TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070043-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: October 17, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
17 OCTOBER 1974
l`JOL . Xx~ , NO. 42)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Socurity Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
17 OCTOBER 1974
CONTENTS
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Brezhnev Urges Progress on Trade, Slaps U.S. Delays. . . . . . .
1
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
USSR Plays Down Kissinger Trip, Stresses Support for. Arabs .
2
U.S.-POLAND
Moscow, Warsaw Praise Gierek Visit, Emphasize Bloc Ties. . . . .
4
USSR
Article on Anniversary of Khrushchev Ouster Boosts Brezhnev. . .
6
Practice of Honoring Brezhnev Becoming Standard at Meetings. . .
6
VIETNAM
DRV Government Statement Endorses PRG Call for Thieu's Ouster. .
8
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
USSR Environmental Warfare Ban Proposal Given Little Fanfare . .
11
ASIAN SECURITY
Moscow Injects anti-China Polemics Into Samarkand Conference . .
13
PERU
Moscow Approvingly Assesses Lima Policies, Downplays Arms Aid.
15
NOTES
PRC-Taiwan; USSR-PRC-Disarmament; PRC-Germany-USSR;
Historical Article Defends Chou; Chinese Education;
FRC Province on Foreign Trade; Moscow on U.S. African Policy;
GDR Reparations Issue. .
17
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . , .
i
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- 1 -
U,S,-SOVIET R ELATIONS
BREZHNEV URGES PROGRESS ON TRADE, SLAPS U, S, DELAYS
In a speech evidently calculated to out pressure on the U.S.
Administration regarding the most-favored-nation issue, Brezhnev
told the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council in the Kremlin
on 15 October that attempts to attach conditions to U.S.-Soviet
trade relations were "utterly irrelevant and unacceptable."
Repeatedly stressing the need for prompt action in removing
restrictions on trade, Brezhnev implied that continued delays
in this regard might jeopardize the progress already achieved
in U.S,-Soviet relations.
Although Brezhnev did not mention it, the U.S. Administration's
move on 5 October to hold up Soviet purchases of grain in the
United States may have played a role in determining the tone
of his speech. In. addition, the current troubles of the U.S.
economy, which he described in exceedingly bleak terms in his
speech in Kishinev on 11 October, may have contributed to the
sense of urgency he displayed.
Although laced with warnings, Brezhnev's speech was not entirely
negative or devoid of optimistic notes, Indeed, the warnings
had more to do with matters of pace than of substance. As far
as the substance of policy was concerned, Brezhnev made it clear
that he was satisfied with what the United States had done thus
far and with the "stated intentions" of the Ford Administration.
He averred, moreover, that the Soviet Union was committed to
seeking improved economic relations with the United States and that
this policy was solidly grounded on ideological principles and
national tradition. It was, he saiC, an "immutable line of our
party" bequeathed to u;, by Lenin, and to buttreus the point he
quoted Lenin as having said: "We are decidely for an economic
understanding with Ame:i.ca--with all countries, but especially
with America,"
Soviet media treatment of the speech and the meeting of the U.S.-
Soviet Trade and Economic Council has projected a positive image
of the proceedings. TASS's English summary of Brezhnev's speech,
although including the negative aspects, was framed in such a way
as to play up the positive, The Moscow domestic service reported
the course of the meetings and, in addition, carried interviews
with Secretary Simon both at the start and at the conclusion of the
meetings. Both. interviews seemed calculated to project a favorable
image of Secretary Simon and of U,S. policy.
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
USSR PLAYS Mill KISSINGER TRIP, STRESSES SUPPORT FOR ARABS
Against the background of Secretary Kissinger's latest discussions
in the Middle East regarding an Arab-Israeli settlement, Moscow has
beet: depicting its role in Middle East affairs as dynamic and
ongoing. Remarks by Brezhnev and routine comment have reaffirmed
the Soviet position on key Middle East issues and emphasized
areas of increasing Soviet-Arab contacts and cooperation as well
as "principled" Soviet support to the Arab cause. Coinciding
with Kissinger's 9-15 October trip to the area, these efforts
testify to Moscow's continuing concern that it maintain its
claim in the achievement of a future settlement. This concern
over a Soviet role was underscored with the announcement by
TASS on the 15th that Brezhnev and Egyptian Foreign Minister
Fahmi, meeting that day in Moscow,. agreed that a Soviet-:--
Egyptian summit meeting would take place in Cairo in January,
BREZHNEV SPEECH Observing that the Middle East situation
"deserves to be dwelt on," Brezhnev in an
11 October speech in Kishinev implicitly referred to Secretary
Kissinger's earlier diplomatic efforts in remarking that the
Ceneva conference had been replaced by "group talks" on troop
disengagement. He called such military separations a useful
"initial measure," but pointed out that this did not solve the
main question of a "complete" settlement. He strong.iy reasserted
the standard Soviet position on resumption "without delay" of
the Geneva conference, accusing Israel and its "traditional
foreign patrons" of seeking to avoid reconvening the Geneva talks.
Brezhnev warned that such delay and the continued Israeli occupation
of Arab lands created a situation that aided only Israel and
could "explode at any moment." At the same time, Brezhnev noted
that the Soviets "highly value our contacts with Arab leaders"
and added that "under present conditions" such contacts are
especially necessary and useful.
