TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 17, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
~ IIIIIIUUmuiiiii~~lllllll~ III)
FORElGN~
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
~~~~~~IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~~~~~~~
TRENDS
in Communist Prop~~anda
STATSPEC
Confidential
17 MAY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, ,JO. 20)
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This propaganda analysis report le ',aced ex-
clualvely on mateelal carried !n communist
broadcast and press media. It Is published
by FBIB without cooedlnatlon with other U.l~.
iiovermnent components.
WARNINC3
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United 8tatea,
within the meaning of T1tle 18, sections 769
and 794, of the U8 Code, as amended. Its'
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person fa pro-
hlblted by law.
C~our i
IlLbdudid boo wrw~N
b~epdiq ~.d
d~el~uilk~riM
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONI~'1UI~;N'I'FAI, I?IiCS 'I'RhNI)S
1.7 MAY 1.972
CONTENTS
'I'OpIcH 1.ITld I:vente Given Mn;'Or AttentiGn i
URV Notes 1.'r.esicl~nt's Cense-f:Lr.e Plnn ..ri>son Adminiptration were iatlued on 3A December 1971 on the
puptalned U.S. sic ptrlkea against the DRV-which had prnmptPd URV
l:oreign ?linietry ptatenlents on the 16th and 29th--and on
1tr December 1970 in puppott of trie 10 December DRV joint party-
gov~rnment appeal follov~nR the euetatred U.S. air strikes and the
abortive prisoner-rescue attempt in North Vietnam. The recent
It, April 11RV joint party-government appeal following the U.S. air
strikes at Haiphong and Hanoi vas not endorsed in an official
Soviet statement. although lYloscuv had promptly protested the attlkea
!n a TASS statement on the 16th.
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t nl?~i' llrt'1~111+1. T'hl ~t 'iltflJtrt:
1 7 1'IAY 1'a l1
"afv Ina~l+~laaibla+" v , ~ t{ra ttnlto+l h.t at oa wt l l {-oat "al l
to~trrrnolht I It y" f+rt 1-r-aar,,. ^ + r-l-aogrran+ aa~ atr~l i hat 1 ha f;-rvlol
rw-vatna+at-t inalata that Iho it,Il, stops "{ro lalirro-llalaly
.,
+ any v 1 7 nr1 .
Ylro at Ht aaronr d t d way that "f h to dangat++rra an~i a 1 t ~l+aty toa+l" ran
rNrly load t++ a nov r-rrwl-1 i+ st ioh of rho I~rtvttrat tr-hA) a1tuA1 t++t- anal
raMod tlrot.+t t+ a 1 1 y v{-at would happon t t of hat at at oar 1n
tOAVr+nAP+ woto (+- A(1 Itl t{r0 MlAtlt/Pt tt+ w4/1x11 tI1P I1-/ttP-1 ilfAtop IrAa
hohavo-1 in Vtotnaar, 7ho TAltt9 at Atatirvtrt of ih Aptil lrtotost.tn~ !.hat
+IAy's h++athinga ++f NatphonK an+l IlAnny--t hp taaat tpcont rtevioua Sirrvtol
+-ff tc tal at atowront +rn 1nd++rhinA==had Alao watno+l Hutt U.g. act ir-na
roul+) loa-) to a "rrrllrj+ltcAttnn of tho lntotnAtic+nal altuotl+ln as a
wh--le," ny rrrnirast. -1+-srnw had bopn a...te dttectly ctitlcal of
tiro 11ntVO+1 fitAt.Qa 11r 1tM goVPtnNlont at AteerPnta Ofl the OperAtlr+nM ttl
t;AAlbodta and LAr+a !n 19> And 1911. T'hv I. Nay 1970 atatasrQnt had
quost t~rnar) tiro 1`re~tdont'a protessvd deatte fot "an etA of
neKottatlona" acrd for talks to solve "utKent intetnotionAl ptobletitra."
And the 15 i'obtuaty 1971 atatesrent on Laos had spec iflcally warned
that 1',fi. actt+-na cmrld Atioct Soviet-A~satican relatio;ts.
tie#cow'a rtrcua-spectton regarding the Nix+rn Adtrinirtration was
particularly ovtdont to tho passage in tho currant stetearent on
oscAlat inn of tho vat, 1t to-~k one obvious dab at the 1'to~idant
vireo it said tiro reAl objective o[ 11.5. actions id not to "save the
Unttpd Statoa ft+rta hrwtllAtton" but to salvage the "notorious"
VtotnAalRat t++n pot tcy~ which it sold "ia obviously tallith,." 11ut
tt wpnt on to refer only to "{iashinptton" whop it complained that
U.S. Acts of encAlAtion "again deaonstrate the predatory nature
of the var." that onsz Aggressive action leads to Anothor still
tirore dangerous ono. and that earlier "barbarous act? and crimes"
Ate being Augmented by nov and still.taore serious ones.
beclArtng that the only way to Bottle the Vietnam problem i? to
respect the people's right to decide their own destiny. th? statement
said that it she United 5tatp? is really ready to do this it should
rsturn to the negottoting t+rble in Paris. `his passogo prefaced
the detaond that the U. S. moves bo "immediately cancolled.'~ The
statesent expressed contidonce thot govertm~rnt? and peoples of oil
peoct-loving oeote? shared ruck a virtvpoint. And it concluded, in
keeping with its general tone of restraint. 4i~h o pledge to give
the Vietnomese "all necessary ?uppcrt" but made no mention of "aid."
The Moscow domestic service on the 12th noted briefly that a White
Mouse spokesman raid the Soviet Government statement had been
received and was being studied by th? U.S. Government. and the next
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rnlJl~ t Itl'N'I 1 AL {'It t is 'I 111',Ntr!i
1 / iiAY I'a lJ
play tiro titlmaatll pPrvlrP aaJ~l IhP AlnPrllan 1-rnaa was glvirlg
"tqr Pat at t ant 1 nn" f r/ t ho pl at omanl , '1hP f i r at 1'11AVItA rl)rrlmattl ramp
~.n 17 Hay 1-- an art i. Io by the papar'p poniur rnmmpntatl/r Yurly
Jlnlwlrv~ wh-/ hlKhltkhtP.1 tho Krrvotnmanl at atPmont'p warninK tllal
file "IIPN PRpAllpit/n of A~V,YPppIVO Af't illllp" by t I1P Ilni full l~tatpp ip
"frAll~ht with pPrit/llp 1'--11pPg11Pn1'Pp fl)Y I11tPYr1At i-Inal 1iPaCP atld
00111rity" arld {IninlPl) tt- wl-r111w1110 f-IndPrllnalinn I/f Ll,ll. al'ip.
i.iI1P t11P W,nVPrrlmPnt pt atP01Pt1t~ 111P arLiC10 1'l/illalnOtl t111 pPrpllltal
rpfPrOnCP tll 1'rPpitiatlt N{1t (111. YhtlkOV roferrt?d Inptoad tU the
"AmPrif'an armod fnrcvp," the {'Pntagl/n~ anfl the "U.H. Adminiptratil-n."
Its appailell the Adtniniatratllln fnr pPPkina "legal Juptlfirallon" f//r
it p acL Ittn, rfdicul ing l1N htnhappador lluph'p arguma~lt that thr
ItnltPd ~tllt0_p Map ~flPrciping itp rlKht lr, "collective pall-dafpnpP.''
1'attictpantp in the 14 Hay clotneptic aarvica roundtable di~cuarfott
quPptionad the lagAlity of the U.9. Action And repaatQCl the Navin
atatPment'p demand that the "blockade" he cAllad off IinmQdlatply.*
c)ne panelist acknowledged that Secretary LAird hop said the United
Statep was not in fact eptAbliplltnq A "blockade," which would
require stopping and scorching All ships whrEn they sneer D11V
tarrftorlal watarp. (A brief 11 MAy domestic rervlce report of
I,Aird's pram conierance the day before had noted that Laird raid
the United Stater will. continua to build up its Air And navAl
ftlrcap in Vietnam and continua brnnbingo~ but did not roeoet that he
Indicated that the United Stater would take action to interdict
shtpr And even to stop A Soviet Airlift if necersary.) 'Che rowultable
paneltre Argued that, whatevee terminology to aped, the United Statep
it interfering with the freedom o[ shipping, and "thir i? the
guideline for the Soviet Government in its Action? to protect itr
phips carrying freight to the fraternal oocialist country." The
panelist did not elaborate on the reference to protection of Soviet
ships. Mother panelist observing that Kissinger had raid fife United
States does not regard its actions ao a confrontation with the
5o~~tet Union and is only seeking a way to end the conflicts commented
that Paris i? the forum where the United States could discuss its
proposals with the Vietnar,eoe side.
7.hukov said in the PRAVDA article that the "collapse" of the
Vietnamization policy had prompted Washington to embark on a new
Damascus media reported that the visiting Soviet Defense Minister
Grechko had denounced the U.S. "naval blockade" of the DRV in
remarks ar a reception in the Syrian capitals but Moscow's brief
accounts of Grechko's speech did not mention Vietnam.
