TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070041-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: October 2, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Trends in C:ar~rlmu.nist-Pro;pag~a.nd~a , ~~ ~_Oc 7~:~~,
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Confidential
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
2 OCTOBER 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 40)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Security Information
JnouII,orized disclosure subject to
CONFIDENTIAL
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2 OCTOBER 1974
Co N T E N T S
CHINA
PRC 25th Anniversary: Chou En-lai Reappears, Stresses Unity . . .
1
ENERGY
Moscow Sees "Imperialist Plot" in Western Oil Price Moves . . . .
5
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
USSR Plays Down Split in Palestinian Ranks, Promotes PLO . . . . .
9
CYPRUS
Brezhnev, Gromyko Register Moscow's Growing Concern . . . . . . .
11
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Kadar Visit Reflects Improved Moscow-Budapest Climate . . . . . .
13
Moscow Belatedly Notes Yugoslav Trial of Pro-Soviet Group . . . .
16
CUBA
Castro Assails President Ford on CIA, U.S. Oil Policy . . . . . .
18
VIETNAM
DRV Reveals High-Level Agricultural Conference held in August . .
21
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Hanoi, Peking, Thai CP Diverge on
Thailand Issues
Sl
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS 'TRENDS
2 OCTOBER 1974
CHINA
PRC 25TH ANNIVERSARY: CHOU EN-LAI REAPPEARS, STRESSES UNITY
The celebration of the PRC's 25th anniversary was highlighted
by the reappearance of the ailing Chou En-lai whose toast at the
30 September "grand reception" he hosted was his first public
speech since late May. The anniversary was also marked by
parties and cultural events in Peking's parks on 1 October.
In his toast at the reception on the 30th, Chou emphasized that
current policies, including the campaign against Lin and
Confucius, must continue, but h' stressed the need for unity
both within China and among the peoples of the world. Chou
singled out as the major achievements of the past quarter-century
the victories over Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao and the "imperialist
and social-imperialist blockade."
The traditional PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY
joint editorial this year concentrated on domestic affairs,
sounding themes noted by Chou in citing the need for unity but
warning that line struggles within the party "will continue
for a long time to come." While the editorial called for
continuing the movement to criticize Lin and Confucius, it
hinted strongly that current restraints on mass activism will
continue. It directed organizations where "mass investigations
have beef, more or less completed" to devote their main attention
to study and criticism, recommending that they read Mao and
the Marxist classics. Recent media criticism of Lin's military
record was reiterated by the editorial, which said that "especially
for the present" study and criticism should concentrate on Mao's
military writings and Lin's military line. As in previous such
editorials since Lin's purge, the PLA was assigned no specific
cavil tasks but was told to "thoroughly implement" Mao's military
line.
The editorial did not give details on economic progress since
1949, but claimed that socialist construction was "briskly
advancing" and that a "fairly complete system of industry and
of national economy as a whole based on socialist agriculture"
was forming. A number of more specific economic advances were
claimed in NCNA articles related to National Day. The editorial
called for fulfilling the yearly economic plan and the fourth
five-year plan, which is scheduled for completion next year.
Unlike last year, the editorial did not call for preparations
for the next,fourth National People's Congress.
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(:UiXIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
2 OCTOBER 1974
As it had last year, Peking's joint editorial all but ignored
foreign affairs, restricting comment to a brief review of the
present "excellent" international situation, characterized by
"great disorder" in which the United States and the Soviet
Union are beset by difficulties while the third world is
advancing. The editorial revived Peking's usual pledge to
liberate Taiwan, which had been omitted last year,
LEADERSHIP China's ailing leaders came out in nearly full
APPEARANCES fc:ce for the festivities, with only Mao and
old Marshal Liu Po-cheng failing to appear in
either Peking or the provinces. Of China's five vice chairmen,
only Chou and Wang Hung-wen had appeared in public since the
31 July Army Day reception. The most surprising appearance
was that of Kang Sheng, who attended the 30 September reception
in a wheelchair. Except for his reported attendance at last
year's party congress, Kang Sheng had been out of sight for more
than three years. Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng, who was under
heavy poster attack last spring and who failed to appear on
Army Day, showed up in his Liaoning provincial base. Yeh Chien-yang
attended both the reception and the festivities in the parks on
the lit. NCNA on 1 October reported the appearance of all
provincially based Politburo members in either Peking or their
provinces, Tachai leader Chen Yurg-kuei attended festivities
in Peking, as did alternate Politburo member Wu Kuei-hsien.
As with Army Day, several newly rehabilitated former PRC leaders
reappeared, most notably Hsiao Hua, former chief of the PLA
General Political Department who was purged in 196','. Hsiao and
former Acting Chief of the General Staff Yang Cherg-wu, who appeared
on Army Day, were the most prominent PLA figures purged when
the cultural revolution began devouring its own. Neither has
apparently been given a new post,each being listed by NCNA merely
as "present at the reception." A number of other purged leaders
were also listed in this category, including Fu Chung-pi, the
only member of Yang's alleged clique not to appear on Army Day.
Other former leaders appearing included several government
ministers, former Northeast Bureau chief Sung Jen-chiung, and
former provincial first secretaries Ouyarg Chin of Heilungkiang
and Lin Tieh of Hopeh.
Several non-Politburo provincial leaders also showed up in Peking
for the celebrations, led by Lanchow Military Region Commander
Han Hsien-chu, who had made no public appearances since January
and who seems to be under attack for allowing a subordinate to
publish a pamphlet in 1971 praising Lin Piao's military genius.
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2 OCTOBER 1974
Another provincial leader thought to be under attack, I-lei.lungkiang
chief Wang Chia-tao, alto nut- in a Peking appearance. Wang has
been out of public view sinctc.in spring and was criticized in
posters. Shansi first secretary Hs:ieh Cher.-hua also showed up,
listed--like Han and Wang--as a member of the Central Committee.
Hsieh had made no previous appearances this year and has apparently
been criticized for allowing the production of the opera "Three
Trips to Taoyuan," which was attacked throughout China last
spring. A fourth leader whose presence in Peking seems directly
related to provincial squabbles is Mao Yuan-hsin, who may be
involved in investigations into the status of Li Te-sheng. Mao,
long rumored to be the Chairman's nephew, has been a party secretary
in Liaoning since December 1972 and was a Red Guard activist
there during the cultural revolution. He has not appeared publicly
since last January, when he attended a New Year's rally just
a_.ter Li 's arrival in Liaoning. Liaoning party Standing Committee
member Chang Shu-te also attended the reception, according to
NCNA, which placed him with Mao as "also present" near the bottom
of its lengthy namelist.