Followup comment on Brezhnev's remarks placed them in the context
of Secretary Kissinger's most recent initiatives: The 13 October
Moscow radio observers' roundtable, for example, explicitly
contrasted the uncertainty of U.S. policies and motives underlying
the Kissinger trip with the consistency and principled position
of the Soviet Union as reaffirmed by Brezhnev. In the same context,
the roundtable discussion einphasiz'd that the Brezhnev speech was
"in the center of attention of the international public" and
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reiterated many of his remarks on the Middle East. PRAVDA on
the 13th highlighted world media reaction to Brezhnev's remarks,
claiming that the U.S. press was "concentrating most attention"
on his speech and quoting from his remarks. And a TASS commentary
by K. Dudarev on thE. 14th amplified the same theme, stating that
Brezhnev's remarks were being received "everywhere" as fresh
proof that the USSR "is actively involved in the efforts to
resolve the Middle East crisis."
KISSINGER TRIP Moscow's public treatment of Secretary Kissinger's
recent trip sought to place it in a context that
would minimize both its immediate significance and any eventual
ach.'evements, while avoiding predictions of the probable course and
outcome of the new U.S. diplomatic efforts. Much of the Soviet
comment has stressed that present U.S, policy in the Middle East
is motivated primarily by a need to bring about reductions in Arab
oil prices, which hoscow describes as a vital necessity for the
economically troubled West and a goal that explains the expedient
modification--not abandonment--of the traditional pro-Israel
nature of U.S. policy. The most polemical comment, for the most
part in Arabic-language broadcasts by Moscow radio and Radio Peace
and Progress, in some instances reduced U,S. policy goals and
motivation to this factor alone. Most con-nent, however, while
mentioning the issue of oil prices, has generally characterized the
trip as opening a new series of U.S, maneuvers which might--at the
limit of success--extract some "partial concessions" from Israel
and thereby assist the quest for a final settlement.
In a 10 October IZVESTIYA article pegged to Secretary Kissinger's
seventh round of Middle East "shuttle diplomacy," senior political
observer A. Bovin in commenting on the disengagement agreements
remarked that "half-measures" do "play a role" in politics. He
repeated the usual assertion that such partial measures could
serve to "freeze" a situation. But in an unusually favorable
observation on "half-measures," he claimed that they could also
"serve as a useful means for shifting the situation from a stand-
still and facilitating radical advances." He seemed to suggest
that there were proponents of both views in Washington, professing
to see one trend alined with Israeli interests and another "believing
it expedient to increase the distance between the United States
and Israel." He found it "hard to predict the outcome of the
clash" between these and other contradictory forces and trends, but
anticipated that Kissinger's visit "should elucidate Washington's
intentions." In any case, Bovin concluded with the standard call
for immediate resumption of the Geneva conference machinery.
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U. S, -POLAND
MOSCOW, WARSAW PRAISE GIEREK VISIT., EMPHASIZE BLOC TIES
PZPR First Secretary Edward Gierek's 8?-13 October visit to the
United States was praised by both Moscow and Warsaw as an
important contribution to East-West detente and a demonstration
of socialist Poland's growing prestige in the worlc:. Moscow's
detailed coverage and comment on Gierek's trip contrasted with
the spotty, uninformative Soviet treatment of the December 1973
visit to Washington by Romania's Ceausescu--the only other top
leader of an East European Warsaw Pact country to visit the
United States. Moscow and Warsaw comment, as well as Gierek's
public statements during his U.S. tour, regularly included
references to the solidity of Poland's alliance with the USSR
and its allies, a point stressed also in the notably heavy
volume of advance comment in Polish media that followed the
28 August joint announcement by Moscow and Warsaw of the
impending visit. Predictably, there was no mention in Soviet
or Polish comment of Warsaw's most-favored-nation status in
trade with the U.S., a distinction enjoyed only by Poland and
Yugoslavia among the communist states.
POLAND'S INTER- Warsaw comment showed a preoccupation with
NATIONAL STATUS the "equality" of the U.S. and Poland as
negotiating partners and with what it viewed
as an enhanced appreciation of Poland on the part of the Americans.
Thus, a PAP correspondent's report on the 14th, entitled "America
Discovers Poland," declared that "for the first time during Edward
Gierek's visit, the American press said openly that Poland, a
member of the great socialist community, plays an active and
constructive rolE:" in strengthening detente. The commentary
portrayed U.S. economic and political circles as having been
compelled by Poland's achievements to revise upward their assess-
ment of the Polish market and Polish industry. An observation
in the 14 October commentary that the new American appreciation
of Poland was based not on "altruism" but on "sober assessment"
may have been inserted to offset the effusively?favorable treat-
ment of the United States by Warsaw media during Gierek's visit.
Gierek's speeches, which repeatedly mentioned Poland's achieve-
ments under the socialist system, stressed at the same time his
country's close identification with the Soviet bloc. Thus, in
his address to Congress on the 9th he declared that Poland,
"together with the USSR and other allies," was dedicated ..o making
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detente irreversible. And at the National Press Club the same
day he added that the "common line" of the USSR and its allies on
detente "was fully reasserted at this year's conference of the
Warsaw Pact"--the April Pact Political Consultative Committee
meeting in the Polish capital. Without mentioning Brezhnev or
Nixon, the Polish leader also paid tribute in his speeches to the
contribution of the U.S.-Soviet dialog to detente. While Moscow
and Warsaw provided only a sketchy account of the question-and-
answer session following Gierek's Press Club speech, they did
report his reply to a question on the stationing of foreign troops
in Europe. The reports quoted Gierek to the effect that, while
the withdrawal of foreign tro'jps was a "complicated" quiestior.,
it "would eventually be solved following a growth in international
confidence."
