TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 30, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

1~JS9709125~C4 DP85fle6 7580003000700053
Approvl3d "Far"Release
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TRENDS
Confidential
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
30 JANUARY 1974
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CONFIDENTIAL
This t,ruimmmil,r analysis report is basin csclosicclp on nuilcrial
carried in (urcign broadcast and press merlin, It is pnhlishcrl
I,v I'IIIS 10thout coordination wills nthcr l .S. (:ov rnnuent
components.
STATSPEC
? I NATIONAL SI':CURfl'1' INFORMATION
Unauthorized discloser:- suhicct to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
30 JANUARY 1974
C0N.TENTS
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Communique on Fahmi Visit Calls Disengagement First Step . . . .
1
ENERGY CRISIS
Moscow Hits Western Oil Moves, Defends Arab Embargo . . . . . .
4
SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS
Brezhnev Pledges Support for Cuba, Continuing U.S.-USSR Detente
6
INDOCHINA
Foreign Minister Trinh Assesses Peace Accord on Anniversary
7
Peking and Moscow Comment on Paris Agreement Anniversary . . . .
11
USSR-JAPAN
Moscow Warns Japan Against Following PRC Line on Relations . . .
12
USSR
Campaign Against Solzhenitsyn Develops Gradually . . . . . . . .
14
CHINA
Peking Warns Against Corrupting Influence of Western Music . .
17
NOTES
Moscow on Peking's Irredentism; CEMA Anniversary;
West European CP Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
Moscow, Peking Broadca';t Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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- 1
ARAB - ISRAELI C ONFLICT
COMMUNIQUE ON FAHMI VISIT CALLS DISENGAGEMENT FIRST STEP
The joint communique on Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's
21-24 January talks in Moscow reiterated the view earlier
expressed by Gromyko that the disengagement agreement has
"positive" significance, taking into account that it would be
followed by a settlement based on Security Council resolutions.
The sides urged an "early and effective" solution of the
fundamental questions faced by the Geneva conference, and
repeated the contention that peace could only be achieved
through Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories
and respect for the Palestinians' legitimate rights. Brezhnev
took the same line in his Havana rally speech on the 29th,
calling the agreement a positive step but adding that the
Geneva conference must achieve a political settlement and
urging full implementation of UN decisions on the Middle East
in the shortest possible time.
Brezhnev hinted at the need for a follow-up Syrian-Israeli
disengagement agreement in remarking that the present concord
involved only one of the Arab countries which took part in
the military action. And a PRAVDA commentator article on
the 30th, as reviewed by TA.SS, gave Moscow's first although
indirect endorsement of Syrian-Israeli disengagement
negotiations in declaring that the problems of disengagement,
as a "first stept' ttoward the retrieval of all occupied Arab
lands, "directly involved Syria."
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN Both the joint communique and surrounding
RELATIONS comment on the Fahmi visit placed great
emphasis on the importance of maintaining
Soviet-Egyptian coordination and conti:.c is in accordance with
the spirit of the Soviet-Egyptian treat y.* Indeed, in its
* The only other Soviet-Egyptian communique since the signing
of the treaty which placed any particular emphasis on
consultations was that on as-Sadat's October 1971 Moscow
visit. Tip sides affirmed, in that document, the importance
of regulrr contacts between leaders in accordance with the
treaty and declared that they regarded such consvii'ations as
an important factor in strengthening their relations and in
establishing peace in the Middle East.
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stress on this point, the communique seerne,d to reflect some
Soviet irritation over the USSR'a effec,-'ive exclusion from the
discussionb of the military working group i-i Geneva as well as
from the disengagement negotiations. It asserted that a "very
important factor" for a just settlement was close coordInation
of Soviet and Egyptian actions "at all stages," and "in all the
working bodies that may be formed" at the Geneva conference.
The same point was apparently underscored in a letter from
Brezhnev to as-Sadat which, according to Cairo radio on the
24th, stressed the importance of contacts between Soviet and
Egyptian leaders, "including personal. contacts." The only
available Soviet reference to the letter, a Moscow broadcast in
Arabic on the 25th, noted that an exchange of messages between
Brezhnev and as-Sadat was the center of attention in Egyptian
media. The Cairo press, it said, pointed out Brezhnev's "positive
appreciation" of the disengagement agreement "which was the result
of our two countries' joint efforts," which led to a change in
the Middle East. situation "compelling" Israel to participate in
the Genevn conference.
Not surprisingly, the joint^.ommunique made no mention of any
discu'.;ions concerning Soviet military aid during Fahmi's visit.
