TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070027-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: June 26, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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LFBIS
TRENDS
Confidential
0070027-9
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
26 JUNE 1974
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
Na;loncl Security Information
Unauthorised disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENrS
26 JUNE 1974
COil TEN TS
ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
TASS Statement Says Israeli Raids on Lebanon Jeopardize Peace. . . . .
1
EUROPE
USSR Disparages NATO Declaration as Contrived, Contradictory . . . . .
3
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Ilichev Returns to Peking; Moscow Reiterates Border Stance . . . . .
5
CEMA MEETING
Sofia Session Records "Unanimity," Accommodates Independents . . . .
7
USSR
Foreign Policy Officials Gain Supreme Soviet Status . . . . . . . . .
10
VIETNAM
Hanoi, PRG Score U.S. Policies, Suspend JMC Talks Again. . . . . . . .
12
Sinking of North Vietnamese Vessel Draws Mild Reoponse . . . . . . . .
14
Peking Sees Indian Ambitions Impeding Improved Relations . . . . . . .
16
PRC Editorial Avoids Issue of Foreign Interference in Taiwan . . . . .
17
I.OREA
DPRK War Anniversary Rhetoric Maintains Current Hard Line. . . . . . .
19
NOTES
CSCE Timing; PRC Leadership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . .
i
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE
TASS STATEMENT SAYS ISRAELI RAIDS ON LEBANON JEOPARDIZE PEACE
In the first such gesture since May 1970; Moscow on 22 June
issued a TASS statement denouncing the Israeli strikes against
Palestinian targets in Lebanon that began on the 3,8th.* TASS
accused Israel of escalating tension in the Middle East at a
time when possibilities for attaining agreement on peace were
"better than ever." The statement reflects Moscow's continuing
effort to build up its image of solidarity with the Arabs,
particularly in light of Cairo reports on the 21st that President
as-Cadat had appealed to President Nixon to restrain Israel from
further raids on Lebanon.
The TASS statement placed "total responsibility" on the Israeli
leadership and government for the "deliberate". buildup of tension,
which it said jeopardized the peace and security of all nations
in the region. There was no repetition of the vague warning in
the May 1970 TASS statement that Israel's."adventurist" policies
were fraught with dangerous consequences for Israel itself. Nor
did the current statement make even an indirect reference to the
United States, as the 1970 statement had done in mentioning
Israel's "support from external imperialist circles." But Soviet
comment and reportage on the recent raids employed the device of
citing Arab sources to link the United States with Tel Aviv's
actions. For example, a TASS dispatch from Beirut on the 22d
and a Rassadin foreign-language commentary the following day
noted that Beirut circles were drawing attention to the fact that
Israel's "new aggression" followed shortly after President Nixon's
Mideast tour, and TASS on the 23d reported a Lebanese parliamentarian's
charge that Israel, "with U.S. connivance," was.bombing Lebanon's
cities and villages. Moscow's Arabic-language serv.ce on the 24th
carried a recorded statement by Palestinu Liberation Organization
chairman Yasir 'Arafat, who called the raids "an American-Israeli
imperialist aggression." 'Arafat added that "it was approved .vid
encouraged, as the U.S.-Israeli joint statement reveals, during tiro,
visit of U.S. President Nixon to Palestine"--a remark that Moscow
deleted during a subsequent Arabic rebroadcast of his statement later
the same day.
* Moscow in September 1972 atypically issued a Soviet Government
statement in response to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria. Other
~h.an a government statement of March 1968 pegged to an attack on Jordan,
the usual Soviet vehicle for response bas been a TASS statement, five
of which were issued between November 1968 and May 1970 in connection
with Israeli attacks on Arab countries,
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Moscow has given low-keyed attention to Israeli. Defense Minister
Peres' current military aid talks in Washington, but an Arabic-
language commentary on the 25th professed to see a connection
between his visit and Israel's announced intention of pursuing
its actions against the Palestinians. The commentary called
attention to reports in Western media of Israel's "nuclear
ambitions" and its efforts to obtain, a large volume of U.S.
military aid, and observed that Tel Aviv should not need all this
if the Middle East were really proceeding toward, peace rather
than. war. TASS on the 215th reported that Secretary Schlesinger.
"tried to justify" the "very impressive" military aid program
by arguing that Israel's partial withdrawal under the di.sengagen;sn.t
agreements "allegedly deprives Israel of its earlier territorial
buffer."
PALESTINIAN ATTACKS As is typical of Soviet comment on Israeli
counteractions,. the TAUS statement portrayed
the victims as peaceful Lebanese and Palestinian civilians and re-
jected as "totally absurd" Israeli attempts to justify these "villainous
actions" as retaliation for "the actions of the Palestinians." Moscow
virtually ignored the 13 June fedayeen attack on Kibbutz Shamir
which preceded the most recent Israeli counterraids. The only reference
to that incident came in a statement by Israeli Communist Party
Secretary General Vilner who, according to a Radio Peace and Progress
broadcast in Arabic on the 24th, rejected the "traditional justification"
of retaliation for extremist actions resulting in the deaths of
civilians in Qiryat Shemona, Ma'alot, and Shamir.
