TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060033-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 15, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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bon c?ential
FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
15 AUGU S I' 1973
(VOL.. XXIV, NO. 33)
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SBCU'CITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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C0141ENTS
Sihanouk Predicts Victory, Appeals for Break With Lon Nol. . . . .
1
DRV Delegation's Tour of Europe Ends With Soviet Aid Pact. . . . .
3
Hanoi Announces Youth Union Will Hold Congress in Early 1974 . . .
6
USSR-IRAN
Prime Miaiuter Hoveyda's Visit Hailed, Asian Security Pressed.
8
AFGHANISTAN
Moscow, Peking React Cautiously to Daud Coup, New Republic
12
CHINA
Peking Publicizes Movement for "PL-ac.eful" Unification. . . . . . .
15
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
East Europe Reacts Cautiously to Moscow's Moves Against China. . .
17
USSR ON WATERGATE
Moscow Offers First Direct Assessment of Watergate Affair.
19
USSR
Regional Leaders Study Moldavian Farm Innovatiuns. .. . . . . . . .
20
Military Indoctrination Remains Hard Line Despite Detente. . . ,
21
ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN "TERRORISTS"
Moscow Disapproves Lebanese Plane, Athens Airport Incidents,
23
NOTE
China-India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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INDOCHINA
SIHANOUK PREDICTS VICTL Y. APPEALS FOR BREAK WITH LON NOL
As the U.S. bombing of Cambodia came to a halt, Prince Sihanouk
and representatives of his front maintained their uncompromising
position on a negotiated settlement and predicted military victory
in the near future. In a message carried by NCNA on 10 August,
Sihanouk warned foreign nations that they must break their ties
with Lon Nol before Phnom Penh falls if they wish to establish
relations with his government. However, in a telegram on the
same day addressed to U.S. Senator Mansfield, as reported by AFP,
Sihanouk reaffirmed that he would reestablish relations with the
United States once Washington ends its bombing and military aid
to Lon Nol. He reiterated that the frnnt would allow the United
States to evacuate Lon Nol and other top Phnom Penh officials and
that lower-level offirsrs w u ld be pardoned if they agreed to
support the front. Low-level appeals from the front's radio have
continued to call for the defection of nom Penh troops and Lui
popular uprisings, at the same time claim !ng that insurgents have
already entered the capital and that it and other Lon Nol strong-
holds would soon become battlefields.
Sihanouk left Pyongyang for China on 14 August, after a stay of
several weeks in Korea. NCNA announced on 15 August that he ha.1
arrived in Tientsin "for a rest after taking 3 rest" in Korea.
This appears to be a deliberate move by Sihanouk to remain out c-.f
the diplomatic limelight.
HANOI While Sihanouk's backers in Peking have maintained their
rrudent low posture on Cambodian events, Hanoi has offered
its first authoritative comment in a week with a 15 August DRV
Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement claiming that "recently,"
at Washington's behest, Saigon had sent "tens of thousands of
troops" to intervene in Cambodia. Labeling the action a "new and
extremely serious military adventure" in violation of the Paris
agreement, it declared that the United States and Saigon must bear
full responsibility for the "serious consequences."
MOSCOW In the face of developments in Cambodia, Moscow has taken
a further step in its ongoing effort to position itself
as a supporter of the insurgents. Following a steady stream of
low-level Soviet commentaries over the past fey; weeks describing
the victories of the Cambodian "patriots" and collapse of the
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Phnom Penh government, a lengthy 12 huigust IZVESTIYA article
by M. Ilyinskiy more authoritatively placed the Russians
on the side of the insurgents' cause. Recent low-level TASS
reports have noted Sihanouk's travels, even once referring to
the prince as Cambodian "head of state." IZVESTIYA ignored
the prince and his government but pointedly hailed the FUNK
as "true representative" of the Cambodian people.* The
article asserted that the insurgents are expanding their
liberated areas and holding the military initiative, and it
hailed the landmark "national congress" in the liberated areas
last month which had issued an appeal for international
support. Reiterating the recent Crimean summit meeting's
call for the strict fulfillment of the Paris peace agreement,
it concludi,d warmly that "the Soviet people fully support
the brave struggle of Cambodian patriots for the freedom
~_nd independence of their motherland."
* The formula. used by IZVESTIYA (podlinnym predstavitelem
naroda strany) leaves unclear whether Moscow is endLrsing the
front as "the" true representative of the Cambodian people, or
"a" true representative of the Cambodian people.
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DRV DELEGATIONS TOUR OF EUROPE ENDS WITH SOVIET AID PACT
Having toured all the Asian communist countries in June, North
Vietnamese leaders' visits to the USSR and four of its East
European allies were concluded on 14 August when Premier Pham
Van Dong left Moscow for home after the signing of a Soviet-DRV
aid agreement. The pact was concluded a month after Le Duan
and Pham Van Dong had paid a week-long visit to the USSR. Le Duan
apparently is still vacationing in the Crimea, where Dong stopped
off enroute from Sofia back to Moscow for the conclusion of the
aid agreement.
SOVIET AID The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the
AGREEMENT DRV delegation's Moscow visit last month had stated
that an agreement was reached "in principle" on
Soviet aid for developing the. DRV's economy, apparently leaving the
specifies to be negotiated by other functionaries while Pham Van
Dong, Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi and other members of the
delegation went on to visit East Europe. Dong returned to Moscow
on 11 August, held "warm and friendly" talks with Kosygin on the
13th, and, on the following day, joined Kosygin at a ceremony
where the USSR-DRV aid agreement was signed by Deputy Chairman of
the Counc4.1 of Ministers Novikov and Le Thanh Nghi.
