TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 21, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
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Y? 1974
o. 8) 1/
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NAT!ONAL SECURITY INFOF!MATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
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CONTENTS
SOLZHENITSYN
Moscow, Allies Mount Public Campaign Against Exiled Writer. . . . . . .
1
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Soviet Debate Continues Over Implications of Arms Race. . . . . . . . .
6
Peking Sees "Impasse" In. U.S.-Soviet SALT Negotiations. . . . . . . . .
9
ENERGY CRISIS
Moscow Media Obscure Gromyko Backing for Special UN Session . . . . . .
10
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
USSR Notes New Kissinger Trip, Has Little Comment on Mideast. . . . . .
12
CHINA
PEOPLE'S DAILY Stresses Party Role in Anti-Confucius Campaign . . . . .
15
PRC Sustains Interest in Better Relations With Southeast Asia . . . . .
17
ASIAN SECURITY
Moscow Scores U.S. Plans for Indian Ocean Base . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
VIETNAM
DRV Trade Union Congress Continues Accent can Economic Recovery. . . . .
20
PRG Pushes Recognition Campaign at- Geneva Law Conference. . . . . . . .
23
Pro-Russian Ukrainians Seek to Downgrade Ukrainian Heroes . . . . . . .
24
New Lithuanian First Secretary Chosen Over Incumbents . . . . . . . . .
25
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . j
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S 0 L Z H E N I T S Y N
MOSCOW, ALLIES MOUN' PUBLIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST EXILED WRITER
In an effort to c.ouate.ract the adverse impact of Solzhenitsyn'd
expulsion Mc3cow ha.i mounted a closely orchestrated show of
public support for the official action. The Soviet media
campaign against the exiled writer was accompanied by ominous
threats to the diss{dent scientist Sakharov and other domestic
critics of the regime. 'P}'F: East. European comuncrmict regimes
for the most part supported the Soviet action, with reactions
ranging from effusive praise to minimal reportage. The West
European CP's reacted along their customary lines, evidently
mostly out of domestic embarrassment, with the French expressing
cautious disapproval and the Italians offering a somewhat
stronger condemnation. There has been no monitored mention of
the expulsion by Peking, Hanoi, or Havar,.a.
SOVIET UNION The Soviet. propaganda machine moved swiftly
into action almost before the ink was dry or.
the 13 February TASS announcement of Sclzhenitsyn's loss of
citizenship and expulsion from .he USSR. Immediately following
publication of the announcement in PRAVDA the next_ day, letters
and statements denouncing Solzhenitsyn and approving the
official action began t:o appear in all central :newspapers and
on Moscow radio and TV. The largely stereotyped expressions of
"unanimous" support from individuals in all walks of Soviet
life were also broadcast to foreign aud:.er.ces in many different
languages. In addition to conservative writers who participated
in the letter writing, a few moderates--notably Boris Polevoy;
Valentin Katayev and Stepan Shchi.pachev--also lent. their names
to the campaign.
In vilifying Solzhenitsyn as sn inveterate enemy of the Sovie'.:
system and a notorious opponent of international detente, the
letters and statements sought to convey an impression. cf
overwhelming public support for the official action., Expressions
of outrage over his "subversive" and "slanderous" writings were
coupled with declarations of "unanimous" satisfaction over his
"natural and just" fate. One PRAVDA writer suggested that
"foreign reactionaries" themselves would soon lament Solzhenitsyn's
presence in their midst because the "melodies of his subversive
ideological activities" would no longer have the same appeal
they enjoyed when he was a Soviet citizen.
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An unattributed TASS roundup of world opinion on the expulsion,
broadcast in many foreign languages on 16 February and
published in all central papers the next day, was contrived to
show widespread foreign approval. Solzhenitsyn's deportation,
according to the roundup, was viewed as a "legitimate'' act
by the Soviet state not only by communist papers but by
noncommunist spokesmen as well. The roundup featured a
selection of noncommunist statements questioning Solzhenitsyn's
popularity in the Soviet Union as well as his judgment in
defying Soviet authority.
In an effort to cloak the Soviet action with legality, Moscow
radio on 18 February reported an interview with Deputy
Prosecutor General Mikhail Malyarov. According to the report,
which was broadcast to France and in English to the United
Kingdom and North America, Malyarov explained that Solzhenitsyn's
arrest was based on a provision in the RSFSR legal code
relating to "aiding foreign states in pursuing a policy hostile
to the USSR" and that his deportation was governed by a
provision in the law on Soviet citizenship covering "actions
incompatible with that lofty title." He even intimated that
such deportations were not uncommon in the West, naming France
in particular.
Although Solzhenitsyn bore the brunt of the campaign of
public abuse, the dissident scientist Sakharov was linked
with `..aim for criticism in an 18 February Moscow TASS dispatch
in Inglish. According to the dispatch, the two most prominent
Soviet dissidents were attacked in an article in the newspaper
VOICE OF THE MOTHERLAND by the historian Nikolay Yakovlev.
Cali)Ing them "first class dissidents," Yakovlev reportedly
charged that their "phony arguments" about the "perfidious
nature" of the Soviet system served the cause of foreign
enemies of the Soviet Union and opponents of detente.
While depicting Solzhenitsyn as a solitary figure in total
isolation from Soviet society, the media drew a tight curtain
around the various domestic expressions of concern over his
fate by Yevtushenko, Sakharov and others, reported in Western
media. Moscow maintained a complete blackout on poet Yevgeniy
Yevtushenko's =.:tter of protest to Brezhnev and the statement
he circulated in Moscow explaining his action, which was
published in the West. The only outward sign of official
displeasure toward Ycvtushenko was the cancellation of his
scheduled Moscow TV appearance on 16 February--a change
recorded in PRAVDA's TV schedule that same day.
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EAST EUROPE Moscow's orthodox East European allies, with
varying degrees of invective, strongly
supported the Soviet action against Solzhenitsyn. The exiled
writer was denounced in doctrinaire terms as a tool of
anticommunist and anti-Soviet forces by Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Hungary, while Polish comment showed some
restraint. Bulgaria, which had strongly criticized Soizhe.nitsyn,
and Romania, which had not mentioned his case, have so far only
reported the 1.3 February TASS announcement of his expulsion.
Yugoslavia, which had treated the Solzhenitsyn controversy
with marked caution, has not commented since TANJUC reported
on the 13th the circumstances of his arrest, Albania has
not mentioned Solzhenitsyn's arrest and expulsion, after having
earlier denounced him as, among other things, "an ugly offspring
of capitalist degeneration in the Soviet Union."
Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 16th carried a dispatch from its
Moscow correspondent, who approvingly noted the "indignation"
of the Soviet public over Solzhenitsyn. After reporting that
Soviet papers had carried letters from Sc?iet citizens approving
the official action the dispatch predicted that the West would
raise a hue and cry about the case in order to conceal the fact
Soviet organs had acted "Justly and humanely" toward the exiled
writer.
Uniquely among the East European countries, c e Bratislava
radio on the 14th reported an organizational denunciation of
Solzhenitsyn, by the Czechoslovak Committee of Writers Union;
meeting that day in Prague. Also on the 14th the Prague radio
carried a commentary by Soviet NOVOSTI editor. Korolev which
gloated that alleged Western hopes that Solzhenitsyn would be
"crucified" as a Christ figure failed to materialize and that
his expulsion had turned him into "a mete blank cartridge."
The same day the Bratislava radio surmised that the FRG would
not welcome Solzhenitsyn as a permanent resident, as this would
"discredit the Federal Republic before the Soviet Union" in
the current era of detente..
The East Berlin domestic service on the 13th commented
sarcastically that the exiled author was now free to arrange
his life in a country which "should suit him better" than
his native country, which h:! had slandered. The commentary
declared that the Soviet authorities had adequate legal grounds
for the move against Solzhenitsyn and that their avoidance of
more drastic action was an "annoyance" to those in the West
who wanted to make him a martyr, The next day, a Raabe domestic
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radio commentary ref,:rr.ed to Solzhenitsyn in terms of Marx's
characterization of perple "wno immediately wither into
everyday figures as ijuon as their situation calls on them
to perform miracles." The talk declared categorically that
"the Solzhenitsyn story is over." A 14 February NEU^S
,`DEUTSCHLAND article by Harald Hause likewise predicted that
the Solzhenitsyn affair would be forgotten "as now the
sensation of Mre. Alleluyc:va has i. been, forgotten.,"
The Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG waited until the 19th
to publish a blistering editorial which contrasted markedly
with Budapest's customary restraint on such matters. The
editorial charged that the exiled author "twists everything"
and "dirties even the finest pages and most heroic struggles
of history." In terms similar to those employed.by Prague and
the GDR, the paper declared that Solzhenitsyn's anti-Soviet
bubble had burst, and that all that was left to him was
employment with Radio Liberty and the "sympathy" of the West
German neo-Nazi party leader Adolf von Thadden. Uniquely in
the East Europe comment,.NEPSZABADSAG conceded that the Stalinist
targets of Solzheni,tsyn's criticisms were genuine, but it went
on to charge that "he blows up the faults and mistakes which
did in fact exist--but which he was not the first to expose--to
a disproportionate size."
An article in the 15 February issue-of the k'arsaw military daily
ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI strongly defended the Soviet action against
Solzhneitsyn. In somewhat more restrained tones than those of
Moscow's other allies, however, the paper echoed the stock themes
that Western hopes for the writer's "martyrdom" were now
disappointed and that he was now just "one more White emigre."
Also on the 15th, the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY published
a shorter version of the commentary b; NOVOSTI editor Korolev.
which the Prague radio had also carried the.day before.
ZYCIE WARSZAWY added to the NOVOSTI dispatch its own observation
that Solzhenitsyn would "now become the West's internal matter."
WEST EUROPE CP'S The West European communist parties' reactions
to Solzhenitsyn's expulsion ranged from
cautious disapproval by the French CP to more critical statements
from the Italian, Spanish, and British communist parties. The
domestic embarrassment caused by the issue to the two major
West European communist parties was apparent in the low-keyed
French and Italian communist media coverage of the event, as well
as in their parties' behavior at the recent Brussels communist
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summit conference. The Brussels meeting avoided dealing with
the Solzhenitsyn affair and Soviet dissidence, and its call
for intellectual freedom was restricted to capitalist countries
in West Europe.
Reflecting both sensitivity to domestic political requirements
and its traditional pro-Soviet orientation, the French Communist
Party responded to the Solzhenitsyn issue by acknowledging the
r.uthor's right to free expression while at the same time
emphasizing the anti-Soviet nature of the campaign mounted iii
the West on his behalf. These themes appeared in a 1.5 February
commentary in L'HUMANITE which went on to accuse Solzhenitsyn's
supporters of hypocrisy in neglecting the victims of dictatorial
regimes in Greece, Chile,, and South Vietnam,, An earlier L'HUMANITE
commentary on the 6th, observing that Moscow had denounced "events"
criticized by Solzhenitsyn as far back as the 20th CPSU Congress
in 1956, charged him with condemning the Soviet Union from "Lenin
to Brezhnev,"
The Italian Communist Party organ L'UNITA, in a 13 February
brief editorial comment on Solzhenitsyn's reported arrest,
conceded that his "arguments" were hindering the process of
detente but objected to the use cf "administrative and judicial
meabur.es" in dealing with intellectual dissent. Even "unacceptable"
political and ideological views, the editorial argued, should be
met on the "battlefield of ideas." The following day L'UNITA
reported Solzhenitsyn's expulsion without comment, together
with a statement by Italian trade unions in support of intellectual
dissent as "an inherent part of freedom of thought," that should
not beco-,ne an "object of repression."
The Spanish Communist Party, in a 14 February Radio Independent
Spain commentary, asserted that despite the exploitation of
the Solzhenitsyn issue by anti-Soviet elements, "we do not
advocate an official philosophy, censorship, or a political
or administrative center to dictate laws to art or science."
British Communist Party leader Gcllan, in remarks reported in
the London MORNING STAR cn the 14th, echoed the Italian stand
calling for "political discussion" rather than administrative
procedures.in dealing with intellectual dissent,
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U. S,-SOVIET RELATIONS
SOVIET DEBATE CONTINUES OVER IMPLICATIONS OF ARMS RACE
The apparent stalemate reached in East-West negotiations on
arms control has evoked expressions of concern and sharply
different conclusions by military and civilian spokesmen in
Moscow., Military writers in RED STAR have pointed to the
continuing pace of arms development in the West as justification
for strengthening; Soviet military might. However, a less
alarmist view of these developments has recently been
strongly asserted by two members of the USA Institute in
Moscow--director Georgiy Arbatov and military specialist
G. A. Trofimenkor They have argued that the appropriate
Soviet response to the continuing arms race should be in the
political, not the military, sphere.