Comment and reportage on the 15 May attack in Ma'alot blamed the
Israelis for the tragic outcome but conveyed Soviet disapproval of
international terrorism in general, along with some cautious
criticism of the fedayeen's seizure of children as hostages.*. A
Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on 25 May, for example,
asserted that the holding of pupils as hostages. "aroused condemnation
among Arab public opinion," and cited a PLO official spokesman as
calling the action "a sad affair."
* Moscow's treatment of the Ma'alot incident and subsequent ..Israeli
attacks on Lebanon is discussed in the TRENDS of :12 May 1974, pages
8-9.'
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EUROPE
USSR DISPARAGES NATO DECLARATION AS CONTRIVED, CONTRADICTORY
In comment on the semiannual meeting of NATO foreign ministers held
18-19 June in Ottawa, Moscow has portrayed the adopted declaration
on Atlantic relations as a display of artificial unity designed to
conceal persistent political differences among the various NATO
countries. Moscow has also emphasized that the document as a whole
is internally inconsistent in that it mixes appreciation of changes
under detente with outdated appeals for increased NATO military
utrength. Expressed principally in generalities and stock
denunciations of NATO as a "militaristic anachronisth," Soviet comment
for the most part has avoided any precise discussion of details in
the 14-point declaration. To reinforce its charges that the document
is contrived and contradictory, Moscow han stressed its controversial
history and has highlighted various passages out of context, in
particular the statement in point five that "the essential elements
in the situation which gave rise to the [NATO] treaty have not
changed."
U.S.-EUROPEAN In recounting the evolution of the new declaration,
RELATIONS Soviet cc:ament has pressed the theme that the NATO
countries have found it increasingly difficult under
present-day conditions to reconcile their national differences. Much
of the comment has asserted that the contentious question of arranging
appropriate consultations between the United States and its European
allies epitomizes these difficulties. Speaking on Moscow radio's
weekly international observers roundtable on 23 June, for instance,
IZVESTIYA's deputy chief editor Nikolay Polyanov.characterized the
issue of consultations and relative independence in decision-making
as "the heart of the entire problem" for mutual relations within NATO.
Polyanov concluded; as have most other Soviet commentators, that the
new declaration reflects an attempt, necessLtated by the impact of
changed world conditions in recent years, to provide the Atlantic
alliance with an appearance of unity and NATO with a rationale for
existing.
NATO AND As is typical in Soviet media treatment of NATO affairs,
DETENTE Moscow has charged that the military alliance represents
a narrow-based, outdated approach to European security
that is inconsistent with the goals of detente and the ideals of
broader all-European cooperation embodied in such approaches as the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In this
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regard, Soviet comment has alleged that favorable references to
detente and CSCE in the new NATO declaration are canceled out
by the document's more predominant and pervasive emphasis on a
military-oriented approach to European relations. PRAVDA Commen-
tator. T. Kolesnichenko.,. in his Moscow radio. review-of the'-week's
events broadcast to North America on 24 June, for example, was
particularly explicit in claiming that the declaration "stresses
a more active NATO war machine." Kolesnichenko added that "in
spite of all the talk" recently that NATO would be reoriented
toward political problems, NATO's actual goal is "to revive the
cold war and the military confrontation between countries with
differing social systems."
BRUSSELS SUMMIT Moacow has reacted in low-keyed fashion to the
Brussels meeting of President Nixon and other
NATO heads of state which included the ceremonial signing of the
NATO declaration on 26 June. While Soviet media had noted in
advance only the fact and purpose of the gathering, TASS on the
26th, reporting that the NATO leaders had aigneJ the declaration,
asserted that the document basically repeated the "'well-known
principles" of the North Atlantic bloc. TASS added that the
declaration was "a compromise" between the U.S. desire for the
dominant role in NATO and the West Europeans' efforts to increase
their say in world affairs.
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S I NO - SOV I ET R E L A T I ON S
om- stretches rather than "recarving the Soviet-Chinese frontier,"
an aim it imputed to Peking. The article again accused Peking of
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Moscow's desire to limit the talks to "specifying thesborderalinelonr
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26 JUNE 1974
ILICHEV RETURNS TO PEKING; MOSCOW REITERATES BORDER STANCE
TASS announced on 25 June that the chief Soviet negotiator at the
stalled Peking border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, had
returned to Peking that day after an unprecedented 11-month
absence. At the same time Moscow seemed to be signaling that no
immediate developments should be expected at the talks by its
extensive publicity for a lengthy Polish discussion of the history
of the Sino-Soviet border talks first carried in the Polish govern-
ment paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY. TASS reporting on 23, 24 and 25 June
and PRAVDA accounts on the 26th in effect reiterated Moscow's
oft-repeated belief that Peking "is not interested in practical
and real agreements" with Moscow on concrete border questions and
that the next move must still come from Peking.