A 14 August TASS report noted that agreements had been signed on
economic and technical cooperation and trade between the two
countries for 1974-1975. Hanoi's report said that the agreement
on economic and technical aid was for 1974. TASS, but not Hanoi,
specified that the Soviet Union would aid the DRV in the development
of the power and coal industry, road building, prospecting, and
the development of virgin lands. The aid was not identified as
"gratuitous" altnoug'_z this characterization was given in the case of
the DRV's aid agreement with China in June, and previous USSR-DRV
agreements have generally mentioned "non-refund" aid.*
Neither Moscow nor Hanoi mentioned military assistance in reporting
the aid agreement, although Defense Minister Grechko and the DRV's
military aid specialist took part in the talks in Moscow last month.
The joint Soviet-DRV statement last month mentioned military aid
onij in a passage noting the "continuous fruitful development of
Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and fraternal cooperation in all the
most important fields--political, economic, ideological, and also in
* A TASS announcement on 1 August that the Soviet Union will gram:
economic aid to the PRG noted that it was "gratuitous."
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the field of defense." :Military assistance was mentioned in
repurts on the aid agreements signed earlier this summer in
Peking as well as in Eastern Europe. And Soviet--DRV agreements
in past years have referred to both economic and military aid.
During Pham Van Dong's tour of East Europe, the signing of other
agreements in Moscow had been announced. Thus, on 25 July TASS
reported an agreement on training North Vietnamese cadres as
skilled workers in such fields as machine building, mining, and
transportation. The future training in Moscow is to include 8,000
Vietnamese covering the period 1973-1976. Moscow's domestic service
announced on 31 July the signing of a program for cooperation in
1973 between the USSR and the DRV in the area of public health
service and medical science. And VNA reported on 9 August that an
agreement was signed on cultural and scientific cooperation between
Hanoi and Moscow.
PHAM VAN DUNG VISITS The DRV party-goverment delegation's
IN ROMANIA, BULGARIA "official friendship visits" to Romania
and Bulgaria followed the general pattern
established in the earlier trips to the Soviet Union, Hungary, and
Poland.* During the visits in Bucharest, from 28 July to 1 August,
and in Sofia, from 1 to 8 August, the DRV delegation was hosted by
prime ministers Maurer and Todorov, respectively, and attended
the standard banquets and friendship rallies. The North Vietnamese
were also received by the party chiefs, meeting with Ceausescu prior
to his departure for the Crimea summit and with Zhivkov following
his return from the Crimea. Neither communique clai-ated that identity
of views had been achieved, thus according with the joint documents
signed following the earlier DRV visits to Moscow, Warsaw and Peking.
By contrast, complete unanimity was claimed to have been reached on
all issues in the communique with the Hungarians, Mongolians, and
North Koreans.
The Romanian and Bulgarian communiques stated that economic and
military aid agreements with Hanoi for 1974 had been signed;
however, only Bulgaria followed the lead of floscow and Budapest
and announced the signing of an agreement canceling previous DRV
debts for economic aid. Following the pattern set during the DRV
* The 9-16 July DRV visit to the Soviet Union is discussed in the
TRENDS of 11 July 1973, pages 1-5, and 18 July, pages 1-5. Pharr Van
Dong's 16-23 July Hungarian stay and his 23-28 July visit in Poland
were treated, respectively, in the TRENDS of 25 July, pages 3-6, and
1 August, pages 20-21.
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visits to the USSR and other Soviet bloc countries, Bucharest
and Sofia endorsed the DRV and PRG demand that the United States
comply with the Paris agreement, but did nct make this demand
themselves in the communiques. Only Hungary, in its communique,
called for an end to U.S. bombing in Cambodia.
Hanoi's accounts of all the communiques on the recent DRV visits
have indicated that the host nations recognized the PRG as
the only legitimate "representative" of the South Vietnamese
people. However, accounts of the documents in the media of
Moscow, Budapest, Warsaw, and now Sofia, watered down this
endorsement by referring to the PRG as the only authentic
"expressor" of the South Vietnamese people's aspirations. Romania,
less reticent, used Hanoi's term "representative." Both Bucharest
and Sofia gave their support to the PRG's 28 June six-point proposal
for a settlement in South Vietnam, leaving Moscow as the conspicuous
exception in its failure to endorse this program.
In line with the earlier Soviet bloc communiques, Bucharest and
Sofia joined the North Vietnamese in noting the need for increased
communist unity. The Romanians, but not the Bulgarians, went
along with Dong's call for the "restoration" of solidarity among
communist states. Dong first raised the call for restoring unity
during his visit in Budapest and it was endorsed by the Hungarians
in their communique. He continued to press his plea in the other
East European capitals; however, perhaps because of the stepped up
campaign against China by Moscow and its allies, the call was not
echoed in the other communiques.
The omission of East Germany and Czechoslovakia from the
delegation's swing through Eastern Europe was surprising in view
of Hanoi's description of the trip as fulfilling Ho Chi Minh's
behest to visit and thank all its allies for their assistance
during the war. Although high-level delegations from Berlin and
Prague did pay official visits to Hanoi this spring,* the two
countries have not yet concluded new aid agreements with Hanoi.
The GDR press agency ADN did announce on 3 August, when Dong
was in Bulgaria, that the East German government had decided to
consider past economic aid to North Vietnam as gratuitous.
* See the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, pages 5-6, for the East German
trip and of 11 April, pages 10-11, for the Czechoslovak visit.
