TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 29, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
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FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE
1111111111111111111111111111111111
TRENDS
in Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
29 MARCH 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 13)
00875R000300050013-6
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis report, is based ex-
clusively on material carried in communist
broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S.
Government components.
WARNING
This document contains Information affecting
the national defense of the United States,
within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793
and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its
transmission or revelation of its contents to
or receipt by an unauthorized person is pro-
hibited by law.
GROUP i
bdud~d Ire,., eure,.reiie
downpredi.0 and
deele,ifte$ie,. _
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
29 MARCH 1972
CONTENTS
Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
DRV Foreign Ministry Calls U.S. Decision on Paris "Sabotage" .
1
Moscow Commentators Assail U.S. "Suspension" of Paris Talks . .
4
DRV National Assembly: Leaders Condemn Administration Policy .
5
DRV Leaders Claim Communist Military Position Improving . . . .
8
Hanoi Highlights, Moscow Plays Down Soviet Military Visit . . .
12
Propaganda Fanfare Marks Anniversary of Sihanouk's Front . . .
15
CHINE'E NUCLEAR TEST
Peking Maintains Silence; Moscow Publicizes Radiation Threat .
18
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
Brezhnev Remarks Serve as Focus for Soviet Propaganda on SALT .
20
MIDDLE FAST
Moscow Continues To Avoid Comment on Husayn Plan for Jordan . .
21
USSR Praises Ties with Arabs But Hints at Areas of Friction . .
22
Moscow Pursues Military, Economic Ties with Belgrade . . . . .
27
Tirana Warns Belgrade of Motives Behind Soviet Overtures . . .
29
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Shelest Gives Demonstration of His Power in Ukraine . . . . .
31
CHINA
Heilungkiang Party Plenum Reflects Army-Civilian Tensions . . .
34
fOPIC IN BRIEF
Havana, Moscow on ITT-CIA "Plot" in Chile . . . . . . . . . . .
36
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FB I S TRENDS
29 MARCH 1972
TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 MARCH 1972
Moscow (2615 items)
Peking (1502 items)
AUCCTU 15th Congress*
(3%)
47%
Indochina
(22%)
35%
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
26%]
[FUNK Anniversary
(--)
23%]
[Middle East
(--)
2%]
[Sihanouk Return
(5%)
4%]
Statement
[Indochina
(--)
1%]
to Peking
[Vietnam
(3%)
4!]
Statement
Domestic Issues
(41%)
32%
[Northern Ireland
(--)
1%]
Husayn Proposal on
(7%)
8%
Statement
Indochina
(14%)
7%
Jordan Federation
Egyptian Government
(--)
3%
[Solidarity Week
(10%)
3%]
Delegation in PRC
China
(6%)
4%
UN Seabed Discussion
(1%)
3%
Midd
le East
(2%)
5%
Nort
hern Ireland
(1%)
2%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
ce'inted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
* Publicity for the three AUCCTU statements is also included in the
figures for Indochina, Middle East and Northern Ireland. The figure
for Brezhnev represents both rebroadcasts of the speech and supporting
comment.
F17,A OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INDOCHINA
Vietnamese communist media reacted cautiously to the U.S. decision,
announced by Ambassador Porter on 23 March, not to hold the weekly
sessions of the Paris talks unless there are indications that
serious negotiations will take place. The first Hanoi press comment
came on the 27th, three days after President Nixon's press
conference statement that he had personally directed Porter's move.
High-level official reaction came belatedly on the 28th in a DRV
Foreign Ministry statement, which echoed earlier comment in. scoring
the President's decision as an act calculated to wreck the
negotiations. Most notably, the statement condemned the unilateral
disclosure of the DRV-U.S. private talks and declared that "thus,
it is the United States that has sabotaged all avenues of
negotiations" with the DRV. A PRG Foreign Ministry statement on
the 29th came out in "full agreement" with the DRV statement.
Hanoi media announced on the 27th that the second session of the
DRV's Fourth National Assembly had been held from 20 to 25 March.
Publicity for the session--attended by party First Secretary
Le Duan as well as by top-level government officials--included the
revelation that the party . Central Committee had held its 20th
plenum "early this year." Premier Pham Van Dong, delivering the,
government report on the 20th, sharply assailed the "Nixon
Administration" for obstructing negotiations but did not expla.citly
criticize the President.
Peking's propaganda on Indochina has been dominated by heavy play
for the anniversary of Sihanouk's front. Peking's attention to
Vietnam has been confined largely to reports of DRV comment,
including a substantial .summaryof Pham Van Dong's National
Assembly speech and accounts of Hanoi comment on U.S. "sabotage"
of the Paris talks. Consistent with PRC media's cautious treatment
of the United States, these.reports omit Hanoi's strongest
denunciations of President Nixon.
The recent visit of a Soviet military delegation led by the air
defense forces commander was given extensive publicity by Hanoi,
while Moscow all but ignored it. Hanoi took the occasion to praise
Soviet military aid and said the delegation's visit will encourage
the war effort in both parts of Vietnam.
DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY CALLS U,S. DECISION ON PARIS "SABOTAGE"
The U.S. decision to suspend automatic holding of the weekly Paris
sessions was at first acknowledged by Hanoi only in the VNA account
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of the 23 March session. VNA said that "the U.S. delegate today
took an extremely serious act of sabotage by proposing to
postpone indefinitely the Paris conference on Vietnam, and
insolently declared that the United States would agree to resume
the conference only when the DRV and FRG sides have putt forward
'serious' proposals." VNA thus ignored Ambassador Porter's
statement that the decision-not to participate in a session on
the 30th was related to the President's decree on the week of
national concern for U.S. prisoners of war.* It similarly
ignored his statement that the allied side intends to suggest
meetings to discuss particular points or subjects whenever
such discissions stun likely to be useful.
The Vietnamese communist delegates had delivered their prepared
statement' before Ambassador Porter spoke. VNA noted that in
additional remarks both PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi and DRV
delegate Xuan Thuy "energetically and seriously condemned the
Nixon Administration foL seeking every way and means to
undermine the conference." Thuy was quoted as claiming that
"the attitude shown by the U.S. delegate today proves that the
Nixon Administration speaks of 'peace' and 'negotiations' while
in fact it is blocking negotiations and intensifying" the war.
He emphasized that the Nixon Administration "must bear fu li
responsibility for all consequences of its acts of sabotage."
(PPr delegation head Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, who arrived in Paris
on the 24th after a seven-month absence from the talks, also
scored the U.S. proposal as proof of U.S. "sabotage" of the
talks.)
Hanoi media were similarly slow to respond to the President's
24 March press conference in which he said that what the
United States was trying to do at Paris was break the
filibuster and that this was being done at his direction. The
communist press spokesmen in Paris on the 25th routinely
condemned the President's "sabotage" of the talks, but their
remarks were not reported by the media until the 26th. The
first substantial comment came on the 27th in a NHAN DAN
Commentator article and in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary.