GROMYKO VISIT As if to avoid any hint of possible Soviet
TO WARSAW dictation to Gierek, the publicity surrounding
the 29 September-1 October unannounced visit
to Warsaw by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko .,mitted any
reference to the Polish leader's impending visit to the United
States. PRAVDA's 2 October report on Gromyko's visit mentioned
only briefly his talks with Gierek, dwelling instead on his meetings
with Foreign Minister Olszowski, which dealt with Soviet-Polish
relations and "urgent questions of the current international
situation." Gromyko was awarded Poland's Order of Merit by Gierek
for his work in behalf of "the foreign policy of the USSR and
the whole socialist community" and Soviet-Polish relations.
PRC., ALBANIA NCNA on 15 October carried a recap of the major
ON GIEREK TRIP events and agreements concluded during Gierek's
American trip. The Warsaw-datelined report
highlighted Polish-U.S. "satisfaction" over the progress achieved
and the prospects for future economic relations. NCNA noted,
where Warsaw and Moscow did not, that Gierek's visit was in return
for "the U.S. President's visit to Poland in 1972." The Tirana
party daily ZERI I POPULLIT on 5 October denounced Gierek's
upcoming visit in a commentary headed "Polish Revisionists On the
Road of Consolidating Relations With the United States."
Portraying an increasing exploitation of Poland's economy by
U.S. capital with Moscow's approval, the paper noted that Poland
had been granted most-favored-nation status by Washington.
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U S S R
ARTICLE ON ANNIVERSARY OF KHRUSHCHEV OUSTER BOOSTS BREZHNEV
PRAVDA's long 13 October editorial article on the anniversary of
the October 1964 Central Committee plenum which put Brezhnev
and Kosygin in power reveals a strong pro-Brezhnev bias. It
plays down what was proclaimed at the time as the main achieve-
ment of the plenum--the reestablishment of collectivity following
Khrushchev's ouster--and notes instt.?d that the Politburo is
"headed by" Brezhnev. Further, in discussing the accomplishments
of the past 10 years, it completely ignored Kosygin's economic
reform and the September 1965 plenum which enacted it, while
lauding the March 1965 plenum at which Brezhnev presented his
agricultural program. It attributes the economic successes of
the regime to measures largely. associated with Brezhnev, such as
the campaigns for socialist competition.
In discussing the latter, the editorial uses Brezhnev's December
1973 plenum distinction between the "two pillars'.' of party economic
policy: improvement of leadership of the economy and mobilization
of the masses. Vile not really elaborating on the first, it
devoted three paragraphs to the second, lauding the new forms and
methods for mobilizing the masses developed in the last three or
four years and attributing.to them a big role in economic growth.
The all-union socialist competition--of which Brezhnev was the
initiator--is credited with helping surpass the 1974 pledges for
5 billion rubles of above-plan industrial production and raise
labor productivity faster than planned.
In the meantime, further. support for the hortatory approach to
economic problems was registered by Brez:.nev protege, Ukrainian
First Secretary Shcherbitskiy, in a 4 October speech to Ukrainian
ideological officials reported in the 9 October RADYANSKA UKRAINA.
Noting Brezhnev's 7 September Novorossiysk appeal for even wider
development of socialist competition, Shcherbitskiy stressed that
all propaganda and media work must be concentrated on whipping up
the workers to prefulf.ill the five year plan.
PRACTICE OF HONOR.NG BREZHNEV BECOMING STANDARD AT MEETINGS
The practice of describing the election of the Politburo "headerl
by" Brezhnev as honorary presidium at Soviet meetings has become
standard over the past year, although anomalies in press reporting
of these formalities still crop up from time to time. The most
recent inconsistency in reporting was in connection with the
9 October Moscow conference of peace supporters.
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The TASS accou:it of the peace conference carried by PRAVDA and
a half dozen other central newspapers on 10 October reported
that the conference had elected the Politburo "headed by"
Brezhnev. IZVESTIYA's account, however, written by its own
reporters on the scene, reported the election of the Politburo
without mentioning Brezhnev. The confusion was compounded by
RURAL LIFE, which carried the rather lengthy TASS account but
omitted the sentence mentioning the election of the presidium--a
highly unusual act, since as a rule the papers carefully include
this item in even the briefest accounts of such meetings. While
this appears to be the .first case of contradictory reporting on
this point by central papers, TASS in at least one case in the
past--on 22 December 1973--included the "headed by" Brezhnev
formulation in its account of the election of the Politburo at
a local meeting in Tadzhikistan, though the local newspaper had
failed to use the Brezhnev formulation.
The practice of describing the election of honorary presidiums
"headed by" Brezhnev was itself an anomaly only a year ago. In
late 1973 the "headed by Brezhnev" phrase began to be added to
the impersonal formula, which mentioned the Politburo but not
Brezhnev, and by early 1974 had become virtually file uniform
practice. This pactern was disrupted by a 23 August 1974 miners'
day ceremony, which reverted to the old practice of reporting
the election of a Politburo without mention of Brezhnev.* The
oddity of the occurence was pointed up in the Ukrainian press,
which carried the TASS account of the Moscow ceremony, omitting
the Brezhnev honorific, along with a report on the Ukrainian
miners' day ceremony which elected the Politburo "headed by"
Brezhnev.
