TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 2, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis w port is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by f DIS without coofdination with other U.S. Government
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INI'ORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENII
2 MAY 1973
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
USSR
Brezhnev Gains Authority, Endorsement of Summit Diplomacy . . . . . 1
RED STAR Stresses Military's Role in Defense Policymaking . . . . . t
EUROPE
Moscow Reserved, East Europe More Vocal on Kissinger Speech . . . . 4
CHINA
Low-Key Celebrations Mark May Day; Most Leaders Appear . . . . . . 6
RED FLAG Explains Line on Conducting Rectification . . . . . . . . 7
Hanoi Scores U.S. Note, Raises Doubt on Kissinger-Tho Meeting . . . 9
PRG Offers Six-Point Program at Consultative Meeting with GVN . . . la.
Massive Hanoi May Day Celebration Hails Communist "Victory" . . . . 13
Moscow Comment Centers on Consolidation of Vietnam Peace . . . . . 16
Peking Reception Marks Indochina Summit Anniversary . . . . . . . . 18
CUBA
Castro's May Day Speech Restates Foreign Policy Positions . . . . . 20
NOTES: China-Philippines; Watergate Developments . . . . . . . . . . 22
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FI3IS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTI011 23 - 29 APRIL 1973
Moscow (2886 items)
Peking (1623 items)
CPSU Central Committee
(--)
10%
Domestic Issues
(36%)
40%
Plenum
Indochina
(25%)
20%
Brezhnev Upcoming Visit
to 1'RG
(--)
9%
[Indochina Summit
Anniversary
(--)
9%]
China
(7%)
5%
[Vietnam
(3%)
4%]
May Day
(6%)
4%
[Cambodia
(]5%)
4%]
Lenin Birth Anniversary
(13%)
4%
[Laos
(3%)
3%]
Vietnam
(4%)
3%
Mexican President
(11%)
14%
Middle East
(4%)
2%
in PRC
PRC Friendship Delega-
tion in Japan
(7%)
3%
Middle East
(5%)
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking dome; tic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the ingthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volu:ae are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may hr,ve been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance,
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CONIC IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973
USSR
BREZHNEV GAINS AUTHORITY, ENDORSEMENT OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY
On the eve of Brezhnev's projected visits to the West, the
Soviet party leader has received strong endorsements of his
detente policy and his role as a world statesman. The
endorsements by the 26-27 April CPSU Central Committee plenum
were appreciably stronger than those made on the eve of the
Moscow summit at the May 1972 plenum. At the same time, the
Kremlin shakeup approved by the plenum--the most extensive
change of its kind in over a decade--served not only to
consolidate Brezhnev's power but also to enhance the status of
the bureaucracies which have been the instruments and supports
of his policymaking leadership.
Brezhnev's role as architect of the Soviet "peace program" and
his personal identification with the succescps already cl3i.med
for that program were highlighted in the plenum resolution?
In addition to acknowledging Brezhnev's "great person-i1 contri-
bution" to statesmanship, the resolution directed the Politburo
to adhere to the "principles and conclusions" contained in his
foreign policy report to the plenum. Such explicit praise for
Brezhnev and such explicit acknowledgment of his policymaking
leadership had been notably absent in the May 1972 plenum
resolution. The current resolution also went out of its way to
endorse the practice of personal diplomacy by the Soviet leaders.
Although the plenum did not break any new ground in foreign
police, it reflected the overriding emphasis which Moscow has
recently placed on expansion of trade and economic relations with
the West. The resolution singled out an "activization" of such
links as an especially effective means of facilitating the
normalization of international relations.
0
In a remarkable show of public support for Brezhnev and his
detente policy, the plenum was addressed by eight Politburo
members and three candidate members--by far the largest
participation by Politburo members in a public party gathering
in the post-Khrushchev period. The previous high of four
members and three candidates was registered at the September
1965 plenum which approved the regime's industrial reform
program.
Brezhnev's personal identification with Soviet foreign policy was
further underscored by his reception of the Lenin Peace Prize,
&
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CONFIDENTIAL FiIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973
announced in the central press on May Day. Moreover, his
enhanced position in the leadership was reflected in a change
in the Politburo listings occasioned by the elevation of
lndropov to full membership in that body. In a departure from
the standard alphabetical listings of Politburo members, a
Moscow domestic radio broadcast of the May Day festivities in
Real Square listed Brezhnev first among those on the reviewing
stand atop the Lenin Mausoleum, followed by the rest of the
Politburo in alphabetical order. Such a device for singling out
the party leader was utilized sparingly even in the hhrushchev
period, and it remains to be seen whether it will become
regularized in the future.
RED STAR STRESSES MILITARY'S ROLE IN DEFENSE POLICYMAKING
In the first of a projected series of articles on Soviet military
theory, RED STAR has taken a subtly partisan position on the
critical issue of the military's role in the making of defense
policy. Authored by Lt. Gen. I. Zavyalov, whose previous
;._~.,~~*ifi-^t'nn^ ^?~^^~^* r rr-v!fi.nns ?..+irh the Genera] Staff, the
19 April article goes over familiar ground In describing the
main characteristics of Soviet military doctrine. It offers some
new formulations, however, or. the question of the authorship of
Soviet military doctrine, suggesting that the military's role in
this process is the primary one. It also suggests that the
driving force behind the changes to be expected in Soviet
military policy in the future will be a product more of military
than of pol{tical inputs into the policymaking process. The
elevation of Marshal Grechko to the Politburo should serve, at
least, to strengthen any such tendencies.