* A NHAN DAN commentary on the 28th called the week of national
concern a "trick," along with the President's instruction for the
U.S. delegation to cease attending the regular sessions. NHAN
DAN claimed that the President was positing the Vietnamese
people's stand on the POW problem as one of many conditions for
a return to the negotiations.
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Commentator reported the President as saying he had directed
Ambassador Porter to stop attending the sessions "because the
Vietnamese side did not agree to negotiate seriously and took
advantage of negotiations to conduct propaganda activities."
The article countered with a review of the President's actions
beginning with his pre-election promise to end the war in
six months, castigating his failure to appoint a chief
negotiator between November 1969 and August 1970, and charging
that all three negotiators--Lodge, Bruce and Porter--had gone
to Paris with "empty briefcases." Cortunentator routinely
repeated the claim that the "essentials" of the U.S. eight-point
prop ' are the sane as those of the Vietnamization plan.
A Liberation Radio commentary broadcast on the 28th, on U.S.
"sabotage" of the negotiations, was particularly abusive
toward Ambassador Porter. It said, among other things, that
in appointing Porter the President had chosen a delegation
chief who "manifested the nature of a pirate." Porter had
achieved a record for cancellation of sessions, the broadcast
said, by canceling six meetings in five months. The QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN commentary on the 27th took the Administration to
task for arrogating to itself the right to determine when
negotiations are serious or useful. The U.S. decision regarding
the Paris sessions, the paper declared, makes it the more
obvious that "Nixon has no intention of -Aegotiating."
FOREIGN MINISTRY The DRV Foreign Mini"try statement on the
STATEMENT 28th echoed the press comment. in highlighting
the President's assertion that Ambassador
Porter's actions had been at his direction. Unlike the press
comment, however, the statement seemed directly responsive to the
President's avowal that the United States "is ready to negotiate
in public channels or in private channels." As broadcast by
Hanoi radio in Vietnamese, it said:
The public still recalls the despicable U.S.
action of unilaterally making public the
private meetings between the United States
and the DRV. Thus, it is the United States
that has sabotaged all avenues of negotiations
between the United States and the DRV.*
* The VNA English version rendered this sentence: "So doing,
the U.S. has blocked all negotiations between it and the DRV."
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While the statement seemed to suggest that Haiini would not welcome
further private discussions, it concluded with a plea for
continuation of the Paris talks. It called on the governments
and peoples of "the fraternal socialist countries, the peace-
and justice-loving countries, the American and world
people . . . to condemn the sabotage of the Paris talks, to
make the Administration put.an end to its Vietnamization
policy, continue attending the Paris sessions regularly, engage
in serious negotiations, and positively respond to the PRG's
seven-point proposal."
MOSCOW CONr1ENTATORS ASSAIL U1S, "SUSPENSION" OF PARIS TALKS
TASS promptly reported AmLassador Porter's decision regarding
the Paris talks on the 23d and has carried Vietnamese communist
and other foreign comment routinely alleging that this shows
that the United States wants to avoid a negotiated settlement.
Brief Moscow radio news reports of President Nixon's 24 March
press conference singled out his comments on the suspension of
the talks, but the TASS report--on 25 March, published in
PRAVDA the next day--played down these remarks. Although the
President's comments on Paris were part of the first exchange
at the press conference, TASS reported them only after
highlighting his references to his forthcoming Moscow trip and
noting his remarks on.other subjects, including the statement
that it would not be useful-to indicate what was or was not
discussed during his visit to Peking. TASS then mentioned
briefly that the President said the Paris talks were suspended
on his instructions because "the way the talks were going, there
was no hope whatsoever."
A report of the press conference in Moscow broadcasts for
domestic and foreign audiences, also on the 25th, said the.
President "tried to justify this unpopular step" by maintaining
that the talks as they now stand have no hope of success and
represented him as saying the United States will return to the
talks only if the DRV and PRG"accede to U.S. conditions." One
such "condition," the report claimed, is that charges of U.S.
"crimes" in Vietnam be dropped.
A PRAVDA article by Korinov, summarized by TASS on 29 March,
called the suspension of the talks a "maneuver" underscoring the
"crisis" of American policy in Asia. Korionov added that the
week of concern for the POW's being observed in the United States
is an "unseemly farce," and he repeated the Vietnamese stand that
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"a deadline for the full withdrawal of American troops would also
become a deadline for the release of American POW's." In a
28 March TASS commentary by Kharkov, the President's statement
that the United States will suspend the talks until the other
side is ready for a serious discussion was described as an
"ultimatum"--an effort to dictate terms to the Vietnamese, "as
many U.S. newspapers noted."
A TASS dispatch from Hanoi on the 26th said that U.S. refusal to
participate in the Paris talks and the continued bombing of the
DRV are regarded in "official DRV circles" as evidence of U.S.
intent to continue the war and "capture the initiative in the
military and diplomatic fields." The U.S. "sabotage" at Paris,
TASS added, is "connected with new aggressive plans of the
American military." The Hanoi-datelined dispatch said "it is
noted here" that the United States wants to impose a discussion
of such "secondary questions" as that of the POW's while refusing
to conduct "serious talks" and to answer the "two main points"
of the PRG's seven-point program--a final withdrawal of U.J.
troops and a renunciation of support for the Thieu regime. TASS
on 25 and 27 March cited the New York TIMES and the Washington
POST as concluding that the suspension of the talks shows that
the United States does not want a negotiated settlement.
DRV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: LEADERS CONDEMN ADMINISTRATION POLICY
Hanoi media first announced on 27 March that the second session
of the DRV's Fourth National Assembly had been held from 20 to
25 March. The first session of the Fourth National Assembly,
elected in April 1971, was held 7-10 June 1971.* In line with
standard pra^.tice, Truong Chinh, chairman of the National
Assembly Standing Committee, delivered opening remarks and
Premier Pham Van Dong delivered the government's political report,
which Hanoi radio broadcast on the 27th. DRV Defense Minister
Vo Nguyen Giap and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trtnh presented
the reports on military and diplomatic affairs, respectively, and
an economic report was read by Vice Premier and Chairman of the
State Planning Commission Nguyen Con. Excerpts of Con's
three-part report were broadcast on the 28th, and VNA briefly
summarized Giap's and Trinh's reports on the 29th. President
Ton Duc Thang gave the closing remarks to the assembly on
25 March. In addition to the above mentioned members of the
Politburo, Le Duan and Hoang Van Hoan were included in the
session's presidium.
*-See the 16 June 1971 TRENDS, pages 1-8.
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DONG, TRINH ON Pham Van Dong's political repcrt included a
U.S. POLICIES detailed criticism of Nixon Administration
policies. And Foreign Minister Trinh,
judging from the VNA report of his remarks, also assailed U.S.
