TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050046-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: November 15, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
TRENDS
in Communist Propa~a~nda
Confidential
15 NOVEMBER 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 46)
000300050046-0
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~ON~'~C1))~;N'~CAL
Thi, propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disc!~sure AubJect m
criminal aunetions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBJS 'Z'RENDp
:L 5 NOVEMBER lg'( 2
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Ci,ven Mayor Attbntion . . . . .
i
INDOCHINA
DRV Agrees to Private Meeting, Urges Signing of Peace Accord
l
Peking Fetes Le Duc Tho, Marks Time on Vietnam Settlement.
7
8rezhnb!~ cans for Removal of Obstacles "Created by U.S. Side" .
g
Hanoi Routinely Protests U.S. Strikes in North Vietnam
U
S
ELECTION
ll
.
.
Soviet Bloc Views Election Returns as Mandate for Detente. .
lg
Yugoslav Commentators Exh~.bit Caution on Policy Implications . .
l5
Peking Provides Straightforward Report on Election Results . .
16
Single Cuban Commentary Disparages U.5. "Electoral Farce". . .
~~
GERMANY
8rezhnev Warmly Praises Bonn But Notes Limits on Cooperation ~ . .
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Brezhnev b:inicult Continues in Face of Policy Setbacks . ~ .
~g
2l
Journal Reveals Purge of Social Research Institute . . . . . . .
22
CHINA
Campaign for a Quality Educational System Gains Momentum . ~ . .
24
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~'?>:Zt OF~'ICLAL, U13E ON~L,Y FBIS TRENDS
15 NOVEMBER 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR A'PTENTI.ON h - l2 NOVEMBER 1912
Moscow (2480 itemel
Peking (1482 items)
October Revolution
(11%)
39%
Indochina
(52%)
33%
Anniversary
[Vietnam
(38%)
14%J
Inr..ernational Working
(2%)
13%
[Cambodian National
(--)
12%J
Yuuth Conference
Moscow
i.n
Day
Domestic Issues
(25%)
30%
Indochina
(139;)
5X
U:1GA Session
(3%)
6%
f Vietnam
(1.2~)
43;]
Albanian Military
(--)
6%
U.S. El.ect.i.ons
(--)
3~
Delegation in PRC
China
(4X)
2%
Malagasy-PRC Diplomatic
(1%)
6%
Relations
October Revolution
(--)
3%
Anniversary
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, gavern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and ~svents given maJor attention in terms of volume are not always
dlscussel in the body of the Trends. gome may have peen covered fu prior issUP.s;
in othrr cases the propaganda content may be routir.~e or of minor slgniflcance.
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CONI~'ZDENTZAL FBZS TRENDS
15 NOVEMBER 1972
INDOCWINA
Hanoi's 14 November announcement of Le Duc Tho'e departure that
day for ?aris, where he would loin Xuan Thuy in a private
meeting proposed "recently" by the U.S. side, came against the
background of persistent DRV complaints about the U.S. failure
to sign the peace accord. While Hanoi has explicitly charged
on at least one occasion that the United States was attempting
to renoge on the peace terms. the main thrust of the propaganda
is that the text has been agreed to and should stand.
Consistent with this pattern, the announcement of Tho's
departure for Paris skirted the question of substantive changes
when it said vaguely that the forthcoming meeting was to take
caYe of the question of signing the agreement.
Hanoi media have continued generally to avoid discussion of
specific issues in contention. However, following the 8 November
NHAN DAN editorial which raised the question of the release of
political prisoners, an editorial in the paper on the 10th
observed that President Thieu wants the United States to continue
the war and opposes the formation of a three-segment administrative
structure in the South as well as unification of Vietnam.
Peking announced Le Duc Tho's arrival there on the 14th on his way
to Paris. Thu had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with
Chou En-lai at a. meeting also attended by VWP Politburo member
Hoang Van Hoan, a figure long associated with Sino-Vietnamese and
international communist relations. Since the airing of a spate
of authoritative comment around the turn of the month pressing
for prompt signing of the peace accord, Peking has been marking
time on the question of a Vietnam settlement.
Brezhnev, in brief comments in a 13 November speech. went beyond
earlier remarks by Kosygin and Mazurov when he blamed the
"American aide" for placing "obstacles" in the way of the peace
agreement. Brezhnev also repeated a pro forma pledge of "active
support" for the Vietnamese struggle but coupled it with an
emphatic assertion that the USSR ?aili "strive to facilitate the
ending of the war." TASS promptly on the 14th carried Hanoi's
announcement that Le Duc Tho had left for Paris and reported that
the Wh1te House had confirmed that Kissinger would meet with Tho.
DRV AGREES TO PRIVATE NE~'cTING. UtGES SIGNING OF PEACE ACCORD
The announcement of Le Duc Tho's departure for Paris on the 14th
was coLC:~.ed in language compatible with Hanoi's public position
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I;ONFLDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 NOVEMBER 1972
that the United States should promptly sign the agreed text of
the peace accord. Thus, the announcement said that the U.S.
side had proposed another private meeting "to solve the
question of signing the agreement" (giai quyet viec ky ket
hiep dinh). It suggASte~l that the agreement should stand as
is when it added that the Vietnamese are warmly responding
to and the world's people are actively supporting L?he DRV's
26 October statement and are vigo4ously demar:ding that the
United States "strictly abide by the terms agreed upon [giu
dung nhung dieu da thoa thuan] and sign the agreement
immediately." On the other hand, the announcement's
concluding passage could be read as implying that there would
be further negotiating. It warned that if the U.S. side
continues to seek ways to prolong the negotiations and delay
the signing snd to carry on the war, the Vietnamese people
are determined to pursue and step up the fight "until
genuine independence, freedom, and peace are achieved."
While acknowledging that Kissinger and the President had said
there were issues that needed to be discussed and settled before
the agreement is signed, prior to the announcement that
Le Duc Tho was en route to Paris Hanoi had generally avoided
directly broaching the question of an actual resumpt?Ion of the
private talks. Thus, although Hanoi had i-riefly mentioned
Xuan Thuy's 4 November interview with the New York TIMES' Flora
Lew1s, it did not acknowledge his reported assertion that the
DRV was not creating any difficulties about a further meeting
but that if after another final round of talks the United States
agrees and then proposes more changes, it would be very difficult.
Hanoi media similarly ignored Thuy's remarks on renewed private
meetings in his 10 November AFP interview. 'phis accords with
Hanoi's long-standing propaganda practice of freq-iently failing
to publicize in its official media issues which Vietnamese
communist spokesmen have discussed with foreign journalists.
