TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: May 30, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBISI
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
Orlon .14 t nn Fire,711nev
- pP.ge 71
tit f1,13 Grochko Art hie - page In
Confidential
30 MAY 1974
(VOL. XXV IT 22)
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CONPIOrMTIAt
CONIE 41S
r811 VRPMflq
10 MAY 10 74
APAII-11PAr1,1 Iq'WF
P'r,' ir 01n0np,Igemr.nt Arrnrd, Ilrgnr4 Parthor MOInItron. .
if.8.-101/TPT mAltotr
q"prnmr. qco/frit Vi Or Proparon Growl(' rOr Nnw 5nmmIt
(7,1r/0-(10V117.T PELATIONq
4nrdc,r cltritnAent Plirito Lnw-Key Poking Reoponno
PPJ: voilyirm POLICY
40
POeInq triorpst In CInFle TIPA Whit Wont
Poking Attirkg "iinrontrainod" Armn Paro on qALT Amtivornary 8
IUDOCI4MA
Aid Agreemont, Commtittivie Cap Xhiet, qAmphan Vinft hn ChInn 10
cl/h", IhOtt ore Partiripation ir Folir-Party .IMC Talkn V.!
1
7
El TP
Moqcr, W fromoq Pnrtligniqp 7Amntg. Wit-no of CrinntPr(7n1ip Darippy . . 14
LATIN AMtl.RICA
Monr.nw ir!Pq Continaing Faton in II.. Latin Amerfran Pollry 17
YilrIOSLAVTA
LW( Congronn Mart?.n imprwrod CPU Tfon, Itrennon MOrIAIIMPMerlf, . R
CZECPOSLOVAVIA
Lenart Collo for Contfnand Strut o AgAinnt Revintoniqm 21
(Cnnt1n?ed)
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r:OtIPtIOITTAV
PIM IPPIllr
10 MAY t174
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4rt.!,I0 Priflopt Ptirnt. Ifilftel In OffIrIll .
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APPTIMI7
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ro0Ft0PNTIAL
APAii f, A I 1, I I II
TIIEND9
10 tlAY 19/4
PPIEPVFN ON OlIFWAGEMENT ACCOPP, UPGrq FOP:14P MFASURES
Moncow'n treatment of thp 21 0.7 iaatiromptit of thp gyrInti-
Inrnoli dtneogngement ngreement terlprtpd the name correct but
rentrufmed attitude that It dInpinyed tovird the ggyptinn-
inrapli disengagement Irrftt-d font January. TAll9 reported
Prenident ilixnn'a announce,-Icrat within the hoot. noting ttint
the agreement would he nigned on the ilot In the military
working group of the Opneva pence conference. glibMerrlent TA8g
and Moarow domentir nervier! reporta attributed 010 r.400011C@M@Mt
to rho,. "gyrInn rndln," nIthough 9nmamettn ra410 In fart merely
reported Prentdent Mixon 'n announcement. And TASq on the 10th
cited in "offtrInl 40Molltlf!PM0Mt" in NMA 4c114 in providing mame
detail!, of the ngreement, The TAS5 ncronnt placed Hp' own
fltrenm on ;.1eFini print of the occord, nlying "it la empha-
nlzed" OW the ngreement in not 0 pg104T.P agreement hut 4 ntep
toward n Piot and durable pence nn the bnoin mf Remolution 318
of 22 October 1971,
govlet media hnvp not yet commented rin hho Agreement, but
Monrow commentntorn on the 26th, In apparent InttrAPgtfon nr
the accord, conceded thnt nuch Jan ngreement would have "a
certnIn Importance" and that the qo'ffeh !Writ). 41Ipport04 thP
tden of oilltary dinengngement. At the nitre time, however,
they reiterated th0 11S911' rontentlon that "lullf meamoren"
could not he nufnitttuted for st comptehenntve ofettlement. Ar
ArAbic-language crimMPiltit7 on the 28th ohnerved that while
dimengngement moven were undotibtedly poni.trIve fnitt4tepm,
there were no grounrin yet for rompinrenry nince "mome forces"
wati., to keep the dinengagement linen for neveral Yestrq.
I/POMYKO IN SYPIA t;romyko'n norond vi nit to Domanctin thin
month it the till end of the dimengagement
negottationn wnn covered by the unto, combination of brief TA83
reportn, ii format Information "report" at the conclusion of
the Vigit, And accounts of remarks of the foreign miniater him-
self. TASS r.4orted brfefly that Gromyko met Secretary Ktominger
on the 28th And that they continued their exchange of opiniona
on problems of mutual intereat, including the "disengagement of
troop on the 5qt:i4n-Israe1i front as A composite part" of the
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collriOrtilfAL IRFtihq
10 MAY /4
genern1 prohlemo of n Midenst settipmeni. otherwise the violt
was presented no n rout ti offnir conducted in on "ntmoopherp
of friendohlp Ind full mutnol nnderitInding."
On hic, nrrIvnl, Grnmytro reltergte0 thnt peoce rnuld he :nciored
may on the hnolo of complete lorieli withdriwnl Ind protection
of the Palpotininno' national righto. "Only those steps towirl
thio (thief-J.1w, which /rP being tnkpn in rho proper context with
n view io n general oetttement," he gold. hive rent I. menning
prncticni valan. hi I opeech it n lnncheon given by Foreign
Minioter V.hnddnm on the 28th, Oromyko decimr9d "-loviet approinl
of Syria's pooltiono on n lettteopnt inn pnrticulnrly on dis-
engngement, rind mi I ni hio tniks confirmed the two conntripos
"common Approach" to n lolution of the Midenot conflict.
The conclnding report pnirted tip Mooc.lw'o interest in n resump-
tion of the Genevn tniks olive disongngemeet to completed.
r:on.lotent with past Soviet-Syrian commeniqueo, the report made
no mention of the Genlvn conferInre, nut it did enll for
!mplementatinn of UN resolutions, n chnnge of pooitinn for
Syria. it gild that the two sideo Feel that an noon 19 agree-
ment is reached on the disengngement of troops and Its clauseo
are implemented, "appropriate menonreo should Immedintely he
taken to achieve an all-encnmpassing rind .111w: settlement that
wOuld Insure realization of correopondlug decloions tni;en by
the Ilnited UntIons." The report repented oricnw's Frequent
definition of disengngement as I "firot step" and Integral
part of an nveratl solution; the Soviet-Egyptian rommnnique
on Gromyko's early March visit to cnTro used virtunity trienit(:At
language in referring tri dioengagement.
The Syriano again affirmed that the Soviet Union should take
part In all stages and aspecto of a oettlement; n Moscow
broadcaat in Arabic on the 27th placed Gromyko's latest visit
in tivrt context, recalling that Syrtn nnd the USSR had frequently
stress.2d the importnnce of such Soviet pnrticiphtion.
Gromyko also met with Palestine hibeintion Organization chairman
'Arafat, as he had on his past two trips to Damascus this year.
TASS mlrely said that in the course of a "Friendly conversation,"
they discusaed questions of a Middle East settlement with special
attention to insuring the Palestinians' national rights. An
Arabic-language commentary on the 29th pegged to the Gromyko-
'Arafat meeting pointed out thAA Moscow regarded the issue of
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coriFinPliTIAL PIM; TRENDq
10 MAY 74
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Pnleatintan rights as an "imperative condition" for n lunt
Mtdeant setttement. Criticizing the attitude or Tel Aviv
and "its protectors" toward Piteatfnian demands, the brondcaat
claimed that the. Palestinians tri angered by reporta that the
United Itates had doubts about Palestinian participation in
bc Genova peace conference.*
* According to a Vienna radio report on the 30th, during
Austrian Chancellor Kreiaky's talks with Kosygin in Moscow
the latter observed that solution Gf the Pgledtinian problem
within the framework of a Mideagt peace wae not simple.
First, Kosygin reportedly said, "the Arab states and the
Falestintana must came to realize what they want."
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U. S, SOVIET 1 ELATIONS
suppuiE soy E-r 7,1 t PPEPAPE7, GPOIltir) FOP NEW 71/1IT
Moscow hns given the 11.S. vls!t by i11Stlk Supreme Soviet deligntIon
thnt began officially on 21 '41-1'; Pxtensive nod eAthusinstfr coverage
unmatched by In./ event In 0.S.-soviet relltfons store the lune 1971
Wnshington sommit. Stich trentment his tht' 0J.,7t of Improving the
climnte it home for m np.4 nnmmit in Op Cslrm of n.c. dOMPcIttr. uncer-
tnintles thP recent stalemate in l.,Interii relations. Moscow's
coverage or the visit hpq Followed th,- lend of the 18 Mn', PRAVDA
article by Vasitvev and Slavin In stretolne hipirtlinn support by
D.5. congrpasmin for a third summ;t sod fr)r 4 ritrthPr improvement
in U.S.-Soviet r0Intloos. At the same time !The visit has provided
a glimpse of the views of delegation bind Ports Ponomnrev, CPSD
Central Committee Secretor./ and Politburo cindidlte member, on
bilaternt U.S.-Soviet IsAlps on which he fins p70.vinusly hid little
to sny publicly.
PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA htivF carried signed articles by their own
correspondents covering the visit highlighting the delclgatIon's
cordial reception and the support for Improved 0.5.-Soviet relations
among both Republicans and Democrnts. IZVESTiYA on the 25th coted
that "particu3nr Interest" in the visit WPfq shown by !letuytors
Kennedy and Percy. "who ire frequently mentioned as pnssible
candidates for the White Hoose In the 1976 elections." According
to correspondents Kobysh and Vondrnshov, this shows that "It is
difficult to pursue top-levet policv in America lad to woo the
sympathies of the mnss of voters without promoting an Improvement
of 0.S.-5oviet reintions nod without establishing personal contncts
with lending Soviet' figures.-
On the 27 lay Moscow rndio roundtible on foreign affairs, PRAVDA's
deputy chief editor Vadim Dekrnsov made It clear that he 5814 the
visit's political significance in the fact that Congress, the host
institution for the visit, hns been the "Focal point" for opponents
of U.S.-oviet cooperation. The central press has reported that
the arguments of the Soviet delegation against restrictions on
* The PRAVDA article is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 May 1974,
pages 1-3.
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10 "lAY P174
--
bitntern1 trade made si ntrorg, favorable impression among Congreasmrn.
PRAV0A'n Vishnevskly nnd Strelnikol, reported on 21 May that Senate
Finance Committee Chnirmnn Russell tong, orlennity a cosponsor of
the inckson amendment, wan changing his mind about 'inking most-favored-
nation gUltitg and credits fcm Hos.!ow to changes in Soviet emigration
policy. IZVESTIYA concluded on the 25th that the delegntionsm discus-
sions showed that 'n dialog is both possible and effective" even with
"skeptics" of U.S.-Soviet cooperation.
Ponomprev, bent known recently for his remarks in January about
"the general crislA of capitalism," during the current visit has
voiced strong support For improved U.S.-Soviet relntions in general
and for further steps at %%LT in particular. in doing no he has
echoed some of the traditional themes of arms control arivocates
such. as USA institute director Ceorgly Arbatov. PRAVDA on 25 May
carried n TASS account of Ponomarev's remarks at n press conference
which included his observation about the need for military in well
as political detente, since "detente and the arms race cannot
proceed simultaneously indefinitely." That argument was also
presented recently by Arbatov in an article in the May issue of
USA which went on to warn that if new agreements at SALT do not
Follow moon the arms race may teatime in full force. PRAVDA
did not carry Ponomarev's further observation, an reported by
TASS on the 24th, that success at SAtT would enable both sides
"to substnntinily reduce defense expendttui-es and rechannel these
resources toward peaceful constructive tasks."
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r.ritIFIIC:"Il (Al
SHIA- 7)0VIL I RUA! LOHS
VI; f !ilf.11W.;
N '1AY
t4iSc1ier i3oPM:P T11Fi1FUf LIf.lr; 1...1 ,Oel -VEY pEviriG Pr;Pot17,-
A ).1 41y P.orn.!gri tlihtqtrv mIltotwAht poh11,17Ing 1 pr.rr..nninIly
genn!tf-tt, rOtio-'4ovtat I' It ,;11 30 miy
/ low-ifey PO(' r'ertAp,410c, chltwqr,
1/Irr Th,r4fir longntlinflng
pryqff-f,01t,. !Icrt:p it M1Hrir, 419ptit4M
1"q I" "1" l'A""! fltn-t It mart.nd thp
ffrot- fho rrii rl t,t'egon phWighed
in off 1 r.rtrrrirl r,ri, t h I 11),I r t iv, r,"of
the c,,),Irit qt/terolt ttrmn0 denittnt-0 to tIndprc.rort! 5r.vle7 resolve
In On fle.7 .4 /ThItIr'r4,4 dvtollf.10r1 rri 4 F'rel'iiPt. 11P11rOrrtPr
111.1 rew -apturefi Tbu r-t4-itr,rtlent portriyed the SOVIet
prigitH11 rlf7CMOd.V.frIP, ,4,11inV rOir'',/ Chinese shipping,
only IF the fjOrlt?q,-, .fir?f rr,r,w07.0d Thviet sovereignty
(1-70r thP tPrrit.riry, Tho ,^0:11.0mr-rit: c:ImP r'n fhu hnelg of n 16 May
17)/17,5TIYA article thAt 11;p1 reaiiirmed the 70fdity of a policy of
restraint on border ft.ral other gotitziti-,rp Igmur!q.*
resnnose, a brief 30 May koreign Ministry spokesman
statement, was issue if a lower level fboo !.tr,c,:fltdYq qtiteMr'lit
ind iJq.i rit Iowr thin Pg?:eingitl tAlroP Pro'llnhq Prntegrq
this year, all at the foreigr ministr... level. r:blna's eurrent
din nrh, fhp ,hlrges of nit-! fur vrotest notes that
Moscow tri19t i)Pgr rn4vott,4/111W7 for t:he"congervienceq" of Itt;
ictIong, t,,,71md . Instead on reaffirming Peking's cllim, under
term of the Sitio-Russian treaty of 1860, to navigation routes
around and territorial sovereignty over the disputed river Is
it highlighted alleged hypocrisy In tioscow's seemingly forthcoming
statement, asserting that Mosf_ow In fact was attempting to "black-
mail" China by making fltinese river passage to the north of the
island contingent upon Peking's recognition of Soviet claims in
the are/. Asserting that Peking "abso!utely will not accept" this
position, the statement nonetheless disclosed that Moscow since 1966
has been "obstructing by force" Chinese navigation north of the
Island.
* The MESTIYA article, by Oleg Borisov, is discussed in the TRENDS
of 22 May 1974, pages 14-16.
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CoNFIHrtiliAL FBI", IPENDc,
10 MAY 1974
7
PR( FORE 16 4 POLICY
PEKING EMPHASIZES INTEREST IN CLOSE TIES WITH WEST
Peking's desire t(0 sostain close political and trade ties with
the West was emphasized on 74PVPTII 01-1n/Onn in the pint wopk,
In a series of high-level Chinese leadership contn.7ts with
Western visitors that were given extensive coverage and prominent
attention going bpyond the usual protocol requirements. ThP
Chinese save wide e7overage to the opening on 72 May of A major
French indnatrlal Pxhibition In Peking, in:Iuding NCNA reports
Ott separate receptions marking the event gfven by the French
embassy, the PRC Foreign Trade Ministry, and the Chinn Council
For the Promotion of international Trade. Chou rn-lal on 21 May
departed from normal protocol practice to meet and hnve
"friendly" conversation with the l'rench Nat tonal Assembly delegate
charged with opening the exhibit, while Vice Premier Teng
1-Wan-ping met the delegate on the 24th.
Mao Tse-tung on 30 May had a "very cordial conversAtion" with
visiting Chinese-American physicist LI Cheng--tan. Li on 24 May
had a "most cordial talk" with a widely representative group of
Chine4e leaders headed by Chou En-lit, Wang Hung-en, Chang Chun-chlao,
Chiang Ching, 'fan Wen-plan and Teng llglao-pfng. That occasion
marked the firer high-levet ChIneae leadera' meeting with Chinese-
American ar!fenrlqts since fare 1971. Chon, Cillang Ching, and other
leaders hid had a "cordial" conversation with LI when he visited
China In October 1972.
Peking's desire to maintain close relations with Western leaders
opposed to the Sovlet Union was clearly evidenced by the extraordinary
welcome it accorded Former British Prime Minister Heath during his
24-28 May visit to Peking. Departing from normal protocol require-
ments, Heath was accorded honors reserved for visiting allies or
heads of government, Including rousing airport welcome and departure
ceremonies and a meeting with Mao on 25 May. Chou En-hi was
present at Heath's visit with Mao and held separate talks with him
on 27 May. Chiang Ching accompanied the former prime minister to
a Peking concert on 26 May.
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, Heath's host in Peking, spoke
positively of West European unity during a 25 May welcoming banquet
address for the British guest. Teng Asserted that West European
unity has made progress in impeding Soviet "hegemonistic schemes"
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COFIDFNTIAL rrits mrtms
10 MAY 1974
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In Eurnpe. This rending contrnsts w1th Chnn En-Ini's mnro
equI vocal charIcterlzatinn, In in II September 1971 banqnet
nddresn Inc visiting French President Pomptdoo, that Rut-einem/
in "if it Is untried nut well" will cnntribnte tn safe-
gunrding nf Enrnpenn interests against entsidc pressore.
While duly scoring U.S.-Tinviet contention ns the enorce of world
disorder that wili lend inevitably tn wir nr revnIntloo, Teng
focu6ed hir speciff:: criticism ngminst Moscow's policies In
Rurope. Chnrging thnt Moscow is the ''nm in danger" tn Europe,
Teng endenvored to capitalize on anti-Soviet feeltng in the a
wnke of the ilrindt res'04nntion, scoring the hypocrisy of "sn4e
people" who "openly speik. of friendship 'tit send -iver spies ander
cover." in addition he repented stnck Peking chnrges of Soviet
insincerity on disormnment qnestions.
PEKING ATTACKS "UNRESTRAINED" APPS RACE ON SALT ANNIVERSARY
Peking marked the second anniversary of the U.S.-Snviet SALT
agreement signed during President Nixon's Mny /972 Moscow visit
with a blunt 25 Mny MCNA article criticizing the superpowers'
eontinufmN nrms CnCe. [Ant yr Peking Wn8 Ritent on the
anniversary. The nrtfcle demonstrates Peking's Increnstngly
confident nssessment, first surfnced kite list year, that super-
power detente mensures hnve fniled and thnt U.S.-Soviet contention
will allov continued opportnnities for Chinese maneuvering.*
While Indle-ortly rritlrizing hnth the ihilt,3d cr-t-om lnd rh. snvtor
Union for their detente-relnted declnrations, the article cnrefully
differentiated between the two superpowers. it stressed particulArly
that Moscow has endenvored to take the leittative in the arms rnrL,,
tying to "seek strategic superiority over the United Stntes,"
while the United States is portrayed ns pursuing it irms programs
in defensive renctlon to Soviet advances.
