TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 22, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

TATSJ?,EG
?~ .. 's` .._
.t'~?.f ! f ~ Y s' k s (("s ~'b r ..: z kY3'.!'c ?`s s Y
3? i `-U ?r F
Etb s i..
Approved For Release 1999/ 2 I0 7 0 0034-'2-,,
 Approved 034-2
STATSPEC Confidential
FIS
it Communist Propagas'?ia
Approved For Release 1
STATSPEC Confidential
22 AUGUST 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 34)
00300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Covernrnent
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
Approved For Release 1999/09/`2SCR.p~A,RqFPT00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
C0NTE11TS
RGNU, Ccmnunist Powers Maneuver in New Cambodian Situation. . . . .
1
DRV Anniversary Editorial Shows Concern Over Detente Ioiicy . . . .
3
West Berlin Issue Stalls Windup of Treaty Negotiattons. . . . . . .
5
Georgian Leader Admits Political Opposition and Unrest. . . . . . .
7
Agriculture Ministry to Issue Proposals on Mechanized Links . . . .
9
NOTES
Czech Invasion Anniversary; Chinese Red Guards Anniversary;
Moscow, Cairo on Detente; Reaction to Schlesinger's Comments
on Soviet MIRVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFI.UI:NT'IAL IBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
INDOCHINA
RGNU, COMMUNIST POWERS MANEUVER IN NEW CAMO1IAN SITUATION
In the wake of the cessation of the U.S. bombing in Cambodia on
15 August, there have been complex cross-currents among the parties
on the communist side as they position themselves for developments
in the new stage. Sihanouk returned to Peking on the 16th after
having issued a statement in Tientsin the previous day hailing
the "day of gross disgrace for U.S. imperialism" and vowing to
liberate Phnom Penh. Sihanouk's Vietnam ^2 and Lao allies issued
official statements expressing firm support for his front, but
Peking has been conspicuously reticent about offering an assessment
of the present situation. Meanwhile, Moscow has moved notably
further toward endorsing Sihanouk's front and distancing itself
from the Lon Nol regime, but the prince has felt constrained to
deliver a sharp slap at the Soviets and to demand a fuller commit-
ment to his movement.
In addition to Sihanouk's Tientsin statement, his government (RGNU)
issued a strongly-worded statement in Peking un the 15th saying
the U.S. bombing _essation "only m-rks a new stage of U.S. aggression"
manifested by an increase in financial and military aid to the Lon
Noi government, "more or less disguised interventions by Bangkok,
Saigon, and other puppet troops," and the formulation of "plans for
a possible direct intervention by U.S. troops." The statement
reiterated that compromise with "the traitors in Phnom Penh" was
out of the question.
There has been no further authoritative assessment of the new
situation by RGNU leaders, and it was not until 21 August that the
front's radio broadcast an appeal claiming that the insurgents
"are launching offensives to liberate Phnom Penh" and government-
controlled provincial tcwns. The appeal called upon Cambodians
and foreigners in areas `::nder temporary enemy control" to "rise up
and overthrow" the Lon Nol regime and to "invite" Sihanouk's
government to assume power. It warned foreigners that their "lives
and belongings are not secure" and asked them to leave. Such
appeals for uprisings have been publicized in the past, but the
latest one was unusually comprehensive and conveyed a greater sense
of urgency.
PEKING, HANOI Although NCNA carried the statements by Sihanouk
and his government on the U.S. bombing halt,
Peking avoided originating any commentary on the situation and has
refrained from authoritative comment on Cambodia since Chou En-lai's
Approved For Release 1999/09/25.:.CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
28 July speech expressing general solidarity with the
insurgents. In contrast, expressions of support from Hanoi
and the FRG were issued on the foreign ministry level, and
the Lao Patriotic Front Central Co.rmittee released an
official statement. Peking's cautioc was evident in its
heavily edited account of the DRV statement, omitting the
sLrongest anti-U.S. accusations and charges of plans for
intervention in C'.mbodia by South Vietnamese and Thai troops.