Army Gen. Ye. Maltsev, writing in the 14 February RED STAR,
acknowledged that the danger of a world nuclear war has begun
to diminish, but he called attention to "the further broaden-
ing of the arms race" in the West. He argued that in light
of such developments as the proposed increases in the U.S.
military budget and the advocacy by U.S. military leaders of
a "new generation of nuclear missile weapons," the USSR and
the Warsaw Pact "are forced, in the interests of the reliible
defense of socialism, to take appropriate steps to strengthen
their military puteol.ta.t." Maltsev echoed remarks made a
week before in RED SLxR by Rear Admiral V. Shelyag in assert-
ing that, though a "deepening of detente" was desirable,
Moscow "must continue to be prepared for any turnabout-in
the development of world events."
TROFIMENKO ARTICLE Trofimenko, writing in the February
issue of USA, also showed concern that
"the arms race in the world as a whole is not substantially
easing off." He attributed this in part to the persistence
of long-ingrained cold war attitudes which were not being
dispelled "as rapidly as detente demands." However he went on
to warn that advocates of new weapons systems in the United
Staf: s should consider the impact of their appeals in Moscow--
having notee earlier in the article that "the Soviet Union was
compelled to react appropriately to the intensification of the
strategic arms buildup in the United States" in the 1960's.
But in contrast to Maltsev and other recent articles in the
military press, Trofimenko argued that: the danger of war
cannot be permanently eliminated "within the framework
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of a purely technical solution of 'attack and defense:"'
Amplifying this stand, he asserted that "only solutions in the
political sphere relying on the firm will for peace of the
broadest segments of humanity can be a real 'antibomb'--a
method of achieving a stable, secure peace." In support of
diplomacy, he called for "the implementation of the tasks
advanced in the [Soviet) peace program" as "the best
guarantee that the changes now taking place in the internattunal
si 'potion ' will- be.pteadfast and stable."
ARBATOV ARTICLE Arbatov, in the February issue of PROBLEMS
OF PLACE AND SOCIALISM, also expressed
concern over the lag between political and military detente.
Like Trofimenko, he complr.ined of "cold war inertia" and quoted
Brezhnev's remarks on this, subject in Washington last June
which had referred to foot-dragging in both the United States
and the Soviet Union. As in previous articles, he was more
forthright than other commentators in complaining about U.S.
developments. He was critice.1 of "the many obvious contradictions
in U.S. policy," in particular the official recognition of the
principle of "equal security" in bilateral relat:_ons coupled
with simultaneous attempts to "step up the arms race."
In response to ominous developments in the United States, Arbatov
counseled patience on Moscow's part, arguing that it was at
present still "difficult to envisage" any development in
the field of armaments that could upset the present strategic
balance. He also went on to argue, even more forcefully than
Trofimenko, for political rather than military response.: by
Soviet policymakers. As on previous occasions in the past
four years, he pointed to the "inexorably shrinking phsre of
applicability of military force" in international affairs and
to the fact that "nonmilitary factors are becoming increasingly
paramount" in calculations of the strength of nations.
Arbatov professed to see the recent "revival of interest" in
the United States in a "counter#orce" strategy as an attempt
to restore the utility of military force. in so doing, he
offered the most detailed Soviet criticism of the theoretical
premises underlying the recently announced changes in U.S.
missile targeting and the deployment of "mininukes." Although
the article was signed to press before recent statements by
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger gave wide publicity to the
strategic debate, Arbatov was responding to earlier indications
that such issues were again under discussion, Drawing or arguments
made by U.S. arms control specialists, Arbatov criticized the
new developments because they would "cultivate a more tolerant
attitude to nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare" anr' cause an
acceleration of the arms race. The latter would result, he
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maintained, from the requirement for more accurate and more
potent weapons to support the counterforce strategy. In attacking
the counterforce concept, Arbatov clearly implied that deterrence
based on mutual. assured destruction was the only viable alternative
until substantial disarmament measures have been agreed upon,
although he expressed distaste for the need to accept a "peace
built on terror."
THEORETICAL The contrasting pozitions of Soviet military
DEBATE and civilian spokesmen on practical policy
issues w're highlighted by their differing
attitudes toward the Clausewitz-Lenin doctrine that war is
a continuation of politics by other means. Military spokesmen
have been vigorously defending the doctrine in the face of charges
that it has been invalidated by the advent of nuclear weapons.
In the most recent defense, Rear Admiral Shelyag in the 7 February
RED STAR article noted that the critics of the doctrine tend
to "oversimplify" the consequences of nuclear war by dwelling
on unacceptable levels of destruction in any..nuclear exchange.
By contrast Arbatov, in his recent article, clearly came out
as a critic of the doctrinaire military viewpoint, arguing
chat nuclear weapons have indeed altered the relationship
between war and p.l.icy: "No policy can have the objective
rf destroying the enemy at the cost of complete self-annihilation."
Referring to a dichotomy used by Clausewitz, he added that
"with the emergence of nuclear missiles any correspondence
between the political ends of war and the means was lost."
Arbatov found further support for this position in the words
of Lenin. He cited Krupskaya's book for LeninIs observation
that "modern technology is increasingly fomenting the
destructiveness of war. But there will 'be a time when war
will become so destructive that it becomes impossible."
The position taken by Arbatov seemed ir~plicit in a 14 February
PRAVDA article on:.SALT attributed to "A. Platonov and L. Alekseyev"
which singled out the urgency of the "problem of preventing
a nuclear war which could turn into a genuine disaster for
all mankind." The article also echoed the reasoning of.:Arbatov
in citing statements by U.S. observers problaiming the failure
of increases in strategic weapons arsenals in recent years
to enhance national security.
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PEKING SEES "IMPASSE" IN U,S,-SOVIET SALT NEGOTIATIONS
Peking has recently displayed a markedly more negative view on
the chances for progress at the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limta-
tion talks that resumed this week in Geneva. A series of un-
usually lengthy Peking commentaries dealing with the SALT resumption
represents a significant departure from China's previously cautious
and reserved assessme?:.t, which had acknowledged the possibility of
at least temporary compromises and agreements in the U.S.-Soviet
negotiations. Taken together with sustained Peking reports of a
lack of movement in East-West talks on European security and force
reduction,* the commentaries suggest growing Chinese confidence
that detente policies have reached a major impasse and that over-
riding U.S.-Soviet differences will provide continuing opportunities
for advantageous Chinese maneuvering in the triangular relationship.