FOREIGN GUESTS Foreign guests in Peking for the celebration
AT RECEPTIONS attended the "grand reception" Ind the festivites
in the Peking parks. Most prominent among the
guests not usually based in Peking was DRV Politburo member Hoang
Van Hoan, not previously reported present in Peking. Visitors of
Chinese ancestry were treated somewhat differently this year than
in the past. The traditional PRC State Council party on the 30th
was attended this year by "Overseas Chinese and foreigners of
Chinese origin." but "compatriots" from Taiwan, 1-long Kong and
Macao who h~.:.. .- _-nded in past years were not reported present.
Unlike past r, i. , only low-level PRC officials attended the
State Counc. '?':c i.or:. and there was no report of speeches.
Former high- :Wmincang official Shang Chen sat at the
head table grand reception, which was also
attended h, 1 o Overseas Chinese and "compatriots from
Hong Kong !rid according to NCNA on 1 October.
A 30 Sep'.. ., ;,,
disclose:
led the S
as head o
the Soviet .
the first names
of other guests.
.tur.t of the PRC embassy reception in Moscow
:;'st year, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev
Though Ilichev has recently undertaken
uyprus crisis, NCNA once again identified him
.-:t delegation to the border talks. In describing
, NCNA was even more curt than last year, omitting
of all Soviet attendees while citing the full names
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CONFI:DENT1AL FBIS TRENDS
2 OCTOBER 1974
MOSCOW COMMENT Initial. Soviet comment on the 25th PRC
anniversary has followed Moscow's recent
line stressing Soviet determination to rebuff ideological
deviation and the "splittist" policies of the Maoist leadership
while highlighting longstanding protestations of Soviet desire
to normalize state relations. The usual greetings message
from the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers for
the first time in recent years did not list the "Chairman of
the PRC" among its recipiants. Addressed to the Chinese NPC
and the PRC State Council, the greetings pointed out past Soviet
aid for China, professed friendship for the Chinese people, and
attempted to underline Moscow's desire for ncrmalized relations
by citing recent Soviet: proposals for treaties with the PRC on
the non-use of force and nonaggression. TASS summaries of
commentaries on the anniversary i_n PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have
taken a similar approach, predictably pointing out that Peking
remains intransigent in the face of the Soviet initiatives.
PRAVDA commentator Andrey Krushinskiy may have been hinting at
enhanced Soviet interest in an international communist conference
when he noted, in reference to Brezhnev's report to the 24th
CPSU Congress, that Moscow would continue to denounce Maoist
policies and would work for the "cohesion of the socialist
countries and the world communist movement on a Marxist-Leninist
basis"--formulas absent from his commentary on the date last
year. As he had last year, Krushinskiy went on to cite Brezhnev
remarks to underscore Moscow's continuing commitment to normalize
state relations.
HANOI OBSERVANCE This year's DRV treatment of PRC National
Day followed the pattern of 1973. The occasion
was observed in Hanoi with the standard grand meeting, a Chinese
embassy reception, and leader greetings. Pharr Van,Dong led DRV
officials at the 1 October PRC embassy reception, providing a
slightly lower-level representatic, than last year, when Truong
Chinh led the turnout. As in 1973, this year's DRV leaders'
message noted the Marxist-Leninist and proletarian internationalist
basis of Vietnamese-Chinese solidarity and praised the willingness
of the Chinese to fulfill their "internationalist duty" in supporting
Vietnam. The greetings this year were more effusive than in 1973,
:noting China's "wholehearted support and great, all-round and
effective assistance.. . ."
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COi1FLDEN'Tf,\1, 1'151;' ')S
2 OC'I'O'it;': 11)74
EA CZGY
"10SCOW SEES 'IMPERIALIST PLOT" IN WESTERN OIL PRICE MOVES
Soviet media have in stereotyped fashion portrayed the current U.S .?-led
western efforts to deal with rising oil prices, inflation, and other
economic :ills as an "imperialist plot" against the oil-pro,luci.n state,,;
and the Third World. :loscow has for the most part ignored tho ''oil
weapon" argument voiced prominently following the Arab-Israeli war
last October, and instead has endorsed the defense of higher oil prices
on economic grounds advanced by spokesmen for iiembers of the Organ:irati'on
of Petroleum Exporting Countries. While backing the oil producers,
Moscow at the same time has accorded circumspect treatment to major U.S.
statements on the oil issue by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger.
As in the past, i'toscow's treatment of the oil issues in L-roadcasts
to Arab audiences--in contrast to general TASS reports and other radio
beamings--has reflected markedly harsher treatment of the U.S. role,
going as far as directly linking "U.S. leaders" and what 'loscow calls
"an extensive campaign of blackmail and pressure" against OPEC states.
To rea.;sure Soviet consumers and :[oscow's oil-dependent allies, 'loscow
has recently reiterated that the USSR itself has enormous petroleum
and energy reserves and that no shortage is likely because of planned
"socialist'' exploitation.
TREATMENT OF TASS provided only sketchy reportage on 1':;
LORD, KISSINGER General Assembly speeches on the oil price issue
by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, President
Ford's 23 September major address at the Detroit World Energy Conference,
and also his address to the 30 September opening of the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank meeting. For example, TASS noted simply
that President Ford's Detroit speech "contained a warning' to OPEC
countries that had increased oil prices, without further details.
Secretary Kissinger's TTt? statement received similar treatment. However,
negative reaction to these speeches by Arab and OPEC leaders was replayed
at length, indirectly revealing alleged U.S. threats of "retaliatory
measures" including the use of food deliveries as ar, ''instrument of
policy" and playing up "indignation" and "shock" in the Arab world.
At the same time, Moscow Arabic-language broadcasts have openly attri-
buted to President Ford, quoting Arab press sources, warnings on the
oil question and U.S. proposals revealing an intention to "set up a
bloc hostile to the interests" of the OPEC members. A 30 September
Arabic commentary on M4oscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress
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i 1.T FBIS TRENDS
2 OCTOBER 1974
typically was more outspoken, claiming that "feverish attempts"
were being made to overcome the Western economic crisis and that
the United States "has threatened" to halt economic aid and end food
supplies to countries raising oil prices or reducing oil production.
The commentary's explanation for the current oil price concern
reflected the view--also reiterated recently by Soviet oil commentator
Rachkov--that OPEC countries were forced to review and raise oil
prices because of Western in.flz,tion and actions by "international
monopolies" to fan the flames of the energy crisis and extract
"exhorbitant profits" from it. The solution to the energy crisis,
according to Radio Peace and Progress, lies not in "political pressure
and intimidation" against developing countries but in "stripping
monopolies of their power" and establishing international economic
cooperation "based on equality."