The ZYCIE WARSZAWY assessment of the talks by Adam Wysocki, co-editor
of the paper and a member of the presidium of the Association of
Polish Journalists, came on the heels of a 22 June TASS report of
a new Soviet Foreign Ministry statement protesting Peking's
continued detention of a Soviet helicopter crew. The statement,
though it was the fourth since the helicopter's capture on 14 March,
was moderate in tone and devoid of threats of retaliatory action.
This most recent representation to Peking on the helicopter incident
and the return of Ilicheev together could be interpreted as evidence
of Moscow's intention to continue a persuasive approach in its
attempts to obtain release of the crew.
The timing of Ilichev's return may also have been influenced by
President Nixon's imminent visit to Moscow. Last year Ilichhev
arrived in Peking in May after returning to Moscow for the April 1973
plenum--which set the stage for Brezhnev's visits to Bonn and
Washington--and subsequently, in the shadow of the Washington summit,
presented the Chinese with a proposed nonaggression pact. Moscow's
sensitivity to the implications the U.S.-Soviet summit may have for
its relations with Peking was registered in a 20 June article by
PRAVDA observer Viktor Mayevskiy, who accused Peking of trying to
interfere with the Nixon visit.
The lengthy TASS excerpts of the ZYCIE WARSZAWY di i
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"blocking" the talks by advancing unacceptable preconditions for
opening specific technical discussions. In this respect as well
as others, Wysocki's analysis closely paralleled the most recent
comprehensive account in Soviet media; presented by Oleg Borisov
in the 16 May IZVESTIYA. It also pointed to the continuity of
Moscow's posture adopted in the wake of Ilichev'a departure from
Peking in July 1973.*
TASS reported that Soviet Ambassador to Peking Tolstikov and the
head of the Chinese delegation to the border talks Yu Chan were
among those present at the airport to welcome Ilichev. Moscow
has regularly reported Ilichev's return to the Peking talks from
Moscow, but has not recently reported the presence of any Chinese
officials to welcome him. Peking, as is its usual custom, did not
publicize Ilichev's arrival.
* Developments in the wake of Ilichev's departure are discussed in
the TRENDS of 25 July 1973, pages 13-14, and 29 August 1973, pages 4-6.
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CEMA MEETING
SOFIA SESSION RECORDS "UNANIMITY., " ACCOMMODATES INDEPENDENTS
The communique on the 28th CEMA session, held in Sofia 18-21 June,
indicated greater agreement than at last year's'meeting in record-
ing an atmosphere of "complete unanimity," as well as friendship
and fraternal cooperation. By contrast, last year's final communique
on the 27th CEMA session, held in Prague 5-8 June 1973, reported
only "complete mutual understanding"--a formulation allowing for
unresolved divergent positions--as well as friendship. The meeting
in Sofia., which also commemorated CEMA's 25th anniversary, was
attended by the USSR's Kosygin and the premiers of the East
European member countries and Mongolia, Cuban Deputy Premier
Rodriguez, Yugoslav Premier Bijedic, and the North Vietnamese
and North Korean ambassadors to Sofia as "observers." The last
time bloc party first secretaries also attended a CEMA session
was the session held in Bucharest in July 1971, which adopted
the long-range CEMA economic integration program.
While the final communique hewed largely to such practical
matters as implementation of the 1971 integration program,
coordination of national economic plans, and fuel and power,
a separate statement issued by the conferees to commemorate the
25th anniversary of CEMA, as well as the speeches by Kosygin
and CEMA Secretary Faddeyev, generalized on CEMA's role in
terms acceptable to the independently minded Romanians and
Yugoslavs.* Thus, the anniversary "decision" read at the open-
ing session on the 18th by host Bulgarian Premier :ndorov and
Faddeyev's speech underscored the "sovereignty" and "equality"
of the CEMA member countries and the development of,economic
relations with "all" socialist countries which are not members
of CEMA.
In his speech, also on the lCth, Kosygin was effusive ire stress-
ing that the "sovereign" CEMA member countries cooperate on the
basis of "fraternal unity and absolutely voluntary consent," in
* Kosygin had a "friendly" talk with Romanian Premier Manescu in
Sofia on the 20th, according to TASS. A meeting between the two
premiers at the Warsaw Pact meeting in the Polish capital in April
had also been described as friendly, while a tali between Brezhnev
and Ceausescu on that occasion was characterized merely as "comradely."
Kosygin's "exchange of views" with Yugoslav Premier Bijedic in Sofia
was reported briefly by Moscow radio on the 20th, with no indication
of the atmosphere.
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contrast to the "manifestations of rivalry" said to exist in
relations between capitalist states. Kosygin's heavy stress,
at the same time, on the rule of CEMA in strengthening the
cohesion and unity of the socialist countries was in tune with
the message sent to the meeting by Brezhnev, broadcast by Moscow
radio on the 18th. Brezhnev's message, while underscoring the
"equality" of the CEMA member states, did not allude to their
sovereignty. Predictably, both the speech by Romanian Premier
Manescu at the Sofia meeting on the 18th and the message to the
session from Ceausescu stressed the "full" equality, sovereignty,
and independence of the CEMA member states, as well as economic
cooperation with "all" the socialist states.
