TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 10, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 ILLEGIB
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F B I S
TRENDS
onfidential
in Communiz;t Propaganda
Confidential
10 JANUARY 1973
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
10 JANUARY 1973
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Hanoi Assails President for Bombing, Attitude at Paris Talks. . . 1
DRV Cites Vigilance, Emergency Measures in Wake of Strikes. . . . 4
Moscow Decries Air Strikes, Welcomes Resumption of Talks. . . . . 7
Peking Assumes Low Posture on Vietnam Developments. . . . . . . . 8
ROMANIA
New Defense Law Rules Out Acceptance of "Foreign Occupation". . . 10
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Economist Proposes Revisions in Republic Borders. . . . . . . . 13
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Peking's Evolving Approach to the
Taiwan Question ? . ? . ? ? ? . ? ? . . ? ? ? . ? ? . ? . . . . S1
CONFIDENTIAL
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
10 JANUARY 1973
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 1 - 7 JANUARY 1973
Moscow (2742 items)
Peking (1114 items)
Vietnam
(17%)
14%
Domestic Issues
(32X)
44%
[Expanded U.S.
(13%)
8%]
Vietnam
(36%)
25%
Bombing
(Madame Binh in
(15%)
8%]
50th Anniversary of
(40%)
9%
PRC
USSR, 30 Dec.
New Year's Day
(--)
8%
Brezhnev Meeting with
(--)
5%
Joint Editorial
French CP's Marchais
China
(3%)
5%
14th Anniversary of Cuban
Revolution
(2%)
3%
Kosygin New Year's
(1%)
3%
Greetings to Soviet
People
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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10 JANUARY 1973
INDOCHINA
In the wake of the 30 December U.S.-DRV agreement to resume the
Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks in Paris on the 8th, Hanoi has
sustained its vitriolic attacks on the President for the B-52
"terror" bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area and has cautioned
that there is as yet no indication that the Administration is
ready to sign the peace accord which Hanoi insists was "agreed
on" last October. Le Duc Tho, in his statement upon arriving
in Paris on the 6th, repeated the claim that it was possible to
resume the talks because there was "a return to the situation
prior to 18 December"--that is, the United States was "compelled"
to stop strikes above the 20th parallel and to reduce those below
the parallel. At the same time, there are repeated warnings of
possible new "adventurous" U.S. actions, with a NHAN DAN
Commentator article on the 9th saying there have been "vile threats"
of renewed bombings which show that "the U.S. aggressors" have
learned nothing and "keep going round in a vicious circle--threat-
esca:lation-defeat-threat."
Hanoi media have reflected the DRV's efforts to deal with the after-
effects of the 18-29 December strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area:
Hanoi radio on the 6th outlined the efforts of various ministries
to help the bombing victims, and NHAN DAN's editorial on the 8th
noted that the government "has adopted concrete policies" on
meeting such urgent daily needs as food, clothing, and housing.
Low-level Moscow comment has welcomed the resumption of the U.S.-DRV
talks in Paris while continuing to assail the massive bombings of
North Vietnam. Moscow praises the DRV's "constructive attitude" at
the talks and echoes Hanoi in saying that a favorable outcome of the
talks depends on the United States.
Peking has reverted to a low posture on Vietnam developments,
offering no Authoritative comment while publicizing protests
against U.S. acticns from Hanoi and worldwide, including calls by
U.S. Congressmen to cut off funds. Even in publicizing the protests
Peking has taken care to soften the sharpest attacks on the
Administration.
HANOI ASSAILS PRESIDENT FOR BOMBING. ATTITUDE AT PARIS TALKS
On 6 January, the day Le Duc Tho arrived back in Paris to resume
the private talks, a NHAN DAN editorial discussed President Nixon's
alleged double-dealing on the Vietnam question for the past four
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years and cautioned against optimism regarding a negotiated
settlement. The editorial ridiculed the President's
assertions over the years that specific U.S. military actions
were aimed at ending the war--for example, the "invasion" of
Cambodia in 1970, operations in southern Laos in 1971, and
the mining and resumed bombing of the DRV in May 1972. But
"the most brazen deceit," it said, was the President's
contention before the election that peace was near and his
subsequent "about-face" in the negotiations and use of B-52's
against Hanoi and Haiphong. Declaring that "no one any
longer believes" the President, the editorial said that,
nevertheless,
vigilance is necessary, taking into consideration
the state of the Paris talks at present. There
is as yet no indication of any willingness on the
part of the Nixon Administration to give up its
high-handed demands and sign the agreement on ending
the war and restoring peace mutually reached on
20 October.
Available summar'.i of the 6 January editorial--carried by VNA
in English and by rlanoi radio in its domestic service--did not
mention that the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks were resuming on the
8th, however. The only explicit references to the resumed talks
came in the reports of Le Duc Tho's departure from Hanoi and
his arrival in Paris, carried by Hanoi media on 3 and 1 January,
respectively. The brief account of his statement upon arrival
in Paris, carried by Hanoi radio's domestic service as well as
by VNA, noted that The repeated the DRV's statement of the 3d
to the effect that it was possible to resume the talks because
the Unit'd States had failed in its scheme to intimidate the
Vietnamese people and had been compelled to sf:op the bombing.
The account of Tho's arrival srar;;;;,..r#- also summarized his
criticism of the massive U.S. oombing, but it did not report
any of his remarks outlining his version of the status of the
talks.
