TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070040-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: September 25, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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on a en
ID'S
'RENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
25 SEPTEMBER 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 39)
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONTENTS
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Ford, Kissinger Statements, SALT Get Moscow Attention. . . . . . . . . 1
FORCE REDUCTION TALKS
Moscow, Allies Remain Adamant in Rejecting NATO's Proposals. . . . . . 3
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA Cite Bloc Support for Ideological Drive. . . . . . . 5
Yugoslavia Sentences Stalinists, Criticizes Outside Support. . . . . . 7
USSR-IRAQ
Moscow Hails Ties With Iraq, Reaffirms Aid to Palestinians . . . . . . 9
INDOCHINA
Recent Ford Statements Draw Routine Response From DRV, PRG . . . . . . 10
Lao Delegation Visits Hanoi at Start of Maur Seeking Aid . . . . . . . 11
DRV Chief of Staff Dung Calls for Army Modernization . . . . . . . . . 12
Chou, Chiang Ching Greet Visiting Philippine First Lady. . . . . . . . 15
Peking Sees Shift in Economic Balance Toward Third World . . . . . . . 16
NOTES
JCP-CPSTJ Relations; PRC-Greece; U.S. Role in Chile . . . . . . . . . . 18
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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U. S. -SOVIET RE L A T I ONS
FORD, KISSINGER STATEMENTS, SALT GET MOSCOW ATTENTION
The issues of detente and U.S.-Soviet relations have reemerged
as focal points of Soviet reportage and comment as Moscow
media took note of recent statements by President Ford and
Secretary Kissinger and provided customary editorial send-offs
for the opening of the UN General Absembly session and the
resumption of the SALT talks. While with one exception--an
article by G.A. Trofimenko on SALE in the USA journal, discussed
below--Moscow refrained from extensive comment on any of these
events, it treated them in a way seemingly carefully calculated
to avoid jolts to the delicate process of developing good
relations with the new U.S. Administration.
FORD, KISSINGER Moscow's treatment of the recent series of
STATEMENTS statements by President Ford and Secretary
Kissinger--the President's press conference on
the 16th, his UN address on the 18th, his speech in Michigan on
the 23d, and the Secretary's UN address on the 23d--suggests it is
still observing a "honeymoon" relationship with the new Administration.
Despite several openings which these statements offered for Moscow
propaganda exploitation, it has confined itself largely to straight
reporting or paraphrasing of the original statements. Even the
President's remarks regarding the question of the CIA's involvement
in Chile elicited little more than passing notice by Moscow
commentators. The same can be said for the President's and
Secretary's warnings to the oil-producing nations in their speeches
on the 23d. Although Moscow has begun to replay adverse Arab
reaction to the statements, particularly in broadcasts beamed to
the Arab world, it has refrained from originating any critical
comment of its own on the subject.
This cautious treatment of the new Administration comes against a
background of renewed emphasis in Soviet comment on the optimistic
themes which Moscow habitually associates with the United Nations
and SALT. IZVESTIYA on the 19th carried a self-congratulatory
editorial hailing the socialist countries' contribution to bringing
about the favorable trends in international relations which, it
said, were "continuing and deepening." The Moscow observers round-
table program on the 22d discussed the opening of the SALT talks in
a similar vein. Hailing the achievements thus far, one commentator
predicted that progress in the talks should promote "in an even more
fundamental way" an improvement of the international climate.
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SALT The major Soviet comment on SALT was a major article
by G.A. Trofimenko in the September issue of the USA
journal which has Just become available in translation. It is
apparent the article is intended to be a persuasive and
reasonable presentation of the Soviet viewpoint regarding the
conceptual framework which should govern the search for
solutions. Although the article argues in moderate terms
and is shot through with an optimistic outlook, it presents a
frank critique of American viewpoints which are said to pose
obstacles to agreement. Among the views criticized is what is
described as an American penchant for defining national
interests in terms of a zero-sum game--a Soviet loss is an
American gain. Another is Secretary Schlesinger's "retargeting
doctrine," which the article disparages as a bluff intended to
exert psychological pressure, on the grounds that such subjects
are not discussed in public by responsible officials.
Finally, in an apparent reference to Secretary Kissinger's reported
effort in March to persuade the Soviets to accept the concept of
"throw-weight" as a principle for negotiating limitations on
offensive missiles, it deplores the practice of "American
theoretician." to propose a "purely American model of a solution . .
which is at radical variance with the traditions and principles
of the military-technological policy of the other side."
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FORCE REDUCTION TALKS
MOSCOW, ALLIES REMAIN ADAMANT IN REJECTING NATO'S PROPOSALS
The spate of comment prompted by the convening of the fourth
round of the Vienna force reduction negotiations on 24 September
maintained the public standpat attitude of Moscow and its allies
that rejects both NATO's draft proposals as a basis for
negotiations as well as the pessimistic Western press views
about an alleged state of "paralysis" in the talks.