Also consistent with Hanoi's long-standing cursory treatment of
the Paris plenary sessions, its accounts of the sessions in the
three weeks since the 26 October release of the draft peace
accord have t~~tally ignored the GVN delegate's lengthy sta~:e-
ments, which have raised such questions as the details of e~.
cease-fire, the status of the demilitarized zone and contineied
presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South, gnd the
question of political power in South Vietnam. Hanoi's concern
to avoid substantive details end the tssue of further negotia-
tions was also illustrated by the fact that its domestic media
ignored the 10-12 November trip of Kissinger's deputy, General
Haig, to Saigon to see President Thieu. A Hanoi English-languabe
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 NOVEMEER 1972
broadcast did refer to Haig'e arrival in passing, saying that
it coincided with the delivery of more large shipments of U.S.
military materiel to Saigon.
NF~MI DAN EDITORIALS Hanoi's most noteworthy comment since
Ito 26 October release of the summary
of the peace agreement appeared in a serieb of four editorials
in the party organ NHAN DAN from 8 through 11 November which
raised sensitive substantive issues and sharply attacked Thieu.
The timing suggests that Hanoi may have wanted to wait rntil
after the U.S. election to engage in substantive discussion
on an authoritative level. The absence of substantial,
authoritative comment pines the 11th may be related to the
timing of Hanoi's decision regarding Le Duc Tho's return to
Paris and another round of private talks with Kissinger.
The NHAN DAN editorial of 8 November, in attacking Thieu's
stepped-up "political persecution," notably stressed that the
peace agreement clearly provides for the release of political
as well as military prisoners.* The editorial charged the
United States with "deliberately delaying" the signing of the
agreement and even attempting "to renege on the teams j.t
agreed to." The editorial in the paper on the 9th com+,~lained
of the U.S. dispatch of massive military supplies to Srsigon,
calling this and Thieu's "persecution policy" illegal acts.
Instead of repeating the charge that the United States was
going back on t_he aRreen;snt, that editorial suggested three
possible reasons fu~ accelerated U.S. military shipments to
T.h~eu: 1) the United States wants not a political solution but
a continuation of the war; 2) it wants to create better
conditiane for negotiating from a position of strength and for
demanding changes in the agreed peace accord; or 3) it wants
to strenslthen Thieu militarily so that he c.3n resist the PLAF
and suppress those who apprcve of nationa~ concord.
* The editorial is discussed in the 8 November 1972 TRENDS,
pages 1-3. As noted above, HRUOi media have not carried Xuan
Thuy's 10 November AFP interview in which he reportedly said that
Hanoi believes the two aides should free prisoners at the same
time, but that to show its good will it had accepted the U.S.
view that the foreign military and civilian prisoners wi?1 be
freed within two months and the South Vietnamese civilians within
three months "ar.cording to the dispositions agreed on between the
two South Vietnamese parties."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 NOVEMBER 1972
The N~AN LAN editorial of the 10th--entitled "The Obstacles to be
Removed"--said that the first obstacle ;.s the apparent U.S.
intention to prolong the war through Vletnamization and that
the second is "top traitor Thieu." Echoing the editorial of
the 9th and earlier. propaganda, 1t ridiculed the notion that
the arms buildup was part of the preparations for a cease-fire.
In this connection, it quoted Secretary Rogers ae saying 1n his
Meet the Press TV interview on the 5th Chat the sending of
Aupplies to Thieu is an effort to assure Saigon that it would
have the necessary weapons and other war n~ateri.el in case a
peace agreement could not be rtal,.zed.
In discussing the need for Thieu to be removed, the editorial
broached some of hie specif is ob~ectiona to the peace agreement.
Without mentioning a cease-fire, it said that he opposes an end
r_o U.S. military involvement--that is, that he wants the United
Staten to continue the war in South Vietnam and to bomb and
b:..ockade North Vietnam. The editorial added that Thieu opposes
national concord, and specifically the formatior. of a three-
aegment admi.nistratlve structure in South Vietnam, and that he
opposes "our compatriots' aspirations for national unification
because he brazenly considers the southern and northern parts
of our nation as two separate countries."
A 14 November Saigon broadcast on General Kaig's visit indicated
that the GVN continues to oppose the proposed three-segment
administrative structure and would not be mollified by a change
in the Vietnamese term used in this regard. Citing the views
of "authorit2tive and most reliable Independence Palace sources,"
the broadcast charged that the North Vietnamese intend to impose
a three-segment government ("chanh phu") described as an
administrative ("hanh chanh") structure. The Vie~:~amese word
used for "administrative" in Hanoi's 26 October summary of. the
agreement was "ch#aAh quyen," a term which can also be used to mean
"government." The term "hanh chanh" which the Saigon broadcast
used is a less ambiguous term for adt;iniatratian and does not
connote government or power. According to Western press reports,
Kissinger in remarks to foreign newsmen on 4 November indicated
that in the peace agreement the United Staten wishes to use the
least vague of three Vietnamese terms to describe the administrative
structure.*
The editorial on the 10th said that Thieu not only wanted to
replace "many importan~ articles" in the approved agreement with
his "insolent demands" but even wat;ted "to pose the problem
* See the 1. November 1972 TRENDS, page i, for a discussion of the
various Vietnamese terms.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 NOVEMBER 1972
concerning the negotiating procedures." The paper stopped
e~Paort of explicitly mentioninK Saigon's desire to participate
in final negotirticiny and to si~tn the peace agreement. ;but
it went on to declare t?liai rather than 1ifrenziedly" opposing
the agreement, Thieu should realize that "he is lucky to
survive" under the terms of the agreement. 1t conclud~u by
posing the qu~etion whether the Nixon Administration wants to
choose peace or to choose Thieu and thereby continue the
Vietramiza`ion plan.
The FHAN DAN editorial of the 11th pursued the issue of Thieu
as an obstacle to an agreement, particularly noting opposition
to him in circles from which the third segment of the proposed
administrative structure presumably would be drawn. It
observed that the forces which oppose Thieu at home and abroad
are interested in solving South Viernam's internal problems in
a spirit of national reconciliation and concord. In the course
of reiterating that the peace agreement takes into account the
actual situPtion in the South--where there are two adminiatrd-
tions, two armies, and three polit:Lcal forces--the editorial
used language that differed from Hanoi's summary of the peace
agreement in regard t~ ele~:tions. Point four of the summary
had explained that the administrative structure, called the
National Council of National Reconciliati~~r~ and Concord, "will
be set up to promote tha implementation of the signed agree?nen*_e
by the PRG and the Saigon government and to organize general
eta.:tions." The editorial on the 11th said that the
administrative structure would advance toward free and
democrat?c elections "to elect the organs of power in the South,"
but it still left ambiguous whether the elections would be for
executive or legislative organs or both. Past communist
proposals have indicated that general elections meant elections
for an assembly t~ work out a new c~nstituticn, while allied
proposals have called for presidential electioi~s.*
After an impas3loned declaratior. on the need for Thieu to
resign or be ?cemoved, the editorial of the 11th assumed a notably
conciliatory tone: It said that "because of different social
and individual circumstances, there can be different paths of
opposing the Americans and Thieu. Although there remai:~ soae
disagreements and misunderstandings, all forces loving the
country and freedcm can discuss together how beat to serve the
'` See the TRENDS of 1 November 1972, page 8.