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t;~-Mlril)I~;N'1'lnl i~lttlt 'i'1lliMllts
I! MAY I'!11
"AmartcaniKat I~~rr" ~rf the war. Ifut the llmaric~anrr "mart finally
real lrea~" Ire aalrl~ "chat they will n~rt achtava a mi l nary aulu~
t lcrn in in~l~rrhina," 11rra1 l Ing that 1'raerlcfant Jnhnuc~n had Haan
lmpa I 1 e+d t o ca I I off the bc>frrb 1 na of the pKV and embark on t Ira
path of nagotl~tton?~~ ha said the Amttrfcan people Itavee not
f~rrKuttan drat "1eMacin" and era r.allirrK 1nr_readtngly for an
Immpdiato halt to "the: 1'antagcru'r" oppraticros against North
Vleetnam and a rerturn to Cher neegotiating table. yhukov corr-
cludeid by citing the Soviet aovernmpnt statemdnt's r.all for
a I1,S. roturn to the 1'arir talky. And a domestic seervica
r..ummpntary by Ryohtkov on 1S May nbaerved that this cal.1 iu
oC "partfcul.ar lmpurtance" in the context of the USSR's policy
on "thct priority of talky and o[ intereeater and intergovern-
montal contACtrr in the settlement of controvsarsial international.
queen tons."
SOVIEt SUf'p01iT, While then recent comment her Avoided
t'Rt)tESt t`~EtINGS highlighting 5oviat oid~ and she govern-
ment statement rvferred only eo "rupport~"
[ollowulr statements by various Soviet public organizations
have promised continued Soviet "aid" ar wall as rapport. A
I'RAVDA editorial on Soviet foreign policy in gonoralc rummarisred
by TASS on rise 1.7t1~~ also stated brio[ly thae she Soviet
Geople. "loyal to the principles or socialist internatiorralism~"
wtll continue to give the Vietnaarese people "they necessary
Assistance And support."<
Moscow media haver been reporting low-level pro~ert meetings
bald throughout the U55R to support the 5oviat Government
statement--a standard device to mobilize public opinion behind
government rtatemento on Indochina. Radio Moscow as well as
the radios of Vladivostok and Oders+e also have reported protest
meetings in Soviet ports at which reamer and dockers expressed
determination to continue dispatching aid to Vietnam. TASS on
the 13th reported radiograms from crews of 5oviat ships in Haiphong
expre~eing resolve to continue helping the Vietnamese. On
12 Mav thi Moscow domestic service carried a statement by the
head of the eastern department of the directorate of Black Sea
shipping lines announcing that "eight heavy tonnage oceangoing
ships are on the way from Odessa and Ilyic hevsk to Haiphong."
(Broadcasts o~?~r Vladivostok and Odessa radios on 13 May each
named three ships en route to DRV ports.) The shipping official's
announcement may have been broadcast inadvertently over the
* The editorial is discussed in the U.S.-Soviet Relations section
of this TRENDS.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Ct1Nlc 1111tN'I' I A1, III I t{ 'i'It1~N11!{
I / f1AY 1 ?l 1 J
Clay t.lta dnmaal.lr aarvlra aald thn Amarlr.att Itraaa waa g,lvlrcg
"great attantlun" to the wtatanlant, 'I'la flrai. I'ilAVitA I~trmmant Tama
tnt 17. May In an artlt~la by the papar'a aanlor coumlantatnr Yurly
Y,hukov, who hIKhIlKhtati the g,ttvarmm~nt al.arnmant'a warnlnK that
tlla "I,7W axpatlMltln Uf ag,g,rnaalVa aCtltlnM" by lha Ilttilad !~Cataa la
"fraU~ht Witll MprIt121M Ct1tlMatlUpnCaM fUr ItllarnaLlUttal peace and
taacurlly" and polntad to worldwfda r.ontlnmttatlun of U.S, acts.
I,lkp the Kovarmm~nt at.atamnnt~ thn article r.ontainstl nu parttonal
rnfnrnnca to I'rnsLlnnt N1.xnn. 'J.hukov referred Instnad to rhn
"Nnnrican armed forces," the 1'entagt~n~ and the "U.J. AdminlMr.rat.ion."
Ile aMSal.lnd the Administration for seeking, "legal Jurtification" for
LtM aetion~ rl.dicultng UN AmbaMrador Bush's argumnnt that th?
Unittad Stftter ~raM exarc.IMing itr right ttt "collective ral f-dnfanMt~.''
I'articipantr in Lhe 14 May domestic service roundtable 'iMCUMMIon
questioned the legality of the U.S. actlon and repsatead the Soviet
rtatrment'r demand that the "blockade" be cal.l.ad oft immrdiately.??
One panellst acknowledged that Secretary Laird Itos Maid the Uttitetl
States was not in fact establishing a "blockade" which would
require stopping and MMarching all ships w1t~n they enter DRV
territorial waters. (A brief 11 May domestic service report of
Laird's press conference the day before had noCed that Laird Bald
tt~e United States will continue to build up its air and naval.
forces in Vieenbm and continua bombingo~ bus did nos report that Its
indicated that the United 5tattas would take aceion to interdict
s}tips and even to stop a Soviet aicllEt if necessary.) 'fhe roundtable
panelist argued that. whatever terminology is uet:d~ the United States
is interfering with the freedom of shipping. and "this is the
guideline for the Soviet Government in its actions to protect its
ships carrying freight to the fraternal socialist country." Ttte
panelist did riot elaborate on the cpferettce to protection of Soviet
ships. Another panelist. observing that Kissinger had said the United
States does not regard its actions as a confrontation with the
Soviet Union and is only seeking a way to end the conflict, commented
that Paris ie the forum where the United States could discuss its
proposals with the Vietnamese side.
Zhukov said in the PRAVDA article that the "collapse" of the
V ~tnamization policy had prompted Washington to embark on a new
* Damascus media reported that the visiting Soviet Defense Minister
Grechko had denounced the U.S. "naval blockade" of the DRV in
remarks at a reception in the Syrian capitals but Moscow's brief
accounts of Grechko's speech did not mention Vietnam.
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t;rIN1r1111~.N'1'IAI. I~ill!I 'I'1~'I~N11;~
I ! FLAY I U 12
"Amer Iranir-,at I--n" of tlra war. Nut Ilia Amarlc_~ana "nruat f Inal ly
Taal It/p~" ha aaid~ "that shay will not. ac~lrleeva a mi I Ii.ary aoluL
t ton in lrtdorlrlrta." Naral l ing that i'raatdant Julutaun hacl haan
Impallad to rail t-if t!ra hombink of tha 1tkV ar-d embark un tlra
path t-f neKut lat lnna~ Ira aald tha Amattr_an peopla Nava not.
fnrgotCan that "laaann" and are railing incraaaln?ly for an
Inrmedlate lurlt to "t ha Pantagon'a" nparatlona against Norlh
Vietnam and a return to titer negotlatlttg labia. %hukov o Ih-- Th+- dal-atta+l
f+-r h~+a+nw +-n hia way 1-a+W to 1'atia~ and f+-t the peat tv++ 1?aata
ll-v t:l-1'9aP have naiad fho ptPaanCa ;-f -i+rvia' attv+rya at fhv
art f va 1 +-r depart urv +-f bitV rvvtaaanlal Ivaa vhnaa i t inataty
alas in+ lu+ivd M+-arcrv. tHhat recant CI-Inaaa gestates t++ tha
S(-ViPta--anCh as tI-o flnviot bntdor naKntiatnra' trnlt --f ~+-nth
t:hina Taal m+-nth~ p-Ihllciepd try b~~th aides--have alr?r hacl
precedents in the peat. year or ao. 'fharQ have btrlrn nav a1Qp~attta.
h+-wever- ay In the report by bath aides that th4 tv+r bordat
dQlv~ationa laid wrQatha at tho "1'avi l i+-n of the >Ilood-Se,lled
kriandahlp Ilvtweplr the ChlnQae and iiovlQt Pcc-pler." in addit.ltrnr
durinK the 1'reaident's China visit {'Qkinq rQportQd for the first
time in several yoara that Chinese officials in Manchurian
cities placed wreaths 1n honor of 5ovipt Armtrd Forcer i)ay on
memorials fc-r fallen Soviet aoldierr.
In the m4antl.me- Peking's anti-Soviet polsmics hava continuQd
on fire low level maintained trace the hatch rx~hange^ at the
i.lme 1-[ the Ind tan -Pakirtanl conflict. NCNA cited a rpeec{t
by a Chinese worker Delegation 1Qader in Tieans on 9 May in
which she lauded Albanian reslrtanra to "modern :avisionism
with the Soviet revisionist clique at its center," but Ppkinq
has left it to third parties to criticize Moscow on the Vietnam
question. Un the 11-.1t NCNA carried excerpts from apro-Poking
Australian party publicatiun that assailed Moscow for
collaborating with the United States "for a Far East Munich
to sell out the Indochinese people." NCNA on rite 14th picked
up an Albanian charge that Moscow was exerting pressure on
the Vietnamese to accept the recent U.S. peace proposals.