U.S. ECONOMIC, iloscow described as a "failure" the 26-27 September
OIL MEETINGS Camp David conference of the Western "Big Five"
finance and foreign ministers of the United States,
Britain, France, West Germany and Japan. 'LASS reports on 30 September
noted that the "Big Five" "failed to solve a single pressing economic
problem" at their conference, which revealed "serious differences" and
`'acute contradictions" among the participants. The secrecy surrounding
the session, TASS noted, stemmed from the participants' belief that
such a forum "rightly" might be regarded as "an imperialist plot against
the oil-producing countries." TASS noted that various press reports
described recent pronouncements by "highly placed U.S. officials"--
an obvious reference to President Ford and Kissinger--as couched in
"particularly harsh tones.`
A 2 October TASS report on the Washington International 'Ionetary Fund
conference noted "tile danger of a prolonged, serious economic recession"
was the main topic for the session, which it said displayed "profound
disagreements between the imperialist states and the developing countries."
President Ford's opening speech to the PTT, '1oscow radio noted on the
1st, stressed that "serious and complex" pi.oblems faced the Western
countr_es.
Commenting on recent U.S. statements on energy and the new I'T, session,
TASS commentator Kiselev on the 27th described at some length the
"broad campaign of pressure" on oil-producing countries launched by
"U.S. leaders"' speeches at the UN General Assembly. He noted that
this envisaged not only reducing foodstuff supplies to Arab OPEC
members and ending U.S. assistance, but also forming a "united front"
of oil-importing states, plans for the diplomatic and political
"isolation" of oil-exporting countries and depriving them of Third
World countries' support by enticing the latter with increased foodstuff
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
2 OCTOBER 1974
supplies, as well as plans for recyL'ing OPEC oil revenues back
to oil-importing nations. Kiselev ch, -1 '_~ doctrinaire terms
that once more "imperialist circles" sou,..., own
economic difficulties "at the expe?.se of peoples _ ..Leer countries"
who were "exercising their sovereign right in freely disposing of
their natural riches."
Rachkov, in a 17 September Moscow Arabic-language commentary, had
defended the 13 September OPEC action to raise oil taxes by 30 cents
a barrel as a "self-defense" action aimed at oil companies, not at
consumers, in order to reduce the "huge profits of the monopolies
themselves," and in that sense called the tax a "special fine imposed
by the developing countries on imperialism" for its failure to over-
come chronic inflation problems. Rachkov stressed that "there is
no doubt's that the solidarity of the oil-rich Arab countries and
other OPEC members with the other developing countries "struggling
against imperialism and suffering poverty and backwardness" will
help find a "useful way" to dispose of OPEC oil revenues linked to
the "common struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism."
Atypical in recent Moscow output was a 7 September Moscow commentary
broad:ast to Arab listeners which raised the "oil weapon" issue and
the L.S.-Israeli relationship in remarking on alegeclly increased
"Israeli intrigues" aimed at increasing 'Middle East tension. Noting
expanded U.S.-Israeli cooperation and Congressional approval of aid
to Israel, the commentary stressed that Israel had to rely on the
United States for oil for its "war machine," and that because some
Arab countries supplied oil to the United States, "a hole is being
drilled in the barrier of Arab boycott of Israel."
OIL MONOPOLIES' Moscow Arabic-language commentaries on 1 October
CONSPIRACY CHARGE revived an alleged linkage between U.S. oil
policy and the Arab-Israeli conflict in a
new context. Quoting French press reports, one commentator charged
that a recent Teheran meeting, headed by former CIA director and now
Ambassador to Iran Helms, had discussed a "campaign of intimidation"
against the oil-producing ;fiddle East countries and that the U.S.
oil monopolies had become more active as part of this campaign. This
proved, the commentator added, that the Arab states faced a "nEu!
conspiracy" by oil monopolies seeking to undermine Arab unity, halt
economic consolidation among the Arabs, and force them to yield
to "monopolist capital." Another Moscow Arabic commentary the same
day pegged to the same "conspiracy" theory cited Arab press reports
alleging there was a link between U.S. oil policy and ''attempts by
Zionist circles in the West to obstruct the settling of the 'fiddle East
issue."
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SOVIET OIL Moscow at the same time continues to exude
ASSURANCES confidence and assurance on the USSR's own
oil and energy resources. A 20 September Moscow
foreign-language broadcast claimed that a recently completed
estimate of all Soviet oil resources had concluded that the
USSR's "potential oil resources" were-greater than those of any other
country and that "in a year's time" the Soviet Union would
be the "world's biggest: oil producer." Another Moscow foreign-
language commentary on the 21st claimed that the USSR ranked first
in the world in natural gas and coal deposits, and these were
being developed by a comprehensive approach which "only socialism
can adopt," in contrast to the crisis-ridden capitalistic system.
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ARAB - ISRAELI I SSUE
USSR PLAYS DOWN SPLIT IN PALESTINIAN RANKS, PROMOTES PLO
Moscow has provided only limited comment thus far on the
26 September announcement by the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP) that it had decided to withdraw from the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and would continue its
armed conflict with Israel outside the PLO. On 27 September
TASS and Moscow radio's Arabic service carried a brief, identical
report on the PFLP announcement, which as the only explanation
for the decision noted part of a statement by the PFLP that it
could not accept current PLO political policy. Moscow omitted
the PFLP spokesman's denunciation of the PLO leadership for
seeking a negotiated "surrender settlement" through political
cooperation with Egypt's President Sadat and through alleged
U.S.-PLO contacts. Moscow avoided original comment on the
development, but it cast the PFLP decision in a critical light
by citing the Lebanese press to the effect that the decision
"at this present stage" would hinder the PLO in its task of
restoring the Palestinians' legitimate rights.
Moscow's handling probably reflects mixed feelings over the PFLP
decision. On the one hand, this highly visible display of
Palestinian disarray occurred at a time when Moscow has been
advocating Palestinian representation at the Geneva conference
and supporting discussion of the Palestinian issue--as a separate
political issue and not merely a refugee problem--at the current
session of the UN General Assembly. The public display of
strong disagreement among the Palestinians themselves as to
which organization and approach best serve Palestinian interests
undoubtedly causes problems for the Moscow media in continuing
public support.
On the other hand, the fact of the Palestinians' disagreement may
cause Moscow less problem than its timing. In the past Moscow
has strongly criticized the PFLP and its leader, George Habash,
as irresponsible extremists who oppose a peaceful resolution of
the Middle East conflict and who foster disunity in the
Palestinian movement. A 14 August article in LITERATURNAYA
GAZETA denounced Habash for his "logic, obviously adopted from
Peking, that peace and socialism are incompatible" and implied
he was serving Palestinian enemies through his "pseud.o- revolution-
arinesslarded with Maoist demagogy." PFLP withdrawal from the--
by contrast--more moderate and responsible PLO may therefore be
viewed by Moscow as likely to facilitate the PLO's efforts to
gain increased international political support.