Differences in stance between Peking and Hanoi were also
suggested in VNA's treatment of talks DRV Premier Pham Van Dong
had in Peking on 16 and 17 August during a scopover on his
return home from the Soviet Union and East Europe. His talk
with Sihanouk was characterized by VNA as "very cordial and
friendly," but there was nc description of the atmosphere of
his meeting with Chou. NCNA said the two premiers had "a
cordial and friendly talk," but even that characterization was
a notch below NCNA's usual formula of "very cordial and
friendly" meetings with Peking's close allies.
MOSCOW Moving to improve its position in the fluid Cambodian
situation, Moscow has taken further steps toward
~.ccording legitimacy to the RGNU, though the Soviets have
refrained thus far from complying with Sihanouk's demand that
they cut diplomatic ties with the Lon Nol government. On the
day of the bombing halt, TASS carried a report on the press
conference held in Peking that day at which the 15 August RGNU
statement was released by Penn Nouth, identified by TASS as
prime minister of the "National Unity Government of Cambodia"--
a formulation acknowledging a government position but omitting
the "'royal" from the title. TASS mentioned Sihanouk but din
not call him head of state. There was no Soviet report of
Sihanouk's 15 August statement in Tientsin, delivered at a
banquet given by the Chinese.
It was also on the 15th that Sihanouk delivered his rebuke to
the Soviets for failing to sever relations with the Lon Nol
government. Sihanouk was reacting to a 12 August IZVESTIYA
article which had accorded his front the r+tatus of "true
representative" of the Cai~bodi,,n people.* Taking note of
this formula, Sihanouk zeroed in on the question of recognizing
his government, charging that Moscow "obstinately" maintains
diplomatic relations with Phnom Penh and has not given any
* See the '1RENDS of 1 A'igust 1973, pages 1-2.
Approved For Release I 999/09f 51L)U DP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
military aid to the insurgents. The prince construed IZVESIIYA's
call for a mobilization of all Cambodian parties as a "plot"
aimed at swallowing the ??:,NlJ in a coalition government, and he
c'bJccted to the paper's reference to establishing a "popular
and democratic" regime as aimed at replacing the Kingdom of
Cambodia. NCNA carried Sihanouk's statement, which was issued
In Pyongyang and cabled to toe AFP office in Peking.
The sequence of events suggests that Sihanouk's rebuke may have
found its target, and that Moscow further adjusted its approach
accordingly. On the 19th TASS carried an account of the 15 August
RGNU statement, -.attributing it to the "Royal Government of
National Un.1ty if Cambodia." More notably, TASS on the 20th
belatedly car-,ied an account of the landmark "national congress"
held in the "liberat-2d area" last month, an event whr.ch had drawn
authoritative comment from Hanoi and Peking but had been mentioned
only briefly in the 12 August IZVESTIYA article. The TASS account's
summary of the appeal to "friendly countries" adopted at the
r!)ngress included its reference to Sihanouk as "head of state,"*
its description of the RGNU and FUNK as the "sole legitimate
representative" of the Cambodian people, and its demand for the
overthrow of the 'traitorous" Phnom Penh regime. The 12 August
IZVESTIYA article had not mentioned Sihanouk or his government.
While taking a more forthcoming approach to the RGNU, Moscow
has also downgraded the Lon Nol government. Thus, a RED STAR
a?.ticle on the 15th said the "patriots" are opposed by
"reactionary forces in the person of Lon Nol's antipopular
regime," and cited as an "apt description" a U.S. press account
of the Lon Nol regime as "rotten and feeble" and "steeped in
corruption." This goes beyond an 8 July RED STAR commentary
which had limited itself to a negative assessment of the regime's
future prospects.