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1 f t'ih Y 1 '~' t 1
t~'V . t ~Jfi Ll'~`~ (llf i WNi 1 Ki r,,t~ x111, ~ 111 Cpl t~. Lf~'~ 1 i 1 r,
VIPfhAMaoa (nruMnhlal ho(}iA ern-tirrno tnrrlirrol~ f(+ lAn(1 Iha (narmunlala'
ari l it atq A( 1-IowP~++or-l a In t;nnll. ViPI nAar in to( onl woPWa, a1 tPaallr~
that Iho11 'wt(intiPa' +1 Par(+r/attAlo fl-P fA}lnto (+f Vtatt-alrr1sa11(+n anal
r(+it1t inR aril iI1P tMlrntl Ahr P of (I1P OMlratleinll n( ~ l i}rPtAtP(} AtPA4,'~
YIIP i-inAf/0O n( (UttI1Pt A1.1A( irA VAa tAlaPd it/ A l5 hAy l,ihPtAl Inl/
Itad1(+ "Pdllntial," lrPpKa(} tr. Iha !9 1'ay annivotaaYy (-( 11(- (;h} 1linlr'a
birth. 1+}-1rh (lAisrP~} thAl ihP lihatal Intl -ntCPa "have the (ondlt Intro
t(r P1~pAl1O t}1P a((+l-P n( thPit (-f(vtlaiVv, fn I1hPtAtO rrl/P AtPA A(fPl
Annt }1Pt , and f (r / tPAt P K(rnO Apt inq, lgtda felt At 1 AfM illtq 1 IIP P11Pmy PVP11
mntP Vl~nt(r11a}y." ThP ~'At1Aed (OtCPa AtlO pP(tple," ACC(rt(ling to tI1P
Pr}itC'ttAl, "AtP Ar}VAllCin~, toward winning fhP ~tPatPAt ViCtotiPf7 At1~l
AC}liPViil~ lavtita to Co11p11P111nratP" Ile+'a birthday.
C('MP11F215('AJ WItN A c(anpatiann hPtwPPn the communfata' a11PgPd
Ndtl-f?itCNCN WAft dPfPat of the a11fPd tactic of using first' hAaPA
And C}1P COmmUnfAt ViCti7riPa OVPt the NrPI1C}1 it/
1950 was dtatrn in an att}(:1? in the 5 Nay tJ11AW bAN, attributed t(,
"Tien Conq" (Attack). Citing fire bases overrun by ccmimunist forcPa
during the current offensive, Tien Conn observed that "thP Ama~ricana
are worried not only about the loos of a acorP of has,~esl, but also
about the fact that one of the basic tactics o[ theft defense stratr~~y
on tihe battlefield 1s collapsing." IiP noted that the fire bases nr~
often built in a network to provide mutual support and went on to
point out that it several. barter arse "encircl?.d and attacked nt the
snore time, they cannot help one another :Ind nee plunged taro
confusion." Accc-rding to 'l'ien Long, the liberntfon troops, "having
high morale, clever tactics, and i~tcreasingly improved equipment,''
ran "nt one time attack and occupy a series o[ tale enemy's moat
powerful fire rases."
Theorizing on the implications of 1'LAF successes, Tien Cong observed
~,ttat "when one side in a war is capable of defeating a basic tactic
of the adversary, it !s capable of changing the situation on the
battlefield." "such a situation," Its maintained, "actually occurred
during our people's war of resistance against the French colonialists,
when our VPA was strong enough .c launch attacks against strongholds
and attack and occupy large bases such ae Dong Khe in the autumn of
1950." The French system of defense based on bunkers was stalemated
both theoretically and practically, Tien Cong continued, and
"immediately after that, General De Lattre's concrete defense line
went bankrupt." ^_'ien Cong noted that tleraafter, in early 1954, the
VPA captured the Dien Bien Phu base and endangered the French defense
system of base complexes, and that the French encountered "many acute
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tnl;t f1-fl+{{k{ V'glh 'Ip{{i{rr.
l i {lAr 1'~r l l
irrtltrq~{I1liirtlq'~ Ally) warn .IriVPll Inll! q tgnrP 40rin114iy irRghiVO
(rn4l t { nrl ~ " Iin 1 ~+fliiAOlll nil I ~ ilP {, , EI . -pllppPl A ar P f A(' i11iI, I Iln pgNrO
gilrlgll~rt/,"
{1{I~/ f10iPilgp )iiniatct Vn fagllyot- Illgir diR1~ 11AMPd IIiP panrP per icclf (rf
thn taglaratt~n apaittat fhP prvtlrh in Itia 1Ptl,~tl-y fnur-part. arlirlo,
Pt1t I i IP~I "Ar111 tI1P flnvctllltirlnAry 1{AAaP~ Arld liui fci tI/P I'Pllpin'a
AYmy," whl(h 1{Arlcli hAM ItPPt) p11hiiCir,ing in inrrtallmPnta pihfP
{)n~'Pth1)nr~A f11 t11P third flArt Ilf rile article, pllhliafiPll ill Ihn
Vvhrnary i~tIAN f)t)f NIIAN 1)AN magar,lnt-, (~iop pnrtrayad thr rtrrrtrt{ancP
Vqr AiIA inAi t ho `rpnch in such a way as to hi~{hl ight itr
nimfiartiina with the currant fighting, although hp did not draw
any dltnct anaing,iPa. 1'.ven painting in effrct to a prrcurMOr to
Vietnami~aticm, Giap said that the prQnch in 1.947 trig to "uaa
Vi PtnamPae to fight ViQtnampaQ." Hir ~rccount of thr 190 border
campaign has many parallQlr with tho apparent cclmmunirt objectivpa
i~~ their current uffcnaiva. Giap noted thnt in 1910 thr communists
launrhec! a ''big military campaign'' and dertroyad ' an important
part of the r'nemy'a tlQasoned mobile [orrt-r," "pierced through the
defenAe 1 tnelr in thQ border eras, l ibeuttad a vart errs, and
cclnatrur.ted rclada to communicat@ with rociallrrt countries."**
(,~UM1G TRI, THIiA THiE)J Vietnamese communirt media promptly
COIJfJTE:ROFFENSIVES acknowledged and deprecated the 13 May
attacks by South Vietnamese maxines in
QuctnR 'Cri, north of the My Chanh River. Hanoi and Front broadeasts
on ills 1.4t11 and the Ilnnoi press on the 15th ridiculed Saigon's
claims to Ilsve launched a counteroffensive ~o r~rtake Quang Tri
['rovincc and to have reoccupied Ilai Lang district town. The
communists alleged flint the marines advancing on the ground were
"immediately intercepted" and sustained 100 casualties. At the
game time, according to communist reports, the PLAF countered the
airborne marine assault by downing six aircraft, including "four
helicopters" carrying marines, causing "the rest of the enemy air
fleet" to "turn tail in panic."
* Portions of the Giap article labeled parts one, two, and three
were published, respectively, in the December, January, and February
issues of the military journal QCAN DOI NIIAN DAN; the I`Iarch issue of
the journal is not available. The first and second parts cf the
article were published in the January and February issues c.f the party
journal HOC TAP. The article was not continued it. the T!Iarch issue of
HOC TAP, but the April issue carried the portion of the third part
previously published in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, as well as an
apparent continuation of this third part. The fourth part of the
article is not yet available.
** This portion of Giap's article is discussed in the 26 April TRENDS,
pages 6-8.
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Il MAY IVIJ
Ilannl anti Vttrllt Irrnatl(aplp nn tha 14th talatPtl iha tinuth ViPtnamv4c
Atipalllt t11 Iha I(UVarnMPllt'p afft'~rtp ((1 plUlra 1111 tnllralP ~t)r Iha
tlofonaa of Ilua. 1,IbPratinn Iladln apCrlhatl part It'l11aY a1~t,t11CIfRllt a
to tills pnllll, 1'1a1n1InK plat "t{IP Lt.t1.~1'{llPll 1'i11111P {p Wl)rrlatl
alrtilll 11110 1-Pt' Allpa t IIP f a l l n C t h l a (' I t y Wtlll l t) Illpall an Pntl 1 tl
U1PttlAflll.r.at 11111 altll the 0111 IappP I1~ 1,{IP '1'111P11 raKlma."
I1ann1 has ala(1 dprrlPtl !~g1~U11'a C1Aim tt/ ha:'t2 rPU~~cuplPd 1t1Ya Ilapa
1laatugna (doallynatad 1)cmg 'I'ranh baps by the cungnutttata) nn 1"- May.
An art it 1P to (1LIAN Ut)1 NIIAN I)AN un tha l yth dPr.l.artad that ''t ha
'vl~Eury' boalttnd by the c+natny La a ahPPr fabrlc:atiun, ainr_a
salgnn troops hava nut auccaPdatl In gatting anywhero Haar
haatugna, 1Pt alunp Ln 'recapturing' 1.t ," Acr.ording to the artlrle~
the rQpurt that thQ bdrp auuthwnat of IIuQ had bnnn recnpturpd was
dealgnad Co "count thn real dnfnstd" of tlln dllinlt. "The few
creak probae by she ~;rnlgon truop~," tha papar acldrtd, "wnrn nlagniEled
only to etrnngthnn the morale of the U.S.-paid grmy in Saigon."
