TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 26, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

For~elea~20~~J~/9J : CI~-~~P$5~~90~000d~6~~-3..~
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
Confidential
TItEIVI~S
in Communist Aropaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
26 APRIL 1972
(VOL . Xa-I I:[ , N0. 17 )
008758000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
(:,UNIT II)I~.N'L'IAL,
This propaganda analysis report is based ex-
;.luslvely on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. St is published
by FBIB without coordination with other U.B.
dovernment coml>nents.
WARNINr.
Th1s cxument contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amenl]ed. Its
transmission o.? revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited oy law.
~aouv tt =
tutuded Iran, au~eraatl~
dornprodinp end
deele?iaae0en
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
CONFIDENTIAL FI3IS TRENDS
26 APRIL 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Mayor ,Attention
INDOCHLNA
i
Opening Weeks of Offensive Reviewed; Recent Fighting Hailed
l
Hanoi, Front Discuss Guerrillas' Relationship to Main Forces
4
U.S. Strikes at DRV Protested by Foreign Ministry Spokesman
9
DRV Scoree U.S. "Threats," Presses Party-Government Appeal
12
DRV Comment on Soviet Ships HiL?s "U. S. Efforts to End Aid"
16
Restrained USSR Comment Offers Low Key Support to Vietnamese
18
Peking Sustains Restraint in Commemorating Indochina Summit
21
Paris: Agreement on MeetinE, Denial of 1968 "Understanding"
24
Hanoi, Front Welcome American Opposition to Bombing of DRV
26
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
Peking Gives Ample, Correct Coverage of Sino-U.S. Contacts
28
SING-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Mutes Differences with Peking, Curbs Polemics
31
LENIN DAY ADDRESS
Kulakov Recites Set Formulations in Reviewing Foreign Policy
35
WARSAW PACT
Romanians Participate in Black Sea Naval Maneuvers
37
WEST EUROPEAN CP'S
Belgian, Italian CP's Show Interest in Ties with Peking
40
CHINA
PEOPLE'S DAILY Editorial Outlines Moderate Cads Policy
44
Aging, Criticized PRC Leaders Assume More Ar-tive Roles
46
PRC AND UNCTAD
Peking Proclaims Role as Developing Country of Third World
45
Approved For R Ieasep2000%0$t//ipp-stCIA-RDP8~~T~~Ov~'~~~~S5bQ1~?2
COI~~I~ENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
FOR OFFICIAL UgE ONLY FBIS TRENDS
26 April 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 17 - 23 APRIL 1972
Moscow (3049 items
Peking (1558 items
Indochina
(13%)
20%
Domestic Issues
(26%)
3l%
[Strikes on DRV &
(9%)
17%]
Indochina
(25%)
24%
Escalation of War
[Strikes on DRV
(17%)
20%]
Lenin's Birth
(--)
13%
UN Trade & Development
(4%)
7%
Anniversary
Podgornyy in Turkey
(ll%)
6%
Conference, Chile
Peruvian President in PRC
(--)
6%
May Day Slogans
(1%)
5%
UN Discussion of
(2%)
5%
FRG Treaties With
(3%)
3%
Decolonization
Poland & USSR
Sierra Leone National Day
(--)
4%
China
(2%)
3%
Mauritanian Prime Minister
(8%)
3%
in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comtiient during the preceding week.
Topics and events given maJor attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some n-ay have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor slgniflcance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/(~N~~~~~P85T00875~~~QQ~~~~OS50017-2
26 APRIL 1972
INDOCHINA
The progress of the communist offensive in South Vietnam was
evaluated in Hanoi and Front ,comment following a roundup of alleged
achievements during the initi'a1 weeks. An editorial in the DRV
army paper QUAN DOZ NHAN DAN on 20 April repeated the view that the
elimination of "vital enemy forces" strikes a blow at Vielnamization
and has changed the balance of forces. Following communist assaults
on positions in the central highlands on the 24th, the PLAF command
in the area called on its forces to pursue retreating ARVN troops
and to attack positions in the provincial capital of Kontum.
Hanoi has continued to protest U.S. air strikes against the DRV at
the routine level of statements by the foreign ministry spokesman,
but the rhetoric is harsher and contents more detailed than in
protests prior to the intensified bombing. Meetings held in
Hanoi by various organizations indicate the importance placed on
stepred-up vigilance and imp7.ementation of the 16 April party-
government appeal issued in the wake of thaC day's strikes against
Haiphong and Hanoi.