Zavyalov's assignment of a primary role to the military in the
formulation of Soviet military doctrine is indirect but
unmistakable. He begins with an obeisance to party authority by
noting that military doctrine 3.s in "complete accordance" with
par!:y policy and that, indeed, its substance is set forth in the
specific decisions of the party on military matters. He then
goes on to state, however, that the "discovery and generalization"
of the propositions on which party decisions are based is the
task of "our military-scientific thought."
Far from leaving the matter at this level of logical innuendo,
Zavyalov goes on to reinforce the implications of his definition
by identifying Soviet military thought with the reigning Soviet
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COW1DENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973
orthodoxies of the moment. He describes Soviet military doctrine
as "scientific," as based on "really exictirig conditions," and
as representing a considered "teaching" on war that has been
"adopted in our country and its armed forces." :ioreover, as
if to place his definition beyond the reach of criticism, he
asserts that "a correct, scientific interpretation of the
concept of 4ni.litary doctrine "'--presumably the one he had Just
given--is an outstanding expression of the creativity of Soviet
military doctrine.
The connection between these scholastic formulas and the
practical issues of policymaking lies in the peculiar Soviet
concept of military doctrine. The Soviets have consistently
presented military doctrine as virtually indistinguishable
from military policy itself. Thus in r_redittng the military
with a primary role in the formulation of military doctrine,
Zavyalov is assigning them, in eff-ct, a corresponding
responsibility for the formulation of military policy.
According to his own definition, which corresponds in this
respect with that of other Soviet writers, the military-
technical aspect of doctrine--that is, the part that would
seem to fall peculiarly within the province of the military's
professional expertise--includes the problems of determining
the strategic nature of a possible future war, the means of
waging it, how to use these means, how to equip the armed
forces, and so on. In sum, it includes all the issues on
which the military might be expected to have a particular
institutional interest to press.
The bias toward the military which Zavyalov has introduced
into his treatment of thee: subtle formulas is far from
unprecedented in Soviet military writings. Military writers
during Khrushchev's regime also tinkered with these formulas to
record the military's claim to a share of responsibility for
determining the nature and scope of the reforms that were then
being carried out. In more recent years, there has been little
evidence of military agitation on this score. The orthodox
position during these years seems to have been reflected, for
example, in an article by Major General Sulimov in RED STAR on
15 January 1970. Ascribing the leadership in all military
affairs to the party, Sulimov went on to say that among the
party's functions was "the formulation of a military, doctrine
in which the state's official views on the nature of a possible
future war, and the conditions and means of insuring victory,
are expressed." Whether Zavyalov's new formulation rei ects
a new military assertiveness on doctrinal and policy issues may
be clarified by the subsequent installments of RED STAR's new
theoretical series.
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2 MAY 1973
EUROPE
MOSCOW RESERVED, EAST EUROPE MORE VOCAL ON KISSINGER SPEECH
Limited comment from Moscow and more vocal reaction from its East
European allies on Presidential adviser Kissinger's 23 April
speech at the annual Associated Press meeting has pictured it
as an acknowledgment of the failure of NATO cold war policy
under the pressure of the foreign policy of the socialist
countries. Highlighting passages in which Kissinger referred
to Western disagreements over economic questions and over
sharing the burden of defense expenditures, Moscow and its
allies have also sought to portray the speech as another U.S.
effort to force economic concessions from West Europe by
linking the question of the stationing of U.S. troops in
Europe with the forthcoming trade and monetary negotiations.
Moscow has conveyed this view, however, largely by quoting
Western comxrents selected to highlight. alleged frictions
between Washington and West European capitals. Negligible
direct Soviet comment included a claim on 29 April, in the
Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable, that the
speech demonstrated the failure of NATO policy.
The East European allies, on the other hand, have commented
at some length on the speech, emphasizing the alleged U.S.
linkage of economic and military issues to wrest concessions
from West Europe. Typical was the comment of the deputy
chief editor of Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, Donev, who wrote
on the 28th that the point of Kissinger's "trial balloon" was
a search not for a "new charter" but for "new forms to
pure-le the old policy of domination" by the United States.
EAST-WEST TALKS The suggestion that Kissinger's speech
was in some way intended to influence
the results of the conference on security and cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) was raised explicitly in a Bratislava radio
commentary on the 25th. Asserting that West European
capitals had received the speech with "considerable reserve,"
the commentator asked rhetorically if Kissinger wished to
"limit the function of the European security charter, which
is likely to emerge as one of the results of the CSCE."
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The Helsinki talks have not been mentioned in available Soviet
comment on the speech. In fact, aside from brief references
by PRAVDA's Mayevskiy on the 15th and IZVESTIYA's Matveyev on
the 19th, in general articles on international developments,
the talks were latgly ignored by Moscow iu any context during
the 6-25 April adjournment. However, on the 25th, the day the
talks resumed, IZVESTIYA's Goloshubov discussed at length the
progress made at Helsinki, labeling the fourth round the
"concluding phase" of the talks. He reviewed all the major
agenda topics and noted in conclusion--as Matveyev tad done on
the 19th--that "certain NATO countries" want to slow down the
multilateral talks in order "to force the Soviet Union to make
more concessions in Helsinki."
