TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050024-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: June 14, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~~ IIIIIIiui~u~~~~~imllllllll~~~'
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVIf,E
~~~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~III
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
C*:if idential
14 JUNE 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 24)
875R000300050024-4
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This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defonse of Lhe 'United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of he US Code, as amended. Its
transmisslor or revelation of its contents to
o;. receipt t y an unauthorized per& in is pro-
hibitcd by law.
cIOUP I
Excluded from euramsk
dow .redina and
deebulRtallen
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 June 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
U.S. Strikes on 6, 8 June Prompt :)RV Foreign Ministry Protest .
DRV Stresses Need for Wartime Footing, Continued Aid to South .
6
PRC Foreign Ministry Says Bombing Threatens Chinese Security .
9
Moscow Reports Air Strikes, Assails Critics of Detente Policy .
11
PRG Council of Ministers Meeting Lauds Offensive, "Uprisings" .
14
Front Media Criticize Communist Failure to Press Offensive . . .
16
SALT AND DISARMAMENT
Moscow Treats SALT Ac:ords with High Praise, Little Detail . . .
18
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
Moscow Portrays Tito Visit as Evidence of "Socialist Unity" . .
19
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Bloc Relations Chief Rusakov Becomes Assistant to Brezhnev . . .
25
Leadership Changes in Ukraine Reflect Discord, Rivalries .
25
Arrested Tourist Implicates Five Ukrainian Dissidents . . . . ?
26
Agriculture Ministry Under Pressure to Reform . . . . . . . . .
27
Peking Cultivates Better Relations, Downplays Insurgencies . . .
30
Peking Plays Up Improved Official Relations with Burma . . . . .
31
CHINA
Hunan Agricultural Report Details Policies, Problems . . . . . .
35
TOPIC IN BRIEF: Israeli-Egyptian Air Incident . . . . . . . .
37
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
14 JUNE 1972
- i -
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 JUNE 1972
Moscow (2857 items)
Peking_ (1328 items)
Indochina
(3%)
10%
Domestic Issues
(53%)
39%
[PRG 3d Anniversary
(1%)
9%]
Indochina
(12%)
25%
Tito in USSR
(1%)
10%
[PRG 3d Anniversary
(1%)
19%]
Nixon USSR Visit
(25%)
6%
UN Conference on
(--)
6%
Moscow World Communist
Conference 3d
(1%)
4%
Environment in
Stockholm
Anniversary
PRf-Greek Diplomatic
(--)
6%
Brussels Conference on
(7%)
3%
Relations
European Security
Middle East 1967 War
(0.1%)
4%
Iraqi Foreign Minister
(--)
3%
Anniversary
in USSR
Kim I1-Song's New York
(0.17)
3%
Nationalization of
(1%)
3%
TIMES Interview
Iraqi Oil
Chilean Economic
(3%)
3%
Middle East
(1%)
3%
Delegation in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate voll-ne of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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CC71FIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 JUNE 1972
I ND0CH I NA
Vietnamese communist media have revealed that the top leadership
in both the North and the South met recently to assess develop-
ments since the launching of the communist offensive on 30 March.
The Front on 11 June broadcast a communique on a PRG Council of
Ministers meeting, held from 6 to 8 June, reaffirming confidence
in the Council's assessment of the situation last January, "which
led to the offensive . . . ." VNA had reported on the 10th that
a "recent" DRV Council of Ministers meeting expressed approval of
feats during the past two months in connection with both the
offensive in the South and U.S. "escalation" against the North.
Hanoi on 10 June broke its pattern of daily foreign ministry
spokesman's protests over the air strikes and issued a higher-level
DRV Foreign Ministry statement--the first at this level since
18 May. The statement singled out attacks on 6 and 8 June in the
Hanoi and Haiphong area as well as the resumption of B-52 strikes
in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area. It did not,
however, mention the strikes near the Chinese border. The state-
ment and other propaganda has reaffirmed North Vietnamese determination
to continue the struggle no matter how great the sacrifices. And press
comment has been stressing the need to rev,; et to a wartime
footing as in the 1965-68 period and to continue supporting the South.
While Hanoi's 10 June protest made no mention of air strikes near
the Chinese border, a supporting PRC Foreign Ministry statement on
the 12th took sharp exception to U.S. air action near the Sino-
Vietnamese border as "threatening the security of China." Having
thus made Peking's first linkage of its security interests with
Vietnam developments since the Lam Son 719 operation last year, the
Chinese statement pledged continuing support; no matter "what
circumstances may yet arise in this war."
Moscow comment on President Nixon's visit to the USSR has continued
to defend Soviet policy against criticism by unnamed parties and to
insist that agreements with the United States are not directed
against any third powers. At the same time, there have been
routine reaffirmations of Soviet support for the Vietnamese.
U.S. STRIKES ON 6, 8 JUNE PROMPT DR'J FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTEST
The 10 June DRV Foreign Ministry statement broke the weeks-long
pattern of daily protests at the lower level of the foreign
ministry spokesman. Presumably the statement was issued at the
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higher level because it singled out action in the areas of
Hanoi and Haiphong--on 6 and 8 June, respective..y--as well as
the resumption of B-52 strikes on the 8th in Quang Binh
Province and the Vinh Linh area. The last two previous foreign
ministry statements, issued on 11 and 18 Yay, also condemned
strikes at Hanoi and Haiphong; the one befora that, on 6 May,
scored the bombing of Nam Dinh city.* Although the U.S.
strikes have continued at an intensive level since the 8th,
Hanoi reverted to its daily routine protests by the foreign
ministry spokesman from the 11th through the 14th. As of the
13th, Hanoi claimed a total of 3,653 U.S. planes since the
beginning of the air war.
The foreign ministry statement sollowed Hanoi's usual practice
in referring only vaguely to "populated areas" and "economic
and cultural establishments" being hit and thus did not acknowledge,
for example, that a thermal power plant reportedly was among the
targets on the 6th. The statement also failed to acknowledge
that the strikes that day were within 20 miles of the Sino-
Vietnamese border. However, a QU4N DOI NHAN DAN commentary
article on the 14th---referring to the strikes on the outaki:ts
of Hanoi and Haiphong, on the 6th and 8th and at Nam Dinh city
on the llth--said that "U.S. aircraft have also bombed areas close
to the Vietnam-China border, threatening the security of the PRC."
The statement differed from earlier ones in that it took the
occasion to round up the strikes since early April. It declared
that U.S. ships and planes have "bombarded on a daily basis many
densely populated areas in the DRV, from the coast to the
hinterland, from villages to towns." It charged that the United
States had attacked Hanoi and 30 municipalities, cities, and tcwns
in 19 provinces and that many areas had been subjected to repeated
attacks, "some to a dozen raids, such as Haiphong, Vinh, Thanh Hoa,
and Dong Hoi." It said :hat "according to still incomplete figures,"
* A 6 April foreign ministry statement condemned strikes at Ha Tinh
and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh; an 11 April government
statement protested the announcement that'U.S. strikes were being
expanded; the 16 April strikes at Hanoi and Haiphong prompted a DRV
joint party-government statement that day; and the President's
8 May announcement cf U.S. mining of DRV ports and other interdiction
moves brought a DRV Government statement on the 10th. The last
previous protest to mention B--52's was the one issued by the
foreign ministry spokesman on 24 April.
? CONFIDENTIAL
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U.S. bombs have hit more than 30 schools, "20 medical centers
including eight provincial and municipal hospitals, 12 churches
and pagodas, 32 portions of dike on the main waterways, and
29 sluices and dams." It also said that many houses have been
destroyed and that "thousands of civilians have been killed or
wounded." Some of these statistics were repeated in an 11 June
NHAN DAN editorial supporting the foreign ministry statement.
On the 9th VNA had publicized a'"special communique" by the
DRV War Crimes Commission on ac*ton against Hanoi on the 6th and
8th. The QUAN DOI KHAN DAN commentary on the 14th ridiculed a
reported statement by Kissinger in Tokyo to the effect that
U.S. policy was to bomb only military targets and that if
civilian targets were hit, it would have been inadvertent.
Also on the 9th, VNA carried a War Crimes Commission communique
enumerating "criminal" actions against both the North and the
South during the month of May. Hanoi media have also publicized
criticisms of alleged U.S. criminal actions in Vietnam voiced
at the UN Conference on the Environment in Stockholm by the
Chinese delegate and by Swedish Premier Palme, among others.
SUPPORT AND AID The high-level protests since the beginning
of April have used various formult?tions
regarding moral support and material assistance from the
communist and "peace-loving" nations. The statement of the 10th
expressed "gratitude" for condemnations of the U.S. escalation
but went on to appeal to "brothers and friends in the world" to
struggle "even more vigorously" to stay the hand of the aggressor
and "to continue to support and assist the Vietnamese people."
The 11 April government statement had been notable for iti appeal
for "even stronger support and assistance," and the 10 May
government statement on the U.S. mhining had expressed "firm
confidence" that the socialist countries and peoples of the world
would "strengthen support and further assist the just resistance
against aggression." Time 11 May foreign ministry statement said
nothing about material aid, instead cal!irig on the fraternal
socialist countries to "act resolutely to stay in time the bloody
hand of the U.S. aggressor." The 18 May foreign ministry
statement was similar to the government statement of the 10th in
expressing confidence not only that there would be action. "to
stay the hand of the aggressor," but that the fraternal and
peace-loving countries would "sur;ort and assist more powerfully
the Vietnamese struggle."