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HANOI ANNOUNCES YOUTH UNION WILL HOLD CONGRESS IN EARLY 1974
Hanoi took a major step toward normal, peacetime operations with
a 9 August announcement that the North Vietnamese Workers
Party's (VWP) national youth organization--the Ho Chi Minh
Working Youth Union--would hold its fourth congress in 1974. The
announcement came in a resolution from the youth group's central
committee; the resolution was publicized by Hanoi along with a
9 August NHAN DIN editorial which noted that lower-level congresses
preparing for the national congress would provide a good
opportunity to further accelerate the task of motivating youths.
The last national youth congress, held in March 1961, launched an
emulation movement to implement the five-year plan adopted at the
September 1960 Third VWP Congress. As yet there has been no
indication that the Fourth VWP Congress has been scheduled,
although such a congress would seem the appropriate forum to set
Hanoi's postwar course.* On the other hand, although the Third
Youth Union Congress followed the party congress, this had not
been the case previously.
The first congress of the youth organization was held in February
1950, a year before the Second VWP Congress. The Youth Union's
second congress was held in October and November 1956--a month after
the VWP Central Committee's 10th plenum had acknowledged the party's
errors in land reform and organization and demoted Truong Chinh
and other responsible leaders. The 1956 youth meeting was apparently
prompted by the need to explain this new party posit'on and to begin
steps to overcome the impact on the Youth Union of the party's
erroneous policies. The Central Committee also a-uLicipated the
need for a party congress at that time, judging by Hanoi's announcc-
ment that the 10th plenum had ordered the Politburo to begin plans
for the VWP's third congress. The final decision to hold the third
congress was not taken for three more years, however, until the
Central Committee's 17th plenum in October 1959--almost a year before
the congress was actually held.
BACKGROUND ON The Ho Chi Minh Working Youth Union (Doan Thanh
DRV YOUTH GROUPS nien Lao dong Ho Chi Minh) was founded in March
1931 and was then known as the Indochinese
Communist Youth Union--also identified as a league or group.
* Although a party congress has not been held for almost 13 years,
the party statutes stipulate that they be held every four years. A
party congress must be called for by the VWP Central Committee and
would be preceded by lower-level congresses to choose delegates to the
national meeting.
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The organization has been known by many titles in the intervening
years, Indochinese Democratic Youth Union (1936-19S9),
Indochinese Anti-Imperialist Youth Union (1939-1941), Vietnam
National Salvation Youth Union (1941-1956), and the Vietnam
Working Youth Union (1956-1970). The other major youth
organization in North Vietnam is the Vietnam Youth Federation
(Hoi lien hiep Thanh nien Viet Nam) which, unlike the Working
Youth Union, is a mass organization not affiliated with the VWP.
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USSR - I RAN
PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDAIS VISIT HAILED, ASIAN SECURITY PRESSED
Moscow's comment on the 6-12 August visit of Iranian Prime Minister
Hoveyda has stressed its importance for general peace and security
as well as for strengthening relations between the two countries.*
Soviet interest in promoting an Asian collective security scheme,
which was evidenced by Kosygin during the visit as well as in the
joint communique, was again highlighted in Brezhnev's 15 August
speech in Alma-Ata. Describing Soviet-Iranian relations as
"good-neighborly," Moscow emphasized the benefits of Soviet
assistance to Iranian development projects? Kosygin in his haiquet
speech seemed to suggest concern over the Shah's military armament
program, but that issue and other sensitive questions such as
Iran's relations with Moscow's treaty partners Iraq and India
were largely softpedaled during the visit.
BILATERAL As with previous high-level Soviet-Iranian talks
RELATIONS during the past year, Hoveyda's discussions with
Kosygin and his separate meetings with Brezhnev and
Podgornyy were characterized as "frank and friendly." The joint
communique noted that further expansion of economic ties had been
discussed and "appropriate instructions" given to the joint standing
commission for economic cooperation which is to hold a regular
session in Teheran in October. Two agreements were signed during
the visit: one on cooperation in the prevention of hijacking of
civil aircraft, and a second, a "supplementary protocol" to the
14 May 1957 treaty, on "the procedure for settling border conflicts
and incidents." This agreement, according to the joint communique,
concerns the border along the Aras and Mil-o Moghan dams.**
* Hoveyda previously paid an official visit to the USSR in July 1967.
During a stopover in Moscow en route home from London this past
April, he had a "friendly conversation" with Kosygin.
** Negotiations on this border apparently have been under way since
completion of the dams in 1970. In December of that year Moscow
radio reported that the Shah had received the head of the USSR Main
Administration of Border Troops and members of the Soviet-Iranian
commission for demarcation of the frontier in the area of the
dams.
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There is no indication that the topic of oil. figured in the
discussions, but Hoveyda was accompanied on a visit to Riga,
at the end of his Moscow talks, by the Soviet minister of oil
industry. Kosygin alluded to the subject in his banquet speech
only in calling for observance of the right of every people to
sovereign ownership of their natural resources. Moscow has given
qualified approval of Iran's agreement with the consortium
achieving sovereignty over its oil. A Shevchenko commentary
broadcast in Persian on 31 July, waile welcoming the agreement,
noted that the consortium obtained an "important concession"
in that for 20 years it would be "nearly the only purchaser of
Iran's oil." Shevchenko no doubt had East European interests in
mind. Recent Iranian negotiations with some East European
countries had shown, he said, that Iran has a "big, reliable and
expanding" oil market in these states.
IRANIAN ARMAMENT, The complex of questions relating to the
REGIONAL RELATIONS Shah's armament program, Persian interests
in the gulf and the Indian Ocean, and Iran's
relations with Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India were generally
bypassed in the official documents and the media coverage. The
joint communique carried the usual Soviet-Iranian statement on
the Persian Gulf, declaring again that questions pertaining to
that region should be resolved by the countries of the area
without foreign interference.