DRV ANNIVERSARY EDITORIAL SHOWS CONCERN OVER DETENTE POLICY
In the courFe of warning against U.S. attempts to pursue a neo-
colonialist policy, a 19 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on
the anniversary of the 1945 August Revolution again showed Hanoi's
displeasure with the policy of detente pursued by its two big
* 'Hoscow had carefully avoided ascribing this title to Sihanouk,
though a 29 June 'L'ASS report on his visit to Romania did so
indirectly by citing the Romanian press agency's reference to the
prince as head of state.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
allies. The paper said that Washington is using "deceitful
labels" to conceal its attempts, through "infiltration,
domination, enslavement, aggression, and subversion," to
"J[vid, and weaken" the socialist countries and "curb the
uevel.opmciit of the world revolution." The most direct
criticism, hr,-.,;ever, was aimed at the USSR, with the editorial
reflecting dissatisfaction with the Soviet stand on tha
preventability of war and a policy of peaceful coexistence.
In effect contradicting Soviet professions of confidence that
the danger of war is receding, the editorial accused the
United States of attempting to attack and wear down small,
weak countries as part of its preparations to "unleash a new
world war." Suggesting DRV dissatisfaction with Moscow's
preoccupation with detente, the paper contended that "the
struggle to preserve peace and implement the policy of peaceful
coexistence among countries with different social systems must
contribute to accelerating and advancing the revolution for
class and national liberation." Caiiing class and national
liberation the basic goals of the revolution, it argued that
the success of the struggle for these goals "is the firmest
safeguard for a lasting peace."
Hanoi had endorsed Soviet policies aimed at impleme,iting the
principles of coexistence in the 16 July joint statement on
the Le Duan delegation's visit to Moscow. But other e.uthoritative
Hanoi pronouncements have indicated concern lest Vietnamese
interests be jeopardized by such policies. Thus, Politburo
member Le Duc Tho, in his June 1972 speech at a Sofia conference
marking the birth anniversary of the Bulgarian communist Georgi
Dimitrov, 1-ad stressed the need for an international united
front to check U.S. "schemes" and declared that "peaceful
coexistence between countries with different social systems
cannot detract from this basic objective and motto or negate
the principle that truly links nationalism with proletarian
inte-cnationalism."*
* See the TRENDS of 21. June 1972, pages 8-10.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
- 5 .-
FRG - EAST EUROPE
WEST BERLIN ISSUE STALLS WINDUP OF TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
Bonn's insistence that the future FRG embassy in Prague should
also represent ir?3titutions, as well as citizens, of West Berlin
has been denounced ;,y Prague as a "pressure" move based on the
calculation that the Czechoslovaks will agree rather than accept
postponement of Chancellor Brandt's announced visit to Prague on
6 September to sign t'- treaty. In the separate negotations between
the FRG and Hungary and Bulgaria, respectively, for which no
completion schedules have been announced, Budapest and Sofia
have merely noted, so far without invective, continued disagreement
on the issue of the FRG's ambassadorial representation of
West Berlin. As a new'round of negotiations with Prague began
in Bonn on the 20th, a West German government spokesman was
quoted by DPA as {.resisting that "legal aid requests by West Berlin
courts, authorities, and institutions muz be routed via Bonn's
future embassy in Prague."
BONN-PRAGUE TALKS Following the 9-10 August round of negotiations
in Prague, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister
Goetz in an interview in the 14 August RUDE PRAVO reiterated the
view that the West German stand goes beyond the provisions of the
1971. fntlr-power agreement on Berlin. The paper reported the
interviewer as inquiring whether West German media support for
Bonn's position indicated "that a form of pressure is being exerted
upon the Czechoslovak side in this manner" and Goetz as agreeing
that "such an explanation is offering itself." Goetz added that
West German media were "threatening that if agreement on the
representation of West Berlin is not reached" iii the bilateral
talks, "the visit of Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt to Prague
early next month is jeopardized."