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Soviet. media references to Palestinian affairs since the PFLP's
withdrawal indicate Mosro;,i is continuing, as in the past, to
support the PLO. The references have not, however, suggested
any significant increase in that support. Moscow radio,, for
example, in a brcadcast to Arab listeners on 30 September
reported without comment a remark attributed to the leader of
a U.S. Communist Party delegation in Lebanon that American
communists "view the PLO as the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestine Arab people." The broadcast added that the
delegation had been invited by the "DPFLP [Democratic Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine], one of the main organiza-
tions in the Palestinian resistance movement and a member of the
PLO." In another Arabic-service broadcast on 30 September,
Moscow was probably alluding to the PLO-PFLP split when it urged
all Arab states to unite in a common front in order to support
the "Palestinian Arab people and their legitimate representatives."
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CYPRUS
BREZHNEV, GROMYKO REGISTER MOSCOW'S GROWING CONCERN
Recent statements by both Brezhnev and Gromyko follow the pattern
of Soviet comment early in September which began to level thinly
veiled criticism at Turkish policy toward Cyprus. Discussion
of Cyprus comprised a major portion of a 25 September Brezhnev
speech at a dinner for visiting Hungarian First Secretary Kadar.
And Gromyko in his 24 September address to the UN General
Assembly stressed that Moscow considers the Cyprus crisis to
be of international importance.
Both leaders reiterated the need to remove the issue from NATO
hands and promoted the Soviet Union's 22 August proposal for an
enlarged conference on Cyprus within the UN framework. Both
Gromyko and Brezhnev seemed to suggest concern that international
interest could wane now that military warfare has stopped and
Turkey is concentrating on establishing an "autonomous administration"
In the area occupied by Turkish troops. Gromyko took issue with
those who are "of the impression that this is an event of local
significance."
Brezhnev's speech on the 25th was clearly designed to focus attention
on the Cyprus situation. Following a discussion of Soviet-Hungarian
relations, he made only a few remarks about socialist unity and
relations with the United States and then concentrated primarily on
Cyprus. BrEzhnev also brought out the need for concern about Cyprus
in implying that the future of the island is not totally unrelated
to the future of Europe. He noted that "events in Cyprus persistently
remind one of the fact that if we want a lasting peace in Europe we
still have to struggle for its effectively." But Brezhnev stopped
short of directly linFing Cyprus to European detente, in line with
the Soviet position at the European security talks that European
and Mediterranean security problems can be dealt with separately.
Moscow has consistently opposed Yugoslavia's position that the two
are interrelated, in order to avoid getting the security talks
involved with issues that could postpone reaching its major
objectives at the CSCE calks.
Brezhnev's criticism of Turkey's role--and Greece's--in the crisis
was transparent. While Gromyko referred to Turkey only in the
most oblique terms, Brezhnev noted that "two NATO member countries"
were responsible for th^ bloodshed on Cyprus. He went further in
registering ":.mall wo;_der" that Greece subsequently withdrew its
military forces from NATO after its "public and new leadership"
saw that NATO is "least of all. concerned" with protecting small
countries.
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Moscow has also carried reports on U.S. Congressional votes
cutting off military aid to Turkey and on Greek Foreign Minister
Mavros' 1 October speech at the National Press Club. TASS reported
Senator Eagleton as defending the'military aid cut-off by saying
that Ankara had used U.S. weapons "not for defense but for other
purposesf and it opened its report on Mavros' remarks by attributing
to him the statement that "Turkey's armed intrusion into Cyprus
has created a very dangerous situation jeopardizing world peace."
Neither Brezhnev nor Gromyko referred directly to partition,
restating only Moscow's standard call for r- oration of "lui epenclence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity" an, it withdrawal of
foreign troops. Moscow media, however, have acknowledged that
partitioning is taking place. NEW TIMES pointed out on the 27th
that Cyprus is already "aci:ually split in half . . , as a result of
the interference of foreign troops."
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COMMUNIST RELATIONS
hn1$ TRENDS
2 OCTOBER 1974
KADAR VISIT REFLECTS IMPROVED MOSCOW-BUDAPEST CLIMATE
The speeches by First Secretary Kadar and his Soviet hosts, as well
as the final communique on the Hungarian leader's 25-30 September
visit to the USSR, reflected a warmer atmosphere than had prevailed
during Brezhnev's November 1972 visit to Budapest although there
are indications that some Soviet-Hungarian problems remain.* in
contrast to the strained atmosphere during his visit to Hungary
two years ago, Brezhnev in a 25 September. Kremlin dinner speech
had warm praise for Kadar, who, in his remarks, repeatedly lauded
Brezhnev and underscored Hungary's long-standing indebtedness to
the USSR and solidarity with the Soviet bloc.
The visit produced no Soviet endorsement of Budapest's New
Economic Management system or any indication that the USSR had
agreed to make long-range commitments for deliveries of essential
raw materials for Hungarian industry--a :tong-standing bone of
contention which had antedated Brezhnev's 1972 visit. On the score
of communist unity, Kadar specifically endorsed international
party conferences, while Brezhnev and Suslov in their speeches
avoided direct reference to the subject. Peking was not explicitly
mentioned in the major pronouncements during Kadar's visit.
The CPSU had hosted a visit from another prominent Hungarian party
figure immediately before Kadar's trip to the USSR: TASS on
5 September raported a meeting in Moscow between Brezhnev and
MSZMP Politburo member and secretary Karoly Nemeth, who has been
conjectured as a possible alternative to Kadar as Hungarian party
first secretary. The report explained only that Nemeth was
visiting Moscow "at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee"
and said the "warm, f rie,adly" talks had dealt with CPSU-MSZMP
cooperation and international topics. Nemeth was also a member
of Kadar's party-Government delegation on the present visit.
BILATERAL RELATIONS The present visit was the third bilateral
meeting this year between Brezhnev and
Kadar, who also had bilateral talks at the Warsaw Pact Political Con-
sultative Committee meeting in the Polish capital in April and in the
* Brezhnev's visit to hungary two years ago had been marked by
a cool reception given him when he delivered a major speech in
the Csepel works, a speech which omitted the customary tribute
to his host, Kadar. See the TRENDS of 6 December 1972, pages 12-15.