POLiCiES OF THE QUAIVG TRt I~urthnr c!lrecti.ves from the revulutiontlry
REVOLUTIONARY Ct~W11TTEi= administration in Quang 'Cri 1'rovlnce have
bean publicized, following a communique
released on 4 May which announced the tormation of a "provisional"
committee for Quang 1'ri city.* On 1l May Liberation Radio broadcast
a 10-point communique of fire Quang Tri provincial revolutionary
committee--dated 24 April, a week before t}te communists' capture
of file province--proclaiming the abolition of the GVN's provinc.ln'
government and establishment of fire "people's revolutionary
administration." Reflecting the communists' apparent concern to
win the sympathy of the population, the 24 April communique promised
that the lfves, property, and rights of the people will be protected;
that the property of the "U.S. imperialists" and the Saigon government
will be turned into public property; that industry, trade, and public
installations will be safeguarded; and that the liven and property of
foreign residents will be protected. It caltad upon personnel of the
Saigon army anA government tc report to the revolutionary
administration with their weapons and gear, and {t reiterated the
offer in the PRG's 25 January 10-point statement to help them return
to their homes or allow them to "Serve the revolutionary administration."
On the 12th Liberation Radio broadcast a much longer 10-point communique
from the Quang Tri committee which covered many of the points raised in
the 24 April document. The new communique bore no date, but its
* This initial communique is discussed in the LO N:ay TRENDS, page 23.
CONFIDENTIAL
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cnWl~ t trt'.W'1 t fit, H q t t: 't p ~.NI-r.
I! NAY 1"~1J
at atatrratrt That all K~rvattimant Inata11at1anM era c~nnflarata~l an~1
wi I I ha managa,l by iha ravalut innary admintatrat inn "an nt tn~tay"
auy,Kaeeter drat It wan clraftacl arrntn~l the bagitutinq, ut' May at
the t ima of the rcrmmunlat taka~rvar ni' the ptuvint~a.
't'he un~tatad ccrmmuniqua prumiMad, amnnt{ other thtnKc, that theta
wrnrld ha n~.- cliwcriminat inn aKaittet frmll ieM of people carving
Cite !~algnn regime and darlatad that the "ravolutlonrry administration"
IM ready to cncrparata with atl elements "approving of pence,
Imtapandanr.a, neutrality, tits uuntinq of the Amarlcdnw, and the
toppllna of Nguyen Van 'I'hiQU." it rrid that the revolutionary
administration will punish any who oppose it or disturb order and
security and added that it will commend those who hale prevrant
Qnemy Nabotage. Ltke the earl ier corte~runiquo, thin one pledged to
protect the lives, proporty, and work of she people rod all
public tnetall.ations. it alto offered r "gurrrntee" of 'freedom
and democracy Cor 811 Vietnamese citizens" and endorsed the
principle of "equality, unity, and mutual support beewoen various
nntionnlities." Civil. servants ware instructed to resume their
work and insure the normal functioning of Choir egencias; and
soldiers warp offered the terms of the 25 January strtemont.
Finally, the communique reiterated the promise to protect
"legitimate rights" of foreign residents "who lead an honest life,"
and it specified that this offer extended to "American residents."
On 13 flay i,iberation Radio broad~ase another l0-point communique
from the Quang Tri committee, slated that day, which outlined 10
"commandments" for "cadres, personnel, and combatants in the newly
liberated area." Among other things, the commandments directed
that the lives and property of the people be protected, that
individuals and houses not be searched without authority, that
criminals be handed over to responsible organs for prosecution,
that property not be misappropriated, and that damages be
indemnified. It also enjoined the cadres and combatants not to be
haughty or oppress the people and to be "diligent, thrifty, hottest,
and impartial."
Along with the release of official communiques from the Quang Tri
revolutionary administration, Vietnamese communist media have
publicized low-level reports on the situation in that province.
Fur example, LPA reported on the 14th that regional and guerrilla
forces in Hai Lang district had "persauded 150 puppet agents to
surrender" and had seized various weapons. In addition, according
to LPA, "65 puppet rsents including village chiefs, policemen, and
members of the local administration in Trieu Phong district
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CnNI'lirl',N'IIAI, V{11ti 'Iltl'.NIIti
I! NAY 1117
aurranrlara.) icr Iha Inral pa~~l-lp," A Ih May V1~A ralrnrl
at t r I lrut. arl t. n a NIIAN ir4W rnrraapr-ndanl. , nrr t ha r~uang, '1'r 1
pnpulat irm'a attitude ~nwar~l the "1 iharat lun trrrraa,' want tonarl a
maatlttK to alprl a "panpla'a adminlatra[Inn.`~
I~L./1C11UF, 10 5AIG(NV'5 Ilaruri prayw artlc~laa on 14 May and other
F1I1FtTll1L l,.l1W Ml~llyllkLS crnamantariaa pracllctably scored th~+
martial law maaMUraa announca~l by the
4nuth Viatnampaa Government un L.1 May. NIIAN UAN's comraant drat
"lira Cawc 1 at measures cannot paves the 'fhlau c 1 Lqua E roar co] 1 epee"
wap typical.. 'I'ha paper added that "br.aryan actp of banc}.ltr.y and
murder" will only make the regime more .isolated and that:
"Lndlpcrlminatc~ preps-ganging and troop upgrading" will only
mnka the AttVN "mare ramxhaukle and more easily dislneegraeed."
A l,lbecation Itadin conrmer.tnry charged that President ihieu had
"exposed h.imselE as a fascist who wnnte to centra.lixe all power
i.n his own hand." ar~d labeled hire "the number one enemy of the
people." 'Che radio claimed that t}te "Vietnamization boat is sinking"
and that 1'hieu 1s "sustaining severe defeats, faced with t}ie strength
of the people who are arising to topple him."
WANOi ANNOUNCES REGULATIONS ON MAINTAINING ORDER AND SECURITY
Hanoi propaganda continues to register concern about the maintenance
of order and security in the face of U.S. air strikes and the
disruption caused by the evacuation of mayor cities. }Ianoi media
reported on 11 May that the Premier hbd issued a decision on the 5th
promulgating regulations on maintaining security and order and
managing commerce in wartime. The decision was described as
implementing a Council of Ministers resolution adopted at a "regular"
meeting on 17 April--the day after the massive U.~. air attacks in
the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Available propaganda had not previously
mentioned the Council of 1~Iinisters meeting.
The 5 May decision called for the dissemination and enforcement of
a series of regulations which, among other things, warned of "severe
punishment" for persons who "take advantage of war conditions to
sabotage production and combat tasks, disturb security, and order,
spread false news, engage in bandit or hooligan activ~r.ies, or
encroach" on private or public property. Indicating some of the
specific problems Hanoi faces, the regulations also asserted that
"it is strictly forbidden to engage in speculation, in i1l.egaJ.
trade, in the sale and purchase of food ration cards, or in exploiting
the evacuated people and agencies transporting them or selling them
food." Elements responsible for enforcing order and security and
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C~-NI~I1~1',N'i'lAl, Irllltt 'I'UI!,NIIN
I 1 MAY I V 17
mnr~aKinK rnnrnarra wars alau warned nut to ''ahandun (iidlr pasta
nr (aAa advantage ul' thalr 1"unct lun (u c~auwa damaka Lu tlia a(ala
and panpla~"
Ilanul had av,ln~~c+~l similar r.n;unrn uvpr probluniw ul' urdar ~,nd
wucurl(y durlnp, ilia ll.~l. al-? wtrlkaw agaf.nwt the UkV bntwnun
191-5 and IyhR, hur nxampl.n, Iloang Quoc Vint, an i~ie ru1.e uN the
chlal' ul tl~~+ UI(V'W 5uprmm~ I'rocuratoratn, r.eportnd to a Nntlc~nul.
ANwr+mbly dvddJun J.n Apr1l 1.9G6 that Juring the pant year. hiN
branch had "h4lghtnnnd the sutler and intnneifiod the task of
controlling the execution of: the law in ors?r to ?trengthen thu
soc.l.aliet legal system and serve the coneolldc+tion of the dictatorship
o[ the proletariat in wart:lme." Zn the same report, released by
'.~anoi on 8 May 1966, Viet called for the further dissemination of
existing .laws and enactment of new laws "to batisfy the demands of
wartime." A decree on counterrevolutionary criR.es was approved in
October. 1967.* And in October 1970, two years after the bombing
halt, decrees on crimes of infringement on private and sucialiet
property were adopter!.
Problems created by evacuation of the population were acknowledged
in llanoi media as early as 1965, although evacuation me~suree were
given the greatest attention following the first U.S. air Strikes
in the llanoi-Haiphong area in June 1966. An article by Le Quoc Than,
vice minister of public security, in the June .1965 issue of TUYEN
l1UAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAZNZNG) pointed up many security problems.
Than urged, among other things, ti~at the lives and property of
refugees be protected and that there be a movement to "promptly
combat hoarding and speculatioi- of goods and other tricks intended
to oppress the refugees in their daily trade."
* The decree on counterrevolutionary crimes, made public in
March 1968, is discussed in the 28 March 1968 FBZS SURVEY, pages
15-17.