Peking has especially played up what it views as a growing Washington
realization that Moscow is using the talks to lull the United States
into weakening its defenses so that the USSR can achieve a superior
strategic position. Typically, a 30 January NCNA article described
the talks as "more dead than alive" because of Washington's increas-
ing awareness that Moscow's "tough stand" in the sessions underlines
a "Soviet intention to achieve all-round nuclear superiority." It
went on to hail U.S. determination, evident in Secretary Schlesinger's
repeated announcements that Washington would not tolerate a position
of inferiority to Moscow, and it noted various new U.S. defense
moves, including increased military spending and a revision of missile
targeting strategy. A 4 February NCNA report similarly referred to
the "stalemate" at the Geneva talks while crowing about the "failure"
of Soviet detente policies in 1973 despite intense personal diplomacy
by party chief Brezhnev. And an 11 February NCNA report of U.S. press
comment on the alleged crumbling of detente emphasized that the United
States has become seriously disillusioned in SALT over the Soviet
failure to follow through on its announced intentions by offering
meaningful compromises in the talks.
* For a discussion of earlier Peking commentaries pointing up
lack of progress in the. European security and force reductions
talks, see the 19 December J.97:~ TRENDS, pages 10-12.
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ENERGY CRISIS
MOSCOW MEDIA OBSCURE GROMYKO BACKING FOR SPECIAL UN SESSION
Soviet media are not known to have publicized thus far statements
in Europe by Foreign M'niscer Gromyko offering explicit Soviet
support for Algeria's call for a UN General Assembly session on
raw materials. Western media, inciuding the New Y-rk TIMES,
reported that Gromyko had confirmed in Paris and Rome on
18 and 19 February that the Soviet Union supported the Algerian
Initiative for a UNGA conference.
Moscow media have noted only that Gromyko told a Paris press
conference that the USSR backs energy talks "by all sides concerned,"
and that such discussions would help to improve the. international
situation and establish mutually advantageous cooperation. Neither
have Soviet media provided any confirmation of a 20 February Algiers
radio report that Gromyko had sent a message to Algerian Foreign
Minister Bouteflika advising him that the Soviet Government had
decided to support Algeria's conference proposal. Moscow media
previously have given sparse and low-level publicity to proposals
by Soviet oil expert Boris Rachkov for a world conference on
energy attended by both communist and noncommunist countries.*
WASHINGTON ENERGY In the aftermath of the Washington energy
CONFERENCE conference, Moscow has continr-=d to cast
doubts on U.S. motives and to focus attention
on the disagreements between France and the other participants
reveal.pd at the conference. While continuing to .;void authoritative
comment of its own, Moscow has replayed numerous r;egative assessments
by the U.S. and Wes. European press and dispatches from Soviet
correspondents abroad continue to display sympathy for the French
position of support for bilateral oil arrangements and opposition
to combined Western efforts to deal with the measures imposed by
the oil-producing countries.
An article by Yuriy Khar;anov in PRAVDA on the 16th maintained
that during the conference the United States "sought, found, and
deepened cracks in the ranks" of the EC countries in an effort to
exploit their differences, and IZVESTIYA's correspondent in
* For background on the Rachkov proposal, see the TRENDS of
23 January 1974, pages 9-10.
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WasleingL:.' said on the 15th that the final communique contained
no analysis of the real causes of the energy crisis and reflected
only the dissatisfa.cLion of the participants.
The only Peking comment on the Washington conference to crate is
a 15 February NCNA report asserting that the United States called
the meeting "to rebuild its hegemonic position in the Western
world, thereby enhancing its struggle with the other superpower,
Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, in the Middle East and
Europe."
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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
USSR NOTES NEW KISSINGER TRIP, HAS LITTLE COMMENT ON MIDEAST
Suv Iet used is h:.lve m:.l InLatned v1.rtual sl lcnce on the issue of
furLher steps for a Middle EaSL peace se~ilcrnent. Moscow has
brLef1y reported on Secretary K.i.ssiugcr's plans for a new
Mtddic East trip next: week, the steps Ln Lite Egyptian-Israeli
d lsell};a};emcut. process, ,and Lite continuing Syrian-Israeli
clashes, but has offered very little collllllent. An exception
was it Losev conunellLiry broadcast In English to North America
on the 8th which asserted that the USSR regardcc Lite Egyptian-
Israeli disengagement agreement as constructive but only a
''part.ial measure," and that the Geneva conference should move
ahead to a "radicaa" set:Bement guaranteeing security for
all stage:; and pvop.l.es of Lite area.
Moscow reported without corlunent President Nixon's 20 February
announcement, after his meeting with tie Egyptian and Saudi
Arabian foreign ministers, that Secretary Kissinger would leave
for the Middle East next week to discuss Syrian-Israeli
ili:;eugagmenL. Reporting the arrival in Washington of the two
Arah ministers, Moscow on Lite l7th had noted that they had
been sent by the participants In the four-nation Arab summit
conference to discuss plans for Syrian-Israeli troop disengagment
and "a possibility" if lifting Lite oil embargo.
Soviet media had prevLousiy reported that these topics were discussed
by the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Algeria at
their. 13-14 February meeting in Algiers. A Moscow broadcast
in Arabic on the 14th cited unidentified "reports" that
Algerian President Boumediene had called at the conference for
continued use of the "oi'. weapon" and that Syrian President
al-Arad had insisted that the oil embargo continue until Israel
accepted Syrian conditions for it disengagement of forces. IZVESTIYA
on the 16th, however, observed that, Judging from Arab press
reports, there was no specific decision on the oil question at
the Algiers summit.
SOVIET "ALERT" The first known reference in Moscow media to
IN OCTOBER WAR a Soviet military alert during the October
war appeared in a 16 February Moscow Arabic-
language broadcast of an interview with Cairo AL-AKIIBAR chief
editor Husayn Fahmi. In the Moscow radio interview, Fahmi said
that "the strong Soviet intervention, the stern Soviet warning
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to larae.l, and the alerting of the Soviet forces to go to the
Middle East to establish pence and top the aggression" changed
the situation completely. It l.ed, he said, to the intervention
of the two superpowers and their rledge to establish a just pence
in the Middle East.