Soviet comment following the 17 June recess of the third round
had stressed that-the East's position was "the same" as outlined
in the original November 1973 proposal. This assessment was-given by
the Eastern bloc's main spokesman, Warsaw's T. Strulak, in an
interview with PRAVDA's Vienna correspondent I. Melnikov published
on 5 August. During the recess Soviet comment routinely. rejected
one aspect after another of NATO's draft proposals, with Vladimir
Komlev in the weekly NEW TIMES (No. 30) for the first time in Soviet
media publicly rejecting various NATO proposals made in the
"informal talks" outside the formal plenary sessions. Repeating
Moscow's strong criticism of the West European states and Canada
for not making a firm commitment along with the United States and
the socialist states to reduce their forces, Komlev declared that
it is "essential for the talks to result in a clear definition of
the extent of the force and arms reduction for each party to the
agreement" on the basis of "agreed d-~adlines." Tnen alluding to
the informal talk;,, Komlev said: "Nor is the situation changed
by certain clarifications which, according to Western press reports,
the NATO countries have made to their position, since the essence
of this position remains as before."
Updating the Pact's public adamant position, Prague's CTK on
24 September reported Czechoslovak delegate Klein as telling that
day's plenary meeting that "the Western concept ignores the
principle of equality of the participants and therefore cannot serve
as a basis for a future solution." Despite this view, Moscow
commentators have made a concerted effort to refute, as stated by
TASS observer Goncharov on the 24th, the "exaggerated pessimism"
expressed in the West over the progress of the Vienna talks. They
have noted that although there has been no meeting of minds on the
two sides' basic proposals, the talks have made possible detailed
discussions of these proposals in a businesslike atmosphere.
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CSCE LINK TO MBFR Evidence that Moscow is marking time in
Vienna until it clearly sees prospects for
a successful conclu^ion to the Geneva C SCE negotiations was again
readily apparent in Fc?reign Minister Gromyko's speech to the
UN General Assembly on the 24th. Gromyko made a lengthy, moderate
assessment of the CSCE negotiations; said the USSP, "attaches
primary importance" to their successful completion, the "number
one question in European political life today"; and then added
a brief passage on the force reduction talks.. The TASS account
quotes Gromyko as saying the USSR "also" believes it important to
achieve results in Vienna, and that any agreements must be based
on "strict observance by all of the rule of undiminished security
for each side," the standard Moscow formulation.
Gromyko carefully avoided an explicit linkage of the Vienna talks
to a successful CSCE conclusion, unlike CPSU Politburo candidate
member and secretary Ponomarev, who did so in a rare Soviet
leadership statement on 10 June.* Gromyko instead followed the more
general position of calling for a conclusion of the CSCE and
declaring that it then would be easier to solve other outstanding
questions. At the unofficial level, however, IZVESTIYA political
observer Matveyev, in the Moscow radio international observers
roundtable program on the 22d, was more direct than Gromyko, point-
ing out that the successful conclusion of the CSCE "without a doubt
will help bring about favorable progress" at the Vienna talks.
U.S. AIRLIFT CAPABILITY A unique aspect of the comment during
the summer recess has been the unusual
stress on the significance of NATO's strategic airlift capability.
This was discussed in detail in August in a three-part series of
articles in RED STAR by Professor Colonel Relov, a commentator who in
recent years has repeatedly discussed in the Soviet military paper
U.S. air warfare doctrines and capabilities. Although he did not
explicitly mention the force reduction talks, Belov made clear, in
discussing the U.S. "dual-basing" system and the series of recent
Reforger exercises, that the U.S. aim was to demonstrate to its NATO
allies "the possibility of rapidly building up the bloc's armed
forces" in the event of "'emergency circumstances."' Belov stopped
short of stating the obvious conclusion his readers would reach:
i.e., the Soviet military leadership must take into consideration the
U.S. potential for rapidly sending troops and armaments to the
European theater when comparing Warsaw Pact and NATO forces.
* See the TRENDS of 19 June 1974, page 19.
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COMMUNIST RE LATI0NS
PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA CITE BLOC SUPPORT FOR IDEOLOGICAL DRIVE
Moscow's current revivalist drive for enhanced ideological vigilance
and communist morality, launched by the CPSU's decree on the Belorussian
party organization summarized in PRAVDA on 30 August, has assumed
bloc-wide dimensions, judging by recent articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA.