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2 OCTOBER 1.974
Crimea on 5 August. The Soviet leader observed the amenities
in his 25 September Kremlin dinner. EEpeeci> in toasting Kadar as
"the seasoned revolutionary, prominent figure of the inter
-
national communist movement, and loyal friend of the Soviet
Union and the party of Lenin." In response, Kadar praised
Brezhnev as an "outsLand:inf; militant of the international
communist movement, who rightly conmirinds sincere respect and
appreciation throughout the world." In his speech at a friend-
ship rally at the Kirov plant in Leningrad on the 27th, attended
by Suslov though not by Brezhnev, Kadar added further praise
for the Soviet leader as "that great friend of our people, out-
standing exponent of the international communist and workers
movement and consistent militant for the cause of peace."
Suslov, at the Kirov plant rally, coupled his tribute to Kadar
with an assurance to the effect that "the CPSU does not and
could not pursue a policy toward fraternal Hungary any other
than" one aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation.
The joint communique on Kadar's visit goes beyond the one two
years ago when it specifies "complete" mutual understanding as
well as mutual satisfaction over the "high level of development"
of fraternal bilateral ties. (The 1972 document had merely
noted the need for "further development of all-round fraternal
cooperation" between the two parties and states.) But the
current communique recorded only generalized Soviet approval for
Hungary's socialist construction, ignoring the specifics of the
New Economic Management system instituted by the Hungarians at
the start of 1968. The MSZMP, at its November 1973 plenum, had
modified some of the decentralized planning and market economy
features of the system objected to by Moscow, while insisting
that the essential elements of the system were still valid.
Moscow's dissatisfaction with the system had accounted for the
failure of Premier Foci(, in March 1972, to secure long-range
Soviet commitments for raw material deliveries to Budapest.
Fock at that time took the unprecedented step of publicly
revealing this disagreement in an airport interview on his
return from Moscow. The 30 September communique merely voiced
satisfaction with progress in Soviet-Hungarian economic coopera-
tion, goods turnover, and coordination of five-year economic
plans. The document tied the Hungarians firmly to the CEMA
long-range economic integration program, as well as to the
"coordinated" foreign policy of the socialist ccmmunity.
Unlike the speeches during Brezhnev's 1972 visit to Budapest,
those during Kadar's current visit showed little defensiveness
on the state of relations between the two countries. Kadar did
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show ,,,ome defensiveness, In his Leningrad speech, in under-
scorl.ng IIungary's socialist credentials and re.11 iab1.1Ity as a
member of the social i.st camp, against the backdrop of a
recollection of the .1.956 "counterrevo.lut.lon." Ile dec.lared that
the llungarlan party had broken away from the old methods.
It has clone away with the former faults and settled
its account with the traitors and has overcome the:
grave situation. The dreams of :International. and
domestic reaction, who had become brazenly bold,
were shattered. Today in Hungary, a stable workers
regime, enjoying the support of the entire people,
is in power. A socialist society is being built
and the Ilungar. ian People's Republic, alongside the
Soviet Union, stands as an unshakable member of the
Warsaw Pact, the CEMA community, . . . the world
socialist system.
COMMUNIST UNITY The communique on Kadar's visit reflected
Moscow's continued reluctance to explicitly
endorse the proposed European and world conferences of communist
parties. Thus it noted that the two parties "attach great
importance to collective forms of work" by communist parties
"both in the regional and in the global framework" and confirm
their readiness to support "practical steps" in this direction.
Kadar in his Kremlin dinner speech on the 25th had said his
party considered it useful to "convoke regional" party
conferences and "gradually to prepare for a new world conference."
Two days later, in Leningrad, the Hungarian leader registered a
more direct call to "start preparations" for a new world conclave
and to "prepare now and then convene" an all-European party
conference. Kadar had been one of the initial supporters of a
new world conference, calling for such a gathering during a visit
to Budapest by Bulgaria's Zhivkov on 3 December 1973. Soviet
broadcasts on 26 and 27 September dealing with Kadar's remarks on
the communist movement duly included, respectively, his Moscow
and Leningrad appeals for new party conferences. However, a PASS
report on the 30th focusing on passages in the communique dealing
with the communist movement omitted the document's veiled
reference to regional and global collective work by communist
parties.
The communique put the CPSU and MSZMP on record as waging
uncompromising struggle against "every manifestation of anticommunism,
nationalism, and chauvinism, against right and left opportunism."
The absence of direct reference to the Chinese in this connection
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was in line with the pattern generally followed at the recent
round of 30th liberation anniversary observances in Warsaw
in July, Bucharest in August, and Sofia in September. At
these meetings, attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy,
respectively, only Zhivkov had explicitly denounced "the
Maoists." A Moscow radio commentary broadcast in Romanian
on the 28th recalled Zhivkov's 8 September attack on the
Maoists as a preface to highlighting Kadar's call on the
25th for gradual preparations for a new world conference.
MOSCOW BELATEDLY NOTES YUGOSLAV TRIAL OF PRO-SOVIET GROUP
Moscow's belated first public mention on 27 September of the
arrest and trial of a pro-Soviet group in Yugoslavia--revealed
by Tito on 12 September--provided few details and predictably
avoided the issue of Soviet involvement in the affair. The
acknowledgment, by TASS commentator Vladimir Goncharov, was
transmitted by TASS, broadcast by Moscow radio, to Yugoslav
among other audiences, and published in PRAVDA.
The thrust of Goncharov's article was clearly to discredit
Western press reports about Soviet troops massing to invade
Yugoslavia. The pro-Soviet group itself was given only minor
attention, Goncharov noting after a lengthy diatribe against rumors
about Soviet military intentions that "in order to thicken this
new anti-Soviet concoction, these gentlemen go so far as to make
wild fabrications alleging that the Soviet Union is preparing to
'invade Yugoslavia' in connection with the discovery in the
country of . . . a 'pro-Soviet plot,' no less!" Avoiding details
about the incident, Goncharov reported only that the group
"opposed the existing system in the country" and that "double-dyed
anti-Soviets" have interpreted the arrest and trial of the group
"to their liking . . . ."
Despite the use of such terms as "fabrications" and "malicious
inventions," Goncharov refrained from categorically denying
Soviet involvement with the group. At the same time he referred
to Soviet-Yugoslav relations in low-key fashion, pointing out
that Western press speculation was directed against the "good"
and "friendly" relations between the two countries.
