TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For-Release 1999109125. CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8. -=
 \J lam...
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROOO OUO~ W11-8 ential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
4 JANUARY 1973
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875ROO6T6oo UO1N@? 1)
 Approved For Release I 999/0J P p85T00875R000300060001-8
Thii propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
ca-ried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other V.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions,
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
NOTICE
The TRENDS was not issued on 23 December 1972 in
view of the closing of Federal agencies that day.
This issue covers developments for the past two
weeks.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
C 0 N T E N T S
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
INDOCHINA
Hanoi Calls for Signing of October Accord When Talks Resume . . . 1
DRV Media Stress Normal Pursuits Despite "Terror" Bombing . . . . 5
DRV Leaders Visit Bombed Areas, Meet to Mark Anniversaries. . . . 10
Pelting Stresses Sino-Vietnamese Solidarity During Binh Visit. . . 13
Brezhnev Warni Vietnam War Could Affect Soviet-U.S. Contacts. . . 18
Meeting in South Commemorates 12th NFLSV Anniversary. . . . . . . 22
Year-End Reviews Claim Victories In Fighting in South . . . . . . 23
USSR ANNIVERSARY
Brezhnev, Foreign Leaders Address 50th Anniversary Meeting. . . . 25
CHINA
New Year's Editorial Shifts Emphasis to Domestic Affairs. . . . . 32
PRC Blames Natural Disasters for Decline in Grain Harvest . . . . 34
CUBA - USSR
Raul Castro Rails Against Anti-Sovietism in Cuba. . . . . . . . . 35
APOLLO 17
Moscow Gives Apollo Mission Routine Coverage. . . . . . . . . . . 39
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Ukrainian 'Coal Lobby' Continues Squabble Over Investments. . . . 40
CONF DAYN -
Approved For Release I 999/09/2w: ` DP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
FOR OFFICIAL USF ONLY
FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 25 - 31 DECEMBER 1972
Moscow (2401) items)
Peking (1117 items)
50th Anniversary of USSR
(51%)
40%
Vietnam
(47%)
36%
30 Dec.
(Mad,,c Binh
(--)
15%)
[Brezhnev Report
(16%)
9%)
in PRC
Vietnam
(18%)
17%
Domestic Issues
(31%)
32%
[Expanded U.S.
(11X)
13%] Foreign Minister (3%)
8%
Bombing
Chi Peng-f ei
[Suslov-Truong
(--)
2%]
in DPRK
Chinh Talks
Messages to
(-- )
Brezhnev Congratulations
on AAPSO 15th Anniver-
sary
(--)
4%
Kim Il-Song
on Election
as DPRK President
5th Anniversary of
Romanian Republic
(--)
3%
Dahomey Foreign
Minister Alladaye
China
(2%)
3%
in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or .;ditorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate vohn_ a 3f comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
INDOCHINA
Hanoi's highest-level official protest over the massive B-52
and other air strikes initiated in the Hanoi-Haiphong area on
18 December was a DRV Government statement on the 21st, a
vehicle that had also been used to protest the resumption of
full-scale air strikes against the DRV last April as well as
the President's 8 May decision to mine its ports. Like other
propaganda, the government statement charged that the Administra-
tion was trying to impose its peace terms through force, and it
appealed explicitly to the USSR and China to "demand" that the
United States sign the peace accord agreed on last October.
Hanoi has kept up a barrage of comment since the 18th stressing
that the Vietnamese will not be cowed by what it calls
"unprecedented terrorism" against the civilian population.
The U.S. decision to again suspend strikes above the 20th
parallel as of 30 December was acknowledged by Hanoi on
1 January. And on the 3d it said that since the United States
"had been compelled" to halt the expanded bombing Le Duc Tho
was leaving that day for Paris to resume the private talks on
the 8th.
PRG Foreign Minister Binh's visit to Peking beginning on
27 December occasioned a major demonstration of Chinese support,
highlighted by a strong leadership turnout at an anti-U.S. rally
followed by a meeting between Mao and Binh. For the first time
in over a year the Chinese revived their pledge to risk even
"the greatest national sacrifice" in supporting the Vietnamese,
but this did not appear until the joint communique issued on
the 1st, the same day Peking carried the DRV statement on the
curtailment of U.S. bombing and resumption of the negotiations.
Peking showed restraint in reacting to the U.S. air strikes
while reiterating its hope for a negotiated settlement.
Soviet: reaction to the expanded U.S. bombings Baas highlighted
by Brezhnev's 21 December remarks, in his address on the 50th
anniversary of the USSR, condemning the U.S. actions and warn-
ing that eve:its in Vietn,un could adversely affect Soviet-U.S.
relations.
HANOI CALLS FOR SIGNING OF OCTOBER ACCORD THEN TALKS RESIME
The 30 December statement by ,.he DRV Paris spokesman on U.S.
restriction of its bombing and the agreement to resume private
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIA FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
talks, carried by Hanoi media on 1 January, observed that the
DRV side "has declared many times" that only when the United
States "returns to the situation prior to 18 December can
the talks between the DRV and the United States resume." It
added that now the United States has replied that it agrees
to end all bombing and shelling above the 20th parallel and
"on this basis" the DRV agrees to resume the Kissinger-Le Duc
Tho talks as well as the experts' meetings.
Hanoi propaganda on the massive air strikes repeatedly stresred
that they were aimed at imposing U.S. negotiating terms and
underlined DRV unwillingness to modify its position in the
face of the attacks. A \i A commentary on the 19th had promptly
warned that the U.S. "big stick and bombing diplomacy would
reduce the prospects for effective negotiations" and
"gradually eliminate all the favorable conditions for the
signing of the agreement." The DRV Government statement on
the 21st observed that the United States had "insolently
threatened" to continue the bombing in hopes of compelling
North Vietnam to accept U.S. terms and said that the Vietnamese
people who had fought for decades "would not shrink in the face
of any cruel force nor fear any insolent threat." The statement,
like other propaganda, also labeled Administration charges that
the DRV was obstructing a Vietnam settlement as "tricks aimed
at finding a pretext for escalating the war."
Hanoi radio on the 25th took issue with White House press
secretary Ziegler's statement that the bombing and mining would
continue until Hai?oi resumed constructive peace nego' 'tions,
charging that it is the President who has rained bombb on "the
spirit of negotiations" and who "has pushed far away the
prospects for the restoration of peace ir. Vietnam, which the
U.S. side once said was at hand." Hanoi also demonstrated its
position that talks could not go on 'hiring the expanded bombing
by its attitude on the experts' talkb. And VNA on the 28th
reported a message sent to the U.S. side the day before which
recalled that Hanoi's position regarding the meetings of
experts had been "clerrly stated" on the 20th and 23d and
declared that the DRV could not participate in the experts'
meeting scheduled for the 27th. The report said that the
meetings will be resumed "when the situation existing before
18 December 1972 has been restored."
Hanoi's report on 3 January that Le Due Tho had left that day
to return to Paris and resume talks on the 8th e^.hoed the
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300060001-8
CONFIDENTTAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
statement by the DRV Paris spokesman on the 30th in saying
thot progress depends on the U.S. side. The item on the 3d
also echoed other propaganda when it said that the November-
December private talks the United States had demanded modifica-
tion of many articles of the peace agreement which involved
basic principles agreed on in October. But Hanoi on the 3d
went on to make the unique statement that "as of 13 December
only a few problems remained." This optimistic assessment
seems to contradict Xuan Thuy's remarks in his 19 December
press conference, as reported by VNA, that up to 13 December
the United States had introduced a total of 126 modifications
to the nine points of the draft agreement and that with a few
exceptions these modifications were basic in nature and wei-t
against the principles of the fundamental national rights of
the Vietnamese. Xuan Thuy gave no indication that the U.S.
request for modifications had been withdrawn or otherwise
disposed of.
Hanoi media while refuting KisaInger's account of the status:
of the private talks in his 16 December press conference
acknowledged little of the substance of his remarks. Similarly,
Hanoi has taken issue with his blaming the DRV for the failure
to reach agreement but without acknowledging such specific
charges as his assertion that the DRV had withdrawn from
previous positions and that during the last three days of the
talks had raised one. "frivolous issue" after another. Xuan
Thuy in a 24 Decembe.* TV interview with. ABC cited specific
examples of modifications allegedly demanded by the United States,
but Hanoi has not even mentioned the interview. According to
Xuan Thuy, U.S. demands involved a phrase implying total
withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces,* the linking of the
release of political detainees in the South to a DRV withdrawal,
the demand that military as well as T1,S. economic advisers be
allowed to remain in South Vietnam, the elimination of references
to the PRG, and the reduction of the functions of the national
council of reconciliation and concord to conduct general elections.
* In his press conference on the 16th, Kissinger expressly :?uled
out Thieu's demand for removal of all North Vietnam troops, but
he said that what the United States cannot accept is "the
proposition that North Vietnam has the right of constant
intervention." He said that th United States wanted something
in the agreement, however allusive, however indirect, which
would make it clear that the t-.'.. parts of Vietnat. would live in
peace and neither side impose a solution on the other by force.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
The brief VNA account of Xuan Thuy's press conference on the
19th had ignored his remarks opposing the U.S. proposal for
an international control commission composed of several
thousand--a proposal discussed by Kissinger on the 16th.*
Hanoi media also ignored DRV Paris spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's
21 December press conference in which he said, among other
things, that during the second phase of the talks beginning
on 4 December it became clear that the more good will shown
by the DRV the more the Nixon Administration's attitude
became unreasonable. Le also said in that pres3 conference
that the U.S. side at the private meetings had repeatedly
threatened to resume the escalation of the war in North Vietnam
and break off the negotiations.
Hanoi's assertion in the report of Le Duc Tho's return for
talks that "as of 1.3 December only a few problems remained"
is the more Striking in vies' of the item's concluding "demand,"
credited to world-wide opinion as well as the Vietnamese, that
the United States "adopt a really serious attitude and sign the
agreement it agreed on with the DRV side on 20 October." Thus,
Hanoi seems to be 'holding out hope that agreement is possible
on the basis of the October draft.