Several passages provided evidence of broadly based U.S. official
resolve not to compromise on important nuclear armament issues to
meet present Soviet negotiating terms. The article noted deter-
mination to sustain U.S. steength not only on the part of Defense
Departmint spokesmen, who are frequently cited by CNA, but
* For a discussion of earlier Peking commentaries pointing up the
lack of progress in U.S.-Soviet detente, see TRENDS of 21 February
1974, page 9.
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FRES TREN11S
10 MAY 1974
also on the part o th. U.S. Congress and of Vice President Ford.
This marked the first time Peking has referred to Vice President
Ford's position on strategic questions.
The NCNA article mnde no direct mention of President Nixon or his
planned trip to Moscow this June, but replayed earlier NCNA coverage
on Secretary Kissinger's preparatory meetings with Soviet officials
in Moscow lest March and in Washington durtng April to underscore
its view that U.S.-Soviet detente has failed. The article noted
especially Kissinger's assessments that no "conceptual break-
through" had been achieved in arms control and thet Washington and
Moscow wilt not hiv a permanent agreement this yeac.
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- 10
1 41)OCH 14 A
F819 TRENDS
10 MAY 074
AID AGREEMENT' COMMUNIQUE CAP KH1EU SAMPHAN VISIT TO CHINA
The Cambodian Front delegation led by insurgent armed forcen
chief Khieu Samphan climaxed tts extended tour of eleven
countries over the pant two monthe with a 20-27 May vintt in
Peking that was marked by the signing of a military aid agree-
ment for 1974 and the relense of a joint communique on the
delegation's stays in Chins during April and May.* The
Cambodian visitors atteneed a dance performance with a Chinese
delegation led by Mao's wife and three other politburo members
on 23 May and held talks the following day with Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nieu, who subatituted for Chou En-lai, the group's
chief host during itn April stay in Peking. LI spoke at the
reciprocal banquet given by the delegation on the 2601, signed
the aid agreement 'Along with Khieu Samphan on that day, and
saw off the Cambodians at the airport, in the company of Vice
Chairman Yeh Chin-ying and two dther Chinese politburo members.
Chou En-lid's oily appearance with the Cambodian delegation
curing this leg of its trip was at the aid agreement signing
ceremony.
The delegation stopped off on the 27th in Hanoi, where it was
greeted at the airport by a high-level group led by Pham Van
Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, and was later received by Le Duan. The
visitors were feted at a dinner on 29 May hosted by Pham Van
Dong, who took the opportunity to denounce continued U.S. in-
volvement in Inl:..oina and the presence of U.S. forces in Thailand.
A 28 May DRV Foreign Ministry communique marking the stopover
disclosed that the DRV had accepted a Cambodian invitation to
send a delegation to visit Cambodia at an "appropriate date."
SIHANOUK'S POSITION Against the background of Khieu Samphan's
emergence during the two-month foreign
tour as a prominent Front international spokesman with authority
rivaling that of "head of state" Prince Sihanouk, Peking and Front
media continue to sustain an image of Front unity under Sihanouk's
titular leadership role. As he had during the delegation's stay
* Apart from its recent stay, the delegation was in China frota
1-5 April and from 8-19 April. See the 10 April 1974 TRENDS, pages
11-15, and the TRENDS of 24 April 1974, pages 19-20.
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CONPIPENTIAL
FBS TRENDS
30 MAY 1974
in Peking last month, Sihanouk attended major ceremonial functions
for the Front visitors, including the 23 May dance performance,
the aid agreement signing and reciprocal banquet on the 26th, ant
the airport r/eperture cerem,nies on the 27th. In their speeches
at the reciptocal banquet both Khieu Samphan and Li Hsien-nien
were careful to note that the conclave was being held "under the
auspices" of "head of state" Sihancuk. Li also went out of his
way to recall that Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth
had been present during the delegation's 2 April meeting with Mao.
AID AGREEMENT The 26 May signing of rlie agreement on China's
"eratis provision r: military equipment and
suppliee tociabodia for 1974" prompted a Ligh-level turnout,
including Chou Ea-lai and Yeh Chien-ying on the Chinese side and
Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, and Khieu Samphan for the Front. By contrast,
Penn Routh and Ll Hsien-nien had been the higheut o'ficials
present for the 13 January 1973 signing of tivd last aid sgreement.
I. February 1972 Chou En-lai and Yeh Chien-ying had led Chinese
officials at that year's agreement signing, which was witnessed
by Sihanouk. As in past years, NCNA did not report any revarks
by either side during the ceremony. There was no mention this
year of "economic aid," which had been covered in agreements for
1973 and 1972.
PRC-FRONT RELATIONS The joint communique noted that both sides
expreeded "full satisfaction" with the
"complictte enccess" of the delegation's China visit but failed to
record a "complete unity of views" as had been marked in the 2 April
DRV-RGNU statement on the delegation's 28 March- 1 April 1974 visit
to Hanoi.* In the communique, and in Li's speech at the 26 May
banquet, Peking conveyed a more restratned tone than had Chineue
speeches at the start of the Front delegation's PRC tour early
last month. Those speeches had revived themes from Mao's 20 May
1970 statement on Cambodia in an effort to underscore Peking's
proletatian internationalist credentials and its commitment to the
struggles of the Cambodian and other oppressed peoples. The Chinese
did laud Khieu Samphan's foreign tour, reaffirm support for the
five pofnts and backing for the RGNU as the "sole legal government
of the Cambodian people," and criticize the Lon Nol regime. Peking
also routinely demanded that the United States end its interference
in Cambodia and allow the Cambodians to settlL their own affairs
without outside interference.
* The Hanoi visit was discussed in 3 April 1974 TRENDS, pages 9-11.
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Though !?eking promised to support and asnist the Cambodian ntrt.iggle,
LI I;Aittn-nten on the 26th alluded to a lenn Oen sanguine Chtnese
view of present military prospect when he pointedly admoninhed
the Front concerning the need for "protracted people's war" to
surmount "difftrultien and obstacles." An had been the case last
month, the Chinese carefully refrained from using pant Peking
formulationa that had nifirms0 China's "powerful barking" and that
Peking would provide "a reliable rear area" for the Cambodian
struggle--formulations pointedly recalled by Front npenkere and
in the Front section of ths communique. Peking demonstrated Its
influence with the i:ambodion on the quentlon of the Soviet Union,
gaining Front endorsement in the communique ryf China's ntandard
anti-superpower view of international affairs.
PRG BREAKS OFF PARTICIPATION IN FOUR-PARTY JMC TALKS
The PRG announced In a 30 May statement by its military delegation
in Sragon that it was suspending its participation in the four-part
Joint Military Commission (JMC) meetings, charging the United Stgion
and Saigon with raising "illogical conditions for restoring the
prerogatives and immunities" allegedly being denied the communist
delegation and failing to adopt a "serious attitude in negotiations.
The latest PRG walkout from the negotiating table follows its
10 May refusal to continue its attendance at the two-party SMC
talks and its 13 May announcement that the consultative meetings
between the two South Vietnamese parties at La Celle-Saint-Cloud
were indefinitely suspended--thus completely severing all formal
negotiating tics with Saign1 and the United States,* The DRV
military delegation to the four-party JMC talks has 'lino insued a
statement voicing its "full support" for the PRG's "correct trnve"
but stopping short of cutting off DRV participation in the talks
Both the PRG and die DRY statements .ere bronOcant by Libsration
Radio on the 30th.
Averring that its delegation has displayed its "utmost patience"
and that "nothing t_a be accomplished by tNe four-party JMC team,"
the PRG statement declared that it "finds it necessary to suspend
Its participation in the sessions . . . until the U.S.-Saigon
side agrees to end all its sabotage acts, insere the reetoration
of normal activities of the JMC organizations and adopts a serious
negotiating attitude." In commending the Pin; action as "rational
and necessary," the DRV rtatement asserted in closing that the
--------------
* For a discussion of the PAC's suspension of the bilateral
meetings, see the TRENDS of 15 May 1974, pages 9-10.
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United Stetes and Saigon "must Sear full reepnnathillty for the
mituation In which the ?retina In chary of Implementing the
agreement have been peralysed md fnr the present extremely
serious situation in 9nuth Vietnam."
In reiterating the Inteet cnmmunint cnmplaInts against the
United States nnd Saigon, both the PPG and the DRY statements
focused attention on U.S. Ambeemodnr Graham Mertin's speech at
n 27 May embemsy ceremony. The PPG chl,Irged that Mertin had
"hrozenly distorted the Snuth Vietnememe people's juut struggle
to protect the Paris agreement, denied tho allatence of the Pna,
and slandered the I'm government." Rchning the same tiontiMsmta?
the !AV atzteMent claimed that his speech conxtituted "framh
proof" that the United Staten wee "continuireA the war ,id
sabntaging the Perim agreement" in 9outh Vietnam. Ambassador
Martin'a speech had been denounced In eurlier comment, Including
a 28 May 911AM DAM article, A rtatemerq 'Aimed by the PRG Paris
delegation to the talks at La Celle-Saint ,Clomi, and Liberation
Radio commenk.
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CONFIDENTIAL FRP', TRENDS
10 MAY 19/6
- 14-
EUROPE
MOSCOW WELCoMES PORTUGUESE EVENTS, WARNS Or COUNTERCOUP DANGFR
tn covaent on political developments in Portugal since the 21 April
coup, Moscow hnm given high marks to the mti.!.tr.ry !until and the
provisional government, while expresetng gunrded optimiAm over
likely future developmentm and warning persistently of n poseible
"counterrevolutionnry" turn of eventm.* TypicC of Soviet comment
throughout the pnet month was 0 25 May PRAVD. rticie which,
although hailing prospects for radicAl domemtle chanae and pi-taming
the "highly important but only first steps" already taken, esutianed
that serious and urgent problems remained to be nolved. The Article
underscored an particularly urgent the ttsks of strengthening the
leftist political alliance and of improving the nation's "extremely
difficult" economic situation. Underscoang the urgency or theme
tasks, the article axpremsed concern that a variety of conservntive
forces were becoming politically active, posing the danger of
rightist opposition to further "democratization" and even a counter-
revolutionary coup.