While the main pronouncements at the Sofia session, like last
year's Prague communique, avoided any direct call for relations
between CEMA and the EC, Faddeyev did note-on the 18th that detente
had "led to the expansion of mutually beneficial economic ties
between the CEMA countries and West European and other economically
developed capitalist countries." He also Hated the agreement
signed in May between CEMA and Finland, CEMA's cooperation with
the United Nations and other international organizations, and
the "interest in cooperation with CEMi" shown by Mexico, Iraq,
South Yemen, Argentina "and other countries." Similarly, the
anniverr.ary decision hailed CEMA's agreement with Finland, its
relations with "more than 20" international bodies, and the
military and economic aid given by CEMA countries to North Vietnam.
YUGOSLAV ROLE Belgrade's concern to maintain a flexible
stance vis-a-vis CEMA appeared reflected in the
fact that this year, as at the 1972 CEMA session in Moscow, it
was represented by Premier Bijedic, while it had lowered its
representation to the 6eputy premier level at the 1.973 meeting
in Prague. While not a member of the body, Yugoslavia "participates"
in the work of certain CEMA commissions on the basis of a September
1964 agreement. In his speech on the 18th Bijedic underscored the
Yugoslavs' "growing interest" in stepping up bilateral and multi-
lateral economic agreements with CEMA member states. Pointedly,
he also noted that such principles as sovereignty, equality,
independence, and noninterference were "incorporated" in the 1971
CEMA integration program. This year's 21 June final communique
went a step further than last year's in stating that Yugoslavia
"will take part in the multilateral integration'.', measures of
CEMA; the 8 June 1973 communique said merely that multilateral
"cooperation" between the CEMA countries and Yugoslavia would
be expanded.
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? At the conclusion of the Sofia session a Kicovic commentary
carried in the Belgrade domestic service on the 22d implicitly
defended Belgrade's independence in the realm of foreign trade,
noting that such CEMA members as the USSR, Poland, and Hungary
carry on "nearly half" of their foreign trade with.non-CEMA
countries. At the same time the talk praised Yugoslavia's
10-year participation in CEMA activities, adding that its
participation would grow with "the solui:ion of certain unresolved
problems, for which a mutual readiness was demonstrated at
Sofia." BTA on the 21st reported that Bijedic had been awarded
a CEMA anniversary medal, to be given to Tito for the Yugoslav
leader's contribution to Belgrade-CEMA cooperation.
PEKING ATTACK NCNA on the 23th noted CEMA's 25th anniversary
with a new attack on the organization as an
instrument used by the Soviet leaders to plunder, exploit, and
"practice neocolonialism in" the CEMA member countries. In
documenting these allegations, the commentary pointed to Moscow's
relations with the orthodox CEMA members--Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Mongolia--without mentioning
the maverick member, Romania. Five years ago, a 5 February 1969
NCNA commentary in the wake of a 21-23 January Moscow meeting
commemorating CEMA's 20th anniversary leveled Peking's usual
charges against the organization but did not mention the anniversary.
This year NCNA on 25 June carried a commentary devoted entirely
to the Romanians and CEMA, reviewing articles in. the Bucharest
biweekly ERA SOCIALISTA and the daily SCINTEIA,both published
prior to the Sofia meeting, criticizing "supranational economic
integration" as an infringement of sovereignty.
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USSR
FOREIGN POLICY OFFICIALS GAIN SUPREME SOVIET STATUS
The list of newly elected Supreme Soviet deputies published
in the 19 June PRAVDA reveals that several key figures in the
foreign policy establishment have for the first time become
members of the Soviet legislature. The most prominent new
additions are USA Institute Director G.A. Arbatov, Institute
of World Economy and International Relations Director N.N.
Inozemtsev, and Brezhnev's personal foreign policy assistant,
A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov. P.A. Abrasimov, head of an unidentified
Central Committee section in the field of foreign affairs, was
reelected to the Supreme Soviet after a lapse of many years.
Other new additions include Institute of Marxism-Leninism Director
A.G. Yegorov and KGB Deputy Chairman V.M. Chebrikov, while those
dropped from the Supreme Soviet include retired senior statesman
A.I. Mikoyan, Culture Mini&iter Ye. A. Furtseva, and longtime
Central Committee section head N.N. Orgauov.
The addition of Arbatov and Inozemtsev to the Supreme Soviet
clearly reflects the rise in the status of their institutes,
since few institute directors have been accorded this honor in
the past. The election of Brezhnev's foreign policy assistants
A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov and K.V. Rusakov also reflects the
increased importance of foreign affairs. Rusakov had been elected
to the Supreme Soviet in 1970, at a time when he headed the
Central Committee's bloc relations section. The two officials
join G.E. Tsukanov, who until this year was the only Brezhnev
assistant to hold Supreme Soviet status. Aside from the administrator
of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, M.S. Smirtyukov, who
was also a Supreme Soviet deputy in 1966 and 1970, no other
assistant of Kosygin nor any of Podgornyy's was elected this
year.