Kosygin may have had the Shah's armament program in mind when he
referred at the 6 August banquet to unidentified "forces"
which oppose international detente and "declare for military
buildup, for inflation of military budgets." At another point
he asserted that foreign policy should be determined by mutual
trust and understanding, not 'y "tensions aad arms race," and went
on to call for strict observ.,-ce of international treaties and
agreements.
A more explicit though indirect criticism of the Iranian armament
program was contained in a TASS commentary broadcast by Moscow in
Persian on the 13th. Quoting the Teheran paper KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
as saying that Moscow had given no indication dur'ln the visit of
any disapproval of Iranian policy in this regard, the commentary
Suggested that the paper was misrepresenting Soviet policy. The
USSR, it said, attempts to base foreign policy on mutual trust and
peaceful settlement of disputes rather than on tension and an
arms race.
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On the Iranian-Iraqi dispute, Hoveyda was asked at a press conference
on his return home whether the issue had been discussed in Moscow.
He was reported by Teheran radio to have said: "We discussed all
international Issues, but I do not think anyone has the right
to intervene in matters concerning Iran." He conceded that
"we discussed this subject as well, however."
The comment has virtually ignored the Afghanistan issue. Moscow
has sought to r.earjsure Iran that while the Soviet Union "cannot
remain indifferent" to what takes place in Afghanistan, the change
of rcgime the.;e was purely an internal affair. In his banquet
speech, Kosygin asserted that Soviet-Iranian cooperation was n ,,,L
directed against any other country, adding It at the same held for
Soviet cooperation with other countries such as India, Afghanistan,
Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan. Echoing Kosygin's assurance, a Persian-
language commentary by Zholkver on 7 August said the USSR tried to
establish is relations with its neighbors, and also relations
between these countries, on the basis of good-neighborliness,
peaceful cooperation, and reciprocal understanding. An earlier
Persian-language commentary on 25 July had dismissed "Western
propaganda" allegations that the proclamation of a republic in
Afghanistan was a victory for the USSR, describing them as "unfair
attempts" to undermine Soviet foreign policy and "its methods with
regard to Afghanistan and other Eastern countries." The broadcast
had cited Hoveyda's forthcoming visit as an indication of the
steadily improving relations between the USSR and the Eastern
countries.
COLLECTIVE Soviet interest it, prcmoting an Asian collective
SECURITY securil..y scheme was again reflected 3.n Kosygin's
banquet speech on the 6th and in the joint communique.
The latter referred to the "intent" of the two countries to work
toward the creation of an Asian collective security system--words
first used in the communique following Kosygin's March visit to
Iran.* The current document added that this should be done "in
such a way as o cover all countries of the continent." Earlier
Soviet communiques with Iran, la., t October, and with Afghanistan,
in March 1972 and May 1973, had -ouched upon--but not specifically
endorsed--the idea of a collcctA.-e security system, declaring
that peace and security in Asia "require the joint efforts of all
countries" of the region.
* Kosygin's March visit to Iran is discussed 'a the 21 March TR& DS,
pages 10-12.
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Moscow has been on record as favoring participation of all Asian
countries in a. security system, and Brezhnev spelled out this
position in his 15 August speech in Alma-Ate: "We repeat again,"
he said, "that the Soviet Union is in favor of active equal
participation of all the Asian countries without xception in the
collective security system." Every Asian state, he added, is called
on to make a contribution to its creation. Last December,
Brezhnev, in his speech on the USSR's 50th anniversary, had rejected
allegations that the collective security system was designed to
contain China. "As we conceive the idea," he had said, "the
People's Republic of China will become an equal partner of such a
system." Gromyko had indicated, in his UNGA add-,esses in 1969
and 1970, that the USSR envisioned participation by all the Asian
states in creating such a system.
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AFGHANISTAN
MOSCOW, PEKING REACT CAUTIOUSLY TO DAUD COUP, NEW REPUBLIC
The 17 July coup converting Afghanistan from a monarchy to a
republic has met with a cautious welcome in Moscow and wariness
in Peking. Moscow moved promptly to recognize the new government
but hes offered little comment on developments. Peking only
belatedly took rote of the coup in reporting the 17 July speech
by Daud, the new head of state, and announcing PRC recognition
at Afghrnlstan's request. Peking's 11-day delay in reacting
suggests Chinese concern over the implications of a major change
in a region that has been marked by instability, particularly
in view of Moscow's gains in recent years and the losses incurred
by Peking's ally Pakistan.
Both Moscow and Peking have steered clear of the Pushtunistan
question, a sensitive issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan which
Daud raised at the time of his takeover. On 15 July the PRC
initiated broadcasting in Pushtu, thus joining the Soviet Union
as the only communist states broadcasting in that language.
MOSCOW The Soviet decision to recognize the new government was
conveyed two days after the coup when Soviet Ambassador
Puzanov, one of the few full members of the CPSU Central Committee
serving as envoys to noncommunist countries, met with new head of
state Daud. The Moscow press carried banner headlines on the
change in government, according to TASS, and favorable treatment
was given to Daud's 17 July speech proclaiming the establishment
of a republic. Daud received a congratulatory telegram on his
"election" from Rrezhnev, Podgnrnyy, and Kosygin expressing
confidence that good relations would continue between the two
countries. This, however, has been the only authoritative Soviet
reaction to the coup. Although implicitly favorable reportage on
events in Afghanistan has been carried in Sov4 t nedi.a, original
comment has been sparse and, has been limited mainly to foreign-
language broadcasts. Foreign speculation about Soviet involvement
in the coup was rebutted in these broadcasts.