While Moscow has studiously refrained from commenting adversely
on Bonn's pending negotiations with Prague, Budapest, and Sofia,
PRAVDA on the 17th reported the main points of the Goetz interview
with RUDE PRAVO, including his assertion that the Czechoslovak
position its based on "a precise interpretation of the four-power
agreemen,, on West Berlin." PRAVDA's report closed on the note that
Goetz had termed the conjectures in West German media on the
Brandt visit as "an attempt to exert pressure on Czechoslovakia."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
A Prague-datelined dispatch carried by the East Berlin domestic
service on the 21st similarly avoided invective on the currently
stalled talks between Bonn and Prague, tying the negotiations
instead to the fifth anniversary of the 20 August 1968 invasion
of ^zechoslovakia. "Despite all difficulties and problems," the
dispatch commented, the current negotiations are evilence of
"the change" in international relations since 1968 when internal
and foreign "reactionary" forces allegedly tried to separate
Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union and its allies. "August 1968,"
it added, caused many Western politicians to adopt more realistic
views."
TALKS WITH Treatment-by Budapest and Sofia of their
BUDAPEST, SOFIA respective negotiations with Bonn--similarly
without result on the issue of representation
of West Berlin--has been free of the kind of acrimony that has
emanated from Prague. Thus the Hungarian delegation's communique
or, the 13-16 August "first phase" talks in Bonn on establishing
diplomatic relations between the two countries said merely that
"a preliminary agreement has been reached on several questions,"
that the talks would "continue in the near future," and that they
had taken place "in a constructive atmosphere." The next day, the
Budapest radio reported a statement by the chief Hungarian negotiator,
Deputy Foreign Minister Janos Nagy, indicatiiig that the negotiators
had "failed to reach agreement on one question"--the issue of Bonn's
responsibility for the "permanent residents and authorities of
West Berlin."
In the wake of 30 July-2 August "preliminary" talks between Bonn and
Sofia in Bona, the Sofia radio on the 2d noted that the joint
statement had characterized the talks as having taken place in a
"good atmosphere"and as having produced "positive results." The
broadcast added that the establishment of diplomatic relations
would occur during the Sofia visit of Foreign Minister Scheel,
the invitation for which had been extended personally by Foreign
Minister Mladenov during the CSCE in Helsinki. The next day, a
dispatch from BTA's Bonn correspondent conjectured that the
establishment of diplomatic relations would be consummated "almost
automatically" during Scheel's visits to Sofia and Budapest, quoting
an FRG Foreign Ministry official to the effect that Scheel's visit
to Sofia "could" take place in late August or the first half of
September. On the unresolved question of '.??-st Berlin, the dispatch
merely quoted the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG to the effect that
"irrespective of certain differences in views" on West Berlin "no
more obstacles exist" to establishment of diplomatic relations
between Bonn and Sofia in the near future.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
USSR
GEORGIAN LEADER ADMITS POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND UNREST
At a 27-28 July Georgian Central Committee plenum Georgian First
Secretary Shevardnadze conceded that Moscow's purge of the
republic has given rise to bureaucratic resistance and popular
unrest. While defending his own leadership, Shevardnadze detailed
a sharp decline in living standards and deplored the upsurge of
rumors about riots in Tbilisi. He and other plenum speakers
indicated that, in addition to the serious problems of corruption,
nationalism and economic stagnation inherited from the past, the
republic now faces severe food shortr_6es and a rising rate of
violent crime.
At the 27 July session Shevardnadze concentrated on the drastic
drop in industrial and agricultural production since 1971, but
subsequent speakers--apparently in response to growing
pressure from below-.-raised questions about the purge
of Georgia< officials, the drive against corruption, Moscow's
intervention in Georgia, popular, unrest, and the drop in the
standard of living. Apparently regarding these matters as too
serious to ignore, Shevardnadze took the unusual step of delivering
a sec)nd s-.)'ech on the 28th almost as long as his report, discussing
these issues and defending his leadership at length.
POLICY Shev?3rdnadze responded to a statement by Georgian
PROBLEMS economics institute director V.I. Melkadze that "a
certain part" of the population of the republic did
not hive confidence in the new "course of correcting the mistakes
of tie past" and were critical of Shevardnadze's cadre policy.