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The current statement's call "to continue to support and assist"
the Vietnamese would seem to indicate satisfaction at the level
of aid at present and concern that it be maintained.
DIFFICULTIES IN U.S., The foreign ministry statement typically
MCGOVERN "PHENOMENON" expressed determination to continue the
struggle. Declaring that the Nixon
Administration believes it can force the Vietnamese "to approve
the insolent U.S. conditions and thereby save ite Vietnamization
policy," the statement said: "Bombs, bullets, and all crafty
political and diplomatic schemes and maneuvers by the Nixon
Administration can in no way shake the Vietnamese people's iron
determination."
The current statement differed from other recent ones in detailing
difficulties facing the United States. Thus, it hailer' the
military successes of the communists in South Vietnam and said
that "the movement to oppose" the Americans and Thieu is develop-
ing in Saigon and other cities, that "the U.S.-Thieu clique's
posture is a passive, defeated one," and that "the Vietnamization
policy is collapsing more and more seriously." Regarding the
situation iti the United States, it pointed to the "growing"
protest movement against the escalation of the bombing as well as
to economic problems facing the President. And it concluded that
contrary to the expectations of the White House, Vietnam remains
a foremost problem in the United States during a presidential
election year and "a central problem in international political
lifa."
The President's alleged difficulties were also discussed iu a
10 June NHAN DAN commentary which reported Senator McGovern's
victories in the Democratic Party primaries and cited reports that
"in all probability" he would be the candidate in the race against
President Nixon. The article ascribed the McGovern "phenomenon"
to the President's "cruel, stubborn, and perfidious policy" on
Indochina. Noting that McGovern was one of the earliest and most
persistent opponents of the Vietnam war, it said the Senator had
described "Nixon's war-maniac measures" of mining DRV ports as
illogical and unnecessary and had stated that they could not
succeed. NHAN DAN said the McGovern "phenomenon" reflects the
strength and scope of the antiwar feelings'in the United States;
it wont on to.cat:tion that there will be many new developments
before the convention but deemed it certain that the war and
economic and financial problems will remain the "burning issues."
The article echoed earlier propaganda in referring indirectly to
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the President's summitry: Declaring that there is still "the
very old Nixon," it said: "Even when this hawk borrowed
dove wings to make distant trips, it still uttered threats and
challenges"; and "the hard race to the White House has brought
Nixon to places tens of thousands of miles away."
FOREIGN MINISTRY In addition to the foreign ministry
SPOKESMAN PROTESTS statement, protests by the foreign ministry
spokesman during the past week have
included the following specific charges:
+ The 8 June statement protested strikes the day before on
Haiphong and "many other populous areas" in Lang Son, Quang Ninh,
Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and
Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area. It charged that also on
the 7th U.S. ships si:elled coastal areas in Nghe An and Quang
Binh. Targets were said to include villages, urban centers,
factories, state farms, and irrigation works, including the
Liem sluice in Wong Cong district of Thatch Hoa Province. There
were allegedly many civilian casualties and great damage to
dwelling houses and economic and cultural centers.
+ The 11 June protest cited repeated bombings on the 9th and
10th against population centers in the vicinity of Haiphong and
in Lang Son, Yen Bai, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Nphe An, Ha Tinh,
and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. "Parci ?ilarly serious,"
according to the protest, were "extermination bombings against
Hon Gai, the capital of the coal-mining province of Quang Ninh,
and B-52 carpet bombings against numerous villages in Quang
Binh Province and Vinh Linh." The bombings were said to have
caused "heavy destruction to many economic and cultural establish-
ments" and homes and "heavy civilian casualties."
4 The spokesman on the 12th protested strikes on the 11th
against: Nam Dinh city and "many populous areas" in Thai Binh,
Ha Bac, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Quang Ninh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and
Quang Biph provinces and Vinh Linh. He labelled as "more
serious still" the "indiscriminate" B-52 bombing of a "number of
villages and hamlets" in Quang Binh Province and Vinh Linh.
+ Of the current protests, the 13 June statement is the only
one to report explicitly the dropping of more mines--on 12 June-
on entrances to ports in the DRV. In addition, it condemned
bombings of "many populous areas" in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Thai Binh,
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh
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area. It also said that B-52's bombed a number of hamlets in
Quang Binh and Vinh Linh and that many civilians, mostly old
people, women, and children, were killed and "many economic
and cultural establishments" and people's hones destroyed.
+ The 14 June protest said that on the 13th, "along with mining
and blockading North Vietnam's ports," U.S. planes hit "many
populated areas in Haiphong and its suburbs" and in Vinh Phu,
Hai Hung, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang
Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. Like all the protests since
10 June, it scored the renewed use of B-52's, stating that
B-52's "wantonly bombed a number of hamlets and villages" in
Quang Binh. The statement asserted that the United States
"rained bombs and shells at random on many villages, townships,
urban areas, and factories, killing and wounding many civilians."
It claimed that "a great number" of economic and cultural
establishments were destroyed, including the Ngoc Uyen church
in Nam Sach district, Hai Hung Province, and a school in Phu Ly,
Nam Ha Province.
DRV STRESSES NEED FOR WARTIME FOOTING, CONTINUED AID TO SOUTH
North Vietnamese determination to continue the struggle was
reasserted officially in a communique issued by the DRVV Council
of Ministers meeting which VNA on the 10th announced had been
held "recently."* The communique, as reported by VNA, called on
the ^.rmy and people, among other things, "to urgently switch
all activities to wartime conditions" and "in all eventualities
fulfill the sacred duty toward blood-sealed South Vietnam" as
well aR th.: "international obligation" toward the peoples of
Laos aad Cambodia.
Earlier, a series of articles in NHAN DAN on 1, 3, and 5 June,
attributed to Hong Ha, graphically detailed the sacrifices and
hardships the people may be called upon to make. In his first
article, Hong Ha said that the North's "greatest and most
valuable task" is to fulfill its duty to the front; he stressed
that a wartime labor mobilization policy is necessary, adding
that "it is unacceptable for the rear base to continue to feed
the lazy and all those who earn their living dishonestly."
* The last known Council of Ministers meeting was'held"on
17 April. Hanoi media on 11 May referred to it in reporting
that Premier Pham Van Dong, implementing a resolution of that
meeting, had issued a decision on 5 May promulgating regulations
on maintaining security and order and managing commerce in
wartime.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FRIS TRENDS
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In the second article he said that the North Vietnamese had
"accepted the Nixon clique's challenge," that all forces
were being mobilized, and that "peace will only return to
the North when the South has triumphed." In the third
article he said the "enemy can never paralyze our economy to
the point of preventing our survival and our ability to supply
the South," and he added dramatically:
Our people can walk, can use torchlight, can
eat watered gruel and still defeat the U.S.
aggressors. We are prepared to do this because
what is important is that our hearts continue
to beat for the South and because at the very
moment we do this, we are approaching final
victory.*
Hong Ha went on to observe that "we still do not have conditions
for making aircraft, artillery guns, and warships, and we do
not need to produce barbed wire and poison chemicals." And he
added that "if we satisfactorily insure communications and
transportation, agricultural production, and local industrial
production, we will meet the fundamental demands of combat
and insure the people's livelihood." He labeled communications
and transportation the most important tasks at present and
said that "arteries operate incessantly to bring aid to the
frontline and to serve combat, production, and the people's
livelihood. However, assistance to the frontline is of first
priority." Stressing the importance of "firmly maintaining
and developing communications and transportation," Hong Ha
said that "we will link roads and communications lines together.
A destination can be reached by many roads. A river can be
crossc;i at different places. Many methods can be used to
transport one type of goods." He also noted the importance
of "absolutely preventing leaks of secrets" on the
transportation and communications front.
* AP in Hong Kong reported that it monitored this article
from a Hanoi English-language transmission on 5 June. FBIS
did not hear the broadcast, and the series is not known to have
bean broadcast ii, Vietnamese.
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Stating that agriculture is one area of production "which needs
to be developed first," Hong Ha noted the necessity of "exhaustively
using any cultivable piece of land and ahy idle laborer in food
production." He urged that "now more than ever it is necessary
to economize on food, to endeavor to abolish the free food market,
and to insure that the state concentrates the necessary foodstuffs
so that it can successfully organize the fighting." In this
context, he also stressed the importance of protecting the. dikes.
NHAN DAN has also recently published a number of editorials
concerning domestic matters. Editorials on 7 and 10 June
stressed the importance of agricultural production, while the
editorial on the 8th linked production with the need to practice
thriftiness. An editorial on the 13th discussed the importance
of correctly implementing the policies regarding sick and wounded
soldiers and the families of fallen heroes and troops.