Since the miners' day an:,,naly, meetings reported in the central
press have resumed the practice of referring to the Politburo
"headed by" Brezhnev. PRAVDA alone reported 10 such meetings
during September. However, a second anomaly appeared in the
8 September PRAVDA report of the Novoross iysk liberation anniversary.
It was noted that the ceremony, addressed by Brezhnev himself,
elected the Politburo, but there was no mention of Brezhnev heading
it. Brezhnev's presence clearly was not the reason, since he was
present at other meetings, both before and after this event, which
reportedly elected the Politburo "headed by Brezhnev" as honorary
presidium.
Reports of provincial meetings, while normally adhering to the
standard Moscow practice, also occasionally refer simply to the
election of "the Politburo" as honorary presidium. Such cases were
reported, for example, in the 18 September SOVIET BELORUSSIA and
the 11 and 14 September RADYANSKA UKRAINA.
* The 24 August instance on Soviet miners' day is discussed in the
TRENDS of 28 August 1974 ages 20-21.
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VIETNlA#1
DRV GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ENDORSES PRG CALL FOR THIEUIS OUSTER
An 11 October DRV Government statement has supported the 8 October
PRG statement that gave official sanction to revived Vietnamese
communist calls for the ouster of Thieu, but the DRV statement
failed to mention the PRG's avowed willingness to meet at the
negotiating table with a newly constituted administration in Saigon
following Thieu's departure.* While both statements focused
mainly on the "present situation in South Vietnam," the DRV
Government stateme:t--the first since March 1974, when one was
issued supporting the PRG six-point proposal for implementation
of the 1973 Paris agreement--broadened its scope to draw attention
to longstanding grievances against the United States. These
included claims of intrusions by U.S. ships and aircraft into
North Vietnam's territorial waters and airspace and allegations
of U.S. refusal to provide the North with reconstruction assistance
under the provisions of the Paris agreement.
The latest DRV statement described the "unbearable" situation that
the uuiLed States and Thieu have allegedly caused in the South and
claimed that there is now a "widespread and powerful movement"
involving a broad range of people in the urban and rural areas
controlled by Saigon who are "demanding . . . the overthrow of the
corrupt, dict^torial, and warlike Thieu." Declaring that the DRV
government "fully supports" the PRG stand defined in its 8 October
statement, the statement repeated verbatim the PRG's two main
demands that the United States terminate its "military involvement
and interference" in the South and that Thieu be overthrown and
replaced with an administration willing to irplement the Paris
agreement.
NEGOTIATIONS While the DRV Government statement failed to refer
to the PRG offer to negotiate with an administration
which replaces the Thieu government, this offer has been noted in
other Hanoi propaganda. The 9 October NHAN DAN editorial on the
PRG statement, for example, implied approval of the PRG offer by
claiming that it was an indication of PRG "good will." The first
known reference to negotiations with a new Saigon regime appeared
in a 19 September Liberation Radio broadcast. Hanoi in reviving
* The PRG statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 October 1974,
pages 11-12.
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the demand for Thieu's ouster over a month earlier in a 15 August
NHAN DAN editorial, by contrast, had vaguely indicated only that
a new Saigon regime would implement the Paris agreement.
BACKGROUND: Although Hanoi and the PRG had protested the original
suspension of the bilateral consultative talks at La Celle-Saint-
Cloud, precipitated by Saigon on 16 April in retaliation for alleged
communist seizure of the Tonle Cham base earlier in the month, the
PRG in mid-May formally declared its own suspension of participa-
tion in the conference, as well as in the two-party Joint Military
Commission (JMC), allegedly because of Saigon's "negative attitude."
While the PRG had previously boycotted individual JMC sessions in
the past, this constituted the first indefinite postponement of
the meetings. This was followed up in late May with statements by
PRG and DRV military delegations to the four-party JMC announcing
indefinite suspension of their participation in the four-party
meetings, thus completely severing all formal negotiating ties
with Saigon and the United States, After a brief resumption of
JMC meetings in June, the PRG and DRV later in the month--on the
eve of former President Nixon's trip to Moscow--announced the most
recent complete termination of its participation in all talks,
blaming this last rupture on Saigon's "refusal" to discuss "full
implementation" of the privileges and immunities for the communist
teams in the South,*
CHARGES AGAINST While Hanoi from time to time has routinely
UNITED STATES issued foreign ministry spokesmen's statements
charging the United States with conducting
overflights of the DRV for aerial reconnaissance, the most recent
protest being lodged on 12 October, the issue of the U.S.. obligation
under Article 21 of the Paris agreement to contribute to postwar DRV
reconstruction has not been raised in monitored Hanoi media in
recent weeks. In the past the propaganda has injected complaints
of U.S. noncompliance with Article 21 into discussions of U,S,
servicemen still missing in action, and it was in this context
that the last such reference was noted in a Hanoi radio commentary
broadcast on 3 August, In a more recent menrion, Budapest domestic
service on 27 August--in reporting a press conference given by tht
DRV ambassador to Hungary--quoted him as alluding to U.S. "unwilling-
ness" to observe the provisions of Article 21,
* For discussions of communist moves concerning negotiations, see
the TRENDS for 24 April 1974, pages 20-21; 15 May 1974, pages 9-10;
30 May 1974, pages 12-13; 5 June 1974, page 18; and 26 June 1974,
pages 12-1.^,.