Fahmi was responding to a question on the effect of the October
fighting on Arab-Sovv1^t friendship. His remarks come against
the background of Moscow's low-keyed campaign to convince the
Arabs of the advantages of Soviet friendship and cooperation and
to rebut alleged "imperialist" and "Zionist" attempts to denigrate
Moscow's Middle, East policy. Tahmi asserted that the October
war gave new impetus to Soviet-Arab friendship by destroying
Imperialist and Zionist fabrications about the "ineffectiveness
of Soviet weapons" and the adverse effect that Soviet-U.S.
detente would have on Soviet support for the Arabs.
In reacting to the 25 October U.,S, worldwide mi1.,.4ary alert,
Moscow had obscured the President's and Kiesinger.'s explanations
that the U.S. action had been taken because there was evidence
that certain Soviet units had been alerted for possible dispatch
to the Middle East. A TAGS statement on the U.S. alert issued
on 27 October had rejected "absurd" allegations that some actions
of the Soviet Union had supposedly given cause for concern. And
Brezhnev in his World Peace Congress speech on 26 October spoke
cryptically of actions "in some NATO countries" di-,sominating
"fantastic speculations" concerning Soviet intcnti ris in the
Middle East. Brezhnev went on to disclose that in response to
Egyptian President aa-Sndat'q request for U.S. end Soviet troops,
the Soviet Union had already sent "representatives" and hoped
the United States wo~lld do the same.
"PEACE AND PROGRESS" Moscow on 15 February inaugurated daily
PROGRAMS IN ARABIC broadcasts in Arabic of the "unofficial"
Rudic Peace and Prcgress programs.
Broadcasts by Radio Peace ind Progress in English to Africa, which
had been the vehicle for news and comment depling with Middle East
developments, are continuing, as are Radic Peace and Progress
programs in Hebrew tailored for Israeli audiences.
News and commentaries in the new half-hour Arabic-'language programs
have predictably focused on continuing Israeli "provocations"
against neighboring Arab countries, Israel's "expansionist" intentions,
and U.S. support and encouragement-for Tel Aviv's policies.
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Ct.mmont has also expressed concern over "rightist" trends
in the Arab world, complaining that the United States was
manipulating "local reactionaries" in an effort to incite
the Arabs against the Soviet Uniot?, divide the ranks of the
"patriotic,. revolutionary forces," and divert the Arabs from
their social, economic and political goals.
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CHINA
PEOPLES DAILY STRESSES PARTY ROLE IN ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN
A 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial has emphasized that the
party has organizational control over the assault against Lin Piao
and Confucius. Unlike a 2 February editorial in the same paper,
which identified the struggle as being "initiated and led" by
Mao himself, the editorial on the 20th provided an organizational
imprimatur, asserting that the campaign is under the leadership of
"fhe Central Committee of the CCP headed by Chairman Mao." In
Al o?at',variance with the previous editorial's sharp warning that
the campaign would be ;.a "test for every lending comrade," the
editorial argued that "we ehould have confidence" that leading
comrades will be able "to maintain the general orientation of the
struggle."* The editorial positively assessed as "fairly good"
the results of the campaign thus for,
In still another contrast, the 20 February editorial did not
repeat the 2 February editorial's call for' the masses to "rise in
action" and previous high praise for the masses as the "main force"
in the campaign. Instead, it stressed the need for party committees
to play the venguard role, "arouse the masses," and guide the
movement along the "correct track." In an apparent attempt to
limit the scope of subjects eligible for review in the context of
the anti-Confucius struggle, the editorial called upon party
committees to help the masses "avoid getting entangled in particular
questions at the expense of criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius."
It said that party committees must "correctly" handle contradictions
among the people and try to combine the old, middle-aged and young
in order to unite with 95 percent of the cadres and masses.
The ideological campaign against Lis and Confucius has still not
produced any clear target for attf,ck, and Peking han strongly
warned against allowing contradictions among the people to cause
polarization among,various group:?. An 18 February NCN.
report on recent PEOPLE'S DAILY articles condemning Lin's influence
within the ranks of the people, for example, asserted that "active
ideological struggle does not turn our comrades into enemies",
and will only "enhance the revolutions.-y unity of cur comrades."
And on the provincial level, a 13 February Foochow broadcast of
* See 6 February trends, pages 13-14.
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a poster criticizing a local teacher noted that teachers and
school leaders shotY1d "not be annoyed by the few big-character
posters put up in tltca school, thinking that: you will, be unable
to control the students." The student's poster confidently
asserted thet. once the erring teacher under attack had corrected
his mistakes, he would "be our good teacher."
Judging by a recent speech by CCP Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching,
the anti-Confucius campaign does not appear aimed at allowing
criticism to adversely affect production. Wei's remarks at,-1ocal
anti.-Confucius meetings, broadcast by Nanning radio on 18 February,
emplasized party leadership over the campaign and stressed the
constructive spinoffs expected from the struggle. Focusing can
the importance of ideological campaigns in promoting production,
Wei argued that the new upsurge of criticism of Lin and Confucius
is "bound" to result in a "new upsurge of production...because
to make revolution is to liberas:e the productive forces and to
stimulate their development." Wei then relegated criticism of
Lin and Confucius to the workers' "spare time" so thatt, victories
can be won in both revolution and production.
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PRC SUSTAINS INTEREST IN BETTER RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ;SIA
Peking has rr.cently reconfirmed its 1, tcrob: in improvinn, bilateral
relations with the noncommun;,st states of 3outhcast Asia and its
approval, for regional alliances in this area to counter Soviet
inroads.
For the first time to recent years the possibility of Chinese
participation in a regional alliance has been preee.rted In a
positive context, in a 14 February NCNA report on Australian
Prime Minister Whitlam's recent tour of six Southeast Asian:
states. NCNA did so by reporting positively Whitlam's proposal
for a broad regional group centered on Southeast Asia and quot,ng
his companion admonitioki rhpt "any organization in Asia and the
Western Pacific would be incomplete and grievously inadequate
if China were omitted from it." Peking's current positive out-
look contrasts sharply with itg intense. suspicion of Asian regional
groupings as fronts for imperialism in the 1960's, but Is con-
sistent with its increasingly favorable treatment in the past year
of such regional organizations as ASEAN that ate not linked with
the superpowers.*
The Peking report on Whitlam's visit underi.ined China's position
that Moscow is the major threat to the region, while the United
States and its SEATO military alliance are favorably viewed as
instruments blocking the USSR. Thus, though duly noting Whitlam's
general characterization of "big power contenticn" as a threat to
the region, NCNA specifically pointed up Whitlam's reference to
"Intensified Soviet activities" while ignoring his accompanying
criticism of the United States. Moreover, NCNA misrepresented
the Australian Prime Minister's anti-U.S. criticism of "Dulles'
concept o5 military containment of China," presenting Whitlam's
remarks as though they were equally applicable to the Soviet
Union and the United States, and pointedly ignored his companion
criticism of the SEATO alliance, which had been a major bulwark
In Dulles' containment policy.
