TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 12, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

...~. _.
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
Confidential
FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
II,IIIIII~~~~~~~~u~~umllllll
b'R~I~1g3S
an Commtc~a.+t 1'r~ pa~an~:~c~
STATSPEC
Confidential
12 APRIL 1972
(VOL. XXIII, N0. 15)
00300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONfI'IDI'sN'l'IAI~
This propaganda analysts report 18 based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIB without coordination with other U.B.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United Btatea,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the UB Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of Its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person to pro-
hibited by law.
cpouv 1
[ulud~d Ism au~sw,atlt
dOWOOIOd100 OOd
bdsulRaUa,
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
12 APRIL 1972
CONTENTS
Tupice and Events Given Mayor ACtention
A
i
INDOCHIN
Hanoi, Front Acclaim "Victories" in South Vietnam Offensive
1
DRV Government Statement Assails Unli~:iited U.S. Air Strikes
5
DRV Claims 22 U.S. Planes Downed in April, Urges Vigilance
9
DRV Military Comment, Plenum Developed Rationale for Offensive.
13
PRC Condemns U.S. Bombing, Acclaims Communist Offensive
16
Moscow Reacts Cautiously to Communist Offensive, U..S. Actions .
20
Cambodia: Communists Claim Their Forces Threaten Phnom Penh
24
SING-SOVIET RELATIONS
Peking Maintains Firm Line on Soviet "Hegemonistic" Aime
26
USSR-IRAQ
Kosygin Visit Produces Second Soviet-Arab Friendship Pact
32
DISARMAMENT
Moscow Hails BW Accord, Urges Ban on Chemical Weapons
39
GERMANY AND BERLIN
Gromyko: Treaty Refection Wi11 "Undermine" Berlin Accord
41
USSR-BOLIVIA
IZVESTIYA Comments Belatedly on Expulsion of Soviet Diplomats
46
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Ukraine Plenum Rebukes Two Obkom Leaders, Removes Sobol
48
CHINA INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shake-up in Kwangtung Leadership Revealed in NCNA Reports
50
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
FOR OP'P'IC'tAL U8E OivLY rBIS 'I'RIsNDS
12 APRIL 1.972
-:L-
'TOPICS AND CVCNTS GIVCN MAJOR ATTCNTION 3 - 9 APRIL .L972
Moscow (2971 items)
Peking (1303 items)
Indochina
(3%)
11%
Domestic Issues
(34%)
32%
[Communist Offensive
(--)
2%]
Indochina
(30%)
28%
in South Vietnam
[Communist Offensive
(--)
12%]
[Strikes on DRV
(--1
2%]
in South Vietnam
[Le DUan'A Birthday
(--)
2%]
[Sihanouk in DPRK
(--)
8?0]
CPSU 24th Congress
(J2%j
g~
[Strikes on DRV
(--)
4%]
Anniversary
ligltese Prime Minister
(4%)
11%
Hungarian Liberation
(U.3%)
SX
in PRC
Anniversary
Palestinian People's
(--)
5%
China
(5X)
4X
Congress
AUCCTU 15th Congress
(13%)
4X
Senegal National Day
(--)
3%
Kosygin in Iraq
(--)
GX
'
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Mobc:ow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, ar diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Toples and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed !n the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor slgniflcance.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONI~'IDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 APRIL 1972
INDOCHINA
Vietnamese communist media Dave claimed military "victories" and
civilian "uprisings" in many parts of South Vietnam, and an order
from the command of the South Vietnamese liberation army (PLAF)
on 11 April. called for further offensive action to achieve
"complete victor~~." Following the initial thrust of the offensive
in Quang Tri, the focus of the propaganda shifted to Binh Long
Province northwest of Saigon--an area which some comment noted
could be used ae a staging ground for further important offensives.
The first substantive report--carried on 10 April by Hanoi radio--
on the North Vietnamese party (VWP) Central Committee's "recent"
20th plenum suggests that the meeting endorsed the launching of
the current offensive in South Vietnam. According to the report,
the plenum held that "victories" since the 1968 Tet offensive
"have opened up the realistic possibility of defeating the
Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Doctrine."
High-level Hanoi condemnation of U.S. air and naval action against
the DRV came in an 11 April government statement protesting the
"continuous" attacks since 6 April "at President Nixon's orders."
The statement contained the first direct acknowledgment of U.S.
charges Chat North Vietnamese forces have invaded the South. The
charges had been referred to obliquely, however, in a 6 April DRV
Foreign Ministry protest against air strikes that day which
ridiculed the "illusion" that the United States could deter the
North from supporting the South.
In a foreign ministry statement on 10 April seconding Hanoi's
protest of the 6th against the U.S. bombing, Peking acclaimed the
"magnificent victories" won in the communist offensive while going
to considerable lengths to rebut Washington's argtunent that the
offensive represents an invar~ion from the North. The statement
showed signs of restraint, containing no direct attack on the Nixon
Admin:~stration by name and failing to reaffirm Peking's support
for the war effort.
Moscow has to dare issued no official endorsement of Hanoi's
protests, although solidarity with the DRV was reaffirmed in a
Soviet-GDR communique at the conclusion of SED party chief Honecker's
4-10 April visit. Moscow's cautious approach is also evidenced by
its avoidance of any personal criticism of the President.
HANOI. FRONT ACCIJ~IM "VICTORIES" IN SOUTH VIETNAM OFFENSIVE
Typical of the broad communist claims regarding the current offensive,
the 11 April order from the South Gietnam liberation army command
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 200~1~p,~~-RDP85T0~7~5,~~i~~300050015-4
12 APRIL 1972
maintains Chat PLAF troops are "winning great victories on all
fronts" and that "our people throughout the South are arising
vigorously, smashing the U.S.-Thieu clique's yoke of domination,
and gaining control.." Calling for further attacks, uprisings,
and proselyting, the order pledges to "develop tY~e offensive
impetus to gain great victories, smash Vietnamization, and
bring our people's resistance to complete ?:ictory."
The PLAF order was welcomed on the 12t1~ in .lanoi press editorials
which acclaimed the "vigorous" development of the offensive.
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's editorial, likQ other comment, reflected
Hanoi's apparent calculation that the South Vietnamese army,
without the support of U.S. ground forces, would b: vulneraule
to the communists' main-force attacks. Appraising the situation
in the South, it observed Chat the U.S. army--the "main pil~.ar"
of the war--had been disengaged from the fighting, and it cl~~imed
that the ARVN is "obviously exhausted following its heavy,
repeated defeats" in 1971. The editorial called upon the communist
"regular units" to "deal the enemy vigorous blows," to attack liim
"continuously and very strongly," and to "fight to break the
backbone of the puppet regular units" and "make him panicked ar.d
confused as soon as he catches sigh of our troops." The paper
maintained: "We are now stronger than before and the enemy is
weaker than before. Nothing can check our advance."
BINH LONG The importance of the attacks northwest of Saigon,
FIGHTING in Binh Long Province, was underscored in a
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 8th which
praised the PLAF there for "destroying a big chunk" of the
defense network "established to block the way and protect"
Saigon. Suggesting that the way has been opened for further
attacks, the editorial maintained that the area of ea8tern Nam Bo,
which includes Binh Long, is a position from which to "stage
offensives that exert a strong effect on the southern cities
and rural areas, from Saigon to the P4ekong Delta." It added
that "the glorious Binh Long victo;.y" had not only "rocked the
enemy's important defense line" but also "directly created
conditions for the revolutionary forces to develop their
offensive position in this strategic area."
In a review of the situation throughout the Soutl-,, a NHAN DAN
editorial on the 8th claimed that the PLAF in Binh bong, in
fighting from the 5th to the 7th, had "seriously damaged" the
ARVN 5th Division, "forced all of the 9th Battle Group to
surrender," and "annihilated" several other ARVtd unite,
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIL`rNTIAL FBIS TRIrNDS
12 APRIL 1972
"completel;~ liberating Loc Ninh district" and seizing control.
of Flighwny 13 north of Chon Thanh--the southernmost district
capital in the province. A Liberation Radio broadcast on the
same day pressed similar claims and asserted that the people of
Loc Ninh district "rose up" in coordination with the military
attacks and were "eagerly constructing a revolutionary
administration." This broadcast, like other commentaries,
stressed that the Binh Long attacks came at a time when ARVN
forces were dispersed to meet other assaults. It Cook note of
reports that the Thieu government has had to use the airborne
battalion that guards the presidential palace to defend the
outskirts of Saigon and has had to assign military cadets to
`~~ard duty.
Details of alleged communist military achievements in Binh Long
Province were supplied in a Front radio broadcast on the 9th
which claimed that 3,500 allied troops were put out of action
from 5 to i April; it alleged that almost 1,000 of them were
captured, including high-ranking officers and U.S. advisers.
The radio said that 400 military vehicles were seized,
including nearly 50 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and
that l0 aircraft were shot down. It went on Co claim Chat the
PLAF wiped out two multibattalion units, one regiment, and
numerous battalions.
Another Front broadcast, also on the 9th, claimed that a third
multibattalion unit--the 52d Battle Group--was "annihilated"
on 7 April north of the Binh Long provincial capital of An Loc
(designated Hon Quan by the communists). This feat, according
to the broadcast, "completely isolated" the allied troops in
An Loc. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 10th, which
highlighted this "large-scale annihilating battle," again
stressed the importance of the eastern Nam Bo battlefield.
And an article in the army paper on the 11th, hailing alleged
communist victories in the neighboring province of Tay Ninh,
claimed that the PLAF is taking control of Highway 22 in that
province as well as of Highway 13 in Binh Long. The article
said that the fighting in the two provinces had forced U.S.
Commander Abrams to move part of the ARVN 21st Division into
the area from the southern part of the country.
IMPACT ON ARVN Hams i ,and Front propaganda continues to place
considerable stress on the need to carry on
proselyting among South Vietnamese Government forces, and comment
on the fighting claims significant success in such efforts. The
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000~g~~g~Etu~l~-RDP85T0~~7S5~~300050015-4
12 APRIL 1972
proselyting duties of the PLAF were officially reviewed in an
instruction from the army's political departmer-t, publicized
by the Front on 6 April, which recalled the PRG's 25 January
l0-point statement of policy toward people "forced by the
U.S.-Thieu clique to serve as mercenaries."* The LO points
have been recalled in other propaganda, including the 8 April
NHAN DAN editorial; NNAN DAN typically held that they have been
"exerting an increasingly strong influence on the ranks of the
puppet army, showing the puppet troops the path to follow ."
The NHAN DAN editorial, in dwelling on the alleged failure of
Saigon's armed forces to deal with the current offensive,
suggested that the communists may be counting on a breakdown
of these forces in order to accomplish their ob~ecti~-es in
the offensive. The editorial claimed broadly that "in the
atmosphere of seething attacks and uprisings by our armed
forces and people on the vast frontline, Saigon puppet units
have begun to continuously stage antiwar acts and to
surrender and desert en masse." IC singled out the alleged
defection under fire of the 3d Division's Stith Regiment in
Quang Tri and the "collective surrender" of the 5th Division's
9th Battle Group it Binh Long; and it went on to observe Chat
such actions clearly show that the "puppet forces" are
declining in the face of the "liberation troops' offensive
strength" and that the communists' strength and the a111es'
"weak and defeated position" are "having a strong effect on
all troop categories of the puppet Saigon .forces."
As has been the case during previous mayor engagements,
including Lam Son 719, communist media have quickly exploited
the claimed capture or defection of ARVN officers, describing
the circumstances in detail and publicizing purported
statements by the officers. For example, VNA on the 7th
announced that the officers and men of the 56th regiment had
been brought to a "specified place" where they Caere "received"
and were given an explanation of the PRG's 10-point policy.
VNA cited the commander and deputy commander of the regiment--
both lieutenant colonels--as stating that their opposition
to the "brutal" implementation of Vietnamization had caused
them to refuse to obey orders from the division command; they
were also quoted as saying they had "seen clearly" that the
ARVN "could not resist the revolutionary forces as Che U.S.
*The 10-point statement is discussed in the 2 February TRENDS,
pages 21-23, and in the 5 April TRENDS, page 4.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL F$IS TRENDS
12 APRIL 1972
troops continued to be pulled out and t-~~ men in the Saigon
army, fed up with the war, no longer wanted to fight." On
the 9th VNA described Che surrender of the 56th Reg.iment's
headquarters at Camp Carroll, indicating that the camp's
defenders had contacted the "liberation" forces by radio
to inform Chem they did not wish to fight and to arrange
their surrender. The 8 April NHAN DAN editorial had
ridiculed the reported announcement by the ARVN that the 56th
regiment's commander committed suicide.
DRV GOVERf~'IENT STATEMENT ASSAILS UNLIMITED U.S. STRIKES
The U.S. decision to step up air and naval attacks against the
North in the face of the communist offensive in South Vietnam
prompted A DRV Government statement* on 11 April which called
the action "an extremely serious new step in escalating the war."
It specifically protested the "continuous" attacks since 6 April
"at President Nixon's orders" against the Vi.nh Linh region,.
Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces, and Vinh city. The statement
cited Secretary Laird for the remark that the United States
would intensify and prolong its attacks on the DRV,, and it went
on to claim that "the White House spokesman" not only said
there would be no limit to the use of air power against the North
but "t:treatened to strike at Haiphong har'uor." A NHAN DAN
editorial on the 12th cited UPI in specifying that this "threat"
was voiced on 8 April, along with the Press SecretF.ty's additional
"hint" that the United States might even bring infantrymen back
to South Vietnam.
'The government statement contained Hanoi's first direct
acknowledgment of U.S. charges that the DRV toad invaded the
South. As carried by VNA in English, it said: "To conceal
their criminal acts of war escalation, the U.S. ruling circles
have put forward deceitful contentions, calling black white.
* Hanoi has issued a number of government statements on Indochina
developments during the Nixon Administration, but this is the
first one pegged to air strikes against the DRV. It apparently
was issued at the government rather than the foreign ministry level
because it was reRponsive to a new U.S. policy derision--to extend
the scope of the air strikes. Earlier government statements
included those of 12 June 1969 on U.S. decisions on troop withdrawal,
6 November 1969 on the President's speech outlining his
Vietnamization policy, 30 April 1970 on the incursion into Cambodia,
and, most recently, 10 February 1971 on Lam Son 719.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 ~~~i~D1~~5T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 APRIL 1972
They have rehashed shopworn contentions about 'North Vietnam
aggression against South Vietnam,' ." (The Vietnamese
word which VNA translated as "aggression" ie "xam luoc," but
in this context it also could be translated as "invasion.")
The KHAN DAN editorial on the 12th was even more precise in~
ref erring to U.S. statements when it said that "frenzied"
acts against the North, including B-52 bombings deeper into
North Vietnam territory, were being justified by such "vile
arguments" as the claim that "the bombings were 'retaliation
against the communist troops' offensive across the DMZ' .