M
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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY SAYS BOMBING THREATENS CHINESE SECURITY
Departing from its markedly cautious reaction to U.S. interdiction
measures in North Vietnam, Peking has sharply protested U.S. air
strikes close to China's border and has hinted at counteraction
in support of the DRV. The PRC Foreign Ministry statement on
12 June, seconding the DRV statement of the lUth, charged that
by "steadily" expanding its air action to areas close to the
Sino-Vietnamese border the United States was "threatening the
security of China"--the first direct linkage of Chinese security
interests with Vietnam developments since the allied incursion
into southern Laos in February-March 1971. The statement called
the U.S. actions "grave provocations" against the Chinese, the
same charge as appeared in the 9 May foreign milnistry protest
against the shelling of Chinese cargo vessels anc.ored off the
DRV. Unlike the May protest, the 12 June statement reaffirmed
Peking's commitment to support the DRV, adding a cryptic reminder
to the United States that the peoples of Indochina "are by no means
alone" in their struggle.*
.While taking sharp exception to U.S. moves near the Chinese
border, a matter of special sensitivity since the very first year
of the PRC's existence, the Chinese statement was carefully limited
in its warning and stopped well short of mee:-ing Hanoi's needs for
reassurance. Indeed, the DRV statement to which the Chinese protest
was pegged had made no mention of air strikes near the PRC border,
and the divergent reactions of the two allies indicate that their
motives and interests remain apart in significant respects. Where
the DRV statement took the occasion of U.S. raids on 6 and 8 June
to call into question the Nixon Administration's interest in a
peace settlement and to raise the iFaue of the U.S. elections,
Peking used the issuance of the DRV statement as a peg for
expressing concern over-action near its borders while taking care
to avoid injecting political issues that would complicate
Sino-U.S. relations** The Chinese statement made no direct
reference to the Nixon Administration and made no mention of
political questions or a settlement. Moreover, Peking took the
unusual step of editing the DRV statement in order to excise
references to the Administration's "hypocritical professions"
about peace and to the war as a factor in the U.S. presidential
* VNA repeated the Chinese statement in full on the 13th, and
TASS that day summarized the statement.
** Peking announced on the 14th that Dr. Kissinger would visit
the PRC from 19 to 23 June to further normalize relations and to
exchange views on "issues of common interest."
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election. NCNA's account of the statement also omitted its
expression of gratitude to the socialist countries and its call
for stronger action to stay the U.S. hand.*
In reaffirming Peking's "unshirkable internationalist duty" to
support and assist the Vietnamese war effort, the PRC statement
revived the formulation--last used at the time cf DRV Premier
Phaa "in Dong's visit in November--saying that China and Vietnam
are "neighbors closely related like lips and teeth." In an
unusual formulation, the statement promised continuing support no
matter "what circumstances may yet arise in this war" and closed
with the reminder that the Indochinese peoples "are by no means
alone" in their struggle. While the statement was vague in
portraying a U.S. threat to Chinese security, the unusual
formulation regarding future Chinese action, taken in the context
of a protest against action near the border, sLlgesta sensitivity
to U.S. pressures along the border that more divectly impinge on
the Chinese than other interdiction measures. In this respect
the protest may be viewed as a warning and a deterrent to dissuade
thc; United States from creating a situation tht,,t would seriously
complicate Peking's tightrope walk between mee+:ing its allies'
needs and sustaining the improved Sino-U.S. rrilationship.**
SPEECH AT STOCKHOLM The chief Chinese delegate at the UN
CONFERENCE conference on the environment being held
in Stockholm delivered a blistering
attack on U.S. actions in Vietnam in the course of a diatribe
against the two superpowers as the main culprits damaging the
environment. In a major speech on 10 June, the Chinese declared
* On a previous occasion, Peking c ced a 6 May DRV Foreign
Ministry statement to delete a charge that the United States had
proven to be worse than Hitlerite fascism. Normally Peking Goes
not tamper with official DRV statements on the foreign ministry or
government level.
** The March 1971 visit to Hanoi of a high-powered PRC delegation
headed by Chou En-lai was designed both to deter the United States from
expanding the operation then going on in southern Laos and to
reassure the DRV of Chinese support. On the matter of reassurance
the Chinese went far beyond what they have be-3n willing to do in the
recent phase of Vietnam developme.its. Apart from the impact of the
well-publicized visit itself, Chou pledged that the Chinese would
not flinch "even from the greatest national sacrifices" should the
United States proceed to expand the war, and he invoked a Mao
instruction declaring that failure to aid the Vietnamese would be
"betrayal of the revolution."
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that the conference should not remain indifferent to such "atrocities"
as the U.S. bombings and shellings, the use of chemical and
poisonous gas, and the bombing of dikes "in an attempt to create
a man-made flood catastrophe." The Chinese delegate called on the
United States to withdraw its troops and to end the Vietnamization
program and support for the Thieu regime. The Chinese had also
used the UN Conference on Trade and Development In April to
criticize U.S. policy in Vietnam and to denounce the superpowers,
and it is likely that it was the opportunity to play to the
third-world gallery again--rather than Vietnam developments as
such--that led the Chinese to unleash their polemical volley at
the Stockholm meeting.
MOSCOW REPORTS AIR STRIKES, ASSAILS CRITICS OF DETENTE POLICY
Moscow has been briefly reporting the continuing DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's protests of U.S. bombings in the course of routine-level
reportag3 of military action in both North and South Vietnam. The
higher-level 10 Jule DRV Foreign Ministry statement was briefly
summarized by TASS as a st:parate item that day, but there has been
no supporting comment. TASS noted that the statement scored U.S.
bombing near Hanoi and Haiphong but inexplicably did not mention
the charge that B-52's bombed in Quang Binh Province. A shorter
version of the report of the DRV statement was published in PRAVDA
on the 11th. Moscow last officially protested U.S. air strikes in
a 16 April TASS statement condemning the strikeo at Haiphong and
Hanoi that day.
On the 13th TASS reported that French Foreign Minister Schumann
received the DRV delegate general in France who handed him a copy
of the foreign ministry statement. The DRV representative
reportedly pointed to the "gravity of the situation" and expressed
satisfaction with the French Government's support for a negotiated
settlement at the Paris conference. Presumably Hanoi representa-
tives regularly deliver such statements to foreign governments,
but available propaganda has rot reported any such delivery of the
10 June statement to Soviet officials. VNA did report last month
that during Xuan Thuy's meeting with Kosygin--when he stopped over
in Moscow en route from Paris to Hanoi--the DRV ambassador had
handed Kosygin a copy of Hanoi's 10 May government statement
denouncing the U.S. mining of DRV ports. The TASS report of the
meeting had said nothing about the delivery of the DRV statement.
Also on 13 June TASS briefly reported the PRC Foreign Ministry
statement supporting the DRV, noting that it warned that the
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expansion of the bombing raids in North Vietnam "'up to the areae
situated in direct proximity to the Chinese-Vietnamese border'
Imperils the security of China and constitutes a 'serious
provocation."' In the past Moscow has occasionally acknowledged
official Chinese statements on Vietnam and other subjects,
including the PRC Government statement on the U.S. mining of
DRV ports--issued on 11 May, the same day as the USSR Government
statement--and the 10 April PRC Foreign Ministry statemen':
denouncing U.S. air strikes on the DRV.
DETENTE POLICY Moscow comment on President Nixon's visit has
continued to defend the Soviet policy of
coexistence and detente against criticism by unnamed parties and
to insist that Soviet-U.S. agreements are not directed against
any third powers. Thus, a 9 June PRAVDA article by Academician
N. Inozemtsev, while noting that "the overwhelming majority of
communist and workers parties" highly assessed the Soviet-U.S.
talks, added that
attempts are being made--although, it is true,
they are few in number--to replace common sense
by unscrupulous speculation about some
"conspiracy between the two superpowers" and
to the effect that the Soviet-American
agreements are allegedly detrimental to some
third countrie3.
To document the claim that agreements with the United States were
not reached at the expense of third countries, Inozemtsev recalled,
among other things, that in the ;point communique the Soviet side
had stressed its solidarity with the Indochinese people's struggle
and support for the DRV and PRG proposaii for a political settlement.
In defense of a pol4.:y of "principle-mindedness" combined with
"maximal flexibility," Inozemtsev invoked Lenin's dictum on the
duty of a "really revolutionary party":
The task of a rer+lly revolutionary party is
not to proclaim the impossibility of rejecting
any compromise but to know how to insure
loyalty to its principles, it class, and its
revolutionary task through all compromises
insofar as they are inevitable . . . .
(PRAVDA's emphasis)
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Earlier, a Mikhaylov International Review in the 4 Jun' PRAVDA
had more bluntly taken exception to critics of Soviet policy,
bringing to mind the 26 May NEW TIMES article by Zagladin, who
had seemed to be lecturing the DRV on the international duty
of socialist states.* Mikhaylov declared that the enemies of
international detente are not only some conservative Westerners
but also "an extreme 'left' wing of opponents to the Moscow
agreements." The latter, he said, while declaring themselves
adherents to the ideas of proletarian internationalism, in
fact try to press the theory that "any agreement is inadmissable
while military conflicts exist and imperialist aggression
continues." Mikhaylov pointed to the impossibility of attaining
any "military solution" in either Indochina or the Middle East
and asserted that recent international events confirm that
only renunciation of force and "recognition of realities"
are a precondition for agreements, citing the example of Germany.