Since the announcement of the agreement Hanoi has at:essed the
matter of the "unity" of Vietnam. A short VNA (ommentary on
the 2d en;.itled "Thieu's Scheme--Partition of Country" said
that "now that there is a chance for the Paris talks to continue"
Thieu has become "more confused and frightened." It added that
his real intention in sending emissaries abroad is "to prepare
for possible American revision of the peace treaty and for later
sabotage." VNA quoted the Saikan paper TIN SONG as saying that
Thieu has not changed his position that "the two Vietnams must
be recognized as two countries who have sovereignty, independence
and inviolable boundaries." And it added that Thieu's behavior
has revealed that "sinister design" he is harboring when he
presses for the restoring of the demilitarized zone, the turning
of the temporary demarcation line into a national frontier to
perpetuate the division of the country. This same line was
pursued on the 3d in a Hanoi radio commentary and in an article
* Hanoi media had atypically broached this issue when a
2 December NHAN DAN article assailed Indonesian Foreign Minister
Malik for expressing willingness to supply 2,000 troops to an
international control commission. See the TRENDS of 6 December
1972, pages 5-6.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, with the latter saying
that "it is crystal clear" that Thieu opposes "the sacred
national rights of our country, peace, and the basic contents
of the agreement on ending the war . . which was concluded
by the U.S. side and the DRV side on 20 October." The
paper added that the peace agreement "clearly stipulates that
the United States should respect the independence, sovereignty,
unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam."
Hanoi's position on the unity of Vietnam was also forcefully
reiterated in VNA's 4 January report that the DRV Paris
spokesman had refuted "a news agency story" on the 2d that
"a compromise accord has bPcn reached between Washington and
Hanoi" and "Hanoi has agreed not to include in the peace
agreement a sentence affirming that Vietnam is one courtry
temporarily divided in two.' According to VNA, the spokesman
recalled that point one of the nine points "agreed upon with
the United States" stipulates that the United States recognizes
the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity
of Vietnam as provided for by t:ie 1954 Geneva agreement.
DRV MEDIA STRESS NORMAL PURSUITS DESPITE "TERROR" BOMBINGS
Hanoi media reacted to the massive B-52 Strikes with an outpouring
of propaganda calculated to dramatize Vietnamese determination not
to be cowed. Initial official protests--a DRV Foreign Ministry
statement on the 19th and the government statement on the 21st--
foll'T.?,:d the pattern of initial reaction last spring when U.S.
striker; were resumes throughout North Vietnam. At that time a
forei3n ministry statement was issued on 6 April and a government
statement on the 11th; tiie B-52 strikes in the Haiphong area on
16 April, however, additionally prompted a DRV Party-Government
appeal the same day. The April joint appeal--which has a
single precedent in one of December 1970 following heavy strikes
and the prisoner-rescue attempt--was notable for its
revival of Ho Chi Minh's July 1966 statement that the Vietnamese
would not be intimidated even if Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities
and enterprises were to be destroyed. This pledge has appeared
in some of the current propaganda including Defense Minister Vo
Nguyen Giap's 21 December speech marking the army anniversary
and in a message on the same day from the VPA High Command
praising air defense forces' feats in downing U.S. planes.
Ho's pledge was not voiced, howeve, in the government statement
on the 21st. Hanoi may have stopped short of repeating the pledge
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
in the vehicle of a governmert statement because of the
intensity of the ongoing attacks at that time. This
possibility seems the more likely in view of the fact that the
pledge was repeated in a foreign ministry statement issued
on 29 December--at a time when Hanoi presumably was aware
that a U.S. suspension of the strikes above the 20th parallel
was imminent. After declaring that the Vietnamese "have%
the necessary amount of resolve and enough strength to
persist in and step up the struggle," the foreign ministry
statement affirmed also that "Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities
and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese will not
be intimidated. Nothing is more precious than independence and
freedom."
Hanoi's leadership endeavored, throughout the period of intensive
bombing, to rally the population against the attacks and to
maintain an appearance of normalcy. Thus, a day after the first
massive strike in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, Hanoi broadcast a
letter from DRV President Ton Duc Thang which, on behalf of the
party Central Committee and government, hailed the antiaircraft
successes and called for further vigilance and efforts. In the
following days Hanoi publicized a series of public appearances by
DRV leaders, including Giap and Premier PhEm Van Dong.
Propaganda stressing the North Vietnamese ability to cope with
the attacks was typified by a 22 December commentary in the
army paper QUAN DOI KHAN DAN. It said that everyone works
tirelessly to keep the mode of life and combat in Hanoi
uninterrupted, adding that "amid flames of bombs dropped by
B-52's, huge transportation convoys camouflaged under leaves
depart Hanoi day and night to reach the frontline." An editorial
in the army paper on the 23d similarly said that convoys continue
to move goods to the frontline.
Hanoi seemed particularly concerned to reassure the Vietnamese
regarding the dissemination of news. The QUAN DOI KHAN DAN
commentary on the 22d said that in buildings where the lamps
are covered "printers work all night so that the reports on our
country's resounding victories over the U.S. aggressors can be
disseminated promptly." Strikes at Hanoi radio were noted in
a VNA commentary on the 19th which said that the United States
was "deliberately carpetbombing the central radio station r2 the
DRV in an attempt to stifle the voice of justice." Hanoi radio
on the 25th broadcast a NHAN DAN editorial which noted pointe.lly
that "the voice of the just cause and victory from the 'Voice of
Vietnam' radio station in the capital city of Hanoi continues to
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
broadcast news of victory throughout our country and the
world and to severely condemn the U.S. war maniacs." On the
30th Hanoi radio broadcast a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of
that day which said, among other things, that "every night
Hanoi streets are still brightly lighted by electric lights,
the light of victory, and from the pride-deserving capital our
radio station and press unceasingly continue to relay news of
resounding victories from all over the country." Hanoi's
"victory" from 18-29 December is said to have entailed the
downing of 81 planes, including 34 B-52's and five F-111's and
the "wiping out" or capture of "hundreds" of airmen.
An editorial in the party organ NHAN DAN on the 26th, entitled
"Hanoi, Capital of Human Dignity," cited a Cornell University
study for the assertion that B-52 bombing is for psychological and
strategic, rather than military, effect. The editorial said that
since 8 May when DRV ports were mined "a huge U.S. psywar
operation" has day and night threatened the use of B-52's. It
added that "friends with sentiments of mutual understanding,
coming to share the danger of bombs with us during the first
months of the criminal U.S. escalation, asked us: 'What if
the H-:`'s bomb Hanoi?"' (VNA rendered this as "some foreign
friends who visited North Vietnam during the first months . . . .")
The answer, NHAN DAN said, came from an ordinary militia woman
who said "houses may collapse, but one thing shall not collapse,
that is man."
An editorial in NHAN DAN on the 24th quoted an air force
lieutenant colonel recently captured as "admitting" that because
of their technical characteristics B-52's could only attack
military complexes covering many square miles, and as saying
that since such objectives did not exist in North Vietnam the
use of B-52's to attack small objectives and densely populated
areas was political and aimed at causing many losses to the
people in an attempt to create pressure. The editorial asked
how President Nixon can answer this admission by a man who has
executed his orders.
Particular vitriol toward the President and the Administration
appeared in editorials in NHAN DAN on the 27th and the 31st.
Declaring that "Nixon has used to the ful at extent the
strategic B-52 which he thinks everyone is afraid of," the
editorial on the 27th said: "The bandits have invaded our home
at night. They closed the door, gagged us, blocked off all
contact with the outside world so that they could brat us while
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO0300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
we could not scream until we dropped to our knees with blood
oozing from our mouths." Asserting that the Vietnamese have
in the course of the week "enhanced their historic reputation,"
NHAN DAN added: "The Nixon clique, whi,.:tt is inherently base,
is all the more like an animal slithering on the ground and
hiding under one's foot. The Nixcrt clique's posture is that
of someone in a weakened, declining position and it will
certainly be destroyed. Our strength is that of human beings
with a just cause, progress and with an ascending historic
tide." The editorial on the 31sc--after the suspension of
strikes above the 20th parallel--called th', President an
"international hooligan" intent on committing "murderous crimes"
and criticized his silence on the issue of the war during the
current escalation, and noted that he spent the Christmas
holidays in Florida rather than Washington. It said this allowed
him to concentrate his energies on "committing a perfect crime--
that is, a quick, orderly, discreet and successful crime--and
on thoroughly cleaning his t1oodstained hands in preparation
for holding aloft another green olive branch."
Other propag^rda since the bombing restriction has pointed up
Hanoi's caution regarding future U.S. action, Thus,
2 January QUAN DOI KHAN DAN editorial, entitled "Pour he Flames
of Hatred on the U.S. Aggressors' Heads," said that President
Nixon's action in using the B-52's over the cities "was an
extremely horrible act which far surpasses that of the
Hitlerite fascists," and that "Nixon is the most bloodthirsty
leader of the 20th century." It conclude-' by saying that
although the U.S. aggressors were duly punished, "we are not
yet satisfied and our hatred for them remains unappeased."
EVACUATION Hanoi media on 30 December reported on a directive
"recently" issued by the Premier's Office concerning
the tasks faced by areas taking in evacuees, and a NHAN DAN
editorial on 2 January, commenting on the directive, emphasized
the importance of evacuation both as "a positive measure to
protect the people's lives and preserve our force in order to
prolong the fight until complete victory" and as a means of
"creating conditions for our armed forces to fight and win."
It said that evacuation must be thoroughly carried out in
populated cities and towns and industrial sites, especially Hanoi
and Haiphong. And it called for the implementation of a policy
according to which "only people required for combat, combat
support, production and for communications and transportation
activities remain in the cities."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
Calls for evacuation have been a staple of Hanoi propaganda
since the resumption of U.S. air strikes throughout North
Vietnam last April, just as they worn during the 1965-68
bombing of the North. Like the current KHAN DAN, these calls
have perior!ically stipulated that all people not engaged in
combat or production should be evacuated. For example, on
10 May, two days after the resident had announced his decision
to mine DRV ports, a NHAN i,iN editorial called for evacuation
of all those not engaged in combat or production, and this was
repeated in an 11 May order from the Hanoi Municipal People's
Air Defense Council. The call for the exodus of nonessential
civilians appeared again in a 10 October resolution from the
Hanoi Municipal People's Council--adopted a week after Hanoi
had charged, in an appeal from North Vietnamese mayors, that the
cities had become strategic targets for U.S. attacks.
According to Hanoi Mayor Tran 1juy Hung the actual preparations
for the evacuation of the city began after 5 August 1964 when
U.S. planes struck North Vietnam during the Tonkin Gulf incident.