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15 NOVF ~lBER 1972
Fatherland and the compatriots." A similar tack was taken
in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 8th which denigrated Thieu
and his career at length. It said that in the Saigon army
there also are a number of high-ranking ,off ices who, for
one reason or anot.~er, have attained thei~~~ presrnt position
by the same path se Thieu. "Nevertheless,' it added, "the
differen.:e is Chat these persons d~ not call themselves
leaders rr politicians, end they do not show that they follow
the Americans to the end or appose by one way or another the
nation to the end. They do accept national reconciliation and
concord so that peace may be ~eestabllsY~ed."
THE FRONT PRG media have continued to echo Hanoi's attacks
on the United States for t?_iling to si~a the
peac= a.greemenc, and Liberation Radix on the 10th began broad-
casting speec!~es deliverer at the 1-2 November conference of the
NFLSV Central Committee Presidium and The. Fxc~cutive Committee
of the Vietnam Alliance.* Li.beratiun Radio reported that NFLSV
Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, in his opening speech, welcomed the
draft agreement as a "sensible and reasonable solution consistent
with the realities in South Vietnam." He declared that "if the
U.S. Government clearly understands the situation and truly
wants to end the war honorably, the solution for peace is
available."
In line with the Hanoi comment cited above, Tho went on to score
*_he United States for delaying *_he signing of the agreement by
demanding changes and prolonging the negc.~tiations and the war.
Stressing the importance of national concord at this puncture,
he called upon the Front and the Alliance to "strengthen their
contacts and broaden their consultations wi*_h all forces,
political and religious organizations; and individuals i:~side
and outside the country, including those in the Saigon army and
administration who want peace and national concord."
Other reports delivered at the conference and broadcast by
Liberation Radio included a statement by PRG Defense Minister
Tram Nam Trung in which he lauded the communist offensive and
claimed ghat the expanded "liberated areas" have "formed firm
and steady base areas and springboards for offensives" and have
"provided sufficient human and material resources for developing
the offensive posture in order to win total victory for the
revolution."
* nitinl reports on the conference are discussed~in the
A November 1972 TRENDS, pages 5-6.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
15 NOVEMBER 1972
^EKING FETES LE DUC THO. MARKS TIME ON VIETNAM SETTI.EP'tENT
P~!:;,ng gave a standard welcome to Le Duc Tho during hie 14-15 November
stopover en route to Paris, reporting in stock terms that he had "a
very cordial and friendly conversation" with Chou En-lai and Vice
Premier Li Hsien-riF,n and was honored at a banquet hosted by Li.
There was no deacrir;.ion of the .:tmoephere at the banquet nor any
mention of speeches. This is consistent with the pattern followed
at the time of Tho's four stopovers from June to September.
However, during Tho's last visit on 15-16 October--after the peace
accord had been negotiated--NCNA reported on the remarks made at
the banquet, which was then hoete,i by Chou and occasioned toasts
to growing Sino-Vietnamese unity.
L1 greeted Tho at the airport on his arrival and saw him off on his
way to Paris via Moscow. NCNA also noted the presence at the
airport of Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov when Tho departed.
DRV OFFICIALS In addition to Tho's standard stopover, the
IN PEKING presence of other DRV officials in Peking
indicate that consultations have been underway on
such subjects as Chinese aid to Vietnam and Peking's role in a
settlement. Among those reported present during Tho's activities
in Peking was North Vietnamese Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, who
NCNA disclosed is "now in Peking." Hoan, who led the DRV mission
in Peking from 1950 to 1957, has long played a mayor role in
international communist relations, and he apparently spent
considerable time in China in late 1969 during the period of
improving Sino-Vietnamese relations and the opening of Sino-Soviet
talks in Peking. Hoare made a two-day layover in Peking in late
May as he was returning from the funeral of the Mongolian president.
There was no announcement on his arrival in Peking on the present
visit; he last appeared in Hanoi on 3 September.
Peking announced on 15 November that a DRV economic delegation
led by Politburo member and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi arrived by
plane that afternoon, hard on the heels of Tho's departure that
morning. Earlier on the same day Hanoi reported the departure of
the delegation for "a number of socialist countries" to negotiate
agreements on "economic and military aid for 1973." The DRV's
annual aid agreements with the communist countries have
customarily been signed by such a touring delegation over the
years, though last year's accords were atypically signed in Hanoi
by delegations visiting from the donor countries.
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l5 NOVEMBER 1972
Preparations for the Nghi delegation's visit to the PRC had
been made by DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who
arrived in Peking on 7 October as head of an "experts
delegation" to "discuss" Chinese economic and military
assistance for 1973. Ban had negotiated the supplementary
aid agreement signed with the Chinese on 28 June in the
course of a protracted stay in China.
VIETNAM SETTLEMENT Peking has reverted to a low posture
on Vietnam after winding down its
major campaign to pressure the United Staten to sign the
draft agreement disclosed by Hanoi on 26 October. Reflecting
what may have been Chirese concern to have a settlement firmed
up before the U.S. Presidential election, Peking issued four
authoritative pronouncements in the five days up to
3 November, but since that time there has been no significant
Chinese comment. Recent Chinese leaders' speeches have
virtually ignored Vietnam, the sole exception being a passing
reference to the Indochinese conflict by Politburo alternate
member Li Te-sheng during a 11 November rally for the visiting
Albanian defence minister.
Peking's current coveraga.of Vietnam developments has had a
time-marking quality, consisting largely of replays of
Vietnamese and other foreign comment that has been carefully
edited to sidestep sensitive issues concerning a settlement
and to muffle criticism of the Nixon A.iminlstr~~tion and its
intentions, Peking carried the text of Hanoi's announcement on
Tho's return to Paris for further negotiations.
typifying Peking's discreet ap~:~~oa:.h, NCNA avoided any
reference to the substance of the Vietnam draft agremeent in
reporting the 8 November KHAN DAN editorial that had marked
Hanoi's first discussion ~~f any of the datails of the accord.
