TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7
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RIPPUB
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C
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32
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November 9, 2016
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April 7, 1999
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20
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Publication Date: 
May 16, 1973
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875R 0030QQ0020-7 16onTiaential FBIS TRENDS in Communist Propaganda STATSPEC Confidential 16 MAY 1973 (VOL. XXIV, NO. 20) Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/(,Y&I,PL85T00875R000300060020-7 This propaganda analysis report is based exclUSively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is publishe(I by II HIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. STATSPEC I NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized disclosure subject to criminal sanctions Approved For Release 19999 Pef)kllk)~P85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 19;3 C 0 N TEN TS Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Le Duc Tho Statement, White Book Set Stage for U.:-.;.-DRV Talks . . 1 U.S. Accused of Repeated Air Attacks in South Vietnam . . . . . . 5 DRV, PRG Comment on Problems of Peace-keeping in the South. . . . 7 Peking Gives Muted Responses to Allies' Calls for Support . . . . 9 Sihanouk, Insurgent Leaders Stress Hard Line on Settlement. . ? 11 LPF Issues Communique on Status of Vientiane Negotiations . . . . U.S. - USSR 12 Moscow Optiminntic But Cautious on Brezhnev Visit. . . . . . . . . EUROPE FORCE CUTS 15 Soviet Bloc Implies Hungary's Exclusion. Permanent . . . . . . . . MIDDLE EAST 17 Moscow Sustains Cautious Coverage of Events in Lebanon. . . . . . YUGOSLAVIA 20 Dolanc Report at LCY Conference Scores Nationalism. . . . . . . . USSR - CHINA 21 Rival Efforts to Influence National Minorities Continue . . . . . CHINA 23 Educational Authorities Encouraged to Enhance Quality . . . . . . 25 Approved For Release 1999/O9P5IPC AJRDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 FOR OFFICIAL U.S. ONLY FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 7 - 13 MAY 1973 Moscow (270a items)- Peking (1208 items May Day, CPSU Plenum (39%) 11% Domestic Issues (30%) 49% VE Pay ll%) 11% Cambodia (9%) 13% Brezhnev in Poland --) 9% [Sihanouk Tour (--) 9%] Lenin Peace Prizes (11%) 9% of Africa, GDR Liberation (--) 5% Europe Anniversary Meetings of i1N Bodies (--) 7% Czechoslovak Liberation (--) 5% Norwegian Foreign (--) 3% Anniversary Brezhnev in GDR (--) 4% Minister in PRC PRC Friendship (3%) 3% China (3%) 2% Delegation in Indochina (2%) 2% Japan These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Mos ^ow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern- ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries. Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior Issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 INDOCHINA A threatening and intransigent statement by Hanoi's negotiator Le Duc Tho upon his arrival in Paris on 14 May seemed to set forth the basic communist position in the talks with Presidential adviser Kissinger scheduled to begin on the 17th. In line with earlier propaganda, Tho claimed that the DRV has "good will and a serious attitude" regarding measures to irsure the implementation of the Paris agreement, but he gave no indication that improve- ment of the situation required any change in the communist stance. Instead Tho assailed alleged allied violations of the accord, including U.S. boml,ing of South Vietnam--a charge first raised on 11 May, the day the PariG consultations were announced--and warned that any further attacks would make the meeting with Kissinger impossible. Hanoi's 1.5 May release of Tno's statement followed a barrage of charges of allied violations. Ap-arently in preparation for the Paris talks, Hanoi media on 10 May issued a DRV White Book documenting the view that the United States and Saigon are the sole violators of the accord; this is the first such document to be issued since 1965. Le Duc Tho made his customary stopovers in Peking and Moscow, arriving in the PRC capital on the 11th and going on to Moscow the next day before continuing his Journey to Paris on. the l.4th. As usual, his Chinese host was Chang Chun-chiao, and he met with Chou En-lai for the standard "very cordial and friendly conversation" whose substance was not disclosed. Peking has given only the barest publicity to Hanoi's announcement that the Kissinger-Tho talks would concern complete implementation of the Vietnam agreement. In Moscow Tho saw Kirilenko and Katushev, the officials who most frequently meet with him on these stopovers. Reporting that the two sides exchanged views on the Vietnamese situation and on how the agreement is being implemented, TASS added that Tho "gave information about violations of the Paris agreement by the American side, quoting numerous facts of the agreement being violated by the Saigon administration." LE DUC THO STATEMENT, WHITE BOOK SET STAGE FOR U,S.-DRV TALKS Hanoi did n',t comment at once on the official U.S.-DRV announcement, which it publicized on 11 May, that Kissinger and Le Duc Thu would CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 meet in Paris on the 1.7th to review implementation of the peace agreement and seek measures t- bring about its strict observance. Prior to VNA's 15 May release of Le Duc Thu's statement at the Paris airport, Hanoi on the 14th publicized a NHAN DAN article which paralleled his remarks in affirming the DRV's good will while maintaining that the U.S.-DRV review should "stress" that the "primary responsibility" for the present situation rests with "none other than the United States." The article asserted that there would be "favorable" conditions for progress in the talks only if the United States stopped reconnaissance over the DRV, resumed mine removal, discharged its "obligations and responsibilities stipulated" in the agreement, and resumed the work of the U.S.-DRV economic commission. VNA underlined the significance of Tho's airport statement by calling it "important." Tho went beyond other attacks on the alleged U.S. air strikes in South Vietnam when he warned that the talks would not take place or would be halted if there was a repetition of the strikes. Suggesting that the alleged incidents may have heightened Hanoi's suspicions about U.S. intentions, Tho charged that the United States had carried out attacks Just before the meeting in order to "pressure" the DRV. He also claimed that the Unites States had "resorted to such a tr{ck" in past negotiations and asserted that "this is a vain effort." A Hanoi radio broadcast on the 16th, read literally, went beyond Tho in suggesting that for the talks to go forward it is necessary not only for the United States to refrain from bombing in the South but to meet Hanoi's other demands: If the Nixon Administration wants to display good will in seriously implemen'Ling the Paris agreement, first of all it should stop sending reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam, carry on mine removal, resume the work of the DRV--U.S. joint economic commission, and immediately suspend all air reconnaissance, strikes, and bombing against the PRG-controlled areas. Only under such circumstances can the 17 May meeting b(:tween the two parties in Paris