The 6 April. DRV Foreign. Ministry statement, protesting air.
strikes that day and claiming the downl*g of l0 planes, had
contained a passage which seemed clear~.~- to have been prompted
by the U.S. charges of a DRV invasion. The statement said:
In carrying out their new military adventures
against the DRV, the U.S. imperialists continue
Co nurture the illusion that Chey can oppress
the Vietnamese people and force them to give .
up their legitimate right to self-defense
against U.S. imperialism and izs henchmen, .
that they can force the North Vietnamese
people to .give up their sacred duties regarding
the freedom and independence of their fatherland
and regarding their kith-and-kin compatriots
in South Vietnam.
Hanoi's pledge to fulfill its duty as the great rear for the
frontline in the South and its support for its southern
compatriots is standard fare in the propaganda, but this
point had not been made in any of the previous nine foreign
ministry statements on air strikes during the Nixon
Administration.
It was left to the government statement to revive Hanoi's
formulation that justifies a Northern military presence
in the South which it does not directly admit. Thus, the
statement said that "wherever there are U.S. aggressors on
Vietnamese territory, all Vietnamese have the right and
duty to fight against them to defend the independence and
freedom of their fatherland." This formulation appeared
frequently in the propaganda after the beginning of the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 APRIL 1972
U. S.-DRV Paris talks in May 1968,* but prior to its use in the
government statement its last known appearance in the propaganda
was in December 1970--in the wake of large-scale U.S. air
strikes against the North in November and the abortive prisoner-
rescue attempt. Defense Minister Giap, speaking at a meeting
marking army day, expressed the DRV's "right to track and shoot
down all U.S. planes, regardless of type if they violate
our airspace." He went on to eay that "we have the' right Co
concentrate troops in whatever zone in order to protect our
fatherland."
After declaring that the Vietnamese have a "right" to fight
wherever there are U.S. aggressors, the government statement
cryptically said "the U.S. Administration also fabricated the
myth about the so-called 'understanding'** between the United
States and the DRV.:'. It did not directly indicate that the
"understanding" concerned DRV military restraint as a quid
pro quo for the U.S. bombing halt. But it reaffirmed
Vietnamese determination to "fight until not a single~U.S.
aggressor remains on their territory," and it added that the
United States had invented the story of "North Vietnamese
violating the understanding" as a pretext for stepping up'Che
war against the DRV "in defiance" of the October 1968 U.S.
pledge "to completely and unconditionally end the bombing of
the DRV."
* For example, Premier Pham Van Dong, speaking at a National
Assembly session, was reported on 24 May 1968 to have said: "A11
our people, 31 million as one, are determined to fight and defeat
the enemy. Wherever there are enemies, every Vietnamese has a
right to go there to fighC them." Earlier in the war,. Hanoi had
periodically explicitly denied the presence of VPA troops in the
South. On six occasions between January 1966 and February 1967,
VNA issued "authorized" denials of Western reports on the VPA
presence.
** The matter of the "understanding" has come up only infrequently
in official statements. It did appear in the 29 December 1971
foreign ministry statement on the sustained air strikes--which
said that Secretary Laird even put out the ''fantastic allegation"
that the DRV had violated an "understanding"--and in foreign
ministry statements of 21 and 27 November 1970.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
12 APRIL 1972
The government statement declared that the Administration has
embarked on "new military adventures against the DRV in the
hope of salvaging" the Vietnamization plait. It added that
this further demonstrates that Vietnamization is aimed not
at ending the war but at prolonging and expanding it. The
foreign ministry statement on the 6th had atypical]y
included in its list of appeals to fraternal socialist and
other peace- and justice-loving nations the plea that they
demand an end to the Administration's Vietnamization policy.
The ministry statement, in addition to calling for an end
to "encroachments" on the ARV, appealed for help in persuading
the Administration to respond to the PRG's seven-point peace
plan. In an earlier passage it observed that U.S. and
world opinion is demanding that the Administration. end its
"sabotage" of the Paris talks.*
The government statement's concluding appeal to the fraternal
socialist and other countries included a call for them "to
extend even stronger support and assts:ance to the dust
patriotic fight of the Vietnamese people, and of the peoples
of Laos and Cambodia as well, until total victory." Similar
references to increased aid had appeared in the foreign
ministry statements of 29 December 1971 and of 6 March. 'At
the same time, the government statement said that U.S. bombs
and shells have been unable and will never be able to subdue
the heroic Vietnamese people. It added that "no brute force
and no insolent threats can shake the Vietnamese people's
determination to fight for the independence and freedom of
their fatherland." It "hailed" both the feats of the North,
which it claimed had "shot down many aircraft and sunk or
damaged many U.S. warships " and the "extremely glorious
victories of the heroic compatriots."
PRG SUPPORT The PRG issued a Foreign Ministry statement
on 8 April, supporting the DRV statement of
the 6th, but as yet there has been no endorsement of the DRV
Government statement. And on the 9th Front media publicized
a PLAF Command congratulatory message, dated the 7th, Co the
* VNA's Paris-to-Hanoi service transmission on 12 April
carried statements from the DRV and PRG delegations to the
Paris conference "demanding" that the 148th session be held
on 13 April. The delegations had issued similar statements
last week.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/~~, ~I~~,P85T0087~~0+~50015-4
l2 APRIL 1972
VPA Filgh Commund on the claimed downing of l5 planes beCween
I and 6 April.* Tho PRG Foreign MinisCry statemenC, ae usual,
followed the g?neral formaC of the DRV eCatemenC. Thus iC said
thus the "nsw militacy adventure" of Che Administration was
uimad ut "forci.ng" the Vietnamese people to give up Chair
lugiCimate right to~self-defense. The PLAF Command matched
Ilunoi'e pleclgo to :Lte kith-and-kin in Che South when it ,
"solemnly warned" Che United StaCee Chat "Vietnam ie
indivisible and Che Vietnamese people are indivisible" and
that if Che United Scales continues to aCta:k the North, "tha
southern troops and people will deal them punitive blows
that will be 10 or 100 rimes stronger." It expressed Che
determinntion of "all southern cadres, combatants, and
compatriots to frustrate Che new Aggressive ploC of Che
U.S. imperialists, to liberate the South and to defend Che
North."
Both the LPA and Liberation Radio commentarieo on the 5th
warned of more U. S. actions against the North, but while LPA
predicted heavier defeats for the United States, Liberation
Radio pointed to the indivisibility of Vietnam and said thaC
"with the 'when the South calls, the North will answer; when
the North ca11e, the South ie present on time' spirit,
. the southern armed forces and people are ready Co
perform steel-like acts to knock out Che enemy if he dares Co
recklessly lay a hand on our beloved North."
DRV CLAIMS 22 U.S. PLANES DOWNED IN APRIL. URGES VIGILANCE
The 12 April NHAN DAN editorial rounds up Hanoi's alleged
victories against U.o. air and naval strikes against the DRV.
Noting that the northern armed forces and people are launching
an emulation movement to accelerate production, t~ be ready to
fight, and to give due punishment to the U.S. "aggressors ,for
their new escalation," NHAN DAN claims that since l April,
* 7'he PRG has endorsed seven of Che l0 DRV foreign ministry
statements protesting U.S. air strikes during the Nixon
Administration; it most recently failed Co issue a foreigq
ministry statement following the 17 February 1A72 DRV statement.
However, on 18 February 1972 the PLAF Command issued
congratulations on the alleged downing of seven planes. The
PLAF Command had also sent congratulations on 22 November 1970
on the downing of six planes.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 200~i1~$4~'~'IQl~4-RDP85T~?~l~~f~-~~300050015-4
I'l AI'ItIL 1972
22 U.S. p.l.anes including throe b-52'e hav? boon downed in the
Fourth Military Region, bringing its total. downed over tied
DRV to 3,468, and that eight U.S. ships "were hit and w?~;
ablaze." A later report ors the 12t{~ brings the number of
ships reportedly hit to nine.
The editorial, in addition to citing such "threats" against the
DRV as the possible bombing of Haiphong, details the U.S.
buildup. It observes that the United States ie increasing the
number of aircraft carriers in the area to six, that many
phantom fete have been sent from Japan to Da Nang, and that
additional B-52's brought in raised the total of those
aircraft to 100. It also charges that the U.S. Seventh Fleet
has easel cruisers and destroyers to strike daily at coastal
areas of southern DRV as well as to provide fire support to
ARVN troops. A LO April Hanoi radio domestic commentary had
cited AP in claiming Chat the Seventh Fleet had "more Chan
doubled its force last week." The commentary said Chat in
addition to more aircraft carriers, the Administration had
mobilized nine cruisers and destroyers. Zt noted that two
additional squadrons of F-4 bets had been brought from Japan,
raising the total number of fete involved in air attacks
against both the North and South to "more than 500." And it,
too, said 100 B-52's were now operating in the area.
Hanoi report on 6 April that 10 U.S. planes were downed that
day, seven in Quang Binh and three in Vinh Linh. Three
additional planes were reportedly downed on the 7th in the
same areau. On the yth, Hanoi said that a B-52 had been
downed that day in Vinh Linh--thp third since 2 April.* Ard
on the 10th, Hanoi claimed three planes, two over Vinh city
(Nghe Are Province) and one over Con Co Lsland. Although the
propaganda has said that a number of U.S. pilots have been
"annihilated," there have been no reports of captured U.S.
pilots.
The alleged downing of the 10 planes or. 6 April prompted a
congratulatory m~.eage from President Ton Duc Thang--dated
the 6th and carried in DRV media the following Say. Thang
* See the 5 April TRENDS, pages 4-6. U.S. spokesmen have
denied that any B-52's have ever been downed, but. on the
9th the U.S. command reported Chat one had been "slightly
damag~^ b~ a surface-to-air missile" that day but returned
to base . ~?fely.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/p~~t~ ~~~,~,~P85T0087~~r~Op1~~~~50015-4
12 AI'it I I, 1 ~JlJ
had rlmllarly cang,ratulatad the people and arrnad furc~ar in the
Ilam Rung brlilada araa tart Dar.amhar Cur the allnl{ad duwnlna
uY the IUOtIi ll.ll. plane in thnt gran. Ar to that marraga~
'I'hung now ~~allad un the people to "~luraly unita~ Curt.har
hclg,hean thd~lr vlgtlnnc~a~ and rtand toady to C1Kht ,"
'Cho VNA prarr review on the Gth noted that cummanddtiunr ware
Lesuad by thn VPA Illgh Command Cur action during the wnak
but. rerangaly~ thorn her bann no mention of any VI'A
congratulatur.y mearagnr alnca thr,~. Such marrag,ar era
common; they had bean iarued in p'a-~ruary of shit year and in
December 1971 as wall rr dr .ng earlier pari~,dr of marriva
bombing in March 1971. and May and November 1970.
VPA ORDER, PREMIER'S ~Nano.i'e continuing attention to
DIRECTIVE ON VIGILANCE heightening vigilance and
combat-readineae hoe included a
6 April VPA High Command order to the North Vietnamese armed
forcer and a "recent" DRV Premier's Office diroctiva on
combat-readiness and air defense taeke~ publicised on the 7th.
A QUAN DOI NIU1N DAN editorial on the 7th called for
implementation of the VPA order, as did a 6 April ilanoi radio
commentary. Tl~e VPA high Command order--only the third to
have been issued during the period of th? Nixon Administration--
ir similar to she previous two in its basic appeals. An Order
was issued on 28 December 1971 ae the time of sustained U.S.
bombinge~ and one on 10 December 1970 urged implementation of
the unprecedented point VWP-Government appeal for vigilance
that followed tl~e massive November 1970 U.~. air strikes and
abortive pr:eoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay.*
The current order calls for the protection of property and lives,
the ensuring of public order and eecurity~ close coordination.
and the downing of many U.S: planes and "capture of many aggressor
pilots." It also urges the military to "completely and quickly
annihilate the enemy's coasnando and surprise assault units if
they venture to come ~" an element preLent in tho 19)0
order but not in the one of 1971. The current order includes
a new element when it ref ere to the "firing at and sinking of
many U.S. warships" and to "taking timely steps to suppress all
* See the TRENDS of 29 December 1911. pages S-5. and of
16 December 1970. pages 1-4.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 20x00u10~8uft18't~lA-RDP85Tm1018'P~BP~U~0300050015-4
17 AI'Nt1, Ib>!
rahc.,taga." 'I'hla t ima the order is apaclCic~al ly addressed In
the "mtaalta~ radars artlllary~ and naval forcer" ar wall as
to the canal antlalrr..raft~ alt f~+rrac raqular army. aarurity~
and rnl I 1 t la fc+rrea.
Y'ha drroc lava from the 1'ramiar'a t)ffica "on atrangthaning
r~+mhat-raadirtasa and the people's air defence" calla nn "all
luraltttaa" to "realty heighten vigilance" and o:;laniKa
combat-raadinarr ratlrtactorily.~ AmonK other thingr~ 1t
orders m111tic~ and self-defense forces to conrolidate and
carry out patrol and guard ciutier~ and It says "stela organs
moat rna i nt a Irr round-the-r lock duty during :~f f hourr rnd
holldayr." it calla for the building o[ sufficient ahalterr~
the Improvement o[ watch and alarm-sounding syrtemr enc.
facet old unitr~ and the rertetction and reduction of
meetings and activities of largo crowds. Like the VI'A Nigh
Commend order, it also calls for satir[actory implementation
of communicationr and tranrportat:ion talks.
A ~ April NiIAN bAN editorlal~ praising the Quang Binh and
Vtnh Ltnlr forcot f.or theft "outstanding feat of army in
shooting down" 1D planet the praviout day. tierilarly exhortr
all locatitiet to heighten combat-readiness and combat
abilities. t..ike the directive of the rams date, it urges the
ronrolidation of the milttia and self-detente forcer. And it
stater char "party committee echelons and the administration"
at baste levels in particular are required to "load the incraara
to air defense. including the digging of pity and trenches and
the or?ganiz.~tion of the alaemc evacuation, dieperrion~ first
air and other systems, and must control these oc~ivities
permanently and closely."
a The Premter~s Oft ice to not known to have issued a previous
dlroctive devoted solely to combat-readiness and air defense
tasks !n the part three and a half years. Hoveverc in
January 1971--after the unprecedented point party-go?~ernment
appeal--an instruction was issued on stepping up "the emulaelon
movement for production and combat preparedness among the North
Vietnamese people ana armed forces in 1971." It included a
brief call for greater efforts in strengthening national
defense and increasing combat-readiness against "all saLotage
and provocative acts of the United States."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/0~;~iN~~~~1~~85T00875R~~1~~,~~~15~0015-4
I! AI~Nit, lv1J
I>NV M 1 ~ I fiN2Y crNfi , f~L,CNl~1 I~VI~ L,O~iaU i~lllT 1 UNAI~ Fl~`t f>t~ ~t;N51 VL
Ilanni anal Mrunt propaKanda fur more than a year has 'wyaQrt remarkably
neon ahcrut the rommuniata' intantton to launch a maJor otternaive+
In N~-uth Vlotnam after U.ti, Krnund troops cuulrl no 1onKrrr play a
rrlgnlticant r.ombat ro1t5. Authoritaliva military c~rmmantatura
have rpppata+lly maintained that t.lta. ANVN?~-unsupported by 1f.N.
trumps--could not fond off lam p-rrcala attacMs by communist
main-tnrco rtntta~ Un 2~i Narch, only six dayrr bpf.ora the
-~urrQnt ~~ftonalvp warn initlatpd, Nanui papQrs published an
articla by the military cornmantator "Chien Thang" ('1'ha Victor)
which reitpratpd thQ view that thQ A1tVN ass "unable to stand
on its own" and QxprQSrrpd the apparQnt thinking of Nanoi.'s
military plannQres "tlnly with 'big punches' of. the regular
Corc'Qa can a party launch maJor annihilating battler and bring
about a clear changQ in the balance of forcer on the battlefield,"
The Chien Thang article, with its optimistic appraisal of the
"upgrading" trend o[ the cotwnttnirt military position, took on
added significance with the release beginning on 27 March of
maJor speeches at the UItV National Assembly cession, held
20-75 March.* The language o[ the leaders' speeches ear
strikingly similar to C}tiQn Thartg's. Morrovar, the speeches
rQVealFd that the party Central Committee's 20th plenum had
been held "early this yrar," thus strongly suggesting that
Chien Thang was reflecting the viaw4 0[ the Central Committee.