CHILEAN Moscow has on occasion compared the situction in Portugal
LESSON to the situation that existed in Chile before the ovev-
throw of the Allende regime. TASS on 14 May carried
two such explicit references by Mario Soares, head of the Portugueme
Socialist: Party and now the country's foreign minister. In both
reference's Soares warned that economic difficulties nnd leek of
lefCat unity had perinitt& a rightist countercoup in Chile. Moscow
media have also stressed the applicablilty to Portugal of n number
of broad lessona drawn from the Allende experience, among them:
(I) the need to implement the concept of "unity of the man' and
tc expand ties between the armed forces, workers, and middle claeses;
(2) the need to support democratic measure; in domestic and foreign
po/lcies to broaden ;IA deepen the "democratic stage" of the revolution
and establish the "embryo of socialism"; and (3) the need to avoid
She "adventurist" actions of left extremists, such gs "Maoist" groups,
who needlessly panic the middle classes.
CAUSES Moscow has been reletant to offer A comprehensive analysis
CW COUP of the causes of the successful revolution. Soviet inter-
pretations have centered largely on the fact that the
leading role was played by the Portuguese armed forces, which had long
; For Moscow s initiel reaction to the coup, see the TRENDS of I May
1974, pages 7-8.
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CON71DENTIAL PSIS TRENDS
10 MAY 19/4
Aupported the regime. A "preliminary Annlynte by A. Bovin in
1ZVESTIYA on 7 Mny not the thenretien1 frnmework within which
monk FL:let comment on the nobject hnr nohnequntly been premented.
Rovin emphAnized thin t:u* coup W44 not fortuitoun but had been
"objectively" predetermined And wi n logicAl connequence of a
nntional iocio-economic crinim, largely eauned by PorZugal'n
coloninl W4rN in Afrirn nnd comommded by a "rrigin of leadership"
and ineffectlee reform,. The Army, Rovin *Aid. "an mremell
oragniked force," neted firmt to overthrow the regime pflr:Iy
bet:Fume its common noldiern reflected the social interests of
their originc, pnvtly herr:11.8e many nrmy lendern fenred a spontansous
populnr revolt And winhed to net (Argot, And partly bevause if
growing opponttion to do warn in Africa. Rovin explained the
speed And bloodlennneng of the coup ng n renult of wldenpread mass
support for the nrmy'n netion.
FUTURE In Annessing the likely future courne of events in
PROSPECTS Portugnl, Moncow ban been cautiounly optimistic.
Moscow hag genernliy approved the domestic reforms
adopted thun far, while ntrenning that only recognition of the
"right to full independence" of Portugal'n African colonies would
compiete the revolution. Moncow han Ala() commented favorably on
the formation of the provinional government and its program on
16 May. During the weekly internAtiinal observern' roundtable
over the Moscow domentic gervice on 26 Mey, however, 1ZVESTIYA
observer V. Matveyev stnted that Portugn1 in "in in A state of
flux" and that it wan "of emu-Re ntill too early to try to sum
past eventn."
On foreign relationn, Moncow hen noted without ccmment that
Portugal intendn to entabligh relation!, with the USSR. On 20 May
Moslcow rndlo reported Foreign Mininter Soares' reference to
establishing relAtions with "n11" countrien, and TASS on 25 May
reported a gimilnr statement by Sonren concerning relations with
"African, Arnb, and nocialint staten," while maintaining traditional
ties with Britain, the United Staten and NATO. On 28 May rASS
reported the issuance of a Portuguese communique which listed as
one goal of the foreign ministry the establishment of diplomatic
relations with "European nocialist countrien, the USSR included."
NATO Until recently Moscow hag played down Portugal's
CONNECTION ties with NATO, relying on occasional statements
that the 25 April coup had "worried" due NATO
"milittirist circles," vho had become uncertain what Portugal's
future policy toward NATO would be. Occasionally, as in a TASS
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coror DP:Win PSIS TRENDS
10 MAY 19)4
report on 2 May, n npeciftc concern wi rtd, nuodt nn the future
of this J.S. or base on the Portugueme-owred Aznren InInndn.
Toward the end of the month, howeler, Moncrtw begnn ntrennIng the
theme thnt South Africa wan nttemptlng tn entInt NATO nupport Jr
preparing for ponnible crisim nituottonm along ttn bordern re--
nutting from dinnrdern that may iievplop in the Portuguene colonien
of Mozambique And Angola.
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CoNMENTIAL
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LATIN AMERICA
F/118 TRENDS
10 MAY 74
MOSCOW SEES CONTINUING FAILURES IN U.S, LATIN NIERICAN POLICY
Moscow has depicted the entabliahment of new U.S. commiasion
to reexamine Latin American relations an a Rign of the con`inulag
failure ol U.S. policy in 1nnt region. Although he 28 Mav
Moscow dcmastic radio commentary doeR not identify the body
specificilly, it in clearly referring to the 23-member inde-
penriont study commiRslon headed by for-er U.S. OAS ambesaador
Sot M. Linowitz.* Moscow depicts t'le move an the katest 'at a
series of U.S. effortm deRtgned to renpond to Latin Ameritan
demands for a new deal in hemispheric relationships.
The commentary goes on co underscore what tm described as "a
considerable wnvsening of relation between the United States
and many Latin Averican Rtates," stmeming from U.S. efforts
to strengthen it influence in the region. The observations
are consistent vith Moscow's roports of acute differences
between the United States nod its southern neighbors said to
have been manifeated at the OAS foreign miniRters' conferences
at Tlaltelolco, Mexico, last February and in Atlanta in April.
The U.S. position at the conferences had been described by
Moscow as conciliatory in principle, but 'erne As tV-epatific
commitments concerning Cuba, the Panama Canal, and private
investment, among others.
The commentary suggests that the new commission is likely to
share the fate of WaRhington's previous efforts to repair
relations with Latin America. Noting Secretary Kissinger'
recent efforts to "open a dialog" on U.S.-Latin American
relations, the commentary observes that these efforts stimur.
lated a "growing unity" among the Latin American stateu, and
strengthened their resolve not to submit to the "diktat" of
the United States. In these circumstances, the commentary
concludes, Washington is obliged to search "feverishly" for
new ways and methods and to "reluctantly" agree to a review
of these relations.
* The commission, wh6se membership was announced in Now York
on 14 May by Linowitr., is being funded by the Ford and Clark
foundations and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.
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YUGOSLAV 1I\
LCY CONGRESS MARKS IMPROVED CPSU TIES, STRESSES NONALINEMENT
Thil 10th Congress of the League of Communintn o: YugonInvie (ICY)
on 27-0 May reflected the marked improvement In Belgrade's
relations with the CPSU and the other pnrtlen of the Warsaw
Pact countries. This improvemenk was manifested both In Yugoslav
pronouncements and In speeches by delegates from the orthodox
Waraaw Pact countries, which had boycotted the Inst ICY congress
five years earlier. At the come time Tito'e min report an well
os :emarka by party eutennnte Edvnrd Kardelj and Stone Dolanc
cisarly served notice that Yilgoslavim will ccotinue to pursue
its t,icy or nonalinement. On tly.t domestic front, the party
conv.ean took place against the background if Belgrade's thrre-year
cempaign to reneert the party's leading role In society and the
principle of democr.icic centralism within the party.
RELATIONS WITH CPSU, PACT Parties of *-7ery Pact country were
represented at the congress, unlike
the last congress in 1969 when, following Yugoslav criticism of
intervention in Czechoslovakia, only Romania sent a delegation.
Alain this year, neither the Chinese Communist Party nor the
Albanian Workers Party was represented. Doianc, according to the
26 May Moscow PRAVDA, explained at a precongress news conference
that neither party had been invited, since party-level relations
do not exist because according to those parties "the ICY Is not a
party with which they can maintain contacts,"
Led by the CPSU'e Andrey Kirtlenko, who in a Kragujevac factory speech
on the 28th labeled Yugoslav-Soviet positions on "key" international
issues as "either identical at very close,' the Pact delegates and
party greettAgs messages notes accept/once in varying degrees of
Yugoslavia's current domestic and foreign policies, while at the
same time calling for socialist unity and coordination.
However, the Bulgarian Communize Party awl its delegate Zhivko Zhivkov
both took the opportunity to obliquely criticize the LCV for its
repeated concerns over Bulgaria's refusal to identify it Macedsnians
as a nationality. The Bulgarian CP Central Committee greetings rind
Zhivkov in a 27 May speech while "siting Montenegro called for
"respecting the principles of noninterferencz in internal affairs . . . ft
The Romanian Communist Party greetings indicated a cooling of relations
since the 1969 congress, when they were characterized as developing
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,)NtI tNItA Ff1 RPNDS
Pi MAY 19/4
In n "mpirit of full confidence, en teem nnd mutnnl underntAnding."
The current Romnninn grertingn downgrodod thin chnrnrteriention
to one of "mutunl sincerity, enteem nnd underntnnding"i
moreover, the Socialist Front orgnn ROMANiA LIDERA of the 27th,
reporting thP congremn opening, chnrncterized the plant meetings
between Cenunencu nnd Tito ns being held in n "spirit of frnnkmoss,
enteem nnd mutunl underntanding."