take place. Routinely protesting numerous U.S. and GVN actions since the peace accord, Tho echoed other Hanoi comment in recent weeks which has charged the United States and Saigon with committing Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL F'3IS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 "extremely serious and systematic acts of violation" which have "posed a diror"t: menace to peace in South Vietnam and rendered the situation in Indochina increasingly tense." Tho maintained that international opinion is protesting these violations and will. not be "deceived" by allied efforts to place the blame on the DRV. According to Tho, a durable peace in Vietnam and Indochina and the normalization of DRV-U.S. relations can be achieved only through a U.S. undertaking to scrupulously implement the Paris accord as well as the act of the inter- national conference on Vietnam. He went on to warn: "Should the United States continue violating the Paris agreement and still scheme to impose its neocolonialism on South Vietnam, the Vietnamese people would resolutely struggle against it, and the United States would certainly not escape another defeat." WATERGATE It is noteworthy that on the eve of the ocheduled DEVELOPMENTS Kissinger-Tho meeting Hanoi's continuing publicity for developments in the Watergate case has included references to its possible effect on the Presidential adviser. Thus, a 16 May Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese, citing numerous Western press reports on Watergate, quoted REUTER as speculating that Kissinger's position might be undermined. A 1 May Hanoi broadcast had mentioned BBC speculation that Kissinger was affected by the Watergate affair because it would have an impact on U.S. foreign as well as domestic policies. On 28 April Liberation Radio, on the other hand, cited an AFP report which set Kissinger apart from the Watergate case since those involved were not members of Kissinger's "group." WHITE BOOK The text of the DRV White Book on alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the Paris agreement, transmitted by VNA on 10 May, was said to have been issued three days earlier by the DRV Foreign Ministry's Press and Information Department. The only previous DRV White Book issued during the war, on 10 July 1965, purported to document "20 years of U.S. intervention and aggression" in Vietnam; since 1965, however, the DRV Foreign Ministry has periodically released "memoranda" indicting the United States in a similar fashion.* It seems likely that the current White Book is * The last such memorandum, issued 27 July 1972, is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 5-6. Pre'.rious memoranda were issued to mark the 20 July anniversary of the Geneva agreement in 1966, 1968, and 1969. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 aimed at influencing world public opinion as well as at bolstering the rommunists' position in the Paris discussions.* The White Book placed particular stress on U.S. responsibility for alleged Saigon violations of the Paris agreement, basing this stand in broad terms on President Nixon's statement in his 23 January speech, announcing the peace accord, that the United States will continue to recognize the GVN as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam. "By this cynical distortion of the agreement," the White Book charged, "the White House has given the green light to the Saigon administration to use all ways and means to oppose the implementation of the agreement in a bid to maintain the Thieu regime." The White Book attributed more specific responsibility to the United States for the problem of Vietnamese civilian prisoners. While the Paris agreement left this issue to be settled by the PRG and GVN, the communists have previously hinted that the United States had privately agreed to take some responsibility. The White Book claimed that Washington "has formally undertaken to ensure the return of all captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel within the 90-day time limit." This claim was previously broached in the 14 April PRG memorandum, sent to participants in the 12-power international conference, which said that the United States had made a commitment that the majority of Vietnamese civilian personnel would be returned within 60 days of the signing of the accord and all of them returned within 90 days.** The White Book underlined its contention with the argument that "it is not proper that the United States tries only to bring back the captured personnel of the U.S. side without fulfilling its obligation to urge the Saigon administration to immediately return all captured and detained Vietnamese military and civilian personnel." * It is noteworthy in this regard that Hanoi's VNA office transmitted similar documentary material on alleged allied violations of the peace accord to its Paris branch on 24 April, three days before the opening of the meetings in Paris between U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan and DRV Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thanh--meetings which were to lay the groundwork for the Kissinger-Tho talks. These earlier materials apparently were not publicized by Hanoi media, nd it is not known if they were ever made public or otherwise used by DRV representatives. ** For background, see the TRENDS of 18 April 1972, page 3. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 The White Book's many-faceted indictment of he GVN included the charge that Saigon has deliberately created obstacles for the GVN-PRG consultative conference which has been meeting outside Paris since 19 March. It reiterated the six-point PRG program presented at the 25 April session of the consulta- tive talks and scored the GVN proposal made on the same occasion. The White Book particularly criticized the Saigon plan for calling for the withdrawal of non-southern Vietnamese troops, charging that the question was not included in the Paris agreement. By making this a prerequisite, the White Book contended, the GVN has put its plan "beyjnd the framework of the Paris agreement on Vietnam, thereby making its 'proposals' null, and void from the legal as well as the practical point of view." The White Book's conclusion again focused attention on the alleged responsibility of the United States in Vietnam, contending that the serious situation in Vietnam and Indochina lie in U.S. unwillingness to give up past policies, strictly end its military involvement and intervention in South Vietnam, and give up its "design of carrying out U.S. neocolonialism in Indochina." It called up;n fraternal socialist countries and others to "expose and condemn in time" the alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the accord and to "put up a resolute struggle to compel the United States to give up its neocolonialist policy" arLd implement the agreement. U.S. ACCUSED OF REPEATED AIR ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM The first Vietnamese communist claim that U.S. planes had attacked PRG-controlled territory in South Vietnam came in broadcasts on the 11th which cited alleged attacks in Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces from 2 to 9 May. A 12 May PRG Foreign Ministry statement singled out raids on th,,a 9th as the most serious, describing in detail bombing and steafing by four successive waves of U.S. F-4's against the PRG-controlled areas in Loc Ninh, Binh Long Province. Characterizing the alleges strikes as "direct military acts by the U.S. Government," the statement called them "extremely gross violatioi,.s" of Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Paris accord and Articles 1 and 2 of the protocol on the cease-fire and the JMC. It demanded an end to U.S. and Saigon reconnaissance flights as well as the U.S. "bombing and spellings" of PRG areas. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 The PRG's concern over the alleged attacks was also expressed on the 12th by the spokesman for the PRG delegation to the JMC at a press conference. According to Liberation Radio on the 13th, the spokesman specified that U.S. and Saigon aircraft had carried out reconnaissance over and bombed or strafed PRG-controlled areas from Loc Ninh to Xa Mat, Tay Ninh Province, on 2 May and daily from the 5th through the 9th. He also charged that B-52's had "intruded into the airspace" of these areas in April, bombing the "South Vietnam-Camuodia border area anti inflicting heavy losses in lives and property on the Vietnamese and Khmer people in the border area." The radio indicated that in response to newsmen's questions the spokesman supported his contention of U.S. involvement by nointelly noting that "only the United States uses B-52's, F-4's, and F-105's." FuLther alleged U.S. air strikes, on 12 May, were denounced in broadcasts on the 13th, including accounts of a protest attributed to the NFLSV and PRG committees of "Binh Phuoc Province"--the communist designation for the GVN provinces of Binh Long and Phuoc Long. The communists charged that on the 12th the United States carried out reconnaissance and then sent two F-4 jets to strafe Loc Tan--a village on Highway 13, about five kilometers northwest of Loc Ninh district capital. The alleged attack of the 12th was protested in a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 14th. Also on the 14th, the PRG announced that its delegation to the JMC had sent notes to he ICCS cn 12 and 13 May scoring alleged U.S. and Saigon air intrusions and attacks on PRG areas in Tay Ninh and Binh Long since the beginning of April and demanding that the ICCS investigate the U.S. "violations." The 14 May spokesman's statement rejected as a "cover-up" the denials of communist charges by the U.S. embassy in Saigon. It charged that the United States "has not truly made up its mind to end its war of aggression, since it is itself directly violating the cease-fire and continuing its military involvement in Vietnam." The statement added.: "This certainly will lead to the danger of involving the U.S. again in Le --onflict in Vietnam and Indochina as before 27 January 1973." The U.S. embassy's denial was also strongly rejected in a 13 May NHAN DAN article which asserted that "the bombing was no mistake." It claimed, to buttress this view, that the air attacks had been on many days and in many planes which had long been under the control of the PRG, in particular at Xa Mat which was chosen as a PRG point of entry. The article warned that the United States should not attempt to convey a threat with such bombings and reaffirmed that no intimidation can shake Vietnamese determination. Approved For Release 19941A-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 An article in the 13 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN claimed that the alleged attacks, along with such actions as a reported U.S. reconnaissance flight over North Vietnam on the 10th,* undercut White House statements that the Kissinger-Tho talks are aimed at shoring up the peace agreement. A 15 May DRV Foreign Ministry statement, endorsing the PRG protests of the 12th and 14th, also noted that the alleged attacks had occurred just before the n;eeting between the U.S. and DRV representatives. DRV, PRG COMMENT ON PROBLEMS OF PEACE-KEEPING IN THE SOUTH NHAN DAN ON ICCS A 9 May article in NHAN DAN, under the signature Lam Dong, for the first time attacked Washington and Saigon for "criticizing" and "pressuring" Hungary and Poland over their actions as members of the ICCS. As evidence the article cited a U.S. "note" in late April accusing Poland and Hungary of failing to perform their duties adequately and the U.S. cancellation of a Polish visit to the United States. The article maintained that U.S. and Saigon "slanders and pressure" against Hungary and Poland in fact "prove that the delegates of these two countries to the ICCS have performed their duties in a correct and serious manner." Consistent with past Hanoi criticism of the Canadian ICCS contingent, NHAN DAN article also scored the GVN for remarks by a spokesman on 7 May complimenting the chief Canadian representative, Gauvin. Gauvin has been periodically criticized in Hanoi and PRG media since he censured the communists at a 13 April session of the ICCS and implied that an ICCS helicopter downed on 7 April might have been fired on by North Vietnamese troops.** Some commentaries have suggested that Canada's role on the ICCS is undermined by its attitude. A 2 May Hanoi radio commentary, for example, cited an instance where a Canadian representative had refused to go along with a report signed by the other ICCS members and commented that if such acts recur "the Canadian side will have lost its status as an objective party in charge of supervising and controlling the implementation of the Paris agreement." * The alleged 10 May overflight prompted a protest statemen* by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 12th. Unlike protests of air intrusions on 19 and 24 Aptil which claimed flights over a wide area of the DRV heartland, the 12 May statement only charged an ini:rusion over the southernmost province of Quang Binh. ** See the "TRENDS of 18 April 1972, pages 4-5. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 DOWNING OF In an unusual admission of a cease-fire violation, JMC COPTER the PRG on 12 May acknowledged that fire from its troops had forced two "Saigon" helicopters to land south of An Loc, Binh Long Province. Judging by the Liberation Radio account, the acknowledgment--at a press conference given by the PRG delegation to the JMC--did not go so far as to note that one of the helicopters was hit by the fire. The press conference spokesman reported that PRG officers were on board the helicopters, although he did not specify that they were JMC helicopters. Fe declared that the incident was "regrettable" and that the local administration was conducting an investigation into its cause. Implicitly offering a justification for the shooting, Liberation Radio's report on the spokesman's remarks concluded by charging that during the first days of May the United States and Saigon had carried out reconnaissance and air strikes in the area where the incident occurred. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 RAY 1973 PEKING GIVES MUTED RESPONSE TO ALLIES' CALLS FOR SUPPORT Against the background if recent authoritative Vietnamese communist calls for international support at a time when the Vietnam settlement is shaky and new consultations in Paris are in the offing, Peking has maintained a discreetly low posture and has demonstrated a reluctance to underwrite its allies' claims. While duly resorting the series of Vietnamese notes and statements on violations of the Paris agreement, including the 14 and 16 April PRG and DRV notes to the inter- national conference participants, Peking has been sparing in its authoritative comment on Indochina, and even this comment has been occasioned by anniversaries for which Chinese pronounce- ments have been virtually mandatory. The last authoritcive Chinese commentary pegged to a current development was the 20 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article protesting U.S. air str.kes in Cambodia and Laos. In what may be a move by Hanoi to conduct close consultations with Peking, North Vietnamese Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan arrived on the 11th on the same plane as Le Duc Tho but not as a member of the Tho delegation. Peking has taken a markedly more relaxed view of current Indochinese developments than that of its Vietnamese allies, softpedaling charges against the United States and expressing only minimal support for the Indochinese communists. In the most recent authoritative comment, ranking Chinese military leader Yeh Chien-ying, addressing a Peking re?:eption on 25 April marking the Indochinese summit anniversary, acknowledged that the Indochinese are faced with "arduous fighting tasks" and that the Vietnam and Laos agreements have been beset with "continual obstruction" by the United States and Saigon. But he failed to echo the Vietnamese speakers' denunciation of "perfidious schemes" and "insolent threats" by the United States designed to thwart the Indochinese struggle. A Chinese leaders' message on the occasion pledged that the Chinese will "resolutely support and assist" the Indochinese struggle, but it stopped well short of the previous yaar's strong avowals of backing--at a time of major military at.tivity--when the Chinese called it their "bounden internationalist duty" to assist the Indochinese and said China provided a "reliable rear area" for the struggle. Chinese pickups of Vietnamese comment have also reflected the divergence in approach between Peking and the Vietnamese. NCNA's account of a 25 April NHAN DAN editorial on the Indochina Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 summit anniversary carefully avoided portraying American actions aq endangering the Indochinese accords by omitting passages chu:?.,iug that U.S. /ielations were threatening the peace tlgreemnnts rnd accusing Washington of attempting to intimidate the. L`T V. Similarly, in ci!porting the substance of the current 1,RV 1Thite Book on allegei3 U.S. and Saigon violations of Lite peace accord, Peking omitted the document's assertion that these v,:olations were threatening the peace in Indochina. Peking also deleted all criticism of the Nixon Administration by name, skirted charges focusing on U.S. intentit'ns and alleging the use of "inpudent threats" in V;etnam, and deleted all references to the 24 April U.S. note on implementation of the Paris agreement. SINO-':'IETNAMESE In keeping with its low posture, ?'eking gave RELATIONS only bare-bones treatment to Le Duc Tho's 11-12 May stopover. PeL ng took note of the purpose of his return to Paris only by citing TFnoi's announcement. Unlike Peking's cov:rage of many of his previous stopovers, NCNA did not report any of the remarks at Tho's meeting with Chou En-lai or at the banquet given by Chang Chun-chiao, and the only characterization of the atmosphere at either occasion was the standard formula that "a very cordial and friendly conversath n" took place at the meeting. As has frequently been the case, NCNA reported that Tho met with a ranking Cambodian leader in Peking, in this instance Penn Nouth, but for the first time there was no characterization of the atmosphere. The arrival of Hoang Van Hoan, who has long figured in inter- national communist relations and was Hanoi's ambassador in Peking in thk 1950's, suggests a need felt by Hanoi to have a Politburo- level officiai in Peking for consultations and perhaps hard bargaining ov'sr support for the North Vietnamese. .:CNA's announcements on Tho's arrival and departure made clear that Iloan was not ;i part of the DRV delegation going to Paris but had only arrived on the same plane. Hoan had also been present in Peking in mid-November at a time when Tho made another stopover and when a DRV aid delegation arrived. He subsequently was in the Soviet Union for several weeks, arriving in Moscow on 18 December as a member of Truong Chinii's delegation to the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations and staying until 26 January, well after Truong Chinh had returned home. There have been signs that the North ''ietnamese have been grasping for signs of Chinese support which Peking has been reluctant to put on record. Where NCNA's account of Yeh Chien-ying's speech at Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FiIS TRENDS .16 MAY 1.973 the Indochina summit observance cited a bland Chinese pledge to "firmly support" the Indochinese, VNA quoted him further as reaffirming the PRC's "close militant friendship and great solidarity" with the Indochinese and as promising assistance for their struggles. More notc.bly, VNA on 5 May reportted that Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan, speaking at an undated rec ption for n South Vietnamese trade union delegation, "warmly praised the great victory of the V etnamese people in the anti-U.S. resistance," condemned the United States and Saigon for violating the Paris agreement, and pledged continuing Chinese support until the VietnamEse have "won complete victory." In Peking's only reference to a meeting between Yso and this delegation, an NCNA account of various May Day celebrations in Peking :Involving Chinese leaders and foreign visitors noted that Yao and others met the Vietnamese along with Albanian and Somali groups. NCNA did not indicate what was said at any of .he celebrations. SIHANOUK, INSURGENT LEADERS STRESS HARD LINE ON SETTLEMENT In moves presumably timed for the Kissinger-Tho talks in Faris, Prince Sihanouk and the Cambodian in-country insurgent leaders have in recent days strongly reaffirmed their opposition to a compromise involving an accommodation with the Phnom Penh govetnment. According to NCNA reportri of Sihanouk's current foreign tour? the prince took the occasion of his stops in Senegal and Guinea to affirm his government's "sacred mission of riddin4 the U.S. neocolonialist system established in Phnom Penh since March 1970 and of liberating the entire national territory of Cambodia," adding that he "will never agree to negotiate or become reconciled with the Phnom Penh traitors today or tomorrow, nex.. year, or at a more distant date." Similarly, the "three ministers in the interior" have since 4 May issued a series of five appeals calling on Cambodians under P!,nom Penh's rule to revolt against Lon Nol and reiterating the rigid line on a settlement that marked their last series of appeals during February. The current FUNK appeals harshly denounce the "sham peace and cease-fire tricks" of the United States and the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam clique* and categorically affirm the insurgents' determination to use armed force to destroy the Phnom Penh regime. * Recent comment in FUNK media on the new hnom Penh ruling political council. has duly noted Cheng Heng's presence among the four-man council. His absence from the rogues' gallery denounced in the series of appeals, and the absence Lrom these appeals of any reference to the new council, suggest that they were composed prior ApproveEPt6P' 'gI a999' f/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 Recent Chinese and VietnameHe comment has avoided the settle- ment question. Hanoi has concentrated on condemning American military actions In Cambodia and noting