NCNA duly repeated NHAN DAN's charges against the Thieu
government's alleged persecution of prisoners in the South,
but the account omitted those passages connecting a prisoner
release with the announced agre~nent. NCNA also muted NHAN DAN's
charge that the Thieu.government's persecution of prisoners
together with the recently increased tempo of U.S. deliveries
of war materiel to South Vietnam were "threatening" the agreement.
Peking's divergence from its Vietnamese allies in dealing with
the United States was pointed up by the NCNA account of a
10 November NHAN DAN editorial on obstacles to a peace agreement.
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CONFIDENTLAL FHIS TRENDB
is NovEMS1vR 1972
NCNA omitted a charge of U.B. "treachery" in delaying the
signing of the agreement ae well as the claim Chat Washington
actually welcomes the Thieu regime's opposition to the draft
accord. Though the NCNA version cited N1~AN DAN's criticism
of recent remarks on Vietnam by Secretary Rogers, it deleted
the editorial's other charges against the Nixon Administration
by name. An NCNA replay of a 9 November PRd Foreign Min_ try
spokesman statement protesting U.S. arms shipments to South
Vietnam omitted a paragraph that harshly criticized the
President by name and also excised the spokesman's charge that
the Nixon Administration is engaging in a ">eace hoax." In
addition, Peking's treatment of the NHAN T!AN editorial on the
10th ae well ae one on the 9th concerning U.3. arms shipments
was measurably more moderate eon~:erning ch~~ Thieu government.
NCNA deleted all but one of the 9 November editorial's
references to the Thieu "puppet" reg!.me, substituting the
neutral term "Thieu administration," and it excised the demand
in NHAN DAN on the 10th that Thieu be "eliminated" to insure
successful enactment of the draft agreement.
BREZI#VE1/ CANS FOR REMdVAL OF OBSTACLES ~~CREATEA BY U ~ S ~ S I DE~~
Brezhnev's comments on Vietnam in his 13 November boeech at the
dinner for the vieitin~; Bulgarian delegation conveyed a sense
of urgency regarding Che t1.S.-DRV peace agreement. The Soviet
leader asserted that the attention of world public opinion is
"riveted" to the question of a Vietnam settlement and that the
people of the world demand that "the obstacles created by the
American aide, literally on the eve of signing an agreement," be
removed and the war ended "at the earliest time." Kosygin on
27 October had expressed hope that "continued talks" would lead
to agreement "soon." And Mazurov on 6 November, noting that, the
agreement "was not signed on the date fixed," called~tor its
signing "as sown as possible." Neither explicitly ca8tigated
the United Sta~`,es for the delay in signing as Brezhnev did on
the 13th.
brezhr.~v repeated a pro forma pledge of "active oupport'' for the
"duet cause" of the Vietnamese fighting "U.S. aggression," but
he coupled it with an emphatic assertion that the Soviet Union
will "strive to facilitate the ending of the war and will
welcome the restoration of peace in Indochina.". When this
happens, he concluded, "the world will sigh with relief and the
international horizon on the whole clear up noticeably."
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15 NOVEMBER 1972
The day before Brezhnev'e speech, a RED STAR artic]9 by
military observer Col. A. Leontyev speculated that U.S.
procrastination may "jeopardize the agreement al Cady reached"
and "indefinitely prolong the war." This line had been
broached as early ae 2 November in an IZVESTIYA article by
Matveyev, who warned that the "serious situation" created by
the U.S. attitude on the peace accord "jeopardizes what has
been achieved" and demanded that the United States not
"prolong the bloodshed in Vietnam." Leontyev went beyond
Matveyev, however, when he forestullyi condemned the United
States for making one more attempt to break the will of the
Vietnamese people in order to then start "another round of
'exhausting talks' and Cry to wr~eet conceseion~ in favor of
the Saigon regime." Leontyev echo other propaganda when he
said the United States had delayed the signing to gain Clue
far the dispatch of weapocts and ammunition to the Saigon regime.
He observed that this "can only place a mine under the still
unsigned agreement." A foreign-language radio commentary on
13 November echoed Mayevskiy in the 2 November PRAVDA when it
said that the Americans are delivering arms to Saigon because
they .intend to "preserve and consolidate the Saigon army's
military potential for a guerrilla war if and when the American
forces ever get out of South Vietnam."
TASS on 14 November reported Le Duc Tho's departure from Hanoi
for Paris to attend a private meeting with the?American aide
"with the object of settling the issue of signing an agreement
to end the war." On the 12th TASS had briefly cited the New
York TIMES for the speculation that Kissinger was to return to
Paris to "resume talks about an agreement on ending the war."
The same TASS item also cited a report in the French newspaper
FRANCE-SOIR that the South Vietnamese authorities have no more
objections to the terms of a cease-fire agreement. On the 14th
TASS duly reported the White House announcement that Kissinger
would meet with Le Duc Tho in Paris, adding that the White House
press secretary also said the United States was satisfied with
the course of the Calks. Moscow media on the?13th.reported
briefly on General Haig's visits to Saigon. Phnom Penh, and Seoul,
speculating that,hia talks concerned the U.S.-DRV agreement. A
Moscow domestic service commentary on the 10th cited s>eculation
that Haig'e trip was designed to gain time to arm the Saigon
regime as well as to "confirm" the U.S. argument that.the U.S.
delay in signing the accord has been due ?~~ Saigon's disagreement.
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15 NOVEMBER 1972
WANOI FtOIlTINELY PkOTESTS U.S. STRIKES kN NORTW VIETNAM
Routine daily statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman
have continued to protest strikes by B-52's and other U.S.
planes over the North, as well as she111ng of coastal areas by
U.S. warships. The statements claim in standard fashion that
the United States is bombing civilian installations, citing
several villages and state farms ae well ab a church as
targets. Several statements have gpecif ically charged that
such actions g1~~e the lie to the United States' "allegations
Chat it is ending its military involvemarc and that it longs
for a fair and honorable peace for everyone." Hanoi claimed
to have downed `LO more planes during the past week, including
an F-111 on the 7th, for a total of 4,042, and to have oet
ablaze two U.S. warships.
Quoting from the spokesman's statements as well as from Western
and Saigon press reports, a Hanoi radio commentary on 14 November
condemned recently intensif ied U.S. air activity over both North
and South Vietnam, and particularly the increase in B-52
"extermination bombings." The commentary charged that such an
escalation, carried out in a frantic attempt to salvage the
Vi.ei~iamization policy, only reveals the Nixon Administration's
"warlike and barbarous nature" and, together with its "breach
of faith" in not signing the peace agreement, exposes the
reality i~ehind all_agen Administration efforts to deceive the
world's people into believing peace is at hand. Clairt~ir~,~ that
the Vietnamese struggle enjoys undin!inished world public support,
the commentary expressed Vietnamese resolv~s.to defeat the "U.S.
aggressors" in both the North and South and cited as proof the
achievements of the armed forces and people in the North in
downing U.S. planes, including the B-52 "trump cards."