In a January 1967 interview with a Czechoslovak correspondent,
the mayor said that children and old people were evacuated in
the first phase followed by those people "who were not necessary
for production in and the defanse of the city." Hanoi media
usually have not cited statistics on evacuation, but Mayor Hung
in an interview reported by TASS in December 1966 said that a
third of the capital, including almost all the children, had
been evacuated. Defense Minister Giap in a July 1969 speech
reviewing activities during the w-c had said that "millions" of
people had been evacuated to rural areas. After the resumption
of full-scale bombing last spring, a 3 May editorial in the
Hanoi city newspaper HANOI MOI noted that already "hundreds of
thousands" of citizens, especially elderly persons and children,
had left the capital.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
DRV LEADERS VISIT BOMBED AREAS1 MEET TO MARK ANNIVERSARIES
Hanoi reported that, beginning on 22 December, North Vietnamese
leaders made a series of visits to air defense installations and
areas in and around the capital which had been damaged in tke air
strikes. The visits by officials, including Vietnam Workers Party
(VWP) Politburo members Pharr Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy
Trinh, and Van Tien Dung, were reminiscent of similar publicized
tours of damaged areas by Hanoi leaders in the wake of the
extremely severe floods during the summer of 1971.* In addition
to visiting various localities, North Vietnamese leaders promoted
the appearance of maintaining normal conditions during the attacks
by attending as usual a 21 December meeting in Hanoi to commemorate
the anniversaries of Resistance Day and the founding of the army.
However, there was no report of a public meeting on the 19 December
NFLSV anniversary, an annual function in past years attended by
Politburo-level figures. Politburo members Le Duan, Le Duc Tho,
and Tran Quoc Roan did not make any publicized appearances during
the period of the attacks; but Le Duan and Hoan did surface on
1 January to welcome Truong Chinh back from his trip to Moscow.**
Publicizing the activities of the North Vietnamese leaders, Hanoi
media reported that on 22 December Premier Pharr Van Dong visited
the headquarters of the army (VPA) antiaircraft and air force
command, accompanied by Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung; Defense
Minister Giap visited a missile unit and various localities in
the Hanoi area; and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh toured
"a number of areas :-ecently bombed and attacked by U.S. aircraft."
The radio report on Giap's activities indicated that the Bach Mal
hospital was among the sites he went to and it claimed that "ev y-
body expressed gratitude for the concern and care of the VWP Central
Committee, the government and the army and promised that they would
* The leaders' visits to flood-stricken areas in September 1971 are
discussed in the 15 September 1971 TRENDS, pages 1-3.
** Politburo members Le Thanh Nghi and Hoang Van Hoan were both out
of the country during the intensified bombing--Nghi in France and
Romania and Hoang Van Hoan with Truong Chinh in the Soviet Union.
Hoan took part in talks with Suslov on 29 December but his where-
abouts has not been reported since. He may have remained in Moscow
since the only available listing of Truong Chinh's delegation since
it left Moscow--carried by Peking media--did not include him.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
turn hatred into strength, make their maximum contributions to the
entire nation's common revolutionary undertaking and completely
defeat the U.S. aggressors."
The theme of official concern for the suffering of the people was
particularly reflected in a 26 December radio report on visits
made by Pham Van Dong and other officials on 24 and 25 December.
For example, Hanoi radio described in some detail the Premier's
tour of bombed areas, noting how moved he was by statements by
survivors and how he embraced and consoled a child who had just
lost her mother and brothers. The radio reported that Dong
instructed members of the party, army, and government to "pay
great concern to the livelihood of orphans and to study and to
motivate the people to love and take care of one another." He
also called for the local administration to have plans to "rapidly
stabiliz' the people's livelihood and restore production."
In iddition to the activities of the leaders in the Hanoi area,
the radio on the 26th reported that "recently" Haiphong air
defense-air force cadres and combatants had been visited by Pham
Van Dong, Giap, and Van Tien Dung.
ANNIVERSARY MEETING Despite the initiation of the air strikes
on Hanoi on the 18th, North Vietnamese media
on the 22d reported that on the previous evening a solemn meeting
had been held in the capital to commemorate the 26th anniversary of
Resistance Day (19 December) and the 28th anniversary of the
founding of the VPA (22 December). As was the case last year, the
meeting was sponsored by Vietnam Fatherland Front organizations and
the Defense Ministry and was attended by Politburo members Pham Van
Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Van Tien Dung. Also present were Central
Committee members Col. Gen. Chu Van Tan and Lt. Gen. Song Hao,
director of the VPA Political Department.
As is traditional, Giap delivered the major address before the
anniversary meeting, after opening remarks by Pham Van Dong.
Giap's speech followed the pattern of previous years in reviewing
military developments in the past months. He predictably lauded
the communist offensive, which he described as "a series of
military attacks with very strong blows by the main force
multibattalions which have coordinated their battles." According
to Giap, the offensive "frustrated to a great extent" the
Vietnamization strategy and created a basic turning point leading
to far-reaching changes in the balance of forces" and an "extremely
bright situation" for the South. Consistent with his reference
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
to Ho's 1966 statement expressing resolve in spite of the
possible destruction of Hanoi and Haiphong, Giap's discussion
of the escalated U.S. air strikes in the North underlined DRV
determination. He maintained that the people will "fight
until final victory" even though "they still must undergo
more sacrifices and difficultied'and he asserted: "In our
glorious thousands-of-years-old history our Vietnar,ese people
have never yielded to any aggressor enrmy."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
PEKING STRESSES SINO-VIETNAMESE SOLIDARITY DURING BINMI VISIT
Peking made use of PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi E1nh's
"official visit of friendship" from 27 December to 1 January to
stage a major show of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity while pledging
continuing Chinese support for the Vietnamese communists. (PRC
media had reported Binh's utopovers in Peking in the past, but
this was her first official visit.) The demonstration of
Chinese support was highlighted by a strong leadership turnout of
all the active Peking-based Politburo members at a rally on
2S December (broadcast and televised live) followed by a
meeting between Mao and Binh. This high-level treatment
paralleled that accorded the visit of DRV Premier Pham Van Dong
in November 1971, which occasioned the last previous such rally.
While reassuring their allies of continuing support and deploring
the heavy U.S. air strikes as a vain attempt at "military
blackmail," the Chinese exercised restraint in reacting to the
December downturn in Vietnam developments, pulling their punches
toward the Nixon Administration and reiterating their hope for
a negotiated settlement. Having ,one promptly on record with
a foreign ministry statement on 20 December seconding the previot a
day's DRV protest against the U.S. bombing, Peking failed to
issue any further official statements on the air strikes. The
21 December DRV Government statement appealing to the USSR and
China "to stay the criminal hands of the Nixon Administration"
was delivered on the next day by the DRV ambassador to Vice
Premier Li Hsien-nien, who was quoted at some length by Peking
as having denounced the "unjustifiable and perfidious" U.S.
actions in bombing North Vietnam and "obstructing" a peace
settlement. On one previous occasion, in September, Li had
substituted for Chou En-lai in accepting delivery of Vietnamese
statements.
Peking promptly carried the texts of official Vietnamese state-
ments on the bombing, with the exception of the 29 December DRV
Foreign Ministry statement which it sanitized to remove harsh
invective against the Nixon Administration. During this period
Peking also carried several reports on U.S. demonstrations
against the bombing, including a dispatch on 21 December citing
a protest by Congressmen that alluded to Kissinger's 26 October
press conference and mentioned the presidential election.
During the election campaign Peking had scrupulously avoided
linking the campaign to Vietnam developments. In another sign
of Chinese disappointment over the bombing, NCNA took the unusual
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FB]S TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
step of reporting alleged statements by recently captured
American airmen saying civilian targets had been bombed.
Peking's most direct assertion of Chinese interests affected by
the U.S. bombing appeared in an "urgent statement" issued by
NCNA on 21 December protesting damage to a Chinese ship docked
at Haiphong and warning that the PRC Government "is closely
watching the development of expanding U.S. war activities."
The unusual recourse to a statement in the nome of the news
agency seemed to reflect Peking's reluctance to associate its
security interests with the Vietnam conflict. There have been
previous instances in which NCNA issued protests in its own name,
but these have usually concerned matters involving NCNA itself
or other journalistic affairs. Protests against damage to
Chinese property in Indochina have formerly taken the form of
statements in the name of government offices, though sometimes
these were simply "the department concerned." Two previous
protests in 1972 were issued as foreign ministry statements.
Peking has not commented on the U.S. curtailment of bombing and
the agreement to resume the Vietnam negotiations, developments
that have been reported in PRC media through pickups of DRV
announcements. Thus, NCNA on 1 January disseminated the text of
the DRV Paris delegation's statement on these developments,
and on the 3d NCNA carried the text of the DRV announcement on
Le Duc Tho's departure from Hanoi to resume the Paris
negotiations.
CHINESE SUPPORT Mutual satisfaction over Peking's reaction
to recent Vietnam developments was reflected
in the "identical views" recorded in the 1 January jr,int
communique on Binh's talks with the Chinese. According to the
communique, the two sides "noted with concern pertinent matters"
and discussed the Vietnam situation and the question of "further
strengthening the mutual support and assistance" between the
Chinese and South Vietnamese. .&..s formulation seems stronger
than the one in the joint communique on Pham Van Dong's visit,
which had referred more vaguely to "the strengthening of the
friendly relations and cooperation" between the two countries
and did not register an identity of views.
That Mao received Binh was not extraordinary in view of his
practice of seeing representatives of friendly governments,
including French Foreign Mitister Schumann as well as heads of
government. What was unusual, however, was that Mao's remarks
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDErTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
to Binh were publicized by NCNA--a gesture whose only recent
precedent was NCNA's account of his meeting with Romania's
Ceausescu in June 1971. Binh was quoted as being honored to
meet "Uncle Mao," who replied by saying, in keeping with the
avuncular image, that China and "South and North Vietnam, and
also Laos, Cambodia and Korea, are all of the same family.
We support each other." This familial. image, with its implication
of Asian communist unity and exclusion of the Soviets, was .
partially incorporated in the joint communique's assertion that
the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples "are of the same family."
The same passage of the communique contained the first revival
in over a year of the Chinese pledge to risk even "the greatest
national sacrifice" in supporting the Vietnamese. However, the
Chinese avoided this warning in their various speeches and
statements, including the rally speech by ranking military
leader Yeh Chien-ying, a figure long associated with Vietnam
developments. In contrast, this pledge--and a companion
assertion, not revived on this occasion, to the effect that
failure to aid the Vietnamese would be a betrayal of proletarian
internationalism--had recurred in Chinese speeches during the
exchange of visits by the PRC and DRV premiers in 1971 and during
Li Hsien-nien's aid mission to the DRV in September this year.