Congressional opposition to Nixon Administrntiai policies, while Peking has focused on signs of weakness and discord in the Phnom Penh leadership. Though mo_,e gingerly than Hanoi, the Chinese have also called attention to American domestic opposition to U.S. actions in Cambodia. An 11 May NCNA report on Secretary Richardson's Congressional testimony on U.S. bombing in Cambodia noted that American "public opinion" is "very much concerned" about U.S. involvement and that there is "ever stronger" Congressional opposition. The report noted in passing that the House had passed an amendment prohibiting the use of funds for military operations in Cambodia. Soviet coverage remains limited to low-level reports on the fighting between the "patriotic" and regime forces as well as reports on the U.S. bombing. PRAVDA on the 12th carried a dispatch highlighting Senator Mansfield's opposition to the bombing as representing a widely shared sentiment in Congress. The Soviets have avoided raising the question of a settlement and have given no publicity to Sihanouk's current tour, as they bad ignored his March trip into Cambodia. (TASS sent a point-to- point dispatch from Dakar reporting Sihanouk's arrival there, but the report was not disseminated in the media.) LPF ISSUES COMMUNIQUE ON STATUS OF VIENTIANE NEGOTIATIONS For three weeks after the return to Vientiane in late April by Phoumi Vongvichit, secretary general of the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF), Pathet Lao media had carried no authoritative evaluation of the status of the prolonged talks with the Royal Lao Government (RLG) on implementing the 21 February cease-fire accord.* This silence was broken on 12 May when the LPF delegation issued a communique at a press conference in Vientiane asserting that Phoumi had presented a draft protocol "containing reasonable proposals for the concrete settlement of the military and political questions" but that the RLG, "under the pressure of the U.S. imperialists and the ultrareactionaries," had raised "unreasonable and tendentious" counterproposals in an effort to obstruct the talks * Phoumi's return to Vientiane and a 23 April LP;' Central Committee statement on the talks are discussed in the TRENDS of 7S April 1973, pages 7-8. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 and "sabotage" the agreement.* Although the head of the LPF delegation, Phoun Sipraseuth, reported at the press conference that "generally speaking, the negotiations achieved some progress," the communique gave nn indication that significant resolution of differences hat! been accomplished during Phoumi's four meetings with RLG Premier Souvanna Phouma and seven meetings with RLG chief negotiator Pheng Phongsavan. The LPF's issuing of the communique seems to reflect an estimate that the talks will be prolonged and that it is in the LPF's interest to publicize its position from time to time. The communique complained that the RLG has been boycotting the plenary sessions that had been held regularly every Tuesday until 27 March; these meetings had presented an occasion for both sides to issue statements and meet with the press. The communique announced that pending the resumption of these meetings the LPF delegation had the "obligation to regularly inform the press about the progress of the talks in order to correctly inform the broad public opinion which is following the Vientiane talks with interest." The communique also focused sharply on the possibility that the apr_ement would be submitted for approval by the RLG to the "ac-called" National Assembly, which began its 1973 session in Vientiane on 11 May. This niuvc: wan viewed as an attempt to obstruct national reunification and the restoration of peace in Laos through the device of a body that "has nothing to do with this agreement and has no right to check its implementation." Several commentaries broadcast by Path::c Lao radio have pointed out that the National Assembly is domtnated by the "ultra- reactionary" Phouei Sananikone, the president of the assembly. Pathet Lao media publicized a few of the remarks made by LPF delegation head Phoun Sipraseuth at the press conference but they ignored his statement that the existence of a formal Indochina front comprising Lao, Vietnamese and Cambodian "patriotic forces" * A draft of the communique was transmitted to Vientiane and Hanoi on 9 May over a Pathet Lao service radioteletype circuit emanating from northeast Laos. Although the delegation in Vientiane was instructed to modify the draft if deemed necessary and "to send the full text of your version to us by teletype for broadcast In a timely manner," there were only minor differences between the draft and the text which was made public on 12 May. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 was a fabrication of "imperialist propagandists," an assertion reported in Moscow radio broadcasts in Lao. Phoun was quoted by Moscow as saying "that the Lao patriotic forces are Implementing an independent policy and are not attached to the so-called Indochina front." The Pathet Lao radio, however, did attribute to him a remark accusing the RLG of trying to avoid a stipulation in the agreement allotting an equal number of ministerial posts to both sides in the projected provisional government, a charge not made previously. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFLIENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 1.6 MAY 1973 U. S, - USSR MOSCOW OPTIMISTIC BUT CAUTIOUS ON BREZHNEV VISIT The 12 May announcement of Brezhnev's for.thcc.ai.ng visit to the United States has been given moderate attentt.on thus far in Soviet press and radio commentary. While it is too soon to say what Moscow's eventual public attitude toward the visit will be, the commentary thus far available reflects a bland of optimism and caution. The more optimistic side of the picture was stressed by IZVESTIYA's political observer Matveyev in the Moscow radio roundtable discus- sion on the 13th. Taking up the visit after a review of Moscow's achievemeuts in bringing about a detente atmosphere in Europe, Matveyev presented a decidedly buoyant assessment of its significance. He placed particular stress on distinguishing the present period in international relations from the "cold war" period that preceded it, suggesting that the changes introduced by the Mo.=-w summit meeting last year had initiated a new historical era. While noting obstacles being placed in the way of Soviet-Americaa relations by "Zionist" circles opposed to granting most-favv~-ed-nation status to the Soviet Union--an indispensable cond'.cion, he said, for Soviet-American trade--he concluded th;L th,ise who are "for commonsense, for realism in foreign policy" will prevail. A similarly optimistic but more cautious note was struck by Yuriy Zhukov in a PRAVDA article, summarized for radio listeners in North America on the 14th. While reiterating some of the points made by Matveyev, Zhukov dwelt more on the developments in Soviet policy leading up to the visit, as though setting forth a justification for Brezhnev's visit. He stressed in particular the "historic importance" of the document on basic principles signed by the principals at last year's summit meeting, noting that it has been evaluated by the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Soviet Government as creating "the prerequisites in international law" for the development of ties and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States on a long-term basis. He stressed in this connection and elsewhere itt the article that a normaliza- tion of Soviet-U.