THAI DELEGATION Sustained Chinese interest in improving bilateral
VISIT relations with Southeast Asian states was evident
in Peking's warm reception last week for a visit-
ing Thai sports delegation led by Defense Minister Thawi Chunlasap,
* For a discussion of Peking's recent attitude towards nonalined
Asian regional organizations sues as ASEAN, see 1 August 1973 TRENDS,
pages S1-S5.
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the highest ranking Thai official to visit China in two decades.
The group was duly entertained by PRC sports figures, met with
Chou Ens-l.ai and Vice Premier Teng lisiao-ping on the 12th for a
"friendly" conversation, and "amicably exchanged views" in separate
meetings with the Chinese foreign trade minister and a vice
foreign minister on,9 February. Such treatment accords with
that given Thai visitors to Peking since the breakthrough in
relations in September 1977.
In a marked departure from the generally modest visit accomplish-
ments claimed by previous Thai visitors to China returning to
Bangkok, Thawi told journalists on the 16th that Chou En-lai had
indicated that Peking had relinquished support for the Thai CP
insurgents, and that he had offered-to sell Bangkok needed dicsel
oil in addition to the 50,000 tons agreed to last December. Peking
has not reported the defense mtnister's remarks.
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ASIAN SECURITY
MOSCOW SCORES U1S, PLANS FOR INDIAN OCEAN BASE
U.S. plans to expand naval and air facilities on Diego Garcia
Island in the Indian Ocean have recently been criticized in
several Soviet central press articles and Moscow radio
broadcasts to Asian and African nations. Articles in PRAVDA,
IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR criticized Britain's agreement to the
U.S. expansion, contending that U.S. efforts to control the
Persian Gulf "oil funnel" would jeopardize the region's
security and intimidate the national liberation movements in
Africa and the developing countries of Asia. Numerous Moscow
radio foreign-language commentaries for Asia have accused the
United States of planning to construct a Diego Garcia base that
would handle the same strategic bombers used over Vietnam and
nuclear submarines that would keep a considerable part of Asia and
Africa "at gunpoint."
Moscow media pointedly contrast the U.S. efforts to expand bases
with Soviet efforts to relax tension, exemplified in Brezhnev's
Asian collective security system proposals and Soviet support
for the Indian and Sri Lanka proposal to declare the Indian Ocean
a peace zone. The current Moscow reaction is consistent with long-
standing Soviet sensitivity to U.S. military acti?;ir.ies in the Indian
Ocean--manifested after Anglo-American agreements on Diego Garcia
were reached in 1966 and 1972, and whenever the U.S. navy made a show
of strength in the area. Moscow's current campaig-. Includes
exploitation of public protests against: the expansion by
various littoral countries.
Commenting defensively on published U.S. claims that reopening
of the Suez Canal would permit a buildup of the Soviet Navy in
the Indian Ocean, PRAVDA Commentator Vladimir Ozerov on 10 February
defended the Soviet naval presence, insisting that plying normal
sea routes was not "exceptional" and constituted "a generally
accepted practice." Similarly, in an article in RED STAR on
the 13th, Captain First Class V. Pustov exposed "the falsehood
of U.S. propaganda statements" alleging the USSR would gain a
strategic advantage when the canal was opened, according to
TASS. Several foreign-language radio commentaries denied that
the Soviet Union was operating naval bases in the area and
countercharged that the United States was planning to constuct
a chain of bases to control the sea routes and intimidate
the littoral nations.
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VIETNAM
DRV TRADE UNION CONGRESS CONTINUES ACCENT ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY
VWP First Se.%retary Le. Duan, In his address at the opening meeting
of the third Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions Congress on
1L February, gave a frank appraisal of the "many difficulties
and great problems" facing the postwar DRV economy and pointed
out. the "imperative need to accelerate socialist industrialization."
The VFTU ^_?)ngres4, the first since 1961, is the first of three
announ-ed DRV mass organization congresses scheduled in 1974--the
f:~urth congress of the Ho Chi. Minh Working Youth Union opened on
18 February, and the fourth congress of the Vietnam Women's Union
wi.ll be held later this year. Predictably, the congress speeches
and closing resolution reflect: Han.oi's continuing emphasis on
returning the country to normal peacetime conditions and on
economic reconstruction as set forth in the general tasks of the
VWP Central Committee's 22d plenum--a theme given detailed treatment
at the DRV National Assembly session which closed on the 9th.*
LE DUAN Playing the same role of keynoter as he did at the last
ADDRESS trade union congress in February 1961, Le Duan in his
address to the congress informed the delegates that
the present congress would be conducting its activities on the
basis of the. "extremely important resolutions" recently adopted by
the 22d plenum. The first secretary gave high praise to the DRV
social system for having survived a "most barbarous. . war of
aggression" and claimed that :.n 1973 "a substantial portion" of
the dire(..t consequences of the war had been overcome.
To offset any unfounded optimism these remarks might engender, Le
Duan hastened t_v remind his ]4steners of the key problems presently
facing North Vietnam. He said that "in view of the noble objectives
of communism," there should be no e.vitisfaction with the current
situation, "especially in economic life." To drive home his point,
he acknowledged that war devastation "has caused our originally
undeveloped economy, which had made a step forward, to regress to
where it was more than a decade ago." Le Duan made it clear,
however, that the war was not the entire cause of the North's economic
predicament, noting that inherent to the DRV's "underdeveloped"
economy were "shortcomings and immaturity in economy;. leadership,
guidance and management,"
* See the TRENDS of 6 February 1974, page j, and 13 February 1974,
pages 12-15 for discussion of the assembly session.
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Dealing with the DRV's population growth, an issue that seems to
be of heightening concern to the DRV leadership, Le Duan stated
that the population increase has been too rapid--"more than 10
million people from 1960 to 1973"--and this has brought about an
"acute imbalance" between demands and the economic and financial
capabilities available to meet them. Deputy Premier Le Th.anh Nghi,
in his government report to the recent National Assembly session,
had voiced similar apprehension about the DRV's soaring birthrate,
declaring that it was necessary to initiate a birth control. movement.