"sabotage" of the negotiations. Although Dong reportedly
addressed the Assembly session on 2C March, passages in the
purported text of his speech as broadcast on the 27th read
like a response to the U.S. action at the Paris session on the
23d: Thus he is reported to have scored the United States
not only for unilaterally making public the private U.S.-DRV
talks, but for "brazenly postponing the open talks for an
indefinite time, therefore blocking the negotiations."
The substance of Dong's remarks on a political settlement
pointed up the recent failure of the media to spell out the
substance of the two points of the PRG proposal elaborated on
2 February. Dong obscured the nature of the "elaboration"
when he said:
In the diplomatic field, we have asserted our
people's positive attitude toward the Paris
talks on the basis of the seven-point solution
set forth by the PRG and the nine points of the
DRV,* with the recent clarification of the two
key points known to everyone.
After reiterating Vietnamese "rejection" of the U.S. eight-point
proposal, without acknowledging its substance, Dong did not go
on to repeat the PRG's elaborated two points but went back to
language he had used in his 20 November speech in Peking.**
* While Hanoi media publicized the nine-point proposal at the
end of January, after the President's revelation in his 25 January
speech, it has since been mentioned only infrequently. It was
cited in a 2 February NHAN DAN Commentator article and in the
5 February DRV Government statement supporting the 2 February PRG
elaboration. Xuan Thuy at the 3 February Pario session said that
the DRV's stand, which accorded with the PRG's, was outlined in
the nine points, but the VNA account of the session did not
report this.
** See the TRENDS of 24 November, pages 5?-S.
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He said that the U.S. Government must stop the war, end all
acts of war against both parts of Vietnam in all forms and
regardless of whence they originate, withdraw totally and
unconditionally, dismantle all U.S. military bases, end
Vietnamization, and end all support and commitments to the
Thieu regime. Dong described these as constituting "the
main demand" in the seven-point proposal--"an overall
solution, an integral, indivisible whole."
In contrast to Dong's remarks, the 28 March DRV Foreign Ministry
statement on the President's "sabotage" of negotiations repeated
some of the substance of the 2 February PRG elaboration. It
failed to specify that point one called on the United States
to set a definite withdrawal date, saying only that its
"essentials" are an end to the war by the United States and
complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. But regarding point two,
it repeated the specific call for Thieu's "immediate resignation"
and "the scrapping of the machine of oppression and repression
of the Saigon puppet administration" and establishment of a
three-part government of broad national concord to hold
elections.
Further inconsistency in spelling out of the elaboration-was
evidenced in the statements by the communist delegates at the
Paris session on the 23d.* Thus, PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi
recalled the demand that the United States set a time limit for.
;withdrawal as well as the cal for Thieu's "immediate" resignation,
and went on to repeat the procedures for arriving at the
formation of a three-component government of "national concord."
The VNA account duly reported Thi's remarks, but it glossed over
Xuan Thuy's reference to the elaboration. In his text Thuy had
spelled out the substance of point one, including the demand
that the United States set a date for withdrawal; but he glossed
over point two, failing to call for the "immediate" resignation
of Thieu or to detail the other demands, saying only that the
United States must respect self-determination for the South
Vietnamese and stop backing Thieu.
* At the 16 March Paris cession--the first ftill session since
10 February--both communist delegates called for a U.S. response
to the PRG'a seven-point proposal, including the 2 February
elaboration, but neither spelled out the substance. This was
consistent with the recent general avoidance of the details of
the elaboration. See the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 29-30,
and 15 March, pages 4-6.
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DRV LEADERS CLAIM COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION IMPROVING
Uniformly optimistic appraisals of the military situation in
Indochina have marked recent authoritative Hanoi propaganda,
including major.speeches at the 20-25 March DRV National
Assembly session--first publicized on the 27th--and an article
by the military commentator "Chien Thang" (The Victor)
published in the Hanoi press on the 24th. Thus DRV Defense
Minister Giap, according to VNA's brief 29 March account of
his assembly speech, maintained that the overall military
situation showed "the losing,passive, and downgrading position
of the enemy and the victorious, initiative, and upgrading
position of the Indochinese peoples." Both Premier Pham Van
Dong and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh used similar
language in their assembly speeches, pointing to the winning
and "upgrading" position of the Vietnamese "people." Chien
Thang's article, published while the assembly was in session,
was devoted entirely to documenting the validity of the
formulation set forth by Giap. It was followed on the 25th
by an editorial in NHAN DAN which cited recent military action
in Indochina to demonstrate the upward trend of the communist
position.
It is possible that the analysis of the military situation put
forward by Giap,.Chien Thang, and the others originated at the
North Vietnamese party Central Committee's 20th plenum which,
according to Vice Premier Nguyen Con's report at the assembly
session, was held early this year. While the implications for
Hanoi's military planning are not spelled out in available
versions of the National Assembly speeches, it is noteworthy
that the Chien Thang article again calls attention to the
importance of large-scale attacks by the regular armed forces--
a theme pressed in several authoritative Hanoi commentaries
over the past year.
CHIEN THANE ARTICLE The article by North Vietnamese
military commentator Chien Thang,
entitled "We Are in an Uptrend Posture, the U.S.-Puppets in
a Downward Posture," was summarized by VNA and Hanoi radio
on the 24th and said to have'been published that day in both
the army paper QUAN DOI KHAN DAN and the party's NHAN DAN.*
* Chien Thang's articles always appear in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.
There are occasional precedents for their appearance in NHAN DAN
as well--as in the case of a 2 August 1971 analysis of the dry
season fighting, discussed in the 4 August TRENDS, pages 15-17.
Chien Thang's last previous discussion of the war was in a series
of articles published in the army paper from 11 to 17 December.
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The text of the article is not available, but VNA outlined
Chien Thang's point-by-point analysis of the war's trend,
contrasting the allies' "losing," "passive," "downward"
posture with the communists' "victorious," "initiative,"
"uptrend" stance. Chronicling the alleged favorable shift
on the battlefield, the article contends in standard fashion
that the "turning point" came after the 1968 Tet offensive
and that the "defeat" last year of Lam Son 719--the "climax"
of allied Vietnamization efforts--thwarted U.C. intentions
to use the ARVN as the "shock force" in Indochina.
Chien Thang leads off with an eva..uation of both sides' regular
forces, claiming that the strength of these forces constitutes
"the most concentrated and highest expression of the military
strength of each belligerent party." Just as he had cited the
unique role of main force units in his 2 August article and
underlined their.importance in his December article,
Chien Thang asserts now: "Only with 'big punches' of the
regular forces can a party.launch major annihilating battles
and bring about a clear change in.the balance of forces on the
battlefield." He holds confidently that "the strongest regular
armies of the puppets," supported by U.S. troops, "lost heavily"
in "tests of strength" in 1971 with the communists' regular
forces. And he maintains that "the backbone of 'Vietnamization "
has been broken "in its most important vertebrae," with the
ARVN "unable to stand on its own." By contrast, he says, "the
PLAF regulars have made tremendous progress in big-unit
operations and in large-scale coordinated actions."