In wha~-. rJght have been an oblique reference to the subject,
the communique noted--as had Gromytto in his 22 January luncheon
speech--that last October's events reaffirmed the "strength and
durability" of Soviet-Egyptian friendship. The communique went
on to affirm the sides' desire to develop and strengthen their
mutual. relations on the basis of the treaty. Somewhat more
dtre.ctly, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 24th declared that
the treaty's effectiveness was apparent last October when "Suviet
weapons and support" played an important role in guaranteeing
the successes of the Egyptian and Syrian forces.
PALESTINIAN The communique formally supported Palestinian
REPRESENTATION representation at the Geneva conference, calling
for "full and equal" participation by Palestinian
"representatives" in the nearest future. While it did not endorse
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by name, it seemed
to suggest a separate Palestinian delegation rather than Palestinian
representation in Jordan's delegation. Moscow had earlier noted,
in a 6 January Arabic-language broadcast, that Cairo's AL-AHRAM had
stated Egyptian support for PLO participation in the Geneva talks,
and a brief 22 Jan,iary domestic service report on as-Sadat's Algiers
press conference said he favored Syrian and PLO participation at
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Geneva, TASS on the 24th reported an official Jordanian spokesman
as saying that the Jordanian Government had accepted an invitation
to the Geneva conference and had "consented to the participation of
the PLO in its work."
SYRIA Brezhnev's hint in his Havana rally speech and the more
explicit reference in the PRAVDA commentator article the
following day constitute the strongest public indication to date
that Moscow has decided to support the initiation of military
disengagement negotiations between Syria and Israel. Heretofore,
Moscow's only references to the Syrian issue had been brief reports
of remarks that Kissinger and as-Sadat had made on the subject.
While neither Brezhnev nor the PRAVDA article explicitly called
for thy: beginning of Syrian-Israeli negotiations, both implied
that this should be an early item on the agenda. The PRAVDA
article, according to a TASS report, called the question of the
retrieval of Syrian territories as "acute" as the retrieval of
all occupied Arab lands.* It also stressed the importance of
maintaining Arab unity, adding that, the Soviet Union supported
the "coordination of actions" of the Arab countries.
* In the only noted 'Soviet reference to Jordanian-Israeli talks,
a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 20 January reported the Jordanian
premier as saying that Jordan and Israel would begin discussions
in the near future on separating their forces along the Jordan River.
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ENERGY C R I S IS
MOSCOW HITS WESTERN OIL MOVES, DEFENDS ARAB EMBARGO
An image of sharpening confrontation between oil-consuming and
oil-producing countries has been conveyed by limited Moscow reportage
and comment on the oil crisis over the past week. While Moscow
still avoids authoritative comment on Presiden'. Nixon's call for
the Washington meeting of oil-consuming countries, low-level comment
depicts the move as aimed against the Arabs. Reports that oil-
consuming countries have sought to conclude bilateral deals with
the Arabs have been briefly noted by Moscow in terms portraying
such efforts as signs of distress in the capitalist economy.
Moscow has avoided comment on the details of various Western
activities related to the energy crisis, but has conveyed a
generally negative impression of Western moves by putting them in
the framework of standard propaganda themes. TASS commentator
Yevgeniy Kiselev wrote on 28 January, for example, that the meeting
proposed by President Nixon represented a U.S. effort to create
"a united front" of the major oil-consuming countries. He concluded
that a failure of this move was predictable in the light of the
refusal of Japan and West European countries to toe the U.S. line.
Kiselev emphasized that the rush of the oil-consuming countries to
conclude bilateral arrangements with the Arabs was further evidence
of the contradictions that had arisen in the West.
Moscow has been similarly reserved about reporting recent developments
in the Arab world. It has not acknowledged, for example, reports
that Saudi Arabia may recommend to the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries a lowering of oil prices, or that Egyptian
President as-Sadat is advocating a lifting of the embargo. It has
continued, however, to express generalized support for the Arabs'
use of the oil weapon as a legitimate defense of national interests,
often interpreting this in stereotyped ideological terms. An
IZVESTIYA article on the 23d by political commentator Vikentiy
Matveyev, for example, proclaimed that the energy crisis was a
result of the general crisis of capitalism and the struggle of
Third World countries to achieve "full economic liberation from
imperialist dependence." Matveyev maintained that the nationaliza-
tion of foreign property and the raising of oil prices were means
to achieve this goal of independence. TASS commentator Bulantsev
on the 25th refuted charges that the USSR had "masterminded" the
oil embargo, asserting that the measure was a legitimate means
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employed by the Arabs to promote the removal of all Israeli troops
from occupied Arab territory. Soviet oil expert and commentator
Boris Rachkuv warned in the first 1974 issue of INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS that the "imperialist states" were trying to sow seeds of
discord among the oil-producing states in an effort to end the oil
embargo and increase the levels of oil production. He added that
the "advocates of oil imperialism" were seriously concerned about
the embargo because it could lead to widespread nationalization.
