quarterly on use of
this authority.
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c. DOD--Contains such an authorization, but limited
to 01amounts .. , appropriated to the Director for such purpose. ?'
The authority could only be exercised to carry out lawful
activities.
d. DCI Position--The Director?s authority should be that
currently provic ed Ln section S(b) of the CIA Act of 1949 as
regards sums made available to the Agency. The proviso that
such expenditures shall be limited to lawful activities is not
objectionable but is unnecessary. The intelligence committees
of the Congress currently may, pursuant to their existing juris-
diction, obtain appropriate information regarding the Director's
use of this authority, and a particular manner or time frame for
such reporting should not be made a matter of statutor. y directive,
9. ISSUE: Comptroller General audit and review of national
intelligence funds and activities.
a. E.O. --Not addressed.
b. SSCI--Provides that appropriated natianal intelligence
funds and activities "shall be subject to financial and program
management audit and review b~ the Comptroller General, "
under "such security standards ' as prescribed by the Director
and the oversight committees. An exemption from such
review would be available only upon determination by the
Director that exemption is 11essential to protect the security
of the United States"; the Director would be required to
report to the Congress as to each such exemption.
c. DOD--Provides that "all funds appropriated to the
Director' i. e. , not agencies within the IC) for "national
intelligence activities, and information relating thereto" shall
be subject to Comptroller General audit and review, under faint
Director-congressional security standards. The draft provides an
exemption similar to that in the SSCI draft.
d. DCI Position--Intelligence funds and activities,
necessari y i~ evolving as they do extremely sensitive intelligence
information, should be subject to statutorily-directed outside audit
and review only under directive of the intelligence oversight
committees and subject to strict security standards as provided
by the Director. There should be a proviso that certain funds or
activities may be exempt from such review if necessary to protect
specially sensitive intelligence activities.
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10. ISSUE: Intelligence relationships with foreign governments
and service
a. E.O. --The Director is directed to promote "services
of common concern bey designated foreign intelligence organiza-
tions an behalf of the ' IC, to formulate intelligence arrange-
ments with foreign governments, and to coordinate relation-
ships between the IC and foreign services.
b. SSCI--The Director is directed to "formulate, as
appropriate-~rpalicies on intelligence arrangements with
foreign governments, and to "be responsible for all relation-
ships between" the IC and foreign services. The Director,
however, must transmit to the oversight committees of the
Congress texts of any proposed arrangements prior to their
being entered into.
c. DOD--Arrangements between the IC and foreign
intelligence or security services are subject to approval
by the Director.
d. DCI Position--The Directorrs responsibilities in
the area ogre at~.ons ips with foreign governments and
services should be provided as in the E, O. ; in other words,
the Director should be charged with promoting and imple-
menting services of common concern with foreign entities,
and he should have a clear directive that he formulate and
coordinate such arrangements. Reporting to the congressional
oversight committees should not require, by statute, that
texts of all such arrangements be so transmitted. The charter
should provide that, in lieu of reporting to the Congress of
international agreements pursuant to the Case-Zablacki Act,
reporting of intelligence agreements should be only to the
intelligence oversight committees. Requiring, by statute,
reporting the texts of all arrangements, however, raises serious
questions concerning the prerogatives of the Executive in
this area, could have a serious negative impact on the
willingness of foreign services or governments to deal with
us, and, of course, would involve proliferation of sensitive
intelligence sources and methods.
11. ISSUE: Reporting of Violations.
a. E.O. --The Intelligence Oversight Board is established
to receive consider reports on intelligence and counterintelligence
activities that raise questions of legality of propriety. The Board's
primary reporting responsibility is to the President and the Attorney
General. Inspectors General and General Counsels of agencies
within the IC are assigned responsibilities to receive and transmit
to the IOB reports on possible illegal ar improper activities. The
Attorney General's responsibilities in this area run to receiving
reports from the IOB and reporting to the President and the IOB.