While the "imperative need to accelerate socialist industrialization"
was listed as one of the five main topics for. Le Duan's address,* he
never elaborated in detail on this subject but merely cataloged
the many problems of socialist construction. He concluded that
socialist industrialization and "rapidly" moving forward to large-,
scale socialist production would solve the DRV's economic dilemma.
Le Duan noted that the resolutions of the Central Committeuu's 19th,
20th, and 22d plenums were framed with this basic objective in mind
and dealt with "economic constructicn and development and economic
leadership and management."**
After an essentially theoretical discourse on the DRV economy's
planned progression from small-scale to large-scale production, Le
Duan warned that the DRV "can neither develop industry nor build heavy
industry unilaterally" in its advance toward large-scale socialist
production. There has to be, he pointed out, a balance between
agricultural and industrial development, although he noted that re-
commending sole reliance on agriculture would be "incorrect," Summing
up the economic priorities, Le Duan stated:
The path leading toward large-scale production in
our country must be: rationally develop heavy
industry on a or.i.ority basis and on the basis of
agricultural and heavy industry development; build
the economy at the central level while developing
it at the regional level; and combine the building
of the economy with nati:nal defense,
* Hanoi radio, in broadcasting Le Duan's speech on 12 and 13 February,
indicated it was a complete text.
** Hanoi media still have net been heard to mention the convening of
the 21st plenum. Le Duan's exclusion of it in his listing would suggest
that economic affairs had little impact on its discussions.
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While a^_,knowledging that "priority development of industry"
is a fundamental law, Le Duan asserted that "this line. . .enables
us to avni_d unnecessaty strains on our economic and social life
that may result from the unilateral priority development of heavy
industry."
SPEECHES, Vice Chairman Nguyen Duc Thuan, in his "report
RESOLUTION on the situation and tasks" of the VFTU executive
committee, provided a lengthy assessment of trade
union activities and achievements since the second congress and a
discussion of present trade union tasks. In listing the trade
unions' major tasks for 1974-1975, Thuan gave precedence to launching
a movement: for "productive labor and practicing thrift to build the
counr..r;;" and observed that this movement should in turn stimulate
the m?:'ve.menr to assist agriculture and consolidate the worker-peasant
al.lianc,e. To underscore the significance of linking the two movements,
Thuan :?tat:ed that agricultural production remains the "central task"
for the period 1974-1975 in the plan for economic rehabilitation-arid
development, In addition, Hoang Quoc Viet gave the inaugural address
and the closing speech, and Premier Pham Van Dong was reported to
have spoken, but available Hanoi media have not publicized Dong!!s
remarks. This is consistent with the scant media attention also
ac.corded to Donb's speech at the recent National Assembly session.
The Lrade union congress resolution, thus far available only in
excerpt form as broadcast by. Hano:L radio, 'reiterated .the,
of the speeches and enumerated six "concrete tasks" for the trade
unions: providing adequate and timely assistance for southern
laborers and compatriots; organizing a movement for labor pro-
ductivity and for building socialism economically; caring for the
livelihood wozkers and office employees; educating and developing
wor.kers and r,1f..ic.e employees able to fulfill the requirements of
the revolution; improving trade union organization and training
and improving trade union cadres; and contributing to the solidarity
and unity of t1i. world trade union movement.
CONGRESS All of the DRV leaders except Defense Minister
ATTENDANCE Giap were reported present at the congress and as
members of the presidium: Ton Duc Thang, Nguyen
Luong Bang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen
Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Van Tien Dung--apparently standing in
for Giap. The new VFTU Central Committee elected at the congress
continued Hoang Quoc Viet in his position as chairman and Nguyen
Duc Thuan, Nguyen Cong Hoa, and Truong Thi My in their positions as
vice chairman, Additionally, Nguyen Duc Thuan was listed concurrently
as secretary general--a position in which he has not been previously
noted.
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China was the only socialist country that did not have a delegation
attending this VFTU congress, which drew visiting delegates from the
Moscow-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions and all other
socialist countries, including Peking's ally Albania, as well as
third world delegates--mostly from the Middle East--and trade
unionists from France and Italy. The unexpected attendance at this
congress by Albania, the only communist country that had not been
at the last VFTU congress in 1961, pointed up the Chinese absence--a
situation duly exploited in Moscow reports on the congress. The
only known PRC acknowledgements of the VFTU congress were a message.
from the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign
Countries and a lengthy 15 February NCNA report pegged to its closing.
PRG PUSHES RECOGNITION CAMPAIGN AT GENEVA LAW CONFERENCE
The PRG, continuing its longstanding campaign to gain wider inter-
national. recognition, has launched another effort in connection with
the Geneva conference on international humanitarian law that opened
20 February. The PRG sent notes to the Swiss Government declaring
its adherence to the four Geneva conventions on. humanitarian law
for the protection of war victims, according to LPA; and on 18 January
Switzerland took note of the PRG declaration and in turn informed the
other participating countries.
A 20 February PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, responding
to what it termed a U.S. threat to withdraw if the PRG took part in
the Geneva conference, declared. that the PRG was "fully qualified
and empowered" to attend and that any U.S. "attempt to prevent the
PRG's participation . . , was completely il.legal," An, earlier
more detailed justification for the PRG's action in a 14 February
foreign ministry statement declared that the PRG would not oppose
participation in the conference by other South Vietnamese parties,
even though the PRG was the "true, sole representative of the South
Vietnamese people." This statement pointed out that PR.G participation
should not be construed as recognition of other parties present at
the conference, nor would it mean recognition of the PRG by other
countries.
A DRV Foreign Ministry statement also issued on 14 February in s.upport
of the PRG initiative declared that the PRG had "full Juridical and
moral right" to attend the conference, PRG and DRV broadcasts have
not provided any confirmation that a PRG delegation will attend.
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U S S R
PRO-RUSSIAN UKRAINIANS SEEK TO DOWNGRADE UKRAINIAN HEROES
Ukrainian proponents of russif.i.cation have begun a move to whittle
rlcwn the reputations of two of the most popular defenders of
Ukrainian culture, onetime Ukrainian Education Minister Mykola
Skrypntk and young poet Vasyl Symonenko. The two men, both
dereased, have been treated as folk heroes in recent years by
many Ukrainians--to the obvious displeasure of pro-Russian
ympathizers. Since the 1972 ouster of Shelest as Ukrainian
party first secretary and Shcherbitskiy's rise to power, officials
suspected of Ukrainian nationalist sympathies have been removed,
and writers expressing nationalist sentiments have been condemned
and in some cases arrested.