Documenting the claim that the allies are in a passive
posture, Chien Thangpoints out that "since late last year,,
the Saigon troops have not been able to launch any big
operations." In a seeming allusion to ARVN deployments to
meet a predicted communist offensive, he asserts that.the.
Saigon troops have in fact been "in constant fear of being
attacked" and that the ARVN's "mobile force are scattered in
many fronts to assume.differen: tasks." (Communist media in
recent months have occasionally referred to allied forecasts
of a major enemy offensive. For example, a 19 March Liberation
Radio commentary pointed to "worries and panic" among the allies
in expectation of an offensive as attesting to the "deceitful"
character of U.S. "clamor" about the success of Vietnamization.)
Claiming the initiative for the communists, Chien Thang says
that the Indochinese armed forces and people have "mcunted
repeated assaults," forcing the allies to scatter their forces,
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and that the "PLAF regular forces" in South Vietnam "hold firm
their initiative in chosing where and when to strike."
Appraising the general trend of the war, Chien Thang asserts
that "the Vietnamese people are facing more favorable
opportunities than in any previous period." In this context,
he points to the significance of the withdrawal of U.S. troops,
arguing that the United States "now has only defeated mercenary
armies at its disposal" and that the single remaining U.S.
"trump card"--its air force and navy--"has long fallen into
disrepute."
BACKGROUND Several Hanoi military commentaries after Lam
Son 719 stressed the important role of main
force units--a subject that had been virtually ignored in
propaganda during the decline in military activity after the
1968 Tet offensive. This line of comment was pursued in
other propaganda around the time of Chien Thang's 2 August
article, and it was stressed in an October article by the
military commentator "Cuu Long" carried in both Hanoi and
Front media.*
Last December Hanoi began to release a major analysis of the
relationship of the regular army to the "armed masses" in the
form of a four-part article by Defense Minister Giap, entitled
"Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build the People's Army."
The first two parts of the article, the only ones available
so far, us.: a lengthy examination of Marxist-Leninist doctrine
and Vietnam's historic experience to define, and defend, the
importance of the regular army's role. This point may also
be the keynote of the final two sections, which are said to
deal with the past 40 years of the party's experience in-arming
the masses and building the army and with the task of "stron,_ly
and largely arming the masses pud building a regular, n-oderr
people's armed forces."**
* The Cuu Long article is discussed in the 20 October TRENDS,
pages 7-9.
** The first section of Giap's article appeared in the December
issue of the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine and the January
issue of the party journal HOC TAP. The second part was
published in the January issue of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
magazine and in the February issue of the party organ.
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At a much lower level, the relationship between the use of large
and small forces was one of the subjects broached in a round-
table discussion "organized" by Hanoi radio and the QUAN DOI
NHAN DAN magazine, broadcast in several installments from
19 through 30 December and again from 14 through 23 March.*
The panelists stressed the interdependent nature of guerrilla
warfare and "concentrated" fighting. While they held that
concentrated fighting is "steadily growing on a larger scale,"
they pointed out that small units can in some circumstances
be as effective as large ones.
* In December Hanoi radio sa:'. it was broadcasting the round-
table to mark Vietnamese communist anniversaries that month.
The rebroadcast in March was keyed to the 19 March anti-U.S.
resistance day anniversary. Hanoi has broadcast similar round-
table discussions of military issues on at '.east two other
occasions--from 26 August to 5 September and from 26 July to
3 August 1971. See the 4 August TRENDS, pages 15-17.
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HANOI HIGHLIGHTS. MOSCOW PLAYS DOWN SOVIET MILITARY VISIT
In an evident effort to underscore Soviet support for the DRV's
military capabilities, Hanoi devoted considerable publicity to
the visit of a Soviet military delegation strongly weighted with
air defense officers. In contrast to Hanoi's extensive
publicity, however, Moscow has all but ignored the delegation's
visit, thus bypassing a chance to play up Soviet backing for the
North Vietnamese military effort against the United States.
On 26 March VNA reported a DRV Defense Ministry communique
announcing that a Soviet military delegation headed by Marshal
P.F. Batitskiy, CPSU Central Committee member, deputy defense
minister, and commander in chief of the Soviet air defense forces,
had arrived for a "friendship visit," but it did not specify the
date of arrival. On the 28th VNA reported that the delegation
had concluded its visit and had been seen off by DRV military
leaders, again without specifying the date. According to VNA,
the delegation included a political officer in the armed forces,
the commander of the air defense missile forces, and the head
of the air defense radar forces.
Though no similar Soviet military delegations had previously
been reported to have visited the DRV, military leaders of a
rank comparable to Batitskiy's have been included in delegations
led by top Soviet leaders. When Kosygin visited the DRV in
February 1965, Marshal K.A. Vershinin, a deputy defense minister
and air force commander, was in the delegation. The Soviet
delegation led by Shelepin in January 1966 included Col. Gen.
V.F. Tolubko, at that time the first deputy commander of the
Soviet missile forces. When Podgornyy visited the DRV last
October, Senior Gen. Sokolov, first deputy defense minister,
was a member of the delegation.
Hanoi's extensive publicity for the Batitskiy delegation's visit
included a NHAN DAN editorial on 27 March and VNA reports that
day of talks with DRV Defense Minister Giap and other military
leaders, a reception hosted by Giap, and a DRV Defense Ministry
banquet. On the 28th VNA reported a meeting with Le Duan and
Pham Van Dong, a Hanoi "grand meeting," and a "grand reception"
hosted by the Soviet delegation. On the 29th VNA reported that
the delegation had called on the special represt:tation of the
PRG. VNA did not report the dates any of these activities took
place. The VNA press review of the 28th said that the Soviet
delegation got "considerable frontpage space" with reports and
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photos of its activities. On the 29th the press review said that
"much space" was devoted to this "major event." This treatment
contrasts with the modest publicity given to the 25 February to
4 March visits to the DRV of USSR Minister of Culture Furtseva
and Minister of the Maritime Fleet Guzhenko.
In Moscow's sole reportage on the military delegation's visit,
a brief TASS dispatch on the 27th cited the DRV Defense Ministry's
announcement of the delegation's arrival. Unlike the DRV
announcement, TASS named only Batitskiy as a member of the
delegation. The delegation was mentioned in passing on the 29th
when the Moscow domestic service broadcast a dispatch from its
Hanoi correspondent pegged to the DRV National Assembly session.
Reporting praise for North Vietnamese military exploits expressed
at the session, the dispatch observed that the DRV is equipped
with Soviet weapons, specifically antiaircraft missiles. Citing
DRV expressions of gratitude for Soviet aid, he dispatch briefly
mentioned the NHAN DAN editorial on the Soviet military delegation's
visit.