While proceeding cautiously in the new situation, Moscow may
hope that the close relations it enjoyed with Daud during his
former tenure as prime minister from 1953 to 1963 will be renewed
and serve the Soviet cause of an Asian collective security system.
Afghanistan had lent support to the idea of collective security
in the past, but Moscow's intensified drive in behalf of its
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15 AUGUST 1973
propo;a1 HInce the Vletit am UlvLtIVille nI in January rec'Ived a
setback In May When Lite J(:int communique on I'odgornvy'(4 21-24
May vii[1 to Afghanistan took it more noncommittal stand on Lhltt
subject than that enuncl.nted In it HIinllar communique Ir;HuccI
last year wlt,.n the Afghan prime m[nlster visited Moscow. Kabu1'H
hesitancy in ~I,ty wits Lite more conspicuous In Lite light of Podgornyy'H
vigorous advocacy of the propotiai In it major speech he delivered
during hill vii4f.t.*
Although Moscow has not. referred tc Lite col.lecL[,ve security
I.toposal in the context of Lite coup, the Slovak party dally
PRAVDA on 27 July cited the new government's announced policy of
neut:,tllty and non alinemcnt. as "n favorable element especIn IIy
as ~;;r its Lite emerging system of collective security in Asin
is concerned." Moscow's continuing interest in the proposal was
reflected during the Iranian prime minister's visit this month
to the Soviet Union** and in Lite major I. A1ekiandrov article
in the 7 August PRAVDA elabornting on Soviet foreign policy
objectives. Attaching "unusually great importance" to Lite idea
of collective security in Asin, Lite article took note of the
difficulties posed by unnamed forces inside and outside Asia
interested In preserving an atmosphere of distrust among Asian
states.
PEKING on 28 July NCNA broke Peking's silence on Afghan
developments by reporting Daud's 17 July speech
and announcing that the PRC on tIit 28th had extended recognition
"at the request of the new government.` NCNA's trief account of
Dnud's speech pointQdly cited his professed Intention to follow
it foreign policy based on neutrality, nonallnement, and friendship
"with all nations and peoples in the world." Tnere has been
no subsequent Chinese reporting on Afghan developments, an arm's-
length posture reflected in Peking's failure this year to report
the customary PRC embassy reception in Kabul marking Chinese
Army Day (1 August).
Peking's concern over developments in this region has been
expressed in warnings against Soviet expansionism and was underscored
by Foreign i4inister Citi Peng-fei's visits to Iran and Pakistt:n
during his four-nation tour In June--the first trip by a Chinese
* Podgornyy's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 31 May 1973,
pages 15-16.
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foreign minister outside East Asia since the 1960'x. An effort
to counteract Soviet influence may also have been reflected in
NCNA'n report on 25 May that two days earlier--during Podgornyy's
vlslt to knbul--the Afghan prime minister had received the
Chinese ambassador for n "cordial and friendly" talk and had
asked him to convey "kind r.egatdn" to Premier Chou En ??lai. in
another sign of Chinese Interest, Peking on 15 July began
broadcasLing two daily half-hour programs In Pushtu, the first
new language to be introduced in Peking's international broadcasts
since 1969. do cow has been broadcasting In Pushtu since 1957.
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15 AUGUST 1973
CHINA
PEKING PUBLICIZES MOVEMENT FOR `'PEACEFUL" UNIFICATION
Marking another step in its evolving campaign to promote reunification
of Taiwan with the mainland, Peking for the first time in recent
years has advanced the prospect of "peaceful. unification." According
to NCNA, senior military leader Yeh Chien-yang on 27 July urged a
group of "Chinese patriots" from Hong Kong and Macao to "contribute
to the cause of patriotism and peaceful reunification of the
motherland." Apart from noting that the meeting took place in the
Taiwan Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Peking, the NCNA
report made no direct reference to Taiwan.
Though Yeh's appeal was made in the context of llong Kong and Macao,
the pitch for peaceful unification was beamed directly to Taiwan
In severa broadcasts from the mainland beginning on the 27th.
These broadcasts have portrayed a broad movement o.i Taiwan,
particu)arly among youth sad students, struggling for peaceful
unification in the face of a panic-stricken Chiang Kai-shek regime.
One broadcast describing a demonstration by Taiwan university
students in February said e-:~me students wrote on walls with their
own blood such slogans as "peaceful unification of the motherland."
The new theme of peaceful unification recalls but differs from the
line taken by Puking when the Taiwan question w-,s 0 ?-h on the agenda
in the 1950's. Though firmly refusing to foreclose t,:p option of
using force, Peking at that time expressed a preference for `peaceful
liberation" of Taiwan. In its current discussion, however, Peking
has avoided that particular formulation. In the nearest approach
to reviving the formulation, an open letter to the Taiwan gov:rnor
broadcast by the PLA's Fukien Front radio on 14 July cited Chou Ea-lama's
1956 appeal to Kuomintang officials to play a role in the "peaceful
liberation" of Taiwan.
Peking's avoidance thus far of the call for "peaceful liberation"
may reflect sensitivity to the issue of nonuse of force, an issue
which bedeviled Sino-U.c. talks in the past and which in recent years
has been the focus of bitter dispute in the Sino-Soviet context.