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2 MAY 1973
CHINA
LOW-KEY CELEBRATIONS MARK MAY DAY; MOST LEADERS APPEAR
May Day celebrations in Peking followed the low-key style set
last year, indicating that this may now be pro forma. Except
for attending Chen I's funeral in January 1972, Mao has not
been reported appearing outside his study in two years. As
in 1972, there was neither a May Day editorial nor a central
fireworks display. In tole new style, all the active Politburo
members based in Peking "joined the masses and foreign friends
in the capital in gala activities in the parks." Leaders were
listed according to mixed party-state rankings, with Chou En-lai
at the top followed by NPC Chairman Chu Te. PRC Acting Chairman
Tung Pi-wu, ranked immediately after Chou last May Day, was
absent this time. Chiang Ching was listed third ahead of
Yeh Chien-ying, who had been given precedence over her for the
second time when she last appeared on 12 March. Politburo members
Chen Hsi-lien and Hsu Shih-yu appeared at their regional bases.
With luug s auseuc.e probably sue resuiL ULliail health, the
turnout among state and government leaders conveyed an impression
of growing normalcy in Peking. The presence among NPC vice
chairmen of Sa.ifudin, who usually appears only in his Sinkiang
bailiwick, may indicate that consultations involving the NPC have
taken place. The recently rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-ping was
listed with two other vice premiers who lost their Politburo
status during the cultural revolution, Chen Yun and Li Fu-chun.
In a telescoped view of the turbulent recent years, an NCNA
account of the festivities said the celebrants hailed the
country's "tremendous victories" in the cultural revolution and
the "new victories in all fields of w6:k thanks to the movement
to criticize revisionism and rectify the style of work." The
criticism and rectification movement has been directed against
the deviations associated with Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao.
The absence of a May Day editorial does not in itself indicate
leadership or policy problems, least of all in internal affairs.
May Day editorials have traditionally dealt with foreign policy
issues, and even before Lin's fall the regime had not felt that
an editorial on this occasion was obligatory. There was no May
Day editorial in 1969, but a joint editorial was issued three
days later to mark the 50th anniversary of the May Fourth movement.
Last year, after failing to issue a May Day editorial, Peking
produced a joint editorial on 23 May to commemorate the
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30th anniversary of Mao's Yenan Talks on literature and art,
which had been delivered at another time of rectification.
That editorial called for "deepening the criticism of and
struggle against . . . political swindlers" and denounced
"pseudo-Marxist swindlers" who "waved red flags to oppose the
red flag."
RED FLAG EXPLAINS LINE ON CONDUCTING RECTIFICATION
The authoritative journal RED FLAG's April issue, which
coincided with the reappearance of Teng Hsiao-ping, has
reflected the regime's problems in coping with the effects of
the Lin Piao affair and in overcoming bewilderment and uncertainty
among the cadres and masses. One article, peg-ed to a 1948
Mao work at another time when there had been successive campaigns
against rightist and leftist deviations, explains th- policy of
rehabilitation and seeks to reinvigorate hesitant cadres by
distinguishing shortcomings from the mortal sin of "opportunism."*
Still another article, attributed to a low-level party committee
and broadcast by Radio Peking on 24 April, pursues a similar
aim by arguing that "criticism of revisionism" is directed only
at high-level leaders who betrayed the party but that these
conflicts at the top should not be reproduced in recriminations
and fear at lower levels.
The second article elaborates a line, first appearing around the
turn of the year, that the heresy of Lin and his cohorts ("swindlers
like Liu Shao-chi") was "ultrarightist" no less than that of
Liu Shao-chi and the main targets of the cultural revolution
("Liu Shao-chi and his company"). Reflecting the regime's
anxiety to control the impact of the Lin purge, the criticism
and rectification campaign has been conducted with the caveats
that criticism must come first and only then rectification, that
the target of uncompromising attack is only the narrow group of
plotters for power, and that a distinction must be made between
contradictions among the people and those between the people and
the enemy. The RED FLAG article makes the point that the latter
conflicts were concentrated at the top and must not be confused
with shortcomings at lower levels. Thus, the article warns against
becoming "entangled with the minor problems of the basic-level
units and making the trivialities among the people themselves the
target of criticism."
See the TRENDS of 18 April 3973, pages 12-14.
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RED FLAG registers the center's dissatisfaction with the development
of the anti-Lin campaign, indicating that some good had been
achieved in arousing "the indignation of the masses" but that
"some comrades" went astray in addressing concrete issues and in
mistakenly interpreting the problem as a matter of leftist and
rightist views. According to the article, some comrades regarded
Lin-type swindlers as ultraleftists, but they came to realize
that Lin and Liu both in essence were ultrarightist. In this context
the article criticizes the "twu unhealthy tendencies" that resulted
from an incorrect reading of the successive purges. At one time,
when Lin's line was in the ascendancy, production and technical
work were sacrificed to the highly politicized interests of the
cultural revolution. But in early 1972, the article indicates,
the attacks on Lin's line caused an overreaction in the other
direction, causing cadres to relax their efforts on the ideological
and political fronts. It is presumably in the interest of
combating the latter tendency that Lin's heresy was redesignated
one of ultrarightism in a few months ago.