& relations would not be prejudicial to the interests of third countries. Also apparently reflecting a concern to forestall criticisms from Moscow's more militant CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 allies, Zhukov sprinkled his text with appropriately militant phraseology; he specifically condemned U.S. bombing in Cambodia and violations the agreements to end the war in South Vietnam and Laos as among the "thorns" barring the path to better relations. Moscow media have also carried reports on U.S. events related to the visit, such as Presidential adviser Kissinger's 13 May press conference on his negLtiations in Moscow. This reporting has been generally straightforward, conveying the impression that a forward momentum is under way in Soviet-American relations and that it is likely to lead to positive results. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL - 17 - EUROPE FORCE CUTS FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 SOVIET BLOC IMPLIES HUNGARY'S EXCLUSION PERMANENT Moscow and its allies have taken a strong public position on the "compromise" agreement regarding procedures and participa; reached at the Vienna preparatory talks on European force reductions (MBFR), maintaining that the agreement is binding not only for the current talks but also for the subsequent formal negotiations. The compromise, which categorized Hungary among the eight "special" participants rather than among the 11 full participants, made it possible for the 19 NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives on 14 May to hold their first plenary session since the talks began on 31 January. Repeatedly referring to the agreement as a "compromise" between the NATO and Pact sta~ed, Moscow and those of its allies which have commented directly o,1 the agreement--Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw--have avoided saying outright that the decision on Hungary's "special" designation in the talks represented an acceptance of their position but have clearly implied that they regard it that way. TASS ON FIRST SESSION Moscow made its stand clear in a care- fully worded TASS report issued on the 15th. Summarizing "proposals submitted" by USSR delegation leader Oleg Khlestov at the opening plenum, and making no reference to explanatory statements by representatives of the West, TASS conveyed the impression that all the Soviet interpretations on contentious issue. had been unanimously approved. Without directly referring to the disputed ise%ie of Hungarian and Italian participation, TASS maintained that the NATO countries had tried unsuccessfully "to secure a decision which would give them unilateral military advantages." Outlining the details of the Soviet "proposals," TASS said 11 states would be parties "to agreements concerning the area of central Europe where the military confrontation is of a particularly dangerous nature." Although the question of "how" a force reduction was to be carried out would be discussed in the future negotiations, TASS said, it was assumed that a reduction "should cover both the national troops of the countries; of the area of central Europe (the FRG, Benelux, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) and foreign troops stationed in the area (U.S., British, Canadian, and Sovier)." TASS added that decisions would be made on a consensus basis. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 As for the "other participants" in the consultations--here TASS followed the agreed procedure in listing Hungary along with Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Romania, and Turkey--the TASS report said they "will not be covered by future agreements." But the report went on to assert--in apparent defiance of the West's position that the question of participation in future substantive negotiations remains open--that the "submitted proposals also define the procedures for both the preparatory consultations and the future talks." The only acknowledgment in the TAGS report that there were any issues left undecided was a reference to the "understanding" that "the question of inviting other European states" (read: France) as observers for participation in the talks may be considered. TASS concluded that the plenary session "unanimously approved the submitted proposals." BUDAPEST, WARSAW REPORTS Moscow's allies, particularly Budapest and Warsaw, have been even more direct in suggesting that the present "compromise" agreement would be binding for the official negotiations as well as for the preparatory talks. Hungary's NEPSZABADSZAG on the 13th said the "compromise is consistent with the principle of equal security," a principle on which "the socialist states will insist at the substantive talks as well." The head of the Hungarian MBFR delegation, Endre Ustor, was reported by MTI as saying at a press conference on the 14th that Hungary would be able to consider participating in any possible decisions only if "satisfactory conditions" were fulfilled; Vienna's DIE PRESSE on the 15th quoted Ustor as saying Hungary would participate as a full member "only if Italy participates as well; this is the main condition." MTI cited Ustor as also stressing that there is no difference between Hungary and the other seven states with "special" status. Interpreting these remarks on a Budapest television program on the 15th, a reporter asserted: "We are prepared to take part in the negotiations with full status only if Italy also takes part in the decisions." Expressing much the same view for the Polish side, Warsaw's PAP commentator Andrzej Rayzacher stated on the 14th that "a very essential element [in the agreementl is the fact that the under- standings concerning participation and procedures will be binding both in the course of the current consultation: and during the negotiations which are being prepared." CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 THE CONCEPTUAL ISSUE The clearest exposition on record of the rationale behind these Soviet bloc views was presented by Hungarian military specialist Istvan Kormendy in the 6 May issue of the Budapest weekly MAGYARORSZAG. Declaring that "central Europe must be viewed from a strategic rather than a geographic" point of view, Kormendy went on to explain how the qu.ation of Hungary's participation impinged on this conceptual issue: The reduction zone outlined after two or three, years of internal NATO debate is unacceptable to the. Warsaw Pact members. Zones consisting of the FRG and the Benelux countries and one of the GDR-Po].and- Czechoslovakia-Hungary would mean, for one thing, that all Soviet forces stationed abroad would come under limitation while the .Americans would station troops in numerous other countries of Western Europe, including Italy. If for no other reason than this, it would make sense for Italy and Hungary to have the same status at the talks: both'or neither should belong in the reduction zone. Only under such conditions, Kormendy concluded, could a reduction of forces in harmony with the principle of equal security--that is, "a proper and mutually acceptable 'state of equilibrium"'-- be achie..led . CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 iIIDDLE EAST MOSCOW SUSTAINS CAUTIOUS COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN LEBANON Moscow's continued cautious treatment of developments stemming from the army-fedayeen clashes in Lebanon