Tlt1s was confirmed on 10 April when Nano! released its first
substantive report of the plenum proceedings. Ths report, like
tlrQ C,hipn Tltang article, held that "fundamental changes" had
occurrQd in fife military situation: "We era holding the
initiative and era in a victorious. advantagaour, and upgrading
position. whereas the enemy is in a losing, passive, difficult,
and downgrading posture."
The report on the plenum also recorded its view tinat communist
"victories" sin^e the 1968 Tet offensive "have opened the
realistic possibility of defeating the Vietnamization policy
and the Nixon bvctrine in Indochina." That the plenum envisaged
a military defeat of Vietnamization was spelled out in an ll April
NNAN DAN editorial on the Central Committee's meeting which declared
in even stronger terms: "We have the proper conditions to take
the initiative in attacking the enemy. to smash the Vietnamization
See the 29 March 'TRENDS. pages 8-11.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000d-AQ~Q~'?r~lA-RDP85TQp~~7~~QQ,Q300050015-4
1J AI'1111. I'lIJ
plan and the NIlr-,n trurlrlna, and to advan-~a (,,ward wlnning
Kraal new vtrt,-rlaa and laadlnk the ant t-It,tl, net lone(
aalvat i--n tpalatanrv t? ti-tal vi-'tory." Ac,'?rding lu ll-a
rapnrt -,n the plenum, 'ha Central t;ummittaa bald that
paraQVrranra In and arralaratl-,n of Una "war of raalrtanra"
la the "urKant teak" of the Viatnamaaa at the praaant stage.
LIACItC,R(RXVb Aa large-acala fighting dlminiahrd 1n the wake
of the 19GN '1'at offrnalva, llancsi propaganda
generally av,rldad dlaruaring the lmportanca of Ihp rota of
thQ male-force unlta, Nut thr North VLatnamec~~Q ,1 id not
auggaat that they could auccred withnut flit urn of there
units. Thr naraartty for attnckr by targp units at toms
point to the war war at least implicitly reaffirmed during
thtr prrtod--in a Uecrmber 19G9 article by URV Uefenre
Minister Vo Nguyen Ciap which pointed out that in ehr course
of a protracted "people's war" thrrr wll.l by n transition
from "progresrivr e;-oluelon" to "developments by ]raps and
bounds." The implicatlon? of Glap'r remarks ware sharpened
in an ur~,yigned article in the January-February 1971 issue of
the URV journal TUYEN NUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING) which
stressed that protracted warfare strategy "is not protracted
guerrilla fighting" and that than mutt also be "sudden
trap-like developments." Llrrtwhare~ the article arrested
even more pot.ntedly that "the total. defeat of the 'Vietnamtzation'
of tFre war inure be a (continuous process and also will take },lace
to large leaps wlriclr change th? balance o[ forcer to the point
where the enemy does not have the cepaciey to continue ehr war."
Prior to the publication of the TUYfN 11UAN article, an
authoritative argument for decisive main-force attnckr war
presented in a December 1970 erticlp attributed to PRG Defense
Minister Tran Nam Trung. publicized in both Hanoi and Front
media. In stark contrast to Vietnamese communist propaganda
over the previous two years, Trung stated baldly that. the
stepping up of big-unit actions is "required in the development
of the ail-people and comprehensive people's war in order eo
smash the U.S. imperialists' stubborn plots and to crush their
aggressive will."
It is possible that the 19th plenum--which Hanoi media first
me-tioned rn 1 February 1971--endorsed Tram Nam Trung's apparent
view that Hanoi's regular army units had to be committed to a
decisive engagement with the allies. Hanoi's report on that
plenum. like its report on the 20th plenum, noted thAt the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
(;rlNlrll)I~N'1'lAl. I~iIIN 'I'111SN1)N
11 A1~1111, 191
t,antral l;~~rmnli i.aa dlwc~uwwad the war, but it rnvnalnd I ittla
alas. t;~~nanant un the l ytlr pl scrum d lct, irowavar, raC l nct Chn
priority North Vlatnam waw Klving to the wart 'i'hn 2 Mabrunr.y
191 NIiAN 1)AN adltnrlal, for nxnmpla, arrwarcad that. "to uppoara
the Amaricanar t~rr national walvaCinn Lrr nn urKnnt, aaerecl,
and moat Lmportant duty of our paopla~"
'I'ha laawlbllity and doslrabili.ty of cunCront.tng thn n111ds with
c~c~rmnuniwt main-f~rrca unitw war pressed in nrticl.onby ilanol
military r~rrnmarrtntors In the spring of 1.911. in the wake of
c)parntton Lnm 4on 119, which Ilnnoi main tnlnsd had bnon a mn~or
wtratagi~~ dafQat for thQ ARVN. Moot notable among those
artic?lew was one written by tha commentator "Chian 91nh"
and publ ishad in the 2 April. QUAN I)DI NiiAN i)AN. Chia? Binh
held that "only by annihilating the enemy's military Eorceo
by big drunks can wo gradually knock out thr enemy, gradually
crush Iris wf ll, and gradually change thta ~,aar ::'?~.~tion in
c~rdar en advance towaed completely militarily d~efoating him."
Ile mnintained that Lnm Son 719 had demonotrateu that the allied
forces "cannot cope" with "large-ocale blows of annihilation."
The role of main-force attacks was again raised in July and
eaely August Ln a spate of commentaries on rho military
sttua(ion during the first six months of the year. A 2 Auguot
article by Chien Thang ~aao particularly outspoken in its etreoo
on the impact of offensives by mein-force units and thtir
unique role in "definitely weakening" the adversary with "big
battles of annihilation."
In October an article by the military commentator "Cuu Long,''
publicized by bath 1lanoi and Front media, again prasoed the
case for large-scale attacks. In one of the boldest
rationalizations for such action, he stated flatly that "our
main-force army can now completely defeat the southern puppet
army." He likened the current situation to that in 1965 when,
he claimed, the ARVN was nearly put out of action prior to the
intervention of U.S. troops. The notion that the ARVN could
be defeated was again raised at the beg inning of this year in
propaganda pegged to a 24 December PLAF command communique on
the fighting in 1971. The communique, released on 3 January,
maintained that with L.S. troops withdrawing and the ARVN
"seriously disintegrating," the PLAF was "fully capable of
defeating the Saigon puppet army even if it received more
U.S. dollars, weapons, and air support."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000(G~l~~l~~jl~; RDP85TOQ~~~~,1 X00050015-4
12 AI'll I L l 912
PRC COI~EMNS U~S~ BdM81NG~ ACCLAIMS CONr11JNlST OFFENSIVE
A IU April 1'k(: F~~rolgn Ministry rtutomont 0oconds Ilunol's wt~~tu~uont
un file G~.h donauncing U.S, bombing o[ tho D:tV and "warmly" uc.~ ~ulmti
"thu magnlClcont virturlo0" won during tho curront conununlse
ut lun~ivo In South Vlutnnm, '1'ho Chin00o 0eutomont l0 not~~blre f~~r
gulag to ronrldnr0blo length to JuOtify eho URV'0 war role In thu
Buuth~ rovlving a thomo that wa? ln0t prominent in Chinosu etutu-
mrant0 !n the mid-1960'0. At Cho Demo eim0, Itiowovor, tho 0tutemunt
uvold0 attacking th? Nixon Admin Utration by name and fail0 to
reaffirm Poking'0 commltmont of rapport to the war effort in
Induchlnu. L~aking'r nw st. recent proviou? official 0tatement on
lndorhtnn, n 31 Marr.h foreign mini0try 0catamone wpporting
Vietname0e cummuni0t protest0 agaln0t ?uspen0lon of the Paris
tulkr, had bean the first. ruch rtotemant in year0 to fall eo express
Chlnere suppers for the war effort.
Apart from the foreign mini0tty statement, which followed Peking's
invariable pattern of 0econding an official DRV statement, there
ha0 been no official or elite comment by Peking on the communist
offensive. Politburo alternate member Chi Teng-kuei, speaking
at an 8 April banquet for a visiting Albanian delegation, referred
only in pa00ing to Indochina in prai0ing Albania for, among other
thing0, 0upporting "the three peoples of Indochina in their war
against U.S, aggres0lon." At the time of the 1968 Tet offensive,
Peking had weighed in with high-level expressions of support
backed by mass rallies. Thus, during the first week, Chou En-tai
had Bent. a message to the head of the NFLSV acclaiming its
"exceedingly brilliant victories" and pledging the PRC's "powerful
backing," and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial combined praise for the
offensive with mocking jabs at President Johnson for being
"genic-stricken."
Although expressing "utmost indignation" over the U.S. bombing of
the DRV, the 10 April Chinese statement shows restraint in
reacting to Vietnamese developments. Unlike the 31 March PRC
statement, it does not attack the Nixon Administration by name,
and it fails to respond to the 6 April DRV statement's call for
the fraternal countries to "act resolutely" and to "struggle
more powerfully" in demanding that the United States end Its
attacks on the DRV, end the Vietnamization policy, and respond
to the PRG's seven-point peace plan. The Chin~Oe statement, in
fact, is devoid or the demands on the United States that have
been included in all other recent statements.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CUNU I U14N'I' I Al, I~(s I S 'I'lli.NUS
a2 AI'R1L ,1972
'I'liu mnl.n throat of tiro rtatmmont, uccount4ng Cr,r almost half of
ler length, is d.iroctad wt the argument--attributed to "the U.S.
Govarnmant"--that thu U.5. attacks on North Vietnam era !n
rusponso to an invasion of the South. ReJecting thi? argument
as "r.idlculous and absurd to the extreme," rho stntement all: but
dienct.ly acknowledges rile North Vietnamese role in the offenAivo
!n the cause of justifying Ilanoi'? actions. Asserting flatly
that "South and North Vietnam i? ens country," the statement
insists that since the "Vietnamese nation is a whole" it is "fully
legitimate and a matter of course for the Vietnamese compatri-its
in the nor~the.rn and southern parts of the country to support each
ether and jointly combat the aggressors." U.S, military threats,
the statement declare,, cnnnot prevent "the people 1n North
Vietnam from fulfilling their sacred duty of supporting their
blood-sealed compatriots in the South."
The issue of North Vietnamese involvement in the war in the South
I~ad figured prominently in Chinese pronouncements in the mid-
1960's reacting to the escalating hoetilitiee. The Chinese
argued et that time that U.S. actions had erased the demarcation
line dividing Vietnam that had been established in the 1954
Geneva settlement. According to this argur,rent, the DRV, China,
and other countries w?er.e thereby free of any restrictions in
offering support and aid to the war effort. In stressing this
issue now,* but without reaffirming its commitment of support
for the war, Peking may be particularly concerned to portray
developments in Vietnam as an internal matter and to play down
the interests of outside powers. One motive for this approach
might be to Limit the impact of these developments on Sino-
U.S. relations.** Another consideration might relate to the
* Peking made a passing reference to this issue in a party-
government statement of 13 December 1970 supporting a DRV
party-government appeal to carry on the war. The Chinese
statement said the "Vietnamese nation ie an integral whole, and
it is the sacred duty of the people in the northern part of
Vietnam to support and assist their kinsmen in the South." The
current Chinese statement's assertion Chat "South and North
Vietnam is one country" represents the sharpest formulation of
this line yet made by Peking.
** In the S1no-U.S. point communique of 28 February, Peking
had softened its standard formulation of support for the
Indochinese "war Pgainet U.S. a,;gression and for national
salvation" to one of support for the Indochinese "efforts for
the attainment of their goal."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/~ ~L,~~tDP85T00~~~t~~~~0050015-4
l2 Afltl.L 1972
c~nCral role played by soviet waaponry in Cho comtnuniss
of fonslve, a role which pule Peking al a dis~.idv~~ntage `.n iCs
composition wish the Soviets for influence in Vielnam~ It may
bu reveuling in t.hie connection that NCNA's nccouns of the
recent VWP plenum, based on VNA's report, omitted the claim
Chat Ilanol had eucceesfuliy won "Che ever greaser sympathy,
support, and assistance of Che fraCerna.l eocialieC countries."
OFFENSIVE IN In acclaiming the "magnificent victories" won
SOUTH VIETNAh1 by the Vietnamese comrades, the foreign minlsCry
statement assesses the "vehemen~,: offensive on
various battlefields" i.n South Vietnam as dealing "a heavy blow"
at the Vi.etnamization programs The statement mentions no other
objective of the offensive and alludoe Co political issues only
in expressing confidence that the Vietnamese will frustrate all
"political schemes of U.S. imperialism."
Apart from the foreign minietry statement, the only authoritative
Chinese comment on the offensive has b~:en a 6 April PEOPLE'S
DAILY Commentator article which also hailed the offensive as a
heavy blow to Vietnamizalion. Mentioning only the Quang Tri-Thus
Th1en area, Commentator expressed approval of the offensive as
demonstrating "the mighty power of people's war" and contributing
"to the three Lndochinese peoples' ~oinC struggle." In contrast
to the 31 March and LO April foreign ministry etatemente, the
Commentator article reaffirmed Peking's backing fur the war as
"the bounden proletarian internationalist duty" of the Chinese
people. "So long ae the Vietnamese people fight to the end,"
Commentator declared, "the Chinese people will support Chem to
the end."
Since a 4 April NCNA report based on Western news accounts, all
of Peking's coverage of the military situation in South Vietnam
has consisted of pickups of Vietnamese communist sources.
Typical of these reports was one carried by NCNA on the 10th
and attributed to LPA which praised the attacks in Binh Long
Province from 5 to 7 April. NCNA ended its account by citing
a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary as portraying "a large-scale
battle of annihilation" in B1nh Long Chat demonstrated "the
strength of a closely coordinated offensive" and an "ability to
fight large-scale battles of annihilation."
In addition to these battle reports, Peking has also been
carrying the texts of official etatemente by the DRV and the PRG.
But Chinese reservations about the offensive, evident in Peking's
failure to initiate high-level expressions of support (the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONCZDENTZAL )!BZS TRCNDS
12 APRIL 1972
foreign ministry statement being a routine seconding vtatement),
also seem reflected in a reluctance to endorse the objectives
of the offensive beyond that of dealing a blow to Vietnamization.