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2 MAY 1973
INDUCHINA
With the Vietnam cer.se-fire entering its fourth troubled month,
Hanoi continued to blame the United States and Saigon for the
failure of the Paris agreement to bring ;?eace and gav3 no public
sign of readiness to modify its position in order to stop the
fighting or encourage implementation of t?he political aspects
of the accord. Hanoi predictably used Oe third monthly anniver-
sary of the agreement, 27 April, as the o,casion for an authorita-
tive airing of its intransigent response to U.S. moves to induce
communiot compliance. A DRV Foreign Ministry statement that day
rejected the U.S. note on communist violations, made public three
days earlier, and maintained that there must be a change in US.
policies in order to guarantee peace in Vietnam and allow the
normalization of U.S.-DRV relations.
The uncompromising communise: position on the situation in S,Juth
Vietnam was set forth in detail in a six-point PRG proposal,
presented at the 25 April session of the GVN-PRG consultative
conference in Paris, which gave priority to the creation of a
favorable climate in South Vietnam for the political struggle
against the ('VN.
Hanoi's resolve tr pursue its long-standing goals was reaffirmed
by DRV leaders in speeches before an audience gathered in the
North Vietnamese capital for an unprecedented May Day extravaganza.
Premier Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap routinely
extolled the "grer:,t victory" represented by the withdrawal of
U.S. forces.
FANOI SC^;_S U,S, NOTE, RAISES DOUBT ON KISSINGER-THO MEETING
The27April DRV Foreign Ministry statement, summing up Hanoi's view
of the first three months since the signing of the Paris agreement,
charged that "very serious and systematic" U.S. and Saigon violations
of the accord have caused peace in South Vietnam to be "directly
threatened" and have created an increasingly strained situation in
Indochina. Like the DRV Foreign Ministry's 16 April note to the
participants in the 12-power international conference on Vietnmi,
the foreign m'.nistry statement recounted alleged U.S., and GVN
violations and, in routine fashion, accused the United States of
refusing to end its military involvement in Indochina and give up
the scheme of carrying out the Nixon Doctrine and "imposing
neocolonialism." Providing Hanoi's official response to the U.S.
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note to the conference participants, release.] on 24 April, the
foreign ministry statement disparaged the note aii an effort to
explain away "flagrant" U.S. violatiors and to shift responsibility
to the DRV. The statement ::eclared that the Vietnamese "resolutely
reject these sophisms and slanders."
The statement's condemnation of "U.S. ruling circles" for trying
to present U.S. "vioiati_ins" as a reply to DRV violations echoed
other Hanoi comment in the wake of the U.S. moves to bring about
communist compliance with the peace accord--the 17 April halt in
U.S. mineclearing operations in DRV waters and the 19 April
suspension of U.S.-DRV economic talks and resumption of aerial
reconnaissance over the DRV. Claiming that this U.S. policy was
aimed in part at preparing the way 'or "new U.S. military
adventures," the statement charged that "U.S. authorities" have
also repeated threats designed to pressure the people of Vietnam
and the rest of Indochina. It also accused Defense Secretary
Richardson of "cynically th:?eatening" to bomb North Vietnam again.
Like the 30 March DRV Government statement marking the conclusion of
r.hQ girct rr.,n mnnrha of t-hp nngr-avrPPmPnt nPrind, the foreign
ministry statement argued that a shift in U.S. policies was the key
to a stable peace: and to the development of U.S.-DRV relations. It
echoed the government statement in calling upon Washington to learn
a lesson from the war and to give up past policies and implement
the peace accord. The earlier government statement said that such
action would be necessary to usher in an "era of reconciliation"
between the United States and the DRV and to create conditions for
establi6hing a new U.S.-DRV relationship. .he current foreign
ministry statement was a shade more specific, usinr, language
contained in the 14 February joint communique on Kissinger's visit
to Hanoi but not usually repeated in Hanoi statements: Thus it
asserted that such a change in U.S. policy would create favorable
conditions for advancement toward "normalization" of relations
between the United States and the DRV.
U.S.-DRV TALKS Hanoi duly publicized the announcement of
26 April that DRV Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen
Co Thach and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan
would meet on the following day to "prepare for the review of the
implementation of the Paris agreement" and to seek "appropriate
measures aimed at ensuring the strict implementation of the
agreement." Hanoi's announcement did not, however, reflect the
reports from Washington that the Sullivan-Thach meetings were in
preparation for a meeting between Kissinger and North Vietnamese
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CONPII)ENT[AL IBIS TRENDS
2 MAY 1973
Politburo member LV Duc Tho In mid-May. Ilanoi's apparent failure
to agree to the higher-level. c011nu1tati.ons was made clearer on
the 28th, when 11n.nol reed la publicized a "communique" from tile
DRV embassy in Paris which said the embassy had no information
on the pros reports of the Kissinger-Tho meeting and charged
that "thin is a case of unil.aterrnl information by the United
States."
The continued exacerbation of U.S.-DRV relations in the wake of
the 27-30 April meetings between Sullivan and Thnch was pointed
up on 2 May when Hanoi reported that the P RV delegation to the
U.S.-D161 economic talks had left Paris by Hanoi. The delegation
had stn)ed on in Paris since the suspension of the talks on
19 April, presumably in hopes that they would resume.
PRG OFFERS SIX-POINT PROGRAM AT CONSULTATIVE MEETING WITH GVN
The 25 April. GVN-PRG consultative meeting in Paris, held two days
before the end of the 90-day period suggested in the Paris
agreement: for the resolution of political issues, provided a
forum for both sides to put their platforms on the record.