U.S. "war crimeA" in the North during October were cited. in a
communique issued by the DRV War Crimes Commission on 6 November..
Stressing that these actions were carried out .while the United
States was professing "good will" and "peace," the communi.~ve
charged that they included "some 7,200 tactical plane sorties,
some 710 B-52 sorties, and nearly 1,500 reconnaissance sorties."
Making no distinction between actions in the last week of
October--when the bombing halt north of the 20th .parallel went
into effect--and the rest of the month the communique claimed
that the raids had hit "22 provinces, six cities, 20 provl-lcial
capitals, and a very large number of populous townships, hamlets,
and villages." The communique highlighted raids on Hanoi
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(including the 11 October raid which destroyed the French
diplomatic mission), Haiphong, and Vinh, as well ae on some
of the provincial capitals. It claimed that the H-52 ~trike~--
which it argued were mostly coti~ducted at right in order to
maximize :ivilian casualties--had hit aree~? from Nghe An to
the Vinh Linh zone in 236 missions. In r;:epanse to these
attacks, the communique claimed that 67 U.S. planes were downed
during October. includi-~g three B-Gl's, and that U.S. warships
were set on fire l3 times.
Specific praise for the "compatriots and combatants" of the
Fourth Military Region in the face of "the U.S. aggressors'
current war of aggression" appeared in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial of 13 November. Arguing that the region is regarded
by the United States ae "a key target for extremely savage
and massive extermination bombardment," which it carries out
"in hope of undermining our people's fighting determination
and interdicting the flow of support and assistance from our
rear bees to the frontline," the editorial claimed that the
ars-ed forces and people have nevertheless managed .to maintain
uninterrupted communications, to fight well, and to contin~~e
production. It stressed that they will continue to carry out
their "fraternal" and "intern~stionalist" duties against the
"U.S. aggressors," and it closed with a pledge to continue
the struggle in the spirit of "President Ho's sacred testament
and the appeal containbd in cur government's 26 October
statement" on the peace accord until the United States is
totally defeated.
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U, S, ELECTIONS
SOVIET BLOC VIEWS ELECTION RETI~NS AS MANDATE FOR DETENTE
President Nixon's landslide ra-election was generally welcomed. in
Moscow and in East European capitals as a vote for interrational
detente. Accompanying the official messages of congratu:.ations
that noted with satisfaction the recent improvement in East-West
relations, press and radio commentaries saw the landslide as
offering broad prospects for further relaxation of international
tensions. Consistent with the Fie-election comment, the post-
mortems on the election attributed the President's overwhelming
victory largely to the favorable impact on American voters of
the Administration's moves toward improved relations with the
Soviet Union and other communist countries. Speaking in this
vein at a Kremlin reception on the 13th for visiting Bulgarian
leader Zhivkov, Brezhnev credited the recent improvement in
U.S.-Soviet relations with having changes the tenor of the U.S.
election campaign .from the rhetoric of "a.ausrter century .of cold
war" to "appeals for a peace-loving, realistic foreign policy."
MOSCOW COMMENT Setting the pattern for Soviet commentaries,
a TASS dispatch by Igor Orlov, broadcast by
Moscow radio in English on the 8th, stated that certain changes
in U.S. foreign policy "linked with the relaxation of international
tension" had played a "big part" in the Nixon landslide. "The
President put to his credit, specifi.cally," Or1ov explained, "the
improvement of Soviet-American relations which found expression
in a number of important agreements between the USSR and the UniCed
States which promote the general strengthening of international
security."
~:nother mayor factor influencing the American voter, Orlov maintained,
was the emergence of the outlines of a Vietnam settlement on the
eve of the election. While noting that Washington had failed to
sign the Paris accord, Orlov declared that its very existence had
influenced the voters, who "believed that the U.S. Government would
fulfil the commitments undertaken and would sign the agreement,
as H. Kissinger asserted, at the earliest time." By contrast,
Senator McGovern's inability to exploit the Vietnam issue was
explained on grounds that he "could offer the electors only
statements which, in the course of the election campaign, were
only modified."
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While giving foreign policy issues mayor credit for the outcome of
the presidential race, Orlov contended that the :;ongressional
races were decided on domestic issues and by the stress played
on them by Democratic party candidates. This, he said, was
why the Repub]~can party had filed to gain majorities in the House
and Senate.
The treatment of the election results as a mandate for peace
became a staple of subsequent Soviet commentaries. A 10 November
PRAVDA dispatch from Washington typically observed that "the
election has shown that the vapt majority of the electorate--
irrespective of whether it voted for the Republicans or Democrats--
advocates a relaxation of international tension and cooperation
between states with different social systems." Calling the state
of U.S.-Soviet relations an "essential baromet:r" by which
Americans fudge their gov~srnment's policies, an I2VESTIYA article
nn the 10th by V. Matveyev stressed the beneficial impact ~f the
Moscow summit on the election: "For the first time :in the whole
~~ostwar period a candidate for the U.S. presider^_y, striving?for
re-election, has been able to present voters not with one but with
a number of important Soviet-American tigreements on limiting
strategic arms, trade, protection of the environment, and other
questions." Matveyev went on to urge the Administration "not to
betray these hopes and aspirations of ordinary Americans for a
direction of the efforts of the country and nation toward peaceisl,
creative aims both in the international arena and in the United
States itself, including the speediest end to i?he war in Vietnam."
While focusing mainly on the positive foreign policy aspects of
the election, Soviet comment also took note of negative domestic
features. Such phenomena as voter apathy, the costs of campaigning,
and the role of "monopoly capital" were singled out as typical
features of the U.S. political pr~,cess. A PRAVDA commentary on
the 10th, for example, dismisp:.a the differences between the mayor
parties in standard, traditi~na.l terms, charging that both parties
sought mainly "to convince the electorate that i;: 'has the
opportunity to choose' when in fact real power remains in the
hands of the powerful of this world."
EAST EUROPEAN CG~h`1EP~lT The movement toward detente in foreign
policy was similarly emphasized as the
telling factor in the election by Moscow's Eaet European allies.
The Warsaw daily GLOS P)EiACY, for example, commented on the 10th
that the Nixon landslide stemmed largely from the opening of a
"meaningful dialog" between Washington and the communist countries,
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and it expressed hope that the maeslve vote of confidence in
the President would lead to further development of the "constructive"
elements in U.S. foreign policy. Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian
commentaries viewed the election in much the same terms, with the
Romanians using the occasion to draw attention to the "ascending
evolution" of relations between Washington and Bucharest and to
stress again the importance of good relations among "all" socialist
countries and "all" states irrespective of social systems.