The theme of "peaceful unification," on the other hand, has the
ad.rantage of 6voiditnn; past associations with the question of force
and serves mainly ae an appeal to Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Macao to identify their interest.. with the mainland and to
work toward an accommodation. In the past year there have been signs
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that Peking is seeking to develop a campaign of conciliation
capitalizing on the c:haagiag Sinc-U.S. relationship and playing
on a sense of Chinese patriotism. Yen Chien-ying had enunciated
a conciliatory line on 29 September in an adiress to "compatriots"
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as well as Overseas Chinese
attending a reception marking PRC National Day. Yeti declared
that "patriots belong to one big family" and that no dibcinction
would be drawn between "those who come forward first and those
later" in responding to the call for reconciliation.
Another stage in this evolving campaign appeared last February
when Peking used the occasion of a Taiwan anniversary that. had
been ignored in recent years to make a highly publicized pitch
for "great patriotic unity" and for talks between PRC and
Nationalist Chinese officials. One of the main speakers on the
occasion, which came within. a few days after the announcement of
the agreement to establish liaison offices in Peking and Washington,
declared that it would be "absolutely impossible for the United
States to maintain its former relations with Taiwan for long."
In a direct appeal to ROC officials the speaker said: "We are all
Chinese. Why couldn't we talk t:or the sake of the sacred cause of
unif"ing the motherland?" It uns not, however, until Yeh's remarks
to tt.e Fong Kong and Macao visitors on 27 July that Peking began
referring to "peaceful unification."
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C O M M U N I S T REL AT IONS
FBIS TRENDS
1.5 AUGUST 1973
EAST EUROPE REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO MOSCOW'S MOVES AGAINST CHINA
Moscow's insistent demand for unity in the face of the Chinese
challenge, conveyed in the 7 August PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov,*
has to date received a cautious response in East Europe. Moscow's
orthodox allies for the most part avoided direct comment on the.
China issue and limited themselves to republication of the
Aleksandrov article, either in full. or in part. Maverick Romania
ignored the PRAVDA article and instead maint.-ixned its even-handed
treatment of Soviet and Chinese affairs. Yugoslavia, alone among
the East European countries, commented directly on the Aleksandrov
article, interpreting it as a Soviet call for concerted action on
all fronts.
ORTi!ODOX ALLIES In a display of unconr'ttional support for
concerted action, the Aleksandrov article was
published in the major newspapers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germ ny and Poland. By contrast, the Hungarian press published
waly the lengthy passages of the article dealing specifically with
China--reflecting Budapest's continuing reluctance to submit
unco?iditionall- to Moscow's diktat. For the most part, however,
Moscow's orthodox allies avoided direct comment on China along the
lines of the Aleksandrov article. A Bulgarian Co,nunist Party
Politburo "evaluation" of the Crimea meeting, a.A reported by Sofia
r^3io on the 8th, attached "especially great significance" to the
"coordinated unmasking" of 1cftist opportunism. Prague's English-
langt:age radio service for foreign listeners broadcast commentaries
criticizing Peking for engaging in "hostile activities against the
socialist courtrie"" in collusion with the "most reactionary forces"
in the Vest , East Gar "any, Hungary and Poland have not disseminated
anti-Chinese comment in the context of the Crimea conference, but
the latter two countries have critic.lzed Chinese disarmament policies
and ideology, respectively, since the meeting.
ROMANIA Bucharest predictably ignored the Aleksandrov article
and further demonstrated its determination to pursue an
independent course in the wake of the Crimea conference. There has
been no discussion of Crimea in Romanian media since the measured
praise of the conclave by the RCP Executive Committee on the 3d
and an unsigned article in the party daily SCINTEIA on the 4th. A
9 August SCINTEIA article hailing Romanian-Soviet cooperation, on
f, The Aieksandrer article is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 August 1973,
pages 1-3.
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the occasion of a new bilateral economic agreement signed ir.
Bucharest by Soviet Deputy Premier Lesechko, was balanced two
days later by an ACERPRES commentary entitled "Fruitful
D?velopment of Romanian-Chinese Economic Cooperation." And
Ceausescu was effusive in hailing China's "successes -a
socialist construction" at the Bucharest ceremony ou the 11th
for the new PRC Ambassador Li Ting-chuan.
In addition to broadcasting summaries of the Aleksandrov article
in Romanian, among other languages, Moscow reminded Bucharest,
in a 7 August Nikolayev radio commentary i.: Romanian only, that
Crimea showed the socialist countries" "determination" to
"always coordinr.te their actions."
YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA Yugoslavia alone among the East Eurc-pean
communist countries, commented directly on the Aieicsandrov ?grticle.
In addition to a brief sLmwary of the article in BORBA on the 8th,
POLITIKA the some day carried an analysis by the paper's Moscow
correspondent R. Bajalski. Featuring the PRAVDA article'3 attack
on the Chinese, the commentary attributed the failure to mention
China in the Crimea communique to Romania's consistent opposition
to "public criticism of any socialis: country." The commentary
also pointed to the PRAVDA art'icle's stress on ideological vigilance
and policy coordination. Other Yugoslav commentaries on the Crimea
conference had similarly surmised that Moscow would intensify its
drive for "ideological alertness."
Tirana ignored this year's Crimea conference, as it had done in the
past.
T&T
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USSR ON WATERGATE
FBIF TRENDS
15 AUGUST 1973
MOSCOW OFFERS FIRST DIRECT ASSESSMENT OF WATERGATE AFFAIR
On 12 A-jgust Soviet citizens were given the first direct Soviet
com::,entary on Watergate as well as the most extensive explLnation
of the affair by Soviet media. The Watergate assessment came
in a discussion between two Moscow radio commjntators, Valentin
Zorin and Leonid Zavyalov, in the weekly radio roundtable on
internrtional affairs. Both observers maintained that Watergate
is essentially r. struggle for power between the President and
Congress, the outcome of which remains in doubt. They also said
that "various influential groupings" with their own axes to grind
were attempting to take advantage of the Watergate revelations.