In their speeches, Yeh and :oreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had
recourse to stock Chinese pledges of support, invoking the
frequently cited Mao quote on rear area support for the
Vietnamese and--in Yeh's case--recalling Mao's 1963 statement
in support of resistance to "the U.S.-Ngo Dinh Diem clique."
While condemning the U.S. air strikes, which Chi called
"unforgivable new crimes," the Chinese did not indicate that
recent Vietnam developments endangered Sino-U.S. relations,
and in fact they avoided criticism of the Nixon Administration
by name. The broader implications of these developments were
broached most directly not during Binh's visit but during Chi's
stay in North Korea from 22 to 25 December. Chi declared that
by its failure to sign the draft accord the U.S. Government
"has forfeited its credibility before the whole world." In
the communique on the visit the Chinese joined their hosts in
expressing "still greater determination to give support and
assistance" to their Indochinese allies.
It was left to Binh, whose rally speech was punctuated with
references to President Nixon by name, to put Vietnam developments
in the wider context of big-power relations. She declared that
the United States "is very afraid of the fact that China and other
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
fraternal countries are stepping up their support and
assistance" to the Vietnamese struggle, and she alluded to
the Nixon Administration's moves toward better relations
with Peking and Moscow by charging that one of Washington's
"most vicious designs" is to "drive wedges" between the
Vietnamese and the Chinese and other fraternal allies. In
the course of praising Chinese aid she cited the two
supplementary agreements signed in 1972 as well as the annual
aid accord for this year.
VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS In her rally speech Binh went into
greater detail than the Chinese in
indicating the issues involved in the Vietnam negotiations,
claiming that the United States had raised the questions of
North Vie-namese troop withdrawal, restoration of the DMZ,
and the South Vietnamese people's right of self-determination.
On the same occasion Yeh charged in more general terms that
the United States had raised "a heap of unreasonable demands,"
and he expressed Peking's support for the "correct stand"
taken by the Vietnamese communists in the negotiations while
placing the responsibility for the suspension of talks squarely
on the United States. Yeh voiced the standard Chinese demand
in calling on the United States to "speedily sign" the peace
agreement "through negotiations," a formulation suggesting
greater latitude in adjusting the terms of a settlement than
the demands posed by the Vietnamese communists. The joint
communique seemed to split the differences between the Chiner,e
and Vietnamese formulations, calling on the United States to
"sit down and negotiate earnestly and speedily sign" the
agreement reached on 20 October.
DRV VISITORS NCNA on i January routinely rLported that DR11
negotiator Le Duc Tho arrived in Peking that
day on the way to Paris. As usual, rho was greeted at the
airport by PRC Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao, who accompanied
him at a meeting with Chou En-lai, feted him at a banquet, and
saw him off on 4 January. In accord with its general practice,
NCNA did not report on the substance of Tho's talk with Chou,
merely noting in stock terms that they had "a very cordial
and friendly conversation." During Tho's December stopover on
his way home after the breakdown in the Paris talks, Peking
had taken the unusual step of reporting on remarks made by Tho
and Chou at their meeting.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
Peking had reported in standard fashion the 31 December-1 January
stopover in Peking of DRV Politburo member Truong Chinh and his
party, which had attended the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations.
As was the case during Truong Chinh's 16-18 December stop in
Pe'1ng on the way to Moscow, he was met and seen oft by Chang
CLun-chiao, who hosted a banquet for him and accompanied him at
a meeting with Chou on the evening of the 31st. NCNA routinely
reported the meeting as having proceeded in an atmosphere of
"fraternal cordiality and frleoiship." As during the December
stop, NCNA did not report thr F,:bstance of remarks made at the
meeting or the banquet, but i;. noted that the banquet "over-
flowed with a warm atmosphere of fraternal friendship and
militant unity." Truong Chinh was reported by NCNA and VNA as
having separate discussions with Prince Sihanouk, RGUNC Prime
Minister Penn Nou,h, and "special envoy" Ieng Sary on the 31st.
On 1 January NCNA reported that DRV Vice Minister of Foreign
Trade Ly Ban and the trade and experts delegation he heads left
for home by train on 30 December. Ly Ban had arrived in Peking
on 7 October to prepare for talks under DRV Politburo member
Le Thanh Nghi leading to the signing on 26 November of the annual
Sino-Vietnamese aid agreement. On 27 December Ly Ban signed
tue annual Sino-Vietnamese trade accord for 1973. The latter
agreement was reported by NCNA in virtually identical terms as
the 5 December 1971 accord for 1972: NCNA noted that an
agreement on "mutual supply of goods and payments" and two
protocols on the PRC's supply of "general goods" and "complete
projects" in 1973 were signed, and that the protocols were in
accordance with the recently concluded aid agreement.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
0
BRE.7J EV WARNS VIETNAM WAR COULD AFFECT SOVIET-U.S1 CONTACTS
On 21 Decem.cr the Soviet line on the massive U.S. air strikes
hardened when 3rezhnev, in his address on the 50th anniversary
of the USSR, strongly condemned the U.S. actioi.s and warned that
events in Vietnam could affect Soviet-U.S. relations. Moscow's
initial reaction to the hcmbings north of the 20th parallel had
been relatively cautious with the brief 19 December TASS state-
ment couched in restrained language.* At varia-!'e with the TASS
statement, Brezhnev explicitly warned that "the question of ending
the war in Vietnam" would affect the future development of Soviet-
U.S. cnrtacts.
:;oocow has rarely broached the issue of the effect of Vietnam on
Soviet-U.S. relations during the Nixon Administration, and this
is the first time the topic has been mentioned since President
Nixon's visit to the USSR. In his report to the 24th CPSU Congress
in March 1971 Brezhnev did not explicitly mention Vietnam in
discussing Soviet-U.S. relations. At that time, however, he did
refer to "aggressive U.S. actions in various parts of the world"
and observed that relations with the United States are complicated
by "zigzags in American foreign policy." A February 1971 USSR
Government statement condemning the incursion into Laos had
specifically warned that U.S. actions in Indochina could affect
Soviet-American relations, as did Kosygin in his June 1971 election
speech.
Despite Brezhnev's harsh criticism in his speech on the 21st, he
still avoided naming the President. Brezhnev observed that the
Vietnam war is the ingest and "dirtiest" in American history, and
"indignantly condemned" the U.S. Government's "barbarian acts."
He decried the latest "American imperialist crimes" in Vietnam and
"unsavory maneuvers" to delay the conclusion of an agreement on
ending the war. Brezhnev pointed out that the USSR gives the
Vietnamese "active assistance in their efforts for a just peace
settlement." Perhaps because Truong Chinh and Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh
* The TASS statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 2C December
1972, pages 10-11.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
among the international communist gallery iepresented at the
meeting, Brezhnev added that the DRV and PRG leaders could
speak more convincingly than the Soviets themselves of the
USSR's "military, economic, and other aid."
The day after Brezhnev's speech, Soviet media publicized a
Soviet party-government appeal on the USSR's 50th anniversary
which condemned the United States for continuing its "disgraceful
aggression in Vietnam," for deliberately delaying the signing
of the peace agreement, and for resuming the "barbarous bombing
raids" on the DRV. It added that the Soviet people "wrathfully
protest against the crimes of U.S. imperialism on Vietnamese
soil."*
Consistent with Brezhnev's remarks, Kosygin's New Year's message,
carried in Soviet media on the 31st, alluded to the effect of the
Vietnam war on other international developments. He noted that
"positive changes" have taken place in the international arena
and a "turning-point" for settlement of a number of important
problems had been reached, but he juxtaposed to these positive
remarks a warning that imperialism has not yet abandoned its
attempts to forcefully impose its will on others, citing the
example of U.S. bombing in Vietnam. Kosygin expressed the soviet
people's condemnation "with anger and indignation" of the
"piratical acts of imperialism in Vietnam," and he demanded the
"earliest signing" of the U.S.-DRV draft agreement and restoration
of peace in Vietnam. (This reference to the peace agreement was
omitted, apparently inadvertently, from the initial Moscow domestic
service report, but TASS and subsequent radio versions including
repeats on the domestic service included it.)
On 25 December Kosygin had received the DRV Ambassador, who handed
him a copy of the 21 December DRV Government statement during a
"friendly and cordial talk." According to TASS, Kosygin expressed
the Soviet people's "resolute condemnation" of the new acts of
* This version was carried on the 22d by Moscow radio's domestic
service and TASS English. An hour earlier Moscow Radio's English-
language service carried a version of the appeal that it called a
text but which did not contain these passages. It included only
brief, generalized remarks on the Vietnam war which did not mention
the United States. It is possible that the description of the item
in the radio's English service as "text" was erroneous. But it is
also possible that the statement was rewritten to cnnform with
Brezhnev's more critical remarks.
CONF IDENT IA.:,
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
"U.S. aggression" and charged the United States with "grave
responsibility for brutalities." He expremsed the Soviet
Government's "expectation" that armed actions aginst the DRV
would be immediately terminated and that the peace agreement
would be signed, and he reiterated that the USSR, loyal to the
principles of proletarian internationalism, would continue to
give the Vietnamese people "the necessary support and assistance."
on the 29th TASS reported that Kosygin again received the DRV
Ambassador that day for a talk "on questions of relations between
the USSR and the DRV" in "a warm and comradely atmosphere in the
spirit of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and fraternal solidarity,"
but the subject of the talk was not further elaborated.
Despite the top Soviet leadership's attacks on U.S. actions in
the DRV, Moscow media showed some restraint regarding the air
strikes. For example, there was no mention that a Soviet ship
had been hit during the raid on Haiphcng on 19 December, nor
was there any mention of the reported bombing of the NOVOSTI news
agency building in Hanoi on the 27th. A 27 December PRAVDA
editorial on the USSR anniversary not only failed to echo
Brezhnev's strong criticism but did not even mention the bombing
of the DRV explicitly. It did express the Soviet people's "angry
condemnation" of the United States' "dirty war in Indochina," but
it also elaborated on the Soviet policies of peaceful coexistence
and detente with the West including the United States.
Routine-level Moscow coverage has generally been confined to
reportage on the bombing raids and pickups of foreign comment
and protests. There have been reports of some low-level protest
meetings in the USSR, and commentators stressed the nonmilitary
nature of the targets and the civilian casualties, drawing
analogies with Nazi atrocities and the bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Emphasizing the need Lo sign the U.S.-DRV
draft peace agreement, commentators accused the United States
of trying to make changes in the agreement and impose a settle-
ment favorable to the United States through massive air raids.