Moscow has continued to tread a careful line between the demands of
its Vietnamese ally and considerations involving Soviet-U.S.
relations. Kulakov, in the Lenin anniversary speech, made a stock
premise of "necessary aid and support" and voiced pro forma
criticism of the U.S. bombing without mentioning the Nixon
Administration. Hanoi's concern over U.S.-USSR relations seemed
evident in comment supporting Moscow's protest to the United States
that four ships were damaged during the Haiphong bombing. While
Moscow has ignored the U.S. reply, Hanoi took issue with the
contention that the USSR shared responsibility and said the
President was trying to force Moscow to stop aiding the DRV.
While reaffirming support for the war effort in marking the second
anniversary of the Indochina summit conference, Peking has continued
to show restraint and to avoid being provocative toward Che United
States. As it did last year, Peking marked the anniversary with a
leaders' message and an editorial pledging Chinese backing as a
"bounden internationalist duty." At the same time, it has shied
away from elite comment on Vietnamese developments.
OPENING WEEKS OF OrFENSIVE REVIENIED: RECENT FIGHTING HAILED
On 19 April LPA released a review of the cammuniets' offensive in
South Vietnam during its first two weeks--from 30 March to 15 April.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 20~INO~/~~~1C~A-RDP85T, ,7~$~300050017-2
26 APRIL 1.972
The "PLAF anc', people" in Che South were said Co have killed,
wounded, or captured nearly 30,000 trocps during tctis period
and to have "wiped ouC" five brigades, tactical groups, And
regiments, 13 infanCry battalions, Chree armored squadrons,
and 10 artillery batCalions. Several other uniL?s were said
Co have been "heavily decimated." In addition, t'te reporC
claimed that the PLAF shoC down or damaged on thF: ground more
than 150 aircraft and destroyed or seized more Chan 1,000
military vehicles, including 300 armo:?ed vehicles. The reporC
also alleged Chat "the people in many provinces and districts
from Quang Tri to Ca Mau rose up, smashed the enemy's grip,
destroyed 'strategic hamlets' and other concenCration camps
seized control, aqd liberated many areas." The deCailed review
of fighting in various areas did not include the earlier spurious
communist claim Co have "liberated" An Loc, the provincial
capital of Binh Long, on 15 April, but iC did as9ert that the PLAF
"surrounded, attacked, and wiped out enemy troops" there.
The roundup of initial "victories" in the South was welcomed in
Front comment and by editorials in the Hanoi press on 20 April,
all contending that the offensive, by destroying large allied
forces, is changing Che balance of forces in South Vietnam.
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial claimed that the PLAF's feats
in destroying "the enemy's vital forces" represent "a very
important victory and a very powerful blow Co the backbone of
the U.S. Vietnamization policy" and have "directly and in shirt
time changed the balance of forces on the battlefield." It
maintained -:hat "the dream of the U.S.-puppet clique of
thwarting and extensively pushing back the liberation forces and
of fighting the war outside of the borders of South Vietnam has
vanished," thus implying communist determination to sustain itA
attacks i~} South Vietnam. And, in a further suggestion that the
offensive will be prolonged, it claimed that the revolutionary
forces have widened the "liberated zone" and acquired "springboards
from which to lsunch new offensives."
While expressing optimism about the favorable position of Che
communist forces, the QUAN DOI NHAN D4N editorial dil not
forecast victory in Che near future. It warned that "ma.:~y
difficulties and challenges" lie ahead, and it went on Co explain:
"Offensives are developing both powerfully and steadfastly and
in accordance with the law of the resistance of our people which
consists of fighting protractedly and more and more. powerfully.
This also corresponds to else guidelines of the .?trategy of the
present revolutionary war, which has to go through many phases."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
CONFID>;NTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 APRIL 1972
Like ~~]AN DOI NNAN DAN, the NNAN DAN editorial on the 20th held
that "the ant-ihilation of a aubstant'lal part of the enemy
potential and the destruction of a sizable amount of hie war
equip-nent" has caused the balance of forces to "continue to
change in favor of our armed forces and people." It asserted
that "the new victories prove that the armed forces and people
in the South 3L'e standing in a new strategic position" and
demonstrate the importance of "the correct political and
military leadership, t;ie correct assessment of the situation,
and the firm grasp cf the opportunity to annihilate the enemy."
ACTION IN KONTUM, The 24 April communist aseaul~ in the
BINH DiNH PROVINCES central highlands of South Vietnam has
drawn a predictable flurry of propaganda,
including an order that day for further attacks ~iom the central
highlands PLAF command, a QUAN DUI NHAN DAN editorial on the
25th, and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 26th. Communist accounts
of the action said that the PLAF in Kontum Province attacked all
the allied encampments along the "Dak To-Tan Canh defense
perimeter" on the morning of the 24th. Hanoi and the Front
claimed *.hat in six hours of fighting the PLAF seized complete
control of all the bases, headquarters, storage areas, airfields,
and district capitals on a 30-kilometer stretch of the defense
perimeter from northern Vo Dinh to Dak To district capital and
from Dak Mot to Tan Canh town. T-.e PLAF was credited with
"wiping out" the forward command post of the 22d ARVN Division
and with "destroying or disintegrating" the 42d and 47th
regiments, the 9th Battalicn of the 3d Airborne Brigade, and one
battalion of tl-e ARVN 41st Regiment. Initial accounts of the
fighting did not mention the surrender of any specific ARVN
units, although an LPA report a?.leged that many units surrendered
and that many others on the defense perimeter along the mountain
range "fled in disorder."