Prior to Moscow's acknowledgment of the affair only bloc maverick
Romania had mentioned it, having promptly reported Tito's
12 September speech. But on 28 September, the day after the
Soviet commentary, Budapest's party daily NEPSZABADSAG carried an
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editorial article which concentrated on .squelching rumors about
Warsaw Paut involvement and seemed to appeal to Belgrade to
forget the affair. Unlike the Moscow comment, however, it
dealt directly with the issue of the pro-Soviet group, including
a mention of the "fabrication" that the group had received
support from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
NEPSZABADSAG, like TASS commentator Goncharov, criticized the Western
press for "putting a sensation-mongering and tendentious slant on
the matter" in order to "poison" relations with Belgrade. In
quoting from "the paper of our Yugoslav sister party, KOMUNIST"
that "part of the foreign press regarded the arrest as a good
opportunity for creating a sensation and to make much ado over
the matter," NEPSZABADSAG seemed to imply that both parties had
agreed in principle at least that a continued public discussion
would not be beneficial.
In what appeared to be an almost formal appeal to Belgrade to bury
the issue, NEPSZABADSAG emphasized the "extensive cooperation"
between the two countries and parties, which it said "we trust,
will continue to develop in the future;' adding that "it lies in
the interests of both parties and both peoples to reject the
fabrications intended to disturb our relations. . . ."
Peking has also mentioned the affair for the first time, NCNA on
the 27th quoting TANJUG on details of the case and selectively
quoting Western press reports to indicate strong Soviet involvement.
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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CUBA
CASTRO ASSAILS PRESIDENT FORD ON CIA, U.S. OIL POLICY
Premier Castro, speaking on a 28 September Cuban anniversary
that coincided with the visit of U.S. Senators Javits and Pell,
delivered one of his harshest statements on the United States
in recent years. Not unexpectedly, Castro used his first public
address since President Ford's 16 September, remarks and later
speeches on two sensitive topics--the CIA and U.S. economic
relations with underdeveloped nations--to launch strong criticism
of the President and denounce the U.S, role in Chile and U.S.
policy toward oil-producing countries.* In contrast, Soviet
handling of Castro's speech eliminated all references to U.S.
policy toward oil-producing states and gave only brier attention
to Castro's attack on the CIA.
CASTRO ON FORD Speaking on the 14th anniversary of the founding
DEFENSE OF CIA of the Cuban Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution, Castro declared that President
Ford's defense of CIA activities in Chile was an arrogant expression
of U.S. willingness "to intervene by any means, regardless of how
illegal, dirty, or criminal," in Latin American affairs. Castro
said that the world had reacted indignantly to the "full and
confessed confirmation" of U.S. Government participation in the
events "which ended with the overthrow and death" of President
Allende.
One day before he met with visiting Senators Javits and Pell, the
Cuban leader blasted U.S. "acts of aggression" in Latin America
and gave a list of supposed offenses directed against Cuba and
other Latin countries. He then asked rhetorically, "What does
the shameless OAS have to say about this?" Speaking in his usual
vein, he called the OAS "prostituted" and urged Latins _o abandon
it in favor of a regional organization, such as the Organization
of African Units, which would exclude the United States.
ATTACK ON U.S. Reflecting earlier Cuban press comments on the
OIL STRATEGY President's and Secretary Kissinger's recent
speeches on the oil price issue, Castro held
the United States responsible for worldwide inflation and defended
* Recent Cuban press comme.it on CIA-Chile revelations and Ford's
press conference are discussed in the TRENDS of 18 September, page
8, and 25 September, page 19.
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the O.PEC's posit Ion is n ".just reraction" to the exploitative
methods of large L rruisnat i ona 1. companies. Cas'*ro quoted portions
of. President. Ford's speech .it the Detroit World Energy Conference
and asserted that U.S, strategy aimed at dividing the nations
of the Third World and isolating the oil producers. Castro
insisted that L was "unjust" to blame OPEC for inflation, because
the responsibility "fundamentally rests with the United States
itself," as a result of its "society of consumption" and vast
expenditures in Vietnam. He noted that Cuba, "with the generous
aid of the Soviet Union," had not suffered any energy crisis and
stood ready to bark the "nonalined countries" if they joined in
an emphatic answer to the "Eli eats and pressures" of the United
Stares. Castro encouraged oil-exporting nations to avoid
investing their revenues in capitalist countries,.
Castro, who has been courting Venezuelan President Perez since
the latter's i.nauguraLion this year gave special support to Perez'
rejection of President Ford's oil thesis. Since Venezuela made
public a letter in which Perez voiced his objections to Ford's
UN speech, the Cuban press has lauded Perez for his defiance of
"what appears to be a return to the big stick policy." Castro
continued this -line in his speech, noting that the Venezuelan
government had responded "vigorously and with dignity" to Ford's
speeches. The Cuban leader promised to continue his backing for
the Venezuelan position and vowed that "Venezuela will not be alone
in this hemisphere as Cuba was."
Castro did not mention the U.S. senatorial visit. Cuban coverage
of it had been light uatil the broadcast of a "Letter from Freddy"
on October. 1.>', In what was called the first of a t,Jo-part report,
"Freddy" devoted most of his space to praising Castro's speech
but added "the talks appear to have been fruitful" and predicted
that they "will be repeated on a large scale." Several short
Soviet reports on the weekend visit of Javits and Pell to Cuba
seemed to offer mild encouragement to such contacts. Admitting
that the trip was undertaken "despite the opinion of the State
Department," a TASS report on the 27th concluded that this was
the "first real step to normalize: relations" between the two
nations. The visit, the Moscow domestic radio noted on the 28th,
was "proof of growing feelings" in congress and public opinion in
favor of "abrogating the policy of boycotting Cuba--a policy that has
failed. "
* The Freddy letters, fictious reports supposedly sent from a Cuban
expatriate now living in the United Stales, are - -ievice used by
commentator Guido Garcia Inclan to treat sensitive topics.
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MOSCOW HANDLING Soviet media, which since Brezhnev's visit
OF CASTRO SPEECH to Cuba in January have given cautious
indications of Soviet support for the
"ntrmalization" of U.S.-Cuban relations, gave slight coverage
to Castro's speech. The only available Soviet reaction thua
far, a TASS English-language report on the 29th, said that
Castro "stressed the need for united action" by petroleum producers
and underdeveloped countries. However, nothing was said of
Cast,-s'., attack on the U.S. oil statements, although the Soviet
media have replayed criticism from other countries.
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V I ETNAM
DRV REVEALS HIGH-LEVEL AGRICULTURAL CONFERENCE HELD IN AUGUST
Hanoi media have belatedly publicized an eight-day "lowland and
midland" agricultural conference that began on 5 August in one
of the DRV's top rice-producing provinces. According to the
initial 28 September Hanoi radio report, the conference was
sponsored by the party Secretariat and heard addresses by First
Secretary Le Duan, Premier Pham Van Dong, and VWP Central Committee
Secretaries To Fluu and Hoang Anh. The leaders' speeches confirmed
the regime's continuing preoccupation with increasing farm out-
put and disclosed plans for a movement to reorganize agriculture
and improve its lower-level management. Also on the 28th, Hat:oi
radio broadcast excerpts from a 16 September Central Committee
Secretariat directive, which had been discussed in draft form at
the conference, detailing the provisions of North Vietnam's latest
approach to its agricultural problems.