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I;i 1N1~ I III?N'1' 1 AL ' 111 !1 't'N ItNUl1
1! MAY lUlJ
~/ a
U. s,-sUV1~1~ kCl_n~toN~
MUSC(~W CC1f~N1ENT (.AYS GRUUNDWORK FdR PRES I DENT ~ S TRIP TO USSR
Af tar n month-lank h.Lutur that cQlncldacl wltl~ the hnikhtuning crl'
tundlone Qvur Vlutnun-, ;;Quiet cuntrnl media Iwvn now rdsumod
comment prepurutury to President Nlxon'o visit to Moscow--in u
lowor kay than boforo, sueking to rfttlonul.Lzo llr.ezhnov's d?tc+ntQ
pQ11cy in the pcosent situation. Editorials in t7.VESTZYA on 1.~e
16th and in I'RAVUA ~n the 17th, while avoiding direct montion oC
the summit, emphasized the "possibility" and "desirability" o;
improved relations with thu United States. The editorials
closely followed Cho lines of Orezhnev' el0 March ~peectr nt
the Soviet trade union congress in portraying a Soviet policy
of settling international prob.l~sme by negotiation rathaY than
confrontation. Defensively reaffirming Moscow's loyalty to
the principles of proletarian internationalism, the PRaVDA
editorial expressed "solidarity" with the North Vietnamese
struggle and stated that the USSR will continue t?o provide
"necessary aid and support."
PRAVDA EDITORIAL Entitled "Steering a Leninist Course," the
PRAVDA editorial portrayed Moscow ae "con-
sistently" pursuing a policy of coexistence, successf ally
balancing the "vital interests ~~f mankind" and world peace with
those of its allies. PRAVDA argued that "the choice mankind
faces today is between cooperation and confrontation, of relaxa-
tion or the heightening of tension and, in the long run, the
choice of the policy of peace or the policy of war" Under
such conditions, it asserted, the Soviet Union "invariably
declares for liquidation of the hotbeds of war." AC the same
time, the paper defensively insisted, Moscow "firmly upholds
the interests of world socialism, of all its friends and allies."
The editorial went on to pledge loyalty to socialist inter-
nationalism and specifically to the DRV, promising the latter
"necessary aid and support."
PRAVDA revealed Moscow's order of prioritier~, however, by con-
centrating on such issues as U.S.-Soviet relations, disarmament,
European security, and a collective security system for Asia.
Without specifically mentioning the upcoming summit, the
editorial stated that the Soviet Union "attaches considerable
importance to the development of equal mutually advantageous
relations with the United States." Invoking "Leninist principles"
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t;rtNlr 1 UI~,N'1' I AL 111 f ti 'l'1lt~;NIJN
I1 MAY I',117
~~f r.u~+xiaturr~nu, IC atr~+awu~l th~~t ti,u lnipruvnrnn~il uC I~uvt~+t-
Amur l~:nn ru 1 n L i unw 1 w "Itiuww ll, l n and ilea Lrab in but, whuuld nut.
Vu c,rl,luv:~~l at the e~xpunwe? uC third e?uuntrl.aM." UCCnring wireit
ywuunt:a to ,i rntlunulu fur tlin runmit, tiro nd turl.,il ducl.~~radt
"Aw Co :lie ;luvl.ut-Amur.l.cun cuntuctn un dlwur.mamant, :hn iJChinvu-
nwnt of n mutuu.lly uc6aptubin agrenment In tlin tnikn on Wtrutugic
urine l.tmltntlun would wait thn intornntn u)' thn ;~uvidt and
Amuricun peoples and tl,e intnrestr of lntnrnutional seeur.l.ty."
IZVLS'1'IYA EUITURIAL The IZVI:S'1'IYA editorial made a similnr
cued for Moscow's "con~lstenC" fordign
policy, editing that it "sorves the vital interests oC. the
pooplos, Eitcilitutos th? easing of international tensions, and
supports tha national liberation movem?nts." Declaring ChMt
"tl~e world ie rocognizing more and more Chat a settlement of
international problems can and must be sought through negotia-
tions rather than confrontation," t'he editorial recounted
various Soviet co;itributions toward a lessening of world
tensions, It noted Chat "tangible changes" were Caking place
in Isotope as a result of Soviet initiatives, citing the Soviet
and Po11sh treaties with the Federal Republic, the big-four
agreement on Berlin, and preparations for a European security
co~~ference. Among "crucial documents" alleged to have improved
international relations, it cited the LT. N. general assembly proposal
far a world disarmament conference, "taken at the initiative
of the Soviet Uni.on," and the convention on banning biological
weapons.
OTHER COMMENT, Soviet preparations for the summit were also
REPORTAGE reflected in belated TASS publicity, on the
16th, for a Gorokhov article in the May
issue of the monthly INTERNATIONAL LIFE--signed to the press on
21 April--which argued for improved U.S.-Soviet relations.
The timing of the TASS release and the statement in the article
that the USSR approaches the summit from "realistic positions"
seemed designed as conf irmation that the summit was on. The
TASS release constituted the first Soviet commentary on U.S.-
Soviet relations since IZVESTIYA political commentator Matveyev's
article in the Soviet monthly USA, signed to the press on
l3 April and given no publicity by TASS or Radio Moscow.
On l5 May PRAVDA intimated that the summit had not been aborted
by Vietnam developments by publicizing TASS dispatches from
London and New York reporting statements by U.S. officials to the
effect that preparations for the trip were proceeding "according
to plan." And a TASS dispatch from Washington on the 17th
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GUN IUI~N'i'IAL hIIIN 'IYIitNUN
rnpur~uJ a Whll.u IluuYn prnY~ c~hP,nrnncn Ytatnuinnt that ehn
I'ru~LJnnt wuw 1:~~ Gnmp UavJ.J prnpurlnR Por "h1Y com~.ng trip to
MUYCUW~" ItaJio MUYCOW heed raportnd on t{~? 15th that !n numeroun
1ntl,urY unJ tn,LngrumY~ yoviut citl~ana wYrr ?xprdYYing YutlrFac-
tlc~n that in thn lntarnntional ur~na Y altuatJ.on is J?v?loping
tlwe u1J,owY onu to hope Eor naw and ~.mportunt Yh~.f?tY toward
uuYing inturnutionul t4naion~"
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CONF.[ll1~N'I'TAL F13iS TRENDS
17 MAY 1972
i'i I DllLE E~sr
DEFENSE MINISTER GRECWKO TREATED 4~JI1H RESERVE IN SYRIA
Soviet Aof.enee Minister Grechko's ].0-14 May visit to Syria was
riven mured publicity by both sides, along the linos of the treat-
ment accorded hie visit to Iraq last December and hie talks in
Egypt in February. Damascus media seemed notably cautious.
Where Moscow repeatedly said Grechko was paying an "official
friendly visit" at the invitation of the Syrian Government,
Damascus specified that the invitation was from hie counterpart,
Defense Minister Ta1as, and appar sntly only once even described
the vieic as "official." Where TASS called Grechko's two meet-
'.nge with President Hof iz al-Arad "warm and cord:~al," Damascus
refrained from any characterization. The Syrianr, failed to
acknowledge the conclusion of "a number of ogre%ments," c;hich
TASS announced with no further explanation. Dissimilar TASS
and llamagcus reports at the conclusion of the visit, in both
cases in tl;e style of a communique but not described as such,
were issued on the 14th; a Moscow commen~~ry itt Arabic on the
15th, however, cited the "Sovi.et-Syrian point communique" in
quoting from TASS' report. (Com:nuuiques had been issued on
Grechko's Baghdad and Cairo visits .in December and February.)
On the heels of the Grechko visit, Damascus radio on the 17th
confirmed a 5 May report in the Syrian paper ATH-THAWRAH that
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 'Abd a1-Ha1tm
Khaddam would leave for Peking on the 18th heading a delegation
on a one-week official visit at the invitation of the PRC
Government. Coincidentally, an Iraqi Government delegation
had visited Peking shortly of ter Grechko's visit to Baghdad
in December.
VARIATIONS Both the TASS and the Damascus reports issued on
IN REPORTS the 14th noted that Grechko met with al-Arad and
with Prime Minister Khul.ayfawi as well as with
Talas. But there :sere inconsistencies in the treatment of other
aspects of the visit:
* Damascus media noted that Grechl.o s delegation included the
Soviet naval commander in chief, Admiral Gorshkov, and the air
force commander, Marshal Mutakhov, as well as foreign ministry
official Sytral:n.
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CONFZDI;NTZAL FBZS TRT?;NDS
17 MAY 1912
+ TASS noted that the Soviet guests were accorded an "extremely
warm welcome," underlining the friendly relations between the
two countries "and the eagerness to develop and strengthen Chem."
1` ?ascus Bald the visitors received "a cordial welcome and warm
hospitality" indicative of the Syrian people's sentiments of
"friendship and kind feeli::r a" toward the Soviet people.
+ Where TASS said thct Grechko visited military unite and
"military educational establishments," Damascus reported that
he visited military units and "frontline positions." Damascus
added--but TASS did not--that Grechko at the end of the visit
stres~~d his impression that the Syrian forces "have attained
a hiCn lavel of combat training and excellent mastery of their
weapons." ,~amascus--but again not TASS--also reported Grp.^hko
as referring, in a reception speerh on the 1lth, to his visit
to the fro~itlines where he was impressed by the Syrian armed
forces' firm^.ess and preparedness to "liberate" the occupied
Arab territories.