NCNe1'e account of the VWP plenum report noted the claim that
victories since 1968 have inflicted "an important failure" on
the Vietnamization policy and the Nixon Docr,rine, but it omitted
the more ambitious claim that thesE victories have "opened the
realistic possibility of defeating" Vietnamization and the Nixon
Doctrine.
NCNA's own reports on Vietnam developments have been devoted to
U.S. actions and statements. NCNA reports on 7 and 10 April
took note of military moves and statements made by the United
States, including Secretary Laird's news conference on the 7th,
in connection with the expanded deployment of U.S. air and naval
forces in Vietnam. Like the foreign ministry statement, NCNA
took issue with U.S. assertions that the communist offensive
represents an invasion by the DRV and violates the 1954 agreements.
The report on the 7th cited three U.S. presidential candidates--
Humphrey, Jackson, and Wallace--as w~:11 as Senator Goldwater as
supporting the use of U.S. air power in Vietnam, thus giving the
impression of bipartisan support for the Administration's moves.
Another NCNA report, on the 11th, rook particular note of what
it described as "indiscriminate bombing" of Vinh and referred
to the use of B-52's over the DRV. Peking has not referred to
U.S. domestic oppasitio-~to American actions in Vietnam.
In a gesture of solidarity with thN DRV, Peking announced on
the 9th Chat a documentary fil~a on Pham Van Dong's visit to the
PC.C last November would be shown beginning on the 10th.
Observing that the film is "permeated with warm feelings of
great friendel;ip ac;.d militant unity" between the DRV and China,
NCNA said that the 700 million Chinese people provide "a
powerful backing" for the Vietnamese and that China's territory
is "their reliable rear area." These pledges have not yet
appeared in Pek.ing's comment on current developments in Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
a.2 APRIL 1972
MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE. U.S. ACTIONS
Moscow has sustained its cautious approach to the latest
developments in Vietnam. Limiting itself chiefly to reportorial
coverage, it has studiously avoided any mention of the USSR's
role in providing military support to the ARV while evincing
sensitivity to the possible impact on U.S.-Soviet relations,
with President Nixon's Moscow visit ~n the offing.
The Soviet Union has yet to issue an official statement on the
recent U.S. military actions. But the first elite reference
to Soviet aid in the context of the current offensive and the
first demand at thy. leadership level for an end to the U.S.
bombing of the North came in remarks by Brezhnev when, according
to Radio Moscow, he received the DRV Ambassador and had "an
exchange of opinions" with him in an atmosphere. of "friendship.
and cordiality."* Reporting the meeting the day it took place,
Moscow said Brezhnev extended wishes for "further success in
defense of the freedom and independence of the. motherland and.
the construction or socialism." Declaring that. the Soviet. party,
government, and people "unswervingly follow the course of
solidarity witY~ Vietnam and with the patriots of Indochina,"
he added that Chey will "continue to give them assistance and
support." Notably, the report of Brezhnev's remarks made no
mention of the war in the South. It quoted the Soviet. leader
only as condemning "U.S. aggression in Indochina" and. as
demanding "at- immediate end to the bombing of the DRV."
Kosygin had used the occasion of a 7 April speech in Iraq to
express "warm, fraternal solidarity" with the Vietnamese people
but mrde no reference to recent developments. More explicitly,
a Soviet-GDR crmmunique on SED party chief Honecker's 4-10 April
* By contrast, reporting on 11 February that Kosygin had
received the DRV ambassador at the litter's request, TASS said
their talk on "questions of mutual interest" passed in .an
atmosphere of friendship and "comradely frankness"--a euphemism
for substantive differences. That meeting was reported some
two hours before the Soviet Government belatedly came out with
a statement assailing the eight-point U.S. peace plan disclosed
by the President on 25 January and backing the 2 February PRG
statement that rejected the U.S. plan and "elaborated" on the
PRG's own seven points.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09..: CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
COI~FZD~NTZAL FBZS TRCNDS
12 APRIL 2972
visit to Moscow, as reported by Radio Moscow, expressed "fraternal
solidarity" with the DRV as well as "concern in connection with
the expansion of U.S. aggression in I.ndochi-~a that has taken
p1a~~ recently." Noting that the United States. had renewed its
bombing of the DRV after the boycott of the Paris talks, the
communique registered both eidee' "decisive condemnation of
these aggressive acts" but rendered no pledge of support for
the DRV.
Soviet sensitivity over the repercussions Hanoi's new offensive
could have on Soviet-American relations was evident in TASS'
account of Defense Secretary Laird's 7 April press. conference:
The account contained no reflection of Laird'e.charge that .the
Soviet Union has been a mayor contributor to the. war by virtue
of its failure to restrain Hanoi Soviet media. also .ignored
State Department press spokesman McCloskey's 4 April press
conference, which included the remark that the North Vietnamese
are largely supported by heavy Soviet mil:~tary equipment. Acid
Moscow's account of the Washington ceremony for.signing..of the
convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons suppressed the
fact that President Nixon spoke, thereby avoiding. the. problem
of how to treat h1s implied criticism of the Soviet support
for Hanoi.
TASS' report of Secretary Laird's press conference characterized.
his remarks as an attempt to "blackmail" the DRV by threatening
a continuation of the bombing "until it displays readiness to
conduct talks in Paris ser~.ously, on terms set forth by
Washington." But TASS obscured the thrust of the secretary's
remarks by neglecting to mention his charge. that Che.North
Vietnamese actions constitute an invasion azd a. violation of
the DMZ that sets aside the 1968 understanding under. which
bombing of the North was halted, nor did it report his. warning
that the bombing of the North will continue until the North
Vietnamese pull back their forces.
TREATMENT OF Moscow's cautious treatment. of .the Vietnam
DRV STATEMENTS developments and of President. Nixon....
personally was underscored in its handling
of the 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement and of the DRV
;overnment statement ~f the 11th. TASS versions of both
s*_~tervents deleted all personal references to President Nixon
and obscured Hanoi's definition of the goals of th~a war.
Where the DRV Foreign Ministry statement says "world public
opinion demands that the Nixon Administration immediately end
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDIrNTIAL FBIS TRENDS
1l APRIL 1972
the war of aggression," the TASS version reads: "World public
opinion demands the immediate end of the war of aggression."
And where the DRV statement specifically affirms the
Vietnamese people's resolve to "struggle tenaciously, to
step up their war of resistance and *_o strugglle.until the
collapse of the puppet regime and armed forces in order to
liberate the South, bt;ild socialism in the North and thus
advance Coward peaceful reunification of the fatherland," the
TASS version reads: "The Vietnamese people. are. determined..
to fight tenaciously, to step up their war. of resistants.".
In the same pattern of restraint, the 11 Apri1.TASS account
of tha DRV Government statement deletes four personal references
to President Nixon and similarly obscures the goals of the war
as enunciated by Hanoi.
Where the DRV Foreign Ministry statement calls on the..fraternal
socialist countries to "act resolutely and timely to check the
new" U.S. actions, the TASS account waters this down to a plea
for the fraternal countries "to condemn the U.S. imperialists'
new military ventures." ~~ASS' account of the DRV_Government
statement entirely omits its call for tie socialist count -.es
to take "timely action" and its added appeal for :'even st.onger
support and assistance." The a~count.of the government
statement also sanitizes that document's allegat{.on that
Secretary Laird "said there was no limitation on. the bombing.
of the North and threatened to attack ilaiphong. harbor.:'..--TASS'
version reads: "The United States Defense Secretary. Laird,
the statement says, has cynically announced that. the United
S~:ates will intensify blows at North Vietnam."
SOVIET COMN~NT Moscow's first comment on the. use .of B-52's
and U.S. naval shellings of the .North. came
on 11 April shortly after the release of the DRV. Government
statement. On his own authority, TASS commentator Vastly
Kharkov described the U.S. military moves as "an extremely
grave step" designed to "save Vietnamization." But he. cited.
the DRV Government statement for the specific charge. that. the
U.S. acts constitute "a violation of international. law, a
cynical trampling on the 1968 ~ommitm~nt~ about the uncondi-
tional cessation of the bombings and ahellings of the. DRV.. .
Asserting that the world public supports the DRV, Kharkov
concluded with a general:tzed reaffirmation of Soviet support:
"The Soviet people, who regard help to arabattled Vietnam as
their internationalist deity, will fulfi].sit to. the end. The
American aggressors ought to know better, for reckless
adventures will inevitably be avenged."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
G(JNFI.ULIJ'1'LAL L~IIIS `CR1:N1)N
12 nI~RIL 1972
I~ur11?r 5lovir~t commcsnt :Lncluded a I'RA1~'DA article by Skvortsov
on tha 8th which said that "the Pentagon's".expansion of the
f.tighti~sg and the American withdrawal from the Paris talks were
twin actions representing an effort by the United Staten to
"impose its will on the Vietnamese people." Skvortsov added
that "the people in Washington should a t long last rid
themselves of the illusion that it is possible to intimidate
the Vietnamese people." An article in RED STAR by Leontyev
on the 9th portrayed "the broad advance of the patriots in
South Vietnam" as another "blow struck at the policy of
Vietnamization," but Leontyev stopped short of claiming that
victory could be achieved on the battlefields "Today it
has been proved again that it is not the notorious.
Vietnamization, but only negotiations that can bring peace
to Vietnam."
DRV EMBASSY MEETING The USSR's reticence about .its military
support role in Vietnam at this delicate
puncture in U.S.-Soviet relations was pointed up.by its failure
to publicize a meeting at the DRV Embassy in Moscow. on S April
which Hanoi said was attended by Soviet Deputy Defense.Minister
Batitskiy. The Hanoi domestic service, Hanoi. broadcasts .to
South Vietnam, and Hanoi's Mandarin service made use of an LPA .
Moscow corY~espondent's account of the meeting.to underscore
Soviet support for the DRV. Noting that Batitskiy.had headed.
the Soviet military delegation which recently visited North
Vietnam, the account quoted him as stating Chat "the new
victories scored by the armymen and civilians of Quang.Tri..
and Thua Thien as well as in Cambodia and Laos indicate the
might of the Liberation Armed Forces and are a heavy blow. to.
the U.S. imperialists' Vietnamization policy." Batit~;kiy
added, the account said, that "the Soviet armymen and..civilians
wi11 do their beat to fu1fi11 their international obligation
of supporting the Vietnamese people and rendering support for
the PRG's seven-point proposal."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 pp l;l)NI~' l l)I;N'I' I AID hpti ll1~~l~. I~~
A roved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85TO 8 0 0050015-4
CAMBODIA! COMMUNISTS CLAIM TWEIR FORCES TI~REATEN PWN~'I PENI~~
Ln thu wr-kc of thu swuru cunununist wlcul..l lnkw and r-ltr-clcu In
rued arounl l'I-nom l'unl- on the night ul' 20-21 Murcl-, thu mc~cllu
of S.Lhanuuk's Frunt (FU-JK) hrivu I'ocusud uttuntLc,n un tho nc~ucl
to '' l:Lber.ate" maJor Cambodian ci,tius--lac lud LnK I'h-tum I'nul--~-rn-ci
have sought to .Lund substance to this obJoctl.vu with thc~
announcement of l?he appoantmunt of rt "1~'U~JK Cc-mmittc~u crf
Phnom Penh." Onl~~ March AK:[, the agency of S.lhannuk'd
Front, publicized a communique from the FUNK's pu.liticnl. bureau
and the Royal Government of National Un.l.on oL Camhudin (kGNU),
dated the 23d, which announced the composition of the I'hnnm
Penh committe~4, headed by Norodom Phurlssara, a cousin ol.'
Sihanouk, Phurissara was reported in January to have coma to
the "liberated zone." The decision on the composition of:
the seven-man committee was said to have been made at a
Joint session of the FUNK and RGNU, in acco~.dance with a pr.opusal
by Khieu Samphan, a FUNK political bureau member, RGNU vice
premier and defense minister, and the army (CPNLAF) commander
in chief .
Also on the 24th, a FUNK radio broadcast highlighting the
20-21 1`larch attacks on Phnom Penh called upon residents of tl-e
capital to "rise up and seize power." Maintaining that the
CPNLAF had been "launching powerful offensives w~rhout letup on
many other fronts" and that "in the future the CPNLAF will
intensify their activities on all battlefields, especially
Phnom Penh," the broadcast urged: "Therefore, the population
of Phnom Penh should rise up unitedly Co strike and demonstrate
to overthrow the Phnom Penh traitorous clique and recapture
power."
Khieu Samphan in his role as CPNLAF Commander in Chief echoed
the radio's claims about the war situation in an appeal to his
soldiers--dated 24 March and broadcast by the FUNK radio on
the 28th--in which he praised the attacks on Phnom Penh and
said that they had "dealt stunning blows to the shaky enemy
leadership apparatus." Holding that "at present the whole
country is launching offensives agai:-st the enemy in all fields--
military, political, economic, and psychological," he asserted:
"We should ceASe]_assly intensify attacks against the enemy
everywhere, around and inside Phnom Penh ." In listing
actions to b, taken, he noted that "people's power" should be
established in and around the capital.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85TOO875ROOO3OOO5OO15-4
 - tqJ~ l;-1 NI IAI r 1 nl'HI-4
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T008~,~F,~IQ3QQ~50015-4
r11~.1 no I April rattlni) annlltat ajrlrPal, ~latn~l thn J41h~ ft~.tn a
Itu-la nttlirtt Inarlnt, N~unti i.ttq, whn waa cs-~r+n~ tir,~av aj.j~nlt-twit
f n I hn Irlli~k t o flaw - nmm 1 1 t nn f nt 1'htinm 1'n-tl- , I h I a alrpna 1
a l l v-) npr-n f Itv war W nt a "nppnr l o l l y I n I'Irnnm 1'nith" - t n a t al;P
pltlkop and in cnnpataly a{ih nlltot ~tnttpa (n nt~+aniva
-innun-atrat Inns and "rlan up 1n fnanrrpr I Imt t.. nvntlhtna Ihn
traitors' arhnfnlatrat Inn an-I taws I-naPt In y~rur nat- Itanrla."
In rnn-?lurlink his apl-va1, Ny,uon I:n~ at atoll "'fhn 1lmv has
cninn. 1110 CI'NLAN ltavn unlvaahn-1 tl-nlt ~onnta) nffnnplvn."
nn 7 Apr I I , Ak 1 Carr t or) an alrpoa 1 f rrrm t by i'tINK' a 1'hnnm 1'anh
cnminlt inP- adrirvaancl in thn - Ii idpna of tltn c appal, able h
nchnwl lhp vlnw that thv army waa attackir-~ vvorywharo and
nnc I rc I Ink tho capital . l t_ urKnd I'hr+nm 1'nnh roa i~lpttf a t n
rnordfnate lhetr pffnrta wish thn i:i'NLAN in nvnrt.hrna Utn
government and "lthpratn" tha capital.