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PEKING CUi-iIENT Pekin' responded to the PRG and DRV government
sta::,.,,.-_nts, of 8 and 11 October, respectively,
with a PEOPLE'S DAILY C:-l:entator article which offered general
support for the Vietnamese demands but did not directly c:.ll for
Thieu's overthrow and played down Vietnamese charges against the
United States. Commentator noted the Vietnamese position,
including the "legitimate demand" for Thieu's overthrow, but did
not list the specifics of the Vietnamese position in offering the
Chinese people's "firm support" for their "Just and solemn stand."
Like the DRV statement, the article made no mention of the PRG
offer to negotiate with a new Saigon regime. It did, however,
lambaste the Thieu administration as a "tool" of the United States
and a "serious obstacle" to implementing the Paris agreement.
The 15 October article is only the third authoritative PRC
comment in support of Vietnamese statements this year. Previous
PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles, Peking's lowest level of
authoritative comment, were issued in response to PRG and DRV
government statement's on the PRG's 22 March six-point proposal
and on foreign ministry statements on the PRG's breaking off talks
with Saigon in May.
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- 11 -
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
USSR ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE BAN PROPOSAL GIVEN LITTLE FANFARE
Moscow's latest disarmament "initiative" at the United Nations,
a proposal to ban environmental warfare, has received only
token publicity since it was first made public in a letter
from Gromyko to UN Secretary General Waldheim in early August.
The letter, delivered on 7 August and published in PRAVDA two
days later, set the pattern for subsequent comment. Moscow has
largely avoided making any connection between the proposal and
the passage in the joint Brezhnev-Nixon statement, after the
Moscow summit this past summer, regarding exploratory talks on
the problem of environmental modification techniques for military
purposes,
DRAFT PROPOSAL Gromyko in his August letter and his 24 Septemoer
General Assembly add_ess explained the Soviet
initiative as prompted by the progress in scientific and technical
knowledge which creates new possibilities "for the use of the
results of this progress not only for peaceful but also for
military purposes," A model treaty ide public by Moscow on
2" ?=p..ember, declared that all sio..~tury states would undertake
not to develop meteorological, geophysical or any other scientific-
technical means of modifying the natural environment for military
and other purposes incompatible with the well-being and health
of people. Enumerating a long list of categories which would
fall under the definition of "modifications," the draft treaty
made clear that the ban would not affect future programs aimed
at conserving and improving the natural environment for peaceful
purposes, a point emphasized in Gromyko's August letter and
stressed in subsequent comment. According to the model treaty,
the main international controlling body for verification procedures
would be the UN Security Council, thus insuring Moscow's own
interest; through the Soviet veto.
U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT The minimal comment on the environmental
initiative has for the most part failed
to recall the passage in the joint Brezhnev-Nixon statement this
past summer which said the sides' "advocate the most effective
measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environ-
mental modification techniques for military purposes" and would
start exploratory talks on this pr.oble? Gromyko made no reference
to this passage either in his August letter to Waldheim or his UNGA
speech, although in the latter he did touch on other agreements
reached during the recent summit.
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In one of the few detailed discussions of the environmental
proposal, a participant in a panel. program broadcast by Moscow
radio in English on 29 September pointed out that the Soviet
initiative was "definitely" in keeping with the spirit of the
U.S.-Soviet bilateral statement and that the new proposal was
for "an international convention that would enforce a universal
ban" on environmental modification for military purposes. And
as if to demonstrate a favorable Washington reaction to the
Soviet move, TASS on 25 September reported a statement by Davies,
assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
in such a manner as to make It appear in support ci the Soviet
action.
Comment on the proposal has generally refrained from resurrecting
past charges of U.S. "ecocide" through "meteorological warfare"
in Vietnam, although the subject has been broached in passing.
Thus a participant in the radio discussion program on the 29th
remarked that "one of the reasons for the concern about weather
modification" was that "the world has already seen such urFShods
of warfare tested by the United States in Indochina."
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17 OCTOBER 1974
ASIAN SECURITY
MOSCOW INJECTS ANTI-CHINA POLEMICS INTO SA11ARKAND CONFERENCE
The official "appeal" adopted by the Soviet-sponsored 25-28
September Asian Security Conference in Samarkand and Tashkent
offered largely standard Soviet formulations on collective
security. Although the appeal itself did not refer to China,
the chief Soviet delegate criticized China at length in his
main address. The appeal from a similar Dacca conference in
May 1973 had indirectly criticized China's policy toward
Bangladesh and its rejection of Brezhnev proposals for Asian
collective security,. Possibly enhanced Soviet interest in
this ye~c's conference was suggested b- the more prominent
leadership of the Soviet delegation--,-olit_buro Candidate member
Rashidov this time, co-npared with Supreme Soviet deputy Kamalov
at the earlier Dacca session--and by the fact Brezhnev himself
signed the traditional greetings to the Samarkand conference,
whereas Premier Kosygin had r'gned the Soviet message to Dacca.