Le Duc Tho repeated the contention, first made in Hanoi's
3 January report that agreement had been reached to resume the
talks, that "as of 13 December only a few problems remained."
He went on to elaborate in a way which clearly implied that
there had been a reversal in the U.S. position following the
recess of the private talks on the 13th and Kissinger's return
to Washington. Tho again repeated the 3 January Hanoi report
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when he said that during the private meetings between 20 November
and 13 December the U.S. side had proposed many changes in the
agreement "bearing on principles and substance." But he went
beyond the report of the 3d when he explained that because "the
DRV side perseveringly maintained the principles and at the
same time made utmost efforts," by 13 December only a few
unresolved questions were left. He added that both sides had
agreed to report to their respective governments, to maintain
contact, to continue the experts' talks, and--"as proposed by
the United States"--not to reveal the substance of the private
discussions.
Reemphasizing his contention that there was no stalemate
at that time, Tho said that the DRV "stuck to these agreements,"
and "by 13 December the negotiations were still making progress
and had prospects of arriving at an early conclusion." He
declared that the United States "acted in complete contradiction
to its agreement" and on 16 December "unilaterally made public
part of the contents of the private meetings, distorted the
truth, and slandered the DRV side for having created obstacles
to the negotiations." h,,t went on to charge that the U.S. side
had placed the onus on the DRV in order to have a pretext to
bomb the DRV and attempt to force it to accept U.S. demands.
Le Duc Tho concluded his statement by asserting that the Vietnamese
problem can be settled peacefully and rapidly ~F the U.S. side has
good will and matches the DRV's serious attitude; but he warned
that if the United States keeps demanding "unreasonable changes
bearing on principles and substance, prolonging and expanding the
war," the Vietnamese people "are resolved not to give in to any
pressure or threat" and will persevere in their struggle.
The unity of Vietnam is the only substantive issue mentioned in
Hanoi propaganda since the 30 December U.S.-DRV agreement to
resume the talks. Following the passage cited above on the
absence of any sign of Administratiln willingness to sign the
20 October agreement, the 6 January KHAN DAN editorial added
that there similarly has been no sign indicating withdrawal of
U.S. support for Thieu--"the man who has recently raised the
insolent demand that South Vietnam be recognized as a separate
stet'." Thieu's stand on the maintenance of two Vietnam states
and the 17th parallel as a national frontier had also been
assailed in a VNA commentary on 2 January and in a Hanoi radio
commentary and an article in the army paper QUAN DOl NHAN DAN
on the 3d.* The cryptic charge that the President "still has
* See the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, pages 4-5.
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traitor Nguyen Van Thleu clamoring for partition of Vietnam"
also appeared in an article in the 7 January NHAN DAN.
The vitriolic nature of the article on the 7th is indicated by
its title--"The New Hitlerite Clique is Condemned to be
Hanged." Both the article on the 7th and another in 14HAN DAN
on the 9th---that one titled "Worse Than the Chicago Gangsters"--
observed that the President was again threatening to resume the
bombing if the DRV did not negotiate seriously. The latter
cited Presidential Assistant Herbert Klein as having said on
NBC's Meet the Press on the 7th that the President does not
rule out the possibility of resuming bombings of Hanoi and
Haiphong if an accord is not reached in the Paris negotiations.
The article also cited press reports that the President had told
members of Congress on the 5th that the bombing pause above the
20th parallel would last only as long as Hanoi negotiated seriously.
NHAN DAN observed that "to openly threaten us before the whole
world" is another attempt to force the DRV to negotiate on U.S.
terms, and it concluded by repeating the standard assertion that
the Vietnamese cannot be cowed.
DRV CITES VIGILANCE, E'F~-.RGENCY MEPSURES IN WAKE OF STRIKES
Since the 30 December announcement by the United States that it
had suspended air strikes above the 20th parallel in North
Vietnam, Hanoi has confined its official protests over the
continuing strikes south of that line to virtually daily foreign
ministry spokesman's statements. During the 18-29 December
period of massive strikes by B-52's ana other planes, in
addition to routine spokesman's prot^sts Manoi had issued a
government statement on the 21st and foreign ministry statements
on the 19th, 27th, and 29th.
Hanoi claimed that during the bombing north of the 20th
parallel the DRV had downed a total of 81 planes, including
34 B-52's. It has claimed an additional 14 planes downed since
then, including five B-52's, for a total of 4,173 as of
10 January. Commendations for downing four of the B-52's
were issued to Nghe An Province on 10 January by the VPA High
Command, which praised the "armed forces and people" of the
province for alleged downings on 4, 6, and 10 January. For
the most part Hanoi has referred to Vietnamese casualties only
in general terms, saying that "thousands" were killed and
wounded. But a DRV War Crimes Commission communique on the 3d
claimed a "tentative" total. in Hanoi alone of 1,318 dead and
1,261 injured.
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10 JANUARY 1973
Propaganda since the limitation of the bombing on the 30th has
repeatedly called for vigilance against future "adventurous"
U.S. actions. To bolster its charge that the Administration's
word is not to be trusted, Hanoi has claimed that by its heavy
bombing in the southern areas of the DRV since the 30th the
United States has violated an alleged pledge not only to stop
the bombing above the 20th parallel but to reduce it below
that line. Thus, the spokesman's statement of the 5th claimed
that the United States bombed a village in Tan Loc district of
Hoa Binh Province--north of the 20th parallel--and continued to
"carpet-bomb" areas below the 20th parallel, thereby violating
its "recent" pledge to "end the bombing and mining in North
Vietnam north of the 20th parallel and reduce the bombing and
shelling south of the 20th parallel in order to resume the
negotiations." Such a U.S. pledge to limit bombing had also
been mentioned in the 3 January Hanoi report that Le Duc Tho
was en route to Paris to resume the talks.