VNA's 27 March report of the talks with Giap and other military
leaders said that they took place in an atmosphere-of "friendship
and fraternal militant solidarity," but the report-the next day
of the meeting with Le Duan and Pham Van Dong did not c:.aracterize
its atmosphere. At Giap's reception, reported on the 27th,
Batitskiy was quoted by VNA as saying that the Soviet people and
armed forces "stand squarely on the side of" the Vietnamese
and other Indochinese people in their fight against the "U.S.
imperialist aggressors." In language similar to that used by
Brezhnev in his major foreign policy address on 20 March,
Batitskiy added that the Soviets "consider it their international
duty to sympathize with, support, and assist that fight. The
Soviet Union will certainly fulfill her international duty."
Giap, in turn, thanked the USSR for its "great, precious, and
effective assistance." At the defense ministry banquet Giap
added in standard fashion that Soviet assistance is given "in
the spirit of proletarian internationalism."
In its 28 Mi---ch reports of activities, VNA attributed somewhat
less effusive language.to.the speakers. The political commissar
of the DRV air defense and air force, speaking at the Hanoi
meeting, was quoted as thanking the USSR for its "support," and
Batitskiy reaffirmed Soviet "support." Giap was quoted briefly,
expressing the Vietnamese people's "sincere feelings" toward the
Soviet Union. At the reception he hosted, Batitskiy expressed his
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firm belief in "the constant consolidation and development of
the fraternal friendship and solidarity" of the Soviet and
Vietnamese peoples and armed forces. Giap emphasized that the
Soviet delegation's visit proved that the USSR and other
communist countries "were always standing with" the Vietnamese
people and helping them to defeat U.S. aggression.
The NHAN DAN editorial of the 27th expressed satisfaction over
the results of the visit and praised Soviet military assistance.
According to the editorial, the visit "will. certainly further
tighten the militant unity" between the DRV and the USSR, and
it will "contribute toward motivating and encouraging" the
people and armed forces "in both parts of our country to
resolutely persevere in and increase our anti-U.S. national
salvation resistance" in behalf of Vietnamese independence,
"the socialist camp's security," and the world revolutionary
cause.* Citing the "many" accords signed in the past on Soviet
aid, the editorial said this "valuable support and aid" based
on proletarian internationalism has "greatly contributed to our
people's great victories."
The editorial concluded by stressing the importance of Soviet-DRV
friendship and unity in language that could be read as expressing
some concern. Thus, it said the Vietnamese "are incessantly
endeavoring to strengthen this friendship" and "sincerely hope
that the militant unity . ... will be-increasingly strengthened
and developed." References to solidarity are more often in a
sloganized form ("May the friendship-and militant solidarity
develop . . ."),.but Le Duan last October, at the time of
Podgornyy'a visit, declared that the party and government "will
do their best to foster the great friendship and militant
solidarity" with the Soviets.
* It is standard Hanoi practice to refer to the Indochina war
as contributing to the security of the socialist camp. For
example, Le Duan did so in a 4 October speech during Podgornyy's
visit.
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PROPAGANDA FANFARE MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF SIHANOUK'S FRONT
Peking and Hanoi have marked the 23 March second anniversary of
the formation of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) and liberation army
(CNPLAF) with a propaganda fanfare and show of support exceeding
that of last year. Moscow has also given the occasion somewhat
more attention than last year, although it has limited itself
to routine-level comment in keeping with its more distant
relations with Sihanouk's Peking-based movement.
PEKING Initial Peking propaganda had included a banquet on
the 19th--marking the anniversary of Sihanouk's
arrival in Peking as well as of the FUNK and CNPLAF--attended
by the entire array of fully active Chinese Politburo members
and a Chinese leaders' message.* This was followed by a
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial; a speech by the Prime Minister of
Sihanouk's government, Penn Nouth, at a 22 March Peking "report
meeting" sponsored by Chinese public organizations; and a banquet
on the 23d hosted by Sihanouk--an event not included in last
year's celebrations--at which the prince and Chou En-lai echoed
points they made in speeches at the 19 March banquet. On the
19th Chou had set the tone of this year's celebrations by calling
Sihanouk the Chinese people's "closest friend."
VIETNAMESE Like Peking, the Vietnamese communists accorded the
COMMUNISTS FUNK and CNPLAF anniversaries more publicity than
last year. This included observance of a "week of
solidarity" with the Cambodian people, messages from DRV and
PRG leaders and defense ministers, and editorials. The Cambodian
ambassador held a banquet attended by Pham Van Dong end Vo Nguyen
Giap and addressed by Nguyen Duy Trinh; Giap and others addressed
a Hanoi "grand meeting." A "grand meeting" was also held in the
South Vietnam "liberated zone." Last year the anniversary had
been publicized only by leaders' messages, editorials, and a
Hanoi press conference by the Cambodian ambassador.
As in 1971, tha DRV and PRG leaders' messages praised the victories
of the Cambodian "patriots" and lauded the fighting solidarity of
the Indochinese peoples. The DRV message, sent this year by
President Ton Duc Thang and Premier Pham Van Dong (last year's
* The initial propaganda is discussed in the TRENDS of
22 March, pages 23-25.
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message having been sent only from Thang), inexplicably Lctil.ecl
to recall the declaration of the Indochinese summit conference
or to praise Sihanouk's five-point program as the message did
last year, but these points appeared in other Hanoi propaganda.
The PRG message, again sent by Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan
Phat, recalled the Indochinese summit conference but failed
to mention Sihanouk's five-point program. Messages from the
DRV and PRG defense ministeru to Khieu Samphan, the defense
minister in Sihanouk's government, were new this year.*
MOSCOW Moscow gave the anniversary somewhat more publicity
than last year, although still limiting itself to
routine-level attention. While last year there had been no
press comment and only a few foreign-language radio commentaries,
this year articles appeared in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR
on the 23rd, and TASS that day briefly reported a Moscow
"public meeting" attended by "diplomatic staff of the embassies
of a number of Asian countries." Unidentified speakers were
quoted as having said that the formation of the FUNK was a
"turning point" in the Cambodian people's struggle and a
manifestation of their resolve to give a rebuff to "U.S.
imperialism's criminal aggression." A resolution adopted
at the meeting expressed the "Soviet people's" condemnation
of U.S. aggression in Indochina and their "full support" for
the struggle of the peoples of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.
Consistent with normal practice, Moscow's comment on the
anniversary failed to mention either Sihanouk or his government
(RGNU). However, the RGNU was mentioned in a 15 March PRAVDA
report of an interview with leng Sary--not connected with the
anniversary--which originally appeared in the VIETNAM COURIER,
a Hanoi weekly published in English and French. PRAVDA duly
reported his title of "special representative of the FUNK and
RGNU," and it quoted him as saying that "the leaders of the
FU!jK and RGNU" are veterans of the liberation struggle, exercise
"collective leadership," and "stick to the political line of the
FUNK." Moscow has mentioned the RGNU since its founding in May
1970 only on rare occasions, usually in connection with Moscow
stopovers of traveling RGNU officials.