At the same time, Mikhaylov spoke of the "immutable" nature of
Soviet-Vietnamese solidarity, a theme echoed in other propaganda
including the 8 June PRAVDA editorial article on the anniversary
of the June 1969 Moscow conference of communist and '.orkers
parties. The editorial stressed that Soviet policy serves the
cause of international security and support] the liberation
struggle, and it declared that the Indochinese "always feel the
hand of the Soviet Union their friend." The 10 June Soviet-
Yugoslav communique on Tito's Moscow visit said that both sides
affirm their unfailing support for the Vietnamese, Lao, and
Cambodian peoples, who are waging a "Just struggle against U.S.
aggression." The communique also called in standard fashion
for a cessation of U.S. bombing, a withdrawal of U.S. troops,
and respect for the right of the Indochinese peoples to decide
their own destiny without outside interference.**
Routine reaffirmations of Soviet support and assistance to the
Indochinese include some Mandarin-language commentaries pegged
to the 6 June anniversary of the establishment of the PRG in
* The Zagladin article is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 June,
pages 19-20.
** While common Soviet-Yugoslav positions on Indochina were stated
in the communique, another passage noted that there had been a
"mutually useful" exchange of opinions and consultations on
"international problems" which would promote "the better under-
standing of each others' views and positions and successful
Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation in the international arena."
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South Vietnam as well as the anniversary of the Moscow conference.
They observed that during the Moscow talks with President Nixon,
the Soviet side invariably emphasized this support and assistance.
The commentaries also again took the Chineso to task for failing
to join in "united action" and attacked PRC "slander" charging
that the Soviet Union is "colluding" with the United States.
PODGORNYY Moscow and Hanoi media have not thus far mentioned
EN ROUTE TO DRV that Podgornyy is en route to Hanoi. The Delhi
radio on 14 June briefly reported his stopover
in .?.lcutta that day. Later the same day, a Delhi broadcast cited
a Soviet Embassy spokesman as saying that Podgornyy's departure
for Hanoi, scheduled after an hour's halt, had been postponed
until the next morning because of bad weather. Podgornyy's mission
is presumably to report to the North Vietnamese on President Nixon's
visit.*
PRG COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING LAUDS OFFENSIVE,, of UPRISINGS 11
Liberation Radio reported on 11 June that the Council of Ministers
of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, meeting from 6 to
8 June, had reviewed the current siturtion and set forth
important tasks aimed at developing the leadership of the
revolutionary administrations at all levels and at accelerating
the offensive. The three-day meeting, chaired by PRG President
Huynh Tan Phat, was said to have been held on the occasion of
the 6 June anniversary of the PRG. (The usual PRG/NFLSV
ceremonial meeting to mark the anniversary was not held this year.)
The communique on the meeting reiterated the standard communist
claims that recent "victories" have dealt "heavy blows" to
Vietnamization, changed the balance of forces, and shaken the
allied de`enses; it added that the successes have also "effected
a qualitative change in the political situation in favor of our
people." Despite this conventional optimism, the possibility
that questions have been raised as to the wisdom of the offensive
was suggested when the communique defensively led off with an
* CPSU Secretary Katushev's 26-29 April visit to Hanoi was not
publicized in Moscow and Hanoi media until the day of his
departure for home, when TASS and VNA issued identical announce-
ments. Katushev's trip came in the wake of Kissinger's visit
to Moscow to prepare for the President's arrival. See the TRENDS
of 3 May, page 17.
CONFIDENTIAL
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endorsement of the Council's analylis of conditions in South
Vietnam prior to the offensive. It stated: "The participants
at the meeting unanimously asserted that the assessment of the
situation by the lash session which led to the high ride of
offensive and uprisings on all battlefronts aimed at smas.iing
the U.S. 'Vietnamization of the war' policy was very accurate."
The previous Council of Ministers meeting had been held "early
in January," according to a 28 January Liberation Radio
announcement. The communique on that meeting, dated 22 Januaryp
claimed that there was a f avorab'c shift in the balance of forces
and called upon the South Vietnamese to develop their struggl^
to win "the greatest victories" in order to "doom" Vietnamization
and "advance toward complete victory."*
In spelling out future tasks, the current communique, like the
one last January, called for the development and strengthening
of the "revolutionary administration" at all levels. This is
necessary, according to the communique, so as to step up the
offensive and "uprisings" and to record greater victories while
building the "liberated zone," developing the political and armed
forces, changing the balance of forces, upholding the initiative,
"completely defeating" Vietnamization, and advancing toward "total
victory." Citing concrete tasks in the local areas, the
communique noted the need to safeguard order and security in
liberated areas, to build combat villages to resist counter-
attacks, to improve the people's livelihood, to boost production,
and to contribute more material and human resources to the war.
The communique indicated that the PRG Council also "paid special
attention" to implementing and developing "announced policies
aimed at broadening the united national front against U.S.
aggression and for national salvation." While the communique on
the January Council meeting had not stressed this point, that
meeting did adopt the PRG's 10-point policy toward members of the
ARVN and their families, released on 25 January, which aimed at
bringing about affiliation with the PRG of the widest possible
range of individuals in South Vietnam. The current communique
reaffirmed the PRG's adherence to the 10-point nolicy and to
the proposal in the PRG's seven points for the formation of a
provisional coalition government to organize free general elections.
* The January Council of Minsters meeting is discussed in the
2 February TRENDS, pages 20-23.
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FRONT MEDIA. CRITICIZE COMMUNIST FAILURE TO PRESS OFFENSIVE
With communict r%ilitary forces apparently stymied on many fronts
in South Vietnam, recent Vietnamese communist propaganda has
reflected dissad sfe':tion with the efforts of some elements in
the offensive. Fur 'xample, a 13 June Liberation Radio commentary
routinely praising; the role of the PLAF -infantry in the offensive
also suggested deL,''ncies in some infantry units: It warned
t!'at units which become dependent on fire support will "slacken
their spirit of resolutely and intensively attacking the enemy,"
will "miss opportunities to annihilate the enemy," rnd will "fail
to take full advantage of fire support," These errors, the radio
said, will restrict victories and "adversely affect the protection,
preservation, and improvement .)f our forces."
Unusually frank criticism of the acti,ns of some cadres and party
members in the conduct of the offensive; was set forth in an
article broadcast by Liberation Radio Cr, 3 June and said to have
been published in issue No. 2 of TAP CHI TIEN PRONG (VANGUARD
MAGAZINE)--a journal of the People's Revolutionary Party, the
communist party in South Vietnam.* The TIEN PRONG article pressed
the view that now is the time to strike a "decisive" blow at the
allies, and it harshly criticized those cadres and party members
who lacked confidence. The article lectured sternly that "being
hesistant, undecided, fearing enemy counterattacks, not daring
to act boldly, and adopting a wait-and-see attitude under t.ie pretext
of making steady progress are gross errors in the present situation."
These attitudes, the article declared, "restrict the great
capabilities of the masses" and the "capabilities of the movement
that must be developed by leaps and bounds in line with the great
developments of the situation."
* The PRP was established in January 1962 and was given fairly
frequent publicity in Vietnamese communist media in the 1964-65
period. Since 1966, however, references to the party have been
extremely rare. The treatment of the PRP in communist media is
reviewed in FBIS Special Report RS. 97 of 24 July 1969, "The PRG
and the PRP in South Vietnam," pages 19-24, and in the FBIS SURVEY
of 15 September 1969, pages 1-4. The publication TIEN PRONG has
been mentioned occasionally in the media; articles from it were
last known to have been broadcast in January and February 1970.
These articles are discussed in the 12 February 1970 FBI3 SURVEY,
pages 10-14.
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The failure of cadres and party members in some areas to take
offensive action we.s reflected in TIEN PHONG's admonition that
the allies "will only be defeated when they have to cope
with the combined strength of our entire armed forces and
people's concerted, widespread, violent attacks Jr. all three
strategic areas." Noting that such concerted action will
support the offensive reduce difficulties, and "save our
cadres and combatants' blood and bones," the journal sounded
an emotional warning:
Failure to resolutely and daringly attack the enemy
in order to coordinate action with the general
movement and failure tc spread out the enemy for
annihilation at a time when the situation is
very favorable for us is tantamount to relinquish-
ing one's responsibility in fighting with one's
comrades-in-arms against the enemy. Hesitation
in taking action and failure to take advantage of
the main-force units' victories to further
develop the offensive position and to exert more
preasure on the enemy in one's locality is
tantamount to disregarding the blood and bones
and efforts of our combatants who have made
sacrifices and fought to create conditions to
stage uprisings and overcome difficult situations
in the localities.
Such attitudes, the article added, "are wrong and must be
regarded as grave offenses against the revolution and the
people."
In contrast to other Vietnamese communist propaganda which
has praised the PLAF's destruction of allied forces and
ignored its failure to take such objectives as An Loc and
Kontum, the TIEN PRONG article demanded that "military
spearheads at the provincial and district levels must be
more resolute and daring," adding that "it is not enough to
only annihilate the enemy's manpower. What we must now do is
liberate many villages and areas."
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SALT AND DISARMAMENT
MOSCOW TREATS SALT ACCORDS WITH HIGH PkAISE. LITTLE DETAIL
Soviet comment following up the President'.' visit--by such senior
commentators as PRAVDA's Mayevskiy and IZVES'i'IYA's Matveyev and
in the V. Mikhaylov and Inozemtsev articles in PRAVDA (discussed
in the Indochina section of this TRENDS)--continues to treat the
strategic arm accords in highly favorable though very general
terms, in keeping with the themes keynoted in the PRAVDA
editorials of 29 and 31 May.