The final conference appeal--aside from its omission of Peking
references--reflected in large part the thrust of Rashidov's
speech to the conference, praising Soviet foreign policy and
detente and advocating united action to insure peace and
security in Asia. Rashidov broke little new ground in discussing
the situation in Asia along lines set forth by B-ezhnev in his
October 1973 keynote speech to the Moscow World Peace Congress.
Ras*Udov declared that the situation in South Asia was becoming
"normalized" and that "favorable conditions" for a "stable and
lasting peace" and implementation of an Asian collective security
system were developing, The anti-_.Jhinese polemics in Rashidov's
speech ranged from warnings of "o',jective difficulties and
obstacles" hampering the cause of peace in Asia to direct attacks
on the "anti-Soviet slander" in the Chinese leadership's denunciation
of the Brezhnev proposals for Asian collective security, calling
the Peking response an effort to divert attention from its own
"hegemonistic, great-power" aspirations. Rashidov dismissed as
"fabrications" Chinese fears of "encirclement." by Moscow and
accused Peking of acting in the same "combat formation" with the
imperialists. A 28 September TASS report noted that "many"
Asian delegates also had criticized the Chinese, but did not
elaborate with details of their speeches.
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17 OCTOBER 1974
After the conference had ended, the anti-Chinese pole--cal
theme emerged more sharply in Soviet media treatment, which
during the sessions had focused on Brezh*iev's greetings message
and his high evaluation of the conference's work. A 5 October
PRAVDA editorial, for example, summarized the conference work
and attacked the Peking leadership for "distorting" the Asian
security concept with charges that Moscow allegedly was encircling
China, adding that all Asian states "without exception" should
join in a security arrangement. Soviet commentaries beamed to
South Asian and African listeners on the Samarkand conference
devoted approximately the same proportion of attention to
anti-Peking po. 'mics as in the 1973 Dacca conference.
PEKING IGNORES Peking followed its usual practice iui regard
CONFERENCE to Soviet-sponsored Asian security forums,
Ignoring the fact that such a conference had
even been held but reiterating its disdain in a passing comment
in a 27 September P7OPLE'S DAILY signed article. The article
noted that Soviet efforts to implement an Asian security system
were generally "ignored" and were doomed to "ignominious failure."
Peking's ally Albania, however, criticized the Samarkand meeting
directly in two commentaries carried by the ATA agency. They
characterized the conference as "revisionist demogogy" and
asserted that despite statements by "known followers of the
Kremlin clique," most delegates had "avoided" discussing the
collective security proposals.
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MOSCOW APPROVINGLY ASSESSES LIMA POLICIES, DOWNPLAYS ARMS AID
Since the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile, Moscow has
held up the left-leaning Peruvian Government as a model of proper
"progressive" and "anti-imperialist" policies in contrast to the
decadence of the Chilean junta and its "hysterical" anti-Peruvian
pronouncements. At the same time, responding to Chilean and
U.S. press criticism of Soviet military and other agreements with
Peru, Soviet comment has insisted that arms support is justified
by Chile's "increasing hostility" toward Peru, but has softpedaled
the extent of the USSR's involvement, claiming that it has been
exaggerated by Chilean journalists and "U.S. propaganda mis.Ln-
formation centers."
SOVIET-PERUVIAN While Moscow had displayed reticence regarding
RELATIONS Soviet arms sales to Peru, occasional comment
has justified Peru's military buildup. A
6 September Spanish-language commentary by Jose Miguel Varas,for
instance, deplored "virulent" anti-Peruvian statements and "false
charges" from Chilean news media, "abetted by U.S. interests,"
against Peru's arms program. Varas accused Chilean President
Pinochet of fabricating a motive for his own increasing military
equipment purchases and maintained that Peru had the right to
obtain "from any country whatsoever" the means to defend its
sovereignty.
Responding to criticism of anoth.ar Soviet-Peruvian agreement, a
13 October PRAVDA article reported by TASS denounced the "slanderous
campaign" against the Aeroflot agreement signed by Moscow and Lima.
PRAVDA charged that "hired pen-pushers" from the Chilean paper
EL MERCURIO were playing an "instigatory role" in seeking to
complicate Peru's relations wit; neighboring states. PRAVDA also
complained that some U.S. journalists, "in the same harness" with
the Chilean papers, were falsely claiming that the Aeroflot agree-
ment contained provisions which threatened Chile. The purpose of
such charges, PRAVDA said, was to present a distorted picture of
Peruvian foreign policy and to divert Latin American attention from
events in Chile.
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Earlier, a 2 October PRAVDA article by V. Listov attempted, in
typically roundabout fashion, to refute stories that the recently
constructed Peruvian fishing port of Paita was functioning as a
Soviet base. Listov quoted the Peruvian fisheries minister as
saying that Paita was a purely Peruvian complex. Rumors about
a Russian base, he asserted, originated in a "canard" prepared
by EL MERCURIO that Paita was becoming a Russian base for nuclear
submarines and nuclear missiles and that the port w's "inundated"
with Russian specialists.