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BREZHNEV PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR CUBA, CONTINUING U,S,-USSR DETENTE
According to initial TASS reports, a gala welcome was accorded
Soviet leader Brezhnev on his 28 January arrival in Cuba for
an "official friendly visit." In live coverage, Havana domestic
television reported the reception accorded Brezhnev at the
airport--where he was met by Cuban Premier Castro, President
Dorticos and other Cuban officials--and the motorcade into
Havana. The following day a mass rally was held in Havana's
Plaza de la Revolucion, where, according to TASS accounts,
more than one million people heard Castro and Brezhnev deliver
speeches, also carried live by Havana television.
In his speech, Brezhnev paid due deference to the achievements
of the "island of freedom" and, citing Soviet economic and
military aid, stated that the CPSU and Soviet Government attach
"prime importance" to deepening Soviet-Cuban relations, which
are being developed on a "long-term basis."
Touching on various international issues, the Soviet leader
referred to the Soviet-U.S. agreerment on prevention of
nuclear war and the summit talks held last June, and said
that the process of normalizing Soviet-U.S. relat'r.ons iais
a :significant factor in bringing about positive changes in
international affairs. He stressed that this process had
helped to achieve j-portant goals of the socialist countries,
and that the improvement in Soviet-American relations
was "profitable to the entire world." At the same time he
reassured his Cuban allies that the Soviet people have
always considered solidarity and support for Cuba a "sacred
duty."
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INDOCHINA
FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH ASSESSES PEACE ACCORD ON ANNIVERSARY
The first anniversary of the 27 January 1973 Paris peace agreement
prompted standard reaffirmations of support for the accord and
warnings of the consequences of U.S. and Saigon failure to comply.
These assessments appeared in PRG and DRV government statements,
issued on the 24th and 25th respectively, in remarks aL a Hanoi
rally on the 28th by Xuan Thuy, chief DRV delegate at the
four-party Paris peace talks, and in interviews with Le Duc Tho,
special adviser to the Paris talks, and with DRV Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh. A less conventional assessment of the post-
agreement situation, however, was offered in an article by 'T'rinlt,
published in the January issue of the party journal HOC TAP
which went beyond other comment in drawing broad lessons for
future policy from l.he experience of the past year.
NGUYEN DUY TRINH The anniversary article by Trinh, which
ARTICLE IN HOC TAP was broadcast by Hanoi radio's domestic
oervice beginning on 28 January, in
general viewed the pursuit of communist objectives in the South
in :obey terms: he warned of a long and difficult struggle to
reach communist goals, stressed that the political struggle
must be pre:;sed along with military counterattacks, and
exhibited undiminished distress over alleged Washington efforts
to undermine Hano-1.'s relations with its allies. Trinh's last
previous article in HOC TAP, published in October 1971, had
expressed confidence that U.S. efforts to split the communist
world had not succeeded and thus set the stage for the temporary
halt, at that time, of the bitter DRV attacks on Peking which
had followed the July 1971 announcement of President Nixon's
plans to visit China. The 1971 article gave unusual stress to
the important role of diplomatic efforts, along with military
and political struggle, and may have reflected Hanoi's moves to
prepare diplomatic initiatives to accompany the offensive which
was launched in the South some five months later.
Citing tasks for the people in all of Vietnam, Trinh's current
article called for maintaining a lasting peace, accelerating the
socialist revolution in the North, completing the national
democratic revolution in the South, and advancing toward
peaceful reunification and the preservation of peace in the
area and the world. He contended that the struggle to maintain
peace and implement the agreement must be "conducted in a
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fierce, arduous, and complex manner," in the face of the
intransigence of the United States and Saigon. Underlining
this severe assessment, he added that "one must realize"
that, "although the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are
in a defeated and weakened position, they still have forces
available and are very stubbornly using them to oppose our
people. Therefore, the southern revolution will inevitably
be a long process of struggle over a winding, tortuous road
before advancing to total victory."
While endorsing the necessity of the policy of inflicting
appropriate military counterblows in the South to contain
Saigon's forces, Trinh stressed the importance of the use of
political struggle as well. Noting that political, military,
and diplomatic struggles must be coordinated, he maintained
that political struggle has "assumed considerable significance"
in the wake of the peace agreement. He went on to claim that
po.'itical struggle, along 4?.th military and diplomatic struggles,
'"can repel and frustrate the enemy's military, political, and
diplomatic maneuvers" and that "our oouthern people attach great
importance to the political struggle."