The progress toward a settlement of the Vietnam war was also seen
in Bulgarian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Romanian commentaries ae
a mayor factor influencing the outcome of the election. A
9 November commentary in Prague's RUDE PRAVO bluntly asserted that
"it became one of the main causes of McGovern's defeat when
President Nixon pulled the rug from under his feet by the latest
negotiationA of Henry Kissinger and the promises of ending the
war." This sentiment was echoed in a commentary on the 9th in
Sofia's ZEI~DELSKO ZNAME, which went on to interpret the elaceion
results as a "mandate" for immediate cessation of the Vietnam war
on the basis of the draft U.S.-DRV agreement.
Some assessments of the election by hardline elements in East Europe
were charactezistically more blunt and less charitable Coward the
United States. An 8 November commentary in Prague's MLADA FRONTA,
for example, accused the President of demagogy, arguing that he
had deviously manipulated the "certain detente" in international
relations "in a masterly way" and had "prevented peace in Indochina
to this very day." It likewise described the average American as
"a conservative who is~afraid of new things and of unrest and who
prefers slight progress to any and all radicalism." An 8 November
commentary on the East Berlir_ domestic service also belabored the
phenomenon of voter apathy and other alleged deficiencies in the
U.S. electoral system.
''~'UGt~SIAV OOMr~NT4TORS DaiIBIT CAUTION ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Belgrade comment oa the U.S. election outcome was cautious and
circumsppr_~ :,n is policy implications. An 8 November domestic
service commentary on Belgrade radio displaye.~l anxiety about the
prospects for peace when it expresse3 hope that events would
disprove the judgments of President Nixon's critics who "darkl-
predict that the President, who cannot be elected for a third time,
and who at heart has always been a rightist and conservative, will
now finally show his true face and drop the mask of a peacemalc~r."
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Taking a more balanced stance in POLITIKA on the 9th, Dusan Simic
saw the election as a vote for "stability and certainty" in U.S.
foreign policy instead of for the "attractive uncertainties
offered by George McGovern." Simic saw the favorable reaction
to the Nixon landslide "in the big, world centers" as evidence of
the extent~to which the President had "progressed, within a
relatively short time, from his former reputation of an ex~anplary
cold war fighter to the statue of a statesman sufficiently
acceptable not only to American voters but also to a majority
of external factors on which world peace and the position of the
United States as a world power depend." After noting the
Administration's mayor foreign policy successes--in achieving
a "more peaceful and stable" world "without sacrificing any
U.S. vital interests"--and praising the President for "extraordinary
skill" in dealing with former adversaries in the world arena, Simic
observed that "even more skill" would be required in the future
"for turning promises into action and announcements into facts:'.'
PEKING PROVIDES STRAIGHTFORWARD REPORT ON ELECTION RESULTS
Peking provided a single, purely factual report on the elution
results, an NCNA report on 8 November noting the popular and
electoral vote totals and explaining the presidential electoral
system. There was no mention of races other than the presidential
one. Peking's only other discussion of the election, a 24 August
NCNA account of the Democratic and Republican conventions, had
contained some polemical elements in referring to the two mayor
"bourgeois" parties and mentioning antiwar demonstrations during
both conventions. Other Chinese coverage prior to the election
consisted of replays of foreign--mainly North Vietnamese--comment
on the President's statements on Vietnam. Typifying Peking's
restraint, an NCNA account on 3 November of the President's speech
the previous day faile.~ to mention that it was an election address.
Peking's straightforward, noncommittal report nn the Election is
consistent with the new atmosphere surrounding Sino-U.S. relations
and the continuing Chinese restraint in d~scuasing U.S. internal
affairs. Implicit in Peking's approach i~as been a recognition that
the PRC must deal with the powers that be in Washington, and the
election totals told their own story in this cor.'-~:ct. In contrast
to the nonco?ittal approach this time, Peking had reacted in
polemical terms to the 1968 presidential election 'as "an out-and-
out diabolic fraud of the monopoly capitalist class to fool the
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American ueople." At the same time, however, Peking had signaled
its intertst in probing possibilities of a reorientation of U.S.
foreign policy under the new President which would reduce the
area of Sino-U.S. conflict. Thus, 1n Peking's sole comment on
the President-elect's campaign statements, NCNA said he was
elected after calling for a reduction of coamnitments in areas
where the United States was overextended and emphasis on priority
areas such as Europe. Later in November 1968 Feking reinforced
that signal by issuing an official statement that expressed
readiness to resume the Warsaw talks with representatives of the
incoming Administration in order to seek agreement on the five
principles of peaceful coexistence--the principles eventually
incorporated into the Shanghai communique on President Nixon's
visit to China this February.
SINGLE CLAN COM~NTARY DISPARAGES U.S. "ELECTORAL FARCE"
The sole monitored Cuban commentary on the election outcome, in
an 8 November Havana broadcast to Latin America, emphasised the
"coatradiction" inherent in the President's re-election while his
party lost out in its effort to gain control of Congress. This
revealed, the commentary said, "the nature of the U.S. electoral
farce." The commentary fell back on the stock communist portrayal
of the two mayor American political parties as indistinguishable
"tools of the oligarchy" whose candidates run on identical platforms
offering the voters no real choice. Election outcomes, in this
portrayal, are determined by "propaganda, the electoral machinery,
and the candidates' promises."
Not even this kind of potboiler was broadcast in the Cuban domestic
service. Nor has any judgment been rendered so far by the leading
Cuban commentators who speak on Havana television and set the
line for substantive Cuban reactions to mayor developments, or by
the freewheeling Guido Garcia Inclan who tends to reflect Fidel
Castro's personal views.
In contrast to t:he hankneyed post-election brwidcast dismissing the
results of any U.S. election as meaningless anc~ thus in effect
abstaining from comment, Castro on 26 July had publicly asserted
' his view of the Democratic Party as the lesser o.E evils and noted
approvingl~? that "one of the candidates" for the presidency was
said to favor lifting of the economic "blockade" of Cuba; Castro
' described the Republican Party as having "the worst pas~tion and .
the most criminal, the most reactionary, and the most warmongering."