The CM, In itn %reetIngs mennnge brondcnnt by Moncow in Macedonian
on the 27th, pt'. d "deep nntinfnction" with Oe development
of "mutunl unliqs;Amoilft and trunt" between the two parties and
ntaten nnd noted "tnngiblo progress . . in all RphereR." The
theme of trust WHR RIR? alluded to by Kfrilenko, who in his factory
speech noted the exintence of "forcen who ROW discord" between the
two pertieR, The greetingn nlno gcve n nod to Yugoslavia'R brand
of Rocialism, acknowledging that "fraternel partieR were achieving
succennem In the creation of n new society by using patterns and
methodm based on general ruleR of Rocialiai: development and, at
the same time, reflecting the concrete hintorical conditions in each
country." However, the CPSU greetings also indiceted pleesure that
the LCY is now reasnerting control within the country, pointing out
that the Yugos1av/4 "have made fundamentel changes in the country's
deRtiny . . . ."
Tito echoed the CPSU's expressions of satisfaction over the
development of relations, while noting in his congress report that
difference/4 "may lead and have led unfortunately to tense relationa
between individual socialist countries." Tito eschewed charges
of Stalinism voiced at the Ninth Congress but reiterated the
position that relations among socialist countries must be beeed
on "principles of equality, independence, mutual respect and
noninterference in internal affairs." Individual communist partie:.:,
Tito said, "must not make absolute or glorify only their paths and
the specific traits of their development and must not impose their
systems on others." And in a remark that could apply to the
PRC, Tito noted that differences among parties are ittettablc, and
he proposed not only "dialog" but also "mutu&I cc,:atr?ctive criticism"
among communist parties.
COMMITMENT TO NONALINEMENT Tito's expressions of satisfaction with
the improvement of relations with the
Soviet Union and the oth2r Pact/7*uui.-71-za were tempered by a strong
reaffirmation of Yugoslavia's c.comitment to nonallnement. Tito
pointed out that nonalinement is both "anti-imperiallot and
antihegemonistic. Therefore it is not and cannot b nnybedy's
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instrument or reserve [force] . . . ." At his precongress news
conference, Dolanc also reasserted Yugonlavia's nonalined
policy. Denying rumors that Yugoslavia wan "joining the socialist
camp," Dolenc, according to TANJUG on the 24th, said: "We are not
going anywhere; we are stayinG right where we are--a socialist
country, but a country for whose foreign policy nonalinement is
the foundation." Party theoretician Kardelj elaborated on
Yugoslavia's nonalined policy in a 27 May speech on the
compatibility of nonalinement and socialism. Nonalinement, he
said, is "directed against al i forms of political and economic
oppreosion," but he also emphasized that its "fundamental essence"
is "snti-imperlalist."
Kardelj, an well as Tito, called for restrictions on the
activities of multinational companies. Although neither Tito nor
Kardelj referred specifically to the United States, TANJUG on the
28th reported UN delegate Lozar Mojsov telling the congress:
"Although these companies were multinational ones, by and large,
one rich powerful country stood behind them--the United States."
Tito did directly criticize the United States in his remarks
on Indochina, calling for a "cessation of all interference by the
United States" in Vietnam and Cambodia. However, he avoided
criticizing the United States durtng his remarks on the ItfAiian
border dispute, unlike his 15 April speech in Sarajevo, whtn he
had attacked the timing of U.S.-NATO maneuvers in the Mediterranean.
Italy was tne only Yugoslav neighbor directly criticized by Tito,
although obviously he had in mind the difficulties with StOpiria
over the Macedonians and with Austria over the Carinthians 143;en,
in referring to national minorities, he condemned "th denial of
their national and ethnic affiliation and of their language and
culture" and also condemned "their assimilation by the nation
in whose state they are now incluied."
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CONFIDFNTIAL FBIS TRENDS
30 MAY 1974
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CZECHOS LOVAK I A
LENART CALLS FOR CONTINUED STRUGGLE AGAINST REVISIONISM
Slovak partyFirst Secretary Jozef Lenart has implicitl; c:Itt(oned
that the softer line toward "revisionists" among Czechoslovrkials
scientific and technical intelligentsia--reflected in the 14-15 Mfy
Czechoslovak party plenum--did not signal any basic shift away
from the party's orthodox line on the 1968 events.* L-srt, a
pragmatic moderate of Husak"s stripe, emphasized in 20 May
Bratislava speech that revisionism "remains the main danger," an
affirmation reflecting the moderates' concern to avoid leaving
themselves vulnerable to possible chlrges of ideological compromise
from hardliners such as Bilak and Indra.
Lensres speech, delivered at a seminar devoted to the 30th anniversary
of the Slovak National Uprising, was reported by CTK on the 20th and
published in the Bratislava PRAVDA on the 21st. Four days after it
had carried an innocuous recorded excerpt of the speech on the 20th,
the Prague domestic radio on the 24th pointedly summarized the pass-
ages dealing with the struggle against revisionism, indicating the
importance of its action by noting at the outset that "today we
return once again to" Lenart's speech.
In an unusually outspoken comparison of the Hungarian events of
1956 and those in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Lenart argued that the
very fact bloodshed was averted in Czechoslovakia made it more
difficult to convince the populace that the Warsaw Pact intervention
was necessary and that a continuing struggle must still be waged
against revisioniam. Thus, he pointed out, while a victory was
achieved in overcoming the "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia
by "political" means, rather than the "rigid administrative procedure"
used in Hungary, this at the same time confronted the Czechoslovak
communists with "a problem" which he said was still unsolved:
As our people did not go through the cruel experience
of the Hungarian people, it is necessary to explain
Lo the people the logicai developments which would
have occurred--that in our country, too, everything
was pointing to a civil war--so that they can under-
* For a discussion of the 14-15 May Czechoslovak Central Committee
plenum, see the 22 May 1974 TRENDS, pave 25-26.
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stand the great importance of our llies' help.
From this viewpoint the struggle against the
revisionist rightist forces remains topical,
and for this reason revisionism remains the
main danger.
While stressing the need to continue the struggle against re-
visioniem, Lenart repeatedly insisted, in standard terms, that
the post-1968 "consolidation" of the situation in Czechoslovakia
had been successfully carried out.
The Prague broadcast of Lenart's remarks wound up with a further
tribute by the Slovak partyleader to the August 1968 intervention
and to the "Leninist" leadership of Kusak since April 1969. Lenart
had been Czechoslovak premier during the No%Itny era and was thus
out of favor during the 1968 liberalization. Following Rusak's
takeover Lim Dubcek as Czechoslovak party first secretary, Lenart
in January 1970 was restored to full membership in the CPCZ
Presidium and appointed Slovak CP first secretary.
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30 MAY 1974
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USSR
CPSU OFFICIAL ATTACKS BREZHNEV, URGES ECONOMIC REFORMS
In a remarkably transparent attack on Brezhnev's leadership, a
CPSU Central Committee official has called for thorough exposure
of mistakes in leadership of the economy and an open, party-wide
debate on a new economic policy. F. if. Petrenko, whose career
appears to have gone into eclipse after authoring several anti-
Brezhnev articles on collective leadership in the mid-1960's,
declared in an article in the April issue of QUESTIONS OF CPSU
HISTORY, Ligned to press on 2a Match, that only sweeping criticism
of mistakes along the lines of the repudiation of Stalin's cult
and Khrushchev'e "subjectivism" can clear the way for adoption
of effective new policies.
In 1973 Petrenko reappeared in the central party press with
several provocative arfAcles, the most notable cf which was
published in PRAVDA on 19 October. In that article he i.ointedly
praised the work of Supreme Soviet agencies, trade unions and
economic managers along the same lines as in his earlier articles,
conveying by implication his adr.i.:.ation for bu,!eaucracies headed
by Podgornyy, Shelepin and Kongie, respectively. Petrenko's
visits to and writings on the bloc countries suggest a relationship
with KGB chairman Andropov, who until May 1967 was head of the
bloc relations section of the Central Committee and who has long
been reputed to he a "modernist" in the Folitteiro.
In view of Petrenko's unmistakably revisionist outlooL and his
apparent political affiliations with the opposition to Brezhnev,
the timing of his most recent articles assumes critical importance.
The twin appearances of the PRAVDA article less than two weeks after
the outbreak of the Middle East war and of the second Petrenko
article at the cloee of Secretary of State Kissinger's 24-28 March
visit to Moscow suggest that foreign policy considerations were
paramount in the timing of the apparent moves against Brezhnev.
QUESTIONS OF CPSU Petrenko's April article, entitled "Freedom
HISTORY ARTICLE of Discussion and Criticism Is a Fundamental
Principle of CPSU Life and Activity," declared
that nothing can remain unchanged forever and placed party cadres on
notice about the onset cl a period of intense criticism and discussion.
Stating that various economic traditions and practices and even some
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aspects of the political system have become outdated, he argued
that if moves to criticize and correct these shortcomings were
not made, there could be "a serious political crisis, as shown,
for example, by events in Czechoslovakia in 1968-69." Further.
the wide discussion of "social and intraparty problems" were said
to be necessary because of the possibility of "subjective" mistakes
in leadership. While conceding that collective leadership, "on
which the party relies at all levels," reduces the likelihood of
errors, he maintained that it "cannot fully exclude them."
Petrenko virtually called upon Soviet leaders to admit their mistakes,
recalling pointedly that Lenin "considered honest admission and correction
of mistakes a sign of political maturity" and that he had maintained
that if leaders tell the people "even bitter and harsh truth,"
the "masses will understand" and "any difficulties" can be over-
come. Citing Lenin's idea that publicizing "is a sword which
heals the wounds it causes," Petrenko refuted those who argue
that it Is too dangerous to reveal mistakes and weaknesses because
these will be used by enemies, and he also ridiculed the "strange
logic" of those who argue that a hidden fault "is not really a
fault at all."