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b. SSCI--The principal Executive Branch entity
responsible for reviewing and reporting on possible viola-
tions is the IOB, with responsibility to report to the
President, the Attorney General, the Director and heads
of agencies within the IC. The Director, the Attorney
General and the heads of agencies within the Community
are assigned responsibilities for ensuring that violations
are discovered and reported on. Further, the Director is
required to regularly (but at least annually) notify IC
employees of their obligations to report on possible viola-
tions, and to report annually to the oversight committees
a certification as to the lawfulness of national intelligence
activities.
c. DOD--Establishes the IOB with general x?eview and
reporting responsibilities to the President on activities it
finds to be violative of the Constitution or laws of the U. S.
or of Presidential directive or order.
d. DCI Position--Establish the IOB to receive and
review reports from t e Attorney General, heads of agencies
within the IC and Inspectors General and General Counsels
of such agencies as to activities that may be unlawful or
improper. The Attorney General and the IOB should be
directed to inform the President of activities which they find
to be unlawful or improper. The Board should keep the
Directar informed of its findings, and the Attorney General,
with due regard for his investigative and prosecutorial
responsibilities, should be directed to keep the oversight
committees informed of findings reported to the President.
Care should be taken so that any reporting to the Congress
is not in conflict with Executive Branch investigative and
prosecutorial authorities and duties. Generally, the
mechanics whereby possible violations of law or Presidential
directive ar order are reviewed and reported on should be
dealt with in Executive Order rather than statute. Moreover,
there is no need to require by statute, as the SSCI draft would
do, that the Director go through the motions of informing and
reinforming IC employees of their duty to report violations.
Nor is there a need to provide by statute that the Director certify
each year that intelligence activities are lawful, since he and other
agency heads would be made statutorily responsible for ensuring
this, checked, of course, by the violations-reporting provisions.
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12~ ISSUE: Reporting to the Congress.
a. E, O. --The Director and heads of agencies within the
IC are tasked with keeping the intelligence oversight committees
fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence
activities, and with reporting to the committees in a timely
manner on violations. All reporting would be subject to the
provisos that such reporting is nat a condition precedent to
implementation of intelligence activities, and that reporting
will be consistent with the respective authorities and duties
of the Executive and Legislative Branches.
b. SSCI--In addition to particular reporting requirements
contained,'~or example, in those sections dealing with the
Director's exercise of termination authority, with relation-
ships with foreign governments and services and with viola-
tions (see paragraphs 2, 10 and 11 above), the Director is
charged with keeping the oversight committees "fully and
currently informed of all national intelligence activities. "
This duty is subject only to the proviso that such reporting
does "not constitute a condition precedent ... " The Director
shall also provide annual reports to the Congress.
c. DOD--The Director's responsibility for keeping the
oversight committees fully and currently informed is similar
to that in the SSCI draft. The Director is required also to
notify the committees 72 hours in advance of undertaking any
special activity subject to Intelligence Coordination Committee
approval, and in advance of Contingency Reserve expenditures
(there is a "48-hoar-after" exception based on Presidential
certification). The Director is required further to notify
the committees 60 days in advance of concluding arrangements
with foreign services and in advance of destruction of records.
The Director reports annually to the oversight committees on
national intelligence activities so designated, on extraordinary
or emergency expenditures, on activities exempted from
Comptroller General audit or review, and on matters relating
to advisory committees.
d. DCI Position--The general provision on keeping the
Congress ful y and currently informed on intelligence activities
should be consistent tivith that in the Executive Order. As to
reporting on particular exercises of authority, such as termina-
tion of employees, arrangements with foreign governrrients or
services, and violations, it is generally preferred that these
not be specified in statute. If they are, however, the provisions
should be such that they do not require notification or reporting
on a specified timetable. 1~Ioreover, such requirements should
be consistent with the respective authorities and prerogatives of
the two Branches of Government and with the practical needs of
the Government's intelligence capability (e. g. , the willingness
of foreign governments and services to deal with the CLA in the
face of a statute requiring prior congressional approval of the
texts of any and all intelligence arrangements).
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Approved'For Rele ?~~b~
MEMORANDLINI FOR: Legislative Counsel
FRAM Michael J. Malanick
Acting Deputy Director for Administration
i 77-4~~5 ~~/I
~ 2 DEC 1977
SUBJECT DDA Comments on Proposed Charter Legislation ~-
Titles I, III and IV
1. Since it is probably purposeful that the legislation goes
into such infinite detail, we must be sure that we possess sufficient
authorities to conduct our business. We must also ensure that organi-
zational responsibilities and authorities are precise. In line with
this, it appears that the definitions of some key terms need cla.rifi.--
cation. We will indicate specific examples in our narrative. More
importantly, so many authorities have been left out of 'T'itle IV that
we c{uestion the usefulness of working from this draft.
2. The following comments represent the salient points raised
in our review of the proposals. For your information though we have
included the individual submissions from the commenting DDA offices.
Please be sure to review these background papers since they contain
additional information. and supporting data on specific provisions of
the proposals.
3. Title I
a. Section 102, page 2. The Statement of Findings is un-
necessary. Anew statute should focus on the future and let the
abuses of the past be forgotten.
b. Section 10 ~ page 4. The definitions:
"Intelligence CoTrnnunity" (1) includes DL:A thus confusing
foreign intelligence and law enforcement.
-- "special activity" (16) should be changed to "covert
activity" t}~.ro~zghout the law in order to clarify just
what kind. of activities are meant.
~~ ~"~ DD/A Fte;,i~try
~t '~nn ~nn~nna~_~ a ---~
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?i:~:?: :~. :~
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- "counterintelligence" (5) should be expanded to cover
information pertaining to foreign entities or inter-
national entities.
- "international terrorist activity" (22) subsection (B)
should include that such activity is intended to fur-
ther military goals in addition to those goals cited.
c. Section 105(b)~~age 10. The Quotation "executive and
legislative branches" makes the Intelligence Co~tnnunity a joint
service of two branches of the Government rather than a service
of the Executive.
d. Section 107(e)(2), pale 15. The language regarding the
dual role o- the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of CIA needs clarification.
e. Section 107(17), pale 18. The language regarding counter-
intelligence needs to be mare exact. }'that this paragraph says is
that the Director of National Intelligence will coordinate with
the Attorney General on counterintelligence activities in the U.S.
f. Section 107(20), page 18. This paragraph calls for
notifying the committees 30 days in advance of any agreement,
arrangement or understanding with a foreign liaison service.
Many liaison services will prefer not to deal with Lis if this
provision is retained in the legislation.
g. Section 107 C29), page 20.
This would require notification by the Director to the
"appropriate committees of Congress" of every termination deci-
sion. Is "in a timely manner" intended to be prior notification
or subsequent to the termination action.
'This section would be complicated by the appointment of
a separate Director of National Intelligence and Director of CIA.
It would result in the Director of CIA with appointment authority
but no termination authority.
h. Section 112 ~)(B), page 28. We believe the drafters in-
tended that the word "ancl" be placed at the end of each of these
paragraphs to clarify the meaning of the section.
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i. Section 113(j), page 37. R'e think that the term "Intelli-
gence Community" should be substituted for "Central Intelligence
Agency" to reflect that the Operations Coordinating Committee
should be reporting on all foreign intelligence activities within
the United States conducted by the entire community.
j. Section 115(x) 1), page 39. The exact meaning of a "fu11-
time religious vocation" needs to be clarified.
k. Section 123 (i) (1) ~A) , pale 61 and Sectian 123 (i) (2) (C) ,
~a_~e 62. The Director's responsibility to report any lllegaliti.es
should extend to all employees of the Intelligence Community and
not just the CIA or Office of the Director.
1. Section 123(m)z page 63. Does this provision for trans-
mission of copies of regulatory issuances apply to all levels of
published instructions?
m. Section 123(p}, page 64. ~'Je find the requirement for all
Intelligence Community agencies to notify the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress of their intent to perform routine file
destruction unrealistic. Records Control Schedules are approved
for all agencies by the Archivist yin accordance with paragraph 33,
'T'itle 44 of the U.S, Code.
4. `T'here appears to be a serious conflict in the authorities of
the CIA and NSA in the area of communications security support.
Section 324(4) of Title III (page 57) specifies that
unique communications security methods and procedures must be
reviewed by the Director of NSA. This will mean that we must
submit to NSA our support plans for clandestine collection and
counterintelligence activities. In addition, Section 306(a}(15)
(page 12) requires NSA review of the CIA communications security
budget and resource allocations. Section 313(j} (page 32) requires
NSA to submit an annual report to Congress on all communications
activities of the U.S. Despite the non-contravention clause of
Sectian 324(d), we feel strongly that the Agency should seek an
exception to the provisions of Title III i.n the conduct of clan-
destine communications or at least clarification of the CIA's
role in this area.
a. Since the proposed legislation is drafted in substantial
detail, we assume the intent is to cover all Agency functions.
If so, the legislation should be expanded to include performance
of the supply function, i.e., the operation of depots and disposal.
of surplus personal property to foreir;n sources. The language
regarding property funding seems to preclude us:i.l~g proprietary
assets to establish. a. new entit~~ should an ex.isti.n~ proprietary
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be liquidated for security reasons. Also, the language on multi-
year funding seems to preclude utilization of lapsed funds for
change orders to multi-Near construction projects.
b. There appears to be a significant omission of any provi-
sion for our Headquarters medical facility, although stac}~ opera-
tion overseas is provided for in Section 417(11), pave 36. We
suggest the exact language for our total health care program be
lifted from the draft legislation to amend chapter 79 of Title 5,
U.S. Code which was prepared by the Interagency Coirnnittee on
Overseas Benefits and .Allowances.
c. Another oversight in Title IV seems to be the lack of
authorization for the training of CIA personnel although provi-
sion is made far GIA training of DOD personnel.
d. There is no provision far domestic ~txavel or assignments;
and, our most fundamental overseas benefit, housing, is pat men-
tioned.
e. Section 405(a~,~age 5. While this Title establishes
the position of Director of CIA as "Head of the Agency," Section
107 (e) of 'T'itle I states that the Director of National Intelli-
gence shall act as Director of CIA. This conflict needs to be
resolved.
f. Section 405 ~d)~~age 6. This provision for compensation.
to the DCI and DDCI from appropriated funds is different from
current la4v. We presume salary becomes a reimbursable item if
one is an active duty military officer.
g. Section 406(c), pie 10. This paragraph does not take
into account activities of the Office of Security to detect
penetrations of the Agency or its contractors. Under this pro-
vision we tivould be required to get Attorney General approval
before each such counterintelligence review.
h. Section 407 (a) ~ (c) , pagers 12 ~ 13. tiVe asstnne the dotian-
grading of the Inspector General and the General Counsel from
Level IV to Level V of the I?xecut-ive schedule was inadvertent.
i.. Section 407(c)(1)~ 2), pale 13. This provision seems to
require the Agency to get Congressional approval for an}~ new
Fxecuti.ve schedule or supergracle positions after the effective
date of this Title.
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j. Section 408(3),~a~e 14 and Section 408(c), pale 16.
There is no provision authorizing CIA to detail, loan or assign
CIA employees to other agencies ar departments.
k. Section 408 4), pale 14. We suggest the wording on the
power to carry firearms be replaced with the language which OLC
has fortivarded to ONNIB as separate legislation:
"(4) authorize...undergoing authorized training."
1. Section 408(-6~ Lp~e 15.
This would limit the DCI's authority to promote or appoint
to GS-18 and below. Clarification is necessary as to whe-then
authority will continue to pay officers in positions at levels
higher than GS-18 who are included in those positions authorized
for transfer to the Agency under Section 407 of the Act.
If the DCI is a different person than the DNI he will be
a "Head of Agency" without the normal authorities sl.ncr--. Title I
provides those authorities to the DNI tiaho "shall also act as the
Director of the CIA."
m. Section 411(d), page 22. For purposes of clarity we be-
lieve the first line here should read "The Director shall furnish
any official information ar material...."
n. Section 416(a)~ page 32. We would like to see the portion
from."...in a manner which results in injury to or seriously
jeopardizes the safety of such officer or employee, or as could
reasonably have been expected to result in injury to or jeopardize
the safety of such officer or employee...." deleted. The knowing
disclosure itself should be grounds for punishment.
o. Section 417, pages 33-43. Rather than repeat here the
numerous comments and questions raised by this section on "Travel
Related Expenses, and Death Gratuities far Certain Agency Per-
sonnel," we call your attention to the Office of Personnel
submission. See particularly pages 3 through 7. Their thorough
analysis of this section seems to indicate that the drafters need
to be more familiar with the practices the Agency follows in this
area. Generally, our policy is based on that of the State Depart-
ment. Perhaps a briefing by appropriate Agency personnel would be
helpful; ar, perhaps a closer working arrangement between the
d~r~afters and Agency personnel could be established.
Ivticha.e~_ J. Malanick
.ittachlnents
Comments by OC, OI?P, CL, OP CS 0'I'R F~ SSA
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