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Cuban commentators sail litL?1e about the election campaign while
it was in progress until the final week, when a rash of comment
accused the President of exploiting aspirations for an end to the
Vietnam war for crass political purposes, picturing a settlement
as imminent and then reneging by failing to meet Hanoi's
31 October "deadline" for signing.
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GERMANY
BRE~INEV WARMLY PRAISES BONN BUf NOTES LIMITS ON COOPERATION
Brezhnev uses' his 13 November speech at the Kremlin dinner for
vleiti.:~ Bulgarian leader Zhivkov to warmly welcome the "ascending
line" of developing relations between the USSR an6 the FRG,
crediting 1t to the establishment of "mutual trust" b~stween the
two countries on the basis of Bonn's adoption of a "realistic"
policy toward present-day Europe. At the same time, speaking Eive
days after the initialing of the FRG-GDR basic treaty {n Bonn,
he seconded the East German insistence on a definitive recognition
of the ideological dividing line between West Germany and the Soviet
bloc.
Serving ~.n part as support for Moscow's East German ally, Brezhnev's
stress on the "absolute" ideological gulf between Moscow and Bonn
also seemed directed in part at the West German electorate, which
will vote for a new parliament on 19 November. His remarks seemed
calculated to undercut charges by the opposition CDU/CSU parties
that the ruling Social Democrats have moved too far to the left
in cooperating with the communists and have given too much away in
negotiAting the Ostpolitik treaties. While clearly acknowledging
Moscow's hopes for the election outcome by lauding the policies of
Chancellor Brandt's SPD/FDP coalition, Brezhnev expressed in strong
terms the basic stand applied by the GDR to .r.elations between the
two German states: "We have no cooperation with the West German
Social Democ~ata on questions of ideology," Brezhnav said, "nor
can there be such cooperation. Everyone knows that ideologically
we stand on absolutely different platforms."
CARROT AND STICr. Without naming the CDU/~~U, Brezhnev denounced
those forces, "still extant and very active in
West Germany today," which "cannot stomach a relaxation ,and the
consolidation of European peace." After listing the various
Ostpolitik agreements reached by Bonn ae constituting "a ~~ictory
for all of Europe," Brezhnev went on, again with an eye tc~ the
West German electorate, to bestow unusually warm praise on the
Brandt-Scheel government: "As for the FRG. objective people ca~ot
but see that it is precisely now, whan it has taken the path ~f a
more realistic policy, its voice is heeded with greater atteltion
everywhere itt the world."
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Where Brezhnev held out to the Weat Germans the promise of
greater international prestige deriving from pursuit of the
Ostpolitik, East German propaganda leveled what amounted to a
blunt warning that the fate of the detente between Wear. Germany
and the Soviet bloc hinged on a victory for Brandt's coalition.
An ADN commentary on the 8th, entitled "There Ie No Better Treaty,"
informed Opposition leaders Bartel and Strauss that "they would
be very much mistaken if they believed that.. in the event of a
CDC/CSU takeover of the government they could conclude a 'better'
treaty with the GDR." Citing "circles" of the SED Politburo and
the GDR Council of Ministers as i.ta sources, the commentary
declared that in initialing the treaty with the FRG, the GDR had
acted on the premise that the present coalition would be in a
position after the FRG elections "to continue the policy of
establishing peaceful, businesslike relations with the Eastern
countries ."
PEKING ON TREATY The Peking NCNA's international aeririce oa
13 November carried a brief, straightforward
report noting that the FRG and GDR had initialled their basic
treaty on the 8th and that it would be signed after the 19 November
elections and then ratified by the two German states. The NCNA
account pointedly included a paragraph on the conclusion of two
weeks of negotiations by the Big Four ambassadors on the 5th and
the four powers' 9 November declaration "affirming that their
'rights and responsibilitics' for Germany will be maintained."
Neither East Berlin nor Moscow has reacted to the speech by PRC
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, at an 11 October Peking banquet
for visiting FRG Foreiga Minister Scheel, in which he described
the relationship between the two German states as "an abnormal
situation." Chi said the Chinese "have always held that a fair
and reasonable solution to the German question should be sought
on the basis of respecting the interests and desires of the
people of the two German states," stopping short of any reference
to the role of the Big Four. He recalled that "as early as 1955"
Mao had issued a proclamation ending the state of war with
"Germany."
CONFIDENTIAL
i
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
BRfcD~NEV MINICULT CONTINUES IN FACE OF POLICY SETBACKS
The steady if not overly conspicuous growth of the Brezhnev
minicult in familiar and unfamiliar places suggests that
Brezhnev has suffered no lose of influence as a result of
this year's agricultural difficulties and the setback in the
Middle East. In addition to continuing references to his
wartime accomplishments, Brezhnev has recently won praise for
inspiring and organizing the successful virgin land harvest
and for keeping the populace supplied with food despite the
drought--kith no public mention of the purchase of foreig-~
grain, however. At the same tip^e, he has been honored by the
publlcatiotc of the third volume of his speeches and of a new
collection ~f his fore'gn policy addresses. A lengthy review
of the third Brezhnev volume appeared in PRAVDA on 1 November,
and it was later reprinted in the regional papers.
Brezhnev's visit to the virgin lands in late August and early
September--well-publicized in the press, films, and televieion~-
has been applauded by numerous virgin land officials for its
inspirational effects. On 14 October, the day the Kazakh harvest
successes were announced in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, the Kazakh
leaders praised the Central Committee and Brezhnev "personally"
for their "constant concern" about Kazakh agriculture, and a
PRAVDA article by Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev praised the
instructlons and advice given by Brezhnev during hie visit.
Likewise, when the Altay successes were announced on 2I October,
Altay leaders praised Brezhnev's advice and instructions in
articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOVIET RUSSIA, RURAL LIFE and
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Altay First Secretary A.V. Georgiyev was
especially solicitous, lauding Brezhnev's "brilliant" Altay
speech and "splendid knowledge" of industry and agriculture in
the 13 September SOVIET RUSSIA and his "deep knowled~ a" of local
affairs in the 21 Octobe- PRAVDA. According to the 25 October
LItERARY GAZETTE, Georgiyev also attributed to Brezhnev "the
strategy and tactics for the harvest" and the accelerated
deliveries of agricultural equipment to the Altay harvesters.
Articles designed to convince the publi~:: of the adequacy of the
food supply have also given Brezhnev much of the credit. A
23 September TRUD article disclosed that Brezhnev had said in
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his 31 August Novosibirsk speech tI~at "everything Che Politburo
is doing this year is aimed, in the final analysis, at ensuring
that the rhythm of life and the level of supply of the
populaticn of our country will not be worse but better than
last year." SOVIET RUSSIn on ?. November published a kolkhoznik's
letter addressed personally to Brezhnev lauding the regime's
agricultural policies for successfully supplying the country
despite the disastrous weather. The letter noted that even
though the drought was worse than. that of 1921, which caused
widespread famine, this year "our kolkhozniks are li.~~ing their
normal life" and are "fully supplied " with grain and vegetables,
"thanks to the concern of the party and government for the
people's welfare." The letter was reprinted in other central
and local papers and was even cited by Mazurov in his 6 November
October Revolution anniversary address.