The First Secretary insisted that "the course dictated by the CPSU
Central Committee in its well-known decree on the work of the
Tbilisi Gorkom" serves the interests of "the absolute majority"
of Georgians and is therefore supported by them. While claiming
that only a "few" oppose the new policy, Shevardnadze indicated
that disputes have arisen over "tactics and methods of introducing
order." And he asserted that complaints that he was too slow in
taking decisions and not harsh enough have "no foundation."
Other speakers at the plenum hinted at unrest and even disorders
amcag the public at large. Second Secretary A.N. Churkin
complained that the June local soviet elections had been marred
by u:,specified incidents "caused primarily by the irresponsible
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
attitude of some party committees to the question of selecting
candidates and in general to the whole complicated and important
matter of selecting cadres for the soviets." He warned that
repetition of "such cases" must be prevented in the coming trade
union, Komsomol and party elections. Tbilisi First Secretary
P.G. Gilashvili complained of malicious persons spreading
"sensational rumors" and interpreting the Georgian Central
Committee's measures as "too harsh."
RIOT RUMORS Noting Gilashvili's complaint, Shevardriadze called
for a concerted struggle against such persons.
At the same time, he repeated in unusual detail rumors that
10,000 people had rioted in Tbilisi and had burned down party
headquarters, that the city had been surrounded by troops and cut
off from the outside world, an] that 1,500 "nationalistically
inclined" party leaders, writers, journalists and youths had been
arrested.
Although Shevardnadze ridiculed these rumors as "slander,` his
speech indicated that there were good grounds for public unrest
but that his cleanup of corruption should not be blamed for these
hardships. F:e went to unusual lengths in citing statistics to
show' that housing conditions and worker and peasant income were
declining under ..zhavanadze and only began to improve in 1973, after
lie had assumed office. He chose not to compare past and present
food supplies, however, on grounds that under Plzhavanadze the
practice of padding figures was so widespread that a "true picture"
of the situation could not be obtained. He pledged that improve-
ment of food supply was now "one of the main orientations'' of his
regime, and he capped this pledge with a strong statement:
We communists always must remember that talk of
raising the material. welfare of the workers not
backed up with new rubles for the family budget,
new kilograms of bread, meat and milk . .
with uew housing space, with a rise in the quality
and lowering of the price of goods, and also with
other social benefits . . . is nothing other than
blather, demagogy and the truest deception of the
workers.
FOOD SHORTAGES Despite Shevardnadze's assurances, conditions
in Georgia appear ripe for trouble. ZARYA
VOSTOKA on 26 June reported that the Georgian Central Committee bureau
had discovered food shortages in Georgian cities to be so serious that
the population was forced to buy food at private kolkhoz markets. The
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
Georgian trade minister and his top deputy were fired as a
result. As Shevardnadze explained in his 28 July speech, the
food shortage: drove up prices in the kolkhoz market to the
point where local authorities unwisely tried to use
"administrative measures" against the markets, with the result
that prices rose further and only "economically privileged
elements" with illegal "big incomes" could afford to make
purchases.
The food shortages apparently stem from a combination of low
production, mismanagement, corruption, and speculation. At
the plenum the new first deputy minister of trade complained
that "bribery in.the trade ministry had acquired a socially
dangerous character" and that the dining halls of enterprises in
Tbilisi and other cities are short of food. The food shortage
is apparently also worsening because peasants have been
smuggling large amounts of food out of Georgia to sell at higher
prices. At the plenum Abkhaz First Secretary V.G. Kobakhiya spoke
of measures to prevent the export of food from the republic but
complained that many police officials were being bribed to allow
speculators to smuggle out food.
'Another symptom of the Georgian malaise was revealed by Churkin's
unusual admission that during the first half of 1973 the number
of crimes in the republic "significantly rose," especially those
"against the life, health, and dignity of citizens."