Progress, according to Petrenko, is ensured by thorough exposure
and criticism of shortcomings, followed by determinat4-T of a
correct course through broad discussion. "Every time the communist
party has faced new complicated tasks," he went on, it has turned
to criticism of shortcomings and party-wide discussion. The two
historical examples he cites have striking parallels with the
present day. In 1925, he recalled, when the party was "summing
up the results of the new economic policy and deciding questions
of further paths of economic construction," it ordered that the
"party masses must be drawn intc L.e most active participation
in discussion and decision of questions facing the [coming] cougress,"
and in the late 1920's, when the growth of the economy snd culture
made urgent the task of fighting "bureaucratic distortions in state
and economic uor," the Central Committee made the theme of criticism
from below of everyone, irrespective of rank, one of the key slogans
of the day.
He argued that even the most radical repudiation of the party's
past errors would be accepted by the public and would be successful.
"One of the most striking examples" of the positive value of thormgh
criticism and exposure of errors, he wrote, was the party's "bold
and open declaration on errors and distortions committed as a result
of the cult of Stalin's personality." This received the "full support
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FBIS TRENDS
30 MAY 1974
of the whole Soviet people," cleared away "serious obstacles on
the path of development of Soviet society," and strengthened the
communist movement. He depicted the overthrow of Khrushchev in
October 1964 in a similar light, alleging it opened the way for
great improvements in economic management.
Party decisions, according to Petrenko, must be arrived at collec-
tivoly,by "free discussion of problems of theory and practice on
all levels" of the party. Virtually ignoring the Politburo, Petrenko
described the recent party congresses and Central Committee plenums
as the key decision-making bodies which have thoroughly debated
economic policies and shortcomings. Discussion of social and
intraparty problems, he declared, is becoming even more important
today, and he reported that at all levels of the party the rank-and-
file are now discussing such questions as the CPSU peace program,
economic plan fulfillment and the "effectiveness and style of party
leadership."
PAST ARTICLES Brezhnev's ant athy toward economic reform
appears to be the target of Petrenko's article,
especially since Petrenko's antipathy toward Brezhnev is abundantly
clear from past articles. Every article he has written since
Brezhnev's rise in 1965 has been permeated wtth themes iehcrently
inimical to Brezhnev's laterests: collective leadership, reduction
of party interference in economic affairs, reliance on specialists
and intellectuals, the urgency of economic reform and the right
of the Czechoslovaks and other nations to pursue an independent
course. In particular, his articles in 1966-1967 criticizing first
secretaries who set themselves above the collective were unmistakable
swipes at Brezhmw.
Petrenko's works disappeared in the central party press after :Ile
Invasion of Czechoslovakia, but they reappeared in 1973 in the form
of articles urging greater scope for soviet and governmental agencies
in running the economy and greater reliance by party leaders on
advice of specialists and intellectuals. Brezhnev responded to this
viewpoint with a warning at the December CPSU plenum against a
"technocratic" approach to management of the economy.
Petrenko's first controversial article after Khrushchev's fall
appeared in a September 1965 issue of PARTY LIFE, and it was co-
authored by Yu. V. Bernov. In May 1965 Petrenko, identified as
a "responsible official of a Central Committee section," and Berney,
head of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav sector of the Central Committee's
bloc relations section, had accompanied Suslov on a visit to Atagaria.
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In the September article they described the role of the Bulgarian
party in the economy and society. They reported that the Bulgarian
Central CommP'tee had condemned party leaders for duplicating the
functicna of economic officials and that "direct interference in
the operational-economic activity of enterprises and their leaders"
had thus been reduced. They also descrt5ed how the Bulgarian Central
Committee and local par z.y committees had increased their reliance
on specialists by creating "problem commissions" headed by party
secretar!as and including prominent scientists and specialists.
The description of Bulgarian affairs was in fact similar to themes
then prominent in Soviet commentazy on domestic affairs.
In a December 1965 KOMMUNIST Article keyed to the upcoming party
report-and-election conferences prior to the 23d CPSU r.ongress,
Petrenko argued that higher echelons of the party should allow
lower echelons greater scope in electing their own leaders and
that election meetings should be marked by free discussion, bold
criticism and more openness and publicity. He rejected the notion
that this wou1.1 undermine "the organizing role of a higher party
committee in relation to lower" committees.
Petrenko' 41 next article was a transparent response to abortive
attempts in early 1966 to elevate Brezhnev above the collesial
organs of authority. At the 23d Ccngress in March-April 1966,
Gorkiy oblast first secretary Katushev--who had been installed
in that post by Brezhnev in December 1965?was the only prominent
official to urge that "henceforth the Central Committee be headed
by a General Secretary." In a 20 July 1966 PRAVDA article on
collectivity, Petrenko criticized "some leaders" who "force"
their opinion on party committees. "A party committee secretary is
not a chief, he has not been given the right to command," he wrote,
"he is only the senior in an organ of collective leadership elected
by communists," and "in deciding questions he has only as many
rie-Its as other members of the committee." Collectivity "its
strengthened where respect for authority does not exceed reasonable
limits . . . ," he added.
In March 1967 Petrenko authored a QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article
on criticism not unlike his most recent QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY
article. The 1967 article clearly revealed Petrenko's reformist
credentials. Not only under capitalism but also Ander socialism,
he wrote, the "assertion of the new is impossiblc without critical
negation of the old which has ceased to correspolid to 'hanged conditions
and tasks." But under socialism4he maintained, "this negation is
aimed not at weakening the existing system :Alt, on the c-Nntrary,
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at ,Jtrengthening It." He went on to pain' out tnct the struggle
between new and out ideas and practices "as n rule" doe? not lead
to "groat social conflict's" under socialism. And he praised the
efforts of historlans arA writers to "critically interpret the
Stalin period as a "necessary tage in the further development: of
historical science and artistic creation" but cautioned that the past
must not be depicted only as a "chain of mistakes."
MILITANT RZFORMIST Petrenko returned to the theme of collectivity
ahortly after N. G. Yegorychev was ousted as
Moncow city first secretary for reporteoly criticizing Soviet policy
In the Hindle East at the June 1967 CPSU pleetm. In a September 1967
PARTY LIFE article, entitled "Strictly Obverve Leninist Norms nf Party
Life," Petrenko warned that "creation of truly comradely conditions
for collective leadership largely depends on the secretary of a party
committee or bureau," and if that official "misuses his position,
collectivity can be reduced to nought." Noting that Lenin provided
an "instructive example" of haw collectivity should operate rt meetings
of the Central Committee, Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat, Petrenko
declared that "one could argue quite freely with Lenin on any
question . . . ." Shortly afterward Petrenko, identified as a
"responsible official of the Central Committee," also delivered a
lecture on "Collectivity?the High Principle of Party Leadership,"
according to the 7 January 1968 MOSIZOVSKAYA PRAVDA.
In a 17 April 1968 rRAVDA article on the role of the party, Petrenko
again argued that the party should not engage in "petty supervision"
of state and economic organs and also voiced indirect support for the
upsurge of reformism in Prague. Arguing that national peculiariza:s
often dictate differences in approach by communist parties in different
nations, Petrenko recalled the "different roads to socialiau" thesis
made familiar in the Khrushchev era. He insisted that "eaco fraternal
party is independent in determining its own policy and also the concrete
forms and melt-hods of activity," and that "the CPSU tre&ts the experience
of fraternal parties with deep respect and attention."
But the crisis over Czechoslovekia and the Auglst 1968 invasion clearly
placed Petrenko and other reformers on the defensive. In an October
1968 PARTY LIFE article on democratic centralism, he blamed the "Czech
events" on the abandonment of the principle of democratic centralism
in the name of party democracy--specifically, the failure to prevent
overt factionalism and uphold Party discipline. However, the Czech
failures, he contended, do not discredit reformism, since the events
in that nation "have nothing in common with genuine concern for develop-
ment of party democracy . . . ."
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ERIS TRENDS
30 MAY 1974
No subsequent articles by Petrenko appeared in the major party
publications until 1973, though a book review appeared in the
journal for the party rank-and-file. POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION,
in April 1971. The book review was used by Petrenko as a vehicle
i:Jr propounding the view that state and economic agencies should
be independent of party interference. He noted that "propagandists
and social science teachers sometimes are asked whether the phrty
snd its organlzationr should so thoroughly 'push their way' into
economic problems and whether state and economic agencies crnnor
themselves handle economic matters and decide them." He wrote that
Lenin had considered it necessary to raise the independence of
soviet institutions and officials, leaving the party with responsibility
for "general leadership."
Although his articles no longer appeared in the major party
publications, Petrenko retained his Central Committee post. He was
identified in the September 1971 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY as a
"responsible official of the Central Committee," and he was reported
to have addressed a July 1971 conference of "Znaniye" Society
lecturers on the 24th CPSU Congress and the role of the party. He
was again identified in PRAVDA on 22 May 1973 as a "reeporsible
official" of an unnamed Central Committee section and as a member
of a delegation headed by Katushev atter...ling a Warsaw theoretical
conference.
RE:ENT ARTICLES In 1973 Petrenko _rice again emerged as an author
in PARTY LIFE, KOMMUNIST and PRAVDA. In his April
1973 PARTY LIFE and July 1973 :COMMUNIST articles, he subtly manipulated
the words and experience of Cuban and North Vietnamese party leaders
in a manner calculated to support a case for ending party interference
in the economy. In his 19 October 1973 PRAVDA article, he advocated
his views more directly.