Sympathy for the President's position in the Watergate affair,
which had been implied in selective reporting in Soviet media in
the weeks since the June summit, was made somewhat more explicit
in the roundtable's observation that rightwing opponents of the
President's foreign policy of "relaxation" were among those
attempting to exploit Watergate. However, the discussion did not
go beyond this allusion to the foreign policy implications of
Watergate.
On the whole, the roundtable observers were cautious about taking
sides. The protagonists--the President and the Senate committee--
were portrayed in a more balanced manner than was evident in
previous reporting. On the one hand, they asserted that the
Senate hearings had been transformed from an investigation of
election irregularities into a "political trial." On the other
hand, they pointed to the enormous concentration of power in the
hands of the President and caustically labeled this phenomenon the
"quintessence" of the "vaunted American democracy."
The roundtable discussion marks a progression in Moscow's coverage
of Watergate and represents the first time Moscow has publicly
conveyed uncertainty as to its outcome. Soviet media had
maintained a virtual silence on Watergate until 16 May, when a
factual report in LITERARY GAZETTE provided the first overall look
at the affair. Subsequent brief reports by TASS and various
domestic media added bits and pieces. Since the June summit such
reports have emphasized statements by President Nixon defending
his position. A TASS report on the Senate hearings published in
the central press on 3 August singled out statements by former
Administration officials denying Presidential involvement.
C NF DENT IAL
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USSR
REGIONAL LEADERS S11JDY MOLDAVIAN FARM INNOVATIONS
Since the CPSU Central Committee approved Mo'.davia's transfer
of control of kol.khozes from the agriculture: ministry to elective
kolkhoz councils, numerous officials from other republics have
visited Moldavia to study the councils and other agricultural
innovations.* The parade appears to have been stimulated by
USSR Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy, who stres3ed the importance
of the Moldavian experiment in a March speech and who visited the
Baltic republics and Belorussia in early June, perhaps to apply
pressure. However, the visitors left the republic without haviaig
endorsed the Moldavian experiment.
Since late June Moldavia has been toured by the first secretaries
of Lithuania and Estonia and of five RSFSR oblasts -- Moscow,
Ivavovo, Kostroma, Yaroslavl and the Chuvash ASSR -- and the
agriculture secretaries of Georgia and Lithuania, with each visit
receiving heavy publicity in the Moldavian press. Moldavian
First Secretary I. I. Bodyul has personally accompanied the visitors
around the republic, seeking to promote his various innovations --
agro-industrial complexes, interkolkhoz organizations and kolkhoz
councils. But the only endorsement of the controversial councils
that Bodyul has been able to obtain was by Polyanakiy's deputy,
I. N. Kuznetsov, who, in presenting an award to Moldavia on 28
July, praised the republic's new forms of farm administration for
having increased production and helped solve "urgent social and
economic problems in the village."
Perhaps the least enthusiastic visitor was Estonian First Secretary
I. G. Kebin, a longtime opponent of kolkhoz unions and a staunch
supporter of the agriculture ministry. Unlike the Litho:anian,
Georgian and Moscow secretaries, Kebin did not grant an :interview
to local reporters upon his departure from Moldavia, and his 30
July-1 August visit was not reported by the Estonian press as late
as 9 August. Although the RSFSR secretaries reportedly studied
the structure and activity of rayon kolkhoz councils and were
escorted by Moldavian Kolkhoz Council Chairman N. M. ZaycherLko,
Kebin's tour covered other aspects of Moldavian agricultural
development.
* For background, see the TRENDS of 14 March 1973, pages 25-26.
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Although Kebin spent some time inspectirg livestock farms and
big agro-industrial complexes and heard Bodyul's sales pitch on
the "advisability of creating large agricultural enterprises,"
the Estonian leaders are on record in 1970 and 1971 for having
criticized such expensive livestock complexes. Bodyul did,
however, manage to persuade Georgian Agriculture Secretary
B. G. *igiberiya, according to the 26 June SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA.
Gigiberiya declared that he had become fully convinced of the
value of investing in such complexes.
MILITARY INDOCTRINATION REMAINS HARD LINE DESPITE DETENTE
A militantly hostile view of the West continues to be cultivated
by the Soviet military training establishment despite the support
for detente currently being displayed by the military leadership.
This dualism is pointed up by two articles in the July, No. 14,
issue of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES. One, written by Lt.
General A. Shevchenko, an officer whose previous writings identify
him with the Main Political Administration, presents a highly
distorted picture of Western military training programs clearly
calculated to inspire distrust of the West and an attitude of
vigilance. The other, written by Deputy Minister of Foreign
Trade, A. Manshulo: projects a directly contrary image by
presenting a highly favorable assessment of the prospects for
East-West trade.
The Shevchenko article strikes a jarring note in the current
detente atmosphere. Setting his account against the background
of a highly n',gative assessment of current political and social
trends in the capitalist world, Shevchenko portrays the Western
troop training programs as instruments of class domination.
The resultant picture is an almost mirror-image likeness of the
practices and philosophy of the Soviet system: centrally directed
indoctrination programs carried out by "apparats" of professional
propagandists, featuring daily, compulsory study sessions in which
servicemen are drilled in the official rationales of government
policy.
While articles of this type are presumably Standard fare in the
Soviet political training program, this one deserves special notice
because of its timing and manner of presentation in the journal.
Both circumstances suggest a special effor+. by thc: editors to
draw attention to the need to tighten up any slack in the Soviet
military training programs that may have been occasioned by
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detente. By placing the two vrticles together, the editors
appear to be reminding the military community that the regime's
current policy has two sides--ideological struggle as well as
detente.