suggests its concern to see the conflict resolved. Maintaining an essentially even- handed approach toward the Lebanese and the Palestinians, Moscow has cited both sides' reassurances concerning their peaceful intentions and their efforts to eliminate the unspecified "causes" of the conflict. But implicit admonitions to potential troublemakers were apparent in PRAVDA's criticism of the actions of Palestinian "extremists" and in treatment of Syria's role in the crisis. An initial PRAVDA account of the clashes noted that they developed following incidents involving "Palestinian partisans," and PRAVDA on the 12th remonstrated against the actions of extremist elements within the resistance movement. Such a rebuke was issued in the wake of Israel's 9-10 April raid in Beirut, and in both instances PRAVDA's criticism was broadcast to Arab audiences. Apprehension over possible Syrian intervention was reflected in an Arabic-language commentary on the 14th which pointedly omitted Syria in naming some Arab states which contributed to easing the Lebanese crisis. PRAVDA on the 10th had repcrted without comment that Syria had condemned Lebanese actions against the Palestinian resistance movement., and the following day cited Israeli Defense Minister Dayan as warning of Israeli actions in the event of further conflict in Lebanon and "on the Lebanese-Syrian border." Mcscow has predictably accused Israel of aggravating the situation through military maneuvers and threatening statements. It has made no mention of the United States in connection with the conflict, ignoring rrports in U.S. and Arab media that Washington was considering Rending small arms ammunition to Lebanon. The propaganda has gone no further than charges that imperialist-directed "subversive elements" were at least partially responsible for the clashes. Approved For Release 199NTdAA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 YUGOSLAVIA DOLANC REPORT AT LCY CONFERENCE SCORES NATIONALISM In a lengthy report to the Fourth Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) on 10 May, LCY Secretary Stane Dolanc claimed successes in the purge of dissident elements initiated by Tito's disciplinary letter to the party last October. At the same time, the second-ranking Yugoslav party leader stressed that the struggle against rationalism--"the mustering point of all class enemies"--would continue. Dolanc's report, released by TANJUG on the 9th, was based on a lengthier report by the LCY Presidium, sections of which had been released in the form of summaries prior to the conference. The LCY conference, the third to be held since the start of last year, was not attended by Tito, whose absence was explained by Dolanc at a press conference reported by TANJUG on the 11th. Tito, he said, "is resting on the advice of his doctor because of exhaustion." Insisting that the Yugoslav leader's health was "excellent," Dolanc denied rumors that Tito would give up any of his party or state posts but conceded that "chan-.es" of a ceremonial nature would be made so as "not to burden thci president with unnecessary protocol duties." Tito addressed the two previous LCY conferences last year, in January and December. Dolanc pointed to progress in c^.nbatting factions--"combinations"-- in the party allegedly guilty of "technocrat ism, liberalism, nationalism, and bourgeois bureaucratism" and abetted by liberal sympathizers abroad. Such "ill-intentioned" sympathizers, he charged, portrayed the purge as "a struggle for power" and tried to "create some kind of fighters for democracy, humanism, and progress out of the people who had to leave--I repeat, had to leave--the LCY." Dolanc stressed that "the open and public character" of the purge had enabled the Yugoslav public "to come out firmly in favor" of the LCY's policy of self-management at home and nonalinement abroad. But he went on to warn that the struggle against nationalism and its causes must remain "a lasting everyday task" for the Yugoslav party. The LCY Secretary wa: more emphatic than Tito had been in his February interview wj.th VJESNIK in denying that the purge represented CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 a departure from the main lines of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy. He ttributed this view to "dogruatist, etatist-centralist, . id neo-Stalinist forces" in the country who considered the purge "a modification of our policy and a correction and repairing of the mistakes made by the LCY in the past." He underscored the point by recalling the party's fight against "anti-self-management tendencies" in the past, beginning "in 1948 at the time of our struggle against Stalinism." On foreign affairs, Dolanc reiterated Yugoslavia's nonalinement policy in general terms without elaboration. However, the international section of the LCY Presidium's report, which TANJUG had summarized on the 7th, included praise for Tito's Tune 1972 visit to the USSR, calling his talks with Brezhnev "a new success" in developing cooperation between the two states and parties. The report also stressed the LCY's adherence to. "independence, equality, mutual respect," and "noninterference" in relations with "other parties and move- ments." Regarding European security, the report reiterated the traditional Yugoslav principle of nonalinement and opposition to blocs. A Belgrade-datelined TASS dispatch published in PRAVDA on the 12th predictably highlighted those passages in the LCY Presidium's report on the purge of liberal and nationalist elements and on Tito's June.1972 visit to the USSR. While duly noting the LCY's positions on interparty relations, the dispatch characteristically ignored the references to nonalinement. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL i'lIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1.973 USSR-CHINA RIVAL EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE NATIONAL MINORITIES CONTINUE Long a factor in border tension and an index of Sino-Soviet hostility, rival efforts to manipulate and control the national minorities in the Central. Asian borderlands have persisted in the climate of unabated Sino-Soviet antagonism. Soviet broad- c -s to the border regions in Uighur, Kazakh, and Mongolian pl.,:y up resentments among the Turkic and Mongolian minorities in tlia PRC over what the broadcasts describe as forcible assim'.lation and colonization of the minorities by the Chinese, destruction of the minorities' national cultures, and the contrast between the oppression found in the PRC and the flourishing life of the minorities on the Soviet side of the border. A favorite device for drawing this contrast is to quote statements by refugees from the PRC, as in a recent broadcast in Uighur quoting a refugee from Sinkiang as expressing satisfa-tion over the opportunities afforded Uighurs in the USSR and saying he had been accused by the Chinese of advocating "pan-Tt,rkism." Some of the more inflammatory Soviet propaganda revives memories of past revolts and separatist movements against the Chinese, as in broadcasts from Tashkent in Uighur recalling the establishment of an independent "East Turkestan" republic in Sinkiang in the 1940's. Another sensitive subject is the charge of Chinese gerrymandering of regions inhabited by minorities and the resettling of Han Chinese into these regions as a means of maintaining control. Relating this charge to a development growing out of the border confronts!ion, broadcasts beamed to Inner Mongolia over Radio Peace