The holding of the conference in the delta province of Thai
Binh--touted in the report as "the first five-ton province"--and
the leadoff assertion in the report that the fifth month-spring
crop has been "highly successful" seem calculated to inspire
and encourage even further successes in inrre sing food production.
Hanoi has only recently been claiming a "highly" successful harvest
for its fifth month-spring crop. Earlier reports, possibly because
al) the statistics were not yet compiled, were more cautious. For
example, the 16 September NHAN DAN editorial on spring crop preparations
reported the latest harvest as only "fairly successful."
Subsequent Hanoi broadcasts of what appear to be texts of the
speeches by Le Duan and Hoang Anh are not available in translation as
of this writing, but it is clear from summary versions that the
primary concern is food production and the feeding of the people;
at the same time the stated intent of the new movement is to
advance agriculture toward the ultimate goal of large-scale
socialist production. The order of agricultural priorities was
made clear by Le Duan in his closing day address to the conference.
He declared the country must "strive to meet the people's require-
ments in grain and foodstuffs; rapidly accelerate production of
export goods; and meet industry's demands for raw material and
labor." These latest goals show little change, allowing for war-
time exigencies, from those enunciated by the 19th VWP plenum
held in 1971. Thus, the 19th plenum resolution called for
agriculture to "provide a full supply of grain and food products to
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meet the needs of the army and people; provide a supply of raw
materials for industry and produce many agricultural products
for exportation in exchange for materials, equipment, and
machinery;.and provide a full supply of manpower for combat,
combat support, industry, and other sectors."
Former Central Agricultural Commission Chairman Hoang Anh's
important role at the conference suggests he remains as one of
the regime's top agricultural spokesmen. Although Anh was
relieved of his position as head of the Agricultural Commission
in a broad reorganization of the government in late April,
he has continued to carry out many of the duties associated
with his former post and on at least one occasion he was again
identified, perhaps by mistake, as the chairman of the
Agricultural Commission--in a 27 July NHAN DAN account of a
message from the commission on the 10th-month rice crop.*
The directive--"on the reorganization of agricultural production
and gradual improvement of agricultural management"--enumerated
the many shortcomings facing agriculture, admitting that there
has been a slowness in even recognizing the problems that need
to be solved. Measures planned to reorganize agriculture as called
for in the directive are discussed in terms of the roles played
by cooperatives, villages, districts, provinces and central level
branches, and party organizations.
The directive recalled plans--first announced by Vice Premier Le
Thanh Nghi in his National Assembly speech last February aht: again
by National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh at
the youth conference the same month--to hold in 1974 a nationwide
congress of peasant members of agricultural cooperatives to "discuss
and adopt" a statute on high-level cooperatives. In what may be an
indication that the original plans for the congress have been
watered down, the directive only vaguely called for "promoting"
the congress, without specifying when it would be held or at what
level. While the directive did mentiun the statute in this game
context, it failed to provide any details on is future ad,ption,
merely asking that its implementation be discussed in coordination
with the reorganization of management and production.
* For a discussion of his removal and the reorganization, see the
TRENDS of 1 May 1974, pages 2-3.
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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
HANOI, PEKING, THAI CP DIVERGE ON THAILAND ISSUES
Almost a year after the installation of the Thai civilian govern-
ment led by Prime Minister Sanya Thammasak, comment from Hanoi,
Peking and Thai Communist Party media reflects divergent attitudes
tcward the regime and its ties with the United States. During the
Indochina war the two communist states and the Thai CP had
assumed a virtual united front and were uniformly critical of
Bangkok and its links with Washington. This unanimity has
disappeared under the impact of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, the
peace agreements in Vietnam and Laos, the gradual reduction of
U.S. military forces in Thailand, and '-he re' urn of civilian rule
to Bangkok.
Presently only Hanoi shows acute sensitivity over the U.S. military
presence in Thailand and close Bangkok-Washington cooperation in
Southeast Asia, viewing U.S.-T'Zai "collusion" as a direct threat
to Indochina. By contrast, with the improvement of Sino-U.S.
relations over the past two years, Peking media now largely ignore
the U.S. presence and refrain from linking Thailand to the
situation in Indochina. At the same time, Peki.ng's corresponding
desire to improve bilateral Thai-PRC relations has been reflected
in a drastic reduction in Chinese criticism of Bangkok's internal
policies. The Thai CP clandestine radio station based in China--
the "Voice of the People of Thailand"--has continued to criticize
the Thai Government and the presence of U.S. military forces, but
has played down the relationship of those forces to Indochina.
HANOI For a brief period after the January 1973 Paris agreement
on Vietnam, Hanoi appeared willing to moderate its
traditionally hostile attitude toward the Thanom Kittikhachon
military government in Bangkok. Evidence of a more favorable
climate on both sides for accommodation surfaced when D RV and PRO
delegations to the Joint Military Commission cordially met with
Thai officials during a stopover in Bangkok on 28 January 1973
en route to their posts in Saigon. Hanoi media, while not
publicizing the stopover, began treating Thailand and the Thanom
government less critically than in the past. Thus, whereas a
12 January 1973 Hanoi radio commentary on U.S. bases in Thailand
?'hid assailed Thanom personally as a "vile U.S. lackey," only a
month later a 15 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on Secretary
Kissinger's visit in Bangkok used such neutral terms as
"Kittikhachon, Thailand's leader" and "Thai authorities" in
referring to the Bangkok government.
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A harsher Hanoi attitude toward Bangkok reemerged only after the
transfer of U.S. command headquarters from South Vietnam to
Thailand, when it was apparent that Thailand would continue to
play a major role in the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia.
Thus, a 22 April Hanoi radio commentary deplored evidence of
Thai cooperation with the United States and criticized the
"reactionary Thai ruling clique," and North Vietnamese media in
the following days resumed attacking Bangkok leaders by name.
The reduced U.S. profile in Indochina following the 15 August
1973 halt to bombing in Cambodia and the concurrent U.S.-Thai
agreement on the initial stage of U.S. military withdrawal brought
no moderation to Hanoi's invective. A 27 August NHAN DAN
commentary pegged to the U.S. withdrawal announcement questioned
Washington's intentions and accused the "Thanom Kittikhachon
reactionary administration" of tailing after the United States
in a futile effort to make the Nixon Doctrine succeed in
Southeast Asia.