Abrasimov had been replaced in April 1973 as ambassador to France
and became head of a Central Cc sittee section. Although the
section has never been publicly identified, Abrasimov has dealt
exclusively with foreign affairs--bloc countries, France and
the Arab countries--and has lectured at important conferences of
Soviet foreign affairs and foreign trade officials in July and
December 1973.
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KGB })eputy Chairman V.M. Chebrikov, a former party official
from erezhnev's home oblast of Dnepropetrovsk, was elected-to
the Supreme Soviet for the first time this year, joining KGB
Chairman Andrnpov and First Deputy Chairman S.K. T5vigun, an
old Brezhnev crony, both of whom had also been elected in 1970.
Mikoyan was presumably not reelected to the Supreme Soviet
this year because of age; he is 79. Furtseva's fall from favor
was telegraphed by the dissemination of reports linking her to
a scandal connected with the construction of an extravagantly
expensive personal dacha. The 73-year old Organov, who headed
an unidentified section of the Central Committee since early
1967, when he was relieved as ambassador to Bulgaria, presumably
lost his Central Committee post by late 1973. While PRAVDA on
3 March 1973 had identified him as first deputy chairman of the
Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship Society and as head of a Central
Committee section, on 13 November that same.paper identified him
only in the former post. Organov's section apparently handled
foreign affairs, since virtually all his public activitieq con-
cerned bloc countries and he belonged to the Supreme Soviet
Council of Nationalities' foreign affairs commission.
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V I E T 9 A M
HANOI. PRG SCORE UPS, POLICIESi SUSPEND JMC TALKS MAIN
The Vi&4':namese communists have taken steps to focus attention
on the impasse tr.-,t exists in their relations with Washington
and Saigon, perhapa in an effort to demonstrate persuasively
on the eve of President Nixon's Moscow visit their dissatisfaction
with the implementation of the peace agreement. The Soviet
public stance on Vietnam has moved closer to that of its Vietnamese
allies since the last U.S.-Soviet summit during Brezhnev's visit
to the United States in Jane 1973, when r'oscow was carefully
avoiding any official criticism of U.S. actions in Vietnam.
Last fall Soviet leaders began to openly accuse the United States
of supporting Saigon "violations" of the peace accord, and this
March Moscow Zor the first time authoritatively endorsed. the
PRG's six-point program for a political settlement,, after virtually
ignoring similar proposals for almost a year.
Hanoi to,)k note of the President's departure for Moscow in a
26 June report, and had reflected its attitude toward such summit
diplomacy in an article in the June issue of the army journal,
TAP CHI QUAN POI NHAN DAN, broadcast on 24 June. The army journal
assailed Nixon's "so-called policy of detente and the strategy
of achieving a balance among the big powers, resorting to insidious
and crafty political, diplomatic, and economic tricks in the hope
of alienating our people from the forces of peace, national
independence, democracy, and socialism in the world."
The PRG sought international attention for its complaints against
the United States in a 15 June memorandum, publicized on 18 June
and sent to the Soviet Union, China, and other participants in
the 1973 Paris International Conference on Vietnam.* Hanoi did
not follow the PRG's lead with a memorandum of its own, but its
propaganda attacks on U.S. policies included a 24 June article by
"Commentator" in the North Vietnamese party -paper NHAN DAN, which
responded to an 18 June statement released by the U.S. Embassy
in Saigon with a caustic attack on Ambassador Graham Martin. And,
in a repeat performance of the early May communist walkout from
negotiating sessions with the GVN and the United States, the PRG
and DRV on 22 and 23 June, respectively, issued foreign ministry
statements an:Aouncing indefinite suspension of their participation
* The PRG memorandum is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 June 1974,
pages 23-24.
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in the two-party and four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC)
talks--ostensibly because of Saigot.'e "refusal" to discuss "full
implementation" of the privileges and immunities for the communist
Joint Military Teams in the South.
NHAN DAN ON While Ambassador Martin has been the subject
MARTIN, KISSINGER of numerous Hanoi attacks in the pardt, the
24 June Commentator article lent new authority
to such criticism and raised the level of verbal abuse directed
at the ambassador. The article characterized him as heving his
hands "stained with blood frem the crimes committed dail?,- in the
southern part of our country" and ter-nsd his "slanders and dis-
tortional' to be "indescribably ignominious." According to
Commentator, Martin bas been "poking his nose into every matter
with increasing brazenness;" he "curses" those who have "exposed
part of the truth" about U.S. "military involvement" in South
Vietnam, and "aggressive but foolish, he labels" those opposed to
such "involvement" as Hanoi's "agent and tool." Continuing the
diatrib,4 against the ambassador, the article scorufuily referred
to hi,m as a "plenipotentiary governor-general from the United
States who is leading the Saigon administration in continuing the
war and sabotaging the Paris agreement on Vietnam."