+ The TASS report on Che 14th concluded by noting the Syrians'
expression of "sincere gratitude" fc~: the USSR's "great unselfish
aid" in strengthening Syria's defense and training national
cadres. No such expression was recorded itt Damascus' report.
But Talas--at a reception given by Soviet Ambassador Mukhitdinov,
reported by Damascus on the 12th--expressed gratitude for Sovie t
support to the Arabs and concluded that Grechko's visit would
"undoubtedly contribute to the enhancement of the combat capa-
bility" of Syria's aimed forces. Reporting Grechko's second
visit with President a1-Asad on the 13th, TASS said the Syrian
president "highly assessed" the talks held between the two
defense ministers and "the results achieved," which "; re an
important contribution" to strengthening friendship ar~3
cooperation between the Syrian and Soviet peoples.
MILITARY Still other discrepancies appeared in the two
COOPERATION sides' reports of the military discussions.
Damascus wrapped up the talks in a sentence
to the effect that "fruitful discussions" were held on
"strengthening military cooperation." TASS, on the other
hand, while claiming that the talks were held in "an atmos-
phere of friendship and complete mutual understanding,"
indicated that there was less than full agreement in noting
that the two sides "exchanged opinions" on questions of
strengthening and further developing cooperation between
the Soviet and Syrian armed forces. But TASS also said both
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Gl)NI~' I,UI~~N'I' IAL I~'il I R 'I'ItI:NI)S
1.7 MAY J.97l
Mllil.lf) uxpruyc~uJ ant.ldl'acticra with thu stato of friandly relations
I+utwu~+n thu twu nr.m.i.us anel noted +~ neod "to further expand and
Htr.un}lthc+n" tlresu r.e.lations :ln the interests of raising Syria's
"clc,Gansu pu~:untiril" and consolidating the friendship betwc+en t;h.:,
SuvLet rind l,yrian peoples. Tn this connection, TASS added, "an
urr~rnuumont wr.-d mitde for taking a number of. additional measures
Ln thc+ fiulcl of military cooperation." On the 13th TASS hacl
CCpOCtCaI that Grechko's talks with Mai. Gan. Talae "ended with the
sigciing of a number of agreements on further developing Soviet-
5yrian cooperation."
Neittror side, of course, mentioned the possibility of a Soviet-
5yrian treaty along the 11nes of those Moscow had concluded with
Egypt anti Iraq, or any linkage between such a treaty and military
assistance. A possible hint of such a connection appeared in a
12 May SOVETSKAYA ROSSXYA article by PRAVDA's former Middle East
specialist Igor. Belyayev. Discussing Soviet friendship and
cooperation with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, Belyayev praised the
Egyptian and Iraqi treaties and ~~enC on to say that? the Egyptians
:end Iraqis, who are defending their countries against "Israeli
aggression" acid imperialist intrigues, "now have modern weapons
at their disposal"; he conspicuously failed to include the
Syrians .
Possibly with Syrian reluctance toward a Creasy in mind, Moscow's
15 May followup commentary on i:he Grechko visit, broadcast in the
Arabic service, assured listeners that in giving Syria and other
Arati countries the "necessary assistance" the Soviet Union
attaches no "conditions infringing on the Arabs' national
sovereignty and independence." Explaining Soviet-Syrian mili-
tary cooperation as stemming from the need to "reply firmly"
to Israeli and imperialist designs, the commentary reiterated
the charge that the Arabs' "enemies" were trying to disparage
and misreprer~ent the "principled nature" of Soviet-Arab cooperation.
The Beirut daily AN-NAHAR speculated on the 12th that Syria's
cautious, reserved attitude on the Grechko visit stemmed from
its concern that "these 'important' talks drag it into discus-
sions" on a friendship treaty, which it said Syria considers
unnecessary. The paper claimed that this subject had been
under serious discussion during the past few months but that
the Syrian Bath Party had decided not to sign any treaty,
believing that sincere cooperation with the USSR did not
require an alliaa::e agreement.
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(;ONhLUi,N'I'TAI, 11114 '1'ill;~aU;;
1,7 t1AY 1972
GfZG:CI-IKO R~M/1RKS 1)umuscus radio prov:Ldod more doL'nild Chun
'CABS did ~Ln roporting the Grechko unci '1'nlue
speochoe ut Ambussudc,r Mukh:Ltdinov's reception on trio 1.2t1i,
(Neither side :Lndicated lltul speeches warn exchungecl tit 'J'n1nN'
ll May luncheon .for Grechko or at Isis reception far the 4uviet
guests on the 13th.) Both versions cited Gr.echko's statomant,
ulonb the liens of the recent Soviet-Egyptian communique, tiiut
in the circumstances the Arab elates "have every reason to use
other means, Coo," beyond political, to regain the occupied
l.rab lands. In the TABS version Grechko, prefacing this state-
ment with an explanation of the "circ `$nces," described
Israel ae persisting in occupation of C~i~ Arab lands, thereby
defying UN decisions, aggravating +.ne t~ituation, and--in a
phrase pointedly omitted from Damascus' account--"frustrating
attainment of a political settlement."
According to Damascus, Grechko reviewed Soviet-Syrian coopera-
tion, noting that Syria was the first Arab country with which
the USSR had concluded an economic and technical cooperation
agreement and adding cryptically that "this cooperation has
presently reached its climax."
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t;I IIJ I'' I I )P;N'I' I A I,
- '! b -
COMP~UfV I ST R~LAT I OIVS
I~'111!i 'I'llI~;NI)!i
I ! MAY 1 X112
PRAVDA OBSERVER ARTICLE REBUTS CRITICISM FROM DIJTChI r,P
MUNLCIW ch~~Eiu Lhu iiuthurltrttJ.vc~ format of tt PRAVDA Observer
(C)bC)ZC~?V1lteJ.) nrt.tcle on 1l May to respond to criticism of the
CPSU by thr. amnl.l. lnclependent-mincled Communlet Pctrty of l?hc
Netherlands (Cl'N) J.n February and March, blaming the Dutr_h
party's 1c+uder.s Eor a pr.olongecl lack of contact betwec~i- tl-e
CPSU and the CPN and accusing them of distorting tl~e CPaU'8
position. 'Phe PRAVDA artlcle also responded to complaints by
the Dutch party, in the acme February and March documents, about
an article in this year's first issue of VOPROSY LSTORII KPSS
(Prob.lems of I~liatory of the CPSU) which had taken issue with
former CPN fader De Groot on the historical role of the Co-r~intern.
PRAVDA's chotce of such an authoritative vehicle to air the
CPSU's squabble with the relatively insignificant Dutch party
attests to Moscow's continuing sensitivity to criticism from
other parries, particularly on the score of CPSU interference
in their affairs via efforts to achieve coordinated policy
positions. Notably, summaries of the Observer article were
broadcast by Radio iwloscow to areas where, with only one exception,
local communist parties either recently have had or still have
mayor differences with the CPSU. Thus Moscow broadcast summaries
in Spanish (twicel, in Germ,~n to Austria, and in Italian, Swedish,
English to the United Kingdom, Greek, Japanese, and Indonesian.
Summaries in German to Germany were the only ones that did not
fall cleanly into the pattern.
The timing of PRAVD/~'s belated response to the CPN's charges
seems related to th.e imminence of the 24th CPN Congress, scheduled
for 26-28 May. The later of the two CPN documents to which the
article replied had been published in the CPN organ in preparation
for the congress. The timing may also be related, though leas
directly, to the opening in Moscow on 15 May of a two-day
conference convened by the Institute of the International Workers
Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences to discuss "new
phenom.na in the world revoluCionary working class movement"
since the 1969 Moscow international communist conference. TASS
reported on the 15th that the conference was attended by
representatives from the USSR and all of its East European
allies, including Romania, and that the opening speech by
Katushev, CPSU Secretary in charge of relations with ruling
parties, stressed the importance o# close cooperation among
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c;1-Nlr 1111~;N'I' 1 AI, 1~11I 4 'I'lll?NI)!{
17 MAY Iy1?
Lhu hnrtl~~N in the Ch~urutlcnl Nphur~~. ilunkrirl.nn PnllCbur~~
mumh~+r. Kc~m~~~~.al.n r.uud n sport on t:ho Hood f'ur unity in thc+
w~.+rl.d cc~mn-uniNt movom~nt, uccor.dl.ng try 'I'AS;i, rind the CI'SU
Cuntr.rrl Committee's uxpor.l on WeHt I;ur.upenn rtfCrtirs, 2uKlrrdJ.n,
to.~k to LnHk both r.l.ghtwa.ng "opportunayte" and "'.l.eftiet'
r.ovie.lan.Lets" in tha inlornutinna.l. movemont. 'l'he ci:Lrector
oC the spr~nsoring Soviet :Lnstitute, 'C:4mur '.Cimofeyev, was
alected chairman of. a newly formed commission on "the working
class in the world revolutionary process."