The order from the central highlands PLAF command, broadcast on
the 25th, claimed that government troops in Kontum Province were
?:.n an "extrEmely critical situation" and "utterly confused."
Urging further offensive action, the order called on the PLAF to
pursue the enemy" and "prevent him from escaping the Kontum area,"
to "vigorously attack the enemy's bases in the provincial capital,"
and 1:o cut allied supply lines and intercept "retreating troops."
The :-rder instructed regional militia and guerrilla forces to
"actively appeal to the enemy's remnant troops who have stra~?ed
into the forest," and it called upon the ARVN officers and men to
"rally to the liberation traaps."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 200~d~~~g~~~~A-RDP85T~~~~~Qg300050017-2
26 APRIL 1972
The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial welcoming the communist successes
in Kontum claimed that the PLAF had shaken the entire allied
defense system in the highlands and "created a springboard for
nEw attacks." "Victories" in the highlands in recent months
were called "evidence of the close coordination among the
vario~~s battlefields throughout the SouL?h." The editorial
added Chat the fighting in this area had scattered and
weakened Saigon's strategic mobile forces and "directly supports
the offensives and uprisings by .the armed forces in the delta
and coastal areas ."
Attention was focused an Kontum Province and the neighboring
coastal province of Binh Dinh in a 25 April Hanoi radio
commentary described as a "correspondent's notebook." It
began by taking note of the geography of this "very important"
area--stretching from the border to the coast, south of Quang
Ngai and Quang Nam (GVN's Quang Tin) provinces. ,After reviewing
the recent fighting in Kor.tum, the commentary recalled action
in Binh Dinh from 9 to 19 April in which the revolutionary armed
forces and people allegedly killed or captured nearly 3,800 troops,
including nearly 2,(100 regular troops, and "completely liberated"
Hoai An district. Underlining the significance of this achievement,
the radio commented: "Geographically, Hoai An district is a shield
protecting the central area of Binh Dinh Province; therefore the
defense was very heavy there. The loss of this area would lead
to the loss of many townships, such as Bong Son, De Duc, and
Tam Quan on Highway 1 and in the coastal area."
Calling attention to the fate of the 22d Division, the commentary
repeated the claim that Kontum forCES "exterminated or disinte-
grated" the division's 42d and 47th regiments as well as one
battalion of iS:s 41st Regiment. It also alleged that action in
Binh Dinh "annihilated" the division's entire 40th Regiment and
one battalion of its 41st Regiment. The radio observed that
the 22d Division was thus "almost annihilated," with three of
its regiments and two battalions of its fourth regiment "annihi-
lated or disintegrated." It added that the 22d Division "now
has only a small segment of the 41sC Kegiment and its rear
headquarters that have not yet been attacked."
WANOI. FRONT DISCUSS GUERRILLAS' RELATIONSHIP TG MAIN FORCES
Most Vietnamese communist comment on the current offensive, stressing
the importance of the destruction of large ARVN forces, has focused
on the act~levements of the communists' main force units but the role
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ~~~i~~5T00875RQ~~3~017-2
26 APRIL 1972
role of local forces hae also been raised. For example, a l5 April
QUAN DOZ NHAN DAN editorial contended that the engagement of
Saigon's main forces had left the rural areas "unguarded" and
"weakened" xnd urged that local forces attack the pacification
program and that the "local people's war keep pace with the
development of the situation." A 24 April NHAN DAN commentary
was also notable for ite even-handed appraisal of the contribution
of the different types of communist forces. Rather than repeating
the standard claim that the destruction cf Saigon's main forces
is changing the situation on the battlefield, the NHAN DAN
conanentary asserted Chat "it is due to the vigorous and uniform
activities of the regular units, regional troops, and guerrillas
that the balance of forces between us and the enemy is constantly
changing in our favor."