Hanoi welcomed the overthrow of the Thanom government in October
1973 but was cautious about public evaluation of the new civilian
administration under Eanya, seeming to adopt a wait-and-see
attitude toward the latter's promises to improve relations with
Indochinese countries. After several months of restraint, a
12 May 1974 NHAN DAN article finally voiced Hanoi's negative
assessment of the Sanya regime and charged that it had failed
to follow through on its announced interiLions to improve relations.
The article, attributed to "Observer," particularly condemned the
continued U.S. military presence in Thailand, Bangkok allegations
about a DRV threat to Thai security, and .3angkok's policies
toward Vietnamese nationals in Thailand. Specifying conditions
for establishing "friendly relations" with Thailand, Observer
asserted that Bangkok must "stop its collusion" with Washington
against Vietnam, refrain fi)m slandering DRV intentions toward
Thailand, and release Vietnar,iese residents in Thailand who had
been "illegally detained."
The Observer article did not include a U.S. withdrawal from
Thailand among its conditions for improved DRV-Thai relations,
but tea demand for a U.S. pullout has 1'en repeatedly voiced
in authoritative Hanoi statements. Hanoi's intention to pressure
Bangkok on this question was underlined in a 7 September 1974
DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement that interpreted
recently proposed Thai legislation to expand Bangkok's control
over U.S. forces as a plot to legalize the U.S. military presence.
The bill's sponsor, former foreign minister Thanat Khoman--an
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independent-minded legislator whose views are frequently cited
favorably in Thai communist broadcasts--was pointedly criticized
by accompanying Hanoi comment. The spokesman's statement
supported the Thai people's struggle for complete U.S. withdrawal
and said that an end to Thai Government involvement in U.S.
moves against Indochinese countries remained "a basic condition"
for the establishment of friendly DRV-Thai relations.
PEKING Peking began to moderate criticism of the U.S.
military presence in Thailand almost a year before the
Paris peace agreement, reflecting the changes in Sino-U.S.
relations at the time of President Nixon's February 1972 visit
to China. The Chinese had previously ,joined the Vietnamese in
condemning U.S. forces in Thailand and the use of Thai-based
planes in Indochina, but by early 1972 Peking's increasingly
sanguine view of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia resulted in a marked
decline in such criticism. There was no comparable moderation in
PRC criticism of the Bangkok government until August 1972, when
Peking media abandoned previous abusive attacks on the
"Thanom-Praphat clique." In September and October 1972 Peking
took its first step toward improving bilateral PRC-Thai relations
by welcoming official Thai envoys to China.
Peking's new line was clearly demonstrated in its comment on the
30th anniversary of the Thai CP on 1 December 1972. Departing
from past practice, Chinese media did not publicize the PRC
leaders' message of greetings on the occasion. The message itself,
as carried by VOPT, seemed calculated to minimize Peking's long-
standing identification with the Thai insurgency. The message
generally praised the Thai party for its "great contribution to
the liberation struggle" in Thailand but did not mention the Thai
Government, instead referring to "local reactionaries." It
conspicuously avoided associating the Chinese with the strategy
of people's war 'a Thailand and did not mention Chinese support.
Following the signing of the Paris agreement, Peking media have
occa-ionally noted the U.S. military presence in Thailand but have
exhibited none or Hanoi's concern about it. Thus, Peking media
reports on the August 1973 U.S.-Thai agreement on the first stage
of U.S. military withdrawals did not echo Vietnamese skepticism
about the move or cite reports that the United States planned to
retain a permanent residual force.
Peking's general caution in its treatment of Bangkok authorities
continued after the assumption of power by Sanya in October 1973.
However, Chinese media have shown somewhat less restraint than
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 Approved For Release I 999/09Vi51'I CIWJIkbP85T008l I bd'Ot b70041-3
2 OCTOBER 1974
during Thanom's rule. Since the change in the Thai Government,
NCNA has carried more reports on fighting and urban unrest in
Thailand and has given somewhat more attention to the Thai CP.
Most recently, for example, NCNA matked the 7 August anniversary
of the Thai insurrection--an anniversary ignored by Peking media
in the previous year--with accounts of VOPT comment dwelling
upon insurgent battle successes. NCNA duly noted the comment's
focus on armed struggle as the proper route to liberation but
omitted references to the United States and mentioned the Sanya
government only once.
THAI CP The Voice of the People of Thailand broadcasts have
never reflected any moderatioi- of the Thai CP's
hostility toward the authorities in Bangkok., despite the change
in the stance of the Thai communists' Chinese mentors. The
party has also continued to criticize the U.S. military presence
in Thailand as an affront to Thai sovereignty, although since
the Vietnam peace agreement it has paid less attention to the
relationship of these forces to Indochina.
Thai CP propaganda after the change of government in October 1973
dismissed the Sanya regime as basically the same "reactionary
clique" that had ruled Thailand for years. The communists have
also continued to call for armed struggle to seize power, although
the increased importance of the mass movements that brought the
downfall of the Thanem administration has been recognized in
expanded VOPT comment encouraging urban political movements,
demonstrations, and strikes.
The party's more favorable assessment of political trends in Thai
cities has also given a more optimistic cast to its view of the
overall situation in Thailand. Thus, while Thai CP comment in
1972 on the 7 August anniversary of their insurrection underlined
the difficulties facing their struggle, this year the VOPT
editorial on the anniversary dwelt upon the achievements of the
political struggle in the past year and characterized the
insurgents' situation as "excellent."
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VIiIS 'I'RI:NDS
2 OC1'0111?R 1974
A P P E N D I X
MOSCOW, 1'I:KI.NG BROADCAST STATISTICS 23 - 29 SEPTEMBER 1974
Moscow (2754 1 tem
l'ekl.ng (79.1. items)
Ilungarian Party Leader
11%
Ph.11IppInes First Lady
(4%)
147,*
Kadar in USSR
[Suslov Frl.e:ndsh ip
(--)
3Z]
Imelda Marcos in I.'RC
UNGA Session
(6%)
7"'
Rally Speech
Mauritanian President
(137)
5 **
UNCA Session
(B7)
67
Daddah in I'RC, DPRK
[Gromyko Speech
(--)
3J
Mozambique Independence
(3%)
37,
24 September
Yugoslavia
(--)
3%
Asian Peace and Security
(--S )
G
[Anti-Regime
(--)
2%]
Conference, Samarkand
[Brezhnev Greetings
(--)
3%]
Group Exposed
Criticism of Lin Piao
(5%)
China
(7%)
5%
and Confu
i
Guinea
Bissau Indepen-
4%
c
us
dence
First
Declaration
Anniversary
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio sc. ;1ces. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention In terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance
* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with
Imelda Marcos.
** This figure excludes brief reports on Chou En-lai's meeting with
Daddah.
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