ASSESSMENT OF Soviet comment in the past few months has
REGIME examined the general orientation of Lima's
military government against the background
of lessons learned from the failure of socialism in Chile,
encouraging sound economic programs and careful control of both
ultraleft and reactionary elements. Typifying the comment, a
Kuznetsov article in NEW TIDIES (No. 30, 26 July) praised Peru's
"sober assessment of the actual state of affairs" and the "opposi-
tion to pseudorevolutionary haste." The military government,
Kuznetsov observed, had placed chief emphasis on the economy and,
while "altering radically" the country's economic patterns, had
taken all steps necessary to prevent breakdowns which could be
exploited by "opponents of reform." Emphasizing that the regime
had won the support of the Peruvian Communist Party ' (PCP) , Kuznetsov
added that the PCP had rebuked "Trotskyites and ultraleftists" for
criticism of the government. Kuznetsov expressed confidence in
the regime despite increased "intrigues" by reactionary forces
both within and without the country.
Along the same lines, an Andrianov IZVESTIYA article on ?8 July
praised Peru's technical advances as well as the growth of "sincere,
cordial friendship" with the Soviet Union. He claimed that foreign
monopolies and local reaction had adopted the "Chilean experience"
of strikes, hoarding and other measures designed to create economic
chaos, but asserted that the Peruvian people were "suppressing all
onslaughts of reaction" and were determined that the current "deep-
ening of democratic reforms" would continue.
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NOTES
PRC-TAIWAN: Peking chose the occasion of the Republic of China's
National Day, 10 October, to show renewed interest in promoting
Chinese unity and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan impasse.
NCNA on the 10th reported that CCP Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying
that evening feted and had a "cordial" conversation with Shang
Chen, a former high-level Kuomintang military and political
leader who has been visiting China since late September. This
marked the first such meeting with a high-level PRC leader in
almost a year. On the same day a Peking broadcast to Taiwan
carried an "open letter" from a former KMT official residing in
the United States which stressed that "peaceful unification"
of Taiwan with the mainland represents "the people's desire"--the
first Peking reference to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
problem since early this year,
USSR-PRC-DISARMAMENT: Moscow has endeavored to discredit PRC
UN delegate Chiao Kuan-hua's 2 October endorsement of a nuclear-
free zone in South Asia by calling attention to Peking's allegedly
hostile intentions in the area, focusing especially on a claimed
buildup of Chinese forces in Tibet. An 8 October.Moscow commentary
in English to South Asia by Yevgeniy Nikolayev said that since
'I' het "stands too close" to tie "vital centers" of South Asian
naLlons, a nuclear-free zone cannot be considered without reference
to Peking's "missile and nuclear buildup" there. Nikolayev
stated that Pcking must prove its interest in a South Asia
nuclear-free zone by "concrete deeds," including the withdrawal
of missile and nuclear forces from Tibet. He also called for an
end to PRC nuclear testing in the atmosphere and a halt to
"behind the scenes bargaining with belligerent imperialist circles,"
as exemplified by PRC "agreement" to the U.S. Diego Garcia base.
PRC-GERMANY-USSR: NPC Vice Chairman Hsu Hsiang-chien, in remarks
at a 14 October banquet for visiting FRG legislators, voiced
Peking's strong support for German reunification while castigating
Soviet oppression of the German people since World War II. In
offering support for German reunification, the Chinese chose to
disregard recent changes in the GDR position, including the
revision of the GDR constitution to eliminate all language reflecting
East German dedication to eventual all-German unification. Going
far beyond Peking's bland calls in the past for an allied peace
treaty with Germany and a fair solution of the "abnormal situation"
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of a divided Germany, Hsu voiced Chinese understanding and sympathy
with the "resolute opposition" of the German people to a permanent
split of their nation and "their demand for national reunification."
Without explicitly mentioning the USSR, Hsu portrayed Moscow as
?-he chief opponent to reunification, charging that "those who
vainly, attempt to dominate the world" have long branded the
Germans with unwarranted labels as a pretext to extend their
presence "from the Elbe to the Rhine and from East Europe to
West Europe so as to dominate the people of the whole Germany
.and the wholr~ Europe." TASS commentator Vladimir Goncharov
promptly rebutted Peking on 15 October stating that the Chinese
position had underlined its recent disregard for the GDR--"a
socialist state on German soil;," and reflects Peking's aim to
incite West Germany and the rest of West Europe against the USSR,
HISTORICAL ARTICLE DEFENDS CHOU: Continuing the practice of
portraying current Chinese leadership problems through historical
analogies, an article in the October RED FLAG (reprinted in
PEOPLE'S DAILY and excerpted by Peking radio on 13 October)
used illustrations from legalist-Confucianist struggles to defend
Chou En-iai. The article by Liang Hsiao appears to be a response
to articles this summer, especially an August RED FLAG article
by Lo Ssu-ting, which may have pointed to Chou in blaming the
prime minister of Emperor Chinshihhuang for allowing Chao Kao, an
evil Confucianist, to usurp power after the emFeror's death. The
August article had noted the many achievements of Prime Minister
3"i Ssu, stating that his "merits outweighted his faults," but
accused him of having "wavered, compromised, and made concessions"
to preserve his position when Chao Kao attempted his coup. The
-urrent article by Liang omits Li Ssu's role entirely, stating
that Chao Kao sneaked in when Chinshihhuang "became somewhat dizzy
with a peaceful atmosphere in which the people led a quiet life."