Brezhnev also received credit for the urban food supply from
Leningrad First Secretary G.V. Romanov. In a local speech
published in the 25 October LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, Romanov
declared that the Central Committee, the Politburo, ant Brezhnev
"personally"-were "dcirg everything necessary to supply the
Soviet people with enough of all food products and consumer
goods" and that the Central Committee and Brezhnev "personally"
were taking "a constant interest in bow Leningraders are being
supplied with food products," wish th~~ result that "a quite wide
selection of milk and meat products" was available in Leningrad
stores.
JOURNAL REVEALS PURGE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
In the wake of the replacement of liberal A.M. Rumyantsev as
director of the Institute for Concrete Social Research, its
parent body, the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, has sharply
criticized. the institute's work, ordered a reorganization, and
redefined its tasks in more orthodox terms.* These disclosures
were made ir. a report on a recent presidium meeting publfshed
in the October issue of the HERALD OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES. Although the date was not ~;'ven, the meeting apparen~ly
occurred shortly after the identification of conservative
M.N. Rutke~?ich as institute di:~ctor in the 16 May PRAVDA, since
the Octobex HERALD was already set in type on 19 August.
* For background see the TRENDS of 24 May 1972, pages 38-40.
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lS NOVEMBER 1972
During R~:myanteev's tenure as director frog: ?.96A to 1971 more
orthodo~- social scientists, including Rutkevich~ repeatedly
warned against attempts to separate concrete social research
from historical materialism and against the copying of
bourgeois sociology. The decree adopted by the recent
presidium session defined the institute's "main Ceske" ae
analysis--"on the basis of dialectical and historical
materialism" and the "theory of scientific communism"--of social
relationships, social structure, and social planning, improve-
ment of the management of social processes, cultural construction,
and communist education of the workers, and criticism of bourgeois
sociological theories.
The presidium complained that "many" of the institute's workers
were "carried away by study of questions not within the
competence" of the institute and that "its leadership did not
take the necessary steps to ensure the high ideological-theoretical
level of all publications." It criticized the institute's
structure, operations, and personnel policies and decreed a
"number of organizational measures" co eliminate the shortcomings.
The institute was renamed the "Institute of Sociological Research."
Another institute in a politically sensitive field was also
recently censured for ideological errors. The August QUESTIONS
OF HISTORY published a decree of the History Division of the
USSR Academy of Sciences attacking the Institute of History
of the USSR for publi-~hing works mieintet~preting the 1917 revolution.
Most harshly assai~ed wire the writings of the institute's director
P.V. Volobuyev, who "mistakerly" asserted that after the February
19?.7 revolution the proletariat was not prepared to be the leader
of :new revolution--despite Lenin's assertions to the contrary.
Thn decree declared that "bourgeois ideologists strive in every
way to play down the role of the working class as the predominant
force in the revolution" and use ouch views in the ideological
struggle. Despite criticism of the books at a March 1972
meeting at the institute, workers of the institute attempted not
only to defend the authors of the mistaken works "but even to
depict them se 'innovators' and expressers of a 'new,' 'progressive'
trend in science." The decree ordered "a strengthening of the
leadership" of the institute's sector dealing with the te~arist pEriod.
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15 Nov~tE~R 1972
CHINA
CANpAIGN FOR A OIIAI.ITY EDUCATIONAL SYSTF~'I GAINS MOMENTt,N~1
Peking has taken several steps to speed the reconstruction of its
once decimated educational system by encouraging further. relaxation
of politically charged reforms undertaken during the cultural
revolution. Etecent commentaries have used notably frank language
to put officials connected with the educational system on notice
thai, wh~'e the ideal graduate is still one who is both "Red" and
expert, emphasis is definitely to be placed on the latter. Chengtu
radio on 11 November, for example, castigated "swindlers from the
left" who emerged during the cultural revolution and tempered with
Me,o's educational line by "shouting that politics could squeeze out
everything," creating s situation 1n which teachers and students
were ai'raid to "talk about teaching or persist in rational sys+.ems
of teaching." These same "swindlers" were specifically condemned
for holding that "if politico and ideology are good, professional
work is bound to be good" in an attempt to "corrupt the young
people" and turn tnem into "political parrots who could only come
out with political slogans but lacked actual knowledge."
A similar denigration of cultural revolution attempts to i.;~.~ure the
political reliability of students as they passed through tht educs.-
tional system was contained in an article on training revolutionary
Successors broadcast by Radio Peking on 17 October which lashed
out at "swindlers" for using "ultraleftist words" in an attempt to
"make a fool of the broad masses of cadres, youths, and people"
and turn them into "blind, muddleheaded revolutionaries." A
radio Peking broadcast on the previous day attacked those who
"peddled such trash as 'it is no use to study'...in a vain attempt
to turn the youths into political imbeciles who cannot work, plow
the fields, or fight a war."
Peking's current concern for quality education appears motivated
in part by a need to ~~vercome the problem of yout;iful workers who
cannot do e. satisfactory fob on the production 11:~e because they
have failed to "master techniques." This problem wss candidly
discussed in an article in RED FLAG No. 10, broadcast by Radio
Peking on 20 October, which was critical of young factory
workers who "have onesidedly set the study of politics against
that of techniques." Spelling out some of the problems produced
by young workers with inadequate technical knowledge, RED FLAG
complained that sane manufactured products are "dunk" and that
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.L5 NOVi11MJliLA 19`l~
industrial accidents have resulted from tho :I.mproper use of
factory equipment. 'i'o overcome these shorteomi.nge, young workers
were firmly urged not to be "content w.L:h hall'-halted knowledge"
and reminded that "to inherit skills from veteran workers, it is
necessary to go through tempering and. serious study." Driving the
lesson home, RED P'LA(} argued that "since techniques are a science,
and since science is true knowledge, one cannot master it without
painstaking efforts."
Judging by a 9 November Changchun commentary written by the party
branch of a local "7 May" school, calla for improving the quality
of education have won enthusiastic response from local teachers.
~o deepen this initial enthusiasm, however, efforts are underway t;o
help teachers distinguish more clearly between correct and erroneous
educational tines. Indicating that some study of classical litera-
ture now falls within the correct line, the article revealed that
Changchun dducators are now teaching once forbidden writings
by Mencius as part of the drive to strengthen the teaching of
basic knowledge. Local students were said to be able to make an
"oral and written translation of a chapter of classical. literature,"
ana it was claimed that those students who had been "influenced by
the anarchist trend of thought" have overcome their ideological
shortcomings.
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