The PRAVDj arti-le, on 14 September, provided a roundup of articles from
the leading party journals of Moscow's orthodox East European allies
and Mongolia, all calling for an intensification of the ideological
struggle. IZVESTIYA on 12 September carried an article by the deputy
director of Czechoslovak television warning against complacency on
the ideological front in the era of detente. Earlier evidence that
the bloc parties undertook some coordination on the current ideological
campaign was afforded by the prompt and extensive reporting of the
CPSU decree in the main party dailies of the orthodox East European
countries. In this respect, the current campaign is reminiscent of
the bloc-wide reemphasis on ideological struggle and policy coordination
which followed the Crimea meeting of bloc leaders in July 1973.
PRAVDA ROUNDUP The PRAVDA roundup, entitled "The Force of the
Ideas of Socialism" and written by a former PRAVDA
Peking correspondent, M. Domogatskikh, was unusual both for its focus
on a single theme and for its blunt inference that the substance of
the 30 August CPSU resolution had applicability for foreign communist
parties as well. Thus, after quoting the CPSU resolution to the effect
that building a new society "and the ferocity of the ideological
struggle in the international arena are making increasingly high
demands on ideological activity," the review declared that "the enhance-
ment of the role of ideological work is considered necessary in all
fraternal parties."
Without giving any indication of the dates of the articles selected,
the PRAVDA roundup went- out of its way to highlight hardlining state-
ments from the party journals of Poland and Hungary--countries which
are usually less strident in the ideological sphere than the other
orthodox Warsaw Pact members. The PZPR's NOWE, DROGI was cited as
declaring that the Polish party "resolutely opposes the chauvinist
and antisocialist ideology of China's Maoist leaders" and that "Maoism
directs its anti-Soviet spearhead against all socialist countries and
against People's Poland's basic national and social interests." The
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Budapest theoretical monthly TARSADALMI SZEMLE was quoted as under-
scoring such themes as defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism,
V:Lntensification of Marxist propaganda," and "not least--close
cooperation with other socialist countries and communist and workers
parties." The review also quoted the Hungarian journal as warning
that "it would be shortsighted and naive to suppose that the enemies
of our system have abandoned their designs" and as stressing the
need to "expose anti-Marxist political concepts."
Citations from Bulgaria's NOVO UREME, Czechoslovakia's ZIVOT STEANY,
East Germany's EINHEIT, and the MPR's NAMYN AM'DRAL included standard
tributes to the successes of the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence
combined with warnings against slackening the international class
struggle. With Peking the obvious target, ZIVOT STRANY was quoted
additionally as asserting that communists throughout the world are
"exposing the hostile propaganda of imperialist ideologists and
apostates of Marxism-Leninism who throw in their lot with them whatever
disguise they might wear." The Prague party journal was also rennr.ted
as observing that "the new conditions" of the ideological struggle
between the two world systems demanded greater internationalization
and "new forms" of ideological activity by the fraternal parties.
There was, however, no mention in the review of the proposed all-
European and world conferences of communist parties.
IZVESTIYA The article in the 12 September morning edition of
ARTICLE IZVESTIYA by Czechoslovak television deputy director
Milos Marko dealt more in specifics than the PRAVDA
review, which adhered largely to generalities on the ideological
struggle. Thus the article, entitled "On the Fronts of the Ideo-
logical Struggle: The Only Correct Path," recalled that the December
1973 Moscow conference of party secretaries had underscored the
urgency of "a resolute rebuff to ideological sabotage and to attempts
by aggressive imperialist circles to wreck the process of relaxation
of tension." Marko also cited Brezhnev's statement, in his 21 July
speech in Warsaw on the occasion of Poland's 30th liberation anniversary,
that "the communists' general line on questions of ideology is essentially
a unified line." Brezhnev had gone out of his way in his Warsaw speech
to stress that the socialist community was based on "common ideology"
and that the socialist countries' cooperation in ideology had been
markedly intensified "in recent years."
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YUGOSLAVIA SENTENCES STALINISTS, CRITICIZES OUTSIDE SUPPORT
Belgrade's handling of the publicity surrounding the exposure and
sentencing of the group of pro-Soviet dissidents arrested last April
reflects an effort to maximize the admonitory implications of the
affair vis-a-vis Moscow without pushing the admonition to the point
of endangering relations between the two countries. A statement
issued by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office on 20 September
announced that 32 persons had been given sentences ranging from one
to 14 years. Like Tito's remarks on 12 September, the statement
provided few details on the affair, particularly on the sensitive
question of where the group received its outside support.* Limited
media comment provided little additional detail but harshly criticized
the countries, unidentified, that "tolerated" the activities of the
group.
The public prosecutor's statement claimed that the aims of the "illegal
group" were to organize itself "for hostile activity against the
constitutional order" and to establish a rival political party. Only
two of the members--identified as the leaders--were named, one a
pensioner, the other a professor. That the group was subordinate to
outside control was clearly implied in the statement's contention that
they were "in contact with Cominformist emigrees working abroad against
our country from whom they received orders and propaganda material."