Liang also pointedly discussed the strategem of a Han dynasty
Confucianist prince,.a relative of the emperor, who tried to change
the legalist line pursued by the dynasty by tricking the emperor
into getting rid of his legalist court minister. Liang noted that
bourgeois representatives in tha party have used similar tactics,
and quoted a Mao statement that ever since Prince Liu Pi's scheme?
many careerists have used the strategem to take power "in the name
of ridding the emperor of a bad minister." Liang had also portrayed
an apparent Chou figure favorably in a May RED FLAG article, using
a Han dynasty dispute over government control over salt and iron to
defend Chouist economic and resource allocation policies.
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CHINESE EDUCATION: Increased Peking resolve to enroll new
college students who have substantive knowledge as well as the
proper political credentials was raf.".ected in an 8 October
Shanghai report on this fall's local enrollment drive. While
stressing the need to give first consideration to an applicant's
political performance, the broadcast contained the unusual
admission that special attention was pid to enrolling "some
of those who had truly performed well," and it revealed that
Shanghai enrollment officials were careful to "insure the
quality of the admitted students." National guidelines
released last summer called for the use of revised entrance
examinations to aid colleges in selecting new students capable
of meeting Mao's "red and expert" goal, but did not hint that
some admissions could be based primarily on academic considera-
tions. Quantitatively, China's higher education system, which
was shattered during the cultural revolution, continues to
expand. NCNA on 14 October announced that 167,000 new college
students were enrolled in universities throughout the country
this year; 153,000 new students were admitted last year. Only
200,000 new students were admitted during the three-year period
of 1970-72.
PRC PROVINCE ON FOREIGN TRADE: A Hofei broadcast on 13 October
updated Anhwei's progress in expanding the range of local products
for export. The broadcast revealed that the amount of merchandise
available for export has been increased by 18 percent over last
year and that several new products, including transistors, sulfa
drugs and hydrochloric acid, have been added to the export list.
A strong provincial commitment to foreign trade had been reflected
last May in another broadcast from Anhwei which revealed for the
first time that a separate bureaucratic chain of command had been
set up to pass central instructions from Peking through a hierarchy
of foreign trade offices reaching down to the county level.
Following Anhwei's lead, several other provincial radios then
revealed the existence of local foreign trade offices. The latest
Hofei broadcast portrayed Anhwei's foreign trade offices as busy
sending out cadres to areas where export products are produced
to encourage the masses to step up production.
MOSCOW ON U.S. AFRICAN POLICY: U.S. press publicity for a 1970
classified National Security Study Memorandum on African policy
and allegations that Secretary of State Kissinger had once proposed
a "tilt" toward South Africa prompted a single TASS report on
14 October which omitted all references to the Secretary and
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obscured the time frame of the memo. Stressing charges of
U.S. support for "racialist regimes" in South Africa, TASS cited
"irrefutable evidence" in the memorandum, excerpted by Jack
Anderson in the 11 October Washington POST, that the United
States is guided by "military-strategic interests" and
"monopolies' demands." TASS' circumspect treatment of
Kissinger is consistent with genera. Moscow media deference
to the Secretary in the current detente per.ir.; . Ignoring
the fact that the memo dated back to 1970, TASS presented
highlights in the present tense as if current U.S. policy
was the issue. The TASS report also noted Washington POST
editorial comment suggesting that the United States "places
economic and political interests above human rights."
GDR REPARATIONS ISSUE: A GDR 25th anniversary article by
Acting Foreign Minister Fischer, published in the Vienna daily
WIENER ZEITUNG on 6 October as a "paid advertisement," was
notable for a rare acknowledgment that the GDR is one of two
successor states to Nazi Germany. The article declared that
the GDR, through the "fulfillment of the commitments of the
Potsdam agreement--which are binding for both successor states
of the imperialist German Reich--has gained the confidence of
the peoples." Fischer added that because the GDR had fulfilled
the Potsdam decisions, it had al'u "fulfilled its reparation
commitment." The article came against the background of
continuing denials by East German spokesmen--not available from
GDR media--of assertioas that East Berlin, in establishing dirlomatic
relations with Washington, agreed to compensate Israel for victims
of Nazi Germany. Following a denial issued by the GDR embassy in
Cairo in September, Premier Sindermann, in a 27 September East
Berlin press conference reported by DPA, denied that the GDR in
negotiations with the United States had declared it was ready
to pay reparations to or to have contacts with Zionist organizations
or Israeli authorities. Sindermann said that only negotiations on
clain;o by U.S. citizens against the GDR and GDR citizens against
the United States would be considered.
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- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 7 - 13 OCTOBER 1974
Moscow (2253 items)
Pekin (877 ite
s)
m
GDR 25th Anniversary (11%) 17%
UNGA Session
(14%)
12%
[Brezhnev Speeches (4%) 6%]
[Chiao Kuan-hua
(9%)
3%
in GDR
Speech
]
Moldavian 50th Anni- (--) 11%
versary
Gabon President Bongo
in PRC
(9%)
11%*
[Brezhnev Speech (--) '/]
in Kishinev
Criticism of Lin Piao
and Confucius
(4%)
5%
China (8%) 4%
PRC National Day
(27%)
4%
UNGA Session (2%) 2%
Vietnam
(--)
3%
Soviet Peace Commit- (--) 2%
tee 25th Anniver-
Lao Independence 29th
Anniversary
(--)
3%
sary
Albania
(1%)
3%
Middle East
(--)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic an(' International radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as comrnei.taries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* This figure excludes brief reports on Bongo's meetings with Mao
Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.
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