Starting with the general framework of the Paris agreement, each
spelled out its respective program to deal with outstanding
problems in such a way as to assure the advancement of its
paramount interests. The PRG's six-point proposal gave priorit~.to achieving ccnditions in South Vietnam suitable for the pursuit
of a nol.itical struggle and made it clear that the communists do
not wish to participate in general elections, called for in the
Paris accord, until the situation in the South has drastically
altered.
The PRG's first point, calling for strict implementation of the
cease-fire, routinely placed the onus on Saigon for the continued
fighting. Thus, it stated that both parties must cease hostilities,
but then specified that the GVN armed forces must "end at once
all their land-grabbing operations, all bombing and shelling,
all hostile acts, all terrorism, coercion, and reprisals, and
immediately bring back their units to the positions held before
28 January 1973."
The return of civilian prisoners ranked next in the PRG's list,
underlining the importance the communists have consistently given
this issue. The contrast between communist and GVN priorities
was stressed in a 29 April commentary in NHAN DAN, pegged to the
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GVN's statement tit the. 25 April meeting, which scored Saigon
for failing to "say a single word about the two major and urgent
problems in South Vietnam at present--that is, an effective
cease-fire and the complete return of- the civilian personnel
detained by the Saigon a dministiation."
The PRG's third point, advocating the :insurance of democratic
liberties, provided a communist interpretation of Article 11 of
the Paris agreement, which calls in very general terms for the
guarantee of basic freedoms such as the freedom of movement,
speech, political activities, and the p?ess. Spelling out
conditions the communists undoubtedly view as necessary to the
pursuit of a political struggle, the PRG proposal specified, for
example, that freedom of movement must encompass the right to
move between the zones of the two sides, that there must be
freedom to "engage in political activities" in both zones, and
that censorship must be ended and "newspapers of different trends"
be allowed to circulate in both zones. The 29 April NIIAN DAN
article deprecated the Saigon proposal on this score, noting
that it merely suggested restoring the freedoms that had been
~i.1fr.1 1.. h1.n ..nv n>.i nly~.?rr~>n th-t thn r:VN T.'tc "ipnnrinp" the
liberties defined by the Paris agreement.
The PRG's evident concern to guarantee protection for the
activities of Saigon's opponents was also reflected in the
fourth poin~, which called for the formation of the National
Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. This point
summarized Article 12 of the accord on cne establishment of the
,~runcil and went on to advocate agreement on its structure,
membership, working reguiLt~ions, ar.-i the "inviolability of the
council members."
The PRG proposal underlined the priority of the first four
points by presenting them ^E the "first stage" in a settlement
and by stipulating that they must be "fully implemented" before
the beginning of the second stage, which would include the final
two points: general elections and the question of disposition
of armed forces. The importance of assuring democratic liberties
prior to elections was also p,,-ssed again in the proposal's
fifth point on elections.
The fifth point reaffirmed the PRG's willingness to reach an
agreement with the GVN on the institutions to be set up through
general elections; but it glaringly reflected the difficulty in
doing so when it recalled the PRG's former proposal--adamantly
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rejected by Saigon--for general. elections for a constituent
assembly to work out a c;.inntitution and set up a new government.
This proposal has not been advocated is Vietnamese media since
last October, prior to the start of the U.S.-DRV negotiat!lons
leading to the Paris ccord.
The PRG's six-point program offered no time frame for the proposed
elections; by contrast, the GVN proposal at thr, 25 April meeting
suggested a precise timetable for steps leading to general
elerti.ons on 26 August 1973--seven months after the conclusion
of the Paris accord. Prior to the signing of the peace agreement,
DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, in an 1.8 October 1972 interview with
NEWSWEEK, and PRC Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Dinh, in a 4 December
1972 Interview with TI.tE, had both indicated that it would be
"reasonable" to have a six-mont-i delay between a cease-fire and
elections. Neither interview was publicized in Vietnamese communist
media.
The PRG's sixth point, dealing with "the question of Vietnamese
armed forces in South Vietnam," is a concession to Saigon's
repeated deriand that the two sides deal with the problem of
North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. The proposal merely
repeated Article 13 of the Paris agreement stipulating that the
two sides should settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in
the South and that their discussions include such questions as
measures to reduce military effectives and to demobilize troops
being reduced. The 29 April NHAN DAN commen:-.ary or. the GVN
proposal reiterated the communists' opposition to the demand for
the withdrawal of forces, calling it "at variance with the spirit
and letter of ti:e Paris agreement."
MASSIVE HANOI MAY DAY CELEBRATION HAILS COMMiJNIST "VICTORY"
Hanoi's May Day celebration gave every appearance of a calculated
effort to present a united leadership and to boost public
confidence in the situation in Vietnam. Exultation over the "great
victory" in resisting the United States provided the keynote for
the unprecedented festivities. Commentaries pointed out that the
celebration came at a time when, for the first time in 115 years,
Vietnam had been "freed from all foreign aggressor troops"; and
this theme of historic victory was underscored in the rally speech
by Premier Pham Van Dong and the Order of the Day address by
Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. This is the first time that Giap
has addressed a May Day meeting and the first time in a decade
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that the main speaker on this occasion was a Politburo member.
(Truong Chinh delivered the main address in 1963 and Phain Van
Dong last had this role in 1962.)