During the war, Commentator articles were a traditional vehicle
for commenting on the views of high-ranking U.S. policymakers
such as the President and Secretary of State, but since the peace
agreement only three such articles had been published under the
byline, the most recent. only two weeks before the current, fourth
one.* The latest Commentator article strives to present Ambassador
Martin's views as an extension of those of Secretary Kissinger--thus,
by implication, making the Secretary the unspoken target of the
article's attack. 1?or example, Commentator rejected th,... notion of
"U.S. press circles" that there seemed to be "some discordance"
between Martin and the State Department and the opinion that Martin
"or_ly repeated parrot-like and in a slightly gross and outmoded
fashion Nixon's old policy." Instead, Commentator argued that
Kissinger's recent testimony before Congress on military and economic
aid for the GVN was not a denial of Martin's statements but rather
confirmed them.
* For a discussion of the last MiAN DAN Comw,,-,ntator. article and
background on previous articleR, see tt-;t TRENDS of 12 June 1974,
pages 16-18.
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A mole direct attack on Secretary Kissinger appeared in the same
irsue of NHAN DAN along with the Commentator article, but judging
by the account broadcast by Hanoi radio, it was a less authoritative,
unsigned commentary. The article, entitled "Mr. Vissinger's
Morality;" in effect blamed the Secretary for alleged actions
creating the current situation in which "peace is in danger of
slipping from oir gre.sp." In this connection the erticle cited
charges in the Wentarn press that Kissinger ht.d "prepared" the
December 1972 bomb-410g of Hanoi, "urged Thlau to work out land-
grabbing plans after Ni'on was elected," and provi'ed Thieu with
weapons during the month before the peace agreement was signed
which have since been used,. along with other U.S. material, to
"sabotage" the peace accorr
SUSPENSION The justification publicized for the current
OF JMC TP..KS communist retreat from the negotiating tabli
is much less explicit than it was i i May, ~-;'_Fn
Vietnamese communist media reported that the JMC; sessions were
broken off Lecause of Saigon's alleged ULwillyugn6sa to grant
specific diplomatic privileges P*id immunities to the military
delegations called for in the Paris agreement ar in the ii June
1973 Paris joint communique.* Aside from a brief mention :hat
the , SaiS. on-Loc Ninh flight had been suspended os 20 June, the
latest P:ZG and LRV foreign ministry statements on. the suspension
of talks did net list--as did May statements--which "privileges
and immunLties" were being deraied Their teams. luatead, they
vaguely called for "guarantees" that all privileges and immunities
be implemented. The DRV statement noted that Saigon, "instigated
by the United States," has refused to discuss the signing of a
"documer.t guaranteeing the privileges and immunities for the
udlitary delegations of the PRG and DRV."
SINKING OF NORTH VIE TNN S VESSEL DRA:$ MILD RESPONSE
The sinking of a DRV "landing craft" by the GVN off the. coast of
Quang Tri Province on 20 tune has prompted mildly worded DRV and
PRG foreign m!:iistry statements and a limited amount of low-key
media comment. The foreign uinistry statements-both released on
21st--described the vessel as a DRV "cargo" ship that was carrying
* See the TRENDS of 15 May 1974, pages 9-10, and the TRENDS of
30 May 1974, pages 12-13, for a discussion of the earlier coin mist
walkout from the JMC sessions. The resumption of the talks is
discussed in the TRENDS of 12 June 1974, page 18.
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foodstuffs and operating within PRG "territorial waters" at the
time of sinking. The statements also demanded the release of
"a number of crew members" allegedly seized by the GVN.
Characterizing the action "a very serious act of war and a brazen
p~.ovocation," the DRV statement blandly warned that Saigon must
bear "full responsibility for the consequences." The PRG statement
predictably devoted somewhat more space to the territorial. issue--
taking exception to Saigon's "arrogance" in claiming sovereignty
over the waters south of the 17th parallel and demanding "respect"
for ?fU "territorial waters." A Hanoi radio report of the 25th
noted that the DRV utatement had bird forwarded to the foreign
ministries of the Soviet Union, Chin&, Poland, Hungary,. Britain,
Franve, ndoncsia, and :ran, to the International Commission of
Control and Supervision, and to the UN Secretary General.
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PRC.FORE I G11 RELATIONS
PEKING SEES INDIAN.ITIONS IMPEDING IMPROVED RELATIONS
Evidence of revived Peking interest in better relations with
India, following the April implementation of UN resolutions on
the Indo-Pakistani war, has been tempered by recent signals of
Chinese opposition to Indian domiuance in South Asia. While
Peking has not directly commented on the 18 May Indian nuclear
test, PRC medi& replays of Pakistani reaction to the test as an
impediment to improved ties indicate that it is a major factor
behind the new hesitance.
On 22 Jung NCNA quoted Prime Minister Bhutto '.s observation that
India's conducting the test near the Pakistani border showed
that New Delhi was using its new power to "threaten" Pakistan.