"CUU LONG" COMMENT Difficulties faced by the guerrillas in
ON GUERRILLA FORCES South Vietnam were frankly detailed in
an article attributed to the South
Vietnamese commentator "Cuu Long," broadcast in installments by
Liberation Radio from 20 to 23 Apri1.* The article, entitled
"Some Problems of Guerrilla Warfare in the Southern Rural Areas
in the Phase of Struggle to Defeat the U.S. 'Vietnamization'
Strategy," seems ~o be aimed at arousing guerrilla forces in the
South which have been dormant in the face of pacification efforts
and have lacked--until now--any substantial assistance from main
force units. Cuu Long called on the guerrillas to take: into
account the general "favorable" situation when asseas~ng their
position in a certain locality; he provided detailau guidance on
methods to step up activities and improve the situation in areas
contested or controlled by the GVN; and he stressed the need to
build guerrilla forces, labeling this "the present important and
foremost requirement." Hia candid discussion noted many guerrilla
shortcomings and acknowledged considerable difficulties faced by
some forces "at a time when the enemy has already established
* Cuu Long is a pseudonym periodically signed to authoritative
commentaries on the war in South Vietnam, particularly on the role
of the southern guerrillas. The laet previous Cuu Long article,
publicized by both Haroi and Front media on 17 and 18 October 1971,
is discussed in the 20 October TRkNDS, pages 7-9. Unlike the
current article, the one in October did not concentrate on the
question of guerrilla activities and even flatly asserted that
communist main-force units "can now completely defea~ the southern
puppet army."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/O~dt4~I~iC~TAARDP85T008 B5ROROt3~00050017-2
26 APRIL 1972
many poste with many troona and when his coercive machinery iv
actively working, whereas our forces have been pushed out of
the localities, the masses have been swayed by the aggressors,
and revolutionary bases have had Co stay inactive or have been
encircled or hunted."
Although Cuu Long did not discuss the current offensive, he
raised thA significant question of the relationships between
"uprisings" and military action and between the guerrilla and
main-force units. He explained Chat during the 1959-60 period
the "concerted uprising" of the masses "relied mainly on
political for.~e Find was supported by a small part of the armed
unite." By conL?rast, he continued, "in the present phase of
defeating the U.5. 'Vietnamization of the war' strategy, the
masses' uprisings rely on both the military and political forces
with military force being used as leverage." He sdded that,
therefore, "guerrilla warfare has developed and is developing the
military strategic effects in close coordination with the
conventional war of the main-force unite." Later spelling out
this coordinat:~on, Cuu Long declared:
When the enemy concentrates his regular forces
in order to cope with our regular forces, the
guerrillas deal them heavy blows from the rear
and he must spread Chin his forces. Berause
thr eneny's mobile forces are scattered, our
regular forces have more ar_d more ~~portunities
to make larger and larger troop concentrations
and, as a result, have dealt, are dealing, and
will certainly deal the U.S.-puppets heavy
annihilating blows and will even more seriously
panic them.
GIAP GN MASS UPRISINGS The relationship between the "revolutionary
AND CONVENTIONAL WAR masses" and the armed forces was discussed
at 1enRth by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyer.
~iap in a four-part artic]e published in installments in the monthly
army magazine QL'AN DOI NHAN DAN beginning in December.* In the first
two installments Giap analyzed at length Marxist-Leninist doctrine
* 1'he first three installments appeared in the December, January,
and February ieauea of the military journal; the March issue of the
journal is not yet available. The first and second installments
also were published in the January and February ieauea of the party
journal HOC TA?. However, the March issue of HOC TAP did not carry
the :third installment.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/0~0~~,~~~85T00875F~,g~~p~~~p017-2
26 APRIL 1972
and Vietnam's hietorica]. experience to define, and defend, the
importance of the role of regular armed forces--an issu~a of
added significance in view of the commitment of communist main
forces in the current offensive in South Vietnam. The third
section, only recently available, seemed to offer even more
pointed lessons for the current period. Discussing the role of
mass uprisings and attacks by main-force units from 1930 until
1954 Giap strongly suggested that in a war such as the one in
South Vietnam today the regular army plays the decisive role
and uprisings of the people cannot occur without the army's
support.
Giap defined the differences between mass uprisings and revolutionary
war by contrasting the experience of the Vietnamese in their 1945
uprising againsC the Japanese and their later resistance war
against the French. Stressing the limitations on mass uprisings,
he indicated that they are only successful--as in 1945--when the
adversary lacks the capacity or will to oppose them with military
force. Uprisings differ from a war, Giap observed, which involves
fighting between two armies. Spe~.ling out this distinction, Giap
asserted: "We can say that if in the August Revolution [1945] the
main strength was the mashes' political organizations and their
broad armed forces, in the people's war against the French imperialists
the main strength was the people's armed forces Chat relied on the
political force of the all-people great solidarity bloc and that had
coordinated political forces."* He added: "Generally speaking, a
revolt is an uprising by the masses but war is combat between two
armies."