Media comment has been very limited, suggesting an effort by the regime
to prevent the airing of critical remarks that might go beyond the
party leadership's own criticism. TANJUG provided the first response,
a commentary issued immediately after the public prosecutor's statement;
and an official League of Communists commentary was carried by KO,,MUNIST
on the 23d. Both provided few additional details on the case but
emphasized the need for continued vigilance against "all" opponents
of the regime and discussed the implications of outside support for
the group.
in a slap at bloc countries that harbor Cominformist emigrees, TANJUG
called the toleration of these groups by other countries "unacceptable,"
pointing out that "it is directed not only against our country but also
against the basic principles on which international relations, cooperation
and friendly relations among countries are based." KOMUNIST was more
* For a discussion of Tito's speech, see the TRENDS of 18 September 1974,
pages 9-10.
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critical, seeing the group's activity as not only "confirmation of
the importance and desperation of the anti-Yugoslav Cominformists"
but even more importantly also of the "bureaucratic-dogmatic people
in the country who share its views." KOMUNIST also emphasized that
such toleration endangered relations and cooperation between
Yugoslavia and "the country from which such activity is pursu.ed."
The party paper added that Yugoslavia would never tolerate such
activity on its own soil, realizing that this "would lead to spoiled
relations with these countries and to a spoiled international
atmosphere in genera].."
Belgrade's reproofs about too much publicity and speculation have
clearly been aimed.at the West as well. Reports about Soviet and
Hungarian troops massing near the Yugoslav border as well as about
the impending recall of Soviet, Czechoslavak and Hungarian diplo-
matic envoys in Belgrade have been carried in the Western media.
Tito himself warned against overdramatizing the case, and KOIi1TNIST
cautioned Western media against "wishful thinking" a;,out deteriorating
relations between Belgrade and Moscow. The decision to go ahead with
the long-scheduled "friendly official" visit of Soviet Army ChirL
of Staff Kulikov from 17-23 September may have been intended it part
to dispel such rumors.
Moscow and orthodox bloc media have continued to ignore the affair,
while maverick Romania, which also had reported Tito's 12 September
speech, reported the sentencing of the group.
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USSR-IRAQ
MOSCOW HAILS TIES WITH IRAQ, REAFFIRMS AID TO PALESTINIANS
Moscow, commenting on the 18-22 September visit to the Soviet Union
by Iraqi Foreign Minister S. Taqah, has used the occasion to praise
the current state of "stable and successfully developing" Soviet-
Iraqi relations while expressing its intent to strengthen coopera-
tion in "political, economic, cultural, and other fields." TASS
on 21 September, reporting a meeting between Taqah and Podgornyy,
stated that both countries also pledged to continue their aid and
support to the Palestinian resi.stance movement.
Moscow and Baghdad n. dia have not disclosed except in highly general
terms what specific topics were discussed during Taqah's talks
with Soviet officials who, in addition to Podgornyy, reportedly
included V. Kuznetsov, first deputy foreign minister. According
to Iraqi sources, Taqah was also scheduled to meet with Brezhnev on
19 September but for unexplained reasons apparently did not. One
probable topic was the continued fighting since last spring between
Kurdish and Iraqi forces in northern Iraq and the implications of
the conflict for Iraqi-Iranian-Soviet relations., Moscow radio's
Arabic service on 20 September suggested that the Kurdish problem
was indeed discussed by noting Taqah's visit and, reviewing the
political context in which it was taking place, observing that in
the past the USSR had praised Iraq's efforts to solve the Kurdish
issue, Asserting that "this has worried Iraq's enemies," the
broadcast stated that Iraq could count on Soviet support in
solving its problems.
Another topic mentioned by the 20 September Moscow radio commentary,
and described as "naturally" a subject of discussion, was "the
Middle East situation" and the need for coordination o. Arab and
Soviet policies, especially in regard to Israel.
In an Arabic language commentary on 23 September Mosco'a radio
suggested that Moscow and Baghdad may not have been in complete
agreement recently on the Palestinian question. Noting that certain
Arab newspapers had been spreading "poisonous propaganda," the
commentary singled out a specific issue--the Beirut AN-NAHAR on
20 September--for publishing "lies hostile to the Arab cause
concerning Soviet-Iraqi differences on the Palestinian cause." Both
this commentary and the Moscow domestic radio on 21 September, in
reporting the Taqah-Podgornyy meeting, stated that both "the Soviet
Union and Iraq intend to continue furnishing aid and support to the
Palestine resistance movement, which they consider an integral part
of the Arab national liberation movement."