The rally also prompted a turnout of all the Vietnam Workers
Party (VWP) Politburo members currently in North Vietnam and other
high-level officials.* The VNA report on the rally gave unusually
high praise to the top echelon of Hanoi's g.,vernment and party
leaders, noting that "outstanding comrades-in-arms and successors
of President Ho Chi Minh, veteran revolutioiaries steeled in the
fire of struggle," were on the reviewing stag!. Those singled
out by the report were President Ton Duc Thang, Vice President
Nguyen Luong Bang, and the top members of the Politburo: Le Duan,
Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Gi.ap, Le Duc Tho, and
Nguyen Duy Trinh. Hanoi is not known to have previously used
such plaudits for its leaders on such occasions,, although Ton Duc
Thang and Nguyen Luong Bang hale previously be...-,n referred to as
comrades-in-arms of Ho.
VNA claimed that the May Day rally was attended by nearly 100,000
nonn1 0 from n11 ni+nr Hip rnnnnrrv--Yhp 1.nrc,f+Gt rt,rnout since the.
U.S. air strikes in 1965 prompted the curtailment of such gatherings.
In another departure, Hanoi staged a massive parade of military
and civilian components, viewed by "hundreds of thousands" of
people. Hanoi has not held a May Day parade since 1960 and is not
known to have ever staged a military parade to mark the occasion.
Pham Van Dong's speech routinely reaffirmed that the DRV and PRG
"have always strictly respected and scrupulously implemented the
Paris agreement," and he repeated charges of U.S. and Hanoi
violations. However, the main thrust of his sTueech conveyed
jubilation over the withdrawal of U.S. troops and certainty of
eventual victory. On the sensitive Issue of foreign assistance,
Dong maintained that "we will always rely mainly on our own forces
while striving for assl.stance in various fields from the Soviet
Unicn, China, and the other fraternal socialist countries."
* Among the officials present at the rally was VWP Secretariat
member Nguyen Van Tran who, according to a report in the 28 April
PRAVDP,, just concluded an 18-27 '.pril visit in the Soviet Union.
He met with Grishin and, according to the report, "acquainted
himself with the CPSU's work experience in the field of party
leadership of industry and mun+.cipal services." Available Hanoi
media did not mention the visit.
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Reiterating a point made in his National Assembly speech in
February, Dong added: "We are prepared to cooperate in the
economic fieli with all countries desiring to cooperate with us
on the basis of respect for each other's independence and
sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit." Dong's concern
about aid was again reflected in his brief closing statement to
the i. -ally which included an appeal to socialist countries and
the world's peoples for "greater sympathy, support, and assistance."
As in other comment in recent months, Giap's Order of the Day
credited the communists' "victory" primarily to the party's
"correct and creative political and military lines." He went on
to note routinely that it also represents "a success of
international support and solidarity." The editorial on May
Day in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN not only praised the
party's role but also struck a decidedly nationalistic note,
claiming that "Vietnam's victory" was a triumph for Marxism-
Leninism and a contribution "to further enriching the
proletariat's treasure of revolutionary theories and further
enriching the proletarian military science." Alluding to the
indebtedness of Hanoi's communist allies, the editorial also
claimed that the Vietnamese "victory" has "created more favorable
conditions for the fraternal socialist countries to carry out
economic construction and development and the development of
national defense in peace . . . ."
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MOSCOW COMMENT CENTERS ON CONSOLIDATION OF VIETNAM PEACE
Moscow has sustained a low-key stance on events in Vietnam,
offering only routine support to the DRV-PRG charges of U.S.
violations of the peace agreement. Recent Soviet official
pronouncements on Vietnam have stressed that the w"r is over
and that Soviet support will be forthcoming for the consolidation
of peace. While Soviet media have continued to report the
Vietnamese communist charges of violations, the Soviet leadership
has displayed reluctance to react to these charges directly.
The 28 April PRAVDA editorial on the recently concluded CPSU
Central Committee foreign policy plenum addressed by Brezhnev
made only pausing mention of the communist "victory" in Vietnam
and the "all-round" assistance provided by the Soviet Union. The
editorial stated that the USSR "will facilitate in every way the
establishment of peace in Indochina." The plenum resolution,
adopted on 27 April, listed among the positive trends in world
affairs the termination of "the imperialist aggression against
Vietnam" and again stressed Soviet dedication to peace. These
theme:, ~acr, -cif tern'-crl in RrP~hnc~~'s May , av Gpeerh in Red Square
which also recalled the "powerful" support of the Soviet Union
and other socialist countries for the Vietnamese communists.
While focusing on an improved situation in Vietnam, the official
statements relating to the plenum and the May Day festivities notably
avoided any reference to violations of the peace agreement.
In keeping with this stance, Moscow has to date still failed to
respond officially to the DRV note of 16 April and PRG memorandum of
14 April, addressed to the participants in the 12?-nation Paris
conference, which detailed alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of
the peace agre:--went.
BACKGROUND The Soviet leadership's emphasis on the positive
aspects of the situation in Vietnam was clearly
ev.dent at Kosygin's 5 April press conference in Sweden.
According to a report in NEW TIMES on 13 April, Kosygin, in
response to a question on the possibility of renewed U.S.
intervention in Vietnam, pointed to the President's statements
calling for strict observance of the Paris agreements. Asked
if Sweden had leveled "sharper and more critical accusations"
against the United States than the Soviet Unior had made, Kosygin
skirted the question by noting that for many years the Soviet
iinion had "waged an active struggle" against aggression in Vietnam
and had givea great aid and support to Vietnam.