During the escalation of the U.S. strikes, the DRV spokesman
in Paris in a 26 December statement railed at the Nixon
Administration for "continuing to disavow its pledges on
halting the air raids against Hanoi, on refraining from bombing
above the 20th parallel, and on reducing the bombing below the
20th parallel in order to create a favorable atmosphere for
the negotiations."* A communique from the Paris delegation
on 23 December had referred more generally to a U.S. agreement
to "significantly reduce" military activities "in North Vietnam"
and to stop the attacks north of the parallel; but most Hanoi
references to U.S. bombing limitations have only noted the
promise to remain below the 20th parallel.
EMERGENCY Hanoi radio reported on 6 January that emergency
MEASURES measures in the wake of the heavy bombing had
been announced by the Prema.er's office and the
ministries of interior, public health, finance, internal trade,
and grain and fuod products and by local Hanoi organs. These
* U.S. Command announcements on the bombing indicate that of to
the opening of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks in Paris on
20 November, U.S. strikes--which were confined to the area below
the 20th parallel--remained below 100 per day, although there
had been no such limitation during the first half of November.
U.S. announcements between 30 December, when strikes were again
confined to the zone below the 20th parallel, and 6 January
indicated that there were more than 100 strikes a day; the number
dropped off sharply on the 7th, however, on the eve of the
resumed talks.
CONFIDENTIAL
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measures included emergency distribution of food, clothing, and
medicine; care and housing for bombing victims; restoration
and replacement of fields and domestic animals; and tasks of
those concerned with carrying out the relief measures.
On 5 January Hanoi radio had announced th+.tt emergency measures
were also discussed at an enlaced session of the presidium of
the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee held on the 3d.
The session reportedly discussed specific tasks to be carried oui:
by Front committees at ~rarious levels as w.?ll as by political
parties and mass organizations comprising t1ie Front. A resolution
adopted by the session listed among the tasks of the Front
continued enlistment of youths, air defense and evacuation, and
assisting the frontline as well as maintaining a strong and stao..e
rear area.
Evidence of concern regarding emergency and relief measures had
appeared earlier in accounts of visits by DRV leaders to bomb-
damaged areas. For example, reports of Premier Pham Van Dong's
visits on 24 and 25 December indicated that he reminded cadres
in areas of Hanoi that they were responsible for organizing and
directing relief activities and restoring production and the
people's livelihood. On 26 December a message from the Central
Agricultural Commission to administrative and agricultural
committees in the provinces expressed concern over damage to the
fifth-month spring crop and urged repair of damaged fields. Truong
Chinh,cna 5 January visit to bombed areas in Hanoi, referred to
government instructions and urged that they be carried out promptly
and thoroughly. Concern over the dikes was expressed by Tran Dang
Khoa, vice chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee,
during a visit on the 6th to the Gia Lam district of Hanoi.
Emergency measures were also discussed by Minister of Internal
Trade Hoang Quoc Thinh in an undated interview carried by Hanoi
radio on the 7th. The trade minister cited examples of successful
efforts to make products available despite enemy attacks and
claimed that these achievements resulted "from our party's policies
and lines, particularly from the 220th resolution* of our party
Central Committee Politburo."
* Resolution 220 has never been released but has been referred to
from time to time in Hanoi media since last summer. According to
an article in the North Vietnamese monthly THANH NIEN (YOUTH)
in September, the Politburo's resolution was dated 1 June and was
on "changing the trend and stepping up all tasks in the North to
continue to fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors."
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10 JANUARY 1973
MOSCOW DECRIES AIR STRIKES. WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF TALKS
Soviet commentators have continued to praise the DRV's "constructive
attitude" on the peace talks and to assail the United States for
the massive bombings in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and for demanding
"fundamental" changes in the peace accord. Moscow has reported
opposition to Administration policy in the United States and
has speculated on the "growing confrontation" between the
President and Congress on the war, briefly noting reports on
poseible congressional efforts to cut off war funds.
Moscow contends that U.S. bombing, rather than breaking the
DRV's will, has succeeded only in prompting worldwide protests.
And it says that it was these protests along with high military
losses which forced the United States to stop the massive bombing
and return to the Paris talks. The substance of the peace accord
is not discussed, however, and Moscow merely echoes Hanoi in
saying that the outcome of the negotiations depends on the U.E,
attitude. On the eve of the resumption of the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger
talks, an international review in the 7 January PRAVDA recalled
Brezhnev's 21 December warning, in is address marking the 50th
anniversary of the USSR, that events in Vietnam cculd affect
U.S.-Soviet relations. Most comment, however, has noted only that
Brezhnev on that occasion reaffirmed the USSR's "principled
position" on Vietnam and pledged continued solidarity.
Moscow media, as customary, briefly reported on the meetings in
Paris between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on the 8th and 9th.
Le Duc Tho's 4-6 January stopover in Moscow on his way back to
Paris was treated in routine fashion. He was met at the airport
by party and foreign ministry officials Rakhmanin and Firyubin
and had talks with Politburo member Kirilenko and candidate
member Katushev--the leaders with whom he has met most frequently
during his stopovers, including his most recent one on 16 December.