Also oft the lcl, tha IrtIWK radio broaclcaa- a commentary wltlrh
labeled recent fightinK "a nat.tonwirle weneral nffenaive" and
claimed that the CI'NLA1~ waa dirt+cllnq its attacks al "a number
of bIK c:ltiva. inrludinK Phnom Penh." tittering inatrnctinna
for reMlrlentp of the capital wlu- chose not to 1envF, the
brondrnpt urged them to atnyawny from lnrntinna whir.h might
be subJect to nttarka. in conc:luaion, it warned that the
capital war c:ompl~tely enrtrcled nn-1 the reKime'p "cionmaday"
waa drawing nrar. (While the concentration of attention nn
the fittest to l?Imum Penh in recent propaganda is unusual,
equally frenzted warninKa itnve been volcerl in thr peat.
'Chun, Cor example, n 10 December broadcast by tl-e NLINK tad to
predlrted in rimllttr t~~rmr th.,t the "doornaday" of tho Lon Not
reKimc war drnwink near and maintained that "our fortes hava~
arrtved nt the Rnteta of Phnom Penh" and have aurroundecl several
other rider.*)
'Chc 3 April radio commentary echoed earlier propaganda in referrtnr
to the CPNLAF's Determination to "liberate" Siem Renp, Kompong
'Thom, and Prey Veng. The intention to "liberate" Kompong 'Thom
was voiced in nn appeal Erom the CPNLAF command in the area,
publicized by AKI on 29 February. A similar appeal pertaining to
Siem Reap was publicized by Che news agency on 14 Ptnrc{t.** And on
2 April, AKI carried a 25 March app~~nl from the CPNL/~F command on
the Prey Veng front which pledged to "liberate" the province and
city of Prey Veng.
* The 10 December broadcast was discussed in the 15 December
TRENDS. page 15.
** The appeals on Kompong Thom and Siem Reap were discussed,
respectively, in the 8 March TR);NDS, page 23, and the 15 March
TRENDS, page 11.
Approved For Release 2000/6~'I'~D.~TI~RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/(~B~Oar:r~~~1-RDP85TOq$~~SF~yQq~00050015-4
1~ AI?Irrl ta~.~
511rt~l=~tlVltt aE.LA11ctN5
tlI:KINc~ h1AIN'TAIN~ ~1t~'1 LINT: aJ "iOV~Lt "I~tl~l~l1'~fi1C" A1h+~,
lihilp 11-n (/liPl/qP filnrr-f~uvlPt pnlolnicgl oarhangPa frl?eata~l by
iI1P lnillAll?I'AMiai Alll runfllr'i IIAVP a1lha ldPd (I/ PAr11Pt 1OWO14~
1'v41n~ hqa indirA(Pd Thal Il 1q in nl- mood fn toapund fgvutghly
1n ihP rl~nl {llgtllry gesture tul.Ard 1I1P C1lihvaP sleds by !(torhnnv
In il-P i;{'tat chlof'a mA~ur furPl{fn pnllry al atPpiont Iln ?tl Nar~h +
IItO/,hr1PV'a apOO111/ Irl which hP PaprPaaPd Ac1VIPi rPAdiilOgq f n
1/ggv rP1Ai 11-11a wish II1P {'iii. 11-1 tIIP prihf fp1O? 11f pQpRpfUl
1 uP\ i Ai Otll P Anli i (1 1 OnC 11IdP A n11t1q~~rPtlpiun ai1,rPP_~Ollt ~
roinrldod with the return to I'Pking of the chief t3uvlPt
tIPIj1/t 1Atur at lhP border tallca after A thteP~auntli abaonc a.
Lint 1kP Moaclw~ 1'Pkinq hAa nut mPnt icmed 11 ichov/a tpturn.
5ixni[icantlyc Peking chnae to puhllcinP proalptly un the rlaxi
day the fact ihAt the aeaafnn nt the N1no-Soviet border
river navi{iatirln commission held from h flecQlaber to 21 March
had failed to rPACh an aRtePment. 1~Ioacow hao remal-1Pd silent
un [hie development.
ConalatQnt with (ta ovoldancP of commentary on 1'rPSidont
Nlxc/n'o vtait~ {'eking hes nut reactQd directly to Moarow'a
criticism of r:he titno-1t.5. commit. but PQking'~ attacko on
tiovfet pc/lfcy and its mouse via-a-via tho two cup~rpoworM
reflect its poaltion within the triangular relationohip.
1'ekinR'o Dense of the global power real itieo wao moot vividly
demon at rated during the tiouth Asian crioi^ whQn the Chinanr~
sharply nccuaed the Soviets of expanalonist ambitions,
Including h rhgrge made by the Chinese repreoQntative at
the Security Council that one of the Soviet aimo was to
encircle China. 1'ektng's responses to other develapmente--
such as Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko'o vioit to Japan a
month before the i'resident's trip [o the PRC~ and a oeemingly
innocuous recent Soviet news report on the Taiwan elections--
hnve evidently been shaped by the triangular context.
During the YtCesident's visit. which produced a communique in
wlllch the two sides pledged not to seek hegemony 1n file Aein-
Pacific region and to oppose efforts by others to do soy Peking
* Brezhnev s remarks on China are d~acussed in the TRENDS
of 22 March, pages 8-11.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/0~,;,~1~,-r-~~85T00875F~~Q,03rQQQr50015-4
I1 Heusi fall
fiArlrr A ~eert rlt u 1 u Itrrar nw Iry i vl-rrt t I-tg fnt t I-a (t t ?t f Imo 111
ru. otrt gout a 1lrat t hlnoaa self lr lala 11r flans but ian - 1t ias hart
plgr arl vtoatl-a In hnnr-t +.f i~r-vlal Atmor) vnrcaa Itay al
mcmrrtlalo fr-t S:r-vlot ar-Iriiara wl-rr fail In (,bins during Wprlrl
Wat 11 Mnarnw rl-I-qP fn Ignnrv t111a g,oafura, rnMplaltrlnyl
1Wtlrot rlrgi '~nvivf rllpinmalq nn thiq rrrraalnt-, as In te+rrnttt
yoara, woto tofnaorl Irvtmlaalnn tr- lay wroatha at tho thoftrr-rlala
In f~rrtlhPagt t.hina~
(,U~N?t1'Vt1 Ifs ,Ihl'NI (:rr-mykrl'a vtail to Japan fr--M ?7 tc- 1N
January pr~~nlpferl a (;hittoav rpapunaA whfr-h
In offer t agaopaori the vtalt as roar l lVo to the new fluldlly
In Aafart affalra imparted by 1'pkln~l'a Invitatlun to 1'rvrldpnt
1:Ixrm. Ar cr-rr1111g tr- a lengthy N(;;aA account on ~ hobruary,
Grr-mykr-'a trip was "an important atop" taken by the Ilovieta
to gtep np cr-llualr-tt with Tokyo attd "ln cllntattd with U.fi.
Impprialiam fns spheres of iniluQnce to AriA." After taking,
nr-tp of the central place held by the Ching quertlnn in the
tioviet-Japanese taller, I~CNA raid hat Grnmyko had "scurried to
Japan tc, wnr- 1t at this Juncture" In order "to expand the
pr-altir-na r-f tiovlet revialnnlsm In Arta." NCNA Alro noted
In this context that U.5.-JApanere relatlona became strninnd
in the second half of 1971, but 1t ment'funed only Wnshington'a
nAw ecr-nr-mic policy na n factor whf le leaving 1'eking'r
invttatiun to }'resident Nixon implicit between the liner.
NCNA probed a seise point in 5ovtet-Japanese relations by
tii-1CllNaint; the northern territories gltsation, in the grocers
inVII11 {tIVAl1~V A1-art Sri+m (hva.~ pnlatiilc'p) ralllar 11agKa~l
t f/ p1/a/~ I C I r phrvurat Iona, 1'ak I nor Ilea
hYaaaall Its ant la4nviat I Itta larknly In Lha Hama of uppllr1111nr1
1-y tlla tblrll w~trlll and "tnwlllnn att~l small ttat.Inna" tll tlta "plludr
a+;~l ha?arnnny pram Iced by the auparllnwnra." 'I'hlla/ 1?athar tllillt
tll ;Iirlura Mitarnw'a Innvny as ~Ilrprtoll al!alnpl. China In partll~ulur~
III11M1 11f Pukitlv'a l'llflgllatll haM Itppll IIPaI~,{t1a11 tU Itt111araCllrO its
r~nnnnnll Intoraata wllh other rountr}aa rprtQntfu} of Muparpl/war
rlutnlnanl?a. 41Ynlflcantlyl 1'ak1nK'tr variatillnn an rho !hams of
aullarpowar "cotttlattt Ion attd col lualon" Nava heart heavily walgittad
to rtrraaaing I~ontentloua alpmanta In '3ovlpt-U.!+, ralatllma.
thereby Jurtlfytng flexible mancuverLnN by i'akinq within the
trtangulnr rel.ationahlp.
Peking's approach haw been ll}urtrat,ed recently on the occerlon
o[ virlitr by drlagationr coming f.rnm arear of ruperpower rivalry.
At the tJme of. the viMle in March of t;gyptian foreign affalrr
advisor kiyad. VicF Premier L1 IlAien-Wien on 23 March declared
thnt one of the rearons why the Middle Last quertion~ "a ma,lor
question cinacly linked with the anti-imparialirt etruggl.e"
throughout the world, remains unsettled is that "one or two
superpowers al~~~k hegemony and contend for rp}terea of influence."
[expressing Chinese euppor': toe the Aeab etrugglelagainre Israel,
Li concicmnecl tiro superpowers for "subverting Aeab I:ountriar to
t}reir aggression. subversion. control, and interference" and
for "their conspiracy to divide spheres of influence." 'Phree
days lnter~ Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei Lectured
the Egypt inns on not becoming dependent on the Soviets.
insisting that every country should pursue a policy of
"maintaining .independence an-1 of relying mainly on ire own
strength and regarding foreign assistance as supplementary."
These themes were also aired by the Chinese during the visit
of Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff shortly after the signing
of anew agreement continuing the British bases on Malta.
Choir En-lair speaking at a 2 April banquet for the vieltore~
pledged support for Malta's effort to "consolidate national
independence" and "develop a self-contained economy devoted
to peace." Declaring that the superpowers are "contending
for spheres of influence everywhere in the worlds from land
to the seas and the oceans," Chou expressed sympathy for
the "many" Mediterranean countries that !rave evinced "grave
concern over the increasing tension created by the superpowers
contending fur hegemony" in that area.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
r;I1NirII11'.IJI'IAI. VIIIt! 'f111~,111R~
1;1 AI'llll. IV11
stir N April, lira day of (Ira Mallaaa ~talaka(1un'a dapattura
fr~~m Iha I'111;, I'I~.I11'I,i~,'!J 11AlI~Y rarHad atr arl Irla artt II lad "111-{ingv
Ih~~ ,irramlrly fnr Ilat{amuny In Iha Mwlltarranaan Ilatwapn Iha
'iupvrlruwara" whl~ lr alahuraled un tha lharrra ui' liuvlal-11.4.
rlvnlry In tha Haditarranaan. 'I'Ird article ~~h:rryad Lhat Lha
"Ins racra lnl, l y scuts rani and Inn" batwaarr Llta Iltt l tad 41 at ra anal
Ihv 4uvlal Unlnn In lira Maditarranaan "Iran anrlnualy Impairad
thv indapandanca and ruverplgrrty of tha cnutttriau alum, It a
c~~art, agKravatar.l thn tenrlun In tha Hiddln Hart and tha
Mediterranean araa, and aruurad krava cuncnrn and atrunk o{rpuMJtlun
Crum tlrc~ Mediterranean courttrleM." 1'LUI'l.li'ij UATT.Y cluaad by
dxpraual.nq ChinaMCr rup~rorC Cur the rtrug{tle ag,alnat the rrupc~rpuwr+r
"urrambla fur haaemuny' in the area.
Peking Isar had rocourre to the proxy of ltr Albanf.an alllear to
talus mare Menuitive irquep lnvolvtng Morcow'n relations witlrln
lire cunununlrt world. An IvCi1A diupatch datellnrd 'Plrana on
1 April rummarized nn art lc la in the Albanian party dcri.ly on
I April Jenouncing the "!lrezhnevlah" docerlne of limited
uuverelgnty of communist cuuntrles. NCNA quoted the article
au saying the SovleCd for years have been manipulating the
German yueetcion, "unscrupulously sacrificing" the GDR's
nntlonal interests for the sake of their "hargainings with
WrWt German imperialism." In this cnnne~tlon the article
w:ru ~luoted ae citlrrg the Berlin agreement ae "flagrantly"
ululating GUR sovereignty. NCiJA also quoted the art.ie:le as
charging that the "Soviet eoc.ial imperialists, besides openly
uccupying Czechoslnvalcia, have sent their troops into and
eil~ntiy occupied" the GUI(, Poland, llungnry, Bulgaria. and--
cuming clo[acr home to the Chinese--Mongolia. Touching
another senpiCive matter, the ~iCNA account cited the article's
conclusiun that "the relations of limited sovereignty cannot
fail to arouse the indignation and revolt" of the pdoples
sub,~ugated by the Soviets.
ATTACKS CrV BREZHNEV Though Peking continues to show restraint
in not pursuing the strident ideological
vendetta against iloacow that embittered Sino-Soviet relations
in the 1.960'x, recent articles in the theoretical journal RED
FLAG have contained personal baba at Brezhnev as a representative
deviatlonist !n tltie history of the communist movement. An article
in RED FLAG i1o. 3, whose title-~-"Be Open and Aboveboard, and Do
Not Intrigue and Conspire"--clearly relates it to the Lin Piao
affair, cited Brezhnev and Khrushchev an examples of leaders
who engaged in intrigues and conspiracies. According to the
article, Brezhnev used these methods to expel. his predecessor,
"carry out Khrushchevism without Khrushchev, and become the
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : C~~ ~RDP85T00875R0(~r03~00050015-4
12 Ai'1111~ ly/7
aml-1lluua rtaw liar uC lira pruaanl nrcr." 'l'hu urtlr~la dLd nut.,
lu-wrvur, rc~l'e~r t-- Nuvle,l clualknw auulnal t;lrlna. ~ilynll'Ic~anlly,
In runnlnl, tlrruu~,h lhv ru?ur~a' gcrllary ul' "awlndlurr+" In
Clr (Haar rununrur 1 Ml li Lwlury, klru err ~ lc~ 1 u d Id nut lnr ludo lhu
chnr?a of "Illlc~ll rul.nllunw with Carulgn c:c,untrl.urt." 'I'Irlr+
chnrgu hnM I'rstluuntly apl-uurucl Ln cc-rnmant rulalucl tc, lh~~ l,ln
Pine purg,u, mUMt nutnbLy in lira nucherrltatlvu l Uucmmbur
Jc-Lne crdl.turiul. cm Mtrengtlrunl.ng party .Lundur.ahlp.*
I)ruzhnuv war alto nnmc~d In u lldt oC r.anc+gadoe in tho communist
nwvumunt dlncudrrud .ln un artLclu .ln RLU IrLAG Nc. 4 calling for
thr. study of world history, Thu artlc.le ca.l.lad fur study of
what It earmed lire close re.laCionshlp between modern world
history, conr:amporary world history, and the h.idtory of the
world communist mnv?ment, on the one hand, and the current
class struggle on the othor. Striking a note that became
prominunt after the announcement of Peking's invitation to
1'r.esident Nixon, t}ie article characterized lire present
situation as one of "global upheaval," a "crucial turning
point" !n which the Chinese "must be prepared to wage a great
struggle differont from the struggles in the past." Ln short,
the article's ipJunctions represent still another effort to
orient the Chinese along the lines of flexible, Chouist
policy directions in the world arena.