Trinh's stress on political struggle is not typical of propaganda
In recent months and m.y reflect a new communist effort to draft
policies to deal with the problem of building their political
forces in the South. By contrast, propaganda for at least six
months, particularly articles in the monthly military journal
TAP CIII QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, has appeared to reflect elaborate,
long-range efforts already underway to improve the communist
military forces. While these articles focus on the preparation
of an army for large-scale military campaigns, they do not--
unlike articles for more than a year before the 1972 military
offensive--press the need to launch such campaigns.*
Going beyond the standard litany of complaints against U.S.
actions raised in other anniversary comment, Trinh assailed
Washington for attempting to isolate Hanoi from its international
Since June 1973 TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN has carried articles
each month discussing in great detail all aspects of preparing
and launching large-scale military campaigns. The December
journal included excerpts from a speech on this topic by North
Vietnamese Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung, also published in the
daily army paper on 16 and 17 December. Some of the earlier
articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, page 14.
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allies. According to Trinh, the United States is using a
policy of "balance of power among the great powers and crafty
political, diplomatic, and economic tricks" in an attempt to
"separate our people from forces advocating peace, national
independence, democracy, and socialism" and to "check the
development of the Vietnamese revolution." He particularly
reiterated concern about the DRV's communist allies. in
charging that Washington is "taking advantage of the 'detente'
label in the hope of dividing the socialist countries and the
national liberation movement . . . ." Trinh also laid stress
on the importance of unity among the people in Indochina and
warned that here too Washington is attempting to divide the
peoples of the three countries, attempting to "revive old
national prejudices . in the hope of implementing th4
'divide and rule' policy of pitting Indochinese against
Indochinese."
GOVERNMENT The government statements, like earlier
STATEMENTS white books issued by the DRV and PRG foreign
ministries in advance of the anniversary,
maintained routinely that the signing of the Paris agreeme,.it
was a "great victory" for the Vietnamese people. and that the
absence of peace in Vietnam resulted from U.S. and Saigon
failure to live up to its provisions.* Both stressed U.S.
responsibility for implementation of the accords, but with
the PRG taking the lead in this regard. The PRG statement
explicitly took issue with President Nixon's assertion that
the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam "does not mean any change
in the interests of the United States, but only in the way to
achieve them," and claimed that this attitude is "the deep
root and direct cause of the current critical situation in
South Vietnam." The DRV statement in making a similar contention
avoided any mention of the President. Similarly, only the PRG
statement warned that continuing "acts of war and the obstinate
attitude of the United States and Saigon have created a very
serious tension in South Vietnam threatening the total
implementation of the Paris agreement."
Hanoi's statement routinely condemned the United States for
alleged aerial reconnaissance over the DRV and euphemistically
acknowledged the absence of U.S. aid when it complained about
attempts to "elude its obligations to heal the wounds of war"
* The DRV and PRG white papers, issued on 17 and 22 January
respectively, are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974,
pages 16-18.
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in the North. The statement also assailed "many responsible
personalities in the U.S. ruling circles" for making "threats"
a'iinst the Vietnamese people. It reiterated the standard
contention that "normalization" of U.S.-DRV relations must be
bused on "scrupulous" U.S. implementation of the Paris agreement.
LE DUC THO In his 26 January interview, Le Duc Tho assessed
INTERVIEW the current situation in South Vietnam in
standard terms, charging that it is "becoming
increasingly serious" because of U.S. and Saigon actions. To
cope with this, he declared that the Vietnamese oeople have
"no other choice" Char to "resolutely and most appropriately
deal counterblows," adding that they must be closely coordinated
with the "struggle on the political and diplomatic fronts."
Tho offered "two paths" to the United? Suites, stating that it
can "scrupulously" implement the agreement and establish "normal"
relations with the DRV or it can continue to violate the accord
and suffer "total defeat." In a 24 December French television
interview after his Paris meeting with Kissinger, Tho had
similarly described the paths open to the United States but had
gone on to express the hope that the United States would opt for
implementation of the accord.
Tho clearly reflected Hanoi's continuing concentration on domestic
problems in responding to a question about current tasks facing
the Vietnamese. He led off with the need to "improve our aware-
ness of collective ownership," an ideological lesson which Hanoi
has been trying to bring home in its campaigns in ri:enc months
to end wasteful or illegal use of materials and poor labor
productivity. In addition, Tho called for emulati.on mcvements
to overcunie difficulties and "quickly heal the woi,nds of war,
intensively restore And develop the economy, accelerate the
buildi.ig of the mattrial-technical bases of socialism,
consolidate the socialist production relationship," and improve
the people's Livelihood. In last place he took note of the
tasks of "intensifying the consolidation of national defense
and the maintenance of security" and of "serving as a firm
and stable support for the revolutionary struggle in the South."