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INDOCHINA
RECENT FORD STATEMENTS DRAW ROUTINE RESPONSE FROM DRV: PRG
DRV and PRG media routinely criticized the Administration's
Foreign policy in low-level press and radio comment on President
lord's speeches to the United Nations on 18 September and to
the World Energy'Conference on the 23d. The 18 September
White House statement on American personnel unaccounted for in
Southeast Asia drew official protests from the DRV Foreign
hinistry spokesman. and a PRG delegation spokesman at the La
Celle Saint Cloud consultative conference.
Comment on the President's UN speech took his incidental
reference to Indochina and his remarks on Secretary Kissinger
as points of departure for castigating U.S. policy on Vietnam
and denigrating Kissinger. According to a 20 September NHAN DAN
commentary, President Ford's speech constituted a "dull repetition"
of Nixon's foreign policy and revealed a "vary wrong attitude"
by the U.S. Government toward Vietnam and Indochina. The commentary
charged that the United States had "deliberately kept open the
wounds of war" in Indochina by its aid to Saigon and Phnom Penh.
Simi'arly, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the following 2
labeled lord's remarks on Indochina a "deceitful statement"
aimed at concealing the "aggressive" policies of the United
States. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN dwelt at length on Ford's statements
in support of the Secretary of State, terming them a "lavish
eulogy" of the "architect of the Nixon Doctrine" and characterizing
Kissinger as a "cunning, crafty lackey" who has served "the
most reactionary U.S. forces."
Hanoi's continued sensitivity to charges that it is not cooperating
.Ln accounting for missing U.S. servicemen was evident in the effort
made in the 20 September foreign ministry spokesman's statement
to discredit President Ford's appeal that U.S. teams be allowed
to conduct the necessary searches. In reacting to what it described
as an accusation by the President that the DRV and PRG had itot
responded to such appeals, the statement claimed this was a "brazen
U.S. distortion" designed to "mislead" public opinion, to "conceal
continued U.S. involvement and intervention" in South Vietnam, and
to "conceal very grave systematic violations" of the Paris agreement.
While not directly denying DRV unwillingness to agree to the search
for the missing personnel, the statement attempted to give an
impression that Hanoi was cooperating by maintaining that it had
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complied with the scheduled return of U.S. prisoners and the
repatriation from the DRV of the remains of U.S. pilots who
died in captivity. Lack of progress in the search, the state-
ment declared, was a result of U.S. and Saigon "sabotage" of
the Paris agreement in other areas, namely the supplying of
U.S. military aid to the GVN and Saigon's detention of "hundreds
of thousands" of civilian PRG personnel. DRV and PRG foreign
ministry statements issued in August protesting U.S. aid to
South Vietnam and the U.S. stand on its personnel missing in
action similarly had charged the United States with a "campaign
of slander" to shift the blame to The DRV for not implementing
the Paris agreement in this regard.*
LAO DELEGATION VISITS HANOI AT START OF TOUR SEEKING AID
A delegation of the Lao Provisional Government of National Union
(PGNU) visited North Vietnam from 15 to 18 September on its
first stop in an aid-seeking mission which Vientiane media say
will take a month and visit Peking, Pyongyang, and Algiers, as
well as Hanoi. The delegation was led by Minister of Economy
and Planning Sot Phetrasi, a representative from the Pathet Lao
side of the PGNU, and included Vice Minister of Transport
and Public Works Houmphan Saignasit, an experienced Vientiane
government official. DRV Minister Dang Thi met and saw off the
delegation, hosted a reception in its honor, and led the North
Vietnamese side in discussions on economic and cultural cooperation.
Dang Thi was not identified in his position as chairman of the
Nation Reunification Commission, but it is possible that his
responsibilities in that post for handling aid to South Vietnam
qualified him to deal with the Lao negotiations. (Prior to his
appointment to head the Reunification Commission in April this
year, Dang Thi was a minister in the Premier's Office and had
held posts in planning and in scientific and technical fields.)
The delegation was also received by Premier Pham Van Dong on
17 September.
According to Hanoi and Lao reports, four agreements were signed
in Hanoi on 18 September, including an accord on DRV assistance
to Laos in goods and materials. Vientiane and Pathet Lao media,
but not VNA, specified that the aid would be gratuitous and
include fnod, medicines, and clothing. Lao media also reported
* The foreign ministry statements and other commentary on missing
personnel are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 August 1974, pages 21-22.
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that one of the agreements provided for cooperation in building
a road and a railway from Laos to the sea through DRV territory;
VNA's report only mentioned the building of a road. The other
two accords dealt with the shipment of goods through DRV territory
and with the repair of Route 7 in Laos. Vientiane noted that the
latter protocol also covered transport of DRV goods to Laos during
the 1974-1975 dry season.