One of the most. notorious russifiers, Mykola Shamota, who is
director of the T.G. She.vchenko Institute of Literature, attacked
Sym-'nenko in a speech excerpted in the 8 February LITERATURNA
UKRAINA. Bitterly complaining that Symonenko is constantly called
the "model for ycut.h" and the "poetic conscience of a whole
genera ," Shamota reminded his audience that Symonenko had also
written "i.mmat:ur.e, ideologically imprecise" works and had repeatedly
expressed nationalistic sentiments that were used by Ukrainian
emigrees abroad. Without repudiating the totality of Symonenko's
work, Shamot.a insisted that the practice of holding him up as a
model. '.or young writers" and an example of "civic courage" must
be "decisively stopped."
Symnner1'.(.,) h.as been in official favor in recent years, even though
tip has served as an inspiration for many Ukrainian literary dissidents.
it the. rime. of his death in December 1963, at age 27, he was a
leader among young Ukrainian writers and the author of many
unpublishc;.d nationalistic poems. Thanks to the efforts of his
friends Ivan Dzvuba and Ivan Svitlichnyy--the two most prominent
Ukrainian literary dissidents--he became a symbol of anti-russification
after his death.. Svit.lichnyy managed to send Symonenko's unpublished
writings abroad, where they were published by Ukrainian emigres
in January 1'65. Svitlichnyy and several others were arrested for
this in August of that year., In January 1965 Dzyuba turned a
celebration. of Symonenko's birthday into a demonstration against
r.ussification, and he was also arrested and held for a short time,
In late 1965 on. suspicion of involvement in secreting the deceased
poet's writings abroad. Svi.tlichnyy is still in prison, while Dzyuba
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was recently released after publicly recanting for Ariting his
book "Internationalism or Itussification?". Dzyuba is now engaged
in writing articles on factory life for LITERATURNA UKRAINA.
Shamota's attack followed a move by Ukrainian Central Committee
ideology Secretary Valen tin Malanchuk to prevent '.Jkrainian writers
and historians from portraying Slrypnik--education minister from
1.927 to 1933 and the best known symbol of "Ukrainianization" since
the revolution--in an overly favorable light- in a December
VITCHIZNA article based on a 22 October speech to Kiev writers,
Malanchuk acknowledged that Skrypnik Iliad been a "prominent" leader
who had been wrongly vilifi^d. But he accused Skrypnik of having
exaggerated the importance of the nationality questi,n in the
Ukraine, and he warned historians not to disregard these mistakes.
During Khrushchev's de-Stalinization Skrypnik was rehabilitated
and lauded even in Moscow as an implacable foe of Ukrainian
nationalism who had been driven to suicide in 1933 by unjust
accusations of nationalist deviation. A 25 January 1962 IZVESTIYA
article declared that he had committed certain mis.:nkts "but they
did not have a political character," while PRAVDA on the same day
likewise stated that Skr.ypnik's mistakes were typical and that h,
was a "true internationalist,"
NEW LITHUANIAN FIRST SECRETARY CHOSEN OVER INCUMBENTS
Bypassing the ranks of incumbent. republic leaders, Moscow has
chosen young,Vil.nyus city First Secretary P. P, Gr.i.shkyavichyus
ac new Lithuanian Central Committee first secretary, succeeding
A. Yu. Snechkus, who died on 22 January, The choice of the
48-year old Grishkyavichyus at an 18 February Lithuanian Central
Committee plenum may reflect displeasure with. the. present leadership
for poor handling of recent nationalist unrest or simply a desire
to infuse new blood in the aging republic hierarchy. This is the
first change in Lithuania's top post since the republic was established
in 1940 with Snechkus as first secretary.
Gri.shkyavichyus, trained as a Journalist, began his career in that
profession but later engaged in party work, becoming secretory of
Vilnyus city from 1955 to 1964. In the early and mid-1960's he
also worked on the republic council for atheistic propaganda and
headed the Viluuyus volunteer people's guards, where he presumably
gained experience in dealing with religious and nationalist unrest.
In December 1964 he was selected at the age of 38 for the sensitive
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21 FEBRUARY 1974
post of head of the Lithuanian Central Committee's party organs
se:~tion. In March 1971 lie was elected Vilnyus city first secretary
and member of the Lithuanian Central Committee bureau. Grinhkynvichkyus
was not elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee at tho
24th CPSU Congress in 1971. It is not unprecedented for a republic
party first secretary to lack membership in the Central Committee in
cases where sudden changes have occurred by deaths or transfers, and
Grtshkyavlchyus presumably will gain Central Committee membership
at the next congress.
Che choice may reflect a lessening of Politburo member Suslov's
Influence in Lithuania. Suslov, long the unofficial patron of
Lithuanian leaders since he supervised the republic In the mid-1940'x,
was extravagantly praised by Snechkus and republic Supreme Soviet
Presidium Chairman Sliumauskas during his late November visit to
Lithuania. When Snechkus died in January, however, his funeral was
attended by Central Committee cadres Secretary Kapitonov, rather
than by Sualov.
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FBIS TREND$
21 FI.BRUARY 1974
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCA07 STATISTICS 11 - 17 FEBRUARY 1974
Moncow 2854 items)
Peking (927 Items)
Brezhnev Cuban Visit
(29X) 9%
Domestic
(54X)
592
China
(GX) GX
[Criti.cism of Lin
(6%)
12%)
Supreme Soviet Decree
(--) 5%
Pino and Confucius
on Solzhenltsyn Expulsion
Indochina
(7X)
5%
WashJngton Energy
(1%) 5%
Attacks on Antonioni
(3%)
4%
Conference
Konygin Message to
(--) 3%
Film
U.S.-Soviet Strategic
(--)
3%
World Peace Council
Session, Sofia
Arms Talks
PRC Foreign Minister's
(--)
3%
Chile
(1%) 3%
;support for Special
IJNGA Session
These statistics are based on the vo!cccnst commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio servlcec. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press nrt!cla or edltorini, govern-
ment or party ntntement, or diplomatic note, Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and tvents given major attention In terms of volume are not ulways
discussed In the body of the Trends Some may have been covered In prior lss;:,a:
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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