and Progress have pointed out that this area was recarved into newly drawn military regions for strategic reasons at the height of border tension in 1969. The:,e broadcasts have also noted that Chinese troops have been ent to the border regions and urban youth assigned to the paramilitary production and construction corps in response to a "fabricated" Soviet threat. On the:! part, the Chinese cite border defense as one of the aims in the a.celerated program for rustication of urban youth. An NCNA report on 5 May invoked Chou En-tai's authority behind the campaign to send urban youth to join the Sinkiang production and construction corps as "an important force in building up and defending China's northwest frontiers." This report was subsequently carried as the lead item in broadcasts by Radio CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONFIDENTIAL rilS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 Peking to the USiR. PRC reglon'il broadcasts seek to foster a sense of unity by playing up the role of both Nan Chinese you'. h and minority youth in developing and guarding "the front lint of antirevisionism." ILICHEV RETURNS Though there have been no signs of progress TO PEKING toward resolving the border dispute, the situation appears to have remained stabilized since the two sides agreed to open negotiations in October 1969 and to defuse the explosive situation that had developed that year. One sign of a stabilized situation is Moscow's maintenance in Peking of a negotiating team h=aded by a deputy foreign minister. In keeping with recent practice, TASS announced on 15 May that Soviet chief negotiator Ilichev -Fong with Ambassador Tolstikov returned to Peking that day, having presurt:ably gone to Moscow for the recent CPSU plenum. There was no ment,-)n of Chinese officials meeting them at the airport and no Chinese announcement on their return. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CON FLDEN'I'IAL l BIS ;'WP;NDS ' ', MAY 1973 C H I N A EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITIES ENCOURAGED TO ENHANCE QUALITY As part of Its atL'1mpL to control the Impact of the 1,in PLac: affair and to cunbat tendencies toward both rcrrlntinations on lo.'er levels i%nd imldity on Lhe part of bewLidered local cadres, the regime has sought to make IL clear that efforts to rebut ld a quality educational system are not to be clef leered by concern over who ther a shift of. l fnc ntig;ht find educational. authorlLles caught moving in the wrong direction. WhiIc narrowing the target of attack on Lin and his cohorts for :heir "uitrarlghtisL" role in the power struggle rat the top, the regime has also continued to attack various .leftist policies aHsociatcd with the "swindlers," including their approach to the sensitlve issue of educational policy. Liaoning, the provincial bailiwick of Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, has been the most forthcoming in calling for intellectuals to adopt a more enthusiastic attitude toward selected cultural revolution "achievements" in educational reform,* but a Shenyang broadcast on 21 Al.ril indicated that in striking the proper balance between "re,l and expert" the trend will continue to be toward expertise. The broadcast gave an unusually candid ar.count of how a party committee In a lical research institute had correctly guided scientific and technical personnel to abandon their "tendency to want to deal with Ideological transformation first and to tackle technical work later." Departing sharply from the cultural revolution's panacea for treating ideological. shortcomings among intellectuals, the party committee led the institute's scientific and technical personnel to "overcome the inclination to take part in manual labor purely for its own sake." The research personnel heeded the advice of local workers who reminded them that "it is good for you to take part in labor work and to strive hard to remold your world outlook" but that "you must not forget that you are also scientific and technical personnel trained by the party and the people. You must put your knowledge to work." Without expressing concern over any elitism in this system--an extremely * See the TRENDS of 18 April 1973, pages 15-1 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 ~. Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 c;ONFII)ENI'IAt, FilLS TRENDS 16 MAY 1973 Ht.nrrltlvc' Huhject. dur flip, the. culturral revolution--the broadcast went on Lc note that. several "Out nLand ing" sc lent I f lc rt:ru technical persontt(I In the plant have been admitted to the CCP +uid that ma- of them have "become' the backbone of the Institute bath politically and professionally and made gratifying ,rr:hI ?vementH In nclentIllc research." The canter has -iddresHed I t.s+e I f specifically to the problem of hesItsutt cadres glving less than full support for raising the duality of educ:Itlcnurl work out of "fear of being held responsible if such acts{ should backfire in the future." PEOPLE'S DAILY on 1 April encouraged teachers to revise and eapplement teaching materials written during, the cultural revolution by the "masses." After noting that even though the new teaching materials were written "under the guldanLe of Chairman Mao's educational revolution Line," PEOPLE'S DAILY admitted: "It must be said that these new teaching materials still leave much room for improvement." The article praised teachers who have "courageously revised and supplemented their current teaching materials" and argued that "it should be permissible" for teachers "to revise and supplement them according to the party educational -,olicy and on the basis of their revolutionary sense of responsibility and their sincere desire to seek truth from facts in order to raise our pedagogical standards to )-igher levels.` School audiurities giving; "little or no support to the teachers in this type of work" weir:' instructed to change this "wrong attitude:" and to encourage teachers to "perfect teaching mit~,rial.s and raise teaching standards?." Teachers should be permitted, PEOPLE'S DAILY declared, to rearrange the contents of their teaching materials according to the learning capacity of the students, to provide additional lessons to maintain coherence In study, and to insert examples of grammatical and idiomatic usage into language-teaching materials where such examples are needed to improve the student's writing ability. The type of educational r::form now being pushed by Chinese leaders differs greatly from the politically charged ones undertaken by student rebels during the cultural revolution. Peking's KWANGMING DAILY on 9 May, for example, announced that it was restoring its special edition on the reform of Chinese characters--a longstanding objective which languished as Red Guards assaulted the educational system. Indicating firm resolve to work for Chinese language reform at this time, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7 CONPII)I,N'I'IAL PHIS TRENDS 16 MAY 1.973 KWANGMINC I)AII,Y will um., the altoclal edition to disC1188 tile Imp ill Icat Ion an (I reurg: nIzn,t ion of Chinertt. cI) nrile tere. popularization of Lite common npuken 1.:tnYunge, teaching the phoncti ., rendition of Lite ClrineH9.1 lany,ua~;e, and tile use of the Ch!!tewe phrenetic alphabet. It wil.I oven "introduce the progrer.ei made by foreign count.rl&H [n reforming the written language: and Htandard[zing both the written and Hpoken of Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060020-7