CPN DOCUMENTS PRAVllA's Observe; responded to two CPN
documents, th+s m+~st recant one a CPN Executive
Committee report published in the central party organ DE WAARI~IEID
on 24 March in preparation for the 24th CPN Congress. The March
re_.ort recalled and reiterated the substance of an earlier
Executive Committee etatPment, dated 23 February and also
published in DE WAARHEID, which rebutted VOPROSY ISTORLI KPSS'
criticism of the CPN's De Groot.*
The February CPN statement charged the authors of the Soviet
journal article, A. P. Dimitriyev and K. K. Shirinya, with a
"vicious" and "primitive" at~empt to "sow dissension" ire the
CPN leadership. It complained that they tried to "whitewash"
the German-Soviet pact of 1939, that they recalled the Comintern
in "nostalgic" terms of approbation, and that they discussed
the "Jewish question" in the Netherlands under the Nazi occupation
with "disdain" and out of context. The CPN statement singled out
the following passage from the Soviet journal article as
particularly offensi/e:
De Groot's publication on the question of the history
of the Comintern and his theoretical position play into
the hands of the powers that are out to divide the
communist movement and poison it with nationalism.
Marxist-Leninists should not be indifferent to s~:ch
phenomena but should take resolute action.
This, the CPN complained, was "a perfidious camouflaged provocation
toward members of the CPN." The statement went on to assert that
similar attempts had been made to "sow seeds of division" in other
communist parties, "especially in the Spanish, Italian, and
Japanese parties despite the CPSU's agreement not to
intervene. That this is now tried from Moscow in Holland by
* See the TRENDS of 15 March 1972, pages 17-21, for a discussion
of this article among others in a spate of Soviet press commentaries
stressing the need for better coordination among parties to achieve
common ideological positions.
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(;l)Ni~' l l)I~;N'I' I AI, Irli l ;i '1'111?NI)~i
17 MAY 1972
nw~my ~~I' a cc~upl.c+ of WrLteCH .LRdLC11l'eH that tlilH ly it conuuon
ruvlNL~-niHC pl~unomenon." Thu CPN atcttement culdcul vituper.ctta.vel.y:
Such cictic~ns show the .falsity of: all mealy-mouthed stn.tementa
about. noninterference in other parties, about equality,
complete independence, and cooperation, about the poeeibil.:Lty
of existence of theoretical and practical differences of.
opinion, and so Forth.
Regarcling CPSU-CPN relations, both CPN documents said Chat in
November 1969 the Dutch party leadership had proposed to the CPSU
that a delegation be sent to the Netherlands to discuss
"normalization of relations," but that in July 1970 the CPN
had received "an oblique refusal" from Moscow. Stressing the
Dutch party's "autonomy," the %~N leadership's March report
said the party bases its relations with other CP's on tits
statement of the 1960 Moscow international communist meeting.
The CPN did not attend such conclaves as the June 1969 Moscow
international party conference, the report explained, because
statements purporting to be "collective" were issued without
the participation of key parties, particularly "from Asia."
In these circumstances, the report said, "such get-togethere
had to lead to a breacY.. in the international communist movement."
The CPN's February statement and the March report both contained
coutervailing elements of caution, keeping the door open for a
reconciliation with Moscow. The February statement sought to
differentiate the attitude of the Soviet party as a whole from
the "bad faith" of th~~ "private individuals" wiio wrote the
VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS article, cautioning readers not to identify
"this kind of person with the Soviet Union and the CPSU as such."
And the March raport observed that the CPN maintains its
"internationalist" traditions "under the most difficulC conditions
and despite differences with people or ~eaders of the CPSU
which, after all, are temporary."
PRAVDA'S REBUTTAL The 12 May PRAVDA Observer article directly
challenged the CPN's allegation tl?~-it the
CPSU had rebuffed the Dutch party's 1969 overture for a meeting
to discuss normalization of relations. Party relations had been
interrupted in 1964 "at the initiative of the CPN leadership,"
PRAVDA countered, and "through no fault of the CPSU." Claiming
that the CPSU had repeatedly over the years called for cooperation
with the Dutch party, Observer said the Soviets in July 1970 had
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CONlr 1111;N'I' f Al, l~'li 15 'I'111~;NI)~i
17 MAY L972
responded positively to Cl'N Cha:Lrman lloekotr.a's Nuggc~st l.on thnt
a bilateral meeting be ha .d and had asked the CPN Cor. "a more
deta:Lled statement of the range of questions it would .like to
discuss."
Noting a subsequent development the CPN documents had neglected
to mention, PRAVDA claimed that in March 1971 Hoeketra advised
the CPSU Chat the CPN was ready to receive a Soviet party
delegation or to send a delegation of its own to Moscow and
"would at a later date show initiative on this question."
Observer insisted that the CPSU ie still ready to resume
bilateral contacts but that there has been no movement in this
direction from the CPN since March 1971. Thus, Observer
concluded, "the assertion Chat the CPSU is unwilling to have
contacts with the CPN is completely untrue and can only mislead
br~n~l sections of the CPN membership."
Observer also responded to the Dutch party's complaints about
the VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS article's treatment of De Groot's
views, rejoining caustically that Soviet researchers and
scholars have as much right as anyone else to express views
on the history of the communist movement. The article
charged the CPN lea~~rship with impugning the CPSIi's right
to discuss a subject the Dutch party itself toad discussed
publicly, in effect rejecting the Dutch party's complaint
that the Soviet 3ournal article constituted CPSU interference
in CPN affairs.
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WUNGARY-USSR
I~'lil~i 'I'III~,NI);;~
1,7 MAY 1972
M06CCrrV AND IIUDAPEST PAPER OVER ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES
Moscow Gnu Budapest continue to make efforts to efface the
embarrassment caused by lungarian Premier Fock's frank revelations,
on his return home from Moscow in late March, about unresolved
economic diff.erencea in hie talks with Kosygin and Brezhnev.*
'."A5S on 6 May reported a Budapest epeeci~ by Fock denouncing
"Western" conjectures about the March talks and affirming the
"harmonious" economic relationship between the two countries.
While reporting Fock's description of the March Calks as "extremely
useful and successful," the brief TASS summary failed to report
statements about unresolved bilateral economic pLOblems contained
in the text of his speech broadcast by Budapest radio on the Sth--
notably, Fock's :xpreseion of hope that agreements encompassing
long-term Soviet Guarantees of raw-material shipments to Hungary
would be concluded by the end of this year.
A further disclaimer of bilateral friction was made in a 13 May
PRAVDA article by Fock, entitled "Hungary and the CEMA Comprehensive
Program," which was reprinted the next day in the Hungarian party
daily NEPSZABADSAG. The Budapest radio's press review on the 14th
gratuitously reported that Fock had dwelt on the "1~ssons" of the
economic negotiations with the Soviets, a term not used in his
article. While acknowledging "differences" regarding Hungary's
role in CEMA integration, Fock took a harder line than in his
Budapest speech a week earlier in scoring "our enemies "' efforts
to "drive a wedge" ar,d "detach the socialist countries from the
Soviet Union" by circulating "false, hostile rumors and conjectures"
about the March talks. !?e described the Hungarian-Soviet "political
and economic alliancF'' as "close and indestructible."
However, Fock conceded that the "practical" and "specific"
definition of Hungary's role in CEMA integration had not yet
been determined: "The differing economic standards of the CEMA
countries which, despite unity on the main questions, have
differences of approach to a number of specif is questions .
give rise to the necessity for discussion, thorough study, and
coordinated views." He went on to spell out the dual emphasis
in Budapest's view of foreign trade--stressing both its heavy
* For background, see TRENDS of 19 April, pages 42-44.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CUNIriUI;N'I' LAL Flll'i 'CRI~NI)S
1.7 MAY .1971
volume of trade with the CI.MA countries, especia.l..ly the USSR,
and the long-range prospect that the CEMA states would "probably
find po?lnts of contact with West European countries which will
make it possible to expand trade relations."
On the same day that Fock's article appeared in PRAVDA, MCI
reported an interview in NEPSZABADSAG with Soviet Deputy Foreign
Trade Minister Leonid Zorin in which Zorin stressed the "dynamic
development" of the Hungarian-Soviet economic relations.
Underscoring Hungary's dependence on Soviet raw materials, he noted
that it getA "almost all" its iron ore and three-fourths of its
petroleum from the USSR. Judging by the MTI report, Zorin did
not allude to the speculation about differences between the
two countries.
Close economic relations between Budapest and Moscow wire also
underscored in articles in the 30 April NEPSZABADSAG by Huc~barian
Politburo member Nyers and Foreign Trade Minister Biro, whic'.1
recalled Fock's March talks in Moscow in wholly positive terms,
with no ~;~'iication of differences. Regarding Soviet raw materials
deliverir~, Biro went out of his way to insist that "the Soviet
partners have unfailingly adhered to prearranged delivery dates
and schedules and, if they deviate from them at all, they do so
on the side of expediting rather than postponing them." Biro
had ~uat returned from 28-29 April talks in Moscow with Soviet
Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. The communique on those talks,
carried by TASS and MTI on the 29th, indicated that the negotiations
on future expansion of bilateral trade had been inconclusive since
further talks on the sub;;ect were scheduled to be held in Moscow
in May and in Budapest in Juiy: Only the MTI version added that
"apart from the above-mentioned topic, the ministers reviewed
bilateral and multilateral relations concerning both parties"
and that the atmosphere of the talks had been one of "cordiality,
mutual unci:~rstanding, and friendship."