During the Moscow talks Le Duc Tho reportedly stressed the
Vietnamese people's determination to continue their "Just struggle,"
and the Soviet side condemned the "barbaric" U.S. bombings as an
attempt to "rudely pressure" the DRV. The reports also said the
Sovtets reiterated their pledge of "invariable solidarity" and
sapportp.l the DRV's and PRG's efforts directed at the "speediect"
iig ing of the peace agreement.
Hanoi's VNA as usual briefly reported Le Duc Tho's Peking and
Moscow stopovers only in a single report of his arrival in
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Paris. VNA indicated none of the substance of the talks in
either capital, merely noting that they took place in a "cordial
and friendly atmosphere." TASS said the conversation took place
in a "heartfelt and friendly atmosphere." Moscow had most
recently used a similar characterization of "friendly and
cordial" to describe the talks during Tho's stopover en route
to Paris in November; a reference to "fraternity" had appeared
in reports of his December stopover and of some earlier ones.
According to TASS, views were exchanged on "problems" of
Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation as well as on "questions connected
with the course of the Paris talks on Vietnam." Bilateral
relations were not mentioned in reports of the December talks,
but "questions of further developing" relations had been
mentioned in November and on earlier occasions.
PEKING ASSUMES LOW POSTURE ON VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS
Following its demonstration of support for the Vietnamese
during PRG Foreign Minister Binh's visit ending on 1 January,*
Peking has reverted to a low posture on Vietnam developments,
offering no authoritative comment while devoting its coverage
largely to reports of protests from Hanoi and worldwide.
Peking took further note, still without comment, of the return
to negotiations in Paris by replaying VNA's account of
Le Duc Tho's arrival statement on the 6th. Peking has also
given further publicity to protests by members of Congress
against U.S. military actions in Vietnam. An NCNA dispatch
on the 5th cited statements by Carl Albert, Mike Mansfield,
Edward Kennedy, and others, including calls for Congress to cut
off funds for the war.
While giving extensive publicity to protests against U.S. actions,
Peking has also shown caution in its treatment of the United
States. Thus, NCNA's account of the 5 January DRV protest
against U.S. air strikes the previous day omitted the charges
* See the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, pages 13-17. On page 15,
there should be a footnote after the first sentence of the
second paragraph to say that the Chinese pledge to risk the
greatest national sacrifice had also appeared in Vice Foreign
Minister Chiao Kuan-hue's wide-ranging UNGA address on 3 October
1972. Rather than being pegged to Vietnam developments as such,
however, Chiao's reaffirmation of this commitment was made in a
broad context of Chinese support for the Indochinese peoples.
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that the continued bombing violated Washington's commitment
to curtail the strikes and that these actions have revtil0
tie Nixon. Administration's "extremely cruel and crafty nature"
and its "deceitful arguments on peace and good will." Earlier,
NCNA had sanitized the 29 December DRV Foreign Ministry
statement by rewriting one sentence to remove a compariuon of
the heavy U.S. bombing with Guernica and other infamous
incident'j, and by deleting a passage calling the Nixon
Administration "the most savage murderer of the present time."
In keeping with this caution, Peking gave only minimal attention
to the alleged damaging of a Chinese ship on 20 December by U.S.
bombing. Apart from the NCNA protest ptatpmont, the only
reference to this incident was lurind in a 6 January NCNA
dispatch from Hanoi reporting a visit to Haiphong on the 5th
by foreign correspondents. NCNA noted that the correspondents
viewed the damage to a Polish freighter and a Chinese vessel.
Peking has not mentioned a 3 January message from the PRC
Public Health Ministry, broadcast by Radio Hanoi on the 8th,
which expressed support for a 23 December statement by the
DRV Public Health Ministry denouncing the bombing of the Bach
etAi hospital in Hanoi.
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10 JANUARY .1.973
R 0 M A N I A
NEW DEFENSE LAW RULES OUT ACCEPTANCE OF "FOREIGN OCCUPATION"
1 he 25th anniversary of socialist Romania was used by Bucnarest to
publicize, on 29 December, a new national defense law which in
effect puts the country's independent stance on a legal basis and--
with the 1968 Czechoslovak events obviously in mind--bans any
"acceptance" of a foreign occupation of Romania. The new law,
carrying strong overtones of Yugoslavia's "all-people's defense"
system, replaces and officially abrogates a whole series of
Romanian regime decrees and decisions on military service and
recruitment dating back to 1954. It is to go into effect on
31 March. Hailed by Ceausescu in his Bucharest speech on i.ae
25th jubilee, the law was ignored in the brief anniversary
message from the Soviet leaders and in the moderate volume of
comment carried by Soviet media on the occasion.
After declaring repeatedly at the outset Romania's identity as
a "sove.:-eign" state, the new "Law Concerning the National Defense
of the ocialist Republic of Romania," published in full in the
29 December SCINTEIA, asserts that
it is banned to accept or recognize any action of any foreign
state or any situation, regardless of its nature, including
general capitulation and the occupation of the national
territory, which, in times of peace or war, would infringe
upon the national sovereignty and independence and territorial
integrity of the Socialist Republic of Romania or which would
in any way weaken its defense capacity.