An atypical commentary, by N. Arkadyev in the 2 June NEW TIMES
(No. 23), was notable for the detail with which it discussed the
ABM treaty and the interim agreement. In a rare mention in Soviet
media of measures for monitoring the accords, Arkadyev pointed
out that "to insure confidence" the treaty will be observed,
"both sides will use the technical control facilities at their
disposal in a manner corresponding to the universally recognized
principles of international law." He said that both the USSR
and the United States "have such national facilities" and have
agreed "not to hinder national technical control facilities or to
employ deliberate means of concealment," but he predictably
stopped short of acknowledging that such "facilities" would include
spy satellites.
Although Moscow promptly publicized Secretary Laird's 27 May order
to halt construction of the ABM system in Montana and suspend work
on other ABM bases, it was not until 6 June that TASS reported
that the USSR Council of Ministers had ordered appropriate USSR
ministries to "observe the obligations under the treaty and the
interim agreement from the day of their signing."
Moscow media have sustained their silence on the protocol to the
interim agreement outlining the number of ballistic missile
submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles allowed on
the two sides. Reporting the submission of the treaty and the
interim agreement to Congress by the :,resident on the 13th, TASS
made no mention of the accompanying documents, including the
texts of the "Agreed Interpretations" and "Unilateral Statements."
Moscow has also been circumspect in reporting the comments by
Administration officials on possible savings in defense expenditures
flowing from the arms accords. TASS, for example, totally ignored
Secretary Laird's testimony to the Congressional appropriations
committees on the 5th and 6th, while selectively citing Admiral
Moorer's testimony. However, the Defense Department's request for
funds for the Trident submarine program and the B-l strategic bomber
have been discussed in routine-level Soviet commentaries.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1', JUNE 1972
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USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
MOSCOW PORTRAYS TITO VISIT AS EVIDENCE OF "SOCIALIST UNITY"
Yugoslav President Tito's 5-10 June visit to the Soviet Union,
his first since the intervention in Czechoslovakia,* carried
forward the mutual effort to further improve relations and to
relegate irreconcilable differences to the background in the
interests of economic cooperation and other pragmatic
considerations. Although both sides generally hewed to
long-standing positions and no new agreements were announced,
the Yugoslavs seem to have scored some ideological points:
The final communique contains no reference to "socialist
internationalism" or to a joint ideological struggle against
imperialism as a basis for bilateral relations, dropping
elements present in the joint statement issued a: the close
of Brezhnev's September 1971 visit to Yugoslavia. In another
notable difference, a reference in the communique to renunciation
of the use of force as an agreed principle of international
relations introduces an element that was not present in the
1971 Belgrade statement.
From Yugoslavia's vantage point, Tito in effect underscored
the pragmatic factor in the rapprochement in remarks vu the
10th, an airport ceremony on his return to Belgrade, when he
hailed the "considerable" progress "especially in economic
cooperation" that resulted from the talks. The thrust of
Moscow's ample publicity for the visit was reflected in
followup comment in PRAVDA which played up the Yugoslav
President's trip as another success for the Brezhnev
leadership's diplomacy and as testimony to the growth of
"socialist unity"--by implication crediting the leadership
with having worked out a modus vivendi with the maverick
Yugoslavs and having edged them toward the Soviet bloc.
* Tito last visited Moscow four, months before the Warsaw Five
moved into Czechoslovakia, during a period of blatant Soviet
bloc pressures on the Czechoslovaks. During a brief "friendly
visit" en route home from Iran, Tito's talks with the Soviet
leadership on 28-29 April 1968 produced no communique; TANJUG noted
cryptically that "viewpoints" on party relations were exchanged.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 JUNE 1972
On the eve of Tito's visit, an article in IZVESTIYA by the
paper's foreign policy observer A. Bovin, citing recent
increased Soviet-Yugoslav contacts, had seemed to betray
Moscow's maximum hopes for the visit--or at least to anticipate
the kind of propaganda mileage Moscow would seek to-draw from
it--in observing that "there are great reserves here for moving
ahead" on ideological problems, despite some "difficulties" in
approach in socialist theory and practice. Noting that on "a
majority" of international questions Soviet and Yugoslav
positions concur or are extremely close, Bovin discerned "a
good basis for coordinating the foreign-political efforts of
both states in the struggle for common goals."
JOINT COMMUNIQUE An indication that the deep-seated
differences effectively blocked any hopes
Moscow may have entertained on the score of "coordination" was
conveyed in Radio Belgrade's report, on 8 June, that "certain
difficulties on some questions" were complicating the drafting
of the final communique. The document that emerged, like the
1971 Belgrade joint statement,* is a patchwork exercise in
semantics that allows for varying interpretations. As carried
by TASS and TANJUG on the 10th, it says that "the two sides
cons'tdered the exchange of opinions and consultations" on
bilateral and international problems to have been "mutually
useful" and conducive to better understanding of each other's
views and positions as well as to successful "cooperation" in
the international arena. Formulas were found that enabled the
two sides to state shared positions, and mask differences in
approach, on such questions as Indochina,** the Middle East, a
* The 1971 visit produced both a communique, essentially confined
to reporting who was present and defining the topics of the talks,
and a joint statement outlining agreed principles of conduct. The
current communique, encompassing both the protocol and substantive
elements, is thus comparable to the 1971 joint statement on
points of substance. It is an anomaly of the successive visits
that a communique is the sole document resulting from Tito's
"official, friendly" visit to Moscow, where what amounted to an
official landmark joint statement emerged from Brezhnev's
"unofficial" visit to Belgrade.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 JUNE 1972
a world conference on disarmament, and the movement toward
detente in Europe. On the policy of nonalinement, the USSR,
as in 1971, expressed unilaterally its support for "the anti-
imperialist trend in the policy of the nonalined countries."
On the question of economic cooperation, the two sides registered
confidence that previously drafted measures "for long-term
economic cooperation would foster a considerable exprasion
of economic ties" but did not project specific economic accords.
Complying with what would seem to have been the minimal Yugoslav
demands on the matter of the basis for mutual relations, the
document says the two sides "noted" the "viability" of the
principles of the 1955 Belgrade declaration on Soviet-Yugoslav
state relations and the 1956 Moscow declaration that.carried
forward the post-Stalin rapprochement by defining the basis
for relations between the parties. The two sides, it says,
"stressed the great importance of the 1971 joint Soviet-Yugoslav
statement'.'--the document which in effect diluted the principles
expressed in the earlier ones. In the vein of the 1971 Belgrade
statement, the communique takes a tortuous line on party relations:
"The CPSU and the LCY, guided by the teaching of Marx, Engels,
and Lenin and creatively applying it in accordance with the
distinctive features of their countries, will continue to act
in the spirit of internationalist traditions, friendship and
mutual respect, and equality for the beneficial and comprehensive
exchange of opinions and experience, for improving mutual under-
standing and for the further expanding of cooperation."
The communique divests the definition of state relations of. a
touchy, contentious element in making no mention of "socialist
internationalism," where the 1971 joint statement had stipulated
that state-level cooperation was based on, among other things,
"loyalty to the principles of socialist internationalism" and
"the struggle against imperialism." The 1971 statement. had also
discoursed on imperialism's aspirations to "dominate-the peoples."
The current communique does not cite the "struggle against
imperialism" as a basis for bilateral relations, and it comes
closest to the 1971 treatment of imperialism in an innocuous
assertion of mutual desires to cooperate with peoples who are
"fighting against imperialism and neocolonialism."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREiI)S
14 JUNE 19;''
The new reference in the ommunique to. renunciation of 'he use
of force appears in the fallowing passage: "The two sides paid
special attention to tr-c_ geed for continuing an active struggle
for consistent realization in international relations of. the
principle of peaceful coexistence of states, independent of
social systems; for renouncing the use of force or threat of
force; and for a peaceful and constructive solution of questions
under dispute." The reference to nonuse of force, juxtaposed
to peaceful coexistence, could be construed from the Soviet
vantage point.as applying only to relations between communist
and noncommunist countries. But in the context-of Yugoslavia's
complaints about the interventionist "Brezhnev doctrine'!-on.
relations between communist countries, its appearance ii. a
joint Soviet-Yugoslav document on principles of "international
relations" could be taken as something of a victory for.the
Yugoslavs. Moscow's sensitivity about publicizing the nonuse-
of-force principle in the context of relations with communist
states had been reflected in Soviet media's treatment of.Brezhnev's
20 March trade union congress speech, broadcast live over Z4oscow
radio, in which the Soviet leader disclosed that the USSR had..
presented proposals to the Chinese including one on "renunciation..
of force." That proposal was omitted in the textual versions .
subsequently carried by TASS and in the Soviet press--tampering.
which suggested that Moscow may have had second..thoughts about...
diluting ii. interventionist doctrine by publicly undertaking
not to use force against a wayward communist state.
The statement of shared positions on principles governing-.approaches.
to international relations came immediately following .a lengthy
discourse--the longest on any single subject apart from.. bilateral
relations--on the "positive" developments in Europe. .. Included in.
this discourse is a passage observing that the..tendenr-y.-.toward.-..