Outlining 1:iese same task, at a 12 January awards meeting in
Hanoi, Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi had described them as
"urgent tasks" for the North in both 1974 and 1975.
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PEKING AND MOSCOW COMMENT ON PARIS AGREEMENT ANNIVERSARY
CHINA Continuing its low posture on Vietnam developments,
Peking marked the anniversary of the Paris accord
with =, 27 January PEOPLE'S rAT.LY editorial that softpedaled
criticism of the United States in a standard fashion and
di.lut(:d past expressions of Chinese support for Vietnam.
The editorial echoed Peking's Vietnamese allies in contrast-
:tng "two diametrically opposed attitudes" toward the peace
accord, but it cited only Saigon as opposing the correct
posture of Hanol. and the PRG. PEOPLE'S DAILY incidentally
criticized the United States as a source of support and
encouragement to Saigon and for allegedly leaving military
personnel In South Vietnam. However, even this criticism was
balanced by the editorial's citing of steps the United States
had taken to implement the agreement and its comment that they
were "conducive to improving the situation in Vietnam and
Southeast Asia."
Li!.e the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial last year marking the signing
of the accord, the current editorial advised of difficulties in
bringing the agreement to complete fruition, warning this time
that an "acute and complex s,:ruggle" lies ahead. But in
contrast to last year's pledge of continued Chinese support
and demand for strict U.S.-Saigon implementation, the editorial
limited itself to expressing confidence that the Vietnamese
would overcome all ramaining obstacles.
USSR Moscow gave low-level attention to he Paris agreement
anniversary, including articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA
and a meeting of workers in Moscow addressed by the DRV ambassador.
The 27 January PRAVDA article observed that the Paris agreement
"largely promoted further improvement of the general political
climate in the internationa', scene" and "consolidated" the
position of the "patrioti^ forces" in Indochina. As reported by
TASS, the article went on to criticise Washington's support for
Saigon and to note that U.S. aid for the GVN and the strtements
of U.S. officials raising the possibility of renewed U.S. bombing
were not helping to "normalize the situation in South Vietnam."
The IZVESTIYA article, as reported by TASS, focused on Saigon's
alleged hampering of the accord, observing only in passing that
"a great share of responsibility for this situation rests with
the U.S. military-industrial complex, which is encouraging the
Saigon Administration in its provocative activities."
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U S S R - J A P A N
MOSCOW WARNS JAPAN AGAINST FOLLOWING PRC LINE ON RELATIONS
Recent Soviet comment has warned Japan in unusually direct
terms not to allow its developing relations with the USSR
to be endangered by the expanding ties with China and
China's support for the return to Japan of Soviet-held Islands.
An 18 January NEW TIMES article by N. Nikolayev warned Japanese
.leaders not to allow "the Peking leadership" to interfere
in questions concerning the Soviet Union and Japan. Ile
attacked Peking's thesis that the Soviet-Japanese territorial
dispute demonstrates the need for joint Sino-Japanese efforts
to defend their territorial claims against a threat from
"the North." Moscow's recent turn towards a more explicit
counterattack on Peking appears to be in response to a!.
ongoing Peking campaign portraying the USSR as a common
threat to the "territorial rights" of both China and Japan.
This theme has been exploited by Peking extensively since
the time of Prime Minister Tanaka's 'ioscow visit last
October.* For example, NCNA on 23 January publicized an
article from a Japanese journal so as to suggest that the
Japanese viewed Soviet missile tests timed jest before
Tanaka's visit as "military intimidation" aimed at the
Japanese-Soviet summit talks.
:ioscow had at first withheld all comment on the sensitive
territorial question in the immediate aftermath of Tanaka's
;ioscow visit but resumed attention to the issue later in the
year. An unusually frank 22 January PRAVDA commentary by
1. "Latyshev criticized the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) for urging a massive public campaign for return of the
disputed islands. Latyshev argued that a recent LDP policy
paper had lost its sense of reality when it claimed "that a
policy of making territorial demands on the Soviet Union could
insure success for the Soviet-Japanese talks on the conclusion
of a peace treaty."
By focusing public attention on its territorial dispute
with Japan at this time, Moscow appears to be telling the
LDP that progress on the sensitive territorial issue will
* For background on this theme, see the 14 November 1974 TRENDS,
pages 28-29.
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come only if Japan succeeds in steering a diplomatic course
away from the line advoc&tedby Peking. A Moscow radio
concnrentary on 24 January, for example, recalled that it
had been agreed during Tanaka's Moscow visit that new
negotiations to conclude a peace treaty would be held in
1974, and asserted "-,.t: "if the rwo sidcis are sincere
in their motives and are willing, all issues in dispute
will find solution." Tanaka has publicly insl.sted that
all four Soviet-held islands must be returned before a
peace treaty iH signed.