Hanoi "warmly acclaimed" the agreements in a NHAN DAN editorial on
the 19th which suggested that DRV assistance was necessarily
limited. The editorial pointed out that North Vietnam still
faced "many difficulties in the postwar reconstruction" and noted
that the DRV people would "contribute to the extent of their
limited potential."
The Lao delegation left Hanoi on 18 September, arriving in Algiers
on the 20th after passing through Vientiane and Moscow.
DRV CHIEF OF STAFF DUNG CALLS FOR ARMY MODERNIZATION
Hanoi's abiding concern about modernizing and improving its armed
forces since the cease-fire was reflected in a talk by DRV Chief
of Staff Senior General Van Tien Dung at a "recent" all-army school
conference of cadres. Dung, long a strong exponent of using main-
force units employing the tactics of conventional warfare, presented
a well-reasoned argument for building a professional army grounded
in modern tr.chnology and trained in the technique of combat coordi-
nation. The first part of Dung's address was summarized in the
August issue of the army journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, but
no other portion has been made public. No date for the cadre
conference was given in the journal, but a 27 June Hanoi broadcast
had reported that Dung, along with Colonel General Song Hao, had
addressed a "recent" conference of military schools.
Dung's remarks suggest continued Hanoi concern over the possibility
of future direct U.S. military involvement in Indochina. He
warned not only of alleged U.S.-Saigon efforts to "sabotage" the
Paris peace agreement but also that a "sizable U.S. force has been
maintained outside Vietnam as a 7realistic deterrent force'."
It is this set of circumstances, he asserted, that require constant
"revolutionary vigilance" for all eventualities.
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According to Dung, the tasks posed by this situation constitute
"major, burning" problems of the armed forces whose solution must
be consistent not only with DRV economic and industrial "realities"
but with world scientific and technological development as well.
Flatly stating that the VPA has not yet been "regularized and
modernized," he called for creative application, throughout the
country and the army, of the latest in scientific and technical
knowledge so as to "quickly" increase national defense potential.
While professing his allegiance to the importance of the political
and moral underpinnings of a revolutionary army as "the most
fundamental factor" in its combat strength, Dung made no bones
about "other factors" that must be taken into account--namely,
organization, weapons and equipment, and tactics. He gave short
shrift to organizational needs and dwelt at length on the "the
very important" factor of weapons and equipment. Quo:-ing Engels
to the effect that the military application of advanced technology
can necessitate a total reorganization of the armed forces, Dung
called for a recognition of this "objective law" in carrying out
''appropriate formulas" of leadership and command.
In discussing the tactics a regular, modern army must employ,
Dung's main concern was what he termed "coordinated combat
tactics''--a theme he had developed in some detail in a talk at
an all-army cadre class that was published in the December 1973
TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. In the earlier talk Dung had defined
coordinated combat as taking place among all armed branches on
different scales and claimed that this was exemplified during the
campaigns of the 1972 "strategic offensive." An army that is unable
to coordinate in this manner, Dung argued in his current talk, is
not yet a truly regular and modern force despite structure,
organization, numerical strength and modern equipment. Noting
that a regular and modern army should be able to engage. in combat
at various levels, Dung marie it clear that it is especially
large-scale coordinated combat that he had in mind, sn.d he declared
that such an army would be able to:
Direct strategically significant, annihilating blows
at the enemy; rapidly and noticeably change the
balance of forces on the battlefield in our favor;
and, together with all our armed forces and people,
contribute to victoriously concluding the war.
At another point, perhaps reflecting Hanoi's intention to follow a
previously untried strategy in any future military escalation,
Dung cautioned that campaigns should not be based on previously
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established patterns or "inflexible formula." He added that
large-scale coordinated attacks do not necessarily mean either
the massive use of weapons to replace men or numerical strength
to overpower the enemy.
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CHINA
CHOU, CHIANG CHING GREET VISITING PHILIPPINE FIRST LADY
Peking's keen interest in improved relations with the Philippines
has been demonstrated by the unusually high-level welcome accorded
Philippine first lady Imelda Marcos thus far during her China tour,
dramatized by her reception by Chou Fn-lai at a hospital in Peking
on 20 September, the day of her arrival. While her visit is at
Chou's invitation, the premier's last public appearance had been
the Chinese Army Day reception on 31 July.