In the kpeil PARTY LIFE article he reported that in August 1970 the
Cuban Politburo had adopted a basic decision to separate party and
state functions. Before that, party cadres had handled both party
and economic work, regional secretaries had directed plan fulfillment,
and party secretaries at entervrise) had concurrently served as
directors of their plants. "Now party and economic functions at
enterprises have been separated," h.. wrote, and, according to Castro,
Cube was raising the role of mass public organizations which had been
neglected.
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in the July KOMMUNIST article, a laudatory review of a new book by
North Vletnameae First Secretary Le Duan, Petrenko focused on Le
Duan's etacements 4pholding the prerogatives of state organization4
in the winagement of the economy. He cited Le Duan's statement
that it is a "task of extreme importance" that party officials and
committee,/ "raise the scientific level of their leadership by close
collaboration with scholars and specialists and leIrn to rely on
their knowledge and experience," and he quoted Lentn to the effect
that "a communist who cannot demonstrate his ability to rally and
modestly direct the work cf specialists . . . is ofteu harmful."
In the 19 October PRAVDA article, Petrenko stated that the quality
of work by "state and public organizations"--economic agencies,
local soviets and track. unichls--had improved so much that party
agencies no longer need iaterfev. in their work and are free to
concentrate on more impertant problems nf socio-economic, political
and spiritual life. While crediting the party with the "leading
role" in the state, he nrged state and public orgaaizatlons to
"use their rights and opportunities to the maximum." Further,
Petrerko attributed the party's abilif:y to lead industry, agriculture,
science, culture, state administration and foreign policy to "the
growth of the intellectual potential of the party"--an article of
faith among revisionist party officials and intellectuals.
Petrenko's article was clearly aimed at a profoundly derogatory
point of view toward the Soviet middle class of economic specialists
and administrator advanced by such reactionary party ideologists
and spokesmen for Brezhnev as V. P. Stepanov and R. I. Kosolapov.
It was not until the public disclz,sure of a partial text If Brezhnev's
10 December 1973 speech at the two-day CPSU plenum that Brezhnev
was directly linked with this point of view. According to the
published version of Brezhnev's remark, he called for a "party
approach" in all spheres of economic activity and, reflecting eviCent
disdain, declared that "one cannot approach leadership of the
economy and the improvement of thia leadership from narrow managerial--
let alone technocratic--positiovs," Petrenko's response to the
body of opinion championed by BreAnev was thus tantamount to a
direct accusation of failure by Brazhnev in economic policy.
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30 MAY 1974
NEW GRECHKO ARTICLE REFLECTS RECENT SHIFTS IN OFFICIAL OUTLOOK
An article by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko on regime-army
reletians, appearik.; in the May issue of the journal QUESTIONS OF
CPSU HISTORY, provides an authoritative glimpse at recent changes
in the Soviet official outlook on domestic and world affairs. In
tone, content and documontation the article differs markedly
from an earlier Grechko article on the same subject, published in
a Fkbruary 110,1J of KOMMUNIST No. 3, 1974. The two articles are
also noteworthy 5ecauae their respective dates of publication--
18 February and 24 April?coincide with significant changes in the
editorial board of KOMMUNIST and the supervisory agency for
QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY. The KOMMUNIST article was written at a
time when that journal was without a chief editor, while the
QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article appeared after the former chief
editor of KOMMUNIST? Anatoliy Yegorov, was identified as new
director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU Central
Committee agency responsible for publication of QUESTIONS OF
CPSU HISTORY.
The most notable substantive differences between the two Grechko
articles may be summarized as follows:
On the issue of olitical authorit over the armed forces,
the first article meandered vaguely in a purely doctrinal vein
about the founding fathers of communist revolution; the second
stressed the strict subordination of the armed forces to collegial
organs of political authority in a manner suggesting that certain
military leaders have 'oefv.. reprimanded for major violations of the
political-military code.
4. On the image of the outside world, the first article conveyed
a conventional, doctrinaire and almost frantic image of a genuine
external military threat; the second projected an image of a
potential, though clearly manageable, external military danger.
-1- On the authority for tine differences in outlook, the first
article cited a passage from Brezhnev's 26 October speech to the
World Peace Congress in Moscow, which referred ominously to
"continuity; and even intensifying" preparations in the West for
a new "world war;" the second conspicuously skirted this passag2,
repeatedly alluding instead to statements made in the controversial
"CPSU Program," formulated in the Khrushchev era, and the "CPSU
Central Committee report" to the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971.
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4. On a military buildup, the first: article reiterated the
conventional goal of strengthening the 41.fensive capability
and combat might of the armed forces; th.c second treated that
goal more as a necessary evil that-. as a desirable condition of
international relations.
4 On military training prmal, the first article recited the
conventional doctrinaire ritual on the "profoundly scientif'.:
line" of the regime--a line said to be fully consistent wIth the
"polittezl, economic, spiritual and military capabilities of
the Soviet state"; tie second stressed the overriding importance
of military knowledge and military science and the need to avoid
"obsolete tenets," ag well as "voluntarism and hare-brained
schemes" in military matters.
On domestic affairs, the first article merely mentioned the
official designation of the Soviet Union as a "developed" socialist
state made at the 24th CPSU Congress; the second gave new content
to the official formula, stressing the "complexity" of the Soviet
system, the confrontation with "qualitatively new tasks on a
far-reaching scale," and the consequent urgency of obtaining
"profoundly sci)ntific, principled iendership oriented toward
long-term objectives and ideals."
The differences in ow. look between the two articles are go
substantial as to raise questions about Grechko's authorship of
either. Circumstanyially, the evidence suggests that different
Politburo factions have at different times used his authority--
and that of the armed forces?La. their own purposes. Grechko's
most recent article places his authority squarely on the side of
what might be called a faction of tough-minded though practical
modernists represented by men like Yegorov and his high-level
backers.
CHAIN OF COMMAND The most recent Grechko article opened with
a clear-cut delineation of the operational
subordination of the armed forces to the highest collegial organ
of cuthority. the CPSU Central Committee. It cited the text
of the official 1918 decr/4e on the political-military chain of
command as follows:
The policy of the military department, as well
as of all other departments and establishments,
is pursued on the precise basis of the general
directives of the party via its Central
Committee and under its direct control.
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It went on to cite the authority of the CPSU Program, adopted
by the 22d CPSU Congress in 1961 in the midst of Khrushchev's
controversial revival of de-Stalinization, as a more recent
basis for part) leadership over the armed forces.
The reasons for Grechko's unusual reminder about the subordinate
role of the armed forces in the Soviet state were undoubtedly
compelling. The issuance of such a reminder two months after the
appearance of an article covering the very same ground of
regime-military relations suggests that it wan prompted by some
act of high-level insubordination, perhaps even by Grechko
himself. This suggestion is strengthened by Grechko's failure
to deliver a speech or cmtribute an article to PRAVDA on
V-E Day--the first such occurrence since he became defense mininster
in 1967. This indignity was compounded by the appearance of an
obscure military historian writing the 9 May PRAVDA literary
assignment traditionally performed by the defense minister--an
indignity surpassed only by Brezhnev'e failure to monopolize the
May Day ceremoniea as he had in recent years.
The QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article also introduced a new clause
in an otherwise stereotyped listing of "Leninist principles"
allegedly governing Spviet military policy. The innovation,
which did not appear in Grechko's February KOMMUNIST article,
referred to "the unity of political, economic and military
leadership," and this principle was ranfted second in a list of
nine official guidelines for Soviet military behavior. Although
the motivations behind the introduction of the new guideline are
unclear, they clearly reflect heightened official concern over
relaticna between militaTy leaders, on the one hand, and the
leaeerehip of other elements of Soviet society on the other.
This concern was notably amplified in a later passage in Grechko's
article, which warned against "any miscalculations" in the use
of the nation's fiscal, economic and manpower resources. The
passage reads as follows:
The CPSU demands that army communists, workers of the
defense industry, and planning organs approach every
question in the sphere of armaments and combat equip-
ment from positions of consistent and specific
implementation of the economic and social policy
formulated by the 24th CPSU Congress and developed in
the documents of subsequent Central Committee plenums,
and that they insure that deciatons, at whatever level
they may be taken, are justified, effective, and economical.
Any miscalculations in this sphere could lead to unjustified
expenditure of funds and of the country's z7---7mic and man-
power resources.
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Logically. a public warning of this kind cou/A be interpreted as a
rebuke to spendthrifts in the armed forces, as well as to
countless political1 economic and military spokesmen lobbying
for greater defense expenditures along the lines of Grechko's
KOMMUNIST article. Coming from an official with an unmistakable
record as a military lobbyist, however, Grechko's warning was
both ironic and self-critical.
DIVERGENT IMAGES Unlike Grechko's KOMMUNIST article, which
OF EXTERNAL THREAT wan replete with grossly exaggerated
images of the military threat posed by the
West, his QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article was, by Soviet standards,
relatively objective. Adopting a posture of almost equanimous
vigilance, the article criticized the "aggressive'' intentions and
actions of "capitalist monopolies" and "reactionary forces" in the
West and regretfully affirmed that as a consequence the Soviet Union
had been "forced" to rearm after the war. The pro forma exercise
in criticism was marked, however, by unusual restraint and little
truculence or invective.
SurInisingly enough, the Soviet defense minister surveyed the state
of world affairs with almost unbounded confidence. In this respect,
his most recent article echoed themes akin to those sounded in the
awards speeches by Kosygin and Podgornyy in Minsk and Riga last
November and December, respectively. He referred to the existence of
a "new correlation of forces" in world affairs which was "constantly"
and irretrievably moving in favor of the Interests of socialism.