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30 JANUARY 1974
USSR
CAMPAIGN AGA',NST SOLZHENTTSYN DEVELOPS GRADUALLY
The campaign against Aleksandr Solzlicnitsyn in the wake of
the foreign publication of his controversial book "Gulag
Archipelago" has developed gradually through a series of
sharp but carefully measured assaults, but it has yet to
reach the intensity of the concentrated attacks last fall
on Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. While the earlier campaign
consisted of a 10-day barrage of individual and collective
letters of protest from members of various Soviet professional
groups published in the central and local press, the current
campaign involves sporadic attacks spread over a period of
a month and the publication of individual rather than
collective letters of protest. PRAVDA and the literary
newspapers SOVIET CULTURE and LITERARY GAZETTE have
virtually monopolized the current campaign.; whereas in
the earlier one other central and local papers participated.
As in the campaign last fall, Solzhenitsyn has been vilified
as a tool of. Western propaganda and an enemy of detente
in a continuing series of commentaries broadcast for
foreign audiences. These charges hnve been sharply amplified
i
d
n
omestic commentary did t did
esgneoscreit Solzhenitsyn,
arouse public indignation against him, and appeal to
patristic sentiments, without at the same time revealing
much of the actual content of his book. By contrast,
the campaign against Sakharov exposed many of Sakharov's
statements and arguments to the Soviet public. Insofar
as the issue of Stalinist repression has been broached
in comment, it has been treated in very general terms as
;, matter "long ago condemned and decisively corrected"
by the regime. Apart from a few hints that the door to
emigration is open to Solzhenitsyn and that he should
not be allowed to become a martyr, the comment has given
no indication of what fate is in store for him.
INITIAL STAGE The campaign began on 2 and 3 January
?ith press releases and radio commen',,ries
directed exclusively at foreign audiences. Attacks on
domestic radio and TV commenced on 4 January, and two days
later the central press began to publish reprints of
attacks in foreign communist papers. The tone of domestic
commentaries was set by Yuriy Zhukov during his 9 January
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30 JANUARY 1974
'I'V program. Responding to letters about foreign radio
broadcasts, Zltukov dismissed Solzlrenit:syn's book as a
malicious slander against the Soviet system and a crude
attempt to revive the issue of "pr^-4 violations of
legality" under Stalin which, he claimed, were "long
ago condemned and decisively cor.ze,ted" by the Soviet
regime.
Although the press at this time avoided direct attacks
ors Solzhenitsyn, moves were made against his associates.
The writer Lidiya Claukovskaya, who reportedly had made her
home available to Solzhenitsyn, was expelled from the,
writers union on 9 January, and on 12 January SOVIET RUSSIA
assailed Cliukovskaya for sending her writings abroad. The
article also attacked Michael Scammell, the British
translator of Solzhenitsi .n 's book, for smuggling manuscripts
out of the Soviet Union.
The first major direct assault on Solzhenitsyn and his
writing;; in the central press appeared in PRAVDA on 14
January. Entitled the "Path of Betrayal" and pu'-lished
over the signature of I. Solovyov, the article labeled
Solzhenitsyn a "traitor" and harshly attacked his book
without revealing much of its controversial content.
The article claimed that the Stalin era repressions had
been officially condemned and that an acceptable body
of literature criticizing those practices had appeared
in the Soviet Union.
Solovyov's article was reprinted in all republic papers
as well as in LITERARY GAZETTE, SOVIET CULTURE, SOVIET
RUSSIA, KOMSO210L.SKAYA PRAVDA, and TRUD. Two days
later. PRAVDA carried a roundup of foreign reaction to
the article that suggested widespread approval and
opposition only by the "most reactionary organs of
imperialist propaganda." For the next few days the
central press carried similar reaction reports or reprints
of foreign articles, leaving the main thrust of the
campaign to the literary press.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS On 16 January LITERARY GAZETTE
printed an extensive assault on
Solzhenitsyn and his writings, similar to the Solovyov
article. In its next issue, on 23 January, the same
paper ran criticism of Solzhenitsyn by RSFSR writers
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CONFIDENTIAL FillS TRENDS
30 JANUARY 1974
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union head Sergey Mikhalkov, Belorussian writers union
Bead Pettus Biovica, former Ukrainian writers union head
Oles Honchar, Georgian writers union head Grigol Abashidze,
and NOVY MLR deputy editor Oleg SmirnKv. Paralleling
these attacks, SOVIET CULTURE in its issues of 18, 22 and
25 January published letters by minor cultural figures
backing Solov~,'ov's charges.