Giap's discussion of the war against the b'rench suggest3 some
parallels with the current war in Vietnam. For example, in
describing France's policies after unsuccessful offensives in 1947
he stressed French attempts to "use Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese,"
although he did not go so far as to label it "Vietnamization."
His review of the 1950 military campaign in the border areas
brings to mind some aspects of the current communist claims
regarding the oFfensive in the South. Giap noted that in the
border campaign
for the first time, with a larger organization and
improved weapons and equipment, our armed forces
* Giap's analysis of these two periods bear;; some reaembJ.ance to
Cuu Long's discussion of the differences between the 1959-60
uprising--relying on political forces--and the current period when
uprisings require the "leverage" of the military forces.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
CONFZDENTZAL FBZS TRENDS
zb APRIL 1972
launched a big military campaign in which we
destroyed an important part of the enemy's seasoned
mobile forces. We pierced through his defensive
lines in the border area, liberated a vast area,
and constructed roads to communicate with
socialist countries. The people's war developed
from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare.
Giap noted that subsequently the main-force troops launched
large-scale operations, political and armed struggles and
uprisings occurred in many areaa, guerrilla warfare made new
progress and was coordinated with conventional war, and--in
late 19'53 and early 1954--a "large-scale strategic counter-
offensive." was launched in many areas of strategic importance.
Finally. he noted, victories at Dien Bien .?hu and elsewhere
dea..t "der-isive blows to the enemy's aggressive spirit."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/~~~r ~~~~~I~P85T0087~~~!~~~520017-2
U,S, STRIKES AT DRV PROTESTCD BY FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN
'I'hwa? URV ~'araign Ministry spokesman's protests--issued on 20,
22, and 24 April--denounce sustained U.S. strikes against
North Vietnam. The armed force;; of Quang Binh are praised for
tl~n downing of the 3,500th U.S. plane on the 20th, and :lanoi
c~.La ms a totaa. of 3, 510 as of the 24th.
* '1'lie spokesman's protest on 20 April charged that on the 19th
anJ 20th U.9. planes an~S ships made "continual bompardments on
Vinh City, Uong Hoi--the chief town of Quang B!nh Province--the
provincial capital of Na Tinh and many townships, hospitals,
sr.hoolo and economic establishments" in Vinh Linh area and in
Quang Binh, Fla Tinh and Nghe An provinces, "perpetrating many
more savage crimes" against the Vietnamese people. It said
thbt the armed forces And people of the 'ocalitiee "meted out
due punishment" !~.~ the United States by downing eight planes
and "wiping out mnn3- air p+rates." Earlier on the 20th, a
Fianoi radii report in noting U.S. bombing and strafing i.n the
three px?avinree that day said that in response to the party-
government appeal the people had downed five planes--two in
Quang Binh, including the 3,SO0th, two in Nghe An and one in
Ha Tinh. Three of the eight planes claimed in the spokesman's
protest had been reported downed earlier by a Hanoi radio
report an the 19th.
-1? The protest of the 22d denounced "savage bombings" conducted
the previous day against populated areas of Thanh Hoa, Nghe An
and Ha Tinh provinces and Vinh Linh. :it noted that the bombing
of a "number of villages" in Thanh Hoa by U.S. planes including
B-52's was "of particular gravity." Zt claimed that three U.S.
planes were downed, "wiling out a number of U.S. pilots." These
downings had also been claimed earlier in a Hanoi radio report
of the 21st.
+ The spokesman's protest on the 24th "severely condemned"
U.S. attacks against Thanh Hoa, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces
and Vinh Linh. It charged that on 22-23 April, U.S. planes and
ships "struck many populated areas" in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh
provinces and Vinh Linh area, and Chat on the 24th U.S. planes
including B-52's "indiscriminately bombed Thanh Hoa provincial
capital and the surrounding areas." The protest claimed that
three planes were downed, including one B-52, and one ship was
"set ablaze." (Hanoi radio on the 23d reported two planes
downed in Quang Rinh and a ship "set ablaze" by the forces in
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000~08V'081;i~~1~RDP85TOm8~I~IDt0300050017-2
26 APitTL 1972
Ha Tinh. VNA on the 4th said that the 8-52 was downed by the
pe,ople's armed forces in Thanh llua "while countera~tacking U.S.
aircraft which were making wanton raids on populated areas in
the province." Lt ,paid this was the second B-5? downed in
Thanh Hoa and the sixth in North Vietnam since l April.)