Nullifying in advance any "invitation" to Soviet troops to enter
the country, like the one allegedly extended by Czechoslovak ultra-
conservatives in August 1968, the Romanian law states that "any
such act of accepting or recognizing [a foreign occupation] is null
and void as being contrary to the state regime and the supreme
interests of our socialist nation." At the same time, it adds a
vague assurance that in setting up the defense system and "carrying
on battle actions against the aggressor, the provisions of
international agreements" to which Romania is a party "shall be
respected." It goes on to stipulate that war will be declared
only in the event of "armed aggression against the Socialist
Republic of Romania or against another state" toward which Romania
"has mutual defense obligations r.adertaken by international treaties."
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There is no mentioi; of the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet-Romanian
20-year friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance treaty
renewed on 7 July 1970. The law goes no further on this score
than to note that. the RCP's defense policy is to strengthen
friendship and alliance with the socialist co::ltries on the
basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and
to promote peaceful coexistence with "all." states, ,-egardless
of social system, on the basis of equality and independence.
In line with past assertions by Ceausescu in the same vein, the
law declares that "the right to decide on the problems of defense"
of Romania "is a sovereign attribute of the Romanian state." The
Romanian leader did not emphasize this point, however, in his
speech at the 25t'1 anniversary meeting on the 29th, presenting
the law instead i.. low key as a call for "patriotic" defense of
the country by all citizens and referring specifically to military
cooperation with "the Warsaw Pact member-states" as well as with
"all socialist countries." The country's sovereign right to decide
on its own defense had been asserted strongly by Defense Minister
Ionita in his presentation of the draft of the law to the Nationi!
Assembly on the 27th. Ionita had also emphasized that "for the
first time" the law ruled out "acceptance or recognition" of any
violation of Romania's territorial integrity.
The law declares that just as the Romanian people have "always"
defclded their independence "with weapons in their hands," now
also "all the country's citizens must be ready to fight, even at
the cost of their lives," to safeguard "the Fatherland's
sovereignty and integrity." It adds that national defense "is
a sacred duty of each Romanian citizen, man or woman, regardless
of nationality"--the latter presumably alluding to the Hungarian
minority in Transylvania.
Moscow had shown its aversion to such all-people's defense
concepts--patently aimed at an external Soviet threat--in the
Yugoslav context in its treatment of a speech by Tito on
9 October 1971 at the close of nationwide military maneuvers:
TASS' report of that speech ignored Tito's Le#%;~;:C:.ces to "all-
people's defense" and "self-management" and to the participation
of "auxiliaries" and "territorials" in the exercises and treated
sarcastically the Yugoslav leader's call for struggle against
external "enemies" of the :'" goslav socialist system.
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SOVIET MESSAGE, The 25th anniversary message from Brezhnev,
COMMENTARY Podgornyy, and Kosygin to Ceausescu and Maurer
on the Romanian holiday was brief for such a
milestone occasion. Published in PRAVDA on the 30th and in SCINTEIA
the next day, it "conveyed "friendly congratulations" to the
Romanians and promised that the Soviet party and people would
"strengthen in the future too the alliance and comradely relations"
with the Romanian party and people. In restrained terms, it called
for "development" of cooper'..iou in the framework of the Warsaw Pact
and CEMA. It wished the Romanian leaders "new successes" in socialist
construction. The 30 December PRAVDA also carried a brief report
that Ceausescu had spoken at the Bucharest anniversary meeting the
day before, with no details of the content.
Similarly ignoring the new Romanian defense law, an N. Aleksandrov
article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 29th, keyed to the Romanian
anniversary, instead pbantedly recalled that "the presence of the
Soviet Army on Romanian territory" at the end of World War II had
forestalled "interference by U.S. and British imperialists in the
Romanian people's internal affairs." The article stressed at
length the Soviet contribution to Romania's economic development
and noted that the basis of t'ie two countries' relations was the
renewed 20-year friendship treaty of 7 July 1970. It citid the
low-keyed statement in Ceausescu's speech at the 22 December
session of the Kremlin meeting on the 50th anniversary of the
USSR to the effect that Soviet-Romanian relations would `continue
to develop and strengthen still further."
POLISH MESSAGE While the anniversary messages from Moscow and
from most of the East Europe allies were largely
pro forma, the one from Poland's Gierek, Jablonski, and Jaroszewicz
appeared to lecture the Romanian mavericks: After recalling that
the Romanians had joined forces with the nascent socialist community
at the start of the postwar period, the message added that, "as then,
the current efforts to strengthen the unity of the socialist
community" and the cooperation among "all" its member countries
"are the basic conditions for the further successes of the entire
community and each country" in the struggle for peace and socialism.
Gierek, recently awarded an Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday,
had been accorded the most prominent treatment of the East European
leaders at the Moscow gathering on the USSR's 50th anniversary: He
was the first to :address the meeting after Brezhnev and the first
to have a bilatr.dl conference with Brezhnev, and he spoke on behalf
of the other leaders in responding to Brezhnev at a reception.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
ECONOMIST PROPOSES REVISIONS IN REPUBLIC BORDERS
Economist V. Kistanov, writing in the December QUESTIONS OF
ECONOMICS on the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR,
has proposed that republic borders be altered in the interest
of more efficient economic development. Citing Lenin to the
effect that economic factors are just as important as nationality
in determining republic borders, Kistanov argued that many
republic boundaries established in the 1920's and 1930's have
become obstacles to efficient economic planning and should be
rearranged. As an example, he pointed to the irrationality of
having the Fergana Valley cotton complex divided among Uzbekistan,
Kirgizia, and Tadzhikistan instead of placing it under a single
administration.