* These messages were devoted to the CNPLAF anniversary. This
anniversary was included in the celebrations in Peking for the
first time this year, but the Chinese have not sent defense
minister's messages since the downfall of Lin Piao.
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Also consistent with Moscow's usual practice, most of the
anniversary comment failed to attack Loa Nol by name. The
IZVESTIYA article was exceptional for its attack on Lon Nol
for his various steps to establish "an overt military
dictatorship," particularly his 10 March proclamation of
himself as President. Mcscow had previously attacked this
proclamation, for example In a 17 March PRAVDA article, but
it has rarely attacked Lon Nol personally in the past,
normally reserving its criticism for the "Phnom Penh regime."
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CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST
PEKING MAINTAINS SILENCE; MOSCOW PUBLICIZES RADIATION THREAT
PRC media have remained silent on the 14th Chinese nuclear test,
reported by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to have been
detonated in the atmosphere on 18 March. Two earlier monitored
Chinese tests had gone unannounced by Peking--those of
24 December 1967 and 14 October. 1970. Peking's longest delay
in announcing its tests followed the eighth and ninth tests of
23 and 29 September 1969, both of which NCNA publicized for the
first time on 4 October. Most announcements have been made by
Peking on the day of the experiment or within a day or two.
Thus the 7 January 1972 detonation, the last previous one
and the 11th to be announced, was acknowledged by NCNA on
9 January; and the test conducted on 18 November 1971 was
reported in PRC media on the 19th.
Moscow and its hardlining East European allies have promptly
publicized the latest Chinese test, as has Ulan Bator. In the
absence of a Chinese acknowledgment of the test, Bucharest,
Tirana, Hanoi, and Pyongyang have all followed protocol and
stayed silent.
SOVIET COVERAGE In the pattern of Soviet media's treatment
of the November 1971 and January 1972 Chinese
tests, TASS and Radio Moscow promptly reported the 18 March
experiment on the 19th, citing the Atomic Energy Commission.*
Also in the pattern introduced in November, Moscow media have
given wide play to expressions of concern over attendant
radiation hazards. Thus Moscow has reported the customary
Japanese protests and has noted the increased radiation levels
in Japan and areas to the east, including the United Sta+-,g.
A Moscow commentary beamed to Southeast Asia in Mandarin .i the
23d pointed to "the destructive effects of the lethal radioactive
* Moscow cited the AEC in reporting the November and January
Chinese tests in advance of Peking's own announcements. Its
previous consistent practice had been to await the NCNA announce-
ments. Thus Moscow media did not at the time report the December
1967 and October 1970 tests which Peking did not publicize; but
Moscow has retroactively included them in adding up the total
number of Chinese tests to date, accurately giving the total as
14 since October 1964.
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fallout on living things" and cited "authoritative experts" for
the observation that Peking's nuclear tests "have caused
irreparable damage to all living plants and especially to the
health of people." In a similar vein, a commentary in English
to South Asia the next day warned of the dangers of an
accumulation of strontium 90 and the consequent threat to the
health "of the present as well as of future generations." A
letter published in IZVESTIYA on 24 March, signed by a Soviet
scientist, took note of the radiation hazards and observed that
nuclear tests carried out by the PRC "in the region geographically
close to the territory of the Soviet Union and the fraternal
Mongolian People's Republic put the Soviet people particularly
on their guard."
Moscow has utilized the latest test, again as in November and
January, to assail the Chinese attitude toward disarmament
measures and to denigrate Chinese motives in developing nuclear
weapons. On the latter score, the 23 March commentary in
Mandarin cited a Dakar newspaper for the view that the PRC's
nuclear weapons "are directed against the neutral countries.
They are being used to turn Africa and the whole neutral camp,
if possible, into China's vassal states." On 22 March, a
Moscow radio commentary for Japanese listeners charged that the
Chinese leadership is strengthening the PRC's nuclear power
"against the interests of the Asian peoples, including the
Chinese people, and is also rejecting all proposals to halt the
nuclear arms race." The commentary quoted the Japanese paper
YOMIURI to the effect that Peking is striving "to develop a
powerful warhead for a medium-range missile."
A NOVOSTZ commentary, published in Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO
on the 23d and in the Bratislava PRAVDA the following day,
chided the PRC for its failure to sign the 1963 partial
test-ban accord and observed that with the latest nuclear test
the Chinese leaders "want to scare their Asian neighbors and
mentally prepare them to aL-Ipt the idea of Maoist domination."
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- 20 -
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
BRED-INEV REMARKS SERVE AS FOCUS FOR SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON SALT
Soviet media treated the opening of the seventh round of the
strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Helsinki on 28 March
in much the same fashion as they treated the opening of the
sixth round in Vienna in November, with straightforward reports
of the ceremonial functions and a careful avoidance of any
mention of substantive issues likely to be discussed. Brezhnev's
general remarks on SALT in his 20 March trade union congress speech
have predictably served as the focus for subsequent comment.
Vladimir Semenov, the chief Soviet delegate to the talks, in
arrival remarks in Helsinki quoted Brezhnev on "the great
importance" the USSR attaches to the talks and on Moscow's
desire for "a mutually acceptable agreement." TASS noted
that Semenov went on to say "we have firm instructions from
the Soviet Government to work in a constructive and businesslike
manner."
Reporting President Nixon's 24 March press conference, TASS said
the President noted that Brezhnev's "quite constructive remarks"
indicate that there is "'a good chance' for reaching agreement"
on strategic arri limitation during the Moscow summit in May.
The account did not mention the President's caveat that an
accord on SALT may not be reached before the Moscow summit
because of differences on such "fundamental issues" as
submarine-based missiles.
In the only available Soviet commentary on the opening of the
Helsinki round, a radio talk by Kozyakov for North American
listeners on 27 March cited Brezhnev's remarks as a summation
of the Soviet attitude toward SALT and called this attitude
"a logical followup of this country's persevering efforts to
reach agreement on disarmament." Following Brezhnev's lead,
the commentator went on routinely to criti:ize rising U.S.
arms expenditures--a theme that threads through other Soviet
propaganda not directly mentioning SALT.
Kozyakov's commentary echoed Brezhnev's praise for the SALT
agreements last September "to reduce the danger of a nuclear
war breaking out" and repeated the Soviet leader's observation
that the USSR would like other nuclear powers to join in such
arrangements in some form. A 28 March TASS commentary by Kornilov,
reviewing the USSR's "peace program" advanced last year, also
repeated this call. Neither commentator elaborated.