NCNA cited Bhutto's statement that the test had undermined India's
international credibility and had "hampered" recent efforts to
improve bilateral relations. On 20 June NCNA quoted Defense
Minister Aziz Ahmed's stronger statement that the blast "has
caused a serious setback in the process of normalization" and
that Pakistan would have to "take stock of the new situation
that has arisen" before further diplomatic progress would be
possible. In view of the close coordination of PRC and Pakistan
policy toward India in recent years, NCNA's citation of these
remarks can be viewed as indicating serious Chinese reservations
about improving t'ieir own relations with New Delhi at this time.
Peking had first revived interest in better relations with India
following consultRtions during Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's
11-14 May visit to China. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, in a
speech on 12 May, went beyond usual formulas to note China's
desire for better relations with countries of the subcontinent,
a line repeated by China's representative at the 10 June Security
Council session considering Bangladesh's admission to the United
Nations. Additionally, Peking media gave noticeably improved
treatment to ,a visiting Indian friendship delegation earlier
this month, in contrast to the restrained welcome a similar
delegation received last year.*
* For background, see TRENDS of 15 May 1974, pages 12-13, and
19 June 1974, page 31.
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Peking at the same time has continued its traditional support
for Pakistan and has given increased attention to evidence of
opposition to Indian dominance elsewhere on the subcontinent.
Teng Hsiao-ping on 12 May carefully balanced his initiative
toward New Delhi with a reaffirmation of support for Pakistan's
position on Kashmiri sslf-determination. More recently, a
23 June NCNA article sharply condemned India's alleged effort
to manipulate the Sikkim assembly so as to "annex" the country,
hailing popular demonstrations and decisions by the king to
oppose New Delhi's moves. Peking gave heavy play to China's
decision to,send a representative ttj the coronation of the.
Bhutan king on 2 June, lauding the king's statements in support
of friendly ties with China and hailing his determination to
preserve sovereignty and to promote self-reliance. NCNA has
also recently played up Nepal-India frictions over the presence
in India of Nepalese dissidents who conduct raids across the
border, and has even endeavored to encourage Bangladesh opposition
to New De ;..i by highlighting Dacca's opposition to India's recent
decision to curtail the flow of the Ganges into Bangladesh.
PRC EDITORIAL AVOIDS ISSUE OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN TAIWAN
Peking's low-key treatment of the Taiwan issue in this year's
25 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the 24th,anni.versary
of the start of the Korean war and the U.S. "occupation" of
Taiwaui has reflected a significant relaxation of China's revived
concern--earlier this year--over persisting foreign involvement
in Taiwan. The editorial made no reference to foreign interference
in routinely pledging to fulfill the Chinese "sacred duty" of
liberating the island. By contrast, last year's editorial had
duly noted t'zht Pek. ng's goal "brooks no interference from any
foreign courLc-,,-y" and cited determination to "eliminate foreign
interference."
Though Peking had gradually displayed less public concern over
foreign influence in Taiwan following the signing of the Sino-U.S.
and Sino-Japanese communiques in 1972, comment earlier this year
had pointedly revived concern that "foreign diehards" were per-
sisting with efforts to blo-k eventual PRC control of the island.
Keynote speeches at a major Taiwan anniversary celebration in
February had warned against foreign enemies who "are still vainly
attempting to dip thei-; finger in the pie of Taiwan" and advised
firmly that the Chinese PLA stands ready to rebuff their advances.*
For background see TRENDS of 6 March 19.74, pages 15-17.
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Further underscoring Peking's present , relaxation, on Taiwan, a
20 June communique and 23 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking
the a tablishment of PRC diplomatic relations with Trinidad
and Tobago trade no mentions of Taiwan. The last such omission
occurred in the communique and editorial marking the November
1972 establishment of PRO relations with Jamaica.
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CORE A
DERK WAR ANNIVERSARY RHETORIC MAINTAINS CURRENT HARD LINE
Pyongyang utilized the 25 June anniversary of the outbreak of
the Korean War to reiterate its harsh line toward the United
States and its current hard line toward'South Korea, while
continuing to emphasize its own proposals as the basis for
negotiations and progress on the questions of North-South
cooperation and eventual reunification. The usual extensive
coverage of the event included a NODONG SINMUN editorial, the
customary yearly "appeal" to the South, and a mass rally of
200,000 people addressed by Colonel General Yi Yong-mu.
As in last year's speech given by KPA Chief of Generel Staff
0 Chin-u, the negotiations between North and South, based on
Kim 11-song's various proposals for reunification, were a
central theme. Unlike last year, however, when 0 Chin-u care-
fully referred to the Pak government as the "South Korean
authorities," t%is y6ar Y.i employed harsh characterizations of
the South Korean leadership, in lLne with increasingly severe
attacks on Pak:'.in the North's media. Yi assailed the "Pak
Chong-hui puppet clique" as not oi-t_y'U.S. and Japanese "stooges"
but also "dirty traitors, diabolic: fascist hangmen, and bellicose
elements . . . ."
This year's "appeal" to the South did not go as far as urging the
overthrow of the Fak government--a call laat made - ' 'n a 1971
appeal--but it ca.,e close, saying that leaving the Pak government
"intact" made reunification "impossible." The appeal urged the
South Korean people to "smash the brigandish 'revitalized'
dictatorship."