During mid-Ja..uary only a handful of the most conservative
officials in the writers union attacked Solzhenitsyn in
radio broadcasts; among these were Mikhalkov and his
Ukrainian and Belorussian counterparts Vasil Kozachenko
and i ?tru.3 Brovka, respectively, LITERARY GAZETTE editor
Aleksandr Chakovskiy, and Yuriy Verchenko, a 'secretary
of the national writers union. In a 14 January broadcast
Mikhalkov suggested that Solzhenitsyn was free to 1eav'a
the Soviet Union.
On 24 and 25 January the campaign picked up slightly as
PRAVDA began publishing letters from writers, workers,
peasants and war veterans responding to the Solovyov
article. Among the letter writers were onetime NOVY IIIR
editor Konstantin Simonov, innovative theater director
Georgiy Tovstonogov, and Rasul Gamzatov, a member of
NOVY MIR's editorial board. Simonov complained that
Solzhenitsyn's activities were becoming increasingly
hostile to the Soviet Union. Tovstonogov stressed the
enormous progress in overcoming the "negative phenomena
of the past" and criticized Solzlhenitsyn's book for
playing into the hands of advocates of the cold war.
Gamzatov notably repeated the offer of exile: "If
Solzhenitsyn does not like our system. . . ," he wrote,
"let him go where he feels comfortable."
In late January, direct attacks on Solzhenitsyn appeared
in other central newspapers. On 27 January KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PR.IVDA printed five critical letters by students, workers
and soldiers, and on 29 January IZVESTIYA carried an
attack by Lt. Gen. Pavel Zh,+.lin, director of the Institute
of Military History, on Soiz:enitsyn's sympathetic portrayal
of the most prominent Soviet wartime defector, General
Vlasov, A Ukrainian paper, RADYANSKA UKRAINA, also
begat, printing critical letters by prominent Ukrainian
writers, composers, kolkhozniks and workers in its
25 and 26 January issues.
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CONFIDENTIAL FllS TRENDS
30 JANUARY 1974
CIIINA
PEKINl WARNS AGAINST CORRUPTING INFLUENCE OF WESTERN MUSIC
Two recent PEOPLE'S DAM articles have decrip: r tendency to
uncritically accept Western music, extending into yet another
sphere the campaign begun over a year ago to prevent the after-
math of the Lin Piao affair from undermining cultural revolution
reforms. The articles on music state that Western symphonic music
is "totally incompatible with the socialist system," note than
"some people" are instilling such music into the minds of young
people uncritically, and link this tendency to the "peaceful
evolution" achieved by Soviet revisionists.
A 2.1 January PEOPLE'S DAILY article affirmed that the issue is
no mere academic struggle, but a "major debate." The article
linked the support for Western, music to the "tendency to worship
everything foreign" and warr;?d that this tendency "is not confined
to mus.Lc circles." While the article unequivocally stated that
it is impossible to shut off contact with foreign things, it set
narrow limits in noting that "the purpose of such contact is
confined only to the creation of our own art."
An earlier 14 January PEOPLE'S DAILY article on music had cited
Chou En-lei's 10th party congress remarks on cultural struggle
as authority for resisting the "comeback of the revisionist sinister
line, on literature and art," but the articles on music and other
recent cultural activities seem to reflect well-known views of
Chiang Ching as well. While Peking domestic media have not openly
credited Chiang Ching with achievements on the cultural front since
flay 1973, she was often previously praised for implementing
precisely the policies advocated by the two PEOPLE'S DAILY articles.
The linkage between Chiang and policies now being praised was
explicit in an interview with pianist Yin Cheng-chung, carried on
27 December by NCNA English but not publicized in domestic media.
Yin praised Chiang's leadership in producing the "Yellow River
Concerto" and credited Chiang for proclaiming the need to revolution-
ize instrumental music and for stating that China must "break with
foreign conventions and go its own way." Yin illustrated the need
for selective cultural borrowing rather than wholesale adoption with
an anecdote describing worker reaction to a new revolutionary piano
tune; previously when they had heard the piano used to play foreign
bourgeois music they had not enjoyed it, but when it was used to play
revolutionary Chinese tunes they realized that it was also built by
workers and could be enjoyed.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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IJ0TES
MOSCOW ON PEKING'S IRREDENTISM: Moscow has been devoting greater
attention to a wide range of territorial issues involving Peking
as the Sino-Soviet polemic has heated up and Soviet pressure for
an Asian security pact has increased. Most recently, Moscow has
seized upon Peking's clash with South Vietnam over the Paracel
islands to highlight Peking's alleged irredentist tendencies to
the south and its willingness to use force to back its aspirations.