* A Szechwan broadcast on l5 March recited a charge against
Mao's former rival Chang Kuo-tap--an appropriate surrogate for
attacks on Lin Piao--that could be read ae linking Lin's purge
to disputes over Peking's stance toward the Soviet Union and the
United States. Reca111ng a dispute that was resolved at the
pivotal Taunyi conference in 1935, the broadcast said Chang
opposed Mao's line of "marching north to resist Japan." Read
in the current context, this might be interpreted as a charge
that Lin opposed the unremitting confrontation with .the SoviQt
Union at a time of improved Sino-U.S. relations. On the ether
hand, the charge against Chang is an important part .of the
communist historical record that could be expected to appear
in a detailed denunciation such as the Szechwan broadcast
contained. The broadcast did not include the charge of
ill:~it foreign connections.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000~~$ufQ9~it-~IRi;RDP85T0(~~itSF~Qk~QQt00050015-4
12 AI'a1L I:y~2
USS?-IRAQ
KOSYG t rJ VISIT t'RODIJCCS SECONb SOV I ET-ARAB, FR I E~JI)SW I P PACT
'1'ha treaty of f riandrhlp and cooperut lun ol.gnad ~.n Baghdad un
9 April., during the 6-10 April "official. friendly vier," of
u Soviet party-govornnent delegation .led by Koeygin, ie
modeled 1ar.gely on the Soviet-Lgypt:lan treaty rigned last
Muy but clivergee from it on some counts--notably including a
weaker article ~n military cooperation. The conclusion of
the trenty was foreshadowed in the communique on the February
US5R visit of an Iraqi delegation led by Bath Regional
Command Deputy Secretary and Revolution Command Council
Deputy Chairman Saddam Husayn.
The stated occasion for Kosygin'e trip was the inauguration
of the Northern ar-Rumaylah oilfield; hie delegation included
the Soviet minister for the oil industry. The Soviet deputy
minister for the gas industry, also in Iraq for the ceremony,
was reported by Baghdad as announcing Chat the first Soviet
tanker would begin loading ar-Rumaylah oil for transport to
the Soviet Union. Moscow propaganda surrounding the visit has
played up what is termed an Iraqi victory over the "monopoly
of the Western oil kings" with the establishment of a national
petroleum industry and commissioning of the first mayor
national oilfield, developed with Soviet techdical and economic
aid.* Speaking at the commissioning ceremony, Kosygin rejected
"fairy tales" spread by the "capitalist oil companies" to the
effect that the Arabs are unable to manage their own economies.
If Iraq and other Arab countries do not now possess enough
experts and technicians, he added, they soon will have them
with the help of the socialist countries.
* Peking has indirectly attacked Moscow on the oil question,
NCNA on the 11th citing a Kuwai~i paper as declaring that
the Soviet leaders are opposed to the idea of the Arab
countries using their oil as a weapon against Israel and
"imperialism." The paper chimed that an "Arab leader"
recently visiting Moscow wr~s told. that Arab oil is actually
"international property."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
C(11Jh1UI~~N'I'1AI, 1'14I~i 'I'ItI~;NIIlJ
12 AI'It I I, 19y2
Thu c.nuuulwalunlnk ul' Chu ul.ll'Luld culttcldtad with culuhraClciny
ail' Chc~lSCh unnl.vurNnry ~)f' Clue ru.li.nK Ba'tit I'rirty--nn uvunC
Suv.lc+t nwdLu Kanura~ l.y s~n~ght to divnecu f:rrtm KoNygin'H vLdit,
pr.uHUmubly eo aN nc)t to nppunr to bu giv.Lng it gruaCur. atC~+ntiun
Clout CI-u Syrlnn Bath Pnrty'N eulubrat?,:Lon of the sumo event.
yupur.at'u CI'SU delegations were aunt to Damnaeus and liaghditd
uxpresNiy :`or the respeet.Lve lia'tlt anniversary festivitios.*
Where liay,hdad accounts oC Kosygin's visit stroesod the double
celebration of the panty's ,jubilee anniversary cnd the start
of ntttic)na:L nil producl?ion, Moscow's focueecl on the latter
avant. c)n 9 April, however, reviewing Kosygin's visit, TASS
did note various activitie:t commemorating the Da'th anniversary,
including a reception attended by Kosygin; and both the
communique on the visit and Koeygin's departure cable to the
Iraqi leaders took due note of the anniversary.
1'Itere were no reports of speeches at a dinner given by
President al-Bakr for KosyKin on 6 April or at a luncheon
given by Saddam l~lusayn and a reception hosted by Kosygin on
the 9th. But speeches were made by Kosygin and Saddam 1?lusayn
at the oilfield inauguration on 7 April and by Kosygin and
al-Bakr at the treaty signing ceremony on the 9th. Kosygir
had preliminary separate meetings with Saddam llueayn and al-Bakr
on the day of his arrival, and Formal talks were held on the
8th--preceded, according to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, by a
90-minute private session between Kosygin and Saddam 1?lusayn.
SOVIET-IRAQI The 15-year friendship and cooperation treaty
TREATY generally parallels the one concluded between
Egypt and the USSR last May, with some additions
and omissions. Two elements in the Iraqi treaty that are not
present in the Egyptian one have precedents in the Soviet
treaty signed with India last August--the phr~sP in Article 10
pledging that neither party will allow its territory to be
used for any action that might cause military harm to the
other, and the stipulation in Article 13 that any differences
in interpretation of provisions of the treaty shall be
resolved between the two sides in a spirit of "friendship,
understanding, and mutual respect."**
* Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, Yugoslavia, and
the DPRK also reportedly sent delegations to both Baghdad and
Damascus for the anniversary.
** Th~: Soviet treaties with Egypt and India are discussed,
respectively, in the 3 June 19'1 TRENDS, pages 11-14, and the
11 August 1971 TRF,i~lDS, pages 26-30.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
(;UNfLI)ItiN'I'LAL I~'IICw 'I'ItI~;NU~I
1.2 AI'R LI. 1972
Artlclu 7 on rugular cnn~eultatiune adds to thu I~gyptian vrar.dlon
a roforoncu ec.~ dovelopanq Iraqi-~!3oviot "po.litical coaporat.l.un."
And whore Clio U~tSlt and t'sgypt agr.oed to consult onJ.y on
Lnternat.lonal :issu?e, the USSR and Iraq agree to consult a18o
"on questions of further developing bi.la-:eral r.e.lct:lans." A
provision for contacts in the event of n threat to peach--
part of Arl?iclo 7 in the Egyptian treaty--becomes a separate
article in the Iraqi document. 'i'bis, along with Article .13,
accounts for the total of 14 articles in the Iraqi treaty as
compared with 12 in the Egyptian.
Article 9 on military cooperation, much briefer Chan the one
in tie Egyptian treaty, says merely that the two countries,
for the sake of their mutual security, will "continue to
develop cooperation in the field of strengthening the defense
capabilities of each." What contribution Iraq might make to
Soviet defense and security is unclear, but the article could
co-~ceivably relate to naval facilities for the Soviet fleet
in the );ereian Gulf. (TABS announced on the 9th a forthcoming
"official friendly visit" by a Soviet naval squadron to the
Iraqi port of Umm Qasr under "an understanding reached
earlier.") The Egyptian treaty;, in contrast, provides for
continuing cooperation in the "military field" on the basis
of appropriate agreements to strengthen Egypt's "defense
capacity," and spells out some elements of this cooperation.
Ln line with Iraq's refection of the November 1967 Security
Council resolution, Article 3 omits a paragraph contained in
the counterpart article of the Egyptian treaty on mutual
efforts to achieve a lasting an~~ fair peace in the Middle
East in harmony with the aims and principles of the UN Charter.
Although Iraq is drawing an Soviet expertise in developing
its oil resources, Article 2 goes beyond the Egyptian version
in adding that the signatories will respect "each other's
sovereignty over all natural resources." The same article
fails to describe Iraq as trying to "reconstruct socdety
along socialist lines," a phrase applied to Egypt in the
Cairo treaty.
The preamble registers bioscow's concern over Arab unity in
a new passage, not present in the earlier treaty, expressing
the two sides' conviction that "further cohesion of all
forces of peace and progress, inc0.uding the consolidation
of the unity of the Arab states" on an anti-imperialist
basis, is l.mportant in the struggle for world peace and security.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL FI3IS TRENnS
12 APRIL 1972
It was presumably also at Moscow's behest that another new
paragraph in the preamble expresses the conviction Chat
international problems "must be solved through cooperation
and by seeking solutions acceptable to the parties concerned."
References to "Zionism" in the preamble and in Article 4, on
the other hand, appear to be at Iraq's behest: The Egyptian
treaty nowhere mentions Zionism and alludes to Israel only
indirectly in a passage on Egypt's "eliminating the consequences
of aggression."
Extolling the treaty in a speech at the signing ceremony,
Kosygin emphasized that it "is not directed against any other
country" and "does not infringe on anybody's ?.egitimate
interests." These remarks may have been intended in part as
assurance to Iran, bur Kosygin clearly also had other Arab
countries in mina: He went on to assert "our deep conviction"
that the treaty is compatible with the interests of wide
international cooperation, "including the cooperation of the
.Soviet Union and Iraq with other Arab countries."
Moscow broadcasts in Arabic have sought to persu~:de other
Arab countries that they will themselves benefit from
strengthened Soviet-Iraqi relations. A commentary on the
7th said Kosygin's visit "should find" an "extensive,
positive reaction" on the part of all friends of Iraq.
And a broadcast on the 11th, praising the Iraqi treaty and
the "companion" Egyptian one, argued that Iraq could now
contribute even more to the general Arab struggle.
Arab reaction to the treaty has been less than enthus~.astic.
Rounding up w~r1d press approbatiol of the treaty on the
11th, TASS found only two Arab papers to cite, and one of
them--Cairo's AL-AHRAM--dealt with the communique on
Kosygin's visit, not the treaty. Egypt's reaction had
teen conveyed in terse reportorial coverage; and a brief
Cairo radio item on the 9th, one of only four on the
subject, pointedly represented the treaty as banning the
use of either country's territory for "provocation or
ideological sabotage" against the other. Monitored Damascus
media have not mentioned the Kosygin visit at a11, although
Damascus radio did report the Bulgarian defense minister's
earlier visit to Baghdad and Podgornyy's current visit to
Turkey. Libya's cool reaction was conveyed officially in
a prompt Foreign and Unity Ministry statement on the 9th
expressing "strong an.xiety."
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
' 12 APRIL 1972
JOINT COMMUNIQUE The 1G April communique on Kosygin's visit
sums ~!p the talks held "in an atmosphere
of friendship, frankness, and mutual understanding." The two
sides are said to have discussed questions of bilateral
relations and to have "exchanged opinions" on international
problems, on which their positions were "identical or similar."
Where international issues were covered in the 17 February
communique on Saddam Husayn's Moscow visit, this one deals
specifi.rally only with the Middle Eaet, repeating from the
February communique a paragraph asserting a shared belief
that a dust and durable peace cannot be established without
the "liberari~a of all" occupied territories and protection
of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs.
The communique touches on party relations in a single sentence,
no!:ng agreement that successful development of such relations
is an important mesns of strengthening Iraqi friendship and
cooperation. It was to further strengthen these relations,
the communique notes, that the two sides concluded the treaty
which among other things contributes to the point struggle
against "imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism." Expressing
"complete satisfaction" with the .revel of relations achieved,
both sides reaffirm a resolve to continue developing ties in
the "political, economic, defense" and other fields. The
communique also records Iraq's gratitude for Soviet assistance
in developing the Iraqi economy, particularly with regard to
the national oil industry.
UNITY PROJECT In taking note of Iraq's unity project
with Egypt and Syria, the communique
broaches a subject Moscow media had all but ignored since
Baghdad's 15 February proposal in the wake of King Husayn's
announced plan for a federated Jordan. Soviet acknowledgment
of the concept in the communique still falls far short of an
endors~!ment: In light of Saddam Husayn's recent visits to
"the friendly fraternal countries" of Egypt and Syria, the
communique says, "the Iraqi side set out its recent steps
toward Arab unity in the interests of countering the intrigues
of imperialism and its agents in the area."* The Soviet side
* In what is apparently the only acknowledgment of the Iraqi
delegation's late March talks in Damascus and Cairo, a Kudryavtsev
article in NOVOYE VREMYA (No. l4, 1 April) noted that in mid-
March the Iraqi Government had submitted a proposal on the forma-
tion "of an alliance in some form" among Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and
that "this scheme was discussed in Damascus, to which an Iraqi dele-
gation came; it then went to Cairo." An Aleksandrov domestic
service commentary on 9 April remarked in passing that the Iraqi
Appr?~e~~q~i~~~~~~~~~0~~'~t ~~ ~~~8v~0~~~v'~t~$~0~'v~0~~~v y4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFZDI:NTIAL flDIS '.CRIB;NpS
l2 APRIL 1972
Ln turn simply "highly assesses the efforts to strengthen
un:LCy of the Arab countries on the progressive, anti-imperialist,
and anti-Zionist basis" and welcomes "the steps of the leaders
of Iraq and other progressive Arab countries in this direction."
A shade more positively but still cautiously, Kosygin in his
ar-Rumaylah speech "warmly welcomed" the "important political
moves by a num'~er of Arab go~.iernments, including the Iraqi
Government--mcres aimed at strengthening solidatity among the
Arab countries" and at consolidating their cooperation in
the struggle against "imperialism and Israeli aggression."
In the same speech, Kosygin warned against anticommunist and
anti-Soviet slogans spread by "enemies of the Arabs" bent on
sowing seeds of mistrust toward the Arabs' friends and
creating a rift in Soviet-Arab relations. The communique
does not repeat the February Moscow communique's indictment
of. imperialist efforts to spread anticommunist and anti-
Soviet feelings.
TALKS WITH KURDS, Moscow's intereaC in unity of the
CONWIUNISTS "progressive forces" in Iraq was under-
scored by Kosygin's remarks in his
ar-Rumaylah speech on the 7th, as well as by hie separate
meetings on the 8th with an Iraqi Communist Party (CPI)
delegation and with members of the Political Bureau of Che
Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK). Zn ar-Rumaylah, he
hailed Iraq's social and economic reforms, the implementation
of measures under the 11 March 1970 manifesto on a peaceful
settlement of the Kurdish problem, and the draft National
Action Charter of last IJovember. The charter, he noted,
provides for the formation of a "front of progressive forces"
in the country. In his speech at the treaty ceremony on
the 9th, the Soviet leader concluded by wishing Iraq further
success in achieving unity of all "national and progressive
forces" in the country for the realization of progressive
economic and social changes and an anti-imperialist foreign
policy. Soviet propaganda, welcoming the establishment last
month of Syria's National Progressive Front, has encouraged
the Iraqis to form their own such organization, wh:!ch would
include the DPK and the CPI.