AGRICULTURE MINISTRY TO ISSUE PROPOSALS ON MECHANIZED LINKS
Under the pressure of press criticism the USSR Agriculture Ministry
has committed itself to taking a stan;i on the controversial link
system of farming. PRAVDA on 15 August reported Deputy Agriculture
Minister A.P. Chubarov's acknowledgment of a 10 June PRAVDA article
berating the ministry for not preparing recommendations on the
organization and wages of mechanized links. Chiibarov declared
that such recommend-2 tions are now being prepared and will be issued
to local agencies in the near future.
The 10 June PRAVDA article had complained that the ministry's new
guidoli.nes for mechanized links were supposed to have been issued
in a mass printing at the beginning of 1971 but that the ministry
had allowed this "important matter" to drift. In 1968 First Deputy
Agriculture Minister I.F. Volovchenko revealed that the ministry
was studying mechanized links, and in 1970 the All-Russian Institute
for the Organization of Labor and Wages in Agriculture came up
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
with recommendations which IZVESTIYA later claimed were of
no "practical use." Subsequently, a group in the Institute
of Agricultural Economics studier! the problem for two years,
but, as director of the Al.l.-,-,Uys;,an Institute for the
Organizotion of Labor and Wages in Agriculture V.A. Tikhonov
complained in the June 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, it
produced recommendations no better than those of his institute.
The Agriculture Ministry finally created a group within the
ministry to study mechanized links in early 1972, according
to a 19 April 1972 IZVESTIYA article which urged the ministry
and scientists to take a stand on the issue.
The 1.0 June PRAVDA article was a follow-up to a discussion of
problems facing mechanized links begun in that newspaper on
8 May. Ii. that discussion, which included link pioneers
V. Pervitskiy and A. Yerkayev, the Agriculture Mir1stry, Gosplrsn
and a nun.',er of state committees were criticized for failing to
prepare guidelines for mechanized links.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONF1DFN'r'IAL FillS TRENDS
22 AUG4JST 1973
N 0 T E S
CZECH INVASION ANNI'ERSARY: The fifth anniversary of the
irivaston of Czechoslovakia occasioned a vitriolic diatribe from
Peking against the "Brezhnev clique" for continuing the Soviet
military "occupation" and thus revealing "the ugly features of
cial Imperialism.` Peking had ignored the anniversary since
19,'0. Its decision this year to mark the anniversary with a
lengthy NCNA commentary on 19 August reflects Peking's current
effort to counteract Moscow's detente policy in Europe and to
portray the Soviets in the most menacing terms. Significantly,
NCNA cited a remark by a Soviet spokesman at the llelsinki session
of the European security conference as revealing that Moscow
would not rule out another action like the invasion of
Czechoslovakia. The Chinese attack elicited a Soviet response
in the fora, of a 20 August broadcast in Mandarin accusing NCNA
of having distorted the August 1968 events and stressing in
standard terms that the invasion was justified by the "counter-
revolutionary situation." Apart from reacting to the Chinese,
Moscow maintained its usual silence on the anniversary. Prague's
RUDE PRAVO on the 18th editorialized routinely on the event,
hailing the country's polil:ical and economic "consolidation"
since the "timely internationalist assist'nce" by the USSR and
its allies.
CHINESE RED GUARDS ANNIVERS^?.RY: For the first time since 1968
Peking has co:miemorated the 18 August anniversary of the first
Red Guard rally in 1966. PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 18th carried
three articles, which were also broadcast over the Peking radio
and summarized by NCNA, praising Red Guard achievements in the
cultural revolution and blaming their mistakes on the "swindlers"
who omented factionalism and reactionary trends through their
"May 16th clique." Indicating that a primary purpose in the new
attention to the Red Guards is to serve the current rustication
program, the articles stressed that youth must "integrate with
the workers, peasants, and soldiers." As portrayed in an 18 August
Tsinan broadcast, the Red Guards now seem to be a mass organization
for maintaining liaisok: between the schools and other institutions
such as factories and government bodies.
Shanghai has marked` he anniversary every year, while other
province-level units have commemorated the event some years and
ignored it at other times. The national attention accorded the
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
.anniversary this year seems par,.* of a general effort to
rcronstitute mass organizations to assist tba party in
exercising mass control and supervision. The rebuilding
of the CYL--for older youth--has alrea-ly been accomplished
in all provinces.