Apart from Chou's "friendly" conversation, during which he wished
her a warns welcome and extended his regards to President Marcos,
she has received unprecedented attention from Chiang Ching who,
as Mrs. Marcos' nearest protocol equivalent, has apparently assumed
the role of co-hostess.* Chiang met with Mrs. Marcos on the 20th
for a "friendly" talk,,. escorted her to a concert in Peking on the
23d, and was present on the 24th to guide her on a tour of Tientsin,
the first time Chiang is known to have escorted a foreign visitor
outside the Pelting area. Chiang's important role was underlined
in a 23 September banquet speech by Vice Premier Li lisien-nien,
who noted that Mrs. Marcos had been received by Chou "and Comrade
Chiang Ching." In addition, a 22 September NCNA account indicated
Chiang's hostess role by stating that she had "entrusted" the
State Council Cultural Group with presenting an opera soiree for
Mrs. Marcos on the 22d. Chiang's active role may be further
explained by cultural talks apparently conducted by the two sides.
During her speech at the reciprocal banquet on the 23d, Mrs. Marcos
emph,-isized that "growing contacts in the cultural and economic
fields" are forerunners of stable and lasting relationships.
As Mrs. Marcos' main host while in Peking, Li llsien-nien led
Chinese officials at the airport welcome ceremonies, was present
at her meetings with Chou and with Chiang Ching on the 20th,
hosted a banquet in her honor that even-ng, and attended the
Philippines' reciprocal banquet on the 23d. Li also led Chinese
officials at the z23 September signing of letters for "further
development of trade between China and the Philippines." In his
* According to a Manila-datelined AFP report on 25 September, Mrs.
Marcos is extending her departure from China from 27 September to
2 October at the personal' invitation of Chiang Ching, in order
to attend PRC National Day on the 1st.
CONFIDENTIAL
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banquet remarks on the 20th,L i lauded recently increased delegation
exchanges and expanded trade between China and the Philippines and on
t'he 23d characterized the current visit as having achieved "positive
results" and added a "new page" to friendly bilateral relations.
Li expressed confidence that relations would undergo "a new and
greater development."
When she left Peking for Tientsin on the 24th, Mrs. Marcos was
accompanied only by deputy foreign ministers Han Nien-lung and
Wang Hai-Jung, according to Peking radio. After her arrival in
Tientsin, she was joined by Chiang Ching, who accompanied her to
a cultural performance, to a production brigade, and to a bicycle
factory. Mrs. Marcos also attended an evening banquet hosted by
provincial chief Hsieh Hsueh-kung, but NCNA's 24 September report
on the day's activities did not report that Chiang was present.
PEKING SEES SHIFT IN ECONOMIC BALANCE TOWARD THIRD WORLD
A 20 September PEOPLE'S DAILY article bluntly asserted that a change
in the world balance of economic power has already taken place,
citing as evidence recent efforts by the United States, the Soviet
Union and developed Western countries to seek surplus capital from
oil-producing, developing nations. Last April, at the time of the
UN conference on raw materials, Peking had described the oil producers'
boycott and pricing moves as a "pioneering action" and had predicted
that by such actions in the future the developing states could shift
the balance of economic power more in favor of the third world. The
current article, signed by PEOPLE'S DATL'i commentator Jen Ku-ping,
represents a measured advance from previous Chinese r,sessments.
Peking thus far has maintained a discreet silence on recent U.S.
efforts to redress the economic balance. While Peking media have
devoted unusual attention to the economic problems facing the Ford
Administration,* they have thus far failed to report the President's
recent addresses at the United Nations and at the Detroit World
Energy Conference, or the 20 September U.S.-West European agreement
on oil sharing. A 23 September NCNA report on UN proceedings noted
that Secretary Kissinger made a statement that day but avoided
discussing its substance.
* For background see the TRENDS of 11 September 1974, page 9.
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Characterizing the United States as a "swashbuckling dollar empire"
that is begging for dollar9 from oil-producing countries, Jen's
article was the first Peking acknowledgement of reported recent
efforts by the U.S. Treasury Department as well as by private
business to lure Arab oil capital. to the United States. The Soviet
Union came in for predictably harsher treatment as "even more
jealous and covetous of the Middle East's oil dollars," and as
being especially "insidious" in selling arms dearly in return for
cheap oil during the October 1973 Middle East war. Jen also called
attention to investments of Middle East oil money in West Europe
and Japan.
Citing the new capital flow from oil producers to developed nations
as proof of the "splitting" and "great disorder" in the international
economic realm, the article went on to stress an unusally bleak
assessment of the industrialized nations' economic woes. It said
the United States and other developed Western states are now
struggling desperately amid "the most unprecedented economic
confusion of the postwar period." It cited particularly problems
of inflation, production declines, capital shortages, mounting
debts and "enormous balance of payments deficits." The article
added that Moscow faces similar problems.
The Chinese have, however, given no indication they view changes
in the economic balance as having an effect on the world strategic
balance. Recent PEOPLE'S DAILY articles timed to coincide with
the reconvening of the SALT talks and East-West talks over European
disarmament in Geneva and Vienna--including a lengthy 14 September
commentary by Jen Ku-ping--have stressed the longstanding Chinese
view that the United States and the USSR, despite economic and other
problems, are determined to continue the arms expansion and strategic
rivalry to sustain their dominant positions abroad.