All three spokesman's protests, like those of l3, l5, and 19
April,* were more strident in Cone than ie usual at the Apokesman's
lsvel. All called the strikes an "indolent challenge" tc world and
U.S. public opinion, and all three, like the protest of the 13th
and the Sovernu~ent statement of the llth, charged that the acts
of "war escalation" violate the "commitment of Cho U.S. Government
to cease completely and unconditionally a~.1 bombardments against
North Vietnam." The moat outspoken of the three, the protest
on the 22d, echoed the l3 April statement in calling the new
bombings "a new and extremely serious war escalation s*_ep and
another crime of the Nixon Administration against the Vietnamese
people." It claimed that by continuing to make "indiscrimina~e
attacks on populated areas with a view to massacring the
civilian population, the U.S. aggressors have further revealed
their barbarous and inhuman nature." (A VNA report on the 22d
said that 66 civilians were killed and 67 wounded--"mostly
children, women and old persona"--in the raids, which also
caused loss of livestock and the destruction of over 230 houses.
Hanoi media on the 25th clairued 164 casualties, with 75 persons
killed.) None of the current protests repeated the charge that
the rai.da were "wrecking" the 1954 Geneva agreements, although
the spokesman on the 20th said they "constituted a brutal
flouting to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and the
fundamental principles of international law."
3, 500TH PLANE The downing of the 3,500th plane over Quang Binh
on the 20th prompted a congratulatory letter
from President Ton Duc Thang to the armed forcus and people of
the province on the 22d as well as press and radio comment.
President 'on Duc Thang acclaimed the feat of arms by the Quang
Bi^h force,,** and scored the U.S. raids against Hanoi and
* See the TRED'DS of 19 April 1972, pages 4-7.
** Earlier Ton Duc Thang had sent a congratulatory letter on the
downing of 10 planes on 6 April and on the downing of the 100th
U.S. plane in the area of the Hari Rong bridge last December.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/4,9~Nt~~roI~P85T00875~QQ0~1Q~,y50017-2
26 APR?1. ;1972
Haiphong. Flo call.ecl on the "compatriotu and combatants" to
answer the 16 April party-government appeal. and "raise high
their iron wi1.l, eharpon their vigilance" and unite to carry
out President llo'e teachings "As long as even one aggressor
remains in our country, we must fight until he ?is expelled."
Ln editorially hailing the downing QUAN DOI NIIAN DAN on the
21st praised the armed services, listing such uni~;e as the
antiaircraft and rocket, air force, navy, radar, signal corps,
and engineer corps, as well ae the self-defense and security
police. The paper claimed that the downing signaled the United
Stater' "heavy defeat." In strengthening the ~tavy and air force,
it added, the Nixon Administrbtion "absolutely cannot intimidate
our people, nor cen it check the offensive of the South
Vietnamese armed forces and people," and it pledged determination
to fight and to carry out the party-government appeal.
Both QUAN DOI NNAN DAN and a radio commentary on the 20th
emphasized North-South relations. The paper said Chat the North,
"the big rear of the entire country, has all conditions for
smashing all U.S. military adventures and enough ironlike
determination to surmount all difficulties." It declared that
"only when the rear area ie stable will the front be strong and
only when the front is strong will the rear be stable. Never
has the strength of solidarity of our entire nation been as
fully developed as it is now, an3 never have the North-South
kith-and-kin sentiments prevailed in all regions of the country
as they do now." The paper added that "we are determined to
bring assistance to the frontline to help it fight the enemy
and gain great victories. No violence by the U.S. aggressors can
check our people's advance."
A NHAN DAN editorial on the 21st called the downing a "very great
victory" of "deep political and military significance." It said
that Nixon had actually used more bombs than his predecessor and,
"more savage st111," had sent "hundreds" of U.S. plates, including
B-52'6, to "wantonly bomb the densely populated districts in
Haiphong city--something Johnson dared not do. Many populated
centers in and outside Hanoi were bombed or shelled." The party
paper pointed out that since the President assumed office more
than 250 planes had been downed over the North.
Hanoi radio on the 21st, atypically broadcast some general statistics
on U.S. plane and ship losses. It said that between 5 August 1964
and 20 April 1972 the North had downed 3,504 U.S. planes, including
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
(;UNh I UhN'I' IAI~ hll l8 'I'III~~Ni)4
26 AI'11 [L 1972
1l 8-52'N; "ann.l.hl.lated c~nd capturocl thousands nl'' 11,8. bandit
pllotu"I "sunk or. rest ablaze ,l(~5 U.B.-pupp?t warshLps and
ranger boats; and nr+atly unnlhJlntud scoruo of U.S.~,pupp?t
rangers and spl?s." 1t said that 47 typ?? of plan?x madd by
1.7 munufactur?re havca been clowned over th? Nor. th, and .lt .Listed
Che number of planes downed in oach provinc?.