Yi's treatment of the United States was standard for the anniver-
sary. Accusing the United States of pursuing a "two Koreas"
strategy in order to permanently divide Korea and "seize at least
South Korea alone" as a military base and commodity market, Yi
called the U.S. presence in South Korea the basic cause of
tension on the peninsula and the primary obstacle to reunification.
He charged that the United States "instigated" Pak to rupture the
North-South dialog, and that the United States is actively backing
o, reinvasion of Korea by Japanese militarists. Yi also raised the
North Korean peace proposal of March 1974, making the observation,
common in any North Korean discussion of the proposal, that the
United States has mane no "affirmative"' response.
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PEKING.. MOSCOW Chinese treatment of the anniversary was
highlighted as usual by a 24 June PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial. In line with Peking's public approach to the
Korean issue over the past year, the Chinese, as in the 1973
editorial, muted cr:.ticism of the United States and completely
omitted any reference to Japan, one of the North's prime
targets. The editorial noted the North's negotiating positions,
including the proposal for a direct peace agreement with the
United States. While it called for U.S. troop withdrawal, it
did not follow the. North in insisting that such withdrawal take
place "immediately," though it did call for immediate cessation
of U.S. military aid to the South. Unlike last year, the
editorial included a barb at the Soviet Union in the form of a
comment on "power politics and hegemorlism."
Like last year, Moscow's treatment thus fAr has been extremely
low-key. Moscow comment has melLtioned the presence of "foreign
troops" in South Korea, and one broadcast briefly noted the
presence of the "Pentagon's" forces, but Moscow has maintained its
cautious stare r-ngarding anti-U.S. references. The question of
U.S. troop withdrawal was raised only indirectly--by a 25 June.
broadcast -which reported a telegram sent to the DPRK-USSR
friendship group from their Soviet counterparts. The broadcast
made a passing reference to the Soliet month of solidarity in
support of the "struggle for ousting foreign troops from South
Korea." The telegram hailed the North's "cor.c ruct:ve proposals"
for unification, and a radio commentary on the same day called the
South's negative stand counter to the "current trend of detente."
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- 217
NOTES
CSCE TIMING: Recent remarks by leading Soviet commentators have
finally, albeit indirectly, acknowledged that MOSCb ,has failed
in its push to wind up the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) at a summit-level meeting this summer in Helsinki.
Instead, the Soviet public stance is now being expressed in terms
of holding the concluding summit "within" the current year. With
this acknowledgment, coming on the eve of President Nixon's
arrival in the USSR, Moscow has made clear its desire for r. break-
through aYrangement at the Nixon-Brezhnev talks which would, enable
CSCE to be concluded with a possible autumn summit meetira. A
TASS dispatch in PRAVDA on the 18th and PRAVDA politic~f. observer
Mayevskiy on the Moscow radio observers roundtable program on the
23d both favorably cited a recent statement by FRG Chancellor
Schmidt that it was possible to complete the conference "this year."
Additionally, PRAVDA's senior political observer Yuriy Zhukov, in
an interview with a correspondent of the Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN
published in that paper on the 22d, declared that the USSR was
"optimistic" regarding the outcome of the conference and "believes
that the third stage--the summit talks--will be accomplished
successfully within this year." Soviet media, meanwhile, have
sought to counter Western press speculation that the third stage
of the conference should be delayed or indefinitely postponed,
with comment generally citing Brezhnev as asking rhetorically, in
his 14 June election speech, what "alternative" to a successful
CSCE conclusion can be suggested by those advocativ- a delay.
PRC LEADERSHIP: Following lass week's unofficial poster attacks on
Politburo member Hua Kuo-feng and on the Peking revolutionary
committee headed by Politburo member Wu Te, Peking has clearly
signaled that such attacks do not signify a fall from power by
reporting public appearances on 24 June by both men. Each leader
was :making his first public appearance since 1 June. Hua
received an Albanian friendship delegation, and Wu joined Yao
Wen-yuan at a performance by an Albanian folk song and dance
performance. For the first time this year NCNA identified Wu in
his post as head of the cultural group under the State Council.
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Peking (985 items)
15%
Law of the Sea Conference
(2%)
10%
4%]
Criticism of Lin Piao and
(6%)
10%
10%
Confucius
OAU Summit, Somalia
(9%)
8%
3%] PRC/Trinidad and Tobago
(--)
5%
6
Diplomatic Relations
5%
Indochina
(6%)
3%
4%]
PRC Nuclear Test
(--)
3%
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Pet ng domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events alven major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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STATISTICS 17 - 23 JUNE 1974
Supreme Soviet Elections (24%)'
[Brezhnev Speech (7%)
CEMA 25th Anniversary (1%)
Session
.[Kosygin Speech
China (4%)
'Arab-Israeli Issue (1%)
[TASS Statement (--)
Chile (3%)
FBIS TRENDS
26 JUNE 1974
APPENDIX