The Kistanov article, like other jubilee articles on the
nationality question, indicates that the current discussion of
nationality problems centers largely on economic relationships
between Moscow and the periphery.* Under Khrushchev the debate
over the nationality question also involved language, culture,
and education.
While upholding the predominance of economic interests,
Kistanov sought to allay fears that he interests of individual
republics would be ignored under his proposals. Thus, although
calling for the creation of new agencies to supervise economic
regions encompassing several republics, he hastened to exempt
the republics themselves from such supervision. This exemption
was apparently aimed at avoiding the antagonism caused by the
creation of such ill-conceived entities as the Central Asia
Bureau in the Khrushchev era.
Kistanov recalled that the borders of republics had occasionally
been changed in the past by joint agreement, and he said that
his proposal was thus not as unusual as it appeared. He was
evidently referring to changes that occurred in 1971 involving
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Tadzhikistan. In May
1971 a large part of Uzbekistan's Syrdarya Oblast--enough to form
* For background, see the TRENDS of 28 June 1972, pages 41-42;
8 November,page 24; and 22 November, pages 37-38.
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six new Kazakh electoral districts--was transferred to Kazakhstan.
The shift appeared designed to reunite the Golodnaya Steppe,
which had been split between the two republics since the 1950's
when the region was transferred to Uzbekistan. In October 1971
part of Uzbekistan's Andizhan Oblast was transferred to Kirgizia,
and in November 1971 territory was exchanged between Uzbekistan
and Tadzhikistan. The purposes of these changes were never
explained, and in some cases the republics apparently never
published the ukases in the local press nor publicly confirmed
them at republic Supreme Soviet sessions.
There have been hints of opposition to such revisions in Central
Asia. A 7 December SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA article, for example,
attacked a prominent Kirgiz scholar for "absolutizing" the
rights of the Kirgiz SSR and for writing about t'-e possibility
of "forcible" border changes: In an article published shortly
after the 1971 border changes, Professor K. Nurbekov in
LITER1,TURNYY KIRGT2STAN, No. 4, 1972, had warned that "forcible"
changes of republic horders would be tantamount to "annexation"
and "violation .2 the principle of self-determination of nations."
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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE
PEKING IS EVOLVING APPROACH TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION
In the wake of its major diplomatic advances at the expense of the
ROC's international standing, Peking has begun fashioning an
approach to the Taiwan issue that reflects the enhanced confidence
born of recent successes while fostering an atmosphere conducive
to overcoming the hostility and uncertainty toward the mainland
regime felt by people on Taiwan. In addition to the steady
succession of diplomatic recognition agreements eroding the ROC's
standing, President Nixon's visit to Peking last February--during
which the United States went on record as not challenging the
position that Taiwan is a part of China--and the establishment of
relations with Japan has significantly reduced major sources of
Peking's concern over Taiwan's juridical status in the international
community. Though the U.S. and Japanese positions on the Taiwan
question fell short of the POC's preferred terms, Peking welcomed
these breakthroughs as giving major impetus to its diplomatic
momentum. As explained in the 30 September PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial on Prime Minister Tanaka's visit, the position taken
by Japan on the Taiwan question delivered "a hammer blow" to
those advocating schemes that would perpetuate the island's
alienation.
Complementing its more relaxed approach to Taiwan as an international
question, Peking has been making a pitch to the people on Taiwan by
playing on a sense of Chinese national unity and patriotism.
Breathing new life into the appeal for the separated "compatriots"
to return to the warm embrace of the motherland," Peking has made
several gestures of inviting the people on Taiwan to visit the
mainland and hinting that their relationship to the PRC might
evolve into one comparable to that of the Chinese in Hong Kong
and Macao. To underscore this message, PRC broadcasts to Taiwan
have extensively publicized comments by visiting Overseas Chinese
on the friendly treatment they have received and their favorable
impressions of life on the mainland. This propaganda effort has
also focused on cases of ROC officials who passed over to the
communist side, as in a recent broadcast to Taiwan referring to
former ROC President Li Tsung-fen's return to the mainland and
his reception by Mao in 1965.
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10 JANUARY 1973
For its part, Taipei has exhibited acute sensitivity over the PRC
effort and has recently taken steps to discourage visits to the
mainland by Chinese on Taiwan and elsewhere. Taipei's news agency
CNA on 18 December released a "secret document" in an attempt to
show ulterior motives behind Peking's policy toward visiting
Overseas Chinese, charging that while the communists are outwardly
smiling they are "sharpening knives to nurder those Overseas
Chinese who come over to them." In his New Year's message for
1973, President Chiang Kai-shek pointedly denounced the "adverse
current" among Overseas Chinese who are "shouting the slogar, of
so-called unification and collaborating with the bloodstained
assassin of our national culture."
TAIWAN'S STATUS The train of recognition agreements having
been set off in October 1970 with the compromise
Canadian formula in which the other country "takes note" of Peking's
claim to Taiwan, the moves in the past year toward dissolving the
stickier problems brought new variants for handling the Taiwan
question. In the joint communique on President Nixon's visit,
the United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side
of the Taiwan Strait" maintain that Taiwan is a part of China,
a position the United Stater "does not challenge." Peking's
apprehension over sentiments favoring an independent Taiwan
must have been assuaged in part by this statement, and in fact
Peking has not pursued its criticism of the Taiwan independence
movement since early last year.
The 28 February 1972 Sino-U.S. communique helped prepare the
ground for the PRC and Britain to break their impasse on the
Taiwan issue the next month and to raise their relations to the
ambassadorial level--a move long blocked by Peking beca'ise the
British had "left their tail behind" on Taiwan in the form of a
consulate. According to the PRC-British joint communique (in
the English version, faithfully reproduced by NCNA's English
service), the British Government, "acknowledging" Peking's
position that Taiwan is a province of the PRC, declared its
decision to remove its official representation from Taiwan.
There was some linguistic juggling involved here, however, as
the Chinese version used the same term, "cheng jen," both for
Britair's "acknowledgment" of Peking's claim to Taiwan and for
British "recognition" of the PRC Government as the sole government
of China. The Chinese version thus gave the impression of a
less equivocal British accession to Peking's terms and obscured
the fact that the British had made use of a key term appearing
in the Sino-U.S. communique. The Chinese version of the Sino-
U.S. communique had used "jen shih tao" for the U.S. acknowledgment
of Peking's view on Taiwan.
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The Britsh formula, complete with the linguistic twists, was also
used when two Commonwealth partners, Australia and New Zealand,
announced their establishment of relati,ns with Peking in separate
joint communiques with the PRC released on 22 December. NCNA's
English version of the 24 December PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
hailing these two recognition agreements let the linguistic cat
out of the bag by saying Australia and New Zealand had "recognized"
the PRC Government as the sole legal government of China and
"recognized" Peking's position on Taiwan. although NCNA's English
versions of both joint communiques used "acknowledged" on the
latter count. Earlier, in a 14 October joint communique, the
more pliant--or less witting--Maldives Government said it
"recognizes" both the PRC Government and the claim to Taiwan.
Notwithstanding these legalistic na.ceties, Peking's more relaxed
posture toward the Taiwan questior. has been reflected in its less
shrill and obsessive concern over the issue. In contrast to his
lengthy discourse on the issue In his 1971 UNGA address, chief
PRC delegate Chiao Kuan-hua ignored the matter in his main address
at the 1972 session. Similarly, Peking's observance of the anniversary
of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan in June was in a much lower key
last year than in 1971. The 1973 New Year's Day joint editorial,
while ritualistically calling for the liberation of Taiwan, failed
to repeat the previous year's denunciation of two-Chinas formulas
and the demand that the United States withdraw its forces from
Taiwan. Expressing "deep concern for our compatriots" on Taiwan,
the 1973 joint editorial went on to refer to "our compatriots in
Hong Kong and Macao" and "our compatriots overseas." Peking may
intend for Hong Kong and Macao to become a model for Taiwan's
future relationship with the mainland: Peking has consistently
avoided acknowledging that the two colonies have been juridically
alienated from the PRC or that their legal status is indeterminate,
but it has not indicated an intent to challenge existing
administrative and economic arrangements.
In the meantime Peking has softened its approach toward the Chiang
Kai-shek government, the last commentary in central media criticizing
ROC policies having been a 13 March NCNA attack on an ROC bank
charter revision that had the effect of blocking PRC legal claims
to assets currently under Taipei's control. While maintaining the
position that Chiang's government is not a legitimate one and
continuing to characterize it as a "clique" and a "gang," Peking
has been avoiding references to the regime, or to Chiang himself,
in such terms as "traitor" or "political corpse"--epithets that
remained in currency until early 1971. Characteristically, it
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10 JANU,IRY 1973
has been left to hardline allies to take up the slack, as in PRG
Foreign Minister Binh's revival--in her Peking rally speech on
29 December--of the formulation that Chiang is "the rotten political
corpse long since repudiated by the Chinese people."
GESTURES TOWARD TAIWAN Peking has sought to promote an ecciaenical
spirit of Chinese unity to attra".t the
people on Taiwan and elsewhere. The 106th anniversary in 1972 of
the birth of Sun Yat-sen receives; a fanfare on the mainland not seen
in recent years. NCNA reported meetings on 12 November at -i's
former bases--Canton, Shanghai, and Nanking--as well as celebrations
in Peking sponsored by the fellow-traveling Revolutionary Committee
of the Kuomintang, the CCP's United Front Department, and the
National Committee of the CPPCC. The anniversary had not been
marked since 1967, when only celebrations in Peking were reported.
A broadcast to Taiwan on the occasion quoted one of Sun's contemporaries
now residing on the main1sad as pointing to the CCP leadership as
the rightful heir of the mandate once held by Sun's Kuomintang.
A gesture signaling Peking's current approach appeared last summer
in connection with the Asian ping-pong championships hosted by the
PRO. NCNA reported on 27 August that the Asian Table Teru is Union
executive committee had expressed readiness to welcome a Taiwan team
to the 2-13 September tournament provided it participated in the
name of "the Taiw,.n provincial team." On the same occasion Hong
Kong and Macao "regional" (ti chu) teams were treated to a warm
welcome at the Peking tournament.
The 1972 PRC National Day celebrations provided the stage for an
authoritative gesture toward Taiwan. Speaking at a reception on
29 September in honor of "compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao,
Taiwan compatriots, and Overseas Chinese and foreign nationals of
Chinese descent," senior military leader Yeh Chien-ying noted that
"quite a number of Taiwan compatriots" had toured the mainland in
the past year, and he welcomed more of them to come and visit their
relatives. (In recent years there had been no mention of Taiwan
compatriots at this reception.) Yeh made a pitch to sentiments
of patriotism among the Chinese on Taiwan and elsewhere, declaring
that "patriots belong to one big family" and that no distinction
should be drawn between "those who ome forward first and those
later." Striking a conciliatory nute that was particularly relevant
to ROC officials, he reassured "those with wrongdoings in the past"
that they will be welcome to join the family. Premier Chou En-tai
lent his authority to the gesture by receiving the Taiwan and other
compatriots for a "cordial talk" on 6 October.
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Peking's attem^t to projer.t an image of solicitous concer.?. for
the people on Taiwan was reflected, atypically, in one of the
series of PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials hailing recognition agreements.
The 18 November editorial on the establishm-nt of relations with
Luxembourg interjected an assertion that the PRC "is concerned
about the living conditions and democratic rights of the compatriots"
on Taiwan.
BROADCASTS TO TAIWAN Radio Peking and the PLA Fuki':n Front
transmitter each beam about 20 hours of
programs daily to Taiwan and the offshore islands. Most of the
programs are in Mandarin, but both stations together carry over
50 hours a week of broadcasts in the Amoy dialect used on Taiwan,
and Radio ?'eking also beams seven hours of programs weekly in the
Hakka dialect. In contrast to Peking's international services,
which draw almost completely on the general file of NCNA and other
central media, these stations originate a considerable amount of
material tailored fo:: their particular audiences as well as
carrying material from the central file. Thus, for example, the
Fukien Front radio carries a "Program for KMT Military and Political
Personnel" consisting of material specifically tailored for ROC
officials.
Mirroring Peking's general line, the broadcasts to Taiwan have
accented the positive by portraying the good life on the mainland
while softpedaling attacks directed personally at Chiang Kai-shek
or other members of his government, and cow-,)letely ignoring the
Taiwan independence movement. Criticism of the ROC has generally
been in a low key, appearing in the context of comparing conditions
on Taiwan with those on the mainland. Thus, the Fukien Front on
16 November broadcast a talk by a Hunan taxi driver who cited
the number of traffic accidents on Taiwan in contrast to the
"good socialist condition" of PRC traffic safety (somehow failing to
factor in the higher per capita number of cars on Taiwan). Thrs
economic situation seems to occasion the sharpest criticism of
conditions on Taiwan, reflecting Peking's concern to undercut the
fears among people on Taiwan regarding the effect on their
prosperity of union with the mainland. Broadcasts to Taiwan h. e
attempted to convince the people there that the average man is
not benefiting from the island's economic growth. Thus, an
8 October Fukien Front commentary, entitled "Expose Lies of
Industrial Developnenr on Taiwan," arguo',i that the Taiwan
economy is mostly foreign-owned and therefore provides little
profit for the island's people, and a 12 October broadcast
rebutted the ROC's claims to improving living standards by
citing statistics about heavy taxes, inflation, and unemployment
that cut into farily incomes on Taiwan.
CONFIDENTIAL
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A characteristic device used in these broadcasts is for former
ROC officials and other noncommunist personages to comment on
the dramatic differences between conditions prior to the
communist takeover and those prevailing now on the mainland.
Typifying this approach, Radio Peking on 21 November broadcast
a talk by a professor of agricultural economics at a Nanking
university who acknowledged that prior to liberation he had
been doubtful about the CCP and had prepared himself to drive a
tractor in case he was ompelled to abandon teaching. To his
surprise, he recounted, he was promoted in his academic department
and even became a member of the Nanking people's conference. His
case history provided a parable of the PRC's reatment of patriotic
intellectuals.
Former capitalists have also been put into service is this
propaganda campaign, as in a 10 November broadcast in which a
businessman from Hunan explained the more favorable economic
consumption pattern of the masses and his own happy life under
communist rule. Others making their contribution have been a
former ROC admiral and a diplomat who defected from the ROC
embassy in Senegal. There may be a less than adequate stable
of these spokesmen, however, in view of the repeated appearances
of some of them, such as a nonagenarian who was a former colleague
of Sun Yat-sen and makes frequent appearances despite his age and
his accent.
In keeping with Peking's recent gestures toward Taiwan, a number
of talks by such spokesmen have urged their "old friends on Taiwan"
to come and visit the mainland and see their friends and relatives.
Replays from Western and Hong Kong media--the communist paper TA
KUNG PAO is a favorite--of comments on conditions in China and
treatment of visitors by such diverse recent travelers to the
mainland as former U.S. diplomat John Service and Chinese-American
scientists and intellectuals have become standard fare in broadcasts
to Taiwan.
Other recent accounts have mane a point of invoking authoritative
sanction for the current invitation. A 9 November Fukien Front
commentary mentioned a meeting of the author with Mao at which the
chairman :-these:1 his "gccat concern for the Taiwanese people,"
and an 11 December broadcast quoted Mao's remarks to Li Tsung-jen
in 1965 promising a warm welcome and good treatment to all like
Li who are willing to reunite with the motherland. This broadcast
prefaced Mao's remarks with a notation of "the drastic change in
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the :international situation during the past year" that had "greatly
shocked" people of all strata on Taiwan, causing them to "long for
a change" and incl'ning them toward the grew- socialist motherland.
It cited instances of people on Taiwan transferring funds and
sending family members abroad in the wake of the ROC expulsion
from the United Nations, and it observed that a large number of
people on Taiwan had traveled to the United States to visit
relatives who had recently been to the mainland and could tell
them about the situation there.
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