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ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN "TERRORISTS"
MOSCOW DISAPPROVES LEBANESE PLAN:, ATHENS AIRPORT INCIDENTS
The Soviet press, according to TASS on the 12th, has "sharply
condemned" Israel's interception and forced detainment of a
Middle East Airlines passenger plane on 10 August as an "impudent
act of air piracy" and a "bandit action." Soviet media have
also given publicity to worldwide critical comment on the incident.,
and have exploited it in routine propaganda. A TASS item on the
13th--described as a TASS statement in foreign language rebroadcasts--
charged that air piracy had been elevated to state policy by
Israel. 1*~ expressed the indignation of the Soviet public over
the incident, and said that Soviet "competent circles" regarded
the action as flouting the UN Charter and international law.
Reporting the Security Council session on the 13th, TASS cited
Soviet delegate Scfronchuk as condemning the "terrorist methods
of Israel in its foreign policy," and expressing Soviet readiness
to support "the most effective sanctions" against Israel. TASS
reported that many delegates suggested that the council should not
limit itself to censuring Israel but should discuss the possibility
of applying disciplinary measures.
The account noted that Ambassador Scali had expressed the regret
of the United States over Israel's violation of Lebanon's
sovereignty and the violation of the UN Charter and the norms
of international civil aviation, A Moscow domestic service
commentary on the 13th declared that Israel's "traditional
protectors" could find no excuses for Tel Aviv this time, and
that the U.S. State Department "was forced" to express regret.
IZVESTIYA's Koryavin noted on the 13th that Tel Aviv had admitted
that the operation was aimed at seizing a leader of the People's
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, A Moscow broadcast in
Arabic on the 13th cited the Cairo AL-AKHBAR as saying that the
CIA through its connections with Israeli intelligence passed on
information about the movements of leaders of the Palestinian
resistance.
A Radio Peace and Progress broadc..st in English to Africa on the
13th quoted a representative of the Soviet commission of the
International Civil Aviation Organization as saying that Israel's
"criminal activities" threatened security of air transportation
in the Middle East and contravened the principles outlined in the
convention on international civil aviation.
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ATHENS AIRPORT INCIDENT Moscow's minimal attention to the
terrorist attack by two Arabs at
Athens airp)rt on. 5 August typically focused on Palestinian denials
c.c an connection with the incident. TASS on the 6th cited the
Palestinian news agency as charging that forces hostile to the
Palestinians were seeking to discredit their struggle, and a
Moscow Arabic-language broadcast the next day attributed to a
Syrian paper the theory that the "terrorist incident" in Athens
was planned by Israeli intelligence to distract attention from the
recent murder of a Moroccan in Norway. Moscow's domestic service
on the 8th reported that the "strictly secret organization"
Black September had announced that one of its members was being
sent to Athens to help establish .he true identity of the terrorists.
While condemning incidents of international terrorism, Moscow
has held that struggle inside the occupied territories is legal
and justified. Commentator Belyayev, in the veekly Moscow domestic
sr.rvice observers' roundtable on the 5th, claimed that the
Palestinian organizations were "decisively disso:iating" themselves
from acts such as aircraft hijacking. All Palestinian n?:tional
liberation organizations, Belyayev added, are maintaining that
the main front of the struggle "is in the occupied territories
and not beyond their borders." And a Moscow broadcast in Arabic
on 9 August asserted that the Palestinian struggle in the occupied
territory was assuming increasing proportions, and that "these
operations are entirely legal from the point of view of international
military law."
CONFIDENTIAL
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15 AUGUST 1973
N 0 T E
CHINA-IND: As part of a series of recent reports critical of
Indian policies, Peking marked this year's anniversary of the
1971 Soviet-Indian friendship treaty by replaying Indian politicians'
adverse comment on the pact. Peking had ignored the anniversary
last year. An NCNA report on 9 August--the date of the treaty--
quoted various Indian political figures as expressing dissatisfaction
with India's "alliance" with the Soviet Union and demanding an
"independent" foreign policy and normal relations with neighbors.
While thus probing areas of Soviet-Indian discord, Peking has
also taken a tougher ap,roaclkv to the Gandhi government by carrying
a wider range of repor,-o portraying India in an unfavorable light.
Thus, a 30 July NCNA pickup of foreign comment depicted India's
iperialistic role" in the Persian Gulf together with the USSR,
comparing an Indian drive for riches to the west with the 1971
moves against what was then East Pakistan. On domestic affairs,
which Peking had discreetly ign'- cd from September 1972 to May
1973, a number of NCNA reports lit recent months have highlighted
labor troubles, police mutinies, and food riots attacking Indian
government policies.
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15 AU(:IIS'I' 1')1 1
- I ..
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS h - 12 AUGUS'T' 1973
Mm~ncow (2575 1 t(-mn)
Peking (1006 I.temn)
Crimea Meeting of Soviet
(l5"/?)
lII
I)omentlc lnnuen
(50%)
607,
Bloc Party Leadern
Cambod [a
( 47.)
6'Y.,
China
( 4%)
5%
Nuclear 'l'ent Ban 'T'reaty,
(---)
7%
1Oth World Youth Festival,
( 9%)
4%
10th Anniversary
Berlin
NCNA Attack on Soviet
Iranian Prime Minister
Hoveyda in USSR
(- -)
4%
Admirals'
Articles
Navy Day
Chile
(---)
3%
Vietnam
Indochina
( i%)
27,
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech. press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party stater1rent, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are,
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior Issues;
'n other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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