Y,'~KUBOVSKIY TASS on the 16th tersely reported the arrival in
IN BUDAPEST Budapest of the Warsaw Pact commander, Marshal
Yakubovskiy. 'fhe MTI report on the 15th--the date
of his arrival--added that he was on an "official visit that will
lasC for a few days" and listed the welcoming delegation headed by
Defense Minister Czinege. The next day MTI reported "a cordial
and friendly exchange of ideas" between Yakubo~-skiy and Czinege
on "topical questions of mutual interest to the parties regarding
the Warsaw Pact member states' point defense organization."
Yakubovskiy had stressed the member countries' "patriotic and
internationalist duty" in 1-lis article in the 14 May PRAVDA on
the Pact's 17th anniversary.
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CUNCIDENTLAi. CA.LS 'I'R1NDS
17 MAY 1.972
CWINA
CAMPAIGN REPUDIATING LIN PIAO CONTINUES TO EXPAND
The purge of Lin Piao has presented the PRC leadership with
the problem of how to repudiate the man who 1s still
constitutionally designated Mao's successor ae party chairman
and who was lauded fer flue years as Mao's "best pupil." So
far the media have conducted the crmpaign in a manner
reminiscent of the cultural revoution purge of. Mao's previous
successor in waiting, Liu Shao-.:hi. L1u was vilified as
"China's Khrushchev" and other Such characterizations for
two years before he was publicly criticized by name following
the decision of the 12th plenum in November 1968 to strip
him of sll offices. Similarly Lin has been attacked indirectly
as a "swindler like Liu Shao-chi" while, as wlrh Liu, a case
is being built up against him for deviations 1n almost every
field.
Am.-ng the more open attacks on Lin has been an article broadcast
by the Peking domestic radio on 10 May which even more obviously
than usual identified the villain of the recently revised opera
"On the Docks" in terms pointing to Lin. The article noted that
the villain had "a sharp counterrevolutionary sensA of smell"
and that upon sensing from the communique of the 10th plenum
of the 8th central committee that another political movement
was in the offing, he decided tc "have another trial of strength
with the proletariat." The episode clearly brings to mind Lin's
reported discomfiture after the 2d plenum of the 9th central
committee, his alleged attempt at a coup, and his final reported
attempt at escai~e--like the villain who, if he failed, "planned
to escape to a foreign country."
Other articles have kept up a steady barrage of criticism aimed
at the "swindler" Lin. .A RED FLAG article broadcast on l4 May
attacked him for the methods of study he advocated which
separated theory and practice, making people "tLauble themselves
with daily trifles and forget the general line.'' This may be
a reference to such widespread cultural revolution practices
as rote memorization of Mac's sayings. Similarly a Kwangsi
broadcast on 12 May critic~?.ed Lin for teaching the "obsolescence
of Marxism-Leninism," another reference to the cultural
revolution period when all theory worth studying was said to
.,e contained in Mao's works.
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CONFIDENTIAL FI3I5 7.'Rfs'NDS
17 MAY 1972
One major line of attack on Lin has been to blame him for
overdoing attacks on cadres in such a way as to cause
divisiveness rather than to promote unity. For example, a
NEILUNGKIANG DAILY editorial on y May criticized the
"wornout tactics" of harming other people and dividing
the revolutionary ranks, and called on people to help erring
comrades while reserving "bitr-er hatred for swindlers like
Liu." A Szechwan broadcast on S May went even further against
extreme measures adopted during the cultural revolution,
attacking the method of "savage struggle, merciless blows,
and 'killing everyone with one blow of the stick."' This
was- said to be the method of swindlers and "diametrically
opposite to Chairman Mao's cadre policy." The Szechwan
commentary Pbsol~~~d Mao from blame by stating that though
the swindlers "decked themselves out as representatives of
the correct line," only Mao can be such a representative, and
so in the end the swindlers "embarked on the criminal road
of betraying the party."
Lin has also begun to be attacked for his economic policies.
Though some articles last summer and fall seemed to be aimed
at his views on economi:: priorities, the anti-Lin campaign had
not advanced far enough to make the identity of the target
completely certain. Recent criticisms of alleged agricultural
errors are unmistakably aimed at Lin, however. A Szechwan
commentary on 3 May attacking those who slandered the peasants
and tried to sunder the worker-peasant alliance referred to
Mao's "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" a~ having
criticized this attitude; the work was originally entitled
"Letter to Comrade Lin Piao." Those who had earlier tried to
subvert the worker-peasant alliance continued to oppose Mao's
rural policies, according t.o the Szechwan commentary, which
thus managed to implicate :.in with all of the errors of the
past, from the extreme right of "dragging the peasants back
to the capitalist road" to the extreme left of "abolishing
private plots."
The campaign against Lin, including documents reportedly
circulating in China but not surfacing in the PRC medic,
apparently is being firmly directed from the center, in contrast
to the vilification of Liu Shao-chi by freewheeling Red Guards
Subject to few controls. The release of the Lin documents, us
well as the conduct of the campaign in the media, may have been
a matter of controversy among the leadership. An article in RED
FLAG No. 3 on the role of teachers by negative example see-ned
to defend the use of revealing details of evildoers' crimes
CONFIDENTIAL
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CUNI~ 1.UIs'N'l' f AI. 1' II1.S 'L'Rf~NI)y
17 MAY 1972
agatnwt complaints by "some comrades" who feared making publl.c
the counterrevolutionary and anti-Mao deeds. They were said to
feel that. the poisonous weeds "are, after a11, poisonous, anti
that taking them to the masses is liable to create a negative
inf.luence." The article rejected this view as underestimat.i.ng
the revolutl.onary enthusiasm of the masses, but it did admit
that '`making public" the negative materials would allow an
opportunity for class enemies "to make trouble." However, it
claimed that this would only allow them to be exposed more
easily. The article was adamant that the best. way c` exposing
the "true fQatures" of the counterrevolutionaries who have
unmasked themselves is to "l.et the cadres and the broad masses
get in touch with the materials of instruction by negative
example."
"LEFTIST' EDUCATIONAL LINE OF "SWINDLERS" DENOUNCED
E
Unusually pointed commentaries on the status of educational
reorganization reveal continuing relaxation of educational
reforms undertaken during the cultural revolutoin as well as
a developing campaign to build a case against Lin Piao and his
followers for pushing a "leftist" educational line. Radio
Peking on 13 May, for example, broadcast an article written by
the party committee of a local technological college which
reported on. the struggle there to overcome the influence of
"swindlers like Liu Shao-chi" who "undermined and interfered
with Chairman Mao's proletarian educational line." Admon~lshing
those teachers who were temporarily taken in by this incorrect
line and "dared not read professional books because they were
afraid of being denounced as devoting themselves to their
professions," and "dared not lecture on basic theory because
they were afraid of making the mistake of underrating practice,"
Radio Peking firmly argued that "if we fail to link political
work with professional work we shall abandon our political
leadership over professional work."
Current calls to provide suitable employment for experienced
rehabilitated veteran cadres--a recently intensified theme in
the ongoing ideological struggle against Lin--were reflected in
the article's claim that teacher morale problems existed at the
college because "aged and middle-aged teachers were not boldly
used" and "young teachers were assigned to take charge of
major tasks 1n teaching and scientific research while others
were g-!ven leading positions at various levels." The college's
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CONF11)~N'CZAL FI3IS '1'RLNI)S
17 MAY 1972
party committee corrected this problem by conducting "a
comprehensive analysis of the employment of teachers in the
college" and then making "rational readjustments." As a
result of this rearrangement, "a number of aged and middle-
aged teachers were selected to take lading positions at
various levels." In dealic~g with young teachers, i.t was
specifically declared, "we have resolutely overcome the
tendency toward only using them but not training them" and
"have encouraged old teachers tc help young ones 1n theoretical
study." Young teachers were even "permitted to attend classes
without participation in production" in order to help them
overcome their shortcomings in "basic theory."
By implicitly linking Lin to past "leftist" deviations in
educational reform, the more moderate voices in Peking today
are able to further blacken hie iu~age while at the same time
using the far-reaching repudiation campaign to help overcome
any lingering resistance to a flexible interpretation of the
cultural revolution's educational reforms and to the moderate
restructuring of anew educational system. For example, the
call to ease worker-peasant entry into the formal educational
apparatus--an extremely e-ensitive i~s~e at the beginning of
the cultural revolutionY--now seems ro have lost its urgency
amid current efforts to raise educational standards. This
was 111ustrated in an unusually frank Sian radio commentary on
9 April which lauded local workers and peasants for adopting
the attitude that "if our application [for university enrollment)
is approved, we will study for the revolution; if riot, we will
work happily where we ar~~ and actively make contributions Co
the party and people." Pointing out that "it is impossible
to satisfy the desires of all workers, peasants, and soldiers
who want to go to a university," the commentary explained that
"it is quite normal for the applications ~f some comrades to
be disapproved." Prospective worker-peasant students were told
to "have one red heart and two sets of preparations attd be
happy whether they go or stay."
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