"normalization of the situation in Europe" has found expression
in a deepening of mutual understanding among European states,
with full respect for principles of independence,.-sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and noninterference "and on.the -.basis -
of renouncing the threat of force or use of force in any form
whatsoever." This and other passages on European developments
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CONIF I DENT I AL FB [S TRENDS
14 JUNE 1972
lead up to a statement of agreement that all necessary conditions
are present for the "urgent" preparation of an all-European
conference on security and cooperation.*
PRAVDA'S APPRAISAL Under the rubric "Positive Advances,"
Vishnevskiy in PRAVDA's international
review on the 11th portrayed Tito's visit as a fruition of the
Brezhnev leadership's foreign policy course staked out at the
24th CPSU Congress and as "convincing evidence" of "close
cooperation" and "the further growth of the socialist countries'
unity." A more comprehensive assessment of the.visit in an
editorial in PRAVDA the next day similarly depicted the talks
as part of the CPSU's "consistent and purposeful" efforts "to
strengthen the forces of socialism." The editorial. added:
"President Tito's visit has become an event of great importance
for the further developing and strengthening of cooperation
between the USSR and Yugoslavia and between the CPSU and the
League." In this context, PRAVDA noted that the two sides agreed
"to an extension of contacts between the leaders of the two
parties, states, and governments."
In the wake of President Nixon's visit, PRAVDA seemed to suggest
that the talks with Tito were the other side of the coin of
Moscow's policy combining detente with the West with fealty to
socialist internationalism and the strengthening of communist
ranks. The editorial quoted Brezhnev for the view that "life
itself shows that the policy of the Soviet Union and the other
socialist countries which is directed at a relaxation of
international tension and the safeguarding of the people's
security is correct and is enjoying even greater support."
* Sensitivity over the implications of the Brezhnev doctrine in.
connection with the proposed European conference was strongly
expressed by the Netherlands in the 16 May joint communique
raising PRC-Netherlands relations to the ambassadorial level.
In the communique the Dutch explicitly interpreted.the principles
of peaceful coexistence as implying noninterference-in internal
affairs not only between countries of different systems but
"equally between countries belonging to an alliance and having
identical or similar sociopolitical systems." This position,
which Peking said it "appreciates," avoids the ambiguity blurring
the formulation in the Soviet-Yugoslav-communique. It had been
in the context of improving Sino-Yugoslav relations that Peking
two years ago adopted the position--unorthodox according. to Soviet
doctrine--that the principles of peaceful coexistence should apply
whether countries have the same or different political systems.
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TITO'S ASSESSMENT In a statement broadcast by Belgrade Radio
on his arrival at Belgrade airport on the
10th, Tito spoke of his cordial reception in the Soviet Union. and
said that his talks with the Soviet leaders had been held in an
atmosphere of "friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding."
He expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the talks, stressing
that they had taken place on "the well-known principles of
equality and mutual respect." The communique had similarly
characterized the talks as "cordial, frank, and friendly" and
specified "a spirit of mutual respect and equality." On the
score of the economic cooperation that was evidently at the
forefront of Yugoslav concern, Tito observed that "results in
economic cooperation are particularly visible" from.. the talks
and added that "many unexploited opportunities" exist in that
area.
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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
BLOC RELATIONS CHIEF RUSAKOV BECOMES ASSISTANT TO BREZHNEV
PRAVDA on 7 June identified K. V. Rueakov as "assistant to the
General Secretary of the Central Committee." His previous title
as head of the Central Committee's bloc relations section was
not mentioned by PRAVDA, but the reference to him was in connection
with his participation in the talks with Tito, indicating that he
remains in the East European party relations field. Another
Brezhnev assistant for foreign affairs, A. M. Aleksandrov,
apparently retains his post: He participated in Brezhnev's talks
with President Nixon on 23 and 24 May and was identified as
Brezhnev's assistant on both occasions.
Rusakov was last identified as a Central Committee section head
on 18 March. He may have assumed his new poet by 29 May, since
he was shown standing with another Brezhnev assistant, G. E.
Tsukanov, in PRAVDA's 30 May photo of the signing of the U.S.-
USSR "Basic Principles" document. As deputy minister and minister
of fisheries in the 1940's and 1950's and member of the USSR
Council of Ministers consumer goods bureau in 1953-55, Rusakov
had long worked under then deputy premier and light industry
supervisor Kosygin. In the late 1950's he went into diplomatic
work and then into the Central Committee apparatus, succeeding
Andropov as head of the bloc relations section in March 1968.
LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN UKRAINE REFLECT DISCORD. RIVALRIES
The 8-9 June Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session transferred Ukrainian
Supreme Sovi : Presidium Chairman Lyashko to the post of premier,
replacing Shcherbitskiy who was promoted to first secretary on
26 May. While the leaders of the Dnepropetrovsk and Donetsk
factions have thus occupied the first and second ranking positions
in the Ukraine, respectively, the No. 3 post vacated by Lyashko
remains open, suggesting that there may be disagreement over the
distribution of the spoils in the wake of Shelest's removal.
In his speech at the session Shcherbitskiy said that in regard
to the election of a successor to Lyashko he will "introduce the
appropriate motion at the next session of the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet" and that in the interim First Deputy Chairman S. Ye.
Stetsenko "will act as chairman" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 10 June).
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The postpcaement in the selection of Lyashko's successor and
delay in naming him premier--the post was vacant for over two
weeks--appear to reflect the unexpectedness of Shelest'a 19 May
transfer to Moscow and the difficulty in resolving the competing
demands of rival Ukrainian factions. Despite Shcherbitskiy'e
praise of Lyashko as "an experienced, principled, energetic
leader" in his speech nominating him for premier, relations
between the two men may be strained. Shcherbitskiy's
Dnepropetrovsk faction at present has two votes (Shcherbitskiy's
and Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary Vatchenko's) in the eight-
man Ukrainian Politburo, while Lyashko's Donetsk faction has
three (Lyashko's, Central Committee Secretary Titarenko's, and
Donetsk First Secretary Degtyarev's); the..r respective proteges,
Vatchenko and Titarer,ko, are prime candidates for advancement.
Another sign of contention may be the practice, begun at the
Supreme Soviet section, of listing Politburo members alphabetically
rather than by rank, as had been the case in the past.
The Supreme Soviet session's other main action was the naming of
Kharkov First Secretary Vashchenko to the post of first deputy
premier for industry, replacing another Kharkovite Sobol who
was retired in April. Ironically, the session adopted a decree
censuring the Kharkov executive committee for local shortcomings
in industry, especially insufficient production of consumer goods.
The Ukrainian Politburo's 1971 exposure and condemnation of
Kharkov's neglect of consumer goods may have been one of the
reasons for Sobol's early retirement. Vashchenko's fortunes
may have been aided by the fact that at the Ukrainian party
congress in 1971 he joined Vatchenko in obliquely criticizing
Shelest for laxity in enforcing ideological discipline.
ARRESTED TOURIST IMPLICATES FIVE UKRAINIAN DISSIDENTS
At a 2 June press conference in Kiev Belgian citizen Jaroslav Dobosh,
arrested by the KGB for an;,!--Soviet activity in January, confessed
to crimes and implicated five Ukrainian citizens as his accom.plicer..
After apparently providing all the evidence desired by the KGB,
Dobosh was released and expelled from the USSR. The conference
was extensively reported in Ukrainian media.
Dobosh confessed that he had been sent to the Ukraine on 29 December
by a Ukrainian emigree organization to contact five dissident
Ukrainians in Kiev and Lvov and receive information and documents
from them in exchange for cash. After completing his mission,
he left Lvov on 4 January but was arrested at the Czechoslovak
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border allegedly with underground documents in his possession,
including a manuscript by Svyatoslav Karavanskiy. On 12-13
January the KGB carried out a series of arrests of Ukrainian
dissidents and on 15 January publicly anno,tnned Dobosh's arrest.
On 21 January LITERATURNA UKRAINA carried a denunciation of
Karavanskiy as a Nazi collaborator and convicted spy and foreign
agent.
Dobosh's 2 June statement listed only five dissidents as
collaborators--Ivan Svitlichnyy, Zinoviya Franko, Anna Kotsurova,
Leonid Seleznenko and Stefaniya Hulyk--but failed to mention
Yevhen Sverstyuk and Vyacheslav Chornovil, whom the KGB had
earlier publicly accused of collaborating with him. In all,
at least 20 were arrested in January directly or indirectly in
connection with the Dobosh affair. Emigre and Western press
sources have listed the names of 12 in Kiev (Svitlichnyy,
Sverstyuk, Franko, Chornovil, Seleznenko, Vasyl Stus, Oleksandr
Sergiyenko, Mykola Shumuk, Zinoviy Antonyuk, Grigoriy Kochur,
M. Plachtunyuk, and V. Minyailo), six in Lvov (Hulyk, Mykhailo
Osadchiy, Ivan Het, Grigoriy Chubay, Stefaniya Shabatura, and
Irina Stasiv), and two in Ivano-Frankovsk (Ivan Dzyuba and Rev.
Vasyl Romanyuk). The same sources ind i:ated that Dzyuba,
Chubay and five of those arrested in K-:ev were later released.
On 11 February the KGB announced that Svitlichnyy, Chornovil,
Sverstyuk, and unnamed others had been brought to "criminal
responsibility" in connection with Dobosh's arrest. On 2 March
RADYANSKA UKRAINA published . letter from Franko confessing to
have passed information to Dobosh; she repeated her confession
in a 25 April Ukrainian broadcast to Europe in an effort to
refute allegations that she had not authored the letter herself.
On 3 March LITERATURNA UKRAINA reported the expulsion of Dzyuba
from the Ukrainian writers union. Among those implicated by
Dobosh, Anna Kotsurova alone had not previously been reported
as under arrest.