DRV SCGRES U ~ S ~ "TWRE~TS ~" PRESSES PARTY-GOVERI~WIEIJT APPEAL
Dotli Hanoi anti Front media ecorad remarks made by Secretaries
Rogers and Laircl before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on l7 and 18 April, respectively. A Hanoi radio commentary on
the 21st assailed the "warlike Nixon clique" for "brazenly making
bellicose statements and threatening to further intensify its
military adventures." The broadcast claimed that Laird "brazenly"
said "massive" strikes against North Vietnam would continue and
"many" U.S. ships would be~sent to Vietnamese waters in the next
two or three weeks and that he "threatened to use mines to attack
and blockade the port of Haiphong." The commentary took Secretary
Rogers to task for "making the odious colonial let argument" that
U.3. air and naval strikes were designed to protect U.S. troops
remaining in South Vietnam and for "slanderously claiming Chat
North Vietnam is invading South Vietnam."
On the 24th, a Liberation Radio commentary closely paralleled
the llanoi broadcast. And an 1,PA commentary on the samE day again
singled out Laird's "failure to rule out" the mining or
blockade of Haiphong harbor.
Hanoi radio has continued to dramatize North Vietnam's determination
to persist in the struggle by-opening its mayor newscasts with a
quccbtfon from No Chi Minh's 17 July 1966 appeal: "Hanoi, Haiphong,
and other cities and certain enterprises may be destroyed, but the
Vietnamese people will not be intimidated; nothing io more
precious then independence and freedom."
Following the issuance of the party-government appeal on the 16th,
Hanoi has publicized a series of meetings held to insure its
implementation. An "extraordinary enlarged conference" of the
Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee presidium on t'~e 18th,
according to a radio report the following day, discussed the military
situation in both North and South Vietnam, studied the point appeal,
and issued a resolution which was read by Hoang Quoc Viet. The
resolution "sincerely thanked the governments and peoples of the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/O~~jN~~,~~~,QAP85T00875~f0003,00050017-2
2h Ai'Rl'1, 1972
broths r.ly socialist countraes~ Che world paop;}o~ end the Nner.lcat~
progrnsslveA for their suppor. t and assi.Rtunce end cal l.ocl nn
friends throughout the world to act !n time to chwc aLro carried open
letters to the American people [rom Vietnam solidarity groups.
The Z6 April NIIAN DAN adito N.al raid the antiwar prot~ttr
exhibttad Amarlcanr' "testa condemnation of tho 'Nixon Uoctrine'
and the who 18 policy of the U.S. Presidane regarding Vietnam and
Indochina." It raid the American people realists that this
"presldeneiul war" it beinK conducted "in an Avon more sanguinary
anJ more ravage manner" than under Johnson. With "teething
demonrtrationr and ra.111er erupting everywhere." the paper snide
rite ('resident Isar discovered that tits Vietnam issue has not
been "defused." In an apparent reference to the President's
trips to Peking and Moecow~ the editorial said: "1le wras wrong
when he pinned hit hopes Eor a secure political posture on a
few diplomatic ployr."
A NtUN UAN article on 19 April qu~tad Wltite 1}outs and Pentagon
spokesmen as saying that "Nixon himself had ordered the strikes
against Nanoi and Ilaiphong" and that the strikes "would continue,"
thus "insuring ttre protection and safe withdrawal of U.S. forces."
NIiAN DAN drew from Senator Fulbright's remarks at the committee
hearings and the give-and-take with Secretary Rogers. The paper
quoted a spectator as shouting "That's a liel" after Rogers said
civilian targets in the North were not bombed. (DRV media did
not mention RogerA' reference to Soviet aid t~ the North
Vietnr,mese or Defense Secretary Laird's appearance before the
committee.)
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :t~+f~~~~,~1~~T00875R0aIQt3+OS~~P~017-2
fir, mull, lu~~
'fhv err Alrr I) I,Iharat Ic-rr fiadi~r rommantary~ 1-I~~klrig, up the earns
Inc~idant at lira cunanlttaa haaring,a~ rlaimad titer. attar Ruwarw
aald Only mllliary tarKata In tlta Nortlt warn bombed, "a young,
man at t and Ing lira meat Ing etoocl up and ahnutac) r 'You're
lylttgl Ynu drnppad bombw ott populated erase.' lla trlurulad~
'Victory balnnKM to U~.a Vlatttamoaa paoplac' as ha war dra?g,ad
farm cha room by police." 'fha commentary assartdd that wlr:h
the election drawinK Haar, 1'rasldant Nfxoti fw "pan lc-Mtrlckan"
because "hie VIa Utamiratton palace has bean bulls on quickaan~l."
The Ilanoi radio commentary on the 25th Wald ~Jlxon's rlaimtr of
MUCCaMM for VIPUtamit-,atlon and of an and to li,!i. Lnvol.vament Ln
Vietnam "can deceive no one." 'fha Vietnam question Is again a
campaign lssue~ it said, and "Nixon is under the prparrura of
a pair of plnr_ern--the victory of the South Vietnamese nrmed
forces and people and the struggle movement of the American pncrple."