MOSCOW, CAIRO ON DETENTE: Moscow and Cairo are continuing
their polemic over the ecf'ects of international detente on the
Middle East situation. Moscow broadcasts in Arabic have
defended detente, arguing that it brings various benefits to
the Arab struggle, is disliked by Israel, and should be
welcomed by the Arabs. An Arabic-language broadcast on the
18th complained that "unfortunately," some people, including
members of the Egyptian assembly, were trying to cast unfavorable
light on the influence of detente on the settlement of Arab
problems. At the same time, Moscow has maintained that a
Mideast settlement must be actively pursued by the Arabs them-
selves in a common effort. A commentary on the 20th pointed
out that the Arabs have the means--citing oil reserves and
monetary assets derived from these resources--which could
"drastically change the balance of power" in the struggle
against Israel "if combined with unity of Arab action" which,
"regrettably," is lacking.
A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 21st, depicting Tel Aviv
as apprehensive about current inter-Arab efforts to overcome
various differences, cautioned the Arabs about "hostile
prcwaganda" aimed at insinuating the idea that the solution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict lay outside the Arab world. The
commentary referred cryptically to a 20 August UPI report
"clearly intended to iaspire inaction among the Arabs."
Apparently referring to the same report, Cairo's Voice of the
Arabs on the 21st said that UPI had cited "communist diplomatic
sources" in London to the effect that the Soviet Union had
decided to leave the problem of finding a solution to the Middle
East stalemate to the United States. Noting that the USSR in
the past had attacked U.S. attempts to solve the crisis
unilaterally, the radio commentary added that "we greatly miss
this attitude now."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 ,AUGUST 1973
REACTION TO SCHLESINGER'S COMMENTS ON SOVIET MIRVS: Moscow has so
far failed to report Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 17 August
remarks on the Soviet MIRV program. This silence reflects a
long-standing position on SALT-related issues as well as a more
recent effort to soft-pedal disagreements with the United States
on a wide range of nuclear issues, particularly since the June
summit. On MIRV, Mo.-,cow has maintained a complete embargo on
discussion in the cen,.ral press since the Moscow summit last
year, although the U.S. M1RV program has been discussed briefly
in the more specialized literature.
Moscow's East European allies have followed its lead in ignor .b
Schlesinger's remarks. Peking, on the other hand, has played on
the U.S. expression of concern about Soviet MIRVs to emphasize
the rivalry that continues between the two countries in spite of
recent summitry and to reaffirm its recent unabashed advocacy of
a continued strong military posture by the West in face of an
alleges! Soviet threat. NCNA promptly reported Schlesinger's
remarks in an 18 August dispatch, highlighting his affirmation of
the need for U.S. action to count_r Soviet weapons development.
On the 20th, NCNA reported Western press reaction to the remarks,
singling out suggestions that Soviet MIRV development will impede
the SALT negotiations and severely test the new U.S.-Soviet
relationship.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2
FBIS TRENDS
22 AUGUST 1973
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13 - 19 AUGUST 1973
Moscow (2591 items)
P
ki
e
ng (1204 items
Kazakh SSR Award Ceremony,
(--)
15%
Domeutic Issues
(60%)
48%
Brezhnev Speech
Ca.nbodia
(8%)
20%
China
(5%)
7%
[Sihanouk in
(--)
9%]
World University Games,
6%
DPRK
Tientsin
Moscow
,
Israeli Intercep-
(--)
5%
Israeli Interception of
(--)
4%
tion of Lebanese
Lebanese Plane
DPRK Liberation Anniversary
(--)
3%
Plane
Vietnam
(2%)
Indochina
(2%)
3%
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Pt-king domestic and international radio services. Tho term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, Eovern-
ment or party statement, or dipI rnatie note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parer:tlieses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terns of iolume are not always
discussed in the body e' the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060034-2