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NOTES
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JCP-CPSU RELATIONS: The Japanese Communist Party has finallly
responded to an attack on it by Argentine CP leader A. Fava--reprint-
ed in the May issue of the Soviet journal PARTY LIFE--with an
unsigned article in the 15 September AKAHATA. While the delay and
the relatively low level of response suggest the JCP has no desire
to broaden the polemics, the AKAHATA article did directly counter-
attack against the CPSU, hinting at Soviet authorship of the Fava
article and accusing the Soviet Union of grossly overestimating
both its own role as a revolutionary force and the beneficial
consequences of its detente with the United States. Condemning
the CPSU and the CCP equally for interfering in JCP internal
affairs, AKAHATA maintained that both parties had destroyed the
unity of the international communist movement. Finally, reaffirming
the JCP stand that the Southern Kuriles were rightly Japanese
territory that had been unjustly seized after World War II,
AKAHATA made public the text of a 1959 JCP-CPSU agreement which
indicated the Soviet Union would be willing to consider returning
the territory once specified developments had taken place in
Japan's domestic structure and foreign policy. The Fava article
had bitingly criticized the JCP demand for return of the northern
territories as without foundation and "unprecedented in the
history of the international communist movement."
PRC-GREECE: Reflecting the continuing Chinese interest in encourag-
ing Western unity against Moscow, Peking's sparse comment on the
new Greek government has played up Athen's pro-West initiatives
while softpedaling coverage of last month's anti-U.S. riots and
decision to withdraw from NATO's military structure. Peking
coverage of the riots and decision to withdraw has been limited
to passing notice in a 5 September domestic radio "currei.t events
talk" which reviewed events surrounding the Cyprus crisis and
carefully pointed. out Athens' continuing political membership
in NATO. NCNA subsequently highlighted cne revived EEC-Greek
ties in a 17 September report that the Common Market had agreed
to Athen's request to revive Greece's associate status with the
EEC. NCNA noted that the decision will release EEC aid funds
for Greece frozen following the 1967 military coup, and it played
up the French prime minister's recent pledge to use French
influence to help Greece join the Common Market as a full member.
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U.S. ROLE IN CHILE: Soviet and Cuban follow-up reportage and
comment on President Ford's 16 September press conference remarks
on CIA activities relater to Chile reflect divergent treatment,
the Soviet central press still avoiding direct attribution of the
coup to official U.S. policy in its own comment while Cuban media
directly accuse and condemn the President. At the same time,
Soviet media have replayed strongly critical U.S. and Chilean
remarks, including a 23 September TASS English report that
Allende's widow, Hortensia Bussi de Allende, holds "Henry
Kissinger, assistant to the U.S. President for national security,
responsible" for approving CIA expenditures in Chile. By
contrast, there was no mention of Kissinger or President Ford
in a V. Matveyev IZVESTIYA article on the 20th that condemned
the "sinister operations" of "U.S. intelligence and other
departments" aimed at overthrowing Allende. Matveyev was
implicitly critical of the President's remarks justifying the
CIA role in Chile, observing that the CIA role could not be
dismissed by,,,"sophistry" or "any reference to the United States'
alleged 'state interests."' Havana radio's initial reaction
on the 18th claimed that "U.S. complicity" in Allende's over-
throw "has been confessed by the current Yankee President,
Gerald Ford." And Havana on the 20th informed Cubans that
"Mr. Gerald Ford has had the supreme shamelessness" to admit
CIA actions against Allende, and it deplored what it termed the
President's "Mussolinian assertion" that Allende had threatened
Chilean opposition parties and the press.
CONFIDENTIAL
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APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 16 - 22 SEPTEMBER 1974
Moscow (2393 items)
UNGA Session
[Gromyko Arrival
Statement
China (7%)
Chile (12%)
Cyprus Crisis (2%)
Iraqi Foreign Minister (--)
Taqah in USSR
30th Anniversary, of
Finnish Withdrawal
From World War II
Gromyko in FRG
Peking (923 items)
8% Seventh Asian Games, (24%) 16%
3%] Teheran
Mauritanian President (--) 13%*
7% Daddah in PRC, DPRK
4% UNGA Session (--) 6%
3% Criticism of Lin Piao (8%) 5%
3% and Confucius
Philippines First Lady (--) 4%
3% Imelda Marcos in PRC
(1%)
(--)
(--)
(--) 3%
Mozambique Independence (5%) 3%
Nigerian President Gowon (--) 3%
Visit Communique
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commenta; ies.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's mFsting with Daddah.
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