Moscow's prompt reports of the cessation of the bombings
preceded Hanoi's own acknowledgment. On 30 December TASS reported
the White House announcement that bo'b.ngs north of the 20th
parallel had been ordered halted and ;,hat the United States
agreed to resume the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks. Moscow on the
31.st reported the DRV and PRG Paris represen::atives' announcement
of agreement to resume talks. On the same u--y an English-
language radio commentary assessed the bombing halt as a
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 N
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
demonstration of the failure of the United Mates to dictate
from a position of strength and asserted that there is "no
other way" of settling the Vietnam problem than through
peaceful, political means.
TASS on 3 January reported what it called a "special communique"
of the DRV Foreign Ministry announcing the departure of Le Duc
Tho from Hanoi for talks in Paris with Kissinger. Essentially
echoing the report as carried by VNA and Hanoi rad:.o, the TASS
version in reviewing the course of the negotiations noted that
although the United States had demanded changes in the draft
agreement, the DRV upheld the agreed-upon principles. TASS also
said that as of 13 December "there had been some other unsettled
issues."
TRUONG CHINH, WE. BINH Moscow treated the DRV's :"ruong Chinh
IN SOVIET UNION and the PRG's Ng+"yen Thi Binh, in the
Soviet Union for the USSR anniversary
celebrations, with proper protocol but did not go out of its way
to demonstrate any exceptional support. On 29 December, the same
day that Kosygin saw the DRV Ambassador, Truong Chinh was received
by Politburo member Suslov.* This meeting, some 10 days after
Chinh's arrival in the Soviet Union and the day before he departed,
took place in an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship and
cordiality," according to TASS. The Soviet side again pledged
"a.0. the necessary aid" until the Vietnamese people's "Just cause
triuwahs," and "strongly condemned" the U.S. bombings of the DRV.
The Soviet side "demanded" the immediate ending of U.S. armed
operations ag:linst the DRV rind the signing of the draft peace
agreement.
Mme. Binh was received on 26 December by her counterpart, Foreign
Minister Gromyko, just prior to her departure. TASS' brief
report noted only that "questions related to the struggle.of the
Vietnamese p'cple on the military, political and diplomatic
fronts" were discussed in ~n atmosphere of "friendship and
cordiality." Moscow did not report, as did a service message
from VNA's Mosrc,w office to Hanoi headquarters, that Mme. Binh
* The North Korean representative, Choe Yong-kon, party
Politburo member and president of the DPRK Supreme People's
Assembly, had been received by Podgornyy on 23 December.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release I 999/@8,@?&Ii IAlDP85TO ?5I3Q OOO60001-8
4 JANUARY 1973
informed Gromyko of the state of the Paris negotiations which
had been "sabotaged" by the United States and of the "Nixon
Administration's extremely serious step" of intensifying the
war in the North and the South. VNA also reported that
Gromyko "strongly condemned" the U.S. war escalation and
affirmed support and assistance to the Vietnamese cause,
remarks that were also omitted by TASK.
MEETING IN SOUTH COMMEMORATES 12TH NFLSV ANNIVERSARY
The bombing of Hanoi apparently prevented the annual ceremonies
there marking the 19 December anniversary of the NFLSV, but
the usual anniversary meeting was held in South Vietnam,
according to Liberation Radio broadcasts that day. As was the
case in the past, the meeting was attended by NFLSV Chairman
Nguyen Huu Tho, Vietnam Alliance Chairmar. Trinh Dinh Thao, and PRG
Preetdent Huynh Tan Phat. Among others on the presidium of the
meeting, Liberation Radio also listed Vo Chi Cong, vice chairman
of the NFLSV Presidium and a representative of the Vietnam People's
Revolutionary Party (PRP)--the communist party in South Vietnam.
Vo Chi Cong is not known to haime appeared in public since
November 1966 and his appearance at this meeting may have been
a deliberate move to put to rest a 25 November LE MONDE article
detailing an alleged armed coup against the NFLSV/PRG leadership
on 10 November and claiming, among other things, that Vo Chi Cong
had been sentenced to 20 years in a concentration camp for his
part in the coup. At the time of the LE MONDE story, LPA issued
a statement denouncing it as "a sheer fabrication."
As in previous years, Nguyen Huu Tho delivered the main address
at the anniversary meeting. He routinely praised the accomplishments
o_ the communist offensive this year and reiterated the formulation
initiated prior to the offensive that "it is obvious that we
are in an ascending, winning position whereas the enemy is in a
declining, defeate6 position." Tho dealt with the diplomatic
situation in standard terms, noting that the United States had
been forced to agree to the draft peace accord but had sabotaged
the signing of the accord "in hope of gaining a position of
strength and maintaining the U.S. neocolonialist system in South
Vietnam." Later Tho called on the armed forces and people to
"step up their offensive and uprising movement on all battlefields
in coordination with the struggle on ..he diplomatic front" in
order to "completely frustrate the Americans' Vietnamization scheme
and compel them to sign the approved peace agreement."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS THE DS
4 JANUARY 1973
YEAR-END REVIEWS CLAIM VICTORIES IN FIGHTING IN SOUTH
Vietnamese communist media have not yet released the usual PLAT
Command communique tallying military achievements in the past
year; however, the progress of the war in South Vietnam during
1972 has been discussed in comment since the end of December.*
While the propaganda praises 1972 achievements and expresser
optimism about the present situation, it does not suggest that
there will be an escalation of attacks in the near future. By
contrast, comment on the fighting a year ago had anticipated the
1972 offensive with claims that the PLAF was capable of defeating
the ARVN, and a prediction of the outbreak of "new concerted
uprisings."
LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) on 30 December carried a commentary
detailing statistics on alleged allied losses in 1972 and reviewing
the course of the fighting. LPA predictably hailed the communist
offensive beginning at the end of March and ma-Intained that allied
counterattacks since mid-June, with the rarticipation of massive
U.S. air and naval forces, had been aiccessfully countered.
According to L,PA, the "liberation forces" have continued to hold
their positions and, "while the puppet main forces have been driven,
pinned down, and wiped ouk by big chunks," the "revolutionary war
has vigorously developed in the densely populated plains."
Like other propaganda in recent months, the LPA commentary claimed
that .he 1972 offensive is continuing, ending the year with
unprecedented "steady allsided and big victories." It added that
"this is a new step in the bankruptcy of the Saigon administration
and army and a very serious setback of the U.S. 'Vietnamization
of the war' policy." LPA concluded that 1972 "marked a new period
of development" in the war and that "at present, the position of
the South Vietnam PLAF and people is steady and fine."
The iighting throughout Vietnam in 1972 was lauded in editorials
in Hanot papers on 1 January, with NHAN DAN claiming that "1972
was a year of the greatest victories in the history of our anti-
U.S. national salvation resistance." NHAN DAN went on to list
two "basi:c victories" this year: the "foiling" o' Vietnamization
* Last year's PLAF command communique was dated 24 December 1971
and was made public on 3 January 1972. The communique and
accompanying propaganda are discussed in the 5 January 1972
TRENDS, pages 18-20.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FUIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
by the southern offensive and the "breaking" of the policy of
re-Americanizing the war with U.S. air and naval forces. It
maintained that 1972 "victories" have "a very important strategic
significance" and have "considerably changed the balance of forces
between us and the enemy in our favor and have profoundly modified
th3 war picture." According to NW- DAN, the allied situation on
the battlefield is irreversi'ale and "can only continue to worsen
rapidly."
The l January QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN editorial commented that the
South's "most significant victory in 1972 was its victory in
gradually changing the war situation, driving back the Americans
and their puppets to an extremely significant degree, and
creating for ourselves a new, strong, and firm strategic posture."
While claiming that "our armed forces and people definitely have
the determination, forces, experiences, and advantageous military
and political posture to attack the enemy on all fronts," the
army paper also warned that the "struggle still must go through
many new trials and remains very violent and complex." Underlining
communist determination, the editorial declared: "Even if we have
to fight for many years we will remain undaunted."
BATTLE STATISTICS Detailing alleged communist victories in the
South over the past year, the 30 December
LPA report claimed that 480,000 allied troops had been put out of
action--a figure topped by the communist claims for 1968 and 1969
when over 600,000 allies were said to have been killed, wounded,
or captured. The increase in main-force attacks this year was
reflected in the news agency's claim that eight ARVN divisions
and 35 regiments, brigades, and tactical groups had been "knocked
out or heavily decimated." Annual statistics in previous years
have not claimed that divisions have been put out of combat and
the highest number of regiments claimed was seven in 1968.
As was the case with the casualty figures, the statistics this
year on the destruction of allied materiel were also lower than
in some previous years, including the 1968-70 period. LPA
claimed the destroyed equipment included 11,000 military vehicles,
2,850 of them tanks and armored cars, as well as 1,500 artillery
pieces, and 2,500 aircraft.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL, FISIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
USSR AillH I V E R S A R Y
BREZHNEV, FOREIGN LEADERS ADDRESS 50TH ANNIVERSARY MEETING
In the latest of an glmost annual series of major international.
gatherings of communist party leaders in Moscow, the celebrations
of the 50th anniversary of the USSR drew delegations from 11 ruling
parties and 65 other CPs.* Opening the celebrations on 21 December,
Podgornyy welcomed delcgations of one sort or another from "more
than 100 countries." The only communist countries not represented
were China and Albania, and among the delegations of ruling parties
only the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, and Yugoslavs were not
headed by party chiefs.
The absent Chinese loomed large in CPSU chief Brezhnev's 21 December
keynote address, a comprehensive review of Soviet domestic and
foreign policies. In his criticism of China and in his condemnation
of the U.S. bombing of the DRV taking place during the celebrations,
Brezhnev tailored his rema!ks fnr the international communist
gallery to demonstrate how Soviet policy is a proper "class policy."
He also stressed that in present conditions tha need for socialist
camp unity and cooperation becomes greater rather than diminishing.
Moscow's orthodox allies chimed in with the expected expressions
of fealty to the Soviet Union and to the dictates of unity under
the Soviet banner. Also characteristically, the more independent
parties made clear their own interests where those diverge from
the Soviet line, especially on the China question. Truong Chinh,
heading the North Vietnamese delegation instead of party chief
Le Duan, who normally represents Hanoi at these conclaves,
followed the North Vietnamese practice of citing both China and
the Soviet Union in hailing international aid for the Vietnamese.
Romania's Ceausescu voiced his party's standard line in stating
that it develops friendly relations with "all" communist parties.
The line of independence was pressed most forcefully by the North
Korean representative, Choe Yong-kon, who warned that new problems
will arise in the international communist movement unless the
principles of complete equality, independence, and noninterference
are observed by the ;aarties.
