TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: October 4, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

 . / c/44
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROOc OiOn ~'O-6
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
4 OCTOBER 1972
875R000 05oM- 6 NO. 40)
 Approved For Release 2000/0-H1 1t1~7X 85T00875R000300050040-6
This propaganda analysis report is bi. ed exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
Approved For Release 20001/'U"gT85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention i
CHINA
National Day Editorial Acclaims Foreign Policy Successes . . . . 1
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Peking Condemns "Sham Relaxation" Promoted by Soviets . . . . . 5
CHINA-JAPAN
Peking and Tokyo Agree to Establish Diplomatic Relations . . . . 8
INDOCHINA
DRV, PRG Press for Provisional "National Concord" Government . . 11
PRC National Day Comment Reflects Sino-Vietnamese Differences . . 15
DRV Continues Criticism of U.S. Reaction to Release of POW's . . 18
Hanoi Protests Alleged U.S. Bombing of Civilian Targets in DRV . 19
Communists Claim Successes in Fighting South of Saigon . . . . . 24
SALT
USSR Praises, Approves Accords, Sets Stage for SALT II . . . . . 26
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Uses Nasir Death Anniversary to Stress Amity with Cairo . 29
IMF SESSION
Moscow Sees U.S. Money Reform Plan as Move to Meet "Crisis" . . . 31
USSR
Mzhavanadze Removed in Disgrace as Georgian First Secretary . . . 33
Altay Agricultural Institute Returns to Official Favor . . . . . 35
Approved For Release 2000YO VG RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1.972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 25 SEPTEMBER - 1 OCTOBER 1972
Moscow (2745 items)
Peking (1520 items)
China
(4%)
7%
Domestic Issues
(40%)
38%
[PRC National Day
(0.1%)
4%]
[PRC National Day
(0.8%)
8%j
UNGA Session
(8%)
7%
Tanaka in PRC
(--)
29%
[Gromyko Speech
(--)
5%]
PRC-Togoland Diplomatic
(--)
7%
Indochina
(6%)
6%
Relations
Ratification of SALT
(--)
32
UNGA Session
(7%)
6%
Agreement by
Indochina
(4%)
2%
Supreme Soviet
UNESCO International
(--)
3%
Scientific
Conference in
Ashkhabad
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
CHINA
NATIONAL DAY EDITORIAL ACCLAIMS FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES
Peking marked National Day this year by triumphantly celebrating
its achievements in foreign affairs during a period of major
international changes and readjustments. Coming on the heels
of significant breakthroughs in relations with Japan ar.d West
Germany, a joint editorial on the anniversary by PEOPLE'S DAILY,
RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY sang the praises of Chouist
policies of flexibility and negotiation while excoriating the
Soviets as being more dangerous than old-line imperialists. On
the latter score, the editorial was notably soft on "U.S.
imperialism" and used the occasion to put on record an approving
assessment of President Nixon's summit talks last February.
As in the case of the 1 Auguet Army Day, the release of a National
Day joint editorial represent,-, a return to normalcy after the
sharp curtailment of anniversary celebrations beginning last
National Day at the time of the Lin Piao affair. The once-
traditional parade was again foregone in favor of festivities
in various parks, a practice having the virtue that it makes
Mao's absence less conspicuous than if he failed to review a
parade.* All of the currently active Politburo members were
present either in Peking or their provincial bailiwicks, and
the editorial struck a subdued note of consolidation in a
discussion of the domestic situation that was overshadowed by
the extensive review of developments in the international sphere.
Chou En-lai, making a triumphal return to Peking after seeing
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka off in Shanghai the day before
National Day, had reason to bask in the glow of the touted
foreign policy successes. In addition to the Tanaka visit, the
announcement on 29 September that the PRC and West Germany had
agreed to establish diplomatic relations was also well timed
for the National Day celebrations. The editorial pointed to
the "permissible and necessary" flexibility being practiced in
foreign policy, and it invoked the doctrines of peaceful
coexistence and of the "first and second intermediate zones"
to explain that the Chinese "strive for the relaxation of
international. tension" and apply this flexibility across a wide
* Mao has made no public appearance outside his house since the
January funeral of Chen I.
Approved For Release 2000/08/0?CN 85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
range of countries, including those which previously had been
hostile. Among the past year's developments the editorial cited
President Nixon's visit, noting that the leaders of the two
countries had held "earnest, frank, and beneficial" talks. This
was the characterization offered last February, but Peking had
not subsequently commented on the _ino-U.S. summit until National
Day.
SUPERPOWERS The Joint editorial cited various developments as
evidence of growing resistance to superpower
hegemony, such as Egypt's "sending away" of Soviet military
advisers, the enlargement of the Common Market, and Japan's new
diplomatic moves. The editorial observed, however, that the
world is far from peaceful, noting that the United States has
persisted in its military actions in Vietnam and that the situation
remains tense in other regionF as a result of contention between
the two superpowers. Putting the stress on rivalry between the
United States and he Soviet Union, the editorial dismissed their
recent agreements as "superficial compromise" and reiterated
Peking's judgment that the strategic arms limitation agreement
is being followed by a new stage in the nuclear arms race. In
an unusual formulation, the editorial said Moscow has played up
the European security question "only to pinpoint Europe as the
main area of its contention" with the United States.
The United States was let off lightly, with no disparagement of
the Nixon Administration by name, but the editorial's account
of superpower rivalry went on to deliver a bitter indictment of
"the Soviet revisionist renegade clique" as "even more deceitful
than old-line imperialist countries, and therefore more dangerous."
With an eye to a new round of polemical exchanges at the United
Nations on disarmament, the editorial dismissed the Soviet proposal
on prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as "Just so much humbug."
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS In its more generalized treatment of the domestic
situation, the editorial summed up current
policies with a lengthy quotatic' from Mao stressing a need for a
balanced approach in which "them. are both centralism and democracy,
both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease
of mind and liveliness." According to the quotation, the aim is
"to build a modern industry and agriculture at a fairly rapid
pace, consolidate our party and state, and make them better able
to weather storm and stress." The editorial called for current
moderate policies on cadres, intellectuals, and the economy to
continue to be implemented, and the injunction to be "both red
Approved For Release 2000 [B'Td . & RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
and expert" was explained as meaning that people should "study
vocational skill and technique and raise their educational
level for the sake of the revolution."
The editorial avoided specific guidelines or projects, making
no mention of the five-year plan or of convocation of the
National People's Congress. It indicated that it "is still our
cardinal task" to deepen the rectification campaign in the wake
of the Lin affair and to further criticize the "swindlers."
There was no reference to the PLA's civilian role, the editorial
simply calling without elaboration for strengthened army-government
and army-civilian unity.
LEADERSHIP The leadership turnout followed expected patterns,
UNITY with no major former purge victim reappearing for
National Day. Peking's increasing tendency to vary
the rankings of leaders according to function and occasion seams
to have confused even NCNA. An early list of leaders attending
the festivities in the parks was led by Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and
Chou, the order frequently used on state occasions, but a later
account inserted Chou between the two octogenarians. Chiang Ching
was listed next, ahead of Yeh Chien-ying, but Yeh preceded her
in the group of leaders reported present when Chou returned to
Peking the previous day. Yeh's role in the Tanaka visit might
account for his higher status at the airport ceremony.
Most provinces held National Day rallies, but several in which
the leadership situation is unstable--such as Szechwan, Yunnan,
and Kiangsi--have as yet not reported leadership turnouts.
Chekiang, where first secretary Nan Ping seems to be in trouble,
did name the leaders present, not including Nan and several
other secretaries who were also absent during the Iranian empress'
visit a week earlier.
TAIWAN The joint editorial contained only the ritualistic
pledge to "liberate" Taiwan, but Peking took the
occasion of National Day to make a pitch to the people on Taiwan
at a time when the Chiang Kai-shek regime'a international standing
had suffered further erosion as a result of the PRC-Japanese
settlement.* Speaking at a National Day reception on 29 September
in honor of "compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan
compatriots, Overseas Chinese and foreign nationals of Chinese
* See the China-Japan section of the TRENT)';.
Approved For Release 2000/08/ffN1!ANIR!P85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
descent,"* Yeh Chien-ying noted that "quite a number of Taiwan
compatriots" toured the mainland in the past year and he welcomed
more of them to come and visit their relatives. Yeh sought to
play on sentiments of patriotism among Chinese on Taiwan and
elsewhere, declaring that "patriots belong to one big family"
and that no distinction should be drawn between "those who come
forward first and those later." Striking a conciliatory note,
he reassured "those with wrongdoings in the past" that they also
will be welcome to the family.
The Fukien party chief and commander of the Fukien Front Command,
speaking at a National Day rally broadcast by the Foochow radio,
also extendcd a welcome to the "compatriots" on Taiwan, Quemoy,
and Matsu to visit their relatives and friends on the mainland.
