TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050029-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 19, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIs
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
19 JULY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 29)
00050029-9
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign b-oadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
STATSPEC
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
^riminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
19 JULY 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention
i
DRV Says Vietnamese Will Not Be Deterred by U.S. Air Strikes . .
1
DRV Council of Ministers Gives Guidance on Wartime Labor Duty . .
8
PRG, DRV Press Military. Political Solution, Reject Cease-Fire ?
10
Peking Offers Restrained Comment on Vietnam Developments, . , , .
12
Moscow Scores U.S. Air War, Stresses Need for Talks , . , . . . .
13
Action in Quang Tri Prompts Further PRG Charges of "Crimes" . . .
16
Moscow Silent on Cairo Ouster of Soviet Military Advisers , . . .
18
Sidgi's "Friendly Working Visit" to USSR Preceded Cairo Move . .
21
SALT
USSR Acknowledges Use of Satellites to Monitor Accords . . . . .
25
U.S. ELECTIONS
Moscow Reacts Cautiously to Senator McGovern's Nomination . . . .
26
USSR-CHINA-U.S.
Moscow Seizes on Boggs-Ford Accounts of Chinese Views . . . . . .
28
Chou En-tai Says SALT Accords Mark New Stage in Arms Race . . . .
30
Peking Strengthens Ties with West European Countries. . ? . . ? .
31
KOREA
DPRK Treaty Anniversaries Receive Low-key Observange ? ? ? ? ?
33
CEMA
Moscow Council Session Ai!mits Cuba to Full Membership . . . . . .
36
(Continued)
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19 JULY 1972
C 0 N T E N T S (Continued)
COIQNNIST RELATIONS
Dutch CP Reasserts Autonomy; Indirectly Rebukes CPSU . . . . . . 39
GERMANY
IZVESTIYA Backe Finnish Proposal for Relations with FRG, GDR . . . 42
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
19 JULY 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 10 - 16 JULY 1972
Moscow (2957 Items)
Peking (1198 items)
CEMA 26th Session
(1%)
13%
Domestic Issues
(42%)
34%
Vietnam
(7%)
11%
Indochina
(18%)
19%
Egyptian Premier in USSR
(--)
5%
(Sihanouk Tour
(2%)
12%]
[Joint Communique
(--)
4.5%]
[Vietnam
(14%)
5%]
Mongolian Revolution
(0.1%)
4%
Korea
(12%)
11%
Anniversary
(PRC-DPRK Treaty
(--)
5%]
China
(2%)
2%
Anniversary
Gromyko Benelux Tour
(3%)
2%
Yemeni (Aden) Government
(0.3%)
6%
.Iraqi Revolution
(0.1%)
2%
Delegation in PRC
Anniversary
Albanian Army Day
(1%)
6%
Iraqi Revolution
Anniversary
(--)
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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INDOCHINA
High-level reiteration of Vietnamese determination to continue
the struggle came In a statement by DRV President Ton Duc Thang
pegged to the 20 July anniversary of the signing of the 1954 Geneva
agreements. Thang echoed other propaganda in condemning the U.S.
resumption of air strikes against the North and the mining of DRV
harbors, and he called on "brothers and sisters" throughout the
world to demand that the United States stop its war escalation
and negotiate serict.C."y at Paris..
The resumption of the Paris talks on 13 July, after a two-month
scapension, occasioned no unusual publicity. Hanoi media carried
a standard cryptic account of the session which summarized the
communist delegates' statements rejecting the notion of a cease-fire
before a final settlement is reached. Hanoi duly reported Le Duc
Tho's arrival back in Paris on the 15th after stopovers in Peking
and Moscow, but at this writing his meeting on the 19th with
National Security Adviser Dr. Kissinger har not been acknowledged.
Hanoi's denunciation of the U.S. air strikes against the DRV
includes continuing, virtually daily protests from the DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman. Persistent stress on alleged strikes at North
Vietnam's dikes is highlighted by a 17 July statement from the DRV
Water Conservancy Ministry spokesman--the fourth statement from
that ministry since the air strikes were resumed in April. Concern
over the maintenance of dikes was also pointed up in instructions
from the DRV Premier's office, released on the 16th, which charged
that U.S. bombing has weakened them.
A Council of Ministers order on wartime mobilization, broadcast by
Hanoi on 16 July, seemed to reflect the increased strain of current
North Vietnamese manpower requirements as well as long-standing
problems of labor management and productivity. It echoed a Council
of Ministers resolution released in February 1970 when it referred
generally to the need to mobilize all labor forces and to discipline
those not willing to work. However, there seems to be heightened
urgency in the more specific measures it spelled out and in its
references to mobilization and deployment of manpower to meet
natural calamities and "enemy-caused disasters."
DRV SAYS VIETWIESE WILL NOT BE DETERRED BY U.S. AIR STRIKES
Reassertions that the Vietnamese are determined to persist in their
struggle in the fac of U.S. "escalation" include the appeal issued
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by President Ton Duc Thang on the occasion of the Geneva agreements
anniversary. Hanoi released the text of the appeal on 14 July and
on the 18th reported that it was endorsed in a resclution phased
at a 17 July enlarged session of the presidium of the Vietnam
Fatherland Front Central Committee.* The conferees as well as
Thang in his appeal repeated the standard demands that the United
States end its action in the North and the Vietnamization policy,
withdraw all troops from South Vietnam, seriously negotiate at
Paris, and "positively" respond to the PRG's seven-point proposal
and its two-point elaboration. The President's appeal was also
welcomed in a statement by the commander of the VPA air defense
and air forces, broadcast by Hanoi on the 17th, which characterized
it as giving new strength to the armed forces in general and to the
air defense and air forces in particular.
CHARGES OF U.S. The charge that U.S. raids against dikes and
STRIKES AT DIKES irrigation works along major rivers were
more frequent and more intensive in the first
half of July than during April, May, and June was pressed officially
in a 17 July Water Conservancy Ministry spokesman's statement
released by Hanoi radio on the 19th, the fourth protest from that
ministry in the past two months.** It charged that during the first
two weeks of July "20 dike portions and two important irrigation
works'in Thanh Hoa, Nam Ha, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, and Ha Bac
provinces as well as many other dike sections and sluices were
attacked "several times in one day." It claimed that on 6 and
7 July raids were concentrated on three dike portions on the Ninh
To River in Nam Ha Province and that many dike sections along the
Thai Binh River in Hai Hung Province were bombed and strafed on the
9th. Attacks on the 11th were said to have destroyed four "vital"
dike sections and sluices within the same province. The statement
* This is first year that President Thang has issued such an
appeal on the Geneva anniversary, although Ho Chi Minh had done so
in 1965, 1966, 1968, and 1969. On the 15th anniversary in 1969,
there was a "grand meeting" held under VFF auspices at which
Premier Pham Van Dong read the text of Hn's appeal. Presumably
an anniversary statement will be forthcawing from the DRV Foreign
Ministry; ministry statements were issued on 19 July.1970 and
21 July 1971, and ministry memoranda on 12 July 1969 and 17 July
1968.
** Statements of 26 May, 16 June, and 1 July are discussed,
respectively, in the TRENDS of 1 June 1971, pages 22-25; 21 June,
pages 12-16; and 6 July, pages 5-8.
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claimed that foreign newsmen observing some of the attacks on the
9th and the 11th had "agreed that the U.S. imperialists could no
longer deny that they were not attacking the dikes."
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 18th said Secretary Laird "was
forced to acknowledge" at his press conference on the 17th that
U.S. aircraft "could have" hit dikes and dams in North Vietnam.
The commentary quoted Laird to the effect that he did not rule
out the possibility that "the dikes and dams and other water
conservancy projects" may have been damaged by the attacks of
U.S. aircraft. It of course ignored his explanation that this
might have occurred if an anti-aircraft installation had been
placed on a dam or dike or when there was a roadway or bridgework
nearby. An article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, reviewed
by VNA on the 18th, mentioned Laird in passing and said that
U.S. attacks on dikes "can no longer be whitewashed by the Nixon
clique." Hanoi media have also used actress Jane Fonda's current
visit to North Vietnam to buttress its case regarding alleged
U.S. attacks on the dikes. Hanoi radio on the 10th broadcast a
statement attributed to her which said, among other things, that
the Presidnt was trying to "trick" public opinion into believing
he is t?,:_:ng to end the war at a time when more bombs than ever
were bei', dropped, including those on the dikes of the Red
River delta "endangering the lives of 15 million people and their
crops and animals." On the 14th VNA reported that after visiting
bombed dikes in Nam Sach district Just east of Hanoi on the 13th,
she had asserted that there was no military target in the bombed
area.
A Hanoi radio commentary on the 15th had detailed charges of strikes
at dikes in Thanh Hoa Province, claiming that dikes and irrigation
projects there had been hit 29 times since April and that "many
portions of dikes, sluices, dams, canals, and ditches have been
destroyed." It said that if this results in damage from typhoons
or floods, the President will be held responsible.
VNA on the 12th provided details on alleged strikes at dikes during
the period 9-11 July. Focusing on dike systems within the
"important rice producing provinces" of Thai Binh and Hai Hung
provinces in the Red River delta, the commentary claimed that some
"70 demolition bombs" had fallen on the Tra Ly dike near the
provincial town of Thai Binh on 11 July. "Hundreds of dart bombs"
were said to have fallen on the same site the previous day,
"seriously" shaking the dike and killing or wcunding many local
inhabitants. The destruction of P. "vital dike portion" stretching
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from Hop Tien and Hop Cat villa as in Hai Hung Province on
9 July was termed "most serious." It was claimed that blests--
r`sulting from "32 big-sized demolition bombs"--blew up many
portions of the dike and caused cracks in others. VNA also
charged that U.S. aircraft "dropped time-bombs which pp.ietrated
deep into the dike body."
INSTRUCTIONS ON Hanoi radio on 16 July publicized recently
MAINTAINING DIKES issued instructions from the premier on
preventing and fighting floods. Local
party committees were instructed to make regular chicks on the
condition of all dike embankments to "disclose the weak points
in order to undertake repair measures in time, especially in
the places that were recently struck by the enemy." The instruction
stipulated fu:trier: All party units are expected to organize
dike-protecting forces and to "constantly observe the dike
situation during the flood and typhoon season"; materials for
fighting floods--sandbags, buckets, and large rocks--are to be
stockpiled and ready for use "in case of need"; all families
living on river bank lands are expected to make plans "to
evacuate themselves and their property if need be" and "not allow
damage in human and material resources to occur." Indicating
that some dike weaknesses were traceable to causes other than
the claimed U.S. strikes, the directive instructed repair crews
to also look for damage caused by "termites."
BACKGROUND: Hanoi has periodically shown concern about the
soundness of water conservancy projects, particularly since the
record floods last August. There were instructions from the
premier on 26 August and 2 September as well as decisions regarding
the floods by the party Secretariat and the Standing Committee of
the Council of Ministers.* Another instruction from the premier
was issued on 28 February this year; it revealed that many dikes,
embankments, and dams damaged in the record-breaking floods of
1971 "had not been repaired well" and warned that this year's
task of repairing dikes, embankments, and dams would be.heavy.
That a study program was underway was suggested by the fact that
just prior to the release of the premier's 28 February directive,
* See the TRENDS of 9 September 1971, pages 3-8. Decisions
regarding the floods by the party Sacretariat and the Standing
Committee of the Council of Ministers ax discussed in the TRENDS
of 15 September 1971, pages 2-3.
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NHAN DAN on 23, 24, and 25 February had carried in installments
without explanation a 21 November 1963 Council of Ministers
document entitled "Regulations on the Protection of Dikes."
Among other things, it said:
. . present dikes have many weak points; they
are made of dirt, were built long ago, were
originally small embankments and have many holes
and termite nests, and their foundation has many
weak portions. Moreover, because the dikes have
been enlarged and built higher, their conduits
have become relatively smaller and weaker.
Because water currents have constantly changed
and waves are strong during storms, dikes and
protective walls have often eroded at their base
or their upper parts have crumbled.
A 7 April directive from the premier on accelerating general
construction work contained the frank admission that the
campaign to repair dikes, dams, and bridges had been slowed
because "a great amount of construction materials were
damaged or lost and the labor force, materials, vehicles,
and machines mobilized to support the fight against the flash
floods was considerably wasted, thereby adversely affecting
the implemention of the rainy season construction plan."
CIVIL DEFENSE, Hanoi's attempt to insulate production
MILITIA FORCES forces from the effects of U.S. bombing
raids was reflected in a 13 July NHAN DAN
editorial. Stressing the need to protect production--"machines,
equipment, material supplies, storage facilities, factories,
and above all producers"--from U.S. air strikes, the editorial
lauded a number of local factories for having "boldly given
cadres and workers some days off to concentrate on consolidating
trenches and shelters." In units where production cannot be
interrupted, NHAN DAN said, "attention must be paid to the
protection of workers whose duty requires them to be permanently
at their working places to operate machines or furnaces, even
during the bombing and strafing by enemy aircraft." The
editorial added that "these workers must have shelters right
beside their working places and even communication trenches to
get outside if necessary." It maintained that "casualties
caused by enemy air raids can be reduced if there are sufficient
trenches and shelters."
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A 16 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial praised the antiaircraft
firepower of local "self-defense militia forces" and claimed
that "no matter how cunning and malicious the U.S. air pirates
may be, they cannot avoid being downed in large numbers." All
militia and self-defense units were called upon "to strive to
train themselves to become skillful gunners" and to "blow to
pieces many U.S. aircraft." As of 18 July, Hanoi claimed to
have downed a total of 3,753 U.S. aircraft.
FOREIGN MINISTRY Foreign ministry spokesman's statements
SPOKESMAN STATEMENTS protesting U.S. bombing during the past
week included the following specific
charges:
+ A statement issued on 13 July condemned U.S. bombing actions
of the 12th which allegedly damaged "populous sectors" of Haiphong
and Nam Dinh, as well as the outskirts of both cities, and
"populous areas" of Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha
Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang
Binh provinces. The statement also charged that B-52's dropped
bombs on a number of localities in the Vinh Linh artia. Among
the economic and cultural establishmer..s reported hit was a
section of the dike surrounding Nam Dinh. The statement charged
that strikes at such establishments were part of the Nixon
Administration's "intentional" bombing and s.rafing of populous
areas, industrial plants, and the dike and sluice system of
North Vietnam.
+ The United States' "frenizied war acts" of 13 July were
protested in a statement on the 14th, which reported strikes on
Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai.Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh,
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and,the
Vinh Linh area. Specific areas reported as suffering damage
were the Bai Chay summer resort and Hon Gai city, both reportedly
nearly destroyed by previous bombing in June; Cat Bai island in
Haiphong harbor; and a 120-meter section cf.dike in Nam Duong
village, Nam Dinh district of Nam Ida Province, which was described
as "seriously cracked." The statement said such war acts prove
that the United States cherishes illusions about using its
military might to strike at Dopulous areas and dikes in the
DRV--behavior which it cannot deny and which only bares its
"extremely cruel, aggressive nature" and exposes its "deceitful
allegations about peace and good will."
+ Continuing strikes on the 14th at Cat Ba island and Nam Dinh city
were protested in the spokesman's statement of the 15th, which also
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listed Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Nam Has Niah Binh, Thanh
Hoag Nghe An, He Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh
Linh area as being affected by the bombing. Dwellings,
pagodas, factories, and dikes and dams were among the cultural
and economic establishments reported hit; the targets allegedly
included a section of the dike on the Ninh Co River in Nghia Hung
district, Nam Ha Province, which was said to have crumbled &:s
a result of the bombing. Adding that a number of civilians,
mostly women and children, were killed or wounded, the statement
went on to charge the Nixon Administration with grossly
encroaching upon the DRV'q sovereignty and security and "all
elementary principles of international law," as well as
violating the U.S. commitment to "completely and unconditionally"
halt the bombing.
+ "Sternly condemning" U.S. air strikes of the 15th, the
spokesman's statement of the 16th cited populated localities in
Ha Tay, Hai Hung, Nam Has Thai Binh, Thanh Hoag Nghe An, He
Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area as the
areas hit. B-52's were said to have "carpet bombed" hamlets
and villages in the Vinh Linh area and in Quang Binh Province,
and U.S. warships were said to have struck at fishing boats
and populated sectors along the coast in these areas. Civilian
casualties and destruction of economic and cultural establishments,
including a middle school in Hai Hung Province, were cited as
crimes further exposing the "cruel and aggressive nr'ture of the
U.S. imperialists" and the Nixon Administration's "Llaims about
peace and good will."
+ Bombing and shelling on the 18th of various localities in
and surrounding Hanoi and Nam Dinh were protested in a spokesman's
statement the same day. The statement also reported air attacks
of the 17th on "populous areas" in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh,
Haiphong, Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa,
Nghe An, and He Tinh provinces and charged that B-52's had
dropped bombs over hamlets and villages in Quang Binh Frovin;.e
and the Vinh Linh area. It alleged that such attacks, together
with the "intentional massacre" of innocent people and the
destruction of economic establishments which serve the
livelihood of the Vietnamese people, "reveal the extremely
cruel and aggressive features of U.S. imperialism." World
public opinion, the statement asserted, demands that the Nixon
Administration end escalation of the war in the North, end
the Vietnamization policy, and "enter into serious negotiations"
in Paris.
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DRV COUNCIL OF MINISTERS GIVES GUIDANCE ON WARTIME LABOR DUTY
Hanoi on 16 July released what it called a "recent" Council of
Ministers order on wartime labor duty which focuses new
attention on North Vietnam's manpower problems and appears to
reflect added urgency in the face of heightened military
requirements and the possibility of floods in the coming
months. At the same time, Hanoi radio also reported that the
Ministry of Labor had "recently" held a conference to publicize
the order. Its injunction that every able-bodied adult be
mobilized for the war effort and for "building socialism" has
been pressed repeatedly in North Vietnamese propaganda in past
years, as has its demand for the enforcement of labor
discipline. However, the public i!! .un of specific guidance on
labor problems suggests that Hanoi views problems in the current
situation as more critical. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 17th
noted that the obligation to work has been a long-standing
duty 1;ut added that the resistance is now entering "an urgent
and fierce stage" and that "more than ever before," every
able-bodied citizen must be "mobilized to devcte all his
intellectual and physical ability to totally defeating the
U.S. aggressors."
Stressing the importance of putting everyone to work# the order
noted that the state may call back some employees who have
retired for health reasons but are still able to serve. It
cited specific penalties for those refusing to work, saying
that they will be assigned to work from six months to two years
in accordance with "regulations on mandatory labor duty." The
order went ocs to spell out the responsibility and methods for
deployment of labor, noting among other things the procedure for
"urgent mobilization of manpower to prevent or combat natural
calamities and enemy-caused disasters" in accordance with
"procedures to urgently mobilize local human and material
resources as outlined in Council of Ministers Decree 232-TP of
November 1Q65." The order also warned against incorrect
implementation of mobilization and waste of manpower, errors
Hanoi has criticized over the years. The NHAN DAN editoria! of
the 17th underlined the need for labor discipline--working a
full day and carrying out orders--and stated that those who
do not comply with assignments may have their pay stopped or
be subject to disciplinary measures. The application of the
labor order to agriculture was touched on in an undated NHAN DAN
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editorial, also broadcast on the 17th, which noted that children
and old people as well an persons in uoor health can be utilized
in agricultural work.*
Further information or. the Council of Ministers order was provided
on 18 July when Hanoi broadcast an interview with Labor Minister
Nguyen Huu Khieu. In response to a question about the "legal
foundation" for the order, Khieu noted that the constitution
required participation in labor and that a National Assembly
Standing Committee resolution dated 21 April 1965 had "entrusted
the Council of Ministers with the task of drawing up partial
mobilization plans and leading the implementation of these plans."
The minister drew a distinction between the usual projects for
which the state mobilized workers and "emergency tasks" which
require "prompt action." The former, he indicated, include water
conservan.y tasks, dike repair, construction of roads and
storage facilities, and support of combat troops "in accordance
with the wartime corvee (dan cong) and mandatory labor statutes."
The emergency tasks, he said, include protection of storage
facilities and dikes, overcoming the consequences of enemy
bombardment, and supporting local combat troops--tasks falling
under "the system of emergency mobilization of local manpower
and material resources."
BACKGROUND: A Council of Ministers resolution on labor released
on 12 February 1970, when the North was not being bombed,
addressed itself to less urgent questions than those taken up
in the current order. That resolution announced a decision
to launch a "productive labor movement" primarily aimed at
Increasing production.** It resembled the present order in
pointing out that sveryone must be mobilized to participate in
productive labor, and it noted cryptically that "those who
oppose labor" must be "reeducated." But the 1970 resolution was
aimed chiefly at gaiding a broad movement to insure the fulfillment
* The use of children and the elderly in agriculture has been
advocated previously. For example, an article on labor mobiliza-
tion in the March 1967 HOC TAP, by Politburo member Pham Hung,
pointed to the advantages of drawing agricultural workers from
labor forces outside the standard age brackets.
** The productive labor movement is discussed in FBIS Special
Report No. 301 of 7 August 1970, "North Vietnamese Problems and
Policie6 as Outlined in Le Duan's February 1970 Article," page 27.
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of the state plan and did not raise the question of emergency
mobilization to cope with natural calamities and disasters
caused by the war.
Propaganda has indicated that the productive labor movement did
not succeed in mobilizing all potential workers. For example,
a January 1971 HOC TAP article by Vice Premier Do Muoi noted
that there were still able persons who were not carrying out
their labor duties and who should be mobilized. Similarly, a
party Secretariat instruction issued on 15 January this year
deplored the fact that "the labor productivity movement has
effectively been a.lternd, and no seething revolutionary movement
has developed among workers and personnel to mobilize them to
actively improve their cultural and technical knowledge and
emulate in increasing labor output and economic effects in
order to build the country and socialism." Difficulties in
obtaining laborers during the disastrous floods in North Vietnam
late last summer were mentioned in some propaganda; an editorial
in the November issue of HOC TAP noted, among other things, that
during the struggle to combat the floods some people "refused to
actively participate in collective labor." The current Council
o' Ministers order is probably aimed at avoiding any such
breakdown under the pressure of bombing or floods this year,
as well as at enforcing general labor discipline in normal work.
PRG, DRV PRESS MILITARY. POLITICAL SOLUTION. REJECT CEASE-FIRE
At the resumed Paris talks on 13 July both DRV chief delegate Xuan
Thuy end PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh indicated that progress
was dependent on "new" U.S. proposals--a position that had also
been reflected in Xuan Thuy's remarks upon his arrival back in
Paris.* The VNA account of the session, as usual, obscured the
fact that the allied delegates spoke first and reported no
details of the remarks by Ambassadors Porter and Lam. It said
only that "the Saigon administration's" delegate "rehrighed the
so-called eight points which had already been turned clown by the
Vietnamese people. The U.S. delegate, too, did not produce
anything new, only repeating what Nixon had already said in his
8 May 1912 statement."
* See the TRENDS of 1~ July 1972, pages 1-2.
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Xuan Thuy in his prepared statement did acknowledge the substance
of the 8 May proposal when he recalled that the President had
repeated it at his 29 June press conference. Thuy said:
"Mr. Nixon said that in exchange for total U.S. troop withdrawal
within four months and for the cessation of all U.S. military
activity, the Vietnamese people must agree to observe a
cease-fire and release the prisoners of war." Thuy thus
obscured the fact that the President had called for a cease-fire
throughout Indochina. He claimed that the proposal meant that
the United States would keep its "neocolonialist" regime in
South Vietnam intact while the Vietnamese would have to give
up their struggle. The VNA account did not report these remarks,
but it did note ihuy's reassertion that the PRG's seven-point
proposal provides that after military and political problems have
been discussed and agreed upon, "there will be a cease-fire."
Mme. Binh, for her part, said that military and political problems
must be solved simultaneously. While reporting this statement,
VNA did not mention that it was preceded by an attack on the
President's 8 May proposal. Mme. Binh said: "A so-called
immediate cease-fire before agreement is reached on military
and political matters is only an arrogant and illogical
ultimatum. Such a cease-fire . . . would legalize the Thieu
admirlstration and the military presence of the United States,
and at the same time would deprive the Vietnamese of their
right to defend themselves."
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PEKING OFFERS RESTRAINED COMMENT ON VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS
In accord with its wait-and-see reaction to President Nixon's
announcement of the resumption of the Paris conference and its
call for a negotiated settlement, Peking has been proclaiming
only minimal support to its Vietnamese allies while muffling
criticism of the United States. As usual avoiding direct comment
on the Paris negotiating sessions, Peking replayed the VNA
account of the 13 July session, including the communist
delegates' invocation of the PRG's seven-point plan and the
demand for a simultaneous settlement of the military and
political questions. For its part Peking has continued to
sidestep any explicit endorsement of the communist peace plan
and has refrained from comment on the U.S. position at Paris.
The Chinese routinely reaffirmed support for the war effort
when Chou En-tai received the DRV ambassador on 15 July and in
a joint communique with a visiting delegation of the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) dated the 17th.
The DRV ambassador handed Chou a copy of the 14 July appeal
issued by DRV President Thang on the occasion of the 18th
anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements on Indochina.*
In contrast to his last such reported meeting with a North
Vietnamese envoy on 12 April in which the DRV charge d'affaires
handed Chou the text of an 11 April DRV Government statement on
U.S. bombing, the Chinese premier was this time notably more
reserved in pledging support. Whereas in April he had promised
"all-out support and .assistance" for the war effort, adding
the warning that "the Chinese government and people are closely
following" U.S. attacks on North Vietnam, Chou at the recent
meeting merely reaffirmed in bland terms that the PRC "will, as
always, firmly support" the 'Vietnamese struggle. According to
NCNA's account, Chou had a "very cordial and friendly"
conversation with the ambassador--Peking's standard characteriza-
tion for meetings with its close allies, but one which it had
avoided using for recent Sino-Vietnamese contacts until Le Duc
Tho's stopover en route to Paris. Chou echoed the Vietnamese
appeal--carried textually by NCNA on the 14th--by accusing the
United States of having "thoroughly violated" the Geneva agreements.**
* Last year the Geneva accords occasioned a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial
on 20 July, the date of the anniversary.
** Continuing to publicize support from abroad, Hanoi on the 17th
replayed Chou's pledge of support and his criticism of the United
States, adding a passage not in the NCNA account that the premier had
dismissed "as complete nonsense" the U.S. charge that North Vietnam
had invaded the South.
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Apart from Chou's minimal response to this DRV initiative,
authoritative PRC comment on Vietnam has been limited to only
passing references to the war in recent speeches by Chou
and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei and in the joint communique
with the PDRY delegation. At a 17 July banquet welcoming a
delegation from the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), Chou hailed
the YAR's support for the Indochinese war effort and its
recognition of Sihanouk's Cambodian government. In documenting
his view of the "increasingly favorable" international situation,
he claimed in stock terms that the Indochinese are winning
"continuous new victories." On the pre?rious day, in a speech
at the Iraqi embassy celebrating Iraq's national day, Chi
Peng-fei mentioned Indochina only in voicing appreciation for
Iraq's support for the Indochinese struggle. In neither
speech did the Chinese reaffirm Peking's backing for the war
effort. The Sino-PDRY communique used a stock formula in
saying the two sides "firmly support" the three Indochinese
peoples in their struggle against "U.S. aggression and for
national salvation."
Consistent with this low-key approach, coverage.of the war in
PRC media has been restricted largely to pickups of foreign
comment carefully sanitized to accord with Peking's own interests.
NCNA on the 13th omitted a critical reference to.the Nixon
Administration's "deceitful arguments of peace-and goodwill" in
picking up a DRV Foreign Miuietry spokesman's statement of the
date, while strident Vietnamese invective personally assailing
the President has been routinely dropped.in PRC coverage. NCNA
on 12 and 13 July carried LPA reports on the establishment of
the "People's Revolutionary Committee of Quang Tri Province,"
but there has been no Chinese comment on this development.
Peking had previously shown itself to be reluctant to play up
Vietnamese communist claims to have established an administrative
structure as a result of this year's offensive.
MOSCOW SCORES U,S, AIR H'AR. STRESSES NEED FOR TALKS
Routine Moscow comment on Vietnam continues to focus on the U.S.
war of "genocide" against the DRV, the alleged bombings of dikes
and dams and "meteorological" warfare to cause torrential rains.
Moscow continues to cite eyewitness reports.to.refute U.S.
denials that bombing of dikes is taking place. A foreign
language commentary on the 13th, taking-issue with Secretary
Laird's contention in his 6 July press conference that bombings
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of dams and dikes were "accidental and sporadic," claimed that
the U.S. "criminal actions" are in fact "of a premeditated and
intentional nature." And TASS on the 17th briefly reported
Secretary Laird's conference that day, citing him as having
"admitted" that U.S. planes bombed DRV dikz s any! dams and that
irrigation structures were "possibly damaged." On 18 July the
Moscow domestic servico, reporting a statement by White House
press secretary Ziegler the previous da , noted his remark that
official U.S. policy excludes the bombing of DRV dikes and dams
and that any damage has been "accidental," but asserted that
his remarks differ from earlier statements in which he
"categorically denied" the possibility of U.S. strikes against
DRV irrigation installations.
Moscow reiterates that the United States will fail in "breaking
the will" of the Vietnamese and cannot attain a "military solution."
Peace talks are the "only" means to reach a settlement of the
Vietnam problem, the "basis" of which is to be found in the
"well-known" PRG, and DRV proposals, the commentators repeat. In
noting the 13 July resumption of the Paris talks, commentators
repeat that the talks provide the United States with the only
realistic and honorable way out of the war. A 14 July domestic
service commentary complains that Washington apparently does
not intend to put forward any new proposals at Paris, referring
to unspecified comments by Secretary Rogers. The American
attitude is shown, says the commentator, by the U.S. intention
to keep the Thieu regime in power, and he claims that the South
Vietnamese aspiration for a "coalition government of national
concord" is "outlining itself more definitely."
Moscow commentators also take the occasion to question Senator
McGovern's promise, if elected, to withdraw immediately from
Vietnam. A panelist in the 16 July domestic service roundtable
discussion, for example, expressed kepticism over U.S. pre-election
promises, recalling that before he was elected President Nixon had
also promised to end the war in Vietnam. Instead, says the
panelist, it appears that the U.S. leadership is now concentrating
on a "military solution" in Vietnam, "pushing into the background"
a political settlement through negotiations.
Apart from routine reassertions of continuing curport and
assistance, Soviet aid to the Vietnamese receives little publicity.
On 13 July a Moscow radio news item reports that Deputy Premier
Novikov saw the DRV ambassador to discuss "problems relating to
Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation," but there has been no
further elaboration.
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Moscow thus far has given the anniversary of the signing of the
1954 Geneva agreements minimal attention, although TASS promptly
reported Ton Duc Thang's appeal. On the 18th TASS briefly
reports that Gromyko received the DRV ambassador, who 6elivered
a copy of the appeal, for a conversation in an atmosphere of
"friendship and cordiality."* On the 17th a brief PRAVDA item
reports the arrival the previous day of a Vietnamese-Soviet
Friendship Society delegation to take part in a "solidarity
month," and an AUCCTU meesage, reported by TASS on the 18th,
expresses support for the Vi'4tnamese in connection with
"international Vietnam day." These observances are presumably
related to the Geneva agreement anniversary, having been
standard features of the anniversary in past years.
LE DUC THO Moscow's reports of Le Due Tho's 13-15 July stopover
STOPOVER on route to Paris note that he was met at the
airport by Party Secretary Katushev, Central
Committee official Rakhmanin, and Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin.
TASS reports that Tho had talks with Katushev in au atmosphere
of "fraternal friendship and solidarity."
During Tho's June and April stopovers, there were no reports that
he had talks with any Soviet %-aders, but in each case the
stopover coincided with Soviet-DRV talks taking place in Hanoi.
On those occasions he was met and seen off by Rakhmanin and
deputy foreign ministers. The only time Katushev's presence was
reported at Tho's departure was in April, just after Katushev had
returned from his visit to Hanoi. When Tho stopped in Moscow in
July 1971 en route home from Paris he had "warm and cordial" talks
with Politburo member Kirilenko, and in June 1971 en route to Paris
he met with Kirilenko and Katushev. There were no reports that he
met any Soviet leaders during a stopover in January 1970. During
earlier trips he met with Kosygin and once with Mazurov.
* Moscow has not recently acknowledged that the DRV ambassador has
been delivering copies of North Vietnamese statements in his
meetings with Soviet leaders. VNA, but not TASS, had reported that
during Xuan Thuy's meeting with Kosygin in May during a stopover in
Moscow en route from Paris to Hanoi, the. DRV ambassador handnd
Kosygin a copy of Hanoi's 10 May government statement denouncing
the U.S. mining of DRV ports. The DRV ambassador had been received
by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Grechko, and Katushev in April. The timing
suggests that the DRV envoy at these meetings had presented the
11 April DRV Government statement and the 16 April DRV Party-
Government appeal protesting U.S. bombings, but neither Moscow's
nor Hanoi's reports mentioned this.
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ACTION IN WANG TRI PROMPTS FURTHER PRG CHARGES OF "CRIMES"
Intensive allied bombing and shelling in support of the Saigon
counteroffensive in Quang Tri Province prompted a second PRG
Foreign Ministry statement, released on 18 July. Like the first
statement, dated it July,* the one on 18th warns of "necessary
military and political measures to punish the U.S. imperialist
aggressors for their war crimes." The statement particularly
scores intensive bombing and shelling from 1 to 17 July and
charges specifically that on 17 July alone B-52's made more than
3"1 sorties, dropping 2,500 tons of bombs on Quang Tri city and
its outskirts. It also decries bombing of the citadel in Quang
Tri city from 10 to 17 July and the use of "many 'smart' bombs"
against the citadel on 12 and 16 July "in an attempt to destroy
it."
Folj.owing up the claim in the earlier statement that bombs and
shells containing toxic chemicals had been used on 8 aid 9 July,
the current statement asserts that "between 8 and 14 July the
U.S. Imperialists on 31 occasions used bombs and shells containing
toxic chemicals in their strikes at Quang Tri city and Nhan Dieu
and La Vang villages" south and southwest of the city. It adds
that "after dropping bombs containing toxic chemicals the U.S.
imperialists dropped bombs that killed the poisoned people."
A 13 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement supporting the 11 July
PRG statement had repeated the PRG,'a charges about toxic chemicals
and had rejected statements by U.S. authorities that the allies
have only used tear gas in the campaign. And a 19 July DRV
Foreign Ministry statement, on the 18 July PRG statement,
charged that "many" have died from chemical weapons and declared
that "this utterly heinous crime of the U.S. authorities cannot
be covered by their claim that they were using 'tear gas' only."
(PRG press spokesman Ly Van Sau at the briefing after the Paris
session on 13 July, when asked whether the chemical involved was
tear gas, DDT, or something new, responded with the claim that
"as everyone in South Vietnam knows, the United States is using
C.S. in a form which is 100 times more concentrated than what is
used in the rest of the world, and this gas is used in such
conditions that it becomes a deadly poison gas." Consistent
with general practice, Vietnamese communist media have not
reported the post-session briefings.)
The 11 July statement was discussed in the 12 July TRENDS,
pages 11-12.
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Graphically portraying the extensive nature of the alleged
attacks, the PRG Foreign Ministry statement maintains that
"the U.S. imperialists have massively uoed tens of thousands
of tons of bombs and hundreds of thousands of artillery
rounds in bombarding an area less than 36 square kilometers
wide with the aim of destroying an entire city in a newly
liberated area." But it concludes that bombs and shells
cannot reverse the allies' "defeated situation" or save
Vietnamization and that the liberation forces will persevere
in advancing to total victory.
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USSR-EGYPT
MOSCOW SILENT ON CAIRO OUSTER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS
Egyptian President as-Sadat's 18 July announcement to the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU) Central Committee of the decision to
terminate the mission of Soviet military experts and advisers
"as of 17 July" has drawn no reaction in Soviet media as yet.
TASS and a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 18th carried
identical two-sentence reports on the opening of the ASU
meeting, chaired by as-Sadat, noting that Egyptian papers
pointed to the "great significance" of the session.
For the Soviet home audience, a Moscow broadcast late on the
18th--well after reports of as-Sadat's move had begun to
circulate abroad--conveyed a picture of business, friendship,
and cooperation as usual in blandly reviewing preparations for
the coming celebration of Egypt's 20th revolution anniversary
on 23 July. It noted that preparations for the third session
of the ASU National Congress, scheduled for the 23d, were being
discussed at a Central Committee session under as-Sadat's
chairma-_ship and that Prime Minister Sidgi was to report on
the results of his recent visit to the Soviet Union. The
broadcast added that the Egyptian press had been publishing
"many materials these past days on the development of Egypt's
economy and culture and on the aid rendered by the Soviet Union."
It went on to cite the Cairo AL-AKHBAR as saying that "as a
result of the Moscow talks" a decision had been taken to
accelerate the completion of the Helwan metallurgical combine,
and it noted an AL-AHRAM report that a week of Soviet-Egyptian
friendship would be held in Egypt concurrently with the
anniversary celebrations.
Soviet treatment of Sidqi's 13-14 July visit to Moscow gave no
intimation of fresh .difficulties in Soviet-Egyptian relations,
although Cairo papers on 18 July said the visit was "closely
connected" with the "positive decisions" to be announced by
as-Sadat that day, and the Beirut AL-ANWAR, as reported b;
the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on the 19th, said that the
decisions had been adopted 10 days ago and that "Cairo political
leaders had communicated them to Soviet officials." Persisting
Soviet-Egyptian frictions were reflected, however, in further
defensive rebuttals of Egyptian criticism of Moscow. Thus, along
with TASS and PRAVDA pickups on the 15th of Cairo press comment
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hailing the.visit,as.fresh evidence of Soviet-Egyptian friendship
and, cooperation, TASS on the 17th cited the Cairo weekly ROSE
AL-YUSUF as affirming that the Soviet Union "does not interfere
in the internal affairs of other countries" and "continues to
reject the idea.of.'exporting revolution."' And a Moscow
commentary in Arabic on the 16th, pegged to the joint communique
on Sidgi's visit, claimed that this document provided.a "stern
reply" to "fabricated. lies of imperialist and Zionist propaganda"
implying that the.Soviet Union "is interested in continuing the
'no peace, no war' state" in the Middle East. Podgornyy, in a
banquet speech honoring the visiting Syrian president on 6 July,
had rejected allegations that the USSR was interested in
preserving this situation.
Sidgi's visit came.close on the heels of the Soviet-Syrian talks
in Moscow, following which President al-Arad had immediately
gone to Cairo for talks before returning to Damascus. The
apparently hastily arranged Sidqi visit-was announced in Cairo
on the 11th, with MENA reporting that Sidqi had met twice that
day with Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov.
AS-SADAT After reviewing Soviet political, military, and
DECISIONS economicsupport'for Egypt as well as Soviet-
Egyptian differences, as-Sadat declared.that
having received Moscow's explanation of the U.S.-Soviet summit
talks he felt the need for "a pause wit!, the friend." Asserting
Egypt's full appreciation of the USSR's "big assistance" and .
concern for its friendship, "while we are at the threshold of a.
new stage of this friendship," he announced his decisions: to
terminate the mission of Soviet military experts and.advisers.
as of 17 July; to consider all military equipment'and installa-
tions set up within Egyptian territory since June.1967.the sole
property of Egypt and under the administration of its armed
forces; and to call, within the framework of the Soviet-Egyptian
treaty, for "an Egyptian-Soviet meeting on a level to be agreed
on for consultations regarding the coming ittage."
President as-Sadat added that these decisions in no way affected
the essence of Soviet-Egyptian friendship, and AL-AHRAM,under-
lined this point on.the 19th in stating, according to MENA,
that the new steps do not affect the Soviet-Egyptian treaty
and that Egypt "is-eager for the provtsions ,f this treaty to
remain in force." AL-ARRAN also explained that termination of
the Soviet military advisers' mission "does not apply to Soviet
training personnel" who are helping the Egyptian armed forces.
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COMMUNIST The GDR news agency A,~N is t:.e only monitored
REACTIONS Soviet bloc source to take note of Egypt's action
so far. A factual report on the 19th, datelined
Cairo, cited MENA for an account of as-Sadat's three decisions,
noting that the withdrawal of Soviet experts and Egyptian takeover
of installations was completed and that consultations were in
progress to find the right method for future effective Egyptian-
Soviet cooperation. Warsaw domestic service newscasts on the
18th reported that as-Sadat had addressed the ASU Central
Committee but did not mention his decisions.
Yugoslavia's TANJUG, in a dispatch from its Cairo correspondent
on the 19th, reported that speculation on a crisis in Cairo-
Moscow relations was "very much on target" with the announcement
in Cairo that the . Soviet. military advisers' missionhad ended
"on the very eve of Egyptian--Soviet friendship week, which
starts today." Noting as-Srdat's explanation that friends and
allies can have disagrc":eats but remain good friends,.the
correspondent pointed out that this is the inte::pretation of
only one side, while the other is refraining from any. comment.
He claimed that the USSR had not waited for as-SAdat's statement
but "three days earlier had ordered the withdrawal of.its
people." As for the Egyptian president's call for a Soviet-
Egyptian meeting, the correspondent thought it unlikely such a
meeting would.ocaur '!in the foreseeable suture." He noted
that the crisis . has. been laid to Soviet failure to deliver
promised offensive weapons and equipment, as well as to "the
impoeaibility of Soviet military personnel and their Egyptian
counterparts finding a common language."
The first monitored Arab communist comment, reported by. the
IRAQI NEWS AGENCY on the 19th, is the Lebanese CP organ
AN-NIDA's observation that the Egyptian decision was a "grave
retreat" before the "reactionary-Zionist-imperialist onslaught"
designed to force the Arabs to capitulate.
HENA on the 18th reported that a DRV delegation had arrived in
Cairo on a tour of African states to explain the Vietnamese
situation "especially after the escalation of U.S. aggression
against Vietnam." The report added that the delegation would
attend the 23 July revolution celebrations and would "discuss
increasing cooperation between the two countr{es."
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a
SIDDI'S "FRIENDLY WORKING VISIT" TO USSR PRECEDED CAIRO NAVE
Apart from publicity for the joint communique on Egyptian Prime
Minister Sidgi's 13-14 July Moscow visit, Soviet media gave
relatively little attention to a visit variously described a a
business or working trip, an official friendship visit, and
simply a friendship.-v.Lait. Moscow was silent on the scheduled
duration of the talks; Cairo media displayed some confusion,
initially announcing that they would last several.days and
reporting Sidgi7.a.departure f r a "three-day" visit. But
Cairo's AL-AHRAM, reporting the start of the talks on the 14th,
said that while "according to the initial program" the talks
might end the same day, "sources close to the talks" indicated
that the visit might. be extended one or two more days, with a
number of delegation members stayi-+; behind to discuss details.
TASS on the 14th listed those present for the balks that day,
report'ng that views were exchanged ona wide range .of "questions
of bilateral relations" in an atmosphere of "friendship and
mutual understanding" and in the spirit of the Soviet-Egyptian
treaty. Special attention, TASS added, was given-to the
Middle East situation, and the two sides expressed satisfaction
with the relations of "traditional friendship and fruitful
cooperation." AL-AHRAM, reporting the :exults of the "quick
visit" on 16 July, said the. full LCIegations met for a three-
hour session on economic relations; after that, "some members
of both sides withdrew," leaving cn.the Soviet side only
Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko, and Grechko to discuss military and
political questions.. This session, AL-ARRAN said, lasted five
and a half hours. Cairo radio's press review on the 15th noted
that Brezhnev interrupted his summer vacation to participate in
the talks. In reporting the opening serss ion, Cairo on the 14th
said Sidqi conveyed as-Sadat's greetings to the Soviet leaders,
"inquired about Brezhnev's health,"* and invited him to visit
Egypt--an invitation notrecorded in the communique. (The
communique on as-Sadat'a February visit to Moscow,.but not
the April one, noted Brezhnev's acceptance of an invitation
to visit Egypt.)
* As-Sadat,'s solicitous inquiry would seem to represent a dig-at
Brezhnev for failing to greet and see off the Egyptian president
on his April visit to Moscow. In his May Day speech as-Sadat had
remarked on "out enemies'-pleasure" at this omission and.carefully
explained that Brezhnev had had two long meetings with him despite
a "397degree-centigrade temperature."
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The program of the visit included a dinner for Sidqi--considerably
delayed, according to AL-AHRAM, by the extended political-
military discussion. Moscow's coverage of this function was
confined to a brief TASS report noting that it was held in a
"warm and friendly atmosphere" and that Kosygin and Sidqi
"exchanged toasts." While Moscow gave no indication of the
substance of the remarks, Cairo media publicized Sidgi's speech
and AL-AHRAM on the 16th briefly reported Kosygin ad stressing
the USSR's friendship for Egypt and as adding: "Please convey
to President as-Sadat what Brezhnev said, that we are not
exchanging Egypt's friendship for another friendship, and also
tell him that the Soviet Union's friendship with Egypt is a
strong one and we will struggle for this friendship and victory
will be ours." Sidqi, as reported by Cairo radio on the 15th,
responded that "campaigns of misrepresentation and misleading"
would not make the Egyptian people doubt their "sincere friends."
He asserted Egypt's determination to put an end to Israeli
"aggression" and expressed the confidence of "our people" that
"you Soviet brothers stand with them with all your hearts and
with all kinds and forms of support and backing in the various
fields."
BILATERAL Like TASS' earlier report on the talks, the joint
RELATIONS communique noted that an atmosphere of "friendship
and mutual cooperation" prevailed--somewhat more
subdued than the atmosphere of "full trust and mutual understanding"
in which as-Sadat's February and April discussions were said to
have been held.* The communique recorded both sides'. resolve to
"further coordinate their efforts" in the struggle against
imperialism and reaction and for peace, freedom, and social
progress. References to the Soviet-Egyptian treaty were patterned
after similar formulas in the February and April documents.
The economic aspect of the talks was underlined in a Moscow Arabic
broadcast on the 13th, welcoming Sidqi, which pointed out that
his name was connected with the economic field, "one of the most
effective fields" of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation. But the.
communique made no mention of any further economic agreements,.
although AL-AHRAM on the 16th reported that the sides had agreed
to expand economic cooperation, including tie signing of a new
agreement in September when an Egyptian delegation would go to
Moscow to draft the final text and specify the projects in which
the USSR would participate.
* Radio Moscow gave the communique considerably more publicity
than it had given other Soviet-Arab communiques this year.
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In the military field, the communique contained no Soviet pledger
of further assistance, with the sides merely confirming their
intention to strengthen relations in the political, economic.,
military, and other fields. The February .and April communiques
on as-Sadat's visits had indicated further steps in strengthening
Egypt's defense capacity and in Soviet-Egyptian military
cooperation. But in the later military discussions, the
differing Cairo and Moscow versions of the communique on
Grechko's hay talks in Egypt and the absence of a communique on
Egyptian War Minister Sadiq's return visit to the USSR in June
had suggested something less than a meeting of minds in this
area, as as-Sadat himself had indicated in a 24 April question-
and-answer session with members of the ASU Central Committee.
ARAB-ISRAELI The communique contained the usual passage
CONFLICT condemning Israel for its refusal to wi..hdraw its
forces and for pursuing an annexationist policy,
also adding a complaint that Israel has been obstructing "all the
steps proposed up to now" aimed at settling the conflict.
The communique also contained a new version of the passage
introduced in the April as-Sadat communique, which had declared
that the Arab states "have every reason to use other means" to
regain the occupied lands. The Soviet side, the current document
said, shares the opinion of Egypt and other Arab states that in
conditions of Israel's rejection of a just political settlement on
the basis of Resolution 242, Arab states "have every teason to
use all the means at their disposal" for the liberation of the
territories seized by Israel and for insuring the rights of the
Arabs, including the Palestinians.
The absence of any reference to the Jarring mission is notable in
view of the endorsement of the UN envoy's activities in the
Soviet-American communique on President Nixon's Moscow talks.
While as-Sadat and the Soviet leaders had strongly urged
resumption of the mission in the communique on the February
visit, there was no reference to Jarring in the April communique.
Sidgi's visit to Moscow came on the eve of UN Secretary General
Waldheim's 17 July arrival there for talks, and on the heels of
Waldheim's Geneva meeting with Jarring and his 11 July announce-
ment--reported-by TASS--that the Swedish ambassador would arrive
in New York early in August to continue consultations with
Waldheim and the opposing sides. Moscow had greeted this news
with "satisfaction" and attributed to Cairo the same response,
while noting Israel's "cold reception" of the development. A
Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on the
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12th, welcoming the prospects for renewal of the mission,
resurrected--apparently for the first time since Tanuary--the
essence of the Soviet proposals for a Mid'aast settlement,
61aiming that Soviet diplomats had worked out a "complete
and realistic plan" for establishing peace in the Middle East.
The broadcast concluded by urging that the Jarring mission be
given the broadest international backing.
Cairo, for its part, evinced something less than the satisfaction
imputed to it by Moscow: AL-JUMHURIYAH, reviewed by Cairo radio
on the 16th, called it obvious that reactivation of the Jarring
mission was aimed at forestalling resubmission of the crisis to
the fall session of the UN General Assembly. A Cairo Voice of
the Arabs commentary broadcast on the 15th, like AL-,JUMHURIYAH,
scorned attempts to "cast doubt" on Soviet-Egyptian relations.
But it said one had to examine the Soviet attitude in light of
the efforts to renew the Jarring mission, a "move that began in
the wake of the Moscow summit meeting." It claimed that-if
Israel again refused to reply to Jarring, then Egypt's "right
to use all means" to liberate the Arab territories should receive
the support of the entire international community, first of all
the Soviet Union.
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SALT
USSR ACKNOWLEDGES USE OF SATELLITES TO MONITOR ACCORDS
An article in the Soviet monthly INTERNATIONAL LIFE (No. 7, signed
to press 21 June) contains the first public Soviet acknowledgment
that the strategic arms accords will be monitored by satellites.
Reviewing in considerable detail both the ABM treaty and the
interim agreement on offensive arms, the author of the article,
V. Viktorov, who has written in the past on disarmament issues,
pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union each
"observes the implementation of the commitments adopt;ed by the
other side under the [ABM] treaty." He added, drawing on the
wording of the treaty, that each side uses for this purpose "the
national technical monitosing facilities at its disposal while
observing generally recognized norms of international law."
This statement prefaced Viktorov's comment on the use of
satellites:
It should be noted that the existence of such sophisti-
cated facilities, particularly artificial earth
satellites, made it considerably easier to reach
agreement, since it removed the question of conducting
international on-the-spot inspections, which had been
a stumbling block during previous examinations of
may-y other disarmament measures . . . . The treaty
prohibits interference by the other side with national
technical monitoring facilities.
Another post-summit article on the SALT accords, in the 2 June
issue of NEW TIMES (No. 23) by N. Arkadyev, also noted that the
two parties to the ABM treaty undertook to use "technical control
facilities at their disposal" but did not go on to mention
satellites. Prior to the Moscow summit, Soviet commentators
and spokesmen had only rarely broached the subject of "spy
satellites," usually in the context of denouncing Washington
for ,?ing them to carry out "subversive" intelligence activities.
In linking the use of satellites with "generally recognized norms
of international law," the Viktorov article may portend a con-
structive change in the Soviet media's treatment of space
reconnaissance.
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U, S, ELECTIONS
MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO SENATOR MCGONERN'S NOMINATION
In line with traditional practice, Soviet media are devoting
limited comment and reportage to the U.S. election campaign,
with the Democratic Convention in Miami drawing less than one
percent of Radio Moscow's comment to all audiences during the
week it was in progress. To date PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA have
discussed the outcome only in correspondents' dispatches from
Miami, relying heavily on the views of U.S. observers. Moscow's
cautious approach so far has been to portray McGovern's selection
as a reflection of public dissatisfaction over Vietnam and a
desire for "radical changes" in American policies, while at the
same time taking note of "inconsistencies" in the Senator's
program and dismissing the party platform as a whole as
offering no prospect for significant change. Apart from noting
that President Nixon will "no doubt" be the Republican standard-
bearer in November, Soviet comment has avoided references to
the President's campaign for reelection and predictably steered
clear of speculation about the outcome. But it has underscored
disarray and division in the Democratic Party and in effect
forecast a difficult path for McGovern.
Against the background of the classic Soviet portrayal of
American elections as offering the voters a choice only between
representatives of "big business" interests, Radio Moscow
correspondents Zorin and Soltan in a dispatch from Miami on
the 14th sought to explain why McGovern was nominated "despite
the opposition of the party machine and the dissatisfaction of
the Wall Street businessmen." They attributed his victory to
"the mood of the American general public, which is desperately
longing for radical changes in the country," is "disgusted with
the policy of continuing aggression in Vietnam, and is
dissatisfied with the rising cost of living and growing
unemployment." The dispatch added that "McGovern's campaign,
despite its inherent demagogic element, to a certain extent
took this mood of the masses into account, and that is why
he became his party's presidential candidate."
In 1968 Soviet commentators had emphasized the affinities of. the
two candidates on the Vietnam issue and concluded that the
voters had no real choice in the election. Now, while playing
up McGovern's Vietnam position as a major factor in his
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19 JULY 1972
nomination, Moscow has avoided comparing it with President Nixon's,
rather setting out to disparage pre-election promises in general.
A panelist in the 16 July domestic service roundtable, in the course
of a wide-ranging discussion of U.S. foreign policies, recalled
that the President, too, had promised to end the Vietnam war
before he was elected. Typifying commentaries devoted strictly
.o the election campaign, which have avoided specific mention
of the President',s.position, a dispatch by PRAVDA's Strelnikov
on the 14th interpreted McGovern's nomination as. a reflection of
public dissatisfaction over "the Pentagon's aggression" in
Southeast Asia and singled out for quotation the Senator's pledge
of a U.S. withdrawal in his acceptance speech.
A 15 July Miami dispatch in SOVIET RUSSIA took McGovern to task
in observing that although he owed his nomination in part to the
support of "liberal" forces, he is "already yielding to.pressure
from the right." Declaring that the Senator has "modified" his
position on Vietnam, the dispatch said that where in the past he
had called for a total withdrawal of U.S. forces fro:' .Southeast
Asia, he is "now saying that a certain number of troops will
remain on the border of Vietnam until all prisoners are released."
Citing unnamed commentators in Miami for the view that there
are "inconsistencies and discrepancies" in McGovern's program
as well as in the party platform, Strelnikov asserted that while
the Senator advocates a reordering of priorities, he has not
"clarified" his proposals on arms spending and advocatee the
continuation of. military aid to Israel, "which fires.the
expansionist designs of the Tel Aviv extremists." Moreover,
the dispatch added, the party's foreign policy program,. which
"does not go beyond certain partial bourgeois reforms," is
also "inconsistent."
While noting that observers in Miami were trying to "guess the
outcome" in November, PRAVDA's correspondent did not cite any
specific speculation but suggested, by his emphasis on
Democratic Party discord, that McGovern faces a difficult
campaign: "The convention has not smoothed over the
contradicting which rend the party . . . and as before, the
powerful industrial-financial circles, the bloc of George
Wallace of Alabama,.the trade union bureaucrats, and the old
guard of the party refuse to support the liberal wing headed
by McGovern." In the same vein, an IZVESTIYA dispatch from
Miami on the 15th stated that the McGovern candidacy "will most
likely provoke a polarization of political forces in America."
In this connection it noted the Republican bid to disenchanted
Democrats to join Republican ranks.
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USSR -CHINA- U,S1
MOSCOW SEIZES ON BOGGS-FORD ACCOUNTS OF CHINESE VIEWS
Accounts by Congressmen Boggs and Ford of their talks with Chinese
leaders have triggered authoritative reaction from Moscow and
Peking that underscores the sensitive triangular issues surround-
ing this year's suvmitry. Following earlier low-level Soviet
reports on the Congressmen's statements after their return from
China, a 16 July PRAVDA article o"-er the authoritative signature
"I. Aleksandrov" complained that the views attributed to Chou
En-lai and other Chinese leaders abetted "extreme rightwing
forces" in the current U.S. debate over arms control and Indochina.
The views cited by Aleksandrov were that the Chinese are concerned
over further Soviet ~'rms development while the United States dis-
arms, and over an American withdrawal from Southeast Asia that
would create a vacuum in that region.
A day after the Aleksandrov article appeared, Chou took the occa-
sion of a banquet for a Yemeni delegation to put on record
Peking's view on the arms control agreements reached at the Moscow
summit. Though he did not mention the Boggs-Ford accounts of
their talks with him or the Soviet reaction, Chou's remarks
broke Peking's long abstinence from comment on the summit agree-
ments and seemed designed to clarify Peking's position amid
speculation aroused by the Congressmen's reports. Previously
Peking had done no more than carry a factual account of the
Soviet-U.S. summit and seemed content to remain noncommittal
on the summit results per se.
Whatever Chou's purpose in raising the issue, Moscow promptly
took note of his speech as in effect confirming the U.S.
Congressmen's accounts. On the 18th TASS commentator Kornilov
cited Chou's remarks on the arms limitation accord as an
example of Chinese pronouncements that "practically confirm"
the Boggs and Ford reports. Kornilov also claimed that the
views attributed to Chou by the Congressmen lifted "the veil
over the real contents" of she Sino-U. S. summit negotiations.
Both Kornilov and a Washington-datelined TASS dispatch on the
18th cited a report that Ford had reaffirmed that the accounts
given earlier by the Congressmen precisely mirrored what they
had been told by Chinese leaders.
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ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE The appearance of a PRAVDA article with
an I. Alekeandrov byline, coming during
a period of several months of Soviet restraint on the China ques-
tion, attests to Moscow's sensit.:-'tty toward any tendency in the
United States to use China for level- a in the triangular relation-
ship. As Alekeandrov put it, the U.S. Congressmen's reports
indicate that "Chou En-lai himself advises America to continue
the arms race and stay in Asia." According to the article, such
views lend support to a "coalition of extreme rightwing forces"
in the "bitter struggle" now taking place in the United States
over such key issues as Indochina and arms control. The article
called it "noteworthy" that Peking has not fount necessary to
deny the Congressmen's accounts. Implicitly playing up to Hanoi
and other anti-U.S. forces, the article said these accounts
provide a godsend for the Pentagon and noted that "not all Asians
think in the same way" about U.S. interference in other people's
affairs and about "the barbarous plans and doings of Pentagon
generals." The article was broadcast; by Moscow in Vietnamese,
Korean, and Mandarin, among other foreign languages.
The use of an I. Aleksandrov article, though in this case as a
brief commentary rather than as a policy statement, reflects
Moscow's concern over a Sino-U.S. accommodation detrimental to
Soviet interests in Asia. The Kornilov TASS commentary made this
point more explicitly in referring to the Sino-U.S. summit as
background for understanding the views now attributed to the
Chinese. Moscow's reac4ionto these views also comes against the
backdrop of its ongoing campaign in behalf of an Asian collective
security system to replace the existing military alliance
structures. A Soviet broadcast in Mandarin to Southeast Asia
on 15 July discussed the Boggs-Ford accounts as showing "Peking's
approval of the U.S. armed forces remaining in the Pacific regions."
According to the broadcast, "those people who were previously
doubtful about Peking's attitude toward U.S. military bases in
the Pacific region should be quite clear now . . . , for Ford's
statement makes it clear that Peking's approval of the stationing
of U.S. armed forces in the Pacific region reflects the long-term
strategy which the Chinese leaders have mapped out in collusion
with imperialism."
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CHOU EN-LAI SAYS SALT ACCORDS MARK NEW STAGE IN ARMS RACE
-in Peking's first comment on the Moscow summit results, Chou
En-lai declared in his speech on 17 July that the agreements on
strategic arms limitation were "by no means" a step toward curbing
the arms race but marked "the beginning of a new stage" of the
arms race between the two superpowers. Without .aentioning the
United States or the Soviet Union by name, Chou observed that
"the ink on the agreements was hardly dry before one announced
an increase of billiono of dollars for military expenditure and the
other haebmad to test new-type weapons, clamoring for seizing
nuclear superiority." He then repeated Peking's standard line
on disarmament by asserting that disarmament, let alone inter-
national peace and security, is "out of the question" in
circumstances in which the superpowers intensify their arms
expansion and war preparations, station forces in other
countries, and practice "nuclear blackmail" against others.
Much as he had used a banquet on 9 July for a South Yemen dele-
gation to call for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, explaining
that the situation in the Far East remains "far from truly
relaxed" because of the Vietnam war, Chou made the same observation
on the 17th about the international situation as a whole in saying
the superpowers have not ceased their "expansion and aggression"
against other countries. Drawing on another favorite theme, Chou
hailed an increasing awareness among "small and medium-size coun-
tries" that they must heighten their vigilance, unite more closely,
and persevere in struggle against the superpowers.
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CHINA - EUROPE
? PEKING STRENGTHENS TIES WITH WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
In the context of growing cooperation among West European states
in an expanding Common Market as well as the developing East-
West detente on the continent, Peking has made a succession of
moves to improve its leverage by strengthening ties with the
three main West European powers. The Chinese have accorded a
friendly reception to delegations from Britain, France, and
West Germany while continuing favorable coverage of developments
that reflect greater unity in West Europe as a counterweight to
the superpowers. At the same time Peking has muted its former
hostility toward detente trends in Europe that would serve to
free the Soviets for applying greater pressure on China. Peking
has yet to comment on recent East-West agreements on Europe,
remaining content thus far with a factual NCNA account on 5 June
of the signing of the quadrilateral accord on Berlin and the
exchange of instruments of ratification of the FRG's treaties
with the Soviet Union and Poland.
The first in the succession of West European visitors to Peking
was that of British Undersecretary for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs Anthony Royle last month. The highest-ranking British
official to visit the PRC, Royle had a "friendly" talk with
Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on 4 June. He also had talks with
Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Assistant Foreign
Minister Chang Wen-chin, who attended a banquet at which British
and Chinese officials toasted the "growth of relations" between
the two countries. The two countries had agreed in March to
raise their relations to the ambassadorial level.
In accord with the warm state of Sino-French relations, the
French delegation was on the level of Foreign Minister Schumann,
who arrived on 6 July. Schumann held extensive discussions
with Chou En-lai and Chi Peng-fei, and he was accorded the rare
honor as a foreign minister to be received by Mao. Unlike the
other meetings, which Peking uniformly described as "friendly,"
Schumann's conversation with Mao was characterized by NCNA as
"friendly and frank," indicating significant points of
? divergence of views. At a farewell banquet on 10 July Chi
called the visit "fruitful and satisfactory" and said it was a
"major event" in Sino-French relations, though he also
acknowledged divergent views on "some international issues."
Typically, the thrust of Peking's comment during the visit was
directed against "hegemony and power politics," though the
Chinese deferred to French sensitivities by omitting their
customary references to the two superpowers.
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Chiao Kuan-hua, speaking at the French embassy celebration of
France's national day on 14 July, said that during Schumann's
visit the two sides had c;trengthened mutual understanding and
made concrete arrangements for the development of economic,
cultural, scientific, and technological exchange. In the same
speech Chiao enunciated a line having relevance to negotiations
on European security when he declared, in a passage expressing
opposition to hegemony by the superpowers, chat relations
between countries "with different or identical social systems
should all be based" on the principles of peaceful coexistence.
He exprcased satisfaction that France and Ch4na have "common
grounds on these major questions of principle." In the '?RC-
Netherlands communique of 16 May raising their relations to the
ambassadorial level, the Dutch had explicitly interpreted the
principles of peaceful coexistence as implying noninterference
in internal affairs not only between countries of different
systems but "equally between countries belonging to an alliance
and having identical or similar socio-political systems." In
the communique Peking said it "appreciates this stand."
Marking the first visit by a West German official to Peking,
the chairman of the Bundestag's foreign affairs committee,
Gerhard Schroeder, a former minister, arrived on 15 July at the
invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign
Affairs--a device used for visitors from countries not having
relations with the PRC. welcoming banquet was attended by
NPC Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo and Chiao Kuan-hua, who earlier had
"a friendly" talk with Schroeder. Schroeder hasaaid he
expects to discuss European and international questions as well
as bilateral matters, possibly opening the way for establishment
of formal relations.
Peking in the meantime has indicated to East Germany that it
wishes to have reasonably good relations with that country. NCNA
reported that the newly appointed PRC ambassador to the GDR, had
a "friendly" talk with State Council Chairman Ulbricht when he
presented his credentials on 3 July. Atypically, NCNA noted
that "all members" of the Chinese embassy's diplomatic staff
accompanied the new ambassador at the meeting.
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KOREA
DPRK TREATY ANNIVERSARIES RECEIVE U)W-KEY CSERVANCE
The 11th anniversaries of the signing of the treaties of friendship,
cooperation, and mutual assistance between the DPRK and the USSR
(u .:uly) and the PRC (11 July) were observed at a level comparable
to that of 1970, the last previous nondecennial observance. This
year, however, the observance was notably subdued in tone,
reflecting the more relaxed atmosphere produced by the past
year's developments in Sino-U.S. relations and the thaw in North-
South Korean relations.* Attacks on the United States in this
year's observance were considerably muffled and there was no
reference to the South Korean people's "struggle" against an
oppressive regime.
Soviet comment on the anniversary routinely supported Pyongyang's
call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South and for
"peaceful unification," but there was no mention of UNCURK. In
observing the anniversary Moscow made no mention of the 4 July
North-South Korea joint statement on reunification, a subject
on which the Soviets have yet to comment. Pyongyang media,
however, reported Soviet speakers as welcoming the statement.
The Chinese, who have authoritatively welcomed the agreement,
included affirmations of support for it in comment markin3 the
treaty anniversary. Peking reiterated its line that the
agreement stripped the United States of all pretexts for
intervention in Korean affairs and demanded that the United
States withdraw its troops, though there was no mention of
UNCURK. The DPRK ambassador in Peking, however, used the
occasion to demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops "that fly
the flag of the 'United Nat?~'.,ns forces"' and the dissolution
of UNCURK.
* Kim Il-song, in some interviews with foreign correspondents
since last fall that were not carried in Pyongyang media, has
suggested that the DPRK might be willing to abrogate its treaties
with the USSR and the PRC to facilitate reunification. Not
surprisingly, this point did not surface in comment marking the
anniversaries.
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TREATY WITH USSR The Korean-Soviet treaty anniversary was
marked with the usual receptions held in the
two capitals by the respective ambassadors, a Moscow meeting
sponsored by the USSR friendship society, and a NODONG SINMUN
editorial article. Soviet Deputy Premier Novikov, as usual,
attended the DPRK ambassador's reception. DPRK Supreme People's
Assembly Vice President So Chol attended the Soviet ambassador's
reception, a somewhat lower-ranking official than in the past;
normally the reception had been attended by Pak Song-chol, a
vice premier at the time.
Moscow described the treaty in the customary terms as providing
a basis for the friendship and cooperation of the two peoples, as
safeguarding the "socialist gains" of the two countries, and as
an instrument of pence in the Far East. Typically, Moscow avoided
the theme of U.S. "war preparations" and "provocations" in Korea,
although Pyongyang was characteristically more polemical. So Chol
said that the treaty is a manifestation of the determination of the
two people to "firmly defend the security of the two countries and
the gains of the revolution from the encroachment of the imperialists,
headed by the U.S. imperialists, and to defend world peace." A
similar remark by the DPRK ambassador was reported by Radio Moscow
in a Korean-language broadcast. The NODONG SINMUN editorial article,
which said that the treaty "dealt a heavy blow to the imperialist
reactionaries headed by the U.S. imperialists," assailed "the
crimes of U.S. imperialism" in Korea, Indochina, and the Middle
East.
Comment on both sides was considerably more restrained than
last year's. Although Moscow had generally avoided associating
itself with Pyongyang's bellicosity and had not specifically
denounced the United States, it had characterized the treaty as
"a serious warning to those who have not abandoned attempts to
operate from a position of strength" and as "a resolute warning
to those who like playing with fire." North Korean speakers had
described the treaty as an instrument for curbing the "crivtinal
maneuvers" of the United States at a time when its "aggressi:-I
and war provocative maneuvers are being intensified," and they
had called upon the two countries to "further consolidate" their
alliance and "faithfully discharge the obligations they assumed
under the treaty" in the face of intensified U.S. and Japanese
aggressiveness.
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TREATY WITH PRC The anniversary of the treaty with the PRC
was observed much like the one in .1970, with
tanquets hosted. by the respective ambassadors, greetings exchanged
yy friendship associations, and a NODONG SINMUN editorial article.
Pak Song-chol attended the PRC ambassador's banquet in Pyongyang,
at which the KPA Chief of Staff spoke. The DPRK ambassador's
banquet this year was attended by Politburo members Yeh .Chien-ying
and Yao Wen-yuan and was addressed by Li Te-sheng, the political
chief of the PLA.
The restraint marking Peking's comment was particularly evident
in the omission of attacks on the United States by name as a
threat to the two communist allies. Li Te-sheng said blandly
that the treaty embodies "the great friendship" forged by the
Chinese and Korean people in protracted struggles against "the
common enemies," and that it "demonstrates their firm determina-
tion to fight in unity for the common cause." The Chinese
friendship association message similarly referred to "common
enemies," in contrast to the Korean message's specific mention
of "Japanese and U.S. imperialism" as those enemies. DPRK
speakers asserted that the treaty contributes to "defending the
security of the two countries and their socialist gains from the
encroachment of the. imperialists, headed by the U.S. imperialists,
and preserving peace in Asia and the rest of the world." The
NODONG SINMUN editorial article was still stronger, saying that the
treaty "frustrates the maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and
their stooges for the provocation of a new war."
This year's comment from both sides was considerably blander
than in 1971, when the Chinese joined with the North Koreani in
saying their treaty was directed against "U.S. imperialist
aggression" and explicitly cited the treaty provision committing
them to provide military assistance in case of attack. The
Chinese last year accused the United States of carrying out
provocations against the DPRK and of occupying Taiwan, and the
North Koreans aired charges that the United States sent "armed
agents, armed spy ships, and high-altitude reconnaissance
planes" into the DPRK and conducted armed attacks along the
demilitarized zone. Last year Peking briefly recalled that
the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) helped the Koreans during
the Korean War, and Pyongyang thanked the Chinese for doing
so. There was no mention of the CPV this year except in a low-
level PEOPLE'S DAILY article by a "workers' commentator group."
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19 JULY 1972
C E M A
MOSCOW COUNCIL SESSION ADMITS CUBA TO FULL MEt ERSHIP
The 10-12 July Moscow session of the Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance (CEMA) "unanimously" accropted Cuba as a full member
of the Soviet bloc organization--a move presumably sought by
Moscow and its partners in the hopt+ of achieving greater leverage
in the management of the Cuban econc. y and introducing greater
discipline into Cuban economic planning through the !%achinery of
CEMA integration. Cuban CP Secretariat member and Minister
Without Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, attending along with
the member countries' prir.Q ministers, acknowledged Cuba's part
of the bargain when he declared over Moscow television on
11 July that Cuba would "share to the full extent the responsi-
bility demanded by" CEMA integration. The new move to enhance
the Soviet role in Cuban economic planning carries forward the
apparent intention behind the formation of the Soviet-Cuban
Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical
Cooperation in December 1970.
Final details of the admission of Cuba, which has held "observer"
status at CEMA gatherings since September 1962, were evidently
worked out during Castro's 26 June-5 July stay in the USSR
following his visits to the six East European CEMA member states.
Castro did not mention CEMA in public speeches during hiG recent
tour of the Soviet bloc. But Havana media on the 17th quoted
Rodriguez in his CEMA session speech as cling a statement made by
Castro in East Europe to the effect that "national egoism is
incompatible with socialism inside and outside of the country,"
to which Rodriguez added his own comment- that Cuban economic
development could not be achieved "without Cuba joining the
process of socialist integration." And Hungary's Premier Fo..k,
in an interview with the Hungarian news agency MTI before leaving
Moscow on the 12th, observed that Cuba's application for CEMA
membership was "probably contributed to" by Castro's East
European tour.*
* PRENSA LATINA reported on the 18th that Crstro's "extensive
and detailed report" on his 10-nation tour was "unanimously
approved" by party, government, mass organization, and media
leaders at a 15-17 July meeting. There has been no Cuban comment
indicating the substance of the report; Castro may take the
occasion ..f a scheduled mass rally in Havana on 26 July, the 19th
anniversary of the Moncada barracks attack, to inform the nation
on his trip.
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Beyond the immediate economic consideration of protecting the
Soviet bloc investment, Cuba's admission serves to foster the
image of an expanding CEMA, open to any country wishing to
participate, at a time of expansion of the West European Common
Market and of more assertive Chinese effo.ts to make inroads
into the Soviet domain. The admission of the only other non-
European CEMA member, the Mongolian People's Republic in 1962,
had taken place in a similar context of Sino-Soviet rivalry.
Fock, in the MTI interview, commented that Cuba's admission now
was based on "the relevant provision of our integration document
according to which any non-CEMA-member country may participate
fully or partially in the implementation of the comprehensive
program." He expressed the conviction that "in the coming years
several countries" would either apply for membership or for the
opportunity to participate "in certain provisions" of the
integration program.
More specifically, Cuba's admission serves the propaganda
purpose of projecting the ultimate expansion of CEMA into Latin
America. Typical of Moscow's brief statements welcoming Cuba'a
admission was PRAVDA's editorial comment on the 15th that
"states of three continents are now members of CT,24A." A
panelist in the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable
the next day remarked in a similar vein that CEMA "from now on
will unite the fraternal socialist countries of three continents."
A domestic service broadcast of a recording of Rodriguez' Moscow
TV speech of 11 July, with overlaid translation in Russian,
represented the Cuban delegate as noting that Cuba was "the first
country of Latin America" to take part in CEMA integration. And
a report of the speech broadcast by Radio Moscow to Brazil
attributed to Rodriguez the more expansive statement that "we
shall incorporate our America--Latin America--in the activities
of" CEMA integration. A report of his speech to the CEMA session,
broadcast by Radio Havana to the Americas and published in the
party organ GRANMA on the 17th, quoted Rodriguez as stating that
with Cuba's admission to (.EMA "Latin America would enter the world
socialist economy."
According to the communique on the CEMA session carried in Soviet
media on 12 July, the other main business was discussion of the
implementation of the long-range economic integration program
adopted at the last session in Bucharest in July 1971, with
emphasis on cooperation in planning, the scientific-technical
sphere, and the electric power, chemical, and engineering
industries. The session was marked by the attendance of Yugoslav
Premier Bijedic--the highest-ranking Belgrade delegate to date
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.1.9 JULY 1972
at a CEMA gathering, raising Yugoslav representation at the session
to the same level as that of the member countries. The
Yugoslavs, holding "observer" statue and "participating" in the
work of a number of CEMA commissions under a September 1964
agreement, have insisted in radio and press comment that Bijedic's
attendance portends no change in Yugoslavia's nonalinement.
TIRANA C0t+IENT A Tirana radio commentary on the CEHA session
on 17 July pointedly omitted any mention of
either Cuba or Yugoslavia. Entitled "C'.MA, an Instrument in the
Hands of the Soviet Revisionists to Exploit the Satellite
Countries," the commentary typically described the meeting as a
further step in an alleged Soviet campaign to tie the economies
of "Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the other revisionist
countries" to that of the USSR. It notably refrained from
directly pinning the revisionist label on Hungary and took the
occasion to draw propaganda capital from the recent tensions in
Moscow-Budapest economic relations. Thus it charged that "how
immoderate the Soviet revisionists are in plundering these
countries is also revealed by the position of Hungarian bauxite
production," adding that "in bauxite production Hungary occupies
second place in the world" but "has no aluminum industry of its
own." Hungary, the broadcast said, must send the bauxite "about
3,000 kilometers" to a processing plant near Stalingrad, and
the USSR sells the processed aluminum to Hungary at a "capitalist
profit."
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19 JULY 1972
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
DUTCH CP REASSERTS AUT0N0MY. INDIRECTLY REBUKES CPSU
The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN)
has strongly reiterated the party's claim to "complete autonomy"
in the international movement and pointedly rebuked the CPSU for
interfering in CPN internal affairs and attempting to alienate
the Dutch party's rank and file from its duly elected leadership.
The documents of the 26-28 May congress in Amsterdam, recently
available in translation, sustain what has become a public polemic
between the CPSU and the small independent-minded Dutch party.
Specifically, the documents may be read as the CPN's response to
a PRAVDA Observer article of 12 May which charged the Dutch party
with rebuffing CPSU efforts to reestablish interparty relations;
the authoritative PRAVDA blast at the relatively insignificant
Dutch CP betrayed Moscow's acute sensitivity to public criticism
from other parties and reflected, at the same tiu,e, the capacity
of a small but vocal party to act as an irritant toward Moscow
at the present juncture in international communist relations.*
The "unanimously" adopted resolution of the CPN congress, published
in the party organ DE WAARHELD on 29 May, spelled out the party's
view of its role in interparty relations. It proclaimed that the
CPN is for "cooperation in concrete actions with all communist
parties without distinction," but it immediate'y added that
"relationships with other parties must be maintained and regulated
only from executive committee to executive committee"--a statement
reflecting fear that the CPSU was attempting to isolate the Dutch
CP leadership from the party rank and file. The resolution
continued:
Relationships between parties in the international
communist movement should be based on unequivocal
recognition of complete autonomy, not just lip
service but also in practice, so that there may be
no talk of interference in any form or support of
gr' ups of persons who attack the elected,
authorized CPN leadership and who oppose the
policy decided upon by the congress.
* See the TRENDS of 17 May 1972, pages 36-39, for a discussion of
the PRAVDA article and background on CPSU-CPN dissensions.
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19 JULY 1972
The PRAVDA Observer article, appearing shortly before the
congress, had made a pointed appeal to the Dutch rank and file:
"The assertion that the CPSU is unwilling to have contacts with
the CPN is completely untrue and is capable only of misleading
broad strata of CPN members; however, such a position hardly
meets the interests of the Dutch communists." Stressing that the
policy of the Dutch CP as approved by the congress must be
enforced by the CPN Executive Committee "under all circumstances,"
the congress resolution cautioned that the "the entire party is
obliged to use the greatest vigilance to protect the unity and
policy of the party against hostile interference."
Alluding to the split in the international movement generated
by the Sino-Soviet conflict, the resolution asserted that the CPN
is for a "principled international discussion on the basis of
equality on the problems of Man:ism-Leninism in these times,"
adding that "no exclusive attitude in regard to other parties
may be taken in these discussions." The issue of relations
between the Dutch CP and the Chinese Communist Party was raised
directly in the resolution's statement that "the CPN in past
years h 3 steadfastly refused to participate ii. the 'anti-Mao
campaign' because of its established rule not to comment on
domestic conditions in socialist countries on which it has no
factual information." CPN Chairman Hoekstra, in his main
report to the congress on 26 May, also said that all communists
must unite against "any intrigues Nixon may try in order to
exploit differences between the Soviet and Chinese communist
parties and to sow confusion; therefore, we must come around to
a new basis of international cooperation and unity of action."
Hoekstra then remarked that the resolution shows how this "new"
unity can be achieved.
CPSU MESSAGE PRAVDA published a two-paragraph CPSU message
to the congress on 26 May which conveyed a
picture of disunity in CPN ranks by pointedly wishing the CPN
"unity of its ranks on the basis of the principles of
Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, development
of ties with friendly communist parties . . . ." Neither
DE WAARHEID's reportage nor available versions of the congress
speeches, however, acknowledged any foreign party congratulatory
messages. The congress resolution explained the absence of
foreign party delegations as well as the failure to acknowledge
the CPSU message: "It is apparent that participation of guest
delegations at congresses and written greetings are-not
practical for the exchange of opinions under present conditions.
Therefore, for the time being, our party is giving up this
practice."
CONFIDENTIAL
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19 JULY 1972
PRAVDA carried its only other mention of the congress on
30 May when it reported tersely that the gathering had
finished its work, having heard the CPN leadership's report,
discussed party finances, and elected a new executive committee.
There was no detail on the substance of the report or the
discussions and no mention of the resolution.
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19 JULY 1972
GERMANY
IZVESTIYA BACKS FINNISH PROPOSAL FOR REU.-IONS WITH FFw, GDR
The Moscow press has for the first time publicly endorsed the
Finnish Government's long-standing proposal to start discussions
with both German states aimed at the establishment of diplomatic
relations. A 16 July IZVESTIYA article by Yuriy Goloshubov took
note of Helsinki's latest public renewal of its proposal, on
10 July, commenting that it "merits a positive appraisal" and
"ought to be considered against the background of the overall
process of detente taking place in Europe." Arguing that
recognition of the GDR would bo "an important contribution"
to the continuing process of lessening tensions in Europe, Lhe
article maintained that this was why the Finnish proposal '+ad
evoked a "great response" and had acquired "such urgency."
Nothing that "unfortunately" there are "voices" in the FRG and
in the West which "are trying to convince the public of the
'prematureness' of implementing the Finnish proposal," the
article concluded that "broad sections of the West Europe public
are convinced" that the Finnish initiative "fully accords with
the spirit and demand of the times."
At the time of the original Finnish Government proposal of
10 September 1971, both the East German and Soviet media had
reacted with extreme caution.* At that time both Moscow and
East Berlin carefully avoided any reference to the Finnish
call for negotiations on the settlement of damages caused by
German troops in Finland in 1944-45, and both ignored Helsinki's
stipulation that its treaties with the two German states must
come into force simultaneously--the first proviso being abhorrent
to East Germany because of its lung-standing refusal to accept
any responsibility for damages inflicted by the Germans in
World War II, and the second giving Bonn power to delay Finnish
recognition of the GDR until its own conditions are met. Other
elements of the 1971 draft treaties submitted to Bonn and East
Berlin, as part of the Finnish "package deal" to be negotiated
along with the establishment of diplomatic relations, included
recognition of Finland's "policy of neutrality" by both German
states and renunciation of force or threat of force in relations
with Finland.
* See the TRENDS of 29 September 1972, pages 31-32, and of
17 November 1972, pages 32-33.
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In reporting on a visit to Finland by SED Politburo member Axen
in November, East Berlin media continued to avoid mention of the
German reparations issue. However, Axon was reported by Helsinki
media to have said that it was difficult to appraise the grounds
for Finland's claim to compensation f or war damages and that
the important thing was to move ahead with negotiations on
normalizing relations. During this visit East Berlin media
acknowledged for the first time that the 1971 Finnish proposal
to establish diplomatic relations with the GDR was contingent
on simultaneous establishment of FRG diplomatic relations with
Finland.
Moscow and East Berlin have apparently reacted more favorably to
Helsinki's 10 July proposal because it now seems to separate the
"other issues" from the establishment of diplomatic relations,
though still calling for negotiations on the other questions
simultaneously with negotiations on diplomatic relations.
GDR REACTION The 10 July proposal was advanced at the
beginning of the annual Baltic Week festivities
in Rostock--a forum that gave East German spokesmen ample
opportunity to welcome the Finnish Government's initiative.
On the official level, the GDR Council of Ministers on the 12th,
according to ADN, instructed Foreign Minister Winzer "to take
the necessary measures for conducting the negotiations proposed
by the Finnish Government for the complete normalization of
relations between the GDR and Finland." Promptly on the 13th,
ADN reported that the acting head of the GDR trade mission in
Helsinki, Nestler, had presented the GDR's reply, which affirmed
thf. GDR's "repeatedly expressed conviction that the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations between the two states corresponds
to the interests" of the two states and of Europe in general.
The reply said the GDR "sincerely" welcomed the Finnish proposal
and declared "its readiness to conduct negotiations with repre-
sentatives of the Finnish Government on the establishment of
diplomatic relations."
East Berlin has not acknowledged the fact that the renewed
Finnish initiative called for the simultaneous opening of talks
on the "other" matters outlined in the original 1971 proposal.
TASS, on the other hand, did note in its 10 July report that the
Finnish Government said "agreement should be reached on the
commencement of a discussion of other questions connected with
? the full settlement of relations" with the two German states.
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