While TASS on the 9th only briefly reported Kosygin's meetings
with the CPI and DPK representatives, a Moscow broadcast in
Arabic that day noted that all Baghdad papers reported the
CPI talks and that the DPK organ AT-TA'AICHZ reported the meeting
with tY~e Kurds. The broadcast said that in the former meeting
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
1'UiJlrll)I~,i1T,lAl, hI)I;i 'I'111StJIJH
I ~ AI'ill 1, I ~/~
Kc.-Wygl,n uxl+rusMUCI eut.l.?i'ucCfun wLCI- Chu cluvuluhmnnl c+l' r~+lal Lcm++
buCwuun 1.rttcl and "oCl-ur Llburutud Arctb Nc.nt.uN" +ta wull ~tw ++I'
"nuCionul. re.lationN .lndidu Lracl" ttnd ChuC hu wulcc+mud discuaalcma
an Cho Cf)UntCy concarning tha Nutlona.l. AcClcm Ch+trCur. Accurding
to a Baghdad radio account of thu Cwo-hour. +uc+uC ng~ CI'l l~lrbC
Secrotary 'Aziz Muhammad asserted 'tu purty'd r.uacll.nu~N Cu Cry
Co overcomo the obetaclus to aor c eoopuraClun~ pnr.tlcul.nrly
among tho Bu'th~ the DPK~ and t"rcc CP:[. 't'ASy cnt Chu Ilth
reported a CPL official as welcoming the trusty and I~fucl~;ink
efforts to implement it "in clove cooporrCion wl.t?.h other
progressive national forces" in Lrr~.
Baghdad's account of the Kosygin-DPK talks said "mutual tatress"
was placed among other thii~gs~ on implementation of the
11 March 1970 manifesto and on the formation of a national
front. Ac^ording o Baghdad, the Kurds present were chiefly
cabineC ministers. Kurdish leader al-Barzani complained in
a LC FLGARO interview reported by AFP on the loth. that
"these happy encounters are being performed behind our backs"
and asserted Chat the Soviet arms obtained by Baghdad would
be used against the Kurds rather than against Lran or Lerael.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
r,irw~ll-t;N1tA1, dalr~ ~Igl~,wrrp
1 7 AI'q 11. 1'a 1 J
U 1 5111tM~1M~N t
h1OSCUW 1~U11L5 ITV ACC()ItIJ, UFZG~S lilW ON CI-IL~MICA1. V~C:AWON~
i'I-p 4uvfat publicity tot tha 10 April algninp, of ilia runvpnti~m
un bannlnK the dpvalupmpnl, pruduct.lun, and rtockpilina of
bartpriolugiral and toxin wnapunr har fQatured 1'rQridant
1'udgurnyy'~ remarks at thQ MoNCaw cararruny. Morcuw har duly
reported that similar carpmonipr wpra bald the rams day in
Lur-~lun and Warhington, with T'AN'S nn the i.Oth noting that
1'reridant Nin~~n "attended" the Warhington ceremony, 'fhp fart
that thr I're~ident delivered a appach ear unmentioned, presumably
because his remacka were implicitly critical. of Morcoa's military
aid to Ilanoi.<
Ibdgornyy cited the accord ar attesting to the possibility oC
progress, step by step, [award canrolidation of international
peace "given a desire to reach agreement on international
issuer." Ile recalled that the convention had bear. approved at
the 26th session of the UN Ganaral Araembly in Uacambar and
called it a result of. "faint ef[ortr by a largo number of
countries." Koutine Soviet commentary, however, har continued
to depict the accord a? an initiative of th? U55tt and its
allies. A broadcast to North America on the 8th, Eor example,
pointedly reminded lirtanar? that the agreement "war initiaeed
by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries"; and a
foreign-language commentary on 29 March. tracing the efforts of
the rocialirt elates to ban bacteriological and chemical weapons
simultaneously, said they had agreed to proceed with a ben on
bacteriological weapons in the face of the West's "negative
attitude."
CI-EMICAI_ WEAPONS Podgornyy used the occasion to reaffirm
Sov.let determination to continue working
toward "limiting the arms race, including strategic arms." He
viewed the ban on bacteriological weapons as opening "new favorable
prospects" for slackening the arms race and as a good example to
be followed in the approach to other pressing disarmament problems.
In line with Soviet comment since the opening of the latest round
* In reporting the ceremonies in Moscow, Washington, and
London for signing of the seabed treaty on 11 February 1971,
TASS noted that President Nixon and Secretary Rogers "made
speeches" at the '.Jashington ceremony. And it quoted some of
President Johnson's remarks in recounting the U.S. ceremony for
signing of the nonproliferation agreement on 1 July 1968.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
r,IrNptIr1~N't IAi, Vht-+ ~lill~,Ntrtl
17 AI'q 11, 1'a 11
~~( rha rinnava dinarnrarnant tatkn ttn !V pahruaryt 1'ttdgnrnyy callwl
t~~r ilto tlr~tllihlt ittn tl( f1lPrait'gi waapllnN ar !lra rtatrt pt alt ant)
t itara/ t of in,ad as "a raw latpttrtant lnlt ial Iva" iha draft t seat y
nnhmitrad Iry tho atrc-tallat daloKat inns at lhrr (lanava ta1kM c-rr
7N Mart h,
N~~ur Ina ~ t,rtrmontary t-vor the part two warka hNr alnn hai lad lira
draft troaty an an important tnitia U va and haw taken thta Waat
r? tank (ttr allaKad lack of anthurtiArrm. '1'hur a panalirrt in the
7 April dttmartic narvira conunantatorr' roundtable chided thtr U.ti.
dalogatlcrn in Canava tot atKulnK that it it too Qaely to begin
drawintl up a troaty; hp Alro rQ_~acttrd obrrrvatlonr in the London
pram that a cottvetttion cannot bQ roncludrd now "because
nu([tciently affactivta means of control. are lacking." 'i'he ramp
rcttronentator ctbratvQd that "certain powers" do nht want to
ralinquialr t{re c?Irtsmical weapons which Ara "being urtad by t}ra
U. ti. tntervvr~t tonirtr in LndoclrinA~ tlra Uritirh punitive (areas
in Ulrter~ the 1'ortuguere colonialirtr in Afeir.A~ and by all o[
them roller_tively agalnrt the Antiwar And progrerrive movements
in their respective c:ounlrlero."
V. Uvchinnikovt !n An international roview Article in 1'RAVbA on
1 April, called A ban on chemical weapons a{re "next urgent lark"
after the Accord on bacteeiologicul agants~ assailing Che
United Stattas in routine faslfion for use of tear gao and
defoliants in Indochina And [or continued failure to ratify the
1925 Geneva protocol barring the use of chemical and
bacteriological wenponr.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
~,uNlr 1 UIrN'I' 1 A1, Itll I !l 'I'ItltNl)!1
17 AI'1111, I'1 J7
. i~
~_i~i,n~~Y nwu ~~ rii~ t ~r
C,I~tlf?1YKU ~ T1tE/ilY IZfrJECT 10N WILL r+U~IDt:RM I NErr i3lrltLl N ACCt~RD
!~uvlel. I?urc?Ign tllni.atar Gr~miyko hnw mnJa tlrr. 1'irat uf.Cacinl yovits'~
t;uvurnmvnt Nt6rtGhlPnt pub.llcly .ll.nking elrn Lmplumn:~Cr.rtlon of Chu Blg
I?~~ur ilur.l.ln ncc:ur~l wlth IrItG rnel.Cicatl.on of tlrr. Mr~rcow and War.snw
tre+rtles--thcr au-cnllracl "ruvurnn li.nkagn" concnpC. Address.Lng n
~ulnt ucnslun of the CorcriKn nCi'nirw committocs of thn USSR Supr.?mn
~ovlct un l'Z April, Gromyko clacl.arad thnt if tho 1rRC fnile to
r?arr.ify lhn twu tr,c~r+tins, "this would rtleo undermine tho known
nKrearnunta on Wort Ilcrlin"--n point Brezhnev had not mnde in hie
20 tlarch Sovlet trado union congress speech in passages rebutting
West Garmnn opponents o[ ratification.
Ccomyko's speech wound up an intensive woek of activity involving
Soviet relations with both Germanys: SCD party chief llonecker was in
t4oacow 4-10 April for talks with Brezhnev, to which Moscow gave
minimnl publicity; a long-term Soviet-FRG trade agreement, incluri-
ing a clause providing for FRG competence for West Merlin once the
B1g Four Berlin accord ie implemented, was initialed on the 7th;
Bundoerat Chairman Kuehn was in the USSR 3-12 April for Calks with
Gromyko and Brezhnev on tt+e treaties; and it was announced o:c the
12th that the ~o1nt Soviet-FRG commission for development of
economic cooperation will hold its first meeting in Bonn on
19 April. These moves have come dust prior to the 23 April
Baden-Wuerttemberg state elections and the subsequent scheduled
readings of the ratification bills in the West German parliament,
thus providing substance to the Brandt-Scheel coalition's argument
that the treaties, though Y+ot ratified, have already given a
visible thrust to developing Soviet-FRG relations.
GROMYKO SPEECH In his speech as reported at length by TASS on
the 12th, Gromyko discussed the Soviet Govern-
ment's views on the treaty and Cook note of several of the sensi-
tive issues raised by the Bonn opposition. Observing that the
"main meaning" of the treaty is that it provides "the necessary
political foundation for a radical turn in Soviet-West German
relations," Gromyko again stated--like Brezhnev at the trade
union congress--that the signing of the treaty was not "a
simple matter for the Soviet Union" because of the consequences
of World War II and the postwar policies of West German
"revanchism." Crediting the Brandt government with "realism,"
Gromyko stressed the notion that the present treaty is the only
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
c;IINh I bl;N~l' I AL 1~ II I'r ~t'Itt~.NIJ;1
I;! AI'Itll. 1'!)7
h~~au l b lc~ una Ln "thn prnnettt cued I t IuttM uf" bn lattra" ltt I;urupa
and r~.~l l.urtr Chct "prlttclpla ul' ayuullty uC ~t?+ttaa." Nutlnp,
thr-I. nulcl+ur utdn hod bnan ubllgad to ranuunc:u nnythlnu car I++ul
tuculvud nnytlJing, ut tho uxpanwu ul' thn uthnr, ha quid Chut "thu
ruin dtutu ul' nffnirv, which nxlwtud without thu tru++ty and
which duuc+ nut dupund un 1tn rucugnll.lun ur nunrocu?nltlon by
uny~~nu, is tnkon un tbn bunlw." Gr.umyku expc+ndad un thn notion
Hutt bock didnu uccnpt rnnunciution of [orcn ne thn mnane to
suttlo dldputnw and thnt both regard the pr?snnt 14u+:opuan bordcrp
nH "lnviolublu," citing tho texC of the treaty urticloe on thnsc~
two pulntt+~
c:rumyko'e r.emarke included Moscow's first public rofernnce to
tits "Unclerstrtnding on the Intentions of Cite Sides," which fire
Soviet foroign minister said was "u soparate document" dletinet
from the treaty toxt. It applied, he added, to the development
of GDR-FRG relations "on the basis of full equality and the
absence of dieerimination," to the process of admitting the two
German stateB to the United Nations, and to "Che settlement of
issues between the FRG and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
connected with the invalidity ~f the Munich agreement." Gromyko
also "informed" the foreign affairs committees about the Scheel
"letter" received by the USSR at the time of Cho signing on
12 August 1970, which TASS said "outlined" the views of the FRG
"on questions of self-determination." TP.SS noted that the
committee membet.s "were familiarized with the text of the letter."
The reverse linkage issue was broached by Gromyko toward the end
of his speech, after hie enumeration of advances made in Soviet-
Weat German relations since the signing of the treaty Strongly
denouncing the opponents of the two treaties, Gromyko complainrJ
that "they are again trying to impose are their country concep tc+
of revanche, of hostility to neighboring peoples and states." But
Gromyko did not denounce the Bonn opposition as a whole, stating
rather that the opponents of the treaties are concentrated around
the "right wing" of the CDU/CSU and thus implicitly recognizing
that the entire CDU/CSU faction is not totally committed to non-
ratification of the treaties--a thetre that has appeared repeatedly
in recent Moscow propaganda. Gromyko insisted that the USSR had
no "intention of intimidating anyone," adding that it was for the
FRG to decide to choose between "friendship and hostility" with
the Soviet Union. He continued with minatory overtones:
There will be no friendly and good-neighborly relations
if the necessary understanding of the Soviet Union's
interests, the minimum of which are reflected in the
Moscow treaty, ie not displayed in the FRG.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
t,11Nh 1 IttrN'I' 1 A1, hN 1 !i 'I'lll!NUlt
t~ nl~ull. I~~i~
1 [ 1 t turns out that. tl~n i~a~lnrn 1 Ilalrub l l c: hay nu dnw i rr
to c.uupnratn wl.tl- ua, naturally wn wtl.l. huvn to mnkn
Hula of tl~lw and draw thn appruprlato cunc:luMlonr. 'I'lin
lu?l.c uC pul.itLcnl dnvnlupmnnt ahuwr that a [ailurn of
thn tr.nntlna to nntnr lntu furcn would ru].l 4uvlot-What
Cnrnurn rnlutlona Cnr brrek. Morn thnn thnt, th].r would
nleo undnrml.nn thn known ugrnomnnta un,Wnrrt Nnrlin,
nrnct now ubrtnclnr on thn rasa of tho normnllzntion
of relutlonr bntwnnn tho hKG and tho GUR, And cross out
rr11 that hua nlrondy boon a :tuinod betwoon tlrom. A11
thin could not but cnuBO a profound crleis uf. confidoncn
In thn policy of th? F'ndoral Ilnpublic of Germany, with
all lire rneultunt connequences.
TAS5 roported that 3romyko entertained questions on the treaty
from the deputise, including one to which he responded: "The
Soviet. Union will not accopt any fresh talks on the treaty."
GromyKO said this had been made clear by 13rezhnev at the trade
union congress, although the CPSU leader had seemingly limited
his refusal to c~~nduct new talks to the treaty's provisions on
borders.
REVERSE LINKAGE Prior to Gromyko's speech, the only explicit
^oviet references to the reverse linkage ques-
tion had appeared in Moscow radio commentaries. For example.