Thus, while taking appropriate note of the potential danger of war,
he took special pains to discount its likelihood under present
and foreseeable circumstances arid to reiterate the regime's commitment
to detente and "the struggle for general and complete disarmament."
By contrast, the themes of detente and disarmament had been notably
absent in Grechko's KOMMUNIST article. Instead, that article echoed
the militant, truculent themes made familiar in the past by hardline
theoreticians of the Lenin Military-Political Academy, the notorious
ideological citadel of the army's political cadres. Not only did
the earlier urticle reiterate in belligerent terms the validity of
the Leninist doctrine on war and politics, it also totally disregarded
the doctrinal implication- of the advent of nuclear weapons on the
world scene. It pointed to the."innately aggressive" nature of the
"capitalist states," and stressed the role of military power as the
"only means" to curb their "expansionist aspirations" and ensure
victory in the event of war. "War and aggression," it mainteined,
"always have been and will remain the inevitable companinn of capitalist
sociezy."
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FBIS TRENDS
30 MAY 1974
The bellicoie rhetoric about the threat posed by the West was
authenticated by reference to Brezhnev's 26 Oirober'speech in
Moscow: "Nor do we have the right to forget, Comrade
L.I. Brezhnev said at the Moscow World Peace Congress, 'that
even under conditions of relaxation vf international tension,
a procliss which is in fact tantamount to material preparation
for world war is continuing and even intensifying." Grechko
had reiterated this very same formula in his January awards
speech in Kazan, as had Suslov and Pcnomarev?they 'lone among
the members of the Soviet rvting group. However, the formula
was missing from Grechko's mote temperate appraisal of the inter-
national situation in his 13 March report to a Kremlin conference
of Komsomol secretaries in the armed forces.
MILITARY DOCTRINE The two Grechko articles also displayed
sharply divergent interpretations of the
origins of Soviet military doctrine. The KOMMUNIST article
flatly stressed the ideological sources of Soviet military doctrine:
Developing these [military] tenets to conform with new
historical conditions, V.I. Lenin formulated a harmonlous
doctrine on the defense of the socialist fath rland,
thereby making a major contribution to the treasury of
Marxism. He enriched the ideas of Marx and Engels on
the need for the armed defense of the victorious prole-
tariat's achievements and the creation of its military
organization and resolved many questions raised by the
practical revolutionary struggle of the working class
and all working people against the aggressive forces
of the old world.
Without slighting Lenin's role in the development of the Soviet
state, the QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article gave an entirely
different account of Soviet military development:
In building the Soviet army the party had to travel
unknown paths, for there were no ready-made theo-
retical theses--even less, any practical experience--
in this respect.
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FBIS TRENDS
30 MAY 1974
Instead of stressing the role of seemingly immutable ileological
principles in the shaping of the Soviet armed forces, as was
done in the earlier article, the more recent Grechko article
focused on the impact of domestic and foreign influences on the
leadership and structure of the armed forces. Aba,:e all, it
stressed the combined role of "Marxist-Leninist teaching on war
and the army and of research and conclusions of Soviet military
science," with particular emphasis on the latter.
Buttressed with quotations from Lenin not contained in the
February article, the more recent Grechko article stressed the
overriding importance of military science. Lenin's statements
on "the tremendous significance of military knowledge and on
the need to "really learn military affairs" were cited, along
with his dictum that "a modern army cannot be built without
stience."
TECHNOCRATIC OUTLOOK In keeping with a pragmatic outlook on
the development of the armed forces,
the QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article offered an unusual glimpse
at the components of a "deve/oped" or "mature" socialist
society, which had been touched upon only briefly in Grechko's
earlier article. Placing a high premium on qualities of lzader-
ship, the article declared:
A mature socialist society is a complex social
organilm, but the mcre complex it is, the more
difficult it is to direct, and the more it needs
proper leadership.
The article went on to emphasize that the search for solutions to
"qualitatively new tasks on a far-reaching scale" would require
"profo?ndly scientific, principled leadership oriented toward
long-term objectives and ideals expressing the aspirations and
interests of the working people of all nations and nationalities and
of all citizens of the Soviet Union." The clearly pragmatic and
enlightened outlook on domestic affairs conveyed in this article
was a far cry from the attitude projected in the earlier one, which
had described the Soviet regime in characteristically doctrinaire
terml as a "state of the dictatorship of the proietariat"--a
concept conveying visions of class warfare instead of social harmony.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS Where the earlier Grechko article .:learly
seemed to be plugging for incremmarillitery
expenditures in the face of an allegedly implacable foe, the more
recent article seemed to view the maintenance of a strong military
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posture as an unavoidable though unpleasant reality of modern
life. However, in attempting to make the most out oZ an
imperfect world, the more recent Grechko article advanced a
number of unusual ideas with perhaps far-reaching implications
for Soviet behavior at home and abroad.
On domestic affairs, it spoke of a "definitive" and "irretrievable"
withering away of the coercive functions of the Soviet armed forces.
This was explained by the alleged absence of "exploiter classes
and social groups against which military force might be used."
This unusual statement, which clearly is more applicable to the
distant Soviet past than to the present period of Soviet politics,
may be a veiled reference to the coercive functions exercised by
organs of Soviet authority other than the armed forces. Insofar
as the KGB has been particularly active against dissident elements
in recent years, the statement in the Grechko article could signal
a possible onset of internal relaxation.
In foreign affairs, the Grechko article referred to the "close
union" between the theoretical and practical activity of foreign
communist parties, and it credited those parties with a "leading
role" in their respective domestic pursuits and international
relations. Whether this statement foreshadows any change in the
traditional relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies
remains to be seen.
The Grechko article also appealed to Soviet citizens to become
"consistent internationalists," as well as "ardent patriots."
In a similar vein of internationalism, the article, while
reaffirming the traditional goalv of detente and disarmament and
disclaiming any predatory intentirns on the part of the Soviet
state, introduced a notable escalation in the Soviet posture of
opposition to the export of "counterrevolution." Where earlier
elite statements had spoken of Soviet "solidarity" with and "active"
support for this cause, the Grechko arti=le added a new "purposeful"
ingredient to the Soviet posture:
In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state
actively and purposefully opposes the export of
counterrevolution and the policy of oppression,
supports the national liberation struggles,
and resolutely resists imperialist aggression
in whatever distant region of our planet it may
appear.
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The new Grechko formulation may be related to recent signs of
movement in Moscow's public posture on Vietnam. Moscow moved
in March to give its first authoritative endorsement to
Vietnamnse communist demands for a settlement of outstanding
political issues in South Vietnam, after avoiding official
Soviet endorsement of earlier six-point proposals in April
and June 1973 by the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary
Government for implementation of the political aspects of the
January 1973 Vietnam peace agreement.
The first indications of this shift came in Soviet reports of a
20 March 1974 meeting between Kosygin and DRV Premier Pham Van
Dong, which quoted the Soviet premier as declaring the "unswerving
solidarity" of the Soviet Union for DRV and PRG efforts for
implementation of the Paris agreement "on a lust settlement of the
internal political problems of South Vietnail.," Two days later,
on the 22d, the PRG issued a government statement with a revised
version of its six-point platform. The six points were finally
officially endorsed by Moscow on 31 March, in a TASS statement
which said that they had met with "great satisfaction by
authoritative Soviet circles."
In terms of the novelty of its outlook on Soviet domestic and
foreign affairs--not to mention its possibly far-reaching
practical implications--the latest Grechko article clearly
ranks among the most striking and most explicit pronouncements
to emerge r....ently from the Soviet Union.
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igOTE
KOREAN RED CROSS TALKS: The sixth and seventh "contacts" between
delegates to the North-South Korean Red Cross talks have moved the
two sides a step closer toward resuming the utalled full dress Red
Cross sessions. At the sixth "contact" held in Panmunjom on 22 May
the two sides agreed to hold working-level meetings, headed by the
deputy chiefs of the delegations, in Panmunjom. At the seventh
"contact" on 29 May the delegates discussed the composition and
procedural matters of the working-level meetings, the first of which
is scheduled for 10 July. The last full-scale session of the Red
Cross talks, which began in August 1971, wee held in Pyongyang in
July 1973. In the interim, beginning in November 1973, the two
delegations have held a aeries of "contacts," wherein each side
has scored the other for delaying the holding of the next fv11-scale
session. The North Koreans claim full credit for breaking the
stalemate: A 24 May NODONG SINMUN commentary greeted the results
of the sixth "contact" as th.lt "fruition of the tireless and sincere
efforts" by the North, and placed the onus for future problams
entirely on the South Korean side.
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APPENDI
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS
Moscow (2950 items)
Supreme Soviet Elections
China
African Liberation Day
Ponomarev Visit to U.S.
Chile
[Arrests/Trials of
Latin "Patriots"
World Peace Council
25th Anniversary
Podgornyy Congrattaations
to French President
Giscard d'Estaing
Afro-Asian Film Festival,
Tashkent
Arab-Israeli Issue
Libyan President Jallud
in USSR
20 - 26 MAY 1S74
Peking (870 items),
Cambodia
[Front Leaders
Cypriot President
Makarios in PRC
32d Anniversary of Mao's
Yenan Talks
Criticism of Lin Piao
and Confucius
Vietnam
Pakistan's Bhutto in PRC
Congratulations to FRG
Leaders on Election
Congratulations to French
President
Congratulations to Yugo-
slav Leaders on
Reelection
in
(2%)
PRC ( )
(8%)
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow end
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item?radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues:
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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