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A similar reluctance to focus on alleged U.S. violations of the
accords was displayed by Podgornyy in remarks during PRG
Foreign Minister Binh's official visit to the Soviet Union.
In presenting Madame Binh with an award on 28 March, Podgornyy
referred only to Saigon's violations and its "attempts to
sabotage" the ,.greement. The joint PRG-USSR communique issued
on 2 April likewise avoided any reference to U.S. violations.
A sitrilnr stance was taken in Ustinov's Lenin anniversary speech
on 20 April.
H
Although TASS has duly reported the DRV and PRG charges of U.S.
violations, comment on the charges has been routine and low-level.
Following Xuan Thuy's meeting with Suslov on 11 April, PRAVDA
reported that the latter expressed Moscow's support of the
statements by the DRV on 30 March and by the PRG on 1 April
criticizing the United States for violating the accords. In a
TASS summary of a 29 April PRAVDA article by Valerian Skvortsov,
the PRG's six-pc?'nt proposal waa called an "important initiative"
which "opens up new possibilities for clearing the barriers that
still stand in the w~.y of the fulfillment of the agreement on
Vietnam." While stressing the positive aspects of the proposal,
the PRAVDA article noted that Saigon has still not released its
political prisoners and that "Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers"
continue to bomb Laos and Cambodia and to make overflights of the
DRV territory.
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PEKING RECEPTION MARKS INDOCHINA SUv1MIT ANNIVERSARY
The Peking observance of the third anniversary of the Indochinese
summit conference, which occasioned the usual PRC leaders'
message and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial,* was rounded out by a
reception on 25 April hosted by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth
and attended by Sihanouk, a strong contingent of Chinese
leaders headed by Chou En-lai, and diplomatic representatives
of Sihanouk's Indochinese and Korean allies. Also attending
was DRV negotiator Xuan Thuy, stopping over in Peking on his way
home; on the same day he had "a very cordial and friendly
conversation" with Chou and Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao.
In their speeches at the reception Penn Nouth, ranking Chinese
military leader Yeh Chien-ying, and t':he PRG and DRV envoys
joined in warm salutes to Sihanouk's recent tour of the Cambodian
"liberated zone" while expressing each side's views on the
current Indochina situation.
Penn Nouth's speech reaffirmed the FUNK's current hard line,
denouncing the Phnom Penh leaders by name and deriding their
"serious cabinet crisis," condemning the United States for bombing
Cambodia and supporting an alleged "new massive invasion" by
Saigon and Thai forces, and reiterating the FUNK's determination
to continue the struggle "without compromise or retreat." This
line was amplified in a FUNK radio editorial the same day
denouncing President Nixon as an "international criminal chieftain"
and pledging a continued armed offensive until the United States
is driven out and "the gang of traitors Lori Nol, Sirik Matak, Son
Ngoc Thanh, and In Tam is overthrown and complete".y destroyed."
The Vietnamese speakers used the occasion to charge U.S. and
Saigon violations of the Vietnam agreement and to invoke
Indochinese solidarity as a counterweight to "perfidious schemes"
and "insolent threats" by the United States and its allies to
thwart the Indochinese struggle.
Yeh Chien?-ying took a rather gloomy view of the situation, noting
that the Indochinese "are still faced with arduous fighting tasks"
and that the Vietnam and Laos agreements have beer., beset with
"continual obstruction" by i:he United States and Saigon. Yeh
mentioned the U.S. suspension of minesweeping and resumption of
reconnaissance over the DRV, and he pointed out "in particular"
that the United States "is still stepping 'ip its armed intervention"
* The message and editorial are discussed in the TRENDS of
25 April 1973, page 6.
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in Cambodia. He demanded that the United States and Saigon
respect the Vietnam Ind Laos agreements and end "all armed
iicervention" in Cambodia and Laos, but he made no mention of
the Lon Nol government or of a Cambodian settlement. According
to NCNA's account, Yeh offered a rather bland pledge that the
Chinese will "firmly support" the Indochinese struggles. VNA
quoted him as reaffirming Peking's "close militant friendship
and great solidarity" with the Indochinese and as promising
assistance for their struggles.
Although Yeh leveled charges against the United States in some
detail, the Chinese have been careful not to portray American
actions as endangering the Indochina accords. Thus, NCNA's
account of the 25 April NHAN DAN editorial on the summit
anniversary omitted passages charging that U.S. violations were
threatening the peace agreements and accusing Washington of
attempting to intimidate the DRV. While carrying the text of
the six-point proposal presented by the PRG representative in
Paris on 25 April, NCNA deleted the charge in his introductory
remarks that the United States is creating an "extremely serious"
situation '.n Indochina. While muffling some of the anti-U.S.
criticism, Peking has replayed comment on Moscow's relations with
Phnom Penh that has accused the Soviets of attempting to sabotage
the Cambodian struggle.
PF?'OM PENH REORGANIZATION In addition to Penn Nouth's
reference in his reception speech,
the recent formation of a four-man council in Phnom Penh has
drawn critical attacks in FUNK and PRG media that have traced the
development to U.S. pressure and to General Haig's trip. A FUNK
radio editorial on 24 April dwelled on the prospects of continuing
dissension in Phnori Penh and called for uprisings to "trample and
bury the group of traitors Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh,
In Tam, Cheng Heng, and their clique forever." A Liberation Radio
broadcast or. 30 April derided the new council as a monster given
birth by the United States.