Ilanoi and prom radios on t1w 2Sth carried roports that Mme. Il nh
and Nguyen Minh Vy spoke by ta.lephone to over SU,000 American
antiwar demonstrators in San prancisco on the 22d. Un the Z4th
Libaratton Radio report@d that Mme. >iinh had received
Representatives Bella Abzug and L'atsy Mink at I,he dalegation'a
Pariq residence on the 21st and hosted them at dinner. The
rer~resentatives "e;?:pressed indignation" at t.(e bombings,
"particularly of Ilanoi and Ilaip}tong," nccording to t}re radio,
and promised shat they "would seep up their activity in the
U.S. Congress to demand" that all teoops be withdrawrt.~ the
bombings halted, end the Paris negotiations resumed.
An open letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity wish
th~? American People was carried by VNA on tits 20th.* The
letter, dated 18 April, }sailed the so-called antiwar "spring
offensive" and mentioned the folly of the present U.S. course of
bombings in the North including the strikes against Ilanoi and
llniphong. It said the South Vietnamese people are "rising up
to apize control" and the renewed U. S. bombings "cannot save its
stooges." The letter asserted that the socialist countries are
"giving all-out assistance" to the Vietnamese people. And it
concluded by calling for Americana to step up the struggle and
atop the "acts of war escalation of the Nixon clique." On the
7th LPA had carried a letter of the same day from the South
Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with the American
People which urged Americana to "push ahead" with the antiwar
struggle and wished antiwar activists "many great victories" in
the "spring offensive."
* The moat recent open letters came during the so-called antiwar
"fall offensive" in 1971. Earlier letters are discussed in the
TRENDS, 21 April 1971, pages 4-5.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ~~~i~~~~5T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/0~/~~,I:I~~,~~DP85T008~1~51~0,~~q,~OtQ050017-2
~~~ nru I I, I y>
SINO-U, S, RELATIONS
PEK I Nd d I VES Ah~I.E ~ CORRECT COVERAL3E OF S I N(1-U ~ S ~ CONTACTS
Uueing the parlud nC the currant communlrt uCCanrlvn Ln Huulh
Vlntnam a~~J U.S, bumb.ing of the 1)KV, PakinK hro bane pruvlding
curract, ~tralghtfurwaed cuvar.aga of ongoing Sinu-U.;~. cnntactw
as onviragad In thn Julnt cummuniyua on Praaidnnt NlxOn'r vlrlt
In Nabruar.y. 'ChuM, two days attar Chou >Zn-lei. donuuncad U.S.
r.ildr nn N~noi anJ flalphong on 16 Apcil, NCNA annvuncnd that
:Wanaeorr Manr[lald and Scott had arrived that day In Paking, and
a dlrp.pch daeo Llnad War hington qp eho 18th roporend that
Pearldane Nixon had roco ivad the Chinas eablo tannic roam
paying "a return visit" to th? Unitod Stator. Utliar NCNA
cuvarago of the Mansfield-Seote visit included reports of a
dlnnar for tho ranatvrs on the 19th attended by NPC Vice
Clialrman Kuo Mo-~o and a meeting with Chou on the next day.
In it? troatmant of U.S. pvlici,a? generally, Faking hoe initiated
little authoritative criticism following the Prasidant'o visit,
apart from minimal reaction to Indochina davelopments* and
relatively mild attacks on the occasion of a Korean army
anniversary. While on occasion taking Adminirtration spokesmen
to task in roueino comment, Peking has avoided criticizing
Washington on sensitive issues such as Taiwan and hoe
scrupulously refrained from personal attacks on the President.
In addition, Paking has not released a "serious waening" against
U.S. encroachment on PRC territory since 24 December, t}ie
longest such gap since the buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam
and one that is especially notable in embracing a period of
large-scale U.S. naval and air activities near the PRC-claimed
Paracels.
(3111~TERAL CONTACTS In its coverage Peking has carefully
distinguished between contacts involving
officials and those representing "people's diplomacy."
Following the precedent set in its reportage on the
President's visit, Peking has avoided any characterization
of the atmosphere surrounding the Whirs House reception of
the table tennis team, the activities of Senators Mansfield
and Scott, or even the exchange of musk oxen and pandas. In
contrast, Peking's coverage of the Chinese table tennis team's
See the Indochina section of the TRENDS.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050017-2
(;~ 1Mr I III;N'1' 1 A1, 1111 tl 'I'iIIrNUI!
21t AI'iIIL I q/J
t.uttr hnw punt'+rycaJ a "warm wulcunin" glvcrtt by lhn Arnarlc~nn
paup l n, n "I r i and l y c