IZV)rSTIYA's senior political observer Matveyev remarked in the
domestic radio roundtable on 12 March that the "West Berlin"
agreement was directly dependent on the fate of the Moscow and
Warsaw treaties, although he stopped short of stating that the
Soviet Union would not sign the final quadripartite protocol if
the accords were not ratif ied. More recently, in a commentary on
the 7 April initia111ng of the Soviet-FRG trade agreement, Moscow
radio's Yakovlev said that the trade agreement "takes the quad-
ripartite agreement on West Berlin into consideration; the latter
will become effective after the ratification" of the Moscow and
Warsaw treaties. Gromyko likewise said on the 12th that the trade
agreement would take effect after the ratification of the Moscow
treaty. Refraining from direct commentary on reverse linkage, the
Moscow central press has instead publicized explicit ref erences
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CtlNlrll)hN'I'lAl, ir141li '1'111{NUlI
1 ~ AI'111[, 1'1 !!
t~- rout+ruu IlnknKu Iry uucl+ 1'urulg,n epuknnnun uw Itr+urdt and (;Ult
I~urc~ly,n Mlnlaecrr Winxur.*
tiuvlr;t cununuutury un thn rnt:Ll'lcutton ul' tl+n trnutinrr wul'tunud
nppruc.lrrhly fulluwlug Ilruxhnuv'+r epraach ~t tlr? tr.adn un.l.un
cun?ruee. Muacuw wont tcu I'+.rr ata to publialzu two taignificunt
et++tumunte by Wuet eiurman i{~adOCe nn thn r.uunif.iention of. the
two Curnurn etnturi during Ilnnnckar'e visit to tha Soviet Union.
Ll,V1.51'LYA un ehu Gth publldhud un lntnrvlew with Drandt by lte
Gunn curruepundunC '1'uaunyun In which Che Chancellor. a11ud?d to
Urc+zhnuv'e tradr union congress speech, Baying that the "hostility
and mutual mlet-?uet" rusulting from Wurlcl War 1L were felt on
both eldue. lirundt woe further quoted as saying that the "suffer-
inge of the war are not, of course, forgotten !.n the Soviet Union,"
but he uddod that "we have additional problems linked to the
division of the Gorman nation." In an even more explicit state-
ment on the reunification of the two Germanys, Bundesrat Chairman
Kuehn Commented in a Moscow radio interview, broadcast on the
11th to German lidtenera, that the Moscow and Warsaw treaties
"were formulated by the government from Che German position and
with all rerQrvations for a peace treaty; reunif ication, for
which all ~: ~s are striving, was not abandoned."
HONECKER VISIT Moscow's public restraint on the ratification
issue was also reflected in its report on GDR
leader tIonecker's "unofficial friendly" visit to Che Soviet Union
3-10 April. Avoiding any appearance of interference in West
German affairs, the report simply stated that the impending
ratification of the two treaties, "the subsequent coming into
force of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin," and the
agreements between the GDR and the FRG and West Berlin Senat
should promote further cooperation and normalization of relations
between the FRG and the socialist countries. Notably, the rep~~rt
contained no polemical reference ~,o the CDU/CSU opposition to
the treaties or to the ccnventional GDR demand that the FRG
recognize the independence and sovereignty of the GDR. The
report stated that the meetings between Brezhnev and Honecker
were held in an "atmosphere of unanimity, sincerity, and
fraternal friendship."
* TASS on 13 March quoted Mikhaylov as commenting in IZVESTIYA
that if the treaties were not ratified the Berlin agreement would
not be implemented. Whether inadvertently or by design, however,
TASS' report; did not make it clear that Mikhaylov was paraphrasing
a statement made by Brandt. See the TRENDS of 15 March, pages 30-33.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
GllNl~' 1.UI;N'I' lAL IrBI ti 'I'ItI~;NUB
1.2 AI'ItI,L ~9yl
I'rudumnbly bucuuvu of its "unofficial" nuturo, 3aviot modiu's
covurugu oC Ilonockur.'s visit was minimal. Central media on tho
4tli and 5th carried u briof 'fAS;i roport on thc~ GllR loader's
arrival but said nothing further about tl~e visit until tho 10th,
whop Moscow radio curried the final report--not described ue a
communique. Moscow and Lust Berlin radios reported Ilonecker'8
return home on tl~e lOtli.
An IsusC Berlin radio conunentary by a Moscow correspondent on the
loth noted pointedly that "the week spent by Erich llonecker with
Leonid Brezhnev did not meet with great publicity in the press."
The first followup Moscow comment on the visit, a radio eommen-
tary by Zholkver broadcast to German listeners on the 11th,
largely paraphrased the Soviet report on the visit but Cook a
slap at the "reactionary imperialist circles [whoJ doggedly
ob;Ject" to the developing detente in Europe. A NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
editorial on the 12th, ae summarized by ADN, refrained from any
polemical attacks on West Germany, at the same time pointing out
such GDR contributions to the lessening of tension in Europe as
the rece_~t arrangements for Easter visits
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
(.;ONIrT.Ub;tJ'L'IAL, l~lil.~i ',I'RI;NI)S
l2 APItiG 1,972
USSR-BOLIVIA
IZVESTIYA CONr1ENTS IIEI.ATEDLY ON EXPULS l ON OF SOVIET DI PI_OMATS
An lZVES'1'IYA article on ll Al~ri1 ended a l3-day silence In
Soviet mecliu on the Lolivian Government's 29 March order
expelling 119 members of the Soviet P;mbaesy for reasons which
remain unspecified, but which by impl:l.cctti.on involve alleged
interference in llo.livian interna'L affairs: ...'The tYming' '
of the article seems related to Western press publicity for
the departure of 30 Soviet diplomatic offlcinle from La Paz
on l0 April, wiL?h additional departures imminent. ivtoscow
had not publicized earlier statements made to newsmen by
the Soviet ambassador in La Paz, reported in Bolivian media.
The IZVESTIYA article, as reviewed at some length by TASS,
now mentions a "statement" issued by the Soviet Embassy
which "rPiected the attempts to accuse Soviet diplomats of
some 'impermissible activity' as absolutely groundless."
b[oscow had waited six days before acknowledging the P4exican
Government's order on 1f3 rlarch 1971 expelling five high-
ranicing Soviet L;mbassy officers. Its reaction then was at
a higher official level--in the form of a Soviet Foreign
Ministry statement to the Mexican Embassy in Moscow,
terming the charges against the diplomats "totally ground-
less" and calling the expulsion "an unfriendly act against
the Soviet Union." TASS carried a brief report of the
24 tiarch statement, and Radio Moscow gave the same brief
report worldwide publicity. But there was no accompanying
commentary, where the IZVESTIYA article now indulges in
rhetoric ab~~ut "anti-Soviet actions" multiplying in Latin
America--replete with vague charges of behind-the-scenes
manipul.:~tion by U.S. interests bent on disrupting hemisphere
countr-~es' relations with socialist states.
Alleginz; that in the wake of the August 1971 coup in
Bolivia U.S. "monopolies" used "a11 the levers to
disrupt S~~viet-Bolivian relations" in a drive to "bolster
their shaken positions in the key branches of the Bolivian
economy," IZVESTIYA says propagation of the timeworn "myth"
about "communist penetration of the Western Hemisphere" and
about "Soviet interference" reached a peak with the
expulsion order. While thus in effect acknowledging the
evident basis for the order, the article--to fudge from
TASS' summary---nowhere directly imputes charges of Soviet
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
GONFIUI~N'1'I:AL. 1.~'1i1.5 'L'RP;tJI)S
:1.2 APRLI. .1972
interference to the Boiiv:lan Government and is at pains to
obscure the Large number of diplomats involved, referring
to the expulsion order as the Bolivian Gover:~ment'e
"invitation to a number of staff members of the USSR
Embassy and other Soviet institutions in La Paz to leave
the country." IZVESTIYA countercharges that the Bolivian
Foreign Ministry "diel.orts even the data about the number
of people in the Soviet colony in La Paz."
The Bolivian Government's action, IZVESTIYA declares, "fan
only play into the hands of those who are ready to sacrifice
the interests of Soviet-Bolivian rela tione to please the
external forces that wish to bring the world back to the
worst times of the cold war." Bolivian media had earlier
quoted the Soviet ambassador in La Paz as making a stronger
and more direct reference to the consequences for Soviet-
Bolivian relations in the comment that "measures such as
this do not contribute in any way to maintenance of cordial
relations between the two governments:" IZVESTIYA, portraying
the Bolivian action ae a link in a chain of anti-Soviet
machinations in Latin America, observes that the "short-
sighted" decir~ion has caused "perplexity and disapproval in
a number of Latin American countries."
IZVESTIYA's lane had been foreshadowed on 2 April in a
commentary in Spanish to Latin America over Moscow's
purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, without
direct reference to the Bolivian episode but in apparent
allusion to it. The commentary noted a "recent step-up
of slanderous attacks against the Soviet Union" in "some"
Latin American countries, adding that "the poison of this
wretched campaign is aimed against the Soviet diplomatic
and trade representations, with the clear objective of
worsening the relations with the Soviet Union and prevent:;ng
the development of recently established economic and cultural
relations." Charging that this effort "is led by the United
States" and employs "the wornout scarecrow of anti-
Sovietism," Radio Peace and Progress cited Costa Rica and
Chile as focal points of current U.S. attempts to disrupt
developing relations with the Soviet Union.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CUNir1:DLN'1'T.AL l~'I1.LS 'I'1t1~N1)S
1.2 AI'RT.1., :1972
- 48 -
USSP IP~ITERNAL AFFAIPS
UKRAINE PLENUM REBUKES Tl~n OBKOM (.FADERS. REMOVES SOBOL
A 3.1 March Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on the organizational
work of the Voroshilovgrad and Cherkassy oblaet party organizations
has rebuked the leaders of these two oblasts and removed first
deputy premier N.A. Sobol--a close protege of Poclgornyy in the
Ukraine--from the Ukrainian Politburo. Although the two oblaet
leaders have no obvious ties with any prominent Ukrainian
factions, the criticism of them, like the recent ouster of the
Khmelnitskiy obkom leader, appears to be linked to initiatives
by Shelest begun at the June 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee
plenum on improving leadership of primary party organizations.
Shelest's current relations with Sobol are unclear, but the
removal of the patron of the Kharkov faction, once the strongest
faction in the Ukraine~is bound to affect factional alinements
in the Ukraine.
The plenum opened with reports by Voroshilovgrad first secretary
V.V. Shevchenko and Cherkassy first secretary A.N. Andreyev on
their oblasts' organizational work, followed: by speeches by two
deputy heads of Che Ukrainian Central Committee cadres section
P. Ye. Didkovskiy and P.K. Klimenko, who presumably presented
their respective assessments of conditions in the ?wo oblasts.
After the remaining speeches, SheJ.est delivered a speech and
the plenum adopted a decree criticizing the two oblasts for a
wide variety of shortcomings, including poor organizational work
and failures in agricultural and consumer goods production.
Since the speeches were not published, the decree provides the
only substantive information on the transactions of the plenum.
Shelest laid the groundwork for the recent attack in his speech
at the 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum. lie then criticized
the Voroshilovgrad obkom and a local gorko~n for not taking
effective measures to correct conditions at a Voroshilovgrad mine
and for not improving the work of party organizations. He
concluded that "the only explanation for this is that leaders
of the obkom and gorkom still are not devoting enough attention
to primary party organizations of enterprises which lag"
(RADYANSKA UKSAINA, 25 June 1971). Inasmuch as Shelest played
the leading role at the.June 1971 plenum and in exposing and
condemning similar organizational shortcomings in Khmelnitskiy,
Yiev.and.TernopoJ. earlier this year, he appears to be the prime
mover in this campaign of criticism.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDI~.N7'IAL IBIS TRENDS
12 APRIL 1972
The March plenum a.iso announced the retirement on pension of first
deputy premier. 5obol and his removal from the Ukrainian Politburo.
lie was removed ae first deputy premier on the same day. Although
tl~e state of Sobol's health is unknown, his age, 62, is not
excessive (in fact, he is younger than Shelest)--suggesting that
he is a victim of political intrigue. Sobo1's retirement may
be related to shortcomings in industry, especially Che lag in
the production of consumer goods at Kharkov's heavy industrial
enterprises. 5helest in his June 1971 plenum speech was
especially critical of Kharkov, remarking that the Ukrainian
Politburo recently had examined production of consumer goods at
the ma~or.Kharkov enterprises and had msde "severe criticism"
of the leaders of several mayor enterprises for cutting back
or not increasing consumer goods production. Sobol may have been
doubly guilty here--as first deputy premier in charge of
industry and a? senior patron of the Kharkov leaders. Indeed,
one of the plants.singled.out.by Shelest--the big Malyshev
transport.machine.building plant--ls currently headed by O.V. Soich,
an associate of Sobo1, and was .formerly directed by Sob61 himself,
who spent most of his career (1929-58) at this plant.
If Sobol's removal from the Politburo was motivated by political
reasons, then it represents a setback far Podgornyy. After
Podgornyy left Kharkov to become Ukrainian first secretary,
Sobol rose in.rapid succession from plant director to Kharkov
sovnarkhoz.chief,.Ukrainian sovnarkhoz chief, and Kharkov first
secretary..-When.Podgornyy.left.the Ukraine in mid-1963, Sobol
was placed in.charge-of.cadre work as Ukrainian second secretary.
When. the_CPSU.Central Committee adopted a decree in 1965
ceasuring.Kharkov and marking Podgornyy's de.`.eat by Brezhnev,
Sobol was.the.main.loser.in the Ukraine, being demoted from
second.secretary.to.f irst deputy premier. Since then the Kharkov
faction.has.never.regained its predominance in the Ukrainian
leadership.. Its.sole representative in the Politburo new is
Kharkov.first.secretary G.I. Vashchenko, who was party secretary
at the.Malyshev.plant when Sobol was director in 1958 and was
later Kharkov first secretary Sobol's top deputy.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
 Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
l~ APRIL 1972
CH I IVA I IVTERIVAL AFFAIRS
SHAKE-UP IN KWANGTUNG LEADERSWIP REVEALED IN NCNA RETORTS
Ting Sheng, commander of the Canton Military Region and a
Kwangtung provincial party secretary, has replaced Liu Hsing-yuan
as chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee--
the first ouch replacement at the top provincial level to be
announced since Lin Piao's fall.
Ting Sheng's appointment was revealed inter alia ir. NCNA accounts
of the Canton reception for Maltese Prime Minister Mintoff.
Party identifications were not provided for the Kwangtung officials
in attendance, b~,t if the national pattern is followed Ting Sheng
will also replace Liu '?sing-yuan as first secretary of the
Kwangtunn party organization. Liu last appeared publicly on
8 March; his background is that of a PLA commissar closely
associated with Huang Yung-sheng, PLA Chief of Staff and former
leader in Kwangtung, who was purged along with Lin Piao last fall.
Liu's downfall, if it proves to be such, may be assumed to be an
outgrowth of the Lin Piao affair and possibly the forerunner of
additional shifts at top provincial levels.
Further shifting of the Kwangtung leadership wa8 also revealed
in the NCNA identification of Chao Tzu-yang, a recent Cransfer
from Inner Mongolia where he had served as a secretary on the
provincial party committee, as a vice-chairman on the Kwangtung
revolutionary committee. Chao, who was first secretary of the
old Kwangtung party committee and also a secretary of the former
Central-South Bureau headed by purged Tao Chu prior to the
cultural revolution, may also fill a vacancy on the provincial
party committee created b; Ting's probable elevation to first
secretary.
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 :CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050015-4