NCNA on 27 April carried an account of the reorganization that made
no mention of the United States and pictured the moves as a
desperate effort :)y Lon Nol to enlist his "political enemies" in
a last-ditch struggle against the insurgents. NCNA quoted an. AP
report for the judgment that the reorganization will have little
or no effect on the regime's "bleak prospects for survivai."
Peking's cautious treatment of the Phnom Penh leadership situation
was reflected in the omission of Penn Nouth's remarks on the matter
from the account of the 25 April reception carried in NCNA's
international service.
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CUBA
CASTROIS MAY DAY SPEECH RESTATES FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS
In a May Day speech devoted mainly to Latin Ame?.ican regional
affai s and generally devoid of inflammatory rhetoric, Cuban
Premier ridel Castro restated established positions on relations
with the United States and on trends in the hemisphere.
Adamantly denying Western press reports that Cuba had
softened its terms for restoration with relations with the
United States, Castro insisted that the Cuban position had
actually "hardened." However, the Guantanamo issue was
notably muted in his speech, and the "unconditional" lifting
of the U.S. "economic blockade" and the cessation of U.S.
efforts to act as a "gendarme" in Latin America were again
cited as Havana's conditions for normalization of relations
with Washington. In his only reference to events outside
the hemisphere, Castro praised the Vietnam settlement as a
VietnnmPG? virtory impnaad on the United St:nte.c,
On the issue of Guantanamo, which the Cuban premier had treated
in notably truculent terms in his May Day speech last year,
Castro said merely that the issue was overshadowed by Havana's
concern over the "common problems" of Latin America.. It was
in this context that he declared that such problems must
take precedence over Guantanamo in any discussion between
Cuba and the United States and that relations between the
two countries could not improve "as long as the United States
insisted on creating a gendarme power in Latin America."
On trends in the hemisphere, Castro's remarks were marked by
cautious optimism over the prospects for lessening U.S.
influence and promoting the emergence of independent regimes.
While reaffirming the socialist credentials of the Cuban
revolution and inviting others to follow its lead, Castro
welcomed the appearance in Chile, Peru, and Panama of
independent though ideologically divergent governments
which he characterized as having embarked on a "decisive
new path." Without minimizing the difficulties facing such
regimes and others in Latin America seeking to defend their
"national interests vis-a-vis Yankee imperialism," he spoke
hopefully about developments in Argentina, where the Peronists
had achieved a "popular-type victory" and an "important"
political change. Castro's acceptance of ideological diversity
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was also evidenced by his offer of support to the Venezuelan
government in the event of a "serious conflict" over the
nationalization of its oil resources.
Castro restated the familiar Cuban positions on relations with
the OAS. Disavowing any Cuban desire to return to the OAS and
pointing to signs of growing opposition to the United States in
that body, he observed that the debate was no longer over Cuban
readmission but over the very existence of the organization in
its present form. Calling for the formation of a new organiza-
tion composed exclusively of Latin American countries and
English-speaking Caribbean states, Castro declared: "There is
no reason for the United States to be a member of that regional
organization."
Castro reserved his sharpest criticism for developments in
Brazil, where he alleged that the United States was attempting
to establish an "imperialist enclave" for the purpose of
suppressing the "liberation movement" in Latin America. He
also castigated the United States for "dumping its surplus
capital" in Brazil and for developing a "capitalist model"
for economic exploitation in Latin America.
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NOTES
CHINA-PHILIPPINES: A 29 April NCNA report on a visiting
Philippine trade delegation, led by members of the Philippine
Chamber of Commerce, represents Peking's first coverage of
contacts with the Philippines since the declaration of martial
law by the Marcos government last September. The report said
that the group was visiting China under the auspices of the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, that it
had attended the Canton trade fair, and that it had been feted
at a banquet in Peking on 29 April hosted by a vice-chairman of
the council and attended by representatives of the foreign trade
and foreign affairs ministries. There was no description of the
atmosphere surrounding the visit. While eschewing any inflam-
matory propaganda, Peking had conveyed mild disapproval of the
Marcos government's declaration of martial law in a lone NCNA
report last September that replayed foreign press comment critical
of Marcos and called attention to demonstrations against his
regime. Peking at that time also suspended its reporting of
"friendly" exchanges in Sino-Philippine people's diplo.nacy.
WATERGATE DLVLLGPi,::.Ni!~: ieei.cher Moscow nor Peking has mentioned
the White House staff resignations or President Nixon's 30 April
address on the Watergate affair. .?eking has been silent from
the outset, and Moscow's earlier coverage was negligible. The
last monitored mention in Soviet media was on 29 April, when
PRAVDA carried a TASS report on FBI Director Gray's resignation.
Other communist media have show. less reticence. Reports of
the latest events have been moritored from all the. East European
countries except Albania and Bulgaria. Some harsh comment has
come from East Germany and Czechoslovakia in particular, playing
up the involvement of top-level White House officials and reporting
dissatisfaction in the United States over the President's handling
of the affair. By and large, however, East European media have
treated the President's personal role in a gingerly fashion.
Vietnamese communist media, by contrast, have cited Western
sources to depict the President's national leadership role as
"threatened." Hanoi radio on 1 May cited the BBC in observing
that "the future of some high-ranking officials, and probably
that of President Nixon himself, seems to be at stake." Havana
has commented caustically and at length, with PRENSA LATINA
saying on 1 May that the affair had by no means reached its
culmination and that evidence implicating the President himself
was likely to emerge.
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