'R There was a reception last year for "Hong Kong and Macao
compatriots" and Overseas Chinese, but there was no mention of
Taiwan cn*:patriots.
Exx
Approved For Release 2000/61"
hRDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
PEKING CONDEMNS "SHAM RELAXATION" PROMOTED BY SOVIETS
PRC National Day provided an occasion for Peking and Moscow to
take stock of their relationship, with the ':zsn 1t that the
Sino-Soviet rivalry shows through with increasing clarity as
the underlying force shaping Peking's broad-based moves in
the international arena. Peking's National Day joint editorial,
recounting "the great achievements" in Chinese foreign policy
in the past year, summed up developments by placing them in a
triangular context in which the Soviets are presented as the
primary current adversary. According to the editorial, "the
policy of those [meaning the United States] who dreamed of
isolating China has gone bankrupt and the still extant
counterrevolutionary schemes [of the Soviet Union] to encircle
China are falling apart."
The editorial's bitter indictment of Soviet "social imperialism"
reflected Peking's resentment over Soviet military pressure
along the border at a time when Moscow is professing a detente
line. The editorial charged that with "a growing appetite"
Moscow "is reaching out its hands everywhere." Making clear
Peking's intention to persist in its anti-Soviet campaign, the
editorial said the Chinese should "especially" expose "the
Soviet revisionist scheme of sham relaxation but real expansion,"
adding that "only by doing so can international tension be truly
eased and world peace safeguarded."
Taken together with Moscow's resurgent polemical attacks on the
Chinese in recent weeks, Peking's policy statement hardly augurs
well for an accommodation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Reports
on celebrations of PRC National Day disclosed that the chief
Soviet negotiator at the border talks, L. Ilichev, and Soviet
Ambassador Tolstikov have been in Moscow. TASS reported that the
two were among those attending the Chinese ambassador's reception
in Moscow on 29 September, and NCNA reported that the deputy
chief of the Soviet delegation at the talks was present at a
30 September reception in Peking honoring foreign guests and.
diplomatic officials.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
SOVIET TREATMENT Moscow's treatment of PRC National Day
OF ANNIVERSARY followed lines similar to last year's, but
developments in the triangular relationship
in the past year were also reflected in Moscow's comment. In
the pattern of recent years, there was an impersonal greetings
message from the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of
Ministers to the PRC chairman, the NPC Standing Committee, and
the PRC State Council. As in 1971, PRAVDA carried an article
by V. Viktorov and IZVESTIYA one by G. Pavlov.
M
The greetings message again expressed a ritualistic hope for an
improvement of relations, but it added a wish that the Chinese
people will have "success in defending the socialist achievements
of the people's revolution." Implicit in such a statement is a
hope that what the Soviets regard as more orthodox policies will
take hold in the course of what the PRAVDA article called "the
complex and contradictory processes in present-day China."
Alluding to the latest convulsions in China centering on the
Lin Piao affair, PRAVDA pointed with scorn to "the complete
theoretical insolvency of Maoism" and said that the practical
application of Maoism "is leading to serious complications and
crises in China's development."
Both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA took exception to Peking's anti-Soviet
line and expressed concern over the leverage accruing to third
parties from the persisting Sino-Soviet conflict. In place of
last year's reference to Chinese preparations for war, the
commentaries this year complained that "imperialist" circles
have propagated the notion of a Soviet threat to China in order
to impede the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. Concern
over the impact on Soviet interests of Peking's active foreign
policy moves, particularly in view of last February's Sino-U.S.
summit, was also reflected in Viktorov's charge that Peking has
persisted in "splitting the anti-imperialist forces" while at
the same time "reorienting its foreign policy toward rapprochement
with the capitalist countries."
Both Viktorov and Pavlov cited the Soviet proposals to the
Chinese aired by Brezhnev in his major 20 March address. Viktorov
mentioned the proposal on nonuse of force as well as those on
nonaggression and a border settlement. But Pavlov, quoting
Brezhnev's speech, omitted the nonuse proposal, which had been
incl,lded in the speech broadcast live over the radio but deleted
from texts of the speech published in the Soviet press. As in
1971, the IZVESTIYA article mentioned the border talks--"which
are continuing"--but PRAVDA did not. There was no attempt to
portray any movement on the negotiating front.
Approved For Release 2000/0& DERtDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
A TASS dispatch from Peking on 2 October pointed out without
comment that this year, like last year, there was no parade
marking National Day. The dispatch noted briefly that the
Joint editorial contained "slanderous anti-Soviet inventions."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ?IW85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
CHINA-JAPAN
PEKING AND TOKYO AGREE TO ESTABLISH DIPL"TIC RELATIONS
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka's 25-30 September pilgrimage to
Peking culminated in the establishment of diplomatic relations
and a joint statement embodying the substance of Peking's terms
for a settlement. In keeping with the accelerated pace of
developments since Tanaka took office, the two sides decided
to exchange ambassadors "as speedily as possible," and they
agreed to hold negotiations on a peace treaty and to conclude
agreements on such matters as trade, navigation, aviation,
and fishery. Declaring that friendly relations between the
two countries will "contribute to the relaxation of tension
in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace," the joint statement
said the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations "is not
directed against third parties."
The "earnest and frank" talks between the two premiers and their
foreign ministers* produced a settlement that largely met
Peking's terms while permitting the Japanese facesaving
devices for handling the delicate Taiwan issue. In the joint
statement the Japanese side said it proceeded from a stand of
"full understanding" of Peking's three principles for establishing
diplomatic relations, but the document contained a flat Japanese
endorsement of only the principle that the PRC is the sole
legitimate government of China. There was no mention in the
joint statement of the Japan-ROC treaty, but Foreign Minister
Ohira declared at a press conference in Peking on 29 September--
reported by NCNA--that the peace treaty signed with the Chiang
Kai-shek regime "has lost the meaning of its existence and is
declared to be terminated."
On the third issue, the status of Taiwan, the Japanese followed
a roundabout path in acknowledging Peking's claim to sovereignty
over the island. In the joint statement Japan said it "fully
understands and respects" Peking's position and "adheres to its
stand" of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam proclamation.
As Ohira pointed out at his press conference, this article
reaffirms the provisions of the earlier Cairo declaration, which
* The major role played in the PRC-Japanese rapprochement by
Foreign Minister Ohira was reflected in the fact that the foreign
ministers as well as the premiers signed the joint statement.
Approved For Release 2000/0@MEtEUl4IRDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
stipulated that Taiwan be restored to the Republic of China.
Inasmuch as Japan has now recognized the PRC as the sole
government of China, the effect is to ackncwledge Peking's
claim to Taiwan. In fact, Peking's legal arguments on the
Taiwan question have revolved around the Cairo and Potsdam
statements as stipulating Taiwan's restoration to China;
according to this logic, the recognized government of China
therefore enjoys sovereignty over the island. A PEOPLE'S
DAILY editorial on 30 September acclaiming the "fruitful"
results of the negotiationb triumphantly declared tha. the
joint statement's position on the Taiwan question "is a hammer
blow" to those advocating versions of a two-Chinas arrangement.
Peking formally renounced "its demand for war indemnities from
Japan," and the Japanese side went on record as "deeply
reproaching itself" for Japan's responsibility for past actions
against the Chinese. There was no mention of Japan's security
treaty with the United States or the U.S. bases it authorizes.
The assurance that normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is
not directed against third countries appeared in a clause
repeating the section in the Sino-U.S. communique last February
to the effect that neither country should seek hegemony in
the Asia-Pacific region and that each is opposed to efforts by
other countries to establish such hegemony. This parallelism
in two documents to which it is a signatory helps explain Peking's
relaxed posture in taking account of the U.S.-Japanese relationship
at this juncture.
The jubilant PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 30 September hailed the
"new page in the annals of Sino-Japanese relations." It praised
Tanaka for having expressed his "full understanding" of China's
three principles for the ncrmalization of relations with Japan
soon after his election as prime minister and for taking "many
practical steps for solving the question of relations between
the two countries." Portraying popular sentiment for normalizing
relations as an "irresistible historic tide," the editorial
confidently predicted that the development of friendly relations
between China and Japan "has broad prospects" and that the
people of both countries "can surely surmount all obstacles and
remain friendly to each other from generation to generation."
Peking's coverage of Tanaka's activities after the release of
the joint statement was clearly designed to convey popular Chinese
acclaim for the settlement with Japan. NCNA reported that Tanaka,
accompanied by Chou, was given a "warm" sendoff by more than
2,000 people as he departed Peking on 29 September for his trip
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
to Shanghai, where he was greeted by Politburo member Chang
Chun-chiao and more than 3,000 people. Chinese television
coverage of the Shanghai banquet that night in Tanaka's honor
ended with a shot of Chou and Tanaka, arms around each other's
waists, smiling and waving as they walked among the tables. As
Tanaka sdid his farbwells at the Shanghai airport the next day,
some "6,000 . . . well-wishers . . . sang and danced and shouted
slogans to hail the establishment of diplomatic relations between
China and Japan" and to express "their wish that the Zreat
friendship between the peoples of the two countries wo%~ld constantly
grow."
NCNA portrayed Chou's triumphant return to Peking on 30 September
as being witnessed by 6,000 people at the Pekin airport in an atmos-
phere "alive with expressions of unity and vigor." Politburo
members Yeh Chien-ying, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and Li
Hsien-nien headed the list of officials whr "cordially shook"
hands with Chou and others alighting from the plane "amid warm
applause." Chou clapped and waved to the crowd of "Jubilant
people waving bouquets and colored streamers and cheering:
'Hail the establishment of diplomatic relations between China
and Japan."'
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
INDOCHINA
Vietnamese communist comment on a political settlement continues
to argue that the reasonable solution would be an agreement on a
tripartite provisional government made up of equal components
selected from the PRG, the Saigon administration "without Thieu,"
and other political forces. Hanoi's concern to dispel the notion
that there had been dramatic progress in the negotiations was
evidenced when it atypically reported DRV Paris delegate Xuan Thuy's
28 September remark to reporters that there war.3 no foundation for
rumors that agreement had been reached on many questions during
private talks he and Le Duc Tho had held with Kissinger. Hanoi
insists that President Nixon's support of Thieu is the main obstacle
to progress, and one commentary claimed that the President "recently"
went so far as to say that "abandoning Thieu would be an immoral
thing to do."
Propaganda on PRC National Day reflected the strains in relations
with the DRV over the past year, during which Hanoi has continued
periodically to sharply voice its concern over Peking's accommodation
with Washington. While its observance of the anniversary was
superficially correct, Hanoi again took the occasion to call attention
to China's obligations. The traditional PRC joint press editorial
routinely affirmed support for the Vietnamese, but in replaying Hanoi's
comment Peking deleted the most pointed statements on cooperation
between the two countries. Minimal and belated support for the PRG's
11 September statement came with Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's
30 September response to the a.pp al by the PRG's Mme. Nguyen Thi
Binh on the 15th.
Foreign Minister Gromyko also has belatedly responded to Mme. Binh's
letter. According to a brief 3 October TASS report, Gromyko merely
asserted that the USSR has "firmly and consistently supported" the
Vietnamese struggle for a settlement, including the PRG's "latest
diplomatic actions." Pro forma support for the Vietnamese was also
voiced by Kosygin at a 2 October dinner for the visiting Malaysian
Prime Minister. Judging from available summaries, Kosygin promised
continued "cooperation" with Vietnam in the struggle against
aggression and expressed support for the PRG's "well-known proposals"
for a fair settlement. He also said that "the world is convinced"
that the Vietnamese will become "complete masters" of their country
and that no outside forces can stop them from reaching that goal.
DRV, PRG PRESS FOR PROVISIONAL "I'ATIONAL CONCORD" GOVERMENT
Hanoi and Front propaganda on a political settlement has had a time-
marking character with no notable new substance since the 25 September
Approved For Release 2000/08
tlm F-MIL&9P85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
NHAN DAN Commentator article introduced the notion that there
could be guarantees for an agreement that neither side would
impose a regime in the South.* This idea has not been repeated;
the communist statements at the Paris talks on the 28th as well
as other propaganda reverted to the ar:,,ment that it is the
United States, not the communist side, that wants to impose a
government on South Vietnam and is blocking a settlement.
Hanoi's apparent concern to stress the differences between the
two sides and to counter speculation in the West that a dramatic
breakthrough might be imminent was indicated by both the handling
and the content of the article in the September issue of the
theoretical journal HOC TAP. The VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY's
international service in English transmitted the text of the
HOC TAP article, which detailed the differences between the allied
and communist negotiating positions, and Hanoi radio broadcast
excerpts of the article in its English-language international
service. However, the article was not carried in Vietnamese-
language transmissions. Thus, Hanoi clearly demonstrated its
interest in presenting its version of the two sides' positions
to foreign audiences along with the reiteration of the t'iarge that
the Nixon Administration is."spreading illusions" when it suggests
that a solution may be near.**
Hanoi took a further step to quash speculation about current
progress when it interjected into its otherwise routine account
of the Paris session on the 28th the report of Xuan Thuy's remarks
to reporters antis way to the session. According to VNA, he said
there was no foundation for rumors that agreement had been reached
on many or most of the questions during private talks with
Kissinger. Consistent with Hanoi's practice of not reporting
the specific private meetings, there was no indication that the
most recent talks had taken place on two consecutive days on 26
and 27 September.
* The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 25th went beyond the
PRG's call, in its 11 September statement, for an agreement that
neither a communist nor a "U.S. stooge" regime shall be imposed on
South Vietnam: The Commentator article suggested that the United
States can agree with the parties concerned on the necessary measures
aimed at "insuring" that no party controls the political life of
South Vietnam. See the TRENDS of 27 September 1972, pages 1-3.
** See the 27 September TRENDS, pages 1-2.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FRIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
CRITICISM OF Hanoi has recently broadcast a flurry of
THE PRESIDENT comment assailing President Nixon personally
for "maintaining" the Saigon regime. The
most sweeping attack came in a radio commentary broadcast to the
Vietnamese audience on 2 October which said the President's
"contentions" in a 28 September campaign speech in Los Angeles
showed that the U.S. stand and the "correct, fair, and reasonable
stand" of the PRG as outlined in its 11 September statement "are
still worlds apart." The commentator asked how the President can,
as he suggested in the Los Angeles speech, end the U.S. commitment
and end the war when he persists in "sticking to his stand of
maintaining the Thieu puppet administration" and in showing no
regard for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.
The broadcast called the President's remarks about U.S. honor "a
deceitful cover to hide dark, evil designs of aggression" an,'
described him as "a shameless swindler who greatly underestimates
the American public." It concluded with the observation that
"Nixon's obstinancy and bellicosity dovetail with the negative
and unconstructive U.S. response to the PRG's 11 September statement."
Another radio commentary, in Hanoi's domestic service on 30 September,
said that although the latest PRG statement is "extremely fair and
reasonable," the Nixon Administration has not stopped rehashing
allegations that the PRG wants to impose a communist government in
the South. Calling such allegations "perfidious," the broadcast
said that "if Nixon would tell Thieu to resign or would declare an
end to his support for the Thieu regime, the ending of the Vietnam
war would be easy and rapid. This is also the key for him to bring
captured U.S. military men home and save the U.S. honor which he
has stained." The commentary observed that in fact the President,
in his support of the Saigon regime, "even went an far as to say
recently that abandoning Thieu would be an immoral thing to do."
The Hanoi commentator may have been alluding to the President's
27 July press conference in which, without mentioning Thieu, he
observed that "it would be the height of immorality for the United
States at this point to leave Vietnam and in leaving to turn over to
North Vietnam the fate of 17 million South Vietnamese who do not
want a communist government."*
* The President similarly mentioned neither Thieu nor the Saigon
government on other recent occasions when he stated that the United
States would not be a party to the imposition of a communist govern-
ment in South Vietnam--for example, in his 23 August speech at the
Rerublican Party convention and in his 29 August press conference.
The President had spoken critically about a coalition government in
his 29 June press conference, however, when he said: "We will not
negotiate with thh~e~enemy for accomplishing what they cannot accomplish
ApprO t~8 elmes. and hl R&W tea" ~ 'Y YOnm ~ %ft ~t 4~i4~ 6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
A NHAN DAN article on the 30th, also broadcast by Hanoi radio
that dey, said that the Paris talks are stalemated because of
the U.S. stand and cited the New York TIMES to bolster its
claim that the President had not lived up to his word on reaching
a settlement on Vietnam. Without mentioning that the TIMES' item
was the editorial endorsing Senator McGovern's candidacy for the
Presidency, NHAN DAN quoted the passage which said that the Nixon
Administration "appears to bra without basic philosophy, without
deeply held values. It is an administration whose guiding
principle is expediency any. whose overriding purpose is to remain
in office."
PARIS SESSION PRC Foreign Minister Mme. Binh at the 28 September
Paris session repeated the line that there cannot
be a correct political solution to the South Vietnam issue as long
as the United States "maintains" the "puppet Thieu administration"
and persists in its denial of the PRG and its opposition to forming
a tripartite provisional government of national concord. DRV
delegate Xuan Thuy--attending the session for the first time since
17 August, and on the day after his and Le Duc Tho's two meetings
with Kissinger--similarly assailed U.S. support for the Saigon
regime and its opposition to a provisional government. He also
explicitly defended the notion of general elections for a
constituent assembly rather than for a president, as proposed by
the United States and Saigon.
Xuan Thuy repeated the position that since there are two administrations
and two armies in South Vietnam, it is necessary to have a three-
component government during the "transitional period." He described
this period as being between cease-fire (nguwngf bawns) and the
forming of an official government. This language differed slightly
from that used in a similar passage in the NHAN DAN Commentator
article of the 25th. NHAN DAN had described the transition period
as "from the restoration of peace" (khi hoaf binhf laapj laij) to
the organization of free and democratic general elections. Thuy
may have used "cease-fire" merely as a synonym for "restoration of
peace," but the variation would in that case be a departure from the
communists' normal careful adherence to set formula.
The VNA account of the session typically dismissed Ambassador Porter's
remarks with the observation that "the U.S. delegate gave a false
interpretation of the DRV's recent release of three captured American
pilots and remained opposed to the PRG's 11 September proposals."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
PRC NATIONAL D^v COMMENT REFLECTS SINO-VIETNAMESE DIFFERENCES
Strains in relations between Hanoi and Peking were again reflected
in their propaganda on the PRC's 23d National Day. Hanoi marked
the anniversary with the usual leaders' message, and several
high-level ARV leaders attended the Chinese embassy's reception;
however, he traditional Vietnamese-sponsored meeting was held at
a lower level than in the past, and Hanoi statements pointed up
DRV dissatisfaction with PRC policies. Chinese comment on the
anniversary offered only routine affirmations of support for Vietnam,
and Peking media characteristically edited Hanoi comment on the
anniversary before replaying it.
The DRV leaders' message reflected the cooling of relations
between the two countries since this time a year ago when Peking
was going to great lengths to reassure Hanoi of its support and
to allay DRV concern over the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. In the
week prior to PRC National Day last year, Li Hsien-nien went to
Hanoi to offer emphatic assurances to the Vietnamese and to conclude
the annual aid agreement; Hanoi's propaganda on the anniversary
suggested that those Chinese efforts had met with some success.
The subsequent deteriorat'.on of relations between the two countries
was reflected in this year's DRV message: It omitted phrases used
last year linking the Chinese with Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism, and it failed to repeat last year's reference to
"Mao Tsetung thought" and praise for Mao as a "bosom friend" of the
Vietnamese. The message also dropped last year's reference to
Chinese achievements in the struggle against "U.S.-led imperialism
and colonialism," although it did, unlike the message last year,
credit the Chinese with contributing to the strengthening of
world revolutionary forces in the "struggle for peace, national
independence, democracy, and socialism."
In past years there has always been a "grand meeting" in Hanoi
attended by a North Vietnamese Politburo member and sponsored by
the Vietnam Fatherland Front, the Vietnam-China Friendship
Association, and the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries. This year there was only a "gathering" held by the
Vietnam-China Friendship Association which rated no Politburo-level
appearance. Although it would seem that Hanoi downgraded the
meeting to again show its pique, high-level DRV leaders did make
their usual appearance at the Chinese embassy's anniversary
reception. As was the case last year, the embassy anniversary
reception was attended by Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen
Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi. Politburo member Hoan
Van Hoan, who was at the reception last year, did not attend.
Approved For Release 2000/08rW"6fAI DP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
The treatment of the question of Chinese aid in the anniversary
comment is particularly notable in the light of Hanoi's
seeming concern about foreign support expressed in the 17 August
NHAN DAN editorial, which had warned against socialist countries
abandoning their "internationalist duty."* Hanoi's dissatisfaction
with Peking's performance on the aid issue was suggested in the
1 October NHAN DAN editorial, which recalled the Mao dictur, that
Peking had used last year to reassure the Vietnamese: "If
anyone among us should say we should not help the Vietnamese
people in their struggle, that will be betrayal of the revolution."
This statement was first quoted by Chou En-lai during his March
1971 visit to Hanoi and was repeated in major Chinese,
statements during September-November 1971. Prior to its citation
in the NHAN DAN editorial, it had appeared neither in Hanoi nor
in Peking propaganda since that time.
At the same time, Hanoi used the occasion of the anniversary to
claim for the first time--both in the message and in editorial
comment--that "recently, in the face of the extremely serious war
escalation of the U.S. imperialism in both zones of Vietnam, the
Chinese Government has taken measures to increase the assistance
to the Vietnamese people." It is not clear what action Hanoi was
referring to. No such formulation was used following the conclusion
on 28 June of a Sino-Vietnamese supplementary aid agreement. It
is possible that the statement alludes to Chinese efforts to
facilitate the delivery of supplies to Vietnam. Hanoi's Vice
Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who had arrived in the PRC on
4 May, departed for home on 23 August; his prolonged stay may have
been related to the coordination of aid efforts in the aftermath
of U.S. interdiction moves. Soon after, Western press agencies
on 4 September reported Prince Sihanouk as claiming in an interview
* NHAN DAN on the 20th published a correction to this passage,
which it said had been "hard to understand." As originally
published, the passage warned that if a socialist country's
efforts to carry out peaceful coexistence are aimed only at its
own interests, that country will not only harm revolutionary
movements but will bring itself losses and "give up its lofty
internationalist duty." The corrected version warned more directly
that if a nation is concerned only about its own interests and
abandons its internationalist duty, it will not only harm the
revolutionary movement but bring losses to itself.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
in Peking that the USSR and China had reached an agreement on
the transport of arms and material to the DRV.*
Chinese reports of Hanoi's comment on PRC National Day included
the references to "measures to increase assistance," but Peking
did not make such a statement an its own authority. The joint
editorial scored the United States for retaining its forces in
Vietnam while reinforcing naval and air bombardment and
"blockading" Vietnam, and it routinely affirmed PRC support for
the war. NCNA's account of the 1 October NHAN DAN editorial
omitted its recollection of Mao's warning about aiding Vietnam as
well as its praise for Chinese who had been injured or killed while
delivering supplies to the DRV. NCNA also excised NHAN DAN's claim
that Chinese supplies had "greatly encouraged" the Vietnamese to
"dash forward to seize new victories."
Chinese anniversary propaganda again illustrated Peking's
circumspect treatment of the Nixon Administration. For example,
at this year's gathering in Hanoi hosted by the Vietnam-China
Friendship Association, the PRC ambassador avoided criticism
voiced last year concerning the "Nixon Doctrine." At the same
time, an NCNA review of the military situation in Indochina
contrasted sharply with a similar review at this time last year
which had accused the Nixon Administration of engaging in
"counterrevolutionary dual tactics" in the peace negotiations and
paying "lip service" to a solution of the war. This year's
review also failed to echo NCNA's disparagement of U.S. power as
a "paper tiger" and its portrayal of the "irreversible crises"
of the Nixon Administration.
PEKING RESPONSE Consistent with Peking's recent low posture
TO BINH LETTER on Vietnam, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's
belated 30 September response to Mme. Binh's
appeal** offered only minimal support for the 11 September PRG
statement on a settlement. Taken together with Peking's only
* Hanoi's current unexplained reference to Chinese measures to
increase assistance is somewhat similar to a statement in a 5 August
PRAVDA editorial article, which said without elaboration that the
Soviet Union "has recently increased its aid to the Vietnamese people
still further." See the 9 August 1972 TRENDS, page 22.
? ** A Hanoi radio report on 20 September disclosed that Mme. Binh had
sent letters and copies of the PRG statement "to foreign ministers of
the socialist countries, other countries having diplomatic relations
with the PRG, and other nonalined countries" as well as to "many
antiwar politicians and personalities" in the United States.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
other authoritative endorsement of the PRG plan, in remarks by
Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien when he received Vietnamese
representatives on 13 September, Chi's pro forma support underlines
Chinese reluctance to discuss issues which are the subject of
detailed debate between the United States and the Vietnamese.
Thus, the foreign minister sidestepped the substance of the
proposals on political and military issues raised in the 11 September
statement, promising "resolute support" by the Chinese for the
"solemn stand" of the 11 September proposal. In endorsing the
Vietnamese war effort he pledged merely to "do our utmost" to
support it, adding that this is a "bounden internationalist duty"
of the PRC.
DRV CONTINUES CRITICISM OF U.S. REACTION TO RELEASE OF POWIS
Hanoi's continuing reportage and comment on the return home of the
three released U.S. prisoners, Lieutenants Gartley and Charles and
Major Elias, sustained the stress on charges of U.S. Government
"interference" and claimed that they were "arrested" upon their
arrival in New York. Hanoi radio on 29 September reported their
press conference during their stopover in Copenhagen as well as.
efforts by the U.S. charge d'affaires to "intervene" during the
group's Moscow stopover. The only allusion to the Peking stop came
in a 30 September English-language broadcast which noted the pilots'
return home after an air journey "across Asia and Europe."
On the 29th, Hanoi radio's domestic service cited "foreign
sources" for the report that upon the pilots' arrival in New York
the "U.S. military authorities" immediately "arrested" them,
pushing them into automobiles which sped away leaving a "melee"
at the airport between the pilots' families and Defense Department
officials. The report said this "arrest" was "consistent with
Secretary Laird's recent threat" that the pilots could possibly be
prosecuted.
Hanoi has not, of course, reported the Defense Department spokesman's
29 September denials that the pilots were coerced and his assertion
that they voluntarily agreed to return to U.S. military control, or
his statement that the pilots said North Vietnam had imposed no
conditions on their release. Hanoi media have repeatedly quoted
Senator McGovern as coiamenting that the Nixon Administration's
"interference" in the release of the pilots stemmed from fear that the
pilots will tell the "a;ful truth" that it is the bombing that keeps
them in prison. A Hanoi broadcast in English on the 29th attributed
a Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
such a statement to Senator McGovern and cited former attorney
general Ramsey Clark as warning that the release of other U.S.
captives could be endangered if the U.S. mi.;itary does not keep
its hands off the three released men. A 2 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
commentary cited Senator McGovern on the Administration's "fear"
and added that because of this the Administration tried repeatedly
to "kidnap" the pilots and finally "arrested" them upon their
arrival home. The army paper said the pilots' statements about
their good treatment contradicts "Nixon's slanderous argument" that
he must continue the war until the last prisoner is released.
The article said "U.S. public opinion" has "warned him" that the
way to release the prisoners is to end the war, and it once again
referred to a statement by Senator McGovern that the bombing
delays the repatriation of the prisoners.
Other Hanoi coverage has included reports of various statements made
by the antiwar activists who accompanied the pilots home, including
Dellinger's assertion that the release was a "peace initiative" by
the DRV to which the United States failed to respond.
HANOI PROTESTS ALLEGED U.S. BOMBING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN DRV
In addition to releasing routine protests by the DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman against U.S. bombing, Hanoi has publicized several statements
scoring the Administration for alleged attacks on civilian targets.
This complaint was pressed in a statement by the War Crimes Commission
and in an appeal from DRV mayors, released at a press conference in
Hanoi on 3 October, which claimed that DRV cities had become strategic
targets for U.S. attacks. Alleged air strikes against North Vietnamese
schools were protested in a 28 September statement from the Ministry
of Education, and alleged attacks on dikes and other hydraulic works
in the southern part of the DRV were decried in a 27 September state-
ment by a spokesman of the water conservancy ministry. An alleged
20 September attack on a pensioners'homa in Kim Bang district of Nam
Ha Province was singled out for criticism in a 28 September statement
by the Interior Ministry's Department of Social Security.
ATTACKS ON CITIES VNA on 3 October reportf:d on the press conference
held that day concerninj; "extermination raids"
said to have been carried out by the Nixon Administration against towns,
cities, and "other population centers" in tha DRV. Presided over by
Col. Ha Van Lau, standing member of the DR'T Commission for Investigation
of U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam, the conference was attended by the
chairmen of the administrative committees (mayors) of Hanoi, Haiphong,
Nam Dinh, and Hon Gai. According to the report, the mayor of Hanoi
read an appeal by the mayors of 37 cities and provincial capitals in
the DRV to peoples and governments of socialist and other countries and
to mayors and city dwellers around the world, condemning the U.S.
Appro# P t Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
Criticizing the attacks of the past five months, the mayors' appeal
charged that the DRV's cities and other population centers have
become "strategic targets" of the U.S. Air Force and Navy. The
appeal stressed the peaceable nature of these cities and the age
and cultural value of their buildings and monuments, as well as
the strictly utilitarian nature of their public works facilities.
It cited several cities which it claimed had suffered extensive
damage, including Haiphong, Vinh, Thanh Hoa, Dong Hai, Hanoi,
Hon Gai, Nam Dinh, the special municipalities of Thai Nguyen and
Viet Tri, and several other provincial capitals. The appeal
charged that the "U.S. aggressors" are using sophisticated weapons
and other technological means to deliberately destroy such targets
as schools, hospitals, creches, residential quarters, stores, and
recreational facilities. It followed these charges with the
standard defiant claim that such "wanton" destruction will never
accomplish the Nixon Administration's goals and will only increase
Vietnamese determination to win.
On 4 October, VNA carried accounts of a document, apparently released
at the same press conference by the DRV Commission for Investigation
of U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam, which likewise condemned "the crimes
perpetrated by the Nixon Administration against population centers
in North Vietnam" since April. Claiming that the Nixon Administration
has committed "hundreds of Son My-type massacres" in the North since
April, the document charged that the President has "gone much farther
than his predecessor on the path of crime." Specificially, it leveled
the following charges:
By the end of August, U.S. aircraft and warships had violently
taken under fire 19 provinces, the Vinh Linh area, all the six
[special] cities including Hanoi and Haiphong, 19 provincial
capitals, 37 townships, and hundreds of villages. All the 23
communes in Vinh Linh, six districts of Quang Binh Province,
and eight districts of Ha Tinh Province were attacked without
letup. All of the four inside precincts and the four suburban
districts of Hanoi have been assaulted; so have'been all the
three inside precincts and six of the seven outlying districts
of Haiphong, where the aggressors have even used B-52 bombers
against the population. In Vinh Linh, not a day has gone by
without some bombardments.
The document then proceeded to a detailed account of damage to
specific cities and other civilian establishments and a descripLion
of various U.S. weapons allegedly used in the attack.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
MINISTRY STATEMENT ON The 28 September statement by the Ministry
ATTACK ON SCHOOLS of Education followed considerable Hanoi
propaganda about attacks on schools, including
a 14 September statement by the Ministry of Higher Education and
Vocational Secondary Schools. The 28 September statement charged
that since the resumption of bombing the United States has attacked
more than 150 general schools, in addition to kindergartens, and
accused the Administration of trying to "destroy the offspring of
the Vietnamese people" in order to "shake our people's combat
determination." The statement cited some specific incidents, among
other things charging that in Nghe An Province alone as many as
62 schools had been attacked and 12 teachers and 181 students
killed. The day the Education Ministry's statement was released,
VNA carried a detailed report on alleged strikes against two schools
in Hoa Binh Province on the 27th.
The Education Ministry statement was followed on the 30th by an
article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which charged the United States with
deliberate and premeditated extermination attacks on populous areas.
The article claimed that the United States carried out successive
attacks on the water conservancy system before and during the rainy
season and then "recently concentrated attacks on schools, killing
hundreds of teachers and pupils and destroying thousands of class-
rooms and hundreds of laboratories."
PLANE DOWNINGS The downing of an F-111 on 28 September was
claimed by Hanoi on the 30th in a report which
credited the achievement to the Yen Bai provincial antiaircraft
forces and said this- was the fourth F-111 to be shot down. A radio
commentary on the 30th and articles in QUAN DOI NI-IAN DAN and NHAN DAN
on 1 October noted that the F-111's had just returned to a base in
Thailand after having been withdrawn from Indochina combat more than
four years ago. The commentaries predictably lauded the reported
downing and maintained that the F-111's will not succeed in their new
mission. The 3 October U.S. acknowledgment that an F-111 had been
lost was promptly reported by Hanoi that day.
The North's antiaircraft achievements in recent months were hailed in
a 2 October Hanoi broadcast which claimed that 86 aircraft had been
? downed in September alone. (Hanoi's total of planes allegedly downed
over North Vietnam stands at 3,964 as of the 2d.) On 3 October
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN published a commentary lauding antiaircraft efforts
? and calling upon the armed forces to attempt to proceed rapidly to
downing of the 4,000th U.S. plane. Underlining the DRV's determination
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
- 22
.add depreciating some of the specific attributes of the P-1114s,
the article declared:
No matter at what high rate the U.S. aggressors commit
their air force, what modern aircraft they may use,
including B-52's and swing-wing planes, or what forma-
tions, in groups or separately, their aircraft-may
adopt, night and day we are determined to achieve close
combat coordination, spread our dense firenet very
widely, and fight well and fire accurately to down
many U.S. aircraft and capture many pirate pilots.
SPOKESMAN'S U.S. air actions over the North were protested in the
STATEMENTS following routine statement -by the spokesman of the
DRV Foreign Ministry:
+ The statement of 28 September charged that on the previous day U.S.
planes struck at the capital of Quang Binh Province and the outskirts
of Haiphong, as well as at populated areas in Lang Son, Nghia Lo,
Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh
provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It.also E.aid B-52's bombed localities
in the Vinh Linh zone. Specific targets repc.rted hit included the Lan
sluice in Thai Binh Province, which the statement charged has been hit
"dozens of times."
+ U.S. attacks on the-28th on the capital of Thanh Hoa Province,
the outskirts of Haiphong and Hanoi, and other 4ensely populated
areas" were scored in a statement on the 29th. The statement also
charged that U.S. aircraft struck at populated areas in Vinh Phu, Quang
Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Has Hoa Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoes Nghe An, He Tinh,
and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone; that B-52's bombed
localities in Quang Binh and the Vinh Linh zone; and that U.S. warships
"i.,discriminately shelled" coastal villages in Thanh Hoa and Ha Tinh
provinces. The targets specified in the statement included a middle
school, a church, and the Lan sluice. Summing up the damage, the
statement charged that in the past three weeks the school has been+h:.L
three times, the sluice five times, and the Thanh Hoa capital amity five
times.
? The statement of the 30th scored alleged U.S. attacks the previous
day, listing among the areas hit the outskirts of Hanoi, the capital
of Quang Binh Province, Ho Xa township in the Vinh Linh zone, and
"several other densely populated areas" in Yen Bois Vinh Phu, Hoa Binh,
Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh
provinces. In addition, B-52's were charged with bombing areas in Quang
Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
+ Alleged strikes during September were summed up in the spokesman's
statement of 1 October, which charged that during the preceding
month U.S. aircraft had struck at "five cities, 13 provincial
capitals, and dozens of townships and district capitals, destroying
30 schools of various levels, dozens of hospitals, many pagodas,
churches, and many sections of dikes and hydraulic works in North
Vietnam." Actions of 30 September were said to have included the
bombing of the capitals of Thanh Hoa and Nam Ha; strikes at populated
areas in Ha Bac, Hoa Binh, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh,
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces; and B-52
bombing of localities in Quang Binh. Among the targets reported
hit were an agricultuml.middle school in Hoa Binh, two sluices in
Nam Ninh district of Nam Ha Province, and the Ngoc Hien sluice in
Thanh Oai district of Ha Tay Province. The statement said the
strikes were "deliberate and systematic," aimed at "exterminating
various cities, provincial capitals, and densely populated areas
[and at] destroying the economic and cultural establishments of
the DRV."
+ Extermination attacks" of 1 October were protested in the statement
of the 2d, which charged U.S. aircraft with dropping "hundreds of
bombs" on three downtown and suburban districts of Haiphong as well
as on the capital cities of Quang Binh and Quanta Ninh provinces and
"many other densely populous areas" in Son La, Lang Son, Yen Bail
Quang Ninr, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, and
Ha Tinh provinces. It also said B-52's "pounded various places" in
Quang Binh.
+ The statement of the 3d protested alleged attacks of the preceding
day on Vinh city and on populated areas in the provinces of Lai Chau,
Yen Bail Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and in
the Vinh Linh zone. It further claimed that B-52's bombed localities
in Quang Binh.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
CO+1UNISTS CLAIM SUCCESSES IN FIGHTING SOUTH OF SAIGON
Hanoi and Front propaganda has highlighted the alleged achievements
of communist forces in central Nam Bo--the provinces immediately
south of Saigon--and western Nam Bo--the provinces in the extreme
southern part of the country. Comment on central Nam Bo was pegged
to a 22 September communique from the regional PLAF command, broad-
cast by Liberation Radio on the 29th, which tabulated alleged
military feats in the area since the start of the offensive, claimed
that there was an "extremely favorable situation," and called
upon the PLAF in the area to continue the offensive. A statement
attributed to a PLAF commander in the area, also broadcast by the
Front radio on the 29th, commented that the offensive had changed the
quality of their movement and "created the ability to develop by
leaps and bounds in the coming period." At the same time, however,
some dissatisfaction was suggested when he commented that the change
in the balance of forces "is not yet uniform."
According to the central Nam Bo PLAF command communique, communist
forces in that area since the beginning of April have put out of
action 84,379 troops--killing 37,465, capturing 1,500, and causing
the "disintegration" of 26,000. Evaluating th.se alleged successes,
the communique claimed routinely that the balance of forces had
shifted advantageously and added that the fighting also assisted
communist forces in the Mekong Delta since government troops had
been pulled out of the delta to cope with fighting in central Nam Bo.
The communique also claimed that government control in the area had
been seriously challenged during the offensive. It asserted that the
government had been forced to withdraw from 569 military posts, and
that 80 villages and 1,074 hamlets, with one million people, had been
"liberated." A supporting 30 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial
indicated that central Nam Bo has a population of more than two
million people so the communists would appear to be claiming control
of nearly half the population in the area. (Communist statistics
on achievements in the offensive in all of South Vietnam have claimed
a total of 2.5 million people "liberated.") Like other propaganda,
the communique reflected communist reprisals against government
personnel when it reported that the PLAF and the "compatriots" have
"punished many cruel villains and spies," but it also said that
"thousands of others" had been "warned or reeducated."
Alleged communist achievements in western Nam Bo were reviewed by
Front media on 1 October and lauded in a 2 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
editorial. The communists claimed that their offensive in this
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
Mekong Delta area has put 46,000 troops out of action, of whom
29,000 were killed, wounded, or captured and 17,000 "disbanded."
According to the communist reports, over 700,000 people in the
area "rose up to seize control" of 800 hamlets and 268 villages
and hamlets were "completely liberated." Stressing the efforts
to oppose government control at the local level, a Liberation
Radio roundup of action in western Nam Bo claimed that more than
one-third of the civil defense corpsmen in the area have
participated in guerrilla activities and that many of them have
assisted in "punishing and educating thousands of wicked puppet
administrative agents, spies, and pacification agents." It
reported that 253 "puppet administrative agents" and "tens of
pacification groups" had been "annihilated or disintegrated."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
SALT
USSR PRAISES, APPROVES ACCORDS. SETS STAGE FOR SALT II
In praising and ratifying the strategic arms limitation accords
at the proforma 29 September session of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium, Soviet spokesmen sought to project a firm public
negotiating stance for the next round of SALT. Approving re-
ferences to the "overwhelming majority" in the U.S. Congress
that support the accords were qualified by strong rejections of
"the various far-fetched 'conditions' and 'interpretations'
attached to the agreements which had already been signed" and
of any U.S. attempt to negotiate "from a position of strength."
The speakers included First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov,
representing the Soviet Government; fourth-ranking CPSU Politburo
member Suslov, speaking for the two foreign affairs committees;
Defense Minister Grechko, and Presidium Chairman Podgornyy.
Echoing in general the statements made at the 23 August joint
meeting of the Supreme Soviet foreign affairs commissions,*
the speakers stressed repeatedly that the accords are based on
the principles of insuring equal security for the USSR and the
United States and of the inadmissibility of military advantages
for either side. There were also reassurances, for domestic
and Soviet bloc consumption, that the agreements do not weaken the
defense capability of the USSR and its allies. Suslov pointedly
cited the Central Committee report to the 24th CPSU Congress in
March of last year to the effect that "strengthening the Soviet
state means strengthening its armed forces too, and enhancing
the defensive capability of our motherland in everyway" (the
emphasis was PRAVDA's in its 30 September report of Suslov's
speech; IZVESTIYA's version did not put "armed forces" in boldface).
In the most explicit Soviet elite-level statement since the Moscow
summit on the USSR's position on the modernization of ABM systems
allowed under the treaty, Grechko declared that the treaty."imposes
no limitations on the performance of research and experimental
work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against
nuclear-missile attack".
Where Kuznetsov, alluding to the Jackson amendment, denounced
U.S. "political figures" for attaching unnecessary "far-fetched
interpretations or conditions" to the agreements with the intention
* See the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 29, anti 23 August,
pages 18-20.
Approved For Release 200 W S7 -RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
of obtaining "one-sided advantages for the United States,"
Suslov directly linked his denunciation of this alleged U.S.
"position of strength" policy with the next round of SALT:
It is essential to say bluntly that those
people who amuse themselves with illusions
about the possibility of talking with the
Soviet Union "from a position of strength"
in future negotiations on strategic arms
limitation are profoundly mistaken. These
people are simply losing their sense of
reality. The Soviet Union will not consent
to any kind of infringement of the principle
of equal security of the sides. We are
profoundly convinced that the American
people are interested in limiting the arms
race to no less degree than the Soviet
people. . . .
Stating that an international treaty is "viable only when it is
conscientiously and unswervingly observed" by the sides concerned,
Podgornyy summed up the session's discussion of the agreement by
declaring that the "the Soviet Union and --we hope-- the United
States, too, will be guided unswervingly by this principle with
respect to" the agreements. Regarding the next round of SALT,
Kuznetsov said that the "positive experience" gained in SALT I
"makes it possible to hope" that the discussion of a further
limitation of strategic offensive weapons will be continued
"in a constructive spirit and produce specific positive results."
One passage in Podgornyy's speech echoed the line, adopted on the
eve of the Moscow summit, which sought to rationalize the Soviet
leadership's reception of President Nixon at a time of increased
U.S. military actions in Vietnam. Podgornyy said: "We unswervingly
proceed from Lenin's tenets which demand consideration for current
tasks and long-term objectives, a combination of principle-mindedness
and flexibility, and the ability, when necessary, to find reasonable
compromises dictated by actual conditions and in keeping with"
socialism's interests." He went on, in a statement having clear
polemical overtones aimed at possible domestic or foreign critics,
to say that "today only an obviously prejudiced politician would
dare claim that the world situation has deteriorated rather than
improved with the reaching of agreements in the sphere of disarmament."
It is noteworthy that this statement appeared in the TASS account
of the ratification session carried in PRAVDA but was absent from
the abbreviated TASS account published in RED STAR.
Approved For Release 2000/09? 3t TAI-DP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
WASHINGTON CEREMONY Moscow reported the exchange of ratification
documents in Washington on 3 October with
President Nixon, Secretary Rogers, and Gromyko in attendance. TASS
and Radio Moscow cited the comments made by Gromyko and the
President, with TASS carrying at length the President's remarks
calling the SALT accords a "first step" in limiting the arms race
and pointing out that there remains "a significant number" of
categories in the nuclear field that are not covered by the present
accords.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW USES NASIR DEATH ANNIVERSARY TO STRESS AMITY WITH CAIRO
In comment in PRAVDA and for Arab audiences over Radio Moscow,
the Soviet Union has used the 28 September anniversary of Nasir's
death to put pointed stress on the deceased leader's faithful
pursuit of a policy of friendship with the USSR, underscoring
the efficacy of that policy and suggesting, through references
to the Egyptian people's continuing "struggle," that such a policy
is as necessary as ever for Cairo.*
PRAVDA's commemorative article on the 28th, by Ye. Dmitriyev,
mentioned Egyptian President as-Sadat only once, recalling that
he had said Nasir "laid the foundations of Soviet-Arab friendship
on the most solid basis" as exemplified in "the treaty of friendship
and cooperation between the USSR and Egypt, of which we are very
proud." The article in effect drove home the lesson for Egypt's
present leadership in declaring that throughout his life Nasir
"was an ardent advocate of the development and deepening of the
relations and cooperation" between Egypt and the USSR and was
convinced that Egypt "could not count on support and understanding
from the capitalist West."
In a broadcast to Arab listeners, Lakif Maksudov, a secretary of
the Soviet Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity
Organization and deputy chairman of the Soviet Societies for
Friendship and Cultural Relations with Africa, asserted that
Nasir "bequeathed the task of completing the great mission
which he had begun to his true successors, to those who place the
interests of the homeland and the aspirations'of the people
and their socialist ideals above everything else." Maksudev
conspicuously failed to mention as-Sadat. He added that "the
Egyptian people" would continue the struggle despite the
"Zionist-imperialist aggressors" and the intrigues of "Arab
reactionaries," and he warned about "voices" demanding the
severance of Arab-Soviet "friendly relations" and casting doubts
on the "fraternal help" of the Soviet Union and other Socialist
countries.
* Moscow had marked the first anniversary of Nasir's death with
a PRAVDA article paying tribute to his achievements and a message
from Podgornyy to an international commemorative symposium.
Approved For Release 2000/08/6@'F TA P85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
Soviet media have yet to acknowledge the Egyptian ambassador's
return to Moscow at the end of September and Soviet Ambassador
Vinogradov's return to Cairo on 3 October--both duly reported
by Cairo, which had announced on 25 September that both
diplomats would soon return to their posts. TASS announced in
a single-sentence report on 2 October that Prime Minister
Sidqi would visit the Soviet Union on the 16th, with no
indication of the purpose of the trip.
RELATIONS WITH SYRIA Soviet media have reported without
amplification the "short and unofficial
visit to Moscow" of Syrian President al-Asad in late September.
Moscow has not, of course, acknowledged the reported Soviet
airlift of military equipment to Syria, but a PRAVDA article of
29 September--summarized by TASS and by Radio Moscow for Arab
audiences--said Syria is being "supplied with the latest weapons
for its armed forces and receives help in the training of
military cadres."
CONF EN IAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/0 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
IMF SESSION
MOSCOW SEES U1S, MONEY REFORM PLAN AS MOVE TO MEET "CRISIS"
Moscow followed standard propaganda lines in limited press and
radio comment discussing the U.S. plan for international monetary
reform presented by Treasury Secretary Shultz on 26 September at
the annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The Soviet commentaries did not get into the details
of the U.S. six-point program that would end the special reserve
role of the dollar and define rules to bring about necessary
changes in currency exchange rates. They discoursed instead on
the doctrinaire theme of "contradictions" in the capitalist
financial system and traced the U.S. plan to the inability of
the United States to extricate itself from a "deepening economic
crisis" exacerbated by domestic inflation and the war in Vietnam.
President Nixon's address to the IMF session on the 25th and
Secretary Shultz' the following day were treated as part of
a futile attempt to "force the partners of the United States
to make sacrifices to save the dollar."
Soviet commentators drew selectively from foreign press reaction
to develop the theme that the U.S. proposals were coolly received
both at the IMF sesa_'on and by observers abroad: A pervasive
theme was that the meeting took place in an atmosphere of
deepening differences symptomatic of "acute crisis" in the
financial system of the capitalist countries. In this vein,
a PRAVDA article on the 29th said the general reaction to the
U.S. plan was manifested in "a new round of infighting between
the 'partners' in the capitalist currency arena." A corollary
theme was that IMF failure to reach agreement on basic issues
attested to "the growing financial-economic contradictions
among the major powers in the capitalist world." This line
was typified in a 30 September TASS dispatch from Washington
which reported that the five-day IMF session ended in "deadlock"
as the result of failure to reach accord on "concrete arrangements
as to says to solve the pressing problems."
Sparse comment from the Soviet bloc in East Europe was on similar
lines, picturing the American initiative as a move to get other
countries to share the burden of coping with the United States'
monetary difficulties. Bulgarian media were the most vocal. A
Czechoslovak press commentary said "none" of the other IMF members
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
backed the U.S. plan, and an East Berlin press commentary
pronounced Washington's move to shift the burden of its
difficulties "onto the 'partners' of the United States" a
failure. Poland's government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY carried
a brief account of the U.S. plan, but there has been no
available comment on it in Warsaw media. Romania, too, has
yet to comment on the U.S. proposals.
Typically lobbying for the interests of the "small" countries,
the Yugoslav press complained that Secretary Shultz devoted "only
a single sentence" in his speech to the developing countries.
Belgrade faulted the United States for focusing on the rich
countries at the expense of those "with the greatest needs."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
- 33 -
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
MZHAVANADZE REMOVED IN DISGRACE AS GEORGIAN FIRST SECRETARY
A 29 September Georgian Central Committee plenum announced the retire-
ment of 70-year old Politburo candidate member V.P. Mzhavanadze as
f:.rst secretary of the Georgian Central Committee and the selection
o:' E.A. Shevardnadze as his replacement. Although Mzhavanadze
reportedly resigned at his own "request" because of old age, his
retirement was clearly forced by the CPSU Central Committee's recent
exposure of corruption and nationalist deviations in Georgia and by
the longtime hostility between 1zhavanadze and Brezhnev. The
involuntary nature of Mzhavanadze's retirement is also indicated by
the choice of his successor; all his longtime colleagues and proteges
were bypassed in favor of the young former Georgian police chief,
Shevardnadze, who only two months ago took over the corruption-ridden
Tbilisi organization. Mzhavanadze will presumably be dropped from the
CPSU Politburo at the next Central Committee meeting, becoming the first
Politburo retiree since 1966.
Mzhavanadze's political disgrace was graphically displayed by a public
snub on his 70th birthday last week. Although he had been at odds
with Khrushchev in 1962, PRAVDA had marked his 60th birthday by
featuring a large picture of him on its front page and publishing a
Central Committee message addressing him as a "prominent figure of the
Communist Party and Soviet state"; the paper also published a Supreme
Soviet Presidium ukase noting his "big services" to the party and
state and awarding him the title Hero of Socialist Labor, an Order of
Lenin, and a Hammer and Sickle medal. In contrast, on his 70th
birthday PRAVDA on 23 September merely published a Supreme Soviet
Presidium ukase awarding him the Order of the October Revolution for
"services" to the party and state.
FRI:TION WITH In the earl,- post-Khrushchev struggle between
BREZ*IEV Podgornyy and Brezhnev, Mzhavanadze appeared to
support the more conservative Brezhnev. His late
June 1965 speech calling for increased party discipline and upholding
elitism foreshadowed the 20 July 1965 Central Committee decree which
condemned Podgornyy's Kharkov proteges for laxness in admissions to
the party and initiated a more restrictive policy. While post-Khrushchev
articles on Leninist principles of leadership had been stressing the
predominance of the collective and playing down the need for individual
leaders, Mzhavanadze's deputy, Second Secretary P.A. Rodionov, was the
first public figure to attempt to justify Brezhnev's ascendance--in
an October 1965 PARTY LIFE article acknowledging the "enormous
significance of the role of leaders."
Approved For Release 2000/08/0J?NtI b'085T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
Later, however, Mzhavanadze appeared more concerned about preventing
Brezhnev from accumulating too much power. His deputy became the
leading spokesman for collective leadership, and Mzhavanadze rivaled
Estonian First Secretary Kebin and Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest
in avoiding praise of Brezhnev's speeches and activity. When PRAVDA
on 20 January 1971 printed the Dagestani leader's statement that
Brezhnev "headed" the Politburo, only Georgia and Belorussia deleted
the formulation from their papers.
At the February 1971 Georgian party congress Rodionov was removed and
demoted to deputy director of the Marxism-Leninism Institute in
Moscow. He later was dropped from the Central Committee at the 24th
CPSU Congress. In his CPSU Congress speech Mzhavanadze, even
while praising Brezhnev's report, appeared to take issue with
Brezhnev's increasing power. He noted that the Politburo's operations
and Brezhnev's report had indicated that the "role and responsibility
of the leader" must grow "immeasurably," but he also stressed that
the leader must be. an example in observing discipline and in listening
to criticism. When Brezhnev announced the new Politburo elected at
the end of the congress, he listed Mzhavanadze last despite his
seniority.
During the April-May 1971 republic supreme soviet nominations, the
Georgian press carried less praise of Brezhnev than of Podgornyy and
Kosygin; and at the 14 May Georgian 50th anniversary celebration
Mzhavanadze introduced Brezhnev without the enthusiastic epithets
used by the Kazakh, Azerbaydzhani, and Armenian first secretaries at
their anniversary ceremonies.
Brezhnev moved against Mzhavanadze in early 1972 when the Central
Committee summoned Tbilisi First Secretary 0.1. Lolashvili to Moscow
and subsequently issued a decree condemning the Tbilisi organization
for a wide range of shortcomings, including corruption and nationalist
deviations.* Mzhavanadze at first attempted to protect his protege,
expressing confidence in Lolashvili's ability to rectify the situation,
but Moscow apparently was dissatisfied with Mzhavanadze's handling of
the situation. A 5 June Georgian plenum fired Mzhavanadze protege
N. Sh. Tskhakaya as secretary in charge of industry, and Lolashvili
was removed as Tbilisi first secretary on 25 July and as Georgian
Central Committee bureau member on 28 July.**
For background see the TRENDS of 8 March 1972, page 40.
** See the TRENDS of 2 August 1972, pages 48-49.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
Lolashvili's successor as Tbilisi first secretary was 44-year old
MVD chiev E.A. Shevardnadze, whose meteoric rise to Georgian first
secretary two months later bypassed 60-year old Premier
G.D. Dzhavakhishvili, 62-year old Presiders` G.S. Dzotsenidze, and
other old cronies of Mzhavanadze. As r;;public MVD chief since 1965
Shevardnadze worked under a longtime Brezhnev protege, USSR MVD
chief N.A. Shchelokov.
ALTA'r AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTE RETURNS TO OFFICIAL FAVOR
Brezhnev's visit to the Altay Scientific Research Institute of
Agriculture in late August restored the formerly disgraced institute
to full official favor. In the 1960's the institute, headed by
G.A. Nalivayko, became Khrushchev's favorite by developing the
so-called intertilled system of farming, but it was widely blamed
after Khrushchev's fall for the 1963 crop failure and disastrous
erosion. After the appointment of a new director in early 1967,
the institute developed new anti-erosion techniques and shunned
publicity. The press began to publicize the Altay innovations in
1971, and during his recent tour of the virgin lands Brezhnev
visited the institute and praised its work. Following the tour,
a 24 September PRAVDA article depicted the institute and its leaders
in glowing terms.
FALL FROM GRACE The Altay agricultural institute gained acclaim
in 1960 when it won Khrushchev's support for
its hastily developed and poorly tested intertilled system of
farming based on the cultivation of corn, beans, And peas as against
ciean fallow, grasses, and more traditional crops. Khrushchev
promoted Altay Kray First Secretary K.G. Pysin to first deputy
agriculture minister and later agriculture minister, hailed institute
director Nalivayko as a national agricultural authority, and forced
widespread adoption of the intertilled system even in clearly
unsuitable areas. However, after Khrushchev's fall the institute
fell into disgrace when the intertilled system was held largely
responsible for the 1963 crop failure and the unprecedented erosion.
Altay First Secretary A.V. Georgiyev continued to publicly defend
Nalivayko until March 1967, when the Politburo adopted a decree on
anti-erosion measures following a visit by Polyanskiy to the Altay
kray. Nalivayko, probably the main target of the decree, was
quietly removed in that month and Georgiyev subsequently reversed
himself, attacking Nalivayko and leading a delegation of Altay farmers
to the north Kazakhstan agricultural institute of Nalivayko's arch-rival
Approved For Release 2000/08/0??btfAAW085T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
A.I. Barayev to study the anti-erosion techniques developed at that
institute. Reporting the visit, an 8 August 1967 KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA article noted that Georgiyev had been "quite recently against
everything" recommended by Barayev's institute, including the use of
clean fallow and moldboardless plowing, but that the Altay was now
joining the rest of Siberia in applying Barayev's methods.
A.N. Kashtanov, an instructor in the Central Committee's Party
Organizational Work Section, was sent from Moscow to become director
of the Altay institute and reorient its work. Writing in the
August 1972 ZVEZDA, Yuriy Chernichenko described the new director
as "restrained and tactful" and recalled how he had delivered
Kashtanov's first article to PRAVDA. That article, which appeared
on 18 September 1969, was notably different in tone from former
director Nalivayko's hard-sell articles.
RETURN TO FAVOR Following the completion of testing, Kashtanov
publicly unveiled his institute's new methods
of cultivation in late 1971--in the 3 August PRAVDA, the 4 August
RURAL LIFE, and the November issue of the journal AGRICULTURE OF
RUSSIA. In the journal article he described the 1967 reorganization
of the institute and the adoption of a new system of anti-erosion
measures involving forest belts, contour plowing, Barayev's
moldboardless plowing, strip farming, clean fallow, and perennial
grasses. In reporting the successful application of these measures
by Altay farms, Kashtanov gave Barayev'e institute much of the credit
for his new system. Georgiyev also sent his rayon first secretaries
on numerous inspections of Barayev's "glorious" institute, according
to LITERARY RUSSIA of 16 'June 1972.
Georgiyev, once the apparent protege of Brezhnev foes Voronov and
Pysin, has recently become notably solicitous toward Brezhnev. At
the 24th CPSU Congress he praised Brezhnev's "brilliant" report as
a "model of creative Marxism-Leninism" and lauded the handling of
agriculture by the Politburo and Brezhnev. And in the 16 June
LITERARY RUSSIA he praiated the "titanic work" of the Politburo and
Brezhnev "personally."
The apparent official rehabilitation of the Altay institute was
reflected in a recent Central Committee decree on the Altay
kraykom's handling of agricultural specialists. Published in PRAVDA
on 27 July, the decree commended the Altay for combatting the
previous "harmful theories, subjectivism, and hasty, unchecked
conclusions" and for applying the new anti-erosion measures. In
RURAL LIFE on 29 July, Georgiyev wrote that it had taken more than
five years to eliminate the discredited habits and apply the new
anti-erosion measures.
Approved For Release 2000/09M?IDi DP85T00875R000300050040-6
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050040-6
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
4 OCTOBER 1972
During his recent tour of the virgin lands, Brezhnev spent three
days in the Altay, addressing a kraykom plenum and visiting the
Altay institute. While inspecting the institute and its fields
he was reported to have given a "high evaluation" of its work
(PRAVDA, 24 September). Georgiyev praised Brezhnev's "brilliant"
speech and claimed that his advice was "based on splendid knowledge
of the situation in industry and agriculture" (SOVIET RUSSIA,
13 September).
PRAVDA writer Anatoliy Ananyev su::sequently toured the institute
with deputy director F.P. Shevchenko, who also was Nalivayko's
deputy director and who, as a fervent supporter of the intertilled
system, hail risen to kray agricultural administration chief under
Khrushche'.. As reported in PRAVDA on 24 September, Ai: nyev gave
a glowing account of the institute and the applicatior of its
system in the kray, noting that director Kashtanov was described in
the kraykom as "a remarkable man, scientist, and organizer."
Approved For Release 2000/>~KT1ALRDP85T00875R000300050040-6