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MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW CONTINUES TO AVOID COMMENT ON HUSAYN PLAN FOR JORDAN
Moscow still refrains from expressing an opinion on King Husayn's
plan for a federated kingdom of Jordan and has followed up its
initial minimal coverage of negative Arab reaction in only one
Arabic-language broadcast on the 25th, reporting an undated NEW
TIMES article which rounded up critical comment. Another
commentary in Arabic, on the 28th, began by noting that Husayn
had arrived in Washington for talks with President Nixon and that
the king's proposals and U.S. aid to Jordan would reportedly be
discussed. After observing that Husayn's trip coincided with Arab
denunciation of the United States, the commentary focused cn the
U.S. policy of "terrible hypocrisy and extreme hostility" coward
the Arabs, with no further mention of the king. TASS the same
day reported Husayn's arrival in Washington on an "official
visit" and said the "official talks" would concern the king's
plan, which "was criticized in the Arab countries."
An article by PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko on
the 27th in effect took the United States to task for misrepre-
senting the Husayn plan, claiming that the American press was
reporting that it forms the basis for a separate agreement
between Israel and Jordan. While the Jordanian representativa
at the United Nations flatly rejected any possibility of a
separate agreement, Kolesnickenko said, U.S. propaganda,
"manifestly incited by the State Department," attempts to sell
the idea of such an agreement as a breakthrough in the Middle
East impasse.
Albania has come out with characteristic censure of the USSR's
attitude toward the Husayn plan: Tirana radio on the 27th
cited the Jordanian weekly AL-HAWADITH as reporting that the
Soviet Union, informed of the plan just prior to its announce-
ment by Husayn on the 15th, had notified Jordan of its
"favorable stand." The Jordanians were also told, Tirana said,
that the Soviet ambassadors in Cairo and Damascus had informed
the respective governments that Moscow approved of the
initiative and that "efforts were being made to examine King
Husayn's plan with greater attention." Tirana further noted
reports that King Husayn's brother had conferred with the Soviet
charge d'affaires on the 26th, a meeting announced by Amman
radio that day. Tirana hit at Soviet silence regarding Husayn's
proposals in a radio commentary on the 28th, charging that
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Moscow's "indifferent attitude" proves that the Soviets accept
the plan because it "answers their reactionary concept--a
political settlement" of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
IRAQ UNITY PROJECT Iraq's hastily proposed unity project
with Egypt and Syria, announced on the
15th shortly after King Husayn made public his proposals for
Jordan, was acknowledged belatedly by Moscow in the 25 March
Arabic-language broadcast of the NEW TIMES article. Noting that
the plan had provoked a "violent reaction" in the Arab world,
NEW TIMES observed in passing that "according to AFP, Iraq has
proposed immediate union with Syria and Egypt to oppose King
Husayn's plan." But there apparently has been no Soviet reference
to the 21-26 March visit to Damascus of a high-level delegation
led by Saddam Husayn, Ba'th Party deputy secretary general and
deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council, or to the
delegation's 26-28 March talks in Cairo.
In a domestic service commentary on the 27th, NOVOSTI commentator
Katin, elaborating on Brezhnev's remarks on the Middle East in
his AC:CTU speech on the 20th, routinely hailed growing inter-
Arab cooperation and singled out "in particular" the formation of
the Confederation of Arab Republics--Egypt, Syria, and Libya--
as "unquestionably a positive element" in strengthening inter-
Arab cooperation.
USSR PRAISES TIES WITH ARABS BUT HINTS AT AREAS OF FRICTION
Despite tiie sweeping claim in Brezhnev's 20 March trade union
congress speech that Soviet relations with the Arabs have never
been "so profound and multifaceted" as now, difficulties in these
relations--as well as concern over inter-Arab frictions and
internal developments in the Arab countries--appear to underlie
frequent Soviet protestations of ever-increasing friendship and
cooperation. Reacting to Arab criticism, Moscow has issued a
defensive explanation of its policy on emigration of Soviet
Jews to Israel; it has also been at pains to encourage coopera-
tion between communists and "progressive" followers of Islam.
Soviet concern about "adventurist" views in Egypt favoring
military action against Israel as well as about "defeatist
theories"--possibly reflecting Egyptian dissatisfaction over
Soviet military supplies--was intimated in a 17 March PRAVDA
dispatch. The paper's Cairo correspondent, Glukhov, praised
the appeal for "self-restraint and for a sober analysis of the
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sitration" at the recent Arab Socialist Union Congress and
denounced "foreign and domestic reaction" for trying to raise
"adventuristic slogans." The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) on
the 27th indicated another area in which the Soviets have come
in for criticism, so far unanswered in Moscow media: At a
seminar organized by AL-AHRAM in February and attended by "Arab,
Egyptian, and Soviet thinkers," MENA said, representatives of
the Palestinian resistance complained to the Soviets that the
Palestine question was not getting the kind of vigorous attention
that the USSR devotes to such similar questions as Vietnam.
EMIGRATION OF Moscow has defended its policy on emigration of
SOVIET JEWS Soviet Jews to Israel in a statement by B. T.
Shumilin, a deputy minister of internal affairs,
to a NOVOSTI correspondent. Except for rare statements by Kosygin
during visits to Western countries, when he has responded to
questions about Jewish emigration in remarks given little or no
publicity in Soviet media, this appears to represent the highest-
level Soviet statement on the subject to date. While other
factors must have entered in, the statement undoubtedly is
responsive in large measure to increasing Arab complaints*: It
was initially broadcast twice to Arab audiences and once in French
to Africa on 24 March, then rebroadcast in Arabic four times on
the 25th. Not until the 270, was the statement issued by TASS.
It was again rebroadcast--twice--in Arabic that day as well as
in some European languages.
Shumilin's statement rebutted "slanderous inventions" by
imperialist, Zionist, and Maoist "propaganda agencies" in
connection with emigration to Israel. In the initial Arabic
version on the 24th, Shumilin pointedly complained that "even
certain Arab statesmen" are taking the liberty of "using such
false sources concerning the position of Jews in the Soviet
Union." As issued by TASS, however, this passage was amended
to say that "some politicians in Western countries" permit
themselves to make use of false sources of information. The
TASS formulation was used in the subseg-ent Arabic broaL..;asts.
* For example, Haykal, chief editor of Cairo's AL-AHRAM,
remarked in a 4 February article that "perhaps we should show
more understanding for the USSR's a4-owing Soviet Jews to
emigrate to Israel." And a Voice of Fatah broadcast from
Cairo on 21 February reported that Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO) chairman Yasir 'Arafat had advised the Soviet
ambassador in Damascus, in a meeting with him that day, of "the
dangers threatening the Arab nation in general and Palestine in
particular because of the mass immigration of Soviet Jews" to Israel.
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Shumilin asserted that the aim of the "slanderous campaign" was
to try to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship. For the Arabs, he
injected a reminder that while in the postwar period approximately
21,000 people had left the Sov!st Union. for Israel, in the same
period about 800,000 Jews emigrated to Israel "from the Arab
countries alone." He also made the point that the USSR does
restrict some categories of citizens from leaving the country,
primarily those "who have had a definite measure of military
training or are by dint of their occupation associated with work
bearing on state interests." In statements made during his visit
to Canada last October, Kosygin had said that the USSR applies
some restrictions, mentioning "those who have only just received
their education" and adding "nor can we supply Israel with
soldiers." IZVESTIYA, reporting his Ottawa press conference
remarks, merely noted that Kosygin said with respect to emigration
that "all these questions are examined within the established
framework of law" and added that "he cited specific examples on
this point."
The Shumilin statement also made the point, pressed in recent
propaganda, that an increasing number of Soviet Jewish emigres
to Israel now wish to leave. The statement was followed up on
the 29th by TASS commentator Boris Petrov's assertion that more
and more applications for permission to return to the USSR are
being received from Jews who "took the bait of false Zionist
propaganda" and left for Israel.
The emigration issue was picked up by Peking in a 28 March NCNA
report on the Kuwaiti paper AL-RA'I AL-'AMM's criticism of U.S.
and Soviet policies toward the Arabs. NCNA publicized the
paper's charge that the USSR is trying to complicate the
situation in order to strengthen its hold on the region. It
quoted the paper as adding: "It is for this reason that the
Soviet Union provides 'aid' to this region and permits Jews to
migrate to Israel."
ATTITUDE Moscow came to the defense of "progressive
TOWARD ISLAM religious groups" in an Arabic-language
commentary on the 27th approving the alliance
of progressive revolutionary parties and "believers" in a common
struggle for just objectives. Billed as the first in a series
entitled "Against Imperialist Attempts To Exploit Religion for
Reactionary Purposes," the commentary may have been intended as
an answer to outbursts against atheistic communism by such
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devout Moslems as Libya's al-Qudhdhafi* and as a warning against
"such reactionary organizations as the Moslem Br.ctherhood, now
banned in Egypt." The aut0or, candidnte of historical. sciences
Dimitriy Ponomarev, affirmed that Moslems in many Afro-Asian
countries where Islam to the official religion actively participate
in the struggle against colonialism, and he credited "progressive
religious groups" with helping bring about profound social
changes. Pointing out that the mufti of Egypt supported Nasir's
1961 decrees "in connection with capitalism," Ponomarev declared
that men of religion currently exercise great influence in
mobilizing Egyptians for the struggle against "Israeli aggression."
Recalling that the 1969 Moscow international communist conference
had discussed the quisstion of unity of action betweei, communists
and believers, Ponomarev pointed out that the conference's main
document said cooperation was developing in certain countries
between communists and the broad democratic masses of Catholics
and members of other faiths. He accused "imperialism" of trying
to distort and falsify many of "Islam's progressive principles"
and create mistrust and hostility among Moslems, as well as of
"fabricating lies" to hinder the unity of action of communists
and "all progressive forces, including the millions of Moslems."
In the second talk in the series, broadcast in the 28th,
Ponomarev further accused "imperialism and Zior.ism" of
"fabrications" to the effect that ruling communist parties in
socialist countries and communists in other countries are
hostile toward Islam and "persecute faithful Moslems." Asserting
that the USSR observes "freedom of conscience and of religion,"
he insisted that in Soviet society there are only "philosophical
arguments" between believers and nonbelievers and that the basic
distinction whizh communists draw is between exploiters and
exploited.
* Yugoslav and South Vietnamese PRG representatives are the
only communist delegates thus far reported to be attendi-ag the
inaugural congress of Libya's Arab Socialist Union, which
opened on the 28th. In reporting the opening session, TASS
said only that the gathering was addressed by al-Qadhdhafi;
the Libyan leader typically said Libya's "international
relations" with the Soviet Government had nothing to do with
communist ideology and doctrine.
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MIDDLE EAST An article by Ye. Dmitriyev in MEZIIDUNAR0DNAYA
SETTLEMENT ZIIIZN (No. 3, signed to press 22 February) points
up Moscow's difficulty in selling the idea of a
political. settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict to "right and
ultraleft circles" in the Arab countries. Ostensibly a critique
of the United States' policy of "quiet dipl.omacy" in the Middle
East, the article expressed regret that Egypt's "peace-loving
and genuinely constructive" foreign policy and quests for a
Middle East. settlement are "virtually regarded as capitulation
by individual people, and even officials, in some Arab countries."
Dmitriyev claimed that the Egyptian path of seeking a settlement
based on Resolution 242 is attracting new Arab advocates who
support the interests of the whole Arab nation, rather than
attaching importance to "wrongly understood and erroneously
interpreted prestige factors." But the stalemated situation,
according to Dmitriyev, affords reactionary forces an opportunity
to strengthen their positions as well as their links with Western
powers, as well as being conducive to a strengthening of
"ultraleft forces" which promulgate the "'people's war' slogai.
disseminated by the Peking leadership." Dmitriyev displayed
concern that this abandonment of a political solution by "certain
circles" in Arab countries resulted in "slander" of the USSR's
Middle East policy.
The author also suggested some disquiet at the notion that these
"right and ultraleft circles" are attempting to move into
positions of political power. "American-Zionist propaganda,"
he charged, is trying to influence "the circles in Arab
countries which have not yet renounced the intention to retu.n
to power" with the aid of imperialist forces. According to
Dmitriyev, these unidentified r1rcles regard Arab "progressive"
development and strengthened ties with the socialist countries
as a sign of their "inevitable future disappearance" from the
political scene.
The article indicated sensitivity to Arab questioning of Soviet
motives in the Middle East in declaring that "Arab patriots"
understand the malice of "propaganda about the 'Soviet threat."'
Dmitriyev went on to cite Egyptian President as-Sadat: as saying
in a New York TIMES interview that the talk about the Soviet
presence is "the same old chestnut" that Israel constantly
repeats to the whole world.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONIC' I I)ENT I A1, V1118 'I'I(ENDS'
29 MAItCII 1972
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA
MOSCOW PURSUES MILITARY, ECONOMIC TIES WITH BELGRADE
Soviet DefenHc Minister GrucIiko's arrival. in Belgrade on 27 March
at the head of a high-powered m:L l.itar.y delegation, coupled with
the opening in Moscow on the same day of a new rounci of Soviet-
Yugoslav tal.l,s on comprehensive economic cooperation, nnderscor.es
the rapprochement between the two countries that has been evolving
since Bcezhnev's visit to Belgrade in September 1971. According
to TANJUr, the Yugoslav press gave prominent coverage to the
Grechko delegation's arrival on "an official visit" returning
Yugoslav Defense Minister Ljubicic's May 1970 visit to Moscow.
In successive reports of the delegation's departure from Moscow
and arrival in Belgrade, TASS called the trip "an official friendly
visit," pointing up the cordiality of bilateral relations at a
time when Moscow is concerned to counter Chinese inroads in the
Balkans and to strengthen its own influence in Belgrade in
preparation for the post-Tito period.
In addition to Grechko, