SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM 'VOYENNAYA MYSL',' NO 9, SEPTEMBER 1963

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: July 14, 1966
• Content Type: TRANS

 OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430,hE Street, N. W.
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FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
TRANSLATION
 pprove
SELECTED TRANSLATIONS FROM VOYENNAYA MYSL'',
Issue No 9, September 1963
Voyennaya Mysl' (Military Thought) is a monthly organ
of the USSR Ministry of Defense, printed by the ministry's
Military Publishing Howse, Moscow. The articles translated
herein are from Issue- No 9, September 1963.
TABLE OF C014TENTS
Page
Tasks of Military Historical Work in the Armed
Forces Resulting From the Decisions of the
June Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU,
by Mar SU S. Biryuzov
Maneuver in Operations and in Combat,
by Col I. Vorob'yev
19
Operations Research, by Engr-Lt Col Yu. Gusev
31
Shortwave Radio Communications and Methods
of Improving Stability 42
On the Question of Troop Leadership, by
Army Gen V. Kurasov 51
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 App rove 4' R1tQ@y01i&48AT7Q
(JJD 'SUM' OF.i:'.QiE^C 11L'C ITZTEgCCBBU
,CPYRGHT
by Mar SU S. Biryuzov
%%NJ0020-4
The June Plenum of the CC CPSU occupies a special place among
the most important actions of the CPSU directed at placing into ef-
fect the grand program of the building of communism.
The grandiose successes of our Motherland in the fields of
economic, political and military development and the steadily grow-
ing power of the entire socialist camp leave for the imperialists
no further hopes or prospects for a victory over the socialist order
either by military force or in economic competition. Therefore the
ruling circles of the imperialist powers are now gambling chiefly
on disrupting the socialist camp from within by poisoning the minds
of the popular masses with corrupt bourgeois ideology and by under-
mining the faith of the people in the achievement of the ultimate
goals of communism, on whose banner shine like a guiding star the
exciting words of our party's Programs Peace, Labor, Freedom,
Equality, Brotherhood and Happiness of all peoples on Earth.
With this aim the bosses of imperialism, using the mercenar-
iness of scientists, literary and art workers of the bourgeois world,
invent new methods of idelogical diversion; intensively mobilize the
means of psychological warfare in an attempt to "cut into the very
heart of communist ideology"; attempt to penetrate socialist coun-
tries, shake the foundations of the new order, and interfere with
the further spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism in order to.
maintain their positions and put off the inevitable fate of the ex-
ploiting society. "Psychological warfare", said L. F. Il'ichev in
a report to the Plenum, "has been elevated by imperialism to the
rank of government policy."
Thus under present conditions the ideological front has been
transformed into one of the decisive factors in the struggle for the
victory of communism. This situation predetermined the exceptional
significance of the June Plenum of the CC CPSU, at which a whole
series.of questions of ideological work were subjected to broad dis-
cuszion and specific steps for its further development and improve-
ment were examined and approved.
The June Plenum of the CC CPSU and its decisions were the
greatest event in the ideal political life of the party and coun-
try. The idea of irreconcilability with bourgeois ideology in all
its forms and manifestations is emphasized throughout all the
Plenum's work. Proceeding from the decisions of the 22nd Congress
and the party Program, the Plenum determined the basic directions
and specific tasks in the field of communist education of the workers.
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Instilling in people a love for the socialist Motherland and
the great Leninist party is one of the main and most important tasks
of ideological work stemming from the decisions of the June Plenum
of the CC CPSU.
Plenum decisions also have a direct relationship to the Soviet
Armed Forces.
Strengthening the security of our Motherland and the might of
the Army and Navy is a vital task for all our people. It is for
this very reason, organizing and strengthening the common front of
ideological work of the party and decisively crushing the attempts
at ideological diversions on the part of the imperialists, that it
is necessary to constantly improve in every possible way the mili--
tary-patriotic education of personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy.
It is known that the might of our Armed Forces is based not
only on first-class military equipment, but also primarily on the
people in whose hands this equipment is placed. The further improve-
ment of ideological work in accordance with the requirements of the
June Plenum of the CC CPSU, the rise in moral combat qualities of
Soviet Armed Forces personnel, their education in the best traditions
of the heroic past of our people, the development of a sense of
international duty and of devotion to the Motherland and party --
this is the specific path for placing into effect the decisions of
the June Plenum of the CC CPSU.
In light of the decisions by the 20th and 22nd CPSU Con-
gresses and also by the June Plenum of the CC of our party, military
historic work in the Armed Forces has taken on great meaning. And
this is quite proper if we consider that military history, as an
inalienable part of Soviet historical science, becomes in present
times one of the most important elements in the overall system of
ideological work by our party.
It will be no exaggeration to state that the brightest pages
of Soviet history are closely connected with long years of struggle
of the peoples of our Motherland against foreign usurpers, i.e. with
military history and with the history of the Soviet Armed Forces.
In the course of this struggle the socialist government accumulated
an enormous amount of experience obtained at the cost of the lives
of millions of Soviet people and colossal material expenditures.
There will remain unforgotten in the hearts of generations the hero-
ism and courage and the grand love for the Motherland displayed by
our people in the defense of the country of socialism against exter-
nal and internal enemies.
The heroic past of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces has
been recorded in world history in golden letters. In addition it
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serves as a powerful means of educating and forming a new person --
it builder of comnr~e-tist society. Therefore it is not by chance that
the Communist Party, following the advice of V. I. Lenin, devotes
over greater, ai,te-.n.t.ion to the deep and thorough study of the uccu--
mulated experience of the struggle of the Soviet people and to the
wide propaganda of this experience for the purpose of instilling in
the Soviet people a spirit of patriotism, and proletarian intcrnatiorn-?
all:m, and for the purpose of a general strengthening of the military
might of our government and of all countries of the socialist camp.
We canaot forget in this regard the remarkable words of Nikita
Sergeyevich Khrushchev in his address to the Soviet youth: "And we
would like to advise our young peoples learn from the history of
the revolution and from the history of the struggle in which your
fathers and mothers took part, hold sacred the memory of those no
longer, living and be respectful to those who are still living; take
from them into your own hands as armament, everything, so that you
will be worthy people, worthy perpetuators; of the affairs of your
fathers." For us, soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy, the appeal
of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces N. S. Khrushchev has a
special meaning. It expresses the constant concern of the head of
the Soviet gover,unent about the steady strengthening of the defcn-
sive capabilities of the first country of socialism in the world.
Truly, the more thoroughly the defenders of the Motherland gain the
military experience obtained in past encounters with the enemy, the
more strongly they become imbued with a sense of responsibility for
an assigned task, the more widely they use in training examples of
supreme service to the Native land, of the heroism and cournge of
older generations, and constant reliance upon the glorious combat
traditions of the Russian people, then it will be with greater
patriotic energy that they fulfill their sacred duty to the Mother-
land. The arming of our military cadres, and especially the young.
generation of soldiers, with thorough military historical knowledge
is the most important and noble aim of the workers on the ideologi-
cal front,
The urnus-ually, rich heroic past of our people, the prrt?sence
of combat experience gained under varion,s situations, numerous exam-
ples of mass heroi,,m, courage and unlimited devotion of the Soviet
people to the id eat- of' Marxism-Leninism and the native party create
exceptionally favorable soil for a general development of fruitful,
purposeful ideological work in the Soviet Armed Forces.
From the first days of its existence our government has had
to repulse the attacks of imperialist aggressors. The Great Patri-
otic War was an. especially difficult test for our people. The
solidarity of the socialist order and the unity of party and people,
front and rear, eras subjected to a thorough test in the military
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encounter of exceptional scale with filter's Germany. The Soviet
Union emerged from this test even :stronger, and with the front of
socialism having broadened, which led to the creation of !- world
socialist system. At the same time the forces of imperialism
weakened. Thus the next attempt by world imperialism to gain -?ic-
tory oven the socialist government by military means met with fail-,
ure.
Th:: Great Patriotic War and the military -axpcrience gained
from it determined the direction ;.,nd content of military historical
work in the Armed Forces. This work bore an exceptionally purpose-
ful nature and was closely allied with the practical tasks of a
steady increase in the defensive citpabiliti-:as, of the Soviet At-my and
Navy. All of the most substantial conclu.uions and ba-st forms of'
organization and conduct of combat operations obtained and discovered
in the process of studying the experience became the property of the
troops and staffs, the military academies and Pchools.
In accordance with the nesr t?a.:,Jce, significant changee ,were in-
troduced into programs on military history and new cour e' 3 of lec--'
tures were developed which tock into account the experience of the
war. In addition to major historical articles on variouz, que ;xionu,
monographs were developed on individual operations and on the war as
a whole.
In spite of the considerable revival of military historical
work with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, many Works
written and published at that time, and. especially in the first
postwar years, bore a one-sided nature. It should be treed that
even here the personality cult of Malin placed a seal of nonobjec-
tivity on the illumination of historical events. It is known that
Stalin for a long time devoted much effort to an exaltation of his
own role and services in leadership, not only as a political, but
also as a military figure. Such self-acclaim took on unusually
broad scope during the Great Patriotic War and especially after the
victory over fascist Germany. Moreover he did not hesitate at a
distortion and pure falsification of facts. Thus, for example, in
answering the letter of Col Razin in 1.946, Stalin ' ith complete bias
evaluated the military work of V. I. Lenin, affirming that "...Lenin
did not consider himself an expert in military affairs. This was
true not only in the past, before the October Revolution, but also
afterwards, after the October Revolution and right up to the end of
the Civil War... As concerned himself, he told us frankly that it
was already late for him to study military mptters."
From beginning to end, the statements by Stalin concerning
the military knowledge of V. I. Lenin -were based on fiction. This
is attested to by the memoirs of people who knew Lenin well. Thus
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 ----------------------
t, ho. fricr.?d and c.ctopan?.ion of Vladimir I1'ich, Nadezhda Konsta.nl.:inovna
Itr'rxp irayta, trr'i r,.t "Il' iclt not only .re-read taa,d in iht- most thorough
manner s.tatdI '.d and tltotitc;ht ovk,!r ew-erything written by Marx and Engels
about re c,1 u.ticn and r rvo1 t, he also read ninny book,; on military art,
con teir.pl.aa.t.ing from all ide'~t tho' te-c:hiiquv?o of armed uprising and
its orgaarrizaxion. Ile did thi much more than is known, and his talks
or, sh:oc:k gr'oup,y in partisan warfare and on "fives and tens" were not
the r rnb'k.irgri of" an igicorant person, but a thoroughly thought out
plan" ([ Note?N. 1;,, K::rupskal r:t, Vo,r ontinazl~i~l+_l o,~T.~anixa. (Dlemories of
Lenin, State; I'oii'::tccLJ. Publishing IIot1~e, 1957, page 92.),
I11-t,uinating the it.tcn tc work of V. I.. Lenin during the Civil
War, KrupAa,y.a in her ana:::-;nir, notes f'ur?thor: "I1'i.ch knew well what
'era;, going on. at the front:,,; he ?t'at~ connected directly with the,
frond and c:onunan.dv.0 the entire struggle... " ([Note] N. K. Krup?-V
skaya, Vo, a;ontiaaran.jja a Lr:niitF*, page 101.9 It is q>iit~: clear to
everyone that only al pcnr on. who knows anal. t'_r.tderstttnds tui l i tary mat-,
tars w-11 can leaarl am. ar?rkeAd struggl?a-. V. I. Lenin was just such a
per-son.
In the same lwtt~r to Col Razin Stalin .itaatecl that allegedly
V. I. Lenin did n;at hondle? que.stiona of .zti-at_gy at. all. This is
also not true. In the book by Gen L D.. DonchWBruyevich VQya vlast'
love-Lam (All Po or to the Soviets), there is affirmation of the fart
that Lenin also ,i~tuilii!d thoroughly quest.ioar,~, of militc:r?y ? trategy.
Thus Vladimir I1't eh xt:ad with utausu:a.1 att.e-ntioat t:,1i three volume
triLte i?v`a (Stras.t :g;y) o f one of the n-c?:t prornitat:ai.t Russian military
theoreticians -- G'sn Lt~v,=r Genr?ikh Antenovich.
w
How Ukill.y'ul l.y V. I. ~nixa. aced 1-,,is .mi li. taar'1? knowledge. i
Qho3rn Y::y tin- b,,- Pod',,-ovr;ki L,enn,i
~f` t ra e r r: daax per_'w'(~rotaLenin in
the Day! Fri: 0- rt ar'o ~ C[Note]t hx~ +;~,r,lyd fa uazeta (Red Gaztytte'3
l~iod e b?~ ^ 1,927), it. ;;hick th.r? author v: r.. ^A early charactt~rize;?
s, ~t _LnGrmoa,Y work d15nj7 by I-r'*.?ai.n during:; thr, defc~nst- of Petrograd a 1
the moot t.en,e dome t of the ll'hit.e Gicafd ant 'ur!-ection... WbiR'e 1.i
ten.iug to the r'._~poa: t of Ant.onov-Cvseye:atko, Lenin e.x.umiraed the map.
With the ar:t~tcr'aL: c"f the most thorough ariid atit,teixtxr,,r. Q,trategist,
and troop leader, he ma::ls. a ,,:umber of extremely intpo r?tan.t remar'k;t
concerning tht: o~rganizi,t,ion of the defaen:-,!e of Petrograd. and demanded
for, the defense of the. nro;-t important poimt? the concentration of
nec.essar?y fort,; at tht cost of trartafer?ri.ng troops from Kronshtadt,
Vyborg and lie Is, i.ngfor. ,;. "From an exchange of opinicus." Podvoy'skiy
writes furthe-, "it be'came cl?.aar that, .-t-e, r'a:ally had made a Whole
series of bat?nder's ard hr:?d riot di.tiplo, yed that extraordinary activity
which the thr't=_at.::ning situation of Peter?lbaa.cg demanded in regards to
the organization of forces and aneara.s for its defense."
An anal.y t s, of many works by V. I ~ Lenin incontrovertibly
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proved that be r;tuclied militaary uffa.iri rie nrio~ut.Ay and thoroughly,
that he knew military niattei'a :.,nd ;.ckillfulIy r-pl;!ied L krrowl,idge
in the q-truggice for victory of the So+ric?L l;out.r. Sv:,l:in n.eed~:d the
falsification of the, truth in order to rEprt?uent. Irila e:If as the
ainc;t major railit:a.ry authority, the ,role expert, in military c:,f'fcair,:.
This pa.rlcoAe waa,n c6lso ,served in pa,r?ticula+.r by they -,:vkTrnl repu.blicu.--
ti onA of ytpl in' .a book f) Vet i h o e (it,eche tverYJia o4 o y zrr ,So v.?t;4lcolrc
So uzu (On the Grt:,ut Patriotic. ;Vnr of th,: 5;ovic . Union . Tlac ,Late-
menu 1.utt for*ard in it could riot )re subjc!ctect to :a critical ra,rtaly-
.eis or ?:ci :ratific re;,earch with nocr concluriion:F which dif'ferc:cd from
Stal in ' .,3.
Stalin:.` , p -rt:onal.ity c.11, retarded the di!-velot;usent of hi.s-
torical sx i ence. In works publ i ?zhk:d d1.Arirlg, the tirrat: of" the per- son-.
ality cult the event..s of the Grer,.t 1;'atriotic "Jar u?prc:- not r,abj!_,cted
to a. d.ii?a f, crit.i.cal analysis. Vict?c'a'ies of our .,r,.r&acd Forces were
described in detail, and all thi aces presented aa:: rep !U1 t, of the
wise Stalir. leader=.hi.p, cl.;j a result of th:r rrrii..ita:ry gtniu:, of "the
:atrattegi.~t of' all times and people:
The enonnou. significance of the deci:=iulr of tl-,~ 20th and
22nd Gongs- a,ia:-3 of our party, tirhich were ciirecttd c .,t uprooting ;:cn.d
eliminating the error9 connected with Stalin's p c r onutli ty cult,
lies in t.h4 fact that they facilitated tbtc rew.i-ra.l of military hi,
torical v,ork in the Armed Forces u.nd to ilacrzu in its quality and
the depth of re; i arch of many ques.1ions rhici, I,r%viou~1y ic:ro pre--
2ented in n. di:..torted form or were concealed aa:l to;;r t:hs r. Ilaivirlc
been frered from the heavy shack ce,; of the. pcr,,oi.1:11 .r t u cult and
using tha^ favorable conditions -which ;.crone for r..reatli,e work, Mili-
tary hi :,torian:; have recently crc:,at#?d many major- rilit3.ry historical
works which objectively illuunirl:.l to the experienc c, of the Greet
Patriotic )Var. In addition to co,pital works which deeply investi-
gate the que:itions of strategy, oper::tion:i1 art and tactics, there
have been redone and newly created. t.c:xtbook,s on tl;:e hi';tory of mili-
tary art, and there have been written and published a considerable
number of monographs and dissertations on front and army operations
and on the use of the service aranc. and branches of the armed forces.
We should consider as a pleasing fn.et the appearance of such works
as KPSS --- vdokhovitel' i orgranizr.tox? robed sovet,'kogo nrtroda yeio
Vooruzhennykh :ail v Velikoff iltecheztvennoy voync (The
CFSU -- In-
spirer and Organizer of the Victori(:. of the Soviet t'cople and its
Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic, liar), R'Iark,sizml enini~+nl o vovne
i armi i (11arxi 3m-Leninism On the and the Army), t:P -- rukovo-
ditcl ' i vo:;X~i tatel' Krasnoy Arnlii (The CPSU -- Leader and ducator
of the Red Army).
The decision of the CC CPSU on the publication of the six
volume work _ ;toritia Vel ikov Oteche::tvennoy vox=So etsko o ,oyuza
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 (111i!t.o1"Y of the Great TPn t.r?,^(ic lv.a
'
f it.., r--
r
vie
o
o
T. ?. - r of i?, ;tict cr?;( both wi thi 11 our country and abroad.
The dr.'E:th and ob?pecti'(ri ty of the rr? t(?I1.Y'l h nf' r.r?r,L.l u... t
k
a
en
ou:, .1.ep r.n t1~~eL ;4tu(.1, and general izutioil of", he ri
e
?
c
r a pw1
ie!nce: uf
they' tar-? itu Pa t.;~iot
1 C' WtxV.? On the I;'ra31 3 or
the
-
-
a
th
p
s a. ^.' au. ,
-
e
y of -
party and 11 r?.op1 e _ the ; ,,,a ? +., b) . .
up
f,'4la rll,If' oft' trc?I? Soviet poopla and. i 4.u Armed For?..r... r~.._
..
.,- -
f
n
-
in
,_ -
???.?.i? ...4 1..U meaning, with
the., ;xvmoY.::r'j jr.,r o f? ' N Y..?.
Y ihl n~ aun4L;'f i c. i ,(i u t.t.?mm i nrr ,'..~. ,. +9..:
'Lilt-;x, r pAe:tsing fact is thrr organization of the
Rio no-
;-,t r.r.heski.;,ux'r.4,aaN((Mii.litary, fHistorical Journal), e tabl.]shed by
the deci.sioii of thy: CC of our party. In sPit' of its youth it has
occupiF.d a worthy- place in. the ideological life of the Armed Forces
of the USSR and has, already succ;:n~ded in, raising many important and
interesting proh1(:ms of military history.
The main goal of these measslir(; taken by the party is to
acti -ate: to the maximum military hi.storic;al work, to instill .in it
genuine creat.i~vity, to .rai..e it to the; of contemporary task:.
and to make r~re'tryt-ting of -value from the accumulated combat, exprri-?
once of the do+riet Arrmod For?c?e,s, the pr'ol;e'r.'t,y of the trooj. ~, Propa-
garrda of' the heroic pa it, of our people arid t is anny huy an impot't.ant
place in all t.ei.. Military hi!tor"i,,al work is now ore of the eeffec.-'?
ti3'e rnear., of t-'?:'rngthening the d= f.'e:r~.~.i , e capability of this social-.
ist and to praise the, combat >'eadi.ne' *4, of the So-- et Army.
An ::tnportant part in thi ti regard t*ra., ptayed by the ordr r' of
the Mini :;t:~:r' of c f' th,- USSR-No ~ 7i of 5 July 1.9?2, and al so
the "Instru.ctior.% or, Military- Historical Work in the Armed Force;.,,"
which was placed into e'ff'..?ct, by him.
Tl e :. doR:'irac,: nts put forth, the ba :i.c tasks and fornl_s of ntili.?-
tar'y- hist?or~cai -rYor'k and determine the system of guiding it in all
clements of the Ax'n(ed Forge.-;;. It is gaze, ed in the order that the
organi ation and 1''ade'r:ihip of' military historical work, and also
F o'a'1t z~ur:t112. 3.x" it a the o1f';r?ia)r3ttt1 of commanders' and
chief-. This once, metre' irdir'ttt.'e , tht :.:1gr~l.fi! anC?s? and
importanc_ of :m;xlita. y historical - or'k,
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 CPYR T
The, order of the Minister of l)efenxiee of' t Et,.. f~S$M and 4h- T-
ae ti vi ty . This i3 borne out by one :ist of OUP%t.iorn? on aTh;nchvwe
roll ~r,r thL tr.ti~, t.; tho builclinn anti leadiarship of the Arw~:;d Forc
thc~
iti^
t
?
:
r;,.
a ,>
.iriirrucio t in Gha; dc've1opnnent of in-.X.itzry t.:qtury of
Second World W'ar, of tl, ? devSlo,prncra t of the AroRL_d i''orcet, irul the
military urt of the USSR and the chief capit li: t corrtrtri..; o.~f'te3r
the Second World War., propaganda of the heroic e tip}-o; l.rj nr? i e
struggle with dogrnati..arn and sub.iectivisrn; and flit-b tk
i
i
f
.,..urgco
~
I& i.Cie ra of a;ilitarT hi.a.tory.
IE i griii.>raLion and in its conduct with tho nv%c,is use by
c:omtmtanl.? or nut1t,ar weapons under conditions where tho rlefons . ho::,
conr,i(le-rAl's r;q);; and breulcs, and with the development of r.ruiljiit
operations over a t?,r?ond front and along indiv.tdual axe~j. Attack be-
gins and ends with mra.a'huvel. This does not moon, of course, that
conditions for it?y accompli imont, will always bf~ Id';ntical. On elves
Where the defender,, are More devastated by fire and also in the gape
and on c?xpos?;r~d Clanks there:. will naturally be a brood expu.inse cre-
ated for mtnc?uver operations. Along such axes the troops will be
able to ma-roc;ve for the most part in march formations.
Cr)nl.ditiOns for maneuver care be different when combat oper-
ations must be conducted with active resistance by the defondcr, and
also when Wnrmounting obr,tacles, sectors of degtrucLiou and zones of
radioactive contamination. Maneuver rates herd will prob,sbly be
lower, inavmtitch as the maneuver itself is fraught, with grout. cliffi-
culties and troops mint accomplish it in deployed formations and in
combat and approach march formations.
The significance of maneuver operations a1::o incre.+se:- in thn
defense. As the power and effectiveness of nirvana of destruction in-
crease, the defender ,strives more and more to accomplish his mis-
sions by active means of maneuver. A special role in the defense
belongs to the maneuver of fire in connection with a sharp increase
in the front of the defending troops. It can be used for carrying
out a powerful counterpreparation in order to destroy the attack
groupings of the enemy before they move into the. attack.
Inasmuch s ianeuver occupies an ever in.crc.a.ling place; .ir..
the defense, the :tatter by its nature become,-j a mobile dc:fonse.
And in reality riot one of the missions of the defen ;e -- repulsing
the attack of over-whelmi.ng enemy forces, destruction of' his grouping
which has wedged its way in, retention of positions and areas -- can
now get along without maneuver. Here the maneuver is naturally sub-
ordinated to the common aim of the defense, especially if this aim
provides for retaining ix portant key areas of terrain and key posi-
tions. It is for thi.: purpose that counterblows (counterattacks)
are made, that there ii regrouping of forces and means from some
axes to others, and that there is replacement ot? troops which have
suffered considerable losses from nuclear strik_-s, etc. Firmness
of the troops is as before the most important quality of the defense,
and is combined with the increased role and high activity of combat
operati one.
A change of the purposes and content of the maneuver inevita-
bly leads to e.Qsential changes in the forms of its accomplishment.
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 CPYRGHTApproved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090020-4
In the past the panic loans of manouv.+r, as I& known, were
the -turn ir-tt movernottt and the: r1nvc onm0tit. Wide and ski 11ful conduct
of decisive and bold enveIopents and turning cnovomur-Ls played all
exceptionally important part in achievornet-t of succeps both in offen-
sive and in dufunsive operat,Ior-y of the past war.
There in no doubt that even now cnvelotmients and turning
movements as fottns of maneuver retain their significance. However
there are vastly greacur opportn-tities which have opened up for their
.ccomplishmunt. Moreover, those forms of maneuver alone do not ox-
haust all the diversity of maneuver operations. The envelopment and
turning movement with blows to the flanks and rear of the enemy have
of course a major significance and facilitate the most effective
destruction of the enemy. Moreover the opportunity to decisively
destroy the enemey with firepower, primarily nuclear, points out the
wisdom of using frontal attacks under curtain conditions. By per-
mitting the successful destruction of the enemy without preliminary
movement of forces and means requiring addit.iunal time, the division
of the oplso4ing grouping into segments, and the headlong development
of the attack along the shortest axis into the depth, peno-trations
create favorable conditions for taking advctntuge of the results of
fire effect and support high rrtte:; of troop movement and the economy
of forces, means and time.
A penetration can under certain conditions seem more suitable
and effective than, for example, an envelopment, inasmuch as the
movement over great distances necessary for the envelopment is fre-
quently carried out across unfavorable terrain, which lowers the
rate of movement of the attacker and increases his vulnerability to
nuclear attack.
The penetration is planned to be primarily used against gaps
and breaks in the enemy operational (combat) formations. Therefore
it must not be identified with it frontal attack. However in dis-
tinction to the turning movement, in which the troops strike with
main forces against the enemy flanks or from the rear, the penetra-
tion provides for a rapid rush of troops along the shortest routes
into the depth of the enemy disposition, the seizure of important
objectives in the rear and battle with the enemy reserves. This
does not rule out the influence on the enemy of a portion of the
forces from the rear and the flanks for the purpose of "dissipating"
his defense or for encirclement or blockade of isolated groupings.
It would be incorrect to contrast a penetration with maneuver.
The maneuver of forces and means will frequently precede and will
accompany the penetration. In its ideal nature the penetration is
also u unique maneuver. The art of maneuver finds its expression in
it in the wise selection of the direction of the main attack, in the
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 CPYRGHT
of a suitable grouping of forces and means and in the
build--up of efforts right up to the completion of the duet-
--a-'-ton- The penetration best attains its result if it is combiners
vi ;:ii other forms of maneuver conducted by a portion of the for.c.es.
Maneuver carried out b_v transferring troops by air has taken
on evr? greater significance under present conditions. This maneeu.z
Ner in an operation pursues very decisive goals and has a number o
ada:antages over other forms. It provides for great flexibility,
zoa?bat efficiency,, r, pidity and surprise. Maneuver by air permits
troops in the shortest time to overcome great distances irregardles.s
of the nature of the terrain and the degree of destruction and. ecn-
tamination by radioactive substances. In this regard maneuver by
i is e:spevially effective in overcoming large zones of destr%=ctioi
and contamination.
While in the past, maneuver by air was limited chiefly to thti
shift of small podrazdeleniya and cha:sti primarily in the interests
of airborne landings, under present conditions the capabilities of
military transport aviation, including helicopters, permit they trans:-
far of comparatively large troop groupings and large reserves of
material means and cargoes over considerable distances. Such tran:1--
fers can be carried out for the purpose of regrouping, for rapid rep-
placement of troops which have suffered heavy losses from ne.clear
attack, and also for the shift of major efforts against other axes
and for blows against the flanks and rear, etc.
There is no doubt that as the spatial scope of operations in-
creases, and as the dynamics and transientness of combat operatis.uns
and the development of military transport aviation increases, *~-
-
ve 7 by air gill occupy an ever greater place. Such maneuver is
peciall.y needed in mountainous theaters of military operation,,
fore-st and s,ampy terrain, and also on coastal axes.
Unevenness in development of combat operations and the oppoy-
tun_ity for a deep movement of troops to the rear and flanks of a osy
group- rigs in ' ombination with airborne landing operations lead to
the appearance of such a new and decisive form of operation as t
simultaneous combined attack from different directions. This attack
an be used in an operation (battle) for the purpose of dismember
men^,, encirclement and destruction of isolated groupings. The skill-
ful accomplishment of such an attack will lead to a rapid di sor ga.ni
iayion of enemy control and a disruption of the work of his rear.
Suc an attack can be looked upon as the result of a combination cf
vario;.s forms of maneuver or as a new variety of maneuver.
One of the new forms of maneuver called to life by the appear-
ance of nuclear weapons is the shift in areas of troop disposition
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,,;1rt f1-?'. i,C:Ji1.111(.Uj, 1it.It a :!,?f1 % O&.tl1,7r 0U1 4:~,tj.1U1,f, 1Je: doUUC
periodicidIIy, +.tllr4ciulIy uvucr -A.c~z rife> very useful,
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 Approved For Rele
9700300090020-4
By Engr-Lt Col Yu. El'terman
CPYRGHT
One of the characteristic peculiarities of modern operations is,
as we all know, the speed with which a situation changes and, along
with it, the increased importance of the factor of time in a combat
action, particularly in control of troops.
It should be noted that in recent years the troops of the leading
nations have been provided increasingly greater amounts of communica-
tions equipment. The amount of such gear in control centers has
increased markedly, and the quality has increased immeasurably compared
to the equipment used during World War II.
The organization of communications and the effectiveness of its
operation depend in great measure on the ability of the individual
to use a system of communication and paying attention to questions
dealing with the care and protection of the equipment during the
course of an operation, as well as on the proper and skillful employ-
ment of technical facilities at hand.
As is generally known,.in controlling troops use is made of short-
wave radio along with wire, radio relay and other means of communica-
tions. Each of these means has its advantages and disadvantages.
For example, cable and radio relay lines have a high traffic-carrying
capacity. With the aid of additional multiplexing equipment it is
possible to set up many single line telephone and telegraph channels,
and because of the low degree of interference these lines insure high
quality communications.
Along with this, when enemy forces are employing a great degree
of fire or when rapid troop movements are involved radio communica-
tions has an unquestioned superiority compared with other kinds of
communications. The use of radio makes it possible quickly to set
up new channels of communication without laborious effort given a
'limited amount of time. With shortwave radio equipment it is possible.
to effect communications over great distances -- up to hundreds of
kilometers in extent -- with relaying, across enemy-occupied territory,
or across radioactivity contaminated zones.
Mobility and speed of deployment of radio equipment make it
possible to ensure communications while in motion, during short halts,
while shifting control centers, as well as when time was lacking to set
up a communications center.
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 CPYRGHT
Ap
roved FoAfheefoh2ggRI48 riscb~-gPiR? TP097p tNPPa` cag-`quip..
went the armies of NATO member nations place great store by various
kinds of shortwave radio gear with a variety of power outputs.
However, the extensive range of action and the capacity of radio-
waves to propagate in all directions has its adverse effect also:
there is the chance that mutual interference can result from the large
number of simultaneously functioning radio sets.
Let us consider in greater detail some of the reasons for inter-
ruption of shortwave radio communications due to interferences and
the methods of improving stability.
Depending on their origin the principal types of interference
can be divided into three groups: mutual interferences produced by
closely-disposed radio sets belonging to a given communications
center; station interferences produced by broadcasting facilities
located some distance away; short-duration interferences in communica-
tions when the correspondent's signal is fading. The necessity of
insuring dependable control over troops calls for a large quantity
of radio communications equipment in the control centers; at times
as many as a score or more radio sets are used. These include
equipment, authorized by TOE as well as radio sets used by the
communications officers of the various arms or services, special
systems of communications, etc. By disposing all these radio sets
directly within the control center area or in its immediate vicinity
the powerful transmitters of the different stations are capable of
inducing great voltages `(exceeding the strength of useful signals by
hundred-fold intensity) on the antennas of nearby receivers.
When the difference in frequencies between transmitter and re-
ceiver is small (of the order of ten or a hundred kilocycles) -the
input circuit of a radio receiver does not insure adequate protec-
tion against such interfering voltages. The detrimental effect
of the latter consists in that they suppress the useful signal in
the non-linear tube stages. In addition, in the frequency band
beamed by each transmitter there is, along with the basic operating
frequency, many so-called side components. These are not audible
to the correspondent, since they lag far behind in frequency and are
of a relatively low level,. But for receivers which are disposed in
a radius of up to several kilometers they can produce severe inter-
ferences. For example, when operating on a 3 me waveband the trans-
mitter beams another entire band of frequencies that are multiples
of 3 Mc as a result of which the receivers located nearby and tuned,
say, to a frequency of 6 Mc, 9 Mc. and the like will be suppressed
by interferences from such a transmitter.
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 CPYRGHT
r~~s~d~~~~,~~a~~~n~,"~l~t~.?~94?~t~~597~I~0~0A~
e ligent transle-tion is impossible. It
deals with harmonics as factors in interference and with cross-talk.)
The methods of eliminating intra-unit interferences created by
operating and secondary radiations by their own transmitters boils
down, mainly, to the correct disposition of radio ejuipment within
the center.
The most radical measure is to move all transmitters of the center
a sufficiently great distance away; the sites are selected depending on
the size of the control center, the time available for organizing a
radio communications center, and the means available for remote control
of transmitters. The areas of disposition of transmitters and their
distance from the? communications center are also dictated by consider-
ations of camouflage of control points
The order of disposing radio receivers and their antennas is
governed by he necessity of excluding local electrical interferences
emanating from telegraph station equipment and other elements within
the communications center, as well as by the need of selecting the
best conditions for the reception of signals from the sender. If
receivers are set up near large nearby objects, in dense forests, and
the like we get poorer reception of useful signals, and this gives
rise to increased chances of radio interference.
Another reason why communications are affected is because of the
long lines between the units of apparatus in he communications center.
Often, valuable information obtained by radio from a distance of many
hundreds of kilometers is lost at the communications cent-tr because
of troubles that occur on a line a hundred meters long between the
pieces of equipment on that line
All these requirements for arranging radio sets should be taken
into account very carefully when organizing a communications center
and in the selection of a site for such a center.
Another possible reason for disturbing radio communications are
the interferences coming from extraneous radio sets o We know that the
total number of radiators of various kinds in the armed forces has
increased markedly during the past 20 years -- the total has more than
tripled (cf Voyennyy Vestnik, No 8, 1962, pp 122). Experience shows
that even low-powered, shortwave radio sets can cause interferences
not only at short distances but at greater distances as well-- of the
order of 400-500 km. The reasons for this phenomenon are to be sought
in the peculiarities of short wave radio propagation; these waves are
reflected from the upper ionized atmospheric layers (the ionosphere).
300 km, and because of this condition it is possible to establish long
range communications -- up to several thousand kilometers.
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 n~i~ir~r~nr RPIPacP ?nnn/nR/n9 - CIA-RfPRSTnnR75Rnnn3nnngnn9n-d
The antenna known as the balanced doublet, consisting of two
horizontal beams suspended a height of 8-10 meters above the ground,
is widely used for reflected beam broadcast work. A large portion
of the power of such an antenna is radiated upward and is then re-
flected by the ionisphere. It ensures good communications far beyond
the limits of the line of sight within a radius of 500 to 1,000 km.
Along with this, use is sometimes made of the vertical rod
cntenna which has horizontal directional properties; usually it is
used for ground wave work at distances of up to 30 or 50 km. At
distances of from 50 to 400 km the rod antenna creates the so-called
"dead zone" in which reception is impossible,- however, beyond the
limits of this zone the signal again appears (within a radius of
1,000 km) due to that portion of the radiowave which is reflected
from the. ground at a low angle and transmitted far beyond the horizon
after bouncing off the ionosphere. By reason of these properties of
the red antenna, shortwave radio stations can cause interference for
other radio sets, including those of the operational level, on a vast
area with a radius of between 1,000 - 1,500 kmo
Taking into account the peculiarities of long range propagation
of radiow-ves the matter of assigning operating frequencies to radio
stations a very complicated and meticulous thing. Even the most
careful selection of frequenci cannot fully protect radio communica-
tions against disturbances from long range radio stations operating
in aijacent foreign countries or in enemy territory during wartime.
When interferences arise the practice is followed of substituting
other wavelengths, striving to select one which is least affected by
interferences. For this purpose there is organized at the communications
center a standby receiver service for determining interference-free
reserve frequencies.
To enhance stability of communications when there are interferences
one can also changeover to the use of keyed transmission and audio
reception. The radioman's ear has additional filtering properties
(similar to a filter with a passband of the order of 200 cycles) which
makes it possible to separate useful signals from interferences by
frequency. An important factor in enhancing the interference killing
feature of audio reception is the possibility of repeated challenges
which, in the opinion of the radio operator, are doubious due to distor-
tion by interferences.
Moreover, audio reception lowers the carrying capacity of the
communications channel. Whereas the telegraph apparatus permits trans-
mitting approximately 50 five-symbol groups per minute, one can transmit
only 12 to 15 groups by key during the same time. Therefore, audible
exchange results in reducing the speed and volume of information
exchanged.
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Mutual interferences can be reduced somewhat if ultrashort waves
are used for near communications; these are poorly reflected by the
ionosphere and hence create interferences only at the limits of the
ground wave operating range.
It is important to emphasize that the range of ground wave commica-
tion in the ultrashort wave and shortwave bands is practically the same:
during the daytime it is somewhat greater in the shortwave range, while
at night, with an increased level of interference on short waves, the
range is greater in the ultrashort wave band. These points are con-
sidered in greater detail in special books devoted to the subject
(Peculiarities of propagation of meter waves -- Yu. I. Davydenko and
N. T. Nechayev, Voyennizdat, 1960). Thus, by way of example, the new
radio sets on the tactical level in the United States Army have a
frequency range from 30 to 70 Mc ("Electronics", October 13, 1962).
For these reasons tactical units prefer UHF bands in ground wave com-
munications.
Overloading the shortwave band and mutual interferences can be
decreased, also, by restricting shortwave telephony and through the
wider utilization of radio telegraphy.
Telephonic communications is more effective for operational
purposes and more convenient to use by commanders because it results
in closer contact. However, one must not fail to take into account
the inadequate quality of shortwave telephonic communication and the
narrowness of the shortwave bands which does not allow of the necessary
number of telephonic channels.
In order to transmit the minimum necessary band of frequencies
used in human speech (300 - 3400 cycles) it is necessary to have a
double band of transmitter frequencies, i.e. about 7 Kc. In practice,
for each telephonic channel of communication, taking into account the
necessary protective sector between adjacent channels, it is essential
to set aside a band of frequencies equal to 10 Kc (in so-called single
side band modulation this interval can be reduced to 5 Kc).
At the same time, for telegraphic operations it is possible to
designate operating 'waves approximately 1 Kc apart. This means that
each telephonic channel requires as many operating waves as do approxi-
mately 10 telegraphic channels. If one operating frequency (10 Kc
band) is assigned for every 10 telephone channels of communications
under conditions when there are not enough wavebands, then, as a
result of mutual interference communications will be virtually im-
possible. Changeover to telegraphic operation permits in this instance
the accomdation within this same band all ten channels of radio
communications with intervals through 1 Kc without mutual interference.
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 It should be borne in mind that apart from increasing the number
of channels and improving the stability of radio communications, tele-
typing equipment offers other advantages also such as providing a
clocLuneritaxy record of the communication.
Let us consider a third group of possible troubles with short-
wave radio communications -- shortwave interferences caused ay fading.
By fading we mean the periodic changes in the volume level of the
signal received due to multibeam propagation of radiowaves. The fact
is that the receiving antenna usually receives not one but several
beams (radiowaves) at a time from the sender via different paths.
We know from physics that when several oscillations are added
together the magnitude of the resultant oscillation is determined
by the phases of its individual components; because the phases of
incoming signals,, which are a function of distance, are not
constant (since the height of the ionizing layer and its degree of
ionization change constantly), the amplitude of the voltage at the
receiving antenna changes within broad limits. If the level of the
incoming signal is comparatively great, e.g. several score times
greater than the level of station and atmospheric noises at the
receiver input, then, as a result of fading, there are only occa-
sional distortions of individual telegraph transmissions at the
moment when the splurge of noises coincides with the minimum level
of the signal. If the signal volume is only slightly greater than
the interference, the distortion is considerable.
Stability of the telegraph communications channel is determined
by the magnitude of the loss of reliability, i.e. the ratio of the
number of distorted signals to the number of signals transmitted. For
the usual kind of letter printing telegraphic work (frequency tele-
graphing) loss of reliability (P N 7- ) under conditions of fading is
determined by the probability theory and can be expressed by the
following simple formulae Pq T = Etu
i.e. it is directly proportional to the mean square noise voltage (E w)
and inversely proportional to the mean square signal voltage (EC).
If we assume that the loss of reliability should not exceed
P y T = 1.10-3 i.e. not over one distorted per thousand transmitted,
it is essential to insure a relationship of signal level to noise
level of 33. At a lower signal level there is increased probability
of distortion. It follows from this that the power of a transmitter,
which governs the necessary signal level, is of great importance to
the quality of radio communications. Thus, increasing the power of
a transmitter l0-fold (e.g. replacing a 100 watt transmitter with a
1,000 watt unit) increases the field voltage by a factor of 3.3 or
10 times the square of the field voltage; this, In accordance with
the above indicated formula exceeds the loss of reliability by a
factor of 10.
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Of great importance in insuring a desirable signal level is the
proper selection of the communications wave length as a function of
broadcasting conditions. The ionized layer reflects waves which do
not exceed a specific frequency, the so-called critical reflection
frequency. The value of this reflection frequency depends on the
height of the ionizing layer, the season of the year, and the time
of day. In addition, it changes in accordance with 11-year sunspot
activity cycles.
When carrying on night communications during the winter season
for a distance of up to 300 km during periods of minimum sunspot
activity the value of the reflection frequency is reduced down to
3 Mc and less. Under such conditions, one can use only a very small
portion of the total shortwave band carried by a shortwave set. This
sharply increases the band load and the danger of mutual interferences
during these periods. For this reason and also in consequency of the
increase in the range of interference during the night period, it is
considerably more difficult to maintain shortwave- communications at
night than in the daytime.
During daytime (especially d?,iring years of maximum solar activity,
the reflection frequency limit is go ta high -- from 6 to 12 Mc. How-
ever, when using frequencies which are of the order of 1.5-2.0 times
lower than the critical reflection frequency the field voltage de-
creases markedly.
Thus, in assigning operating frequencies it is essential care-
fully to take into account the peculiarities of radiowave broadcasting,
the changes in critical reflection frequencies, and use suitable wave
lengths for communicating day and night.
Unfortunately, given the great amount of radio equipments used
by troops it is very difficult to assign optimal wavelengths to all
radio nets and directions and, therefore, insure good communicating
conditions, especially for teletyping.
Stabilizing radio communications with respect to fading can be
achieved by the use of duplex spaced reception (sdvoyennogo prostran-
stvenno-raznesennogo priyema] in which two receiving antennas are used;
these are set up approximately 200-300 meters apart and used with two
receivers having a common output. Due to the difference in distances
to each of the antennas the incoming beams arrive differently in each
one. When the oscillations in one of the sets exceeds the minimum
the other, as a rule, has an adequate signal level. When using cross
blocking, the receiver with the weakest signal is blocked at the out-
put circuit and, therefore, the telegraph apparatus receives only
comparatively high level signals.
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 C YRGHT
One of the most common reasons why shortwave communica-
tions are affected, as we have already pointed out, is
the combined action of interferences and fading; because
of fading,, the signal weakens and the output relay is then
controlled by the interferences which produce distortions
and malfunctions in the receiving telegraph apparatus.
In duplex reception the fading effect is virtually excluded hence
a considerably lower signal to noise dominance is permissible. Loss
of fidelity when fading is absent can be determined from the formula:
P -r = : c n- in which (r = 2.18. Computations by this formula
demonstrate "that a good quality of communications (p r 110`"3)
can be achieved when the signal-to-noise ratio is of the order of 4
rather than 33. This gain is equivalent,, approximately, to an 8-fold
increase in transmitter power output.
With this method it is possible also to evaluate the effectiveness
of the use of an additional reciver tuned to a standby wavelength.
The probability of the appearance of random stationary interferences
on two wavelengths simultaneously, naturally,,, is considerably less
than on one. For example, if the probability of hitting one channel
Pi = 0.2 then with twc) channels it will be equal to P2 e 0.22 - 0.04,
The above indicated possible sources of trouble in shortwave
radio communications do not, however, detract from those outstanding
advantages inherent in radio as compared with other kinds of com-
munications. On the one hand, it is important to employ mechanical
or technical measures for protection against local interferences,
select correct wave lengths, etc,; on the other hand, it is necessary
carefully to process the documents in order to avoid transmitting
extra or repetitious information within them which would overload the
radio channels. It is important also correctly to establish the time
and sequence for the transmission of documents. In this connection,
it is important to coordinate the activities of the communications
personnel and staff officers. The latter should know exactly the
actual. capacities of the communications channels, and in preparing
the operation they should take the necessary meast'es to reduce trp
scope of the radio programs, make broader use of radio communications
tables, coded charts, etc.
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 CPYRGHT
a e o nom'exhaust the many engineer and organiza-
tional problems encountered in improving radio communications stability.
Under modern conditions all commanders and staff officers are
expected to have a well-grounded knowledge of the theory and practice
of radio communications. This is necessary to properly dispose the
various elements of the communications center,, select the most
effective types of activity for the radio system; prepare the ap-?
propriate documentation, maneuver the radio a gApment during the
course of an operation, etc. Only under these conditions may one
hope for a successful solution of the problems involved in providing
uninterrupted control of troops by radio.
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 Approved For Release 200M0JNQ9 q &6pE8*Ti8?7 A90020-4
CPYRGHT
Army Gen V. Kurasov
In the past,, troop leadership (vozhdeniye) was looked upon as
she art 'of troop direction (rukovodstvo) in war, beginning with their
approach to the field of battle and ending with the engagement. The
Great Patriotic War and World War, II expanded our comprehension of
troop leadership and introduced significant changes into its content.
But the truly basic change in the nature of troop leadership occurred
with the appearance of and during the course of the rapid develop-
ment of nuclear weapons.
Under contemporary conditions troop leadership may be looked
upon as the art of troop direction in battles, operations, and armed
conflict as a whole. Its main role belongs to the commanders (Ko-
mandiry) of soyedineniya and commanders (komanduyushchiye) of opera-
tional and strategic ob'yedineniya, that is, the basic organizers and
leaders of battle and operations o Only they, determine the concept
of the battle or operation, make decisions for its conduct, r.ad carry
the full individual responsibility. As far as the staffs are con-
cerned, they are necessary, very responsible and important organs of
troop control, (upravldni ye);however, as we well know, their" entire
activity is implemented on the basis of the concepts and decisions
of the commanders and commanding officerslZr taping an active part in
their preparationand 2 riw atic and making these decisions anti concepts
known to the troops a Basically, the same may also be said of the
political organs, which in accordance with the concepts and decisions
of the commanders or commanding officers, exert direct leadership
over the party-political activities, directing it towards ensuring
success in the battle or the operation.
In this article, we will attempt within possible limits, to
examine the role and basic activity of soyedineniya commanders and
commanders of operational ob'yedineniya, and will refer to them sub-
sequently under the term "commanders" (komanduyushchiye). As far as
the role and activity of staffs and political organs during the process
of troop guidance is concerned, this can be the subject of another
article o
First of all troop leadership takes into account the creative
activity of the commanders as expressed in their concepts for a battle
or an operation, and in their decisions to execute them. This is
ccns- dered the main aspect of their activity since it forms the basis
for the direction of combat operations o At the same time the commander's
organization and political activity has an important meaning since
their results ensure the successful execution of the concepts and
decisions to a considerable degree.
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 CPYRGHT
App ro~i+~dcTpor~ie 21 Q@ %: i~PPlT~ aWOtOo g9ia9OO20-4
com-
mander-troop leader only in that instance when victory over the enemy
is achieved rapidly and fully, without needless losses, and when his
own troops are capable of conducting further combat operations. Much
of this depends not only on the training of the commander and their
practical experiences in troop direction, but also on their personal,
primarily resolute; qualities.
The fast-moving and extremely maneuverable character of contem.,
porary combat operations extremely complicates troop direction.
Only a highly trained commander, possessing the necessary moral and
combat qualities and leaning on a well-established and &etive staff
and political organs will be able to artfully employ his troops in
operations and battles. Physical and mathematical sciences are so
essential to military art under contemporary conditions, that it is
difficult to imagine the possibilities of successful troop direction
without a knowledge of their fundamentals.
There has even been a decisive change in the modern conditions
of troop leadership. During the offensive operations of the Great
Patriotic and World War II, the commanders usually had sufficient
time to gather the fullest data on the situation, conduct recon-
naissance, develop concepts, make decisions, and, finally, conduct
personal conferences with subordinates. However, under contemporary
conditions they usually will not have this time and the development
of the concepts for the operation, battle, and the making of deci-
sions for their execution will be conducted in very compressed time
periods and frequently in an unclear situation. Brief instructions,
rapidly transmitted by technical means are becoming the basic method
of troop control rather than personal conferences between the com-
manders and their subordinates.
All troop leadership activity, particularly in offensive opera-
tions, will now have to be implemented by the soyedineniya commanders
,chile on the march and during short halts. Commanding officers of
operational ob'yedineniya will now have to exercise troop leadership
from frequently displaced command posts.
All of this, as well as the complex and sharply changing situa-
tion in which this work usually is conducted, forcefully demands
mechanization and automation of troop control, different organiza-
tion and new methods of work on the part of commanders, staffs, and
political organs, and more appropriate, highly maneuverable and
dynamic forms of troop combat operations.
Let us briefly examine the contents of the commanders' activity
in troop leadership.
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 CPYRGHT
rovid Fo eT'a? "-7G0??6AMx GfAcR 4fls8_6RA@b}36 WQ2Qt4oned,
s most important, as during its process the bold and original
battle and operation concepts are formulated, and the decision for
their execution is taken. It is during the process of this activity
that the bases of successful combat operations are laid down. A
commander's achievements in military art and a degree of its super-
iority over the military art of the enemy is reflected most fully
in his concepts and decisions o
By its very nature, the basic aim of the creative activity of
the commanders i, in determining the concept and in decision-making.
However., to achieve this aim, the clarification of the objectives
of the battle or operation and the evaluation of the situation are
very necessary and extremely important. The correct concept cannot
be formulated and an expedient decision cannot be taken without a
full clarification of the objectives of the battle and operation and
a full and painstaking evaluation of the situations Moreover., deci-
sions which are made without a deep clarification of the objectives
of the battle or operation and a deep analysis of the situation., as
experiences in the past war have shown, result in failures.
The clarification of the objectives of a battle or operation,
and, particularly, the evaluation of the situation under conditions
of a future war, must to an even greater degree than in the past war,
become the system of constant concern on the part of the commanders.,
as well as those individuals who direct staffs and field control
elements. It should be kept in mind, however, that this system will
give practical results only when it has been carefully formulated
well ahead of time and is completely mastered by the commanders and
the individuals directing the staffs and field control elements.
Under contemporary conditions, the scope of creative activity
of commanders has increased significantly, whereas the time for
implementing it has sharply decreased. So that this activity may
always be on the level of the requirements imposed upon it, the
following are now very necessary;
constantly conduct active and purposeful reconnaissance
of the enemy and particularly of his means of nuclear
attack; if necessary it should be reinforced during the
period preceding the time the decision is taken;
constantly and particularly in clarifying the
objectives of the operation or battle, as well as in
evaluating the situation, demonstrate deep operational
foresight in the development of friendly and enemy troop
activity especially after nuclear strikes have been
delivered;
5R000300090020-4
 CPYRGHT
pproved F%u 4AWO 1O&eq&ill.Off b40gc RxRQPc gq9aQ20-4
situation and maintain an uninterrupted reconnaissance of it;
develop the concepts for the operation and battle
within the shortest time possible and make the decision
quickly.
These are only a few of those basic requirements whose e..cecution
in the process of creative activity by the commanders ensures the
achievement of success in an operation or battle.
At any given moment in an operation or battle, the staffs must
provide the commanders with data on the situation, prognoses, and
calculations, which are necessary for making decision. This is a
most important functions of modern staffs which must also be executed
on the basis of deep operational foresight regarding the development
of the situation.
The creative activity of a military leader in preparing for and
executing any battle or operation begins with a clarification of the
objectives. What is understood in this?
Clarifying the objective of an operation or battle, as we vi-
sualize it, means properly understanding the requirements of the
senior command, and the combat missions assigned by them, determining
the role of one's own operational ob'yedineniye or soyedineniye in
the forthcoming operation or battle, noting the main effort of friendly
troop concentrations, and the most effective methods of their co-
ordinated action.
In analyzing the requirements of the senior command, it is first
of all necessary to clarify what the enemy groupings are and in which
areas they must be destroyed; determine the strength and composition
of these groupings, and the degree of their destruction; and determine
the areas which must be occupied by friendly troops after destroying
the enemy groupings, and the time period in which these areas must
be occupied. Just the mere listing of these questions indicates the
importance of correctly understanding the basic requirements of the
senior command in order to develop the concepts and make a clear
decision.
Only after exposing these requirements can a proper determina-
tion be made of the role of one's operational ob'yedineniye or soye-
dineniye in the forthcoming operation, the direction of the main
thrust by the troops and the methods of their coordinated activity.
Under some conditions, the role of a given operational ob'yedineniye
or soyedineniye may be the main one, and then the coordinated activity
of all troops participating in the operation will be implemented "I
00300090020-4
 porting one. and ther1. the given cperational ob'yedineniye or soye-
dinenlye must render assistan.,.,e to other operational ob'yedineniye
or sc>yedi.ne.niya which have the main role in the operationo
~ te. direction of the main effort can be most correctly selected
on..Ly arrer. tie . mi:un enemy grouping, to be destroyed is identified
and the locatir*~n of the main objectives which are to sustain nuclear
attack are exact] ?,v Identified.
In c: ar:f~rtn.z; the objec't'ives of the operation or battle the
fundamentals cf the concepts are set forth first and subsequently
made more precise during the process of evaluating the situation.
As a rule:. and beNause of the extreme importance and responsi-
bility of this activity,, clarification of the objectives of an
operation or battle is personally and independently implemented by
the commander. In some cases he may bring in the chief of staff and
other responsible individuals of f1 eid control elements into this
activity.
A deep clarifi cation of the objectives of the operation or battle
gives the commander confidence that his plan, that his decision will
be formulated on a correct basis and that the effort of his sub-
ordinate troops will be dire_:ted towards achieving that which has
been demanded by the senior command.
The estimate of the situation is an important aspect of the
creative activity of the commanders o The T.aal.ity of the concepts
and decisions depen.d.z upon the degree: of depth and carefulness of
the estimate of the s~. W.ttatior Errors and miscal eul.a?tions in est.i-
mati.ng the situatI' cam, as e xpe-: ie,nc:e of past war's and postwar exer-,
vises has sho *n, have resulted i,n bras and improper decls~cns. as
well as in sltuati c'ns where the main efforts of operational oh'_
yedineni.ya were fre 'Lent?y concentrated in directions where they
could not bx't.ng decis.ve requits while forces and means were i.ade,
sua to in the i..ne r main effort , where the, fate of the operation
aJrrd ba t e. A'c..- '~:tua a_;V e1.~2 eci., e .
in est:,;nating the six;a'ati.on, i A. Is extremely Important to cor-
rectly evaluate the designs of the enemy, and not to underestimate
his strength, area-us,, and capabilities.. particularly in the use of
nuclear weapons s-i i:ce ,his would result in a. preconceived decision
calculated easy success and. would t.hus lead to heavy friendly
troop, losses If a strong and active enemy were met. It i.a expedient
to consider t."le? worse and most complicated situation for.' oneself,
hawwever, , the enemy should not be overestimated inasmuch as this can
result ;. ti='Lift dot,i's_ nns and an overly careful and passive activity
by the .fi' end.J.,y troops.
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 CPYRGHT
ApprovedfmR 21fl!0/ IO9ta.C,6A-R-Dfi8JT@@A?&5 OQP3 ,49QQ d but
at the same time deep and comprehensive ana.l,ysis of t,Yhhe fool.l.c~~ring;
the enemy's strengths and means in the a.,o.o.e of action of
one's own operational ob'yedineniye, or sow edinexaiye, as well as on
the flanks, and first of all. the enemy's meanrt of nucl.ea.r, attack and
their combat ccs,pabi l,i.ties; the probable. enemy pla,as, his groupings
of forces and me.en.s; the main and secondary d.i..rections of enemy
combat actions and, the time of their onset; the weak and strong sides
of the enemy,o prssible changes in all of these data from the onset
and during tb course of the operation or battle"
the strengths., means, and combat capabilities of friendly
troops and primarily the capabilities of the nuclear means, the direc-
tion of the main and secondary thrusts, and the possible troop group-
ings in them; the most effective means of employing nuclear weapons
and other means of combat along the directions; the, relation of
forces (friendly and enemy), as well as the possibilities of changes
in this relation from the onset and during the course of the battle
or operations,; the terrain characteristics in. the action zone of
friendly troops and particularly in the direction of the main effort;
its dangerous and protective features under conditions attending the
employment of nuclear weapons and the effect of these features on
the forthcoming combat operations of the troops; measures for the
employment of advantageous terrain features and for the elimination
of its negative effects;
the weather conditions and their effec on the combat opera-
tions of the troops (friendly and enemy), mainly upon the employment
of nuclear weapons by the rocket troops and air forces, and in
particular on the level of radioactive contamination of the area in
tbe, action zone of the troops.
During the process of estimating the situation, for purposes of
rapidity and clarity, there will always be the need for various
tactical and operational computations ,rapidly done by means of cal-
culating and computing equipment o
In analyzing the situation, a critical approach should be made
to data and their sources, and it is necessary to avoid rumors which
frequently exaggerate things, prohibit one-,sided evaluations of hap-
penings and the over-evaluation of friendly successes, and to refrain
from drawing hasty conclusions and deductions o
Only a deep clarification of the objectives of the operation or
battle and a comprehensive, objective estimate of the situation can
ensure the formulation of a bold and original concept and the taking
of an expedient decision.
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 C:I: FBI) T?1 NQ:, 963
~'~^~~~~+~~.~~ ,,robed'o~FieleaO~,QIa$~OC'-RkSP~'{gjt$7~RO~Q300090020-4
FIROM
 CP
The concept is essence, :Ls the main Idea o1' a, battle operation.
The entire operation or the entire battle represents the consecutive
development and imyale.mento,tion of this main idea. It is not difficult
to imagine the extreme danger which may be posed by an erroneous main
idea. Neither the mastery of the troops nor their efforts in imple-
menting such an idea can prevent failure of the operation or battle.
The history of the last war has many examples supporting this position.
As we see it,., the concept of an operation or battle must provide
answers to approximately-the following basic questions:
which enemy groupings must be destroyed; which is the main
grouping;bovbestto distribute the strength of one's own operational
ob'yedineniya (primary and secondary objectives), and which areas ;must
be occupied to execute the established missions;
in what directions is it expedient to deliver the main and
secondary thrusts; what friendly troop groupings must be established
along these thrust lines;
on what foundations is it appropriate to develop coordinated
action of one's own operational ob'yedineniya or soyedineniya with
adjacent, or other branches of the armed forces, and combat arms.
Let us examine the content of an offensive operation concept in
somewhat greater detail.
Under contemporary conditions, the basic enemy groupings consist
of his tactical and operational means of nuclear attack and different
troop soyedineniya which have been deployed for delivering the main
thrust or establishing particulaxiy strong resistance in the zone of
forthcoming operations a In determining the strengths and composition
of such enemy groupings. it is always necessary to take into the
account the possible changes during the course of the operation as a
result of our thrusts. The basic enemy grouping must be identified
as precisely as possible prior to the launching of rockets or airborne-
carriers, down to chast' level and even down to individual pcdraz-
deleniya
Only after the strength and compos:~tion of the enemy groupings
have been determined is it possible to note the direction of the main
effort and secondary efforts of one's own operational ob'yedineniye or
soyedineniye. The main effort must give the greatest effect within
the shortest period of time. For this, as we see it, it would be
expedient to concentrate the basic mass of nuclear weapons against
the most important targets of the main enemy grouping, and to direct
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 CPY T
the efforts of the motorized rifle and tank soyelineniya along the
shortest routes against those targets whtch ensure the rapid advance
of the troops and the rapid exploitation of the results of friendly
nuclear strikes with the aim of completing the destruction of the
enemy. Depending upon the direction of the main effort, other lines
of attack are developed to ensure the destruction of the basic enemy
grouping.
The strength and composition of the shock and other troop group-
ings of the operational ob'yedineniya or soyedineniya and their
formations are made with a consideration of the size of the basic
enemy grouping, but primarily in accordance with the amount and power
of the nuclear ammunition issued for its destruction. Consideration
should be given to the possible changeb in the strength and composition
of the basic enemy grouping as a result of nuclear strikes delivered
against it during the course of the operation.
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The bases of coordinated action of one' c own operational ob' ' yediniye
with adjacent ones and with other types of armed forcer, are usually deter-
mined by the missions. In so doing, the objectives in the off. ens:Lve zone of
one's own operational ob''yed:Lneniya against which the adjacent operational
ob"yedineniya must deliver nuclear ati?ikers or apply other means of combat
ure selected and defined, as well, any the objectives in the offennivci zone of
the adjacent elements against which wu must deliver nuclear strikes. Further-
more objectives are determined for Joint strikes by one's own and
troops during the course of offensive operations in the interests of the
rapid and complete destruction of the basic encmy grouping.
In developing the concepts of operation consideration should be given
to the possible results of friendly and enemy strategic nuclear strikes de-
livered in the offensive zone of the operational ob "yedinen:Lya .
It should be kept in mind that the frequent and sharp, and at the
same time ma'or, changes in the situation during the course of operations
undoubtedly will. introduce major corrections into the concepts and will
frequently require its reformulation.
The operational concept is the result of the great personal creative
activity of the commander. However, the chief of staff must always be
ready to report his suggest ons regarding the operational concept to the
commander. During the process of developing the concept, short exchanges of
ideas between the commander and the chief of staff are possible, as well as
the use of reports, calculations, and ideas of the commanders of arms and
chiefs" of services.
The operational concept which responds more to the question of "what
"
to do
is basic for all subsequent decisions by the commander, which
primarily answer the question of "how to do it" and anticipate the most
effective means of guiding troop combat operations.
The decisions of the commanders must always be bold, purposeful,
valid, and, most important, must always conform to the concept of the
operation and the situation. Decisions which do not answer these require-
ments cannot ensure the successful attainment of the objectives of the
operation. In view of the extremely important significance of the deci-
sions, the commander should make them personally and independently.
One cannot agree, for example, with the expressions of some com-
rades to the effect that in modern, very complex conditions, the best
method for taking a decision is by a group, that is, when the decision is
made not so much by the commander, as by a group of generals and officers
subordinate to him and with his participation. The use of such a method
during the course of operational preparation will undoubtedly be detrimental
to the act of training and educating the resolute qualities of a commander.
It stands to reason thaftwhen necessary, the commander may discuss and seek
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 CPYRGWtTnrn%,Prl Fnr RPIPact ?nnn/nR/n9 - CIA-RfPRSTnnR75Rnnn3nnngnn9n-d
the advice of the chief of staff and other of his subordinates but he is
the one who must make the personal decision?
Because the work load of the commanders has increased considerably,
while the time for Its execution has become quite short,. some comrades have
suggested that part of the commanders' functions 'be transferred to the chiefs
of staffs, commanders of arms, and chiefs of services, thus simultaneously
raising their, responsibility and independence. This can hardly be correct.
Can the responsibility of the commanders for troop leadership be decreased
to any degree as a result of reducing the work load on them? Of course
not. The commanders must always be fully responsible for troop direction,
for the fate of the operation or battle, and, in particular, for the
execution of those functions which, let us assume, would be transferred to
the chiefs of staffs, the commanders of arms, and chiefs of services. The
question is not one of reducing the load on the commanders, but in tire-
lessly raising their level of operational-tactical and military-technical
training, in strengthening the practical skills of troop direction and their
resolute qualities, and in the best organization of their work. This is
the route which should be followed in preparing commanders for troop leader-
ship.
Operational decisions may be general and local. General operational
decisions are usually made for the entire operation or for the e::ecution of
the immediate troop mission, and anticipate the application of all forces
and means of the operational ob ''yedineniya. Local operational decisions
are usually made during the course of an operation as a result of changes
in the situation and anticipate the employment of individual operational
ob '' yedieniya or soyedineniya. These decisions, as an example, include:
the use of second echelons and reserves; the forcing of water barriers and
crossing zones of radioactive contamination; and the temporary transition
from offense to defense in one sector or another. It should be kept in
mind that sharp changes in the situation during the course of contemporary
offensive operations will require decisions of this nature more frequently
than in the past war.
The organization activity of a commander is usually based on the
operational concept and the decisions taken to execute it with the objective
of ensuring its successful execution.
The most important thing in the organizational activity of commanders
is that of rapidly making their decisions known to subordinate troops. This
is accomplished through the issuance of directives, combat orders, and
instructions. Only after the troops have received the decision can they
begin to put it into operation.
The commanders' decision must be made known to the immediate users
so rapidly, so far in advance, that the latter would have sufficient time
in which to make their own decisions and prepare the troops for, combat
operations.
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 The rapid transmission of directives, combat orders, and inatructionFl
in contemporary conditions assumes such importance that the decision as to
the methods and means of their transmission should be taken to a lesser de-
gree by the chief of staff of an operational ob "yedineniye or soyed i neniye.
The fundamentals of organizing an operation or battle must always be
personally determined by the commander. He is the only one who can give
instructions as to who, what, and when it must be organized, so that all sub-
ordinate troops are in: full combat readiness to execute promptly the assigned
missions. In so doing, the commanders must identify what he will organize
personally and what must be organized by his immediate assistants. The
solution of this question will always depend primarily on the amount of time
available for preparing for the operation or battle.
Thus for example, with a minimum amount of time to prepare for an
offensive operation, the commander, undoubtedly, will assume the organiza-
tion of the nuclear strike and the offensive by the motorized rifle and
tank troops, as well as the preparation of the combat activities of the
second echelons and the reserves. He can do all of this work with the com-
mander of the rocket troops and artillery, the commander of the air army,
the chiefs of the engineer and chemical troops, and with-,certain other of
his closest assistants.
Simultaneously the chief of staff together with the chiefs of staffs
of arms and the chiefs of services and staff sections, in accordance with
the decision and itis?hructions of the commander, usually organize the fol-
lowing: reconniassance and Other forms of operational.snnnor.t, com-
munications and troop control, as well as control, over
the combat readiness of the troops.
However in even the most complex situation in which the preparation
for the operation will be taking place, the commander st ft,jnd the time
in order to inspect personally the organization of the econnaissance,
air defense, and the preparation of the rear area.
In this manner, the chiefs of arms and services may participate in
crganizing the operation under the leadership of the troop commander and
the chief of staff. Together with this, they will be conducting inde-
pendent organizational activity for the execution, of missions which have
been assigned their arms and services.
On the instructions of the commander, and if time permits, the staff
of the operational ob "yedineniye develops the operation 'preparation plan
which identifies the organizational measures, those who will perform them,
and the period of execution. This plan is approved by 'the commander.
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 CPYRG
Organizational activity is necessary not onlyWin preparing for
but in the course of the operation. At this time it is conducted in a
more complex situation, therefore it has a different character and scope
than prior to the beginning of combat activities. For example, in view
of the extremely compressed time periods it will frequently be performed
in a decentralized manner, simultaneously by various individuals res-
ponsible for performing it, and over a broader front. Under these con-,
ditions the basic measures are organized personally by the commander.
The political activity of commanders in a nuclear war will. have a
very important significance, inasmuch as in this kind of a war the role
of the moral-,political factor and political work among friendly and enemy
troops will be far greater than previously. As the main organizer of an
operation or battle, the commander must understand deeper and better than
anyone else that the forceful effect of politics L work .pn the troops, will
be determined first of all by the concrete results of their actions during
the course of the operation.
The commander personally indentifies and aosigns the missions for
political activity. But before doing so it is useful for him to listen
to the concepts and suggestions of the chief of the poi4tical organ and
become acquainted beforehand with the fundamentals of the concept and the
decision. In order to identify these problems correctly the commanding
?officer must be well Aware of the military-political situation both in the
country and in the zone of the forthcoming activities of the operational
ob " yedineniye, and most important, to be constantly well aware of the
moral-political condition, of his troops and of the eneupr troops.
In conjunction with the fact that political activity is conducted
among friendly troops, enemy troops. as well as among the population,
the basic mission in this work is divided: among friendly troops, enemy
troops, and the population of the liberated territories.
The problems of political activity are placed before the troops
not only in preparing for the operation, but also during its course,
and particularly at critical times and at turning points during the com-
bat activities. Their contents must be closely tied in with the
situation and with the concrete missions of the troops.
The commander not only only sets the basic missions for political
activity but also determines the most effective forms of its work to
ensure a successful execution of the assigned missions:__
Troop leadership in a contemporary war demands that the commanders
have not only an outstanding knowledge of their activity, an inquisitive
mind, the capability and experience of troop direction, but also under the
most complex and difficult situations, be able to retain fortitude and
calm, and demonstrate decisiveness and initiative necedysary for over-
coming any dangers or difficulties encountered on the route to achieving
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success in the battle or operation.
In this kind of a war the moral strength of the onl:i.sted personnel
will. be subjected to great stresses and unprecedented trials,, and so
that they would be able to withstand them successfully it is necessary
to indoctrinate the Soviet soldiers, and primarily the cornmandQrs,
with high moral and political qualities. In so doing it is extremely
important thatthey be indoctrinated in Communist consciousness, in the
Ma,rxi nt-Leninist, outlook which will create a scientific basis for the
proper understanding of the essence and character of the laws and ten-
dencies of armed conflict and the development of military art will re-
?Inforce their confidence in our victory, will. facilitat9 the successful
execution of all missions of operational, combat, and political training
and will be an effective means of countering the pernicious bourgeois
ideologies. Only those commanders who possess a Marxisti-Leninist out-
look are capable of correctly understanding the essence and character
of the most complex phenomena in the political and military situation,
the natural law of armed combat, and will stubbornly and confidently
strive for a victory by our great work.
The Marxist-Leninist outlook is the basis for instilling the
commanders with fortitude, decisiveness, initiative, and ot__er resolute
qual:i.tie,s which have an important influence on troop leadership.
The fortitude of commanders lies in their constant responsibility
and readinesn to exercise bold and confident troop direction even under
the most complex and difficult conditions. Under the effect of nuclear
weapons and in a situation of massive lasses and dnstruCtion, the com-
manders must take bold and intelligent decisions and must carry full
responsibility for them before the Communist Party and the senior com-
mands and subordinate troops. A stern jucdE,r1101it foes not await that
commander who, in striving to execute his mission in the best way
possible, has permitted individual errors in his decision and suffers
certain failures,, but does await the one who did not find the necessary
fortitude to overcome fear of responsibility and at the needed moment
to make a bold decision requited by the situation and accompanied by a
certain risk.
The commanders must possess great will power which will help them
to suppress their own vacillations, indecisiveness, and feelings of fear
which emanate from danger and in the most complex situations mast retain
boldness of spirit, self-.assuredness, clarity of thought, and a high
responsibility. Such fortitude on the part of commanders is considerably
greater than their inherent personal bravery, fearlessness, and even
readiness to sacrifice themselves in battle.
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P
 C:PYRC;HT
"r''flowever, rcie-MMUc VIT ' I' c lit tc lid`l'd"urid"'rrite'I'1'1 den cled~ eon=
making only in those conditions when it is combined with coolness and
self-control on the part of the commander which lceepu him from malting
hasty, rash, and incorrect decisions and actions in difficult, and
dangerous situations and at the same time develops o:fecling of con-
fidence among the subordinate troops that under his direction they ..ill
Decisiveness by commanders is, first of all, an expression of
their fortitude. This important quality which frequently expresses it-
self during war, has particularly great influence on the course of the
combat operations by the troops. As we well know, the situation during
a war is never fully clear. However, the vagueness of -the situation does
not free the commanders from making a decision promptly.
Making a decision rapidly, particularly during the use of nuclear
weapons, and its firm and persistent realization guarantees successful.
troop leadership. It also happens, that tactical and operational de-
cisions are made slowly and with lack of sureness, especially when a
commander in trying to avoid mistakes, attempts to base a decision in
the suggestions made by his subordinates. If an earlier made decision
no longer corresponds to the situation, the commanders must find the
fortitude to promptly reject it and immediately take a new and more
purposeful decision. The military leader who is highly' trained,
courageous, decisive, full of initiative, and resolute is the one who
will win out in a war. Indecisiveness on the part of a commander during
the course of an operation will frequently result in inactivity and the
defeat of his subordinate troops. Indecisiveness and vacillation, on
the part of a commander, may bring about defeat even in the most favor-
able of conditions.
The commanders' initiative is, in essence, their developed in-
dependence, which in conjunction with their bravery and decisiveness
will permit them to take bold and intelligent decisions promptly under
those conditions when the situation has sharply changed and the missions
being executed by the troops no longer correspond to it, and when there
are no instructions from the higher command and action is necessary.
All decisions taken on the individual initiative.of a commanding
officer must be immediately made known to the higher command and to the
adjacent elements.
An intelligent initiative is built on an understanding of the con-
cept of the operation or battle, the mission of the senior operational
ob'' yedineniye and adjacent elements and is base in the desire to find
the most effective decision, to make maximum use of favorable possibili-
ties for the destruction of the enemy or the elimination of the danger
at hand. Initiative, unless part or all of these requirements have been
considered, may result in the destruction of one's own troops and failure
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 of the operation. Intelligent initiative must be encouraged and im-
mo(1f utel.y employed for the development of the success.
Commanders may manifest initiative to the fullest degree in those
conditions when their relation with the senior command is built on the
confidence of the senior in his subordinates. Unless the commander is
confident of support of his inift tive it is impossible to accept it;
moreover this may give birth to indecisiveness, passiveness, and
caution in action in the commander.
AU of the listed qualities of a commander may be trained and
developed if they have will power, that is, the capability to show
firmness and strength of character, under all conditions, permitting
them to resist the effects of various dangers and stresses of war.
It is necessary to emphasize that from the very beginning of a
war, the decisions of the commanders will be made and executed under
the threat of enemy nuclear strikes. This is where the: commanders
will need power, firmness, and fortitude in order to exercise con-
fident troop leadership under complex and difficult conditions.
A commander's will power will be more necessary in a nuclear war
than in previous wars. Only resolute commanders are capable of
demonstrating courage, decisiveness, and initiative under contemporary
combat conditions. Only a resolute commander will be able to lead his
sub:)rdinate troops out of the most difficult positions ,and achieve
success where they are threatened with destruction.
The commanders must be very exacting towards their subordinates
but combine this quality with a constant fatherly concern for them.
This exactingness is expressed first of all in the desire to-,attain
exact execution of orders and instructions., regulations,. and statutes.
However, exactingness by military leaders should have nothing
in common with crudeness, which only deeply hurts the soul of the
subordinates, brings forth their just protest, and decreases their
activity and efficiency.
"Vladimir Il'ich" recalls Fotiyev, "considered it-vile and un-
worthy of a Soviet person and a Communist to be crude to an individual
who is below him in position and therefore does not dare to answer,."
(Vospominaniya o Vladimire Il'iche Lenin , Recollections on Vladimir
Il'ich Lenin. Vol 2, State Publishing Haase for Political Literature,
1957, p 213).
Crudeness is the sign of weak and spineless military leader,
characterizing in him the lack of a capability to lead subordinates. A
resolute commander has no need to be crude.
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 Apl YiedA r 1 8 c`~~ct a~Q %q b-
ordinutes nu,t be conib:tnocl with the same high exactingness toward himself .
Subord:i.uuter; will always understand thane stern but just requirements
and will spare neither their life nor strength to curry them out.
Military leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the
socialist countries, leaning on their subordinate troops, will-never face
the dangers of war alone. In this lies the great advantage over the
military leaders of the bourgeois armies who are aligned with the
ruling classes against their own people and their representatives in the
army, and therefore cannot count upon their support. Oe should always
remember this great advantage of ours and make every possible use of it
in war.
It is evident from what has been said that the commanders must
constantly and persistently ready themselves to their very responsible
and complex activity in troop' leadership so that it could be widely and
successfully exploited in war.
For the purpose of training commanders in troop leadership, as we
see it, further studies should be expanded on certain problems and
questions of troop leadership. It would be useful to conduct such
studies on both an historical and theoretical plain. It is necessary
to show in these studies how the creative,, organizational, and political
activity of commanders and other military leaders are developed and
should be developed in an operation or battle, as well as the effect that
their personal qualities have and can have on troop leadership. In such
studies, it is necessary to expose the dangers and difficulties which
may arise during the process of troop leadership, and primarily to show
the most effective means of overcoming them.
Historical studies on the questions of troop leadership should be
based primarily on operations of the Great Patriotic War in which they
played an important role. However, studies should not be excluded on
the question of troop leadership in other operations of past wars if
they bring out those sides of the actions of commanders in troop leader-
ship wh.4.ch are also applicable for modern conditions. It is very im-
portant to study the direction of tank soydineniya and pb "yedineniya,
since the experience of their combat actions during the past war may
be useful for modern operations as well. Considerable interest and
great value may be presented by studies on the problems of directing
combined arms and airborne landing soyedineniya; as well as operational
ob' 'yedineniya in operations in which the employed means of combat
activities are close to modern ones.
Historical studies on the questions of operational ob"yedineniya
leadership in offensive operations during the past war will permit, with
great detail, to open all phases of commander activity in troop leader-
ship, as well as those personal qualities which had a positive effect
on this activity.
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It known that; historical experience is irregular inasmuch ac its
conclui;inns are bo,,ied on the stern practice of war. Each historical study
on the problems of troop leadership will provide rich material. for the
theoretical elaboration of this i nportant problem.
Theoretical. studies on the problems of troop leadership must recult
in the development of the content and order of comman u r activity in
operations and battles of a future ,-ar. In addition to historical. ex-
perience, these studies must make maximum use of the experience of post-
war training, which Is the sole basic in peacetime prodding the pos-
sibility for the fullest degree of studying all sides of commander ac-
tivity in troop leadership.
In the theoretical studies, it would be useful to have a simultaneous
examination of all phases of military leader activity in troop. leadership,
personal qualities, and methods for training these qualities.
Approximate themes for the theoretical study of the problems of
troop guidance could be: "leading a tank'division in &p offensive
operation"; "leading a motorized rifle division during the course of an
offensive operation by a combined arms army"; "leading a tank army in
the offensive operations of a front"; and "leading a combined arms araV
of the second echelon of a front in offensive operations", and others.
Similar themes for theoretical studies, developed within specific frame-
works and boundaries will give them the greatest purposefulness, concrete-
ness, and depth, and will make them easier to understand. Subjects of a
narrower nature would also be useful, w rich would be dqdicated to the
examination of a particular side of a complex activity of commanders in
troop leadership in one or several operations or battles. Of coarse all
of these studies should not be voluminous.
The theoretical development of the questions of troop leadership
may be realized in the form of descriptions of all or several sides of the
activity of commanders on the example of specific studies., practical
training, or war games. The basic purpose of such descriptions, based on
the concrete examples of combat actions of soyedineniya and operational
ob''yedineniya formulated during the course of command and staff training
or war games, would be to show the activity of commanders in troop leader-
ship. In studying such descriptions, the young and still insufficiently
experienced commanders, would be able to understand and master the basics
of troop leadership more rapidly.
In the formulation of such descriptions, the selected concrete
example is divided into several problems each of which contains. a short
tactical-operational-situation, the development of one of the questions
of commanding officer activity, and the examination of this question.
Furthermore, some of the problems jriay show well-developed directives,
combat orders, instructions, and tactical-operational considerations.
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 CPYRGI-T
The ntaniber of ouch problcnw in the clcr,cr.l htY oiA will be deter. mined by
the n.umbc,r of qucutionn characterizing, the art T.vity or the commander
diocuriced in the doucr.iption.
The moat effective form of training commartdcrr, for troop leader..
ship to in command and stuff and troop exercises as well as in war
games, at which all phases of their activity ore worked out in a cot'i-
c.rcte situut.ton and thci.r personal qualities, necessary for successful
troop leadership are developed. The greater the complexity of the Gi-
tuation during such exercises and war games, the greater will be the
results of commander training and education. The operational maturity
and degree or 1r.airling of military leaders for troop leadership receive::
its greatest exposure durinz; exercises and in war games.
Experl' nce has shown that during the course of exercises and war
games basic attention is given to -Improving the creative activity of
commanders. During ouch exercises and war game-, their organizational
and especially political, activity is occasionally insufficiently or-
ganized. The same may also be said on educating the personal qualities
of the commanders. It stands to reason that we should not overlook the
fact that organizational activity of commanders can be developed during
all exercises and war games, while their political activity, ao a rule,
is developed only during troop exercises where real conditions are
established for this.
Earlier we spoke of the fact that all activity by commander;, in
troop leadership must now be accomplished several times faster than
during the past war. This rapidity of commander activity is now
facilitated by a wide use of mea'.is of mechanization and automation.
In view of this, systematic training exercises for commanders on the use
of new technical means of control are assuming greater significance.
These exercises must be preceded by exercises and war games. Everything
must be done so that the commanders would not feel thetitoelves con-
strained by this new equipment but would be completely at ease with i,
As it seems to us, the implementation of all of these measures
can improve the training of commanders for troop leadership and will
facilitate higher quality of work by the staffs and political organs.
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