A TASS dispatch of 26 January, carried in PRAVDA the next day,
quoted the JAPAN TIMES as saying that Peking had "shown its
aggressive claws and clearly intimated that it is ready to use
armed force in order to assert itself on the territories it
claims." The dispatch went on to quote the INDIAN EXPRESS on
the "fear" engendered in the Philippines, Thailand and other
Southeast Asian countries by the Chinese actions in the Paracels.
Reporting Indian reaction, TASS added that "as noted here in this
context, it is becoming increasingly obvious why the PRC is so
hostile to the creation of a system of c~l1,ctive security in
Asia whose goal is the solution of all disputes by peaceful
means." On 25 January TASS reported a Japanese government
statement reasserting Tokyo's claim to the Senkaku Islands in
the East China Sea "in connection with the PRC's claims," and
subsequent radio commentary has accused China of sinister designs
in this region as well. TASS commentator Mikhail Yakovlev on
the 26th ,?id that Peking needed "an increase in tension on its
northern, western;, and now its southern borders, in order to
divert the Chinese people's attention from ir.,ternal difficulties."
Moscow has avoided any direct suggestion that Peking's actions
in the Paracels are cause for new concern on the Sino-Soviet
border. However, the 27 January domestic radio roundtable on
international affairs hinted at such a possibility. Reiterating
a thesis that has emerged in other commentary recently, IZVESTIYA
commentator Vikentiy Matveyev drew attention to signs that a
new cultural revolution may be imminent in China and went on to
observe that "it was at the height of this [earlier] cultural
revolution that the Chinese military undertook armed provocations
on our borders."
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CEMA ANNIVERSARY: A lengthy PRAVDA editorial article on 23 January
marking CEMA's 25th anniversary hailed the expansion of its member-
ship since its inception, while at the same time conceding "difficulties"
in achieving economic integration. The difficulties were attribuL d
to geographical remoteness--an allusion to the relatively recent
entry of Cuba and Mongolia into the fold--and to the diversities
in size, historical background, and economic development of the
member countries. The article singled out Yugoslavia's increasing
participation in the organization and noted the role of the DRV
and DPRK, occasionally listed as meeting "observers," in the work
of "some" CEMA bodies. The article concluded with an appeal--
consistent with .he line of the Crimea conference of bloc party
leaders last July--for unity among the communist parties of
socialist countries. A Bucharest SCINTEIA editorial on the 25th
commemorated the occasion by stressing that Romania would increase
economic cooperation withL "all" socialist states and "all" countries
reg.?rdless of social system, thereby serving notice of Bucharest's
continued insistence on national independence and sovereignty.
WEST EUROPEAN CP SUMMIT: A Brussels conference of West European
communist parties from 26 to 28 January produced predictable
broad,-'.des of propaganda in favor of Moscow's foreign policy
positions, as well as occasional displays of national party
differences over such issues as the treatment of China and the
calling of a world communist party conference. According to
TASS reports on "_he proceedings, French Communist Party leader
Georges Marc;iais sharply attacked the Chinese leadership for
supporting "big imperialist bourgeoisie" positions, which he
alleged illustrated China's "abandonment" of proletarian inter-
nationalism. By contrast, Italian party leader Enrico Berlinguer
refrained from publicly criticizing the Chinese leaders. West
German party chairman Herbert Mies reiterated his earlier calls
for an all-European as well as a world conference of communist
parties, stressing that "the moment has come when preparations
should start" for the world conference. Moscow briefly reported
on the communique issued as well as a "joint der.Jara.tion" which
said, among other things, that detente created a favorable
situation for strengthening the left alliance in West EuropF-.
TASS also noted that statements of solidari:.y with Vietnam and
Chile and a resolution on the energy crisis were adopted by the
conference.
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FBlS TRENDS
30 JANUARY 1974
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 JANUARY
Moscow (2650 items)
Peking (1174 items
Brezhnev Cuban Visit
(4%)
15%
Domestic Issues
(54%)
49%
Lenin 50th Death
(7%)
9%
Vietnam
(4%)
16%
Anniversary
[Paracel Islands
(2%)
7%]
China
(6%)
8%
Dispute
[PRC Expulsion of
Soviet Diplomats
l-?-)
4%]
[Paris Agreement
Anniversary
(--)
5%]
Middle East
(2%)
7%
PRC Expulsion of
(2%)
11%
[Egyptian Foreign
(-- )
5%]
Soviet Diplomats
Minister in USSR
PRC Foreign Ministry
(--)
3%
Indian National Day
(--)
3%
Note on USSR
CEMA 25th Anniversary
(1%)
3%
Expuls.. on of PRC
Attacks on Solzhenitsya (4%)
3%
Diplomat
These stn'Astics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic P.nd int(lrnational radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of c,,mment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention jr terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues:
in other cases the propaganc:a content may be routine or of minor significance.
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