* Other comparable occasions include the CPSU congresses in 1966
and 1971, the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in 1967,
the international party conference in 1969, and the Lenin centennial
in 1970.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
CHINA Speaking before this array of foreign party leaders,
Brezhnev delivered his cecond denunciation of the
Chinese in three weeks. As in his 30 November speech in
Budapest, Brezhnev again sought to portray Peking's anti-Soviet
policies as directed against the interests of the entire
"socialist community." Also as in his Budapest speech,
Brezhnev made a point of dismissing Peking's allegations of
a Soviet threat to China, and he took this occasion to confirm
that Moscow had offered to conclude a bilateral treaty
renouncing the use of force. The question of nonuse of force
has been the focus of bitter Chinese attacks on Moscow's detente
policies generally and its military posture toward China in
particular.
Brezhnev's lengthy diatribe against the Chinese overshadowed the
complications he cited as arising from recent Vietnam developments*
and underscored the intractability of the China problem at a time
when the Soviets see progress on several other important fronts.
Censuring the Chinese for laying claim to Soviet territory,
sabotaging efforts toward detente, and attempting to split the
communist camp, Brezhnev identified the "sole criterion" of
Chinese policy on any major issue to be the objective of
inflicting the greatest possible damage to the USSR and to the
interests of the socialist community. Having thus linked Soviet
interests with those of the communist camp generally, Brezhnev
sought to undercut Peking's portrayal of a Soviet threat by
disclosing again that Moscow had repeatedly proposed to the
Chinese since 1969 that the two aides undertake nonaggression
commitments toward one another. Seeking to document Moscow's
sincerity, he revealed in particular that the Soviets on
15 January 1971 had submitted a draft treaty renouncing the
use of any type of force, including conventional, missile,
or nuclear.
Brezhnev had first referred to proposals of this sort in his
conciliatory speeci on 20 March last year, in the period between
the Peking and Moscow summits. There was some indication at
that time of second or conflicting thoughts over disclosing the
proposal on nonuse of force. In his speech broadcast live over
Radio Moscow, Brezhnev had referred to proposals on nonaggression,
nonuse of force, settlement of border issues, and improvement of
* Brezhnev's remarks on Vietnam are discussed in the Indochina
section of the TRENDS.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
relations, but the published text deleted the reference to
renouncing force. The specific details given on this proposal
in the 21 December speech--duly incl,.,ded in the published text--
indicate that the inhibiting counsels or considerations had
been overcome. In still another reference to nonuse of force
in the recent speech, Brezhnev followed up the UNGA resolution
on this issue by declaring Moscow's readiness to undertake
formal commitments with any of the nuclear powers on renouncing
the use of force, including the banning of the use of nucleor
weapons against one another.
Brezhnev indicated firmly that Moscow would continue the China
policy enunciated at the 24th party congress, telling his audience
that the Soviets are convinced that this policy is correct. He
also took the occasion to recall the good old days of Sino-Soviet
relations, making a rare reference to the 1950 treaty of alliance
and citing the "tremendous aid" rendered by the Soviets to the
Chinese during the period of close relations. Brezhnev left it
to the Chinese and the laws of history to return ^hina to a state
of cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Brezhnev's repeated references to the territorial question--his
mention of "absurd" claims to Soviet territory in listing the
elements -,f Peking's foreign policy, his remark that the Soviets
have no territorial claims against China, and his reference to the
inviolability of Soviet territory--suggest that the border dispute
remains as intractable as ever.* Border tension also seemed
reflected in a KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA article two days earlier
honoring border guards in connection with the USSR's 50th
anniversary. The article indicated that ther,~ had been a border
skirmish and apparently a death in the fall of 1971, and it
played on the memory of the fighting and deftths in the Central
Asian border area in August 1969. The border detachment involved
in the 1971 incident was the same one as was engaged in the major
clash on 13 August 1969.
All of Moac:r's East European allies except Romania carried the
full Lexc of Brezhnev's speech. A summary of the speech in the
Romanian party paper omitted all references to Chita. Following
Brezhnev's lead, four of the East European party chiefs--Gierek,
* A recent review of Soviet foreign policy by V. Petrov in
KOMMUNIST (No. 17, signed to press 30 November 1972) complained
of Peking's territorial claims and said the border talks "are not
making any headway because of the schismztic and hostile positions"
of the Chinese.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
Honecker, Kadar, and Zhivkov--referred critically to Peking's
anti-Soviet policy, Romania's Ceausescu predictably and
Czecr,oslovakia's Husak inexplicably avoided the subject. At
t".4 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971 Husak had belabored Peking
more vigorously than any of his East European counterparts, and
he had associated himself with an attack on Peking as recet:rly
as late September 1972 in a joint communique with Honecker.
Consistent with io..lcations of persisting border problems, the
Mongolian Tsedenbal voices the sharpest criticism of Peking.
Zeroing in on Peking's "naL.onalism and great-power chauvinism,"
Tsedenbal condemned the Chinese leaders for practicing sinification
and forced assimilation of national minorities--which, of course,
inhabit the borderlands and have long been caught up in the Sino-
Soviet struggle. Coming against the background of recent Chinese
polemical sallies directed against the Soviet troops in the MPR,
Tsedenbal's denunciation of Peking contrasted with his praise for
the MPR's mutual defense alliance and "inviolable friendship" with
the Soviets.
SALT Brezhnev's speech contained his first public reference to
the second round of the SALT negotiations and the first
Soviet elite-level discussion of the SALT It agenda. Brezhnev
cited "ways of turning the provisional agreement into a permanent
one" as one of the aims of the current round. Arid he recommended
two further agenda items: discussion of means to proceed from
limiting armaments to gradually reducing them, and establishment
of limitations on their qualitative development. Brezhnev's
remarks ?coincided with the publication of the communique on the
first session of SALT II which, in addition to disclosing agreement
on a permanent consultative commission as?foreseen by the ABM
Treaty signed in May, announced only that an "understanding" had
been reached on the general range of questions to be discussed in
forthcoming sessions.
Brezhnev's remarks were more detailed than elite-level comment
on the first round, which generally avoided mention of specific
agenda items. Suslov is the only other Soviet leader to have
publicly broached the second round: In alluding to the Senate
debate over the Jackson amendment at the SALT I ratification
discussions in the Supreme Soviet Presidium on 29 September, he
criticized those in the United States who hoped to conduct further
negotiations from a "position of strength."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDr
4 JANUARY 1973
The problem of U.S. forward-based systems in Europe (FBS) is the
only SALT II issue that has been mentioned in infrequent routine-
level Soviet comment surrounding the opening of the second round;
however, G. A. Trofimenko, in a 5 September overview in IZVESTIYA
of the process leading to the SALT I agreements, did suggest that
qualitative limitations "could" be discussed in SALT II.
Since Brezhnev's report, conunent on SALT In Soviet media, as well
as a rare discussion of the negotiations in the GDR media--in the
23 December NEUES DEUTSCHLAND--have repeated Brezhnev's proposals
for the SALT II agenda. The head of the Soviet SALT delegation,
Vladimir Semenov, in a TASS-dispatched statement made on leaving
Geneva for Moscow 24 December, cited Brezhnev'.; remarks on SALT but
referred specifically only to the goal of transforming the interim
agreement on offensive systems into a permanent agreement. While
TASS carried the complete text of the communique on 21 December,
there has been no follow-up comment to date in either Soviet or
East European media on the communique or the month-long first session.
DISARMAMENT Brezhnev's speech also featured his first comments
on general disarmament issues since his address to
the 15th trade union congress last March. Although.b reaffirmed
Moscow's interest in further partial arms control measures as well
as the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, the only
specific proposal was his declaration of Moscow's readiness to
"implement" the just adopted UNGA resolution on nonuse of force
and a permament ban on the %se of nuclear weapons (NUF) by
concluding bilateral NUF agreements with "any of the nuclear powers."
Brezhnev's remarks were the first elite-level Soviet pronouncement
on the new NUF pac.cage proposal, and they may signify Moscow's
decision to aim for bilateral NUF agreements with other nuclear
powers in recognition of the failure of the proposed five-power
nuclear conference to evoke support from any cou'itry ether than
France.*
Follow-up comment o: his proposal. has been light. Georgiy Svyatov,
a member of the USA Institute, in a Moscow radio broadcast to North
America on 30 Decen-oer, cited Brezhnev's remarks on NUF and
emphasized that "the Soviet Government suggests going further" than
the UNGA resolution. He singled out the United States as a desired
partner in a bilateral NUF treaty, although Peking may well be the
primary target of this Soviet gambit, for reasons both o military
security and propaganda advant.-3e.
* The UNGA inil.iative ann1 its background are discussed in the TRENDS
of 20 September 1972, pages 30-32, and 27 September, pages 25-26.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1,973
EUROPEAN SECURITY Brezhnev expressed the hope that the European
conference on security and cooperation (CSCE)
would begin not later than the middle of 1973 and routinely listed
the principles on which the USSR and its allies consider European
security should be based. On the contentious issue of the movement
of ideas and people between East and West, Brezhnev declared: "We,
too, are in favor of this if, of course, such cooperation is
conducte.i with respect for the sovereignty, the laws, and the
customs of each country, and if it promotes mutual spiritual
enrichment of the peoples, greater confidence between them, and
the ideas of peace and good-neighborliness." Stating that the
USSR favors wider tourism anu professional exchanges on either a
collective or individual basis, Brezhnev declared that agreement
on this issue cot- lei be reac!:.od if it is approached "in a spirit
of mutual re-;ecL. and noninterference in each other's affairs and
not in a cold war spirit."
On force reductions in Europe (MBFR), Brezhnev refrained from
acknowledging the Western invitation for exploratory talks,
-oting briefly that, "as we know, talks also lie ahead on the
reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, first and
foremost in central Europe," and adding eo.c.t Moscow is in favor
of "serious preparations and efficient ha:u ling of these talka."
Although there was considerable speculation in the Western press
over whether there would be a response from the Warsaw Pact
countries to the NATO allies' invitation, there was no formr.1
public acknowledgment of any such response during the anniversary
celebrations in Moscow.
While there was no public indication that the Warsaw Pact countries
met jointly in MM)scow, Brezhnev did meet individually with all the
East European leaders. The Soviet reports on these meetings,
published in PRAVDA on the 23d and 24th, clearly reflected the
isolation of Romania via-a-vie the other Warsaw Pact members:
Brezhnev's meetings with Giarek, Husak, Honecker, Zhivkov, and
Kadar were reportedly held in an atmosphere of "cordial friendship
and complete unity of views," whereas his meeting with Ceausescu
was described as-one of "friendship and frankness." On the other
hand, the Bucharest media tried to soften the public acknowledgment
of differences with Moscow. The AGERPRES account in English said
"friendship and aincerityr'prevvailed at the meeting, choosing to
translate the Romanian word "sinceri.tate" used in the SCINTEIA
report as "sincerity", even though it may also be translated as
"frankness." TASS did not hedge in its translation of the
Russian; it used the word "frankness."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
In their public pronouncements, the Romanians have maintained that
European security and military issues should not oe the
responsibility of the two opposing military blocs and that not
only Bucharest but also "all European states" must be allowed
to participate in any force reduction talks. This position has
been particularly stressed in public statements since the
beginning of the CSCE preparatory talks and was reiterated
as recently as 29 December, six days after the Ceausescu-
Brezhnev meeting, by the Romanian leader 5.n a speech honoring
the 25th anniversary of communist rule in Romania. Moreover,
in an interview given to a Cairo paper on 28 November but not
publicized by Bucharest media until 29 December, Ceausescu even
invoked the Warsaw Pact Prague Declaration of January 1972 to
support his argument for Romanian participation in force
reduction talks, citing the Declaration to the effect that the
solving of this problem "must not be the prerogative of the
existing military-political alliances in Europe."
COMMON MARKET-CEMA In his remarks on trade relations between
East and West Europe, Brezhnev conveyed
Moscow's interest in Establishing formal institutional contacts
between the Common Market and CEMA: "Can a basis be found for
some form of businesslike relations between the interstate trade
and economic organizations of CEMA and the EEC?" Answering this
rhetorical question in the affirmative, Brezhnev said "apparently,
yes it can" provided the EEC "states " do not discriminate against
"the other side" and if they assist "the development of natural
bilateral ties and all-European cooperation." In making this
proposal, Brezhnev went considerably beyond his March 1972 watershed
statement acknowledging the "reality" of the Common Market. In that
statement Brezhnev had stressed Soviet trade relations with the
"participants" of the EEC as opposed to the Common Market as an
entity; now Brezhnev coupled his implicit proposal for negotiations
between the two blocs with a somewhat ambiguous statement stressing
the development of "natural bilateral ties" in commerce.
Brezhnev's remarks on links between the EEC and CEMA followed by
a week a statement made by Hungarian Council of Ministers Deputy
Chairman Valyi to the Hungarian National Assembly on 13 December
which also took note of a future relationship between the two blocs.
Arguing that there should be no discrimination in international
trade relations against CEMA, Valyi declared that "the establishment
of ties between the EEC and CEMA could contribute to this, if it is
? done at an appropriate time and in a suitable form." Brezhnev's
remarks in effect lent the weight of his authority to Valyi's
speculation about ties between the EEC and CE k.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
C H I NA
NEW YEA! I S EDITORIAL SHIFTS EMPHASIS TO DOMESTI C AFFAIRS
For the first time since the Ninth CCP Congress in 1969 formally
consolidated the political changes wrcught by Vie cultural
revolution, the Now Year's Day joint editorial by PEOPLE'S DAILY,
RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY gave priority to domestic
affairs. While claiming "great victories" during the past year, the
editorial's generally restrained tone reflected recent political
and economic problems while expressing "confidence and determination"
regarding the new year. The editorial indicated no new major departures,
continuing to allot political priority to the persisting campaign
against Lin Piao's deviations and stressing agricultural development
as the most important economic task. Bringing Mao's authority to
bear on ongoing efforts, the editorial unveiled a Mao instruction
to "dig tunnels deep, store Frain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."
Continuing the trend since Lin's fall, the PLA received relatively
little attention, thuugh it was credited with "new progress politically
and militarily" and was enjoined to "undertake rigorous training."
Certifying a line set forth recently in provincial media, the joint
editorial asserted that "criticism of revisionism comes first and only
then rectification of the style of work," indicating that the
ideological campaign against Lin and his disgraced followers should
be pressed without expanding the target of attack against a broad
range of officials. Despite indications of problems in insuring
the proper responsiveness from officials, the regime evidently is con-
cerned to prevent a new wave of recriminations between local factions
which, as in the cultural revolution, the center would find difficult
to manage.
The proble- of centralized control was given major attention in the
editorial, which reiterated that "the party committee at the highest
level in a given area, under the leadership of the party central
committee, exercises centralized leadership over all sectors." The
editorial also stressed that decisions must be made by party committees
as a whole rather than by the top men. Given the dominant role of
i'A officers in local party committees, the emphasis on collegiality
serves to strengthen the hand of civilian members during a period in
which the regime is loath to resort to large-scale purges or transfers.
Concern for strengthening party control over the army was also reflected
in this year's New Year and Spring Festival circular--issued by the
State Council and the party's Military Commission--on supporting the
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FiIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
army. In contrast to last year's much longer statement, the 1973
circular conte.ined no reference to the PLA's civil administrative
role--a function the army inherited from the shattered party apparatus
during the cultural revolution--and omitted several of the plaudits
given to the PLA in last year's circular. Most notably, the previous
claim that the PLA "is loyal to the party and to the people" was
dropped from this year's document.
In the context of party control over all activities, the joint editorial
called for further efforts to revive various mass organizations, including
the YCL and other youth groups, the trade unions, and peasant and women's
organizations. Recent provincial reports have indicated that the YCL
is well or the way to being reconstituted this year, but there had been
no previous signal that the trade unions were to be formally 'inbuilt in
the near future. Revival of these organizations signifies a further
retreat from the cultural revolution, during which the unions wcte
criticized and disbanded for devoting undue attention to economic issues.
But while indicating progress on these fronts, the joint editorial this
year avoided mentioning the convocation of the long-delayed National
People's Congress, a body that would ratify changes in the top Structure
of the regime.
The grain crop failures of the past year have apparently caused no changes
in the economic line. Claiming a "good" harvest despite "serious
natural disasteri3," the editorial continued the policy of stressing
"all-round development in crop production" in contrast to the cultural
revolution's emphasis on grain crops. Industry was again enjoined
to assign priority to increasing raw materials and power supplies
as a base for industrial expansion.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS As in 1972, the New Year's Day editorial this
year used the formula that the world is undergoing
changes through a p.- ?ess of "great upheaval, great division and great
realinement," but there was no attempt to convey the heightened sense
of expectancy that heralded last year's major breakthroughs. The
superpowers received brief criticism for practicing power politics, and
the December downturn in Vietnam developments prompted inclusion of a
passage condemning tha heavy U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and pledging
continued Chinese support for the war effort.
Growing confidence on the Taiwan question seemed reflected in the
absence this time of last year's denunciation of two-China schemes
and of the call for the United States to withdraw from the island. In
keeping with the line Peking has taken toward Taiwan in repent months,
the editorial expressed "deep concern for our compatriots" in Taiwan
and in the same context mentioned "our compatriots" in Hong Kong and
Approved For Release 1999/09/25coMA EM5T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
M
Macao and overseas. A reduction of Peking's concern over the juri-
dical status of Taiwan has been accompanied by an effort to play on
nationalist sentiments among Chinese in areas claimed by Peking but
outside the regime's cuntrol.
PRC BLAMES NATURAL DISASTERS FOR DECLINE IN GRAIN HARVEST
On 28 December NCNA released preliminary grain crop statistics for 1972,
revealing a decline of approximately four percent from the record 1971
crop. Production was estimated at 240 million tons, about the same
as in 1970. The announcement attributed the drop in production to "the
worst drought in years and other natural disasters." Reflecting changed
priorities which have placed greater emphasis on non-grain crop:, an
NCNA report on 30 December claimed significant increases last year for
several industrial crops, though admitting that "because about half the
acreage suffered natural adversities" cotton output had declined.
None of the NCNA or local harvest reports drew any connection between
the decline in grain output and the shift in emphasis from grain to
balanced agricultural development, nor was there any indication of a
shift in land allocation back to grain.
The 28 December report made a point of portraying the well-being of
China's people in spite of the disasters, comparing the situation under
communist rule to that in 1920 when a major drought, but one not so bad
as this year, resulted in famine affecting 20 million people in North
China. Two of the five northern provinces hardest hit this year were
said to have actually increased outputs in spite of the drought. While
the worst problems were apparently in the north, parts of southern China
were also said to have suffered "fairly serious natural disasters," though
14 provincial-level areas had "excellent" harvests.
That the preliminary figures may be revised is indicated by statistics
given for last year's grain crop. The preliminary r:aport for the 1971
harvest estimated a yield of 246 million tons, but the revised figures
for 1971 now being used claim that tha 1971 crop totaled 250. Claiming
that China has "a certain surplus" in grain production, the 28 December
report noted that China imported 5 million tons "chiefly to meet the
needs of friendly countries and balance the people's diet." The report
also claimed that 3 million tons of rice were exported this year, an
amount which would, at normal prices, more than pay for the wheat
imports. This figure is considerably greater than the amount China had
been thought to export.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
CUBA-USSR
RAUL CASTRO RAILS AGAINST ANTI-SOVIETISM IN CUBA
Speaking on 22 December at Havana ceremonies marking the 50th
anniversary of the USSR, Cuban First Vice Minister Raul Castro
discoursed on the evils and perils of anti-Sovietism. Although
he was rather vague about specifying the target of his diatribe,
his comments were probably intended as a warning to Cubans
harboring reservations about Havana's close ties with Moscow,
particularly Cuba's economic dependency.
The speech was made the day before Fidel Castro and Brezhnev
signed a series of economic agreements in the Kremlin. Describing
the accords in a 3 January Havana Radio and TV address, the Cuban
Premier went out of his way to laud Soviet largesse and to describe
the accords -in unprecedented detail.* In spelling out the terms of
the new accords, Castro may have sought to dampen the Cuban anti-
Sovietism that was a major concern of his brother's speech.
22 DECEMBER SPEECH After effusively praising Soviet achievements
and expressing gratitude for Moscow's support,
Raul Castro assailed "the whole throng of revisionists and false
Marxists" who "distort the character" of Cuban-USSR relations.
Here, and in follow-up remarks in the speech, he was referring
chiefly to K. S. Karol and Rene Dumont, two erstwhile friends of
his brother who became persona non grata in Cuba after they published
* According to Castro, the agreements included: deferment on
payment of existing Cuban debts to the USSR until 1986 and repayment
over a period of 25 years "without any interest"; extension of
credits to cover Soviet-Cuban trade imbalances for 1973-75 with
repayment to begin in 1986 without interest; prr)vision of
technical and economic assistance for 1973-75 amounting to 300
million rubles, mainly for investments in textile and nickel
production, electric power, and rail transport; a Soviet commitment
purchase Cuban sugar and nickel during 1973-80 at prices
substantially in excess of current world prices. Castro said that
Moscow had agreed to pay about eleven cents per pound for Cuban
sugar as against the current world price of about nine cents.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
books criticizing growing Soviet influence in ''tba and Fidel's
personal style of rule.* Ha quoted from Fidels April 1970
Lenin Day address which had obliquely axoriated his former
friends as self-appointed "superrevolutionaries" who are
implacably hostile to the Soviet Union.
Although Raul Castro did not elaborate on the nature of the
"distortion" of Cuban-Soviet relations, his remarks appeared
aimed at allegations that Cuba had paid for Soviet assistance in
the form of lessened independence. Noting that Cuba had been
unflinching in the face of "imperialist" threats, he observed
defensively: "This determined attitude of revolutionary
intro..sigence has made us deserving of the support of the Soviet
Union and the rest of the socialist nations." Later, after
warning against "anti-Soviet tendencies that are sugar-coated
with a superrevolutionary phraseology," he expressed particular
concern about "imperialist" attempts to divide the international
communist movement by "sowing distrust among people struggling for
economic and political liberation regarding Soviet aid and
experience."
The source of Castro's concern was reflected in an unusual Havana
TV report of 13 November on the sentencing of an unspecified
number of "counterrevolutionaries" in Pinar del Rio on the grounds
of "destroying or damaging machinery and other tools obtained
from socialist countries." The culprits were said to have been
motivated by a desire to "develop attitudes of looking down on
the technology of the socialist camp countries." To accomplish
this, Havana TV said, "they would point up technical defects and
other shortcomings, which they themselves premeditatedly caused."
The report twice repeated the stiff terms of their sentences,
"ranging from eight to thirty years' loss of freedom." In
concluding his speech, Raul Castro warned that "those who cast
gloom over or weaken the ties uniting" Havana and Moscow "will
find themselves in the trash can of history or crushed by their
unavoidable fate."
* Karol is a French Marxist journalist whom Castro in the past
had favored with exclusive interviews, and Dumont is a French
agronomist who served as an adviser to the Cuban leader:. The
works criticized were Karol's "Guerrillas in Power" and Dumont's
"Cuba, Is It Socialist?," both published in 1970. In a 6 June
speech Raul Castro had directly attacked these works as "totally
anticommunist" and described their authors as "CIA agents."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
BACKGROUND The tenor and content of Raul Castro's remarks
bore a close resemblance to the comments made in
his 6 June speech marking the llth anniversary of the Cuban
Interior Ministry. However, Havana media's treatment of the
6 June speech--in which Castro went into greater detail in
describing manifestations of anti-Sovietism--was unusually
circumspect. The only lengthy version of the speech appeared
more ihaiu six weeks after its delivery, in the 23 July issue of
the Cuban armed forces organ VERDE OLIVO. Havana radio confined
itsr.tf to broadcpsting a short report of the VERDE OLIVO version
whi,;h omitted r.i1 of Raul's allusions to anti-Sovietism. The
fact that the speech was delivered while Fidel Castro was in
Eastern Europe and was not published until well after his
6 July return to Cuba may indicate that even this kind of
restrictive coverage required Fidel's personal sanction. In
contrast, the 22 December speech was carried live by Havana
radio ;ini TV, and Raul Castro noted that his remarks "represent
the opii,i.on of our Politburo."
In his 6 June remarks, Castro left no do?ibt that the forms of
ant?L-Sovietism that concerned him were linked with domestic
criticism of Sov,.et-Cuban economic relations:
The enemies of the revolution also employ the old trick
of anti-Sovietism in connection with their ideological
diversionism. They launch rumor campaigns and comment
in which they maliciously tie our difficulties in with
efforts wdde by the Soviet technicians and technicians
from other socialist countries an they try to help us
emerge from underdevelopment.
Turning to specifics, Castro noted the vulnerability of Cuban
officials to the attempts by "the missions of capitalist
companies accredited in Cuba" to divert Cuban "purchasers
toward capitalist areas . . . to the detriment of Cuba and the
socialist camp." Cuban government officials, he said, have on
occasion been victims of "bribd" attempts by capitalist
representatives and have been guilty of "engaging in criticism
of the quality of technology of the socialist countries."
Castro urged the drafting of new laws "providing for criminal
responsibility for those who engage in actions of ideological
diversionism," including "punishment of any crime committed
against any other worker state."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
U.S.-SOVIET In what may have been an indication of Cuban
DETENTE discomfiture over the recent improvement in U.S.-
Soviet relations, Castro in both speeches ;.a6tigated
"imperialist" efforts to "build bridges" between East and West and
to propagate the "theory of convergence." In his 22 December speech,
Castro described "the building of bridge&" and "the theories of
convergence" as being part of an "imperialist" effort to subvert
the unity of the socialist camp, with "anti-Sovietism" being the
"main ideological weapon" toward this goal. While TASS'
23 December report of the speech noted Castro's condemnation of
anti-Sovietism and of those who distort Cuban-Soviet relations,
his caustic references to !'ridge-building and the convergence
theory were not reported. In his 6 June speech--which came on
the heels of President Nixon's trip to Moscow*--Castro condemned
the Western policy of "peaceful penetration" of the socialist camp
and warned against the perils of succumbing to "imperialist"
strategems:
In essence, the policy of "bridge-building" is the
continuation of imperialist adventures and is nothing
more than a tactic designed to provoke the ideological
breakdown of the socialist countries. We still have fresh
in our memories the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a
clear example of the danger inherent in walking across the
bridges which imperialism builds.
* The President's Moscow talks drew almost no comment from
Havana and only sparse and selective news coverage. On 20 July,
a Cuban CP Central Committee resolution on Castro's trip to the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Africa implicitly registered
continuing reservations about Soviet summitry when it took
special note of a Cast -o statement that "genuine revolution"
must be based on "full awareness that imperialism's apparent
cooperation with any truly revolutionary process is deceptive
and false in the long run."
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
APOLLO 17
MOSCOW GIVES APOLLO MISSION ROUTINE COVER\GE
Moscow's coverage of the Apollo 17 moon mission 7-19 December
followed the pattern established during the last several Apollo
missions. The central press ran brief daily progress reports
by TASS, with PRAVDA additionally carrying several colorful
reports on the mission by its correspondent B. Strelnikov.*
Radio Moscow's domestic service also broadcast brief daily
progress reports. (By contrast, GDR coverage of the mission
was politically colored, as was the case in the past. For
example, East Berlin's domestic service on 6 December carried
an Aria, Friedmann commentary that emphasized Ronald Evans'
previous career as a bomber pilot in Indochina and cited U.S.
critics who drew unfavorable comparisons between expenditures
on the Apollo program and other U.S. domestic programs.)
During the space shot, Soviet media carried several items on
U.S.-Soviet cooperr3ti.on in space, reporting the results of a
7-15 December meeting in Moscow of technical experts working on
the Apollo-Soyuz docking experiment scheduled for 1975 and citing
U.S. spokesmen on Sovi,~t-American cooperation. On the day of the
launch both PRAVDA and Radio Moscow's duiuestic service aaxried
a 7 December TASS report of an interview with NASA Direct.ar James
Fletcher in which he "stressed the great significance of Soviet-
American cooperation in the exploration and conquest of outer
space for peaceful purj, ses."
Soviet media have thus far not offered any general assessment
of the Apollo 17 flight or the Apollo program as a whole. As
with Apollo 1.6, Podgornyy and Ceausescu ware the only bloc
leaders to send telegrams of ccngratulation upon successful
completion of the flight.
* For Apollo 16, PRAVDA as well carried only TASS reports.
Apollo 11 received by far the most extensive coverage in Soviet
media.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 JANUARY 1973
U S S R I N T E R N A L AIFAIRS
UKRAINIAN 'COAL LOBBY' CONTINUES SQUABBLE OVER INVESTMENTS
The increased investments for the Donbas coal mines gained as a
result of former Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest's special
pleading at the 24th CPSU Congress have apparently been pared
down in the newly revised economic plan.* As a result,
Ukrainian Premier Lyashko and Ukrainian industry secretary
Titarenko--both former Donetsk leaders--expressed alarm at the
19 December Supreme Soviet session over the effects of the
apparent investment cutbacks on Donbas coal production.
Although the leaders of the Donetsk faction are lobbying in
defense of the Donbas coal industry, Ukrainian First Secretary
Shcherbitskiy has conspicuously ignored theit cause and has
even criticized unnamed officials for defending local economic
interests.
Titarenko expressed alarm over the future of the coal industry
because of the postponement of "earlier planned" schedules for
opening new Donbas mines and modernizing of old mines. He and
Lyashko cited the Donbas coal industry's overfulfillment of
coal production and labor productivity plans as justification
for faster reequipment of the mines.
Shelest, seconded by Donetsk First Secretary Degtyarev, had
complained at the 24th Congress of the lack of investment in
Donbas coal. After noting that only two new mines had been
opened in the last five years and that modernization of existing
mines had been sharply cut, Shelest assailed "some people" for
asserting that the coal industry should be slighted in favor of
gas and petroleum. A subsequent CPSU Central Committee-Council
of Ministers decree, "On Measures to Further Develop the Coal
Industry of the Donbas," doubled investments in new mines and
equipment. Degtyarev in the 18 April 1972 PRAVDA UKRAINY
disclosed that seven new mines with a capacity of 13.1 million
tons would be opened by 1975. Shelest and other Ukrainian leaders
gave considerable publicity to the add?.tional investments.
Thanks to the Ukrainian successes in boosting coal output, the
coal production targets for the USSR were raised considerably
after the adoption of the five-year plan in 1971. Gosplan
Chairman Baybakov's report at the recent Supreme Soviet session
* For background, see the TRENDS for 28 June 1972, pages 41-42.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREVDS
4 JANUARY 1973
stated that, "in accordance with the five-year Flan;' USSR coal
production would reach 665,300,000 tons in 1973. The original
plan had called for only 651,500,000 tons in 1973. Most of
the increase may be credited to the Ukrainian drive to boost
coal production above planned goals. During 1971, according to
Ukrainian Coal Minister M.M. Khudoeovtaev in the 18 February
1972 RADYANSKA UKRAINA, the Ukraine produced 8 million tons
above the plan.
Approved For Release 1999/09/25: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060001-8