AGRICULTURE MINISTRY UNDER PRESSURE TO REFORM
Recent changes in the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, traditionally
a bulwark of bureaucratic conservatism, suggest a weakening of
resistance to agricultural innovation. Two new deputy ministers
of agriculture have been identified since mid-May, and both
new appointees are on record directly or indirectly in favor of
agricultural reforms, including the controversial link system
of farm labor organization. At the same time, the central
agricultural bureaucracy has been undergoing a series of
organizational changes designed to facilitate specialization
and improve administration.
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On 19 May RURAL LIFE identified L. I. Khitrun, former Belorussian
deputy premier in charge of agriculture, as the new first deputy
minister of agriculture.* This change in the agricultural ministry
was followed by the identification of fcimer Central Committee
agriculture section deputy head I. N. Kuznetsov as a new deputy
minister of agriculture (SOVIET KIRGIZIA, 1 June). Both new
appointees have been receptive to aCricultural innovation.
Their appointments notably coincided with a flurry of articles
in the central press favoring the introduction of unregulated
mechanized links, including IZVESTIYA's 19 April challenge
to the agriculture ministry to take a definite stand on the issue.**
Khitrun presumably favors the mechanized links, since this and
other agricultural innovations were officially. approved and
widely applied in Belorussia during his tenure there as deputy
premier. Kuznetsov's record is more outspoken in support of
innovation. In a 19 January 1972 PRAVDA art'clehe complained
that introduction of agricultural innovation- ?aas proceeding
"extremely slowly" and declared it a "most important duty of
the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and its local organs to
actively introduce into production achievements of science"
and to "act as the main organizers of technical progress."
In an April PARTY LIFE article Kuznetsov praised mechanized
brigades and links using the unregulated wage system modelled
after V. Ye. Pervitskiy's link. Noting that thousands of
brigades and links in the Kuban and Ukraine had followed
Pervitskiy's example, he declared that "this progressive form
has a great future."
Kuznetsov had risen from deputy director of the Omsk Agriculture
Institute, which was high in Khrushchev's favor, to head a
subdivision of the Central Committee agriculture section in
the early 1960's. He was promoted to deput;' head of the section
in spring 1971 and became one of its most active spokesmen,
although the April 1972 article was his first mentiin of links.
Further support for agricultural innovation appeared in a 5 June
PRAVDA editorial which praised the creation of agricultural
associations, agroindustrial complexes, trusts, sovkhoz
ministries, and other changes in agricultural administration in
* For background see the TRENDS of 1 June,..pages 39-42.
** For background, see TRENDS of 3 May, page 43.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1.4 JUNE 1972
recent years. Some organizational changes were begun in early
1972 in order to improve administration of the new specialized
farms and livestock complexes created as a result of the spring
1971 Politburo decisions. In February an RSFSR Ministry for
Sovkhozes was created to take over management of the new sovkhoz
trusts, and first deputy agriculture minister I. P. Volovchenko
was appointed minister (PRAVDA, 21 March). The Azerbaydzhani
paper VYSHKA on 3 March announced the formation of a USSR Main
Administration for Production of Livestock Products on ac
Industrial Basis (Glavzhivprom) to administer new livestock
complexes; the new administration was patterned after the All-
Union Administration for the Poultry Industry (Ptitseprom),
created in 1964 and singled out for special praise in PRAVDA's
5 June editorial. VYSHKA also reported rtii 3 March the
establishment of a new main administration in the Agricultural
Equipment Association for the purpose of aiding construction
of the new livestock complexes. And Deputy Agriculture Minister
A. V. Kardapoltsev was appointed deputy chairman of the
Agricultural Equipment Association, a post in which he was
first identified in the 31 March TRUD.
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a
- 30 -
PRC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
PEKING CULTIVATES BETTER RELATIONS. DOWNPLAYS INSURGENCIES
In keeping with its expanding effort to develop political and
economic relations with Southeast Asian governments while
downplaying its involvement with insurgent move:,,,ent.s, Peking's
muted observance of the anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 statement
on world revolution was not accompanied this year--as it had been
during the major celebration of the occasion last year--by a
review of Maoist armed struggles in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Indonesia. With the change in foreign
policy priorities and the fading of the Maoist evangelism that
put a premium on armed insurgency in the late 1960's, Peking
has significantly reduced its propaganda support for insurrectionary
movements while publicizing growing official and unofficial contacts
with the target countries. The declining propaganda support for
the insurgents consists mainly of broadcasts by PRC-based
clandestine transmitters and selective replaying of these
broadcasts in Peking media.*
Peking has made the largest strides toward normalizing bilateral
relations with Burma, whose prime minister visited the PRC last
year and whose aid relations with Peking have recently been
advertised in PRC media (see c.iscussion below). There have
also been signs of cordiality in Chinese contacts with delegations
from Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, though these have
been -eestricted to the unofficial level. Most recently, NCNA
on 30 May reported that Chinese medical figures had feted a group
of Malaysian physicians, and on 9 May PRC Agriculture Minister
Sha Fang held a "friendly conversation" with a group oF.
Philippine politicians. At the same time, Peking's propaganda
support for communist-led insurgencies in these countries has
been sanitized to remove direct criticism of the governments
involved and to avoid other sensitive issues. Thus, NCNA on
4 May marked the 42d anniversary of the founding of the
Malayan CP by reporting a 29 April editorial on the occasion
broadcast by the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution," but unlike
last year the NCNA cccount deleted attacks on the Razak and Lee
* There are three clandestine stations: The Thai CP's "Voice
of the People of Thailand," the "Voice of the People of Burma"
broadcasting in the name of the Burmese communists, and the
"Voice of the Malayan Revolution" beamed to Malaysia and
Singapore.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 JUNE 1972
"cliques." Also omitted was last year's charge that "Malay
chauvinism" was causing persecution of Chinese and other
minorities, a sensitive subject which Peking has chosen to
treat gingerly. The downgrading of the cult of Maoism was
subtly reflected in NCNA's formulation referring to "Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought"--a form of punctuation reverting
to past usage before the cultural revolution elevated Mao
Thought to a level equivalent to Marxism-Leninism.*
As in the case of Malaysia and Singapore, Peking's pickups of
infrequent statements of the Maoist Philippines CP have
contained no direct attacks on the Marcos government. In
the case of Indonesia, however, Peking has aired direct
condemnation of the Suharto regime in the name of the Indonesian
communists (PKI) while reducing its publicity for the Peking-
based PKI delegation. NCNA made no mention of delegation head
Adjitorop as present at the 6 June PRG anniversary reception
in Peking, an event which he attended last year, but NCNA's
23 May account of a PKI statement on the party's 52d anniversary
included denunciations of the "bloody suppressions" and "political
swindles" of the "Suharto fascist military clique."
PEKING PLAYS UP IMPROVED OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH BURMA
Peking's warm reception for the "friendly" visit of a Burmese
Government economic delegation from 15 May to 7 June underscored
its continuing efforts, in the months following Burmese Prime
Minister Ne Win's 6-12 August 1971 visit to the PRC,** to improve
official relations with Burma. The hospitality accorded the
economic delegation was markedly more cordial than that granted
Ne Win nine months ago or a Burmese trade delegation in November.
While Peking remains identified with the Burmese Communist Party
(BCP) by the continuing operation of the clandestine "Voice of
the People of Burma" (VDPB), a radio propagating a Maoist line of
armed struggle against the Rangoon regime, support for the BCP
in PRC media has become virtually nonexistent..
* At the peak of the Mao cult during the.cultural revolution,
Peking began using the formulation "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung
Thought," a change of punctuation serving to put Mao on the same
level as the two masters of communist ideology. That formulation
? is still standard usage by Peking in the Chinese domestic context.
** Peking's treatment of the August 1971 visit of Ne Win is
discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 23-26.
CONFIDENTIAL
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COIAL
1.4 JUNE 1972
Chinese media carried no commentaries on Sino-Burmese relations
during the Burmese economic delegation's Visit, but ample reportage
covered the activities of the delegation. The tone was set when
the visitors, led by Minister for Planning and Finance U Lwin,
were welcomed at the Peking airport on 17 May by a Chinese
delegation headed by Fang 1, the minister in charge of Chinese
foreign aid. NCNA reported that the national flags of Burma
and China fluttered at the airport and that welcoming crowds
shouted slogans hailing Sino-Burmese friendship. Only the
national flags had greeted Ne Win in August; there were no
welcoming crowds shouting slogans. And neither flags nor crowds
greeted the November visit of a Burmese trade delegation.
Speaking as the host at an 18 May banquet "permeated with an
atmosphere of friendship between the people of China and Burma,"
Fang I suggested that the Chinese considered Ne Win'i visit
last August as a turning point in Sino-Burmese relations. He
remarked that since Ne Win's visit "the relations between our
two countries have experienced a new development." Noting that
bilateral economic and technical cooperation "began over 10 years
ago," Fang said the current economic delegation's visit "will
certainly promote the friendship between the two peoples and
the economic and technical cooperation between the two countries."
In contrast, during the Ne Win visit neither side referred to
economic aid relations, and Fang L; although present on protocol
occasions, did not take part in the talks between the Ne Win
delegation and Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien. Expressions of
Sino-Burmese friendship and praise for growing economic cooperation
pervaded Peking's coverage of the Burmese delegation's three-week
stay in China. At a farewell banquet hosted by U Lwin on the
26th both he and Fang I, according to the NCNA report, expressed
the hope that "the friendship between the people of China and
Burma and the relations of economic and technical cooperation
between the two countries would grow continuously."
BILATERAL RELATIONS Since Ne Win's August-1971 visit Peking
has publicized a number of bilateral
contacts while virtually ignoring the BCP. Thus, Peking reported
that the Chinese ambassador to Burma gave .a PRCNational Day
reception "in a friendly atmosphere" on 1 October 1971; on
8 October NCNA reported the renegotiation of the terms of a
1961 agreement on economic and technical cooperation; on
8 November it reported the receipt of a congratulatory message
on the PRC's seating in the United Nations; and in.November it
covered the visit to the Canton trade fair and to Peking of a
Burmese Government trade delegation and the signing on 19 November
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of a trade agreement and a commodity loan agreement between Burma
and the PRC. In contrast to coverage of the recent visit,
Peking's reportage on the November trade delegation's stay in
China consisted of a few brief items on the delegation's
principal activities without atmospherics or reports of
banquets or speeches.
Peking's observance of the 24th anniversary of Burmese independence
on 3 January this year reflected the improved atmosphere surrounding
bilateral relations. A C'.tc'A En-Lai message of congratulations to
Ne Win expressed the hope tnat "friendly relations and cooperation
between China and Burma" would "develop continuously," and Li
Hsien-nien headed a Chinese delegation attending an independence
day reception given in Peking by the Burmese ambassador.
According :o NCNA, toasts offered at the reception acknowledged
"the new development of the relations between Burma and China
brought about by the concerted efforts of the two governments
and two peoples in recent years,* and wished the friendship
between the two peoples and the relations between the two
countries constant development." Last ;rear Peking media did
T.ot report a high-level Chinese congratulatory message to the
Burmese; a lower-level delegation--headed by Kuo Mo-jo--attended
the 3 January 1971 Burmese ambassador's reception in Peking;
and the toasts then expressed a more subdued hope that bilateral
friendship "would be further developed."
Also in January this year, Peking reported Chou En-lei's receipt
of a message from Ne Win "expressing sincere condolences" on
the death of former Foreign Minister Chen I.
PRC SUPPORT While playing up improved bilateral relat~.ons, Peking
FOR BCP media have virtually ceased their support of the
BCP in the past two years and particularly since
Ne Win's August 1971 visit. For example, after giving extensive
commentary observance in 1970 to the 28 March anniversary of the
launching of the Burmese communist insurgency, Peking media
were silent on that occasion in both 1971 and 1972. The last
Peking-originated commentary on the BCP's exploits was in
September 1970. Peking did not acknowledge a 30 October 1971
BCP Central Committee congratulatory message to the CCP Central
Committee on the PRC's seating in the United Nations--although
it disseminated a message from the Burmese foreign minister.
In fact, Chinese media have publicized only four BCP messages
in the past two years: on the 3 March 1971 PRC satellite
launching, on the 50th anniversary of the CCP, and on 19 January
* Chou En-lai at his 6 August banquet for Ne Win had credited the
Chinese Government--but not the Burmese--with "consistently pursuing
a friendly and good-neighbor policy." Chou was restrained in his
assessment of Sino-Burmese relations at that point and limited in
his praise for Burmese policies.
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and 8 April of this year expressing condolences on the deaths
of Chen I and Hsieh Fu-chih. The January message contained .no
reference to the situatio..i in Burma and the April one did so
only in noting that Hsieh's death represented a great loss to
China and "also to the oppressed peoples of Burma and other
countries in the world."
In what may also reflect a similar downgrading of Chinese. support
for the BCP, Peking has not since 1 October 1971--at PRC National
Day observances--acknowledged the presence in Peking of Thakin
Ba Thein Tin, identified as leader of the resident BCP.delegation
in Peking and vice chairman of the BCP Central Committee. Sa
Thein Tin was not reported to have been present this year at
the May Day celebrations in Pe.ki-ig or at. the 6 June PRG
ambassador's reception in Peking--events which he was reported
by Chinese media to have attended in 1971.
VOPB BROADCASTS The voice of the People of Burma--which,.
unlike other PRC-based clandestine radios,
has never been acknowledged by Peking--has throughout this
period sustained unremitting hostility toward the Ne Win
government and propaganda support for the PRC on various
foreign policy issues. In response to the 20 April Burmese
Government announcement of a top-echelon reorganization,. which
among other things upgraded Vice Premier San Yu by appointing
him concurrently defense minister, the VOPB expanded its
criticism of the "Ne Win military clique" to encompass the
"reactionary Ne Win-San Yu military cl{que." As its standard
fare, the VOPB carries frequent combat reports of victories
of the insurgent army led by the BCP, commentaries denouncing
government policies, and lessons in Marxism-Leninism and Mao
Tse-tung Thought. Contending that governmental reorganizations
will not transform i:he Ne Win regime,, a VOPB commentary on
23 April argued that the only alternative "is to seize power
and win the war, carry on the people's democratic armed
revolution, and fight until the Ne Win military government
is overthrown. Thera is no other way."
The VOPB's line on international issues offers support for Chinese
policy. Thus, a 20 January VOPB commentary called the Burmese
Government's recognition of "East Fakistan as a separate country
under the name of Bangladesh" an "extremely reactionary act"
indicating that the Ne Win government "openly supports the Soviet
social imperialists' plans for imperialism, economic monopoly, and
encirclement and blockade of the People's ::apublic of China." In
a similar vein a 14 May commentary called for resolute opposition
to "the Soviet social imperializt military demon" and its "collusion"
with the United States in an effort "to divide the world."
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HUNAN AGRICULTURAL REPORT DETAILS POLICIES. PROBLEMS
924-4
A report issued by a Hunan provincial symposium on learning from
Tachai, broadcast on 8 June by the Changsha radio, provided a
detailed account of the progress being made in dismantling agri-
cultural policies advocated during the cultural revolution. The
report noted the principal areas of change, in policies affecting
crop diversification and peasant remuneration, and admitted that
in some areas "the struggle between the two roads is still very
sharp."
The report painted a picture of overall progress for the province,
with grain yields up 10 percent and peasant income up 12 percent,
thanks to "a certain extent" of change away from a one-crop
economy. But "everywhere there are some backward units" where
the implementation of current policies is lagging, and the report
stated that yields are still generally low, diversification
efforts are being implemented too slowly, and "little contribu-
tion is made to the state."
To overcome resistance to the return to more moderate policies,
the symposium report offered the theoretical justification that
the current stage of people's communes as "collective economic
organizations" must persist "for a very long historical period."
Thus cadres and peasants alike should not fear another sharp turn
toward hasty communization, and assurances were given that private
plots and remuneration according to labor will continue. Without
even a bow to the usual requirement that vorkpoints not be put
back in command, the report stated that remuneration may take
"various forms" so long as distribution is according to labor,
is convenient and supported by the masses, and obeys the vague
injunction to "persist in the socialist road." Without explica-
tion, the report declared that the methods now in effect in the
various localities "are practical and should be even further
implemented."
Implicitly placing the blame for past errors on Lin Piao, the
report blamed "swindlers" for hurting production by "negating
objective laws." While noting rightist errors such as "production
first," the report took aim primarily at those 4':io "preached that
'politics can squeeze out everything else"' and who neglected
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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science in favor of politics. The symposium called for bringing
back former cadres into their old positions, taking special note
that former agricultural technicians "should as far as possible
return to their brigades and production teams."
The themes sounded in the Hunan report have also been advanced,
though in less detail, in Peking media. A 2 June Peking broad-
cast emphasized the primacy of the production team in ownership,
part of the general policy of remuneration for achievement.
Production brigade-run enterprises were praised for reducing
manpower borrowing from the teams to a minimum. Also, any
manpower borrowed was compensated "according to the production
teams' system of recording workpoints" and the individuals
received credit. As a result the "brigades, teams, and the
commune members were all happy." Plans of larger units were
also said to depend on the approval of teams. A county party
committee was praised for its attention to "the production
teams' opinions and requirements," after it abandoned plans
for a large water project which would have taken team manpower
and affected production. Marking a sharp departure from past
practice, Peking applauded the decision that "the plan for further
big projects be shelved."
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/09(;() I R?5T00875R 3Q,OQ024-4
14 JUNE 1972
TOPIC IN BRIEF
ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AIR INCIDENT
Moscow media carried a prompt, terse acknowledgment--citing
only Cairo's version--of the 13 June clash between Israeli and
Egyptian aircraft over the sea north of Sinai. The brief
Soviet report, carried by TASS and broadcast by Radio Moscow
in Arabic on the 13th and domestically on the 14th, stated
that "16 Israeli aircraft violated Egyptian airspace this
afternoon in the Pros al-Barr area north of the Suez Canal."
It added: "The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY reported that twc
Israeli Mirage aircraft were shot down during the air battles
and that two Egyptian aircraft were damaged." In the pattern
of Moscow's treatment of the clashes involving Israeli and
Egyptian aircraft on 11 and 17-18 September last year, the
report predictably ignored Israel's claims that two MIG-21's
were shot down, its denial of Cairo's claim that two Israeli
aircraft were shot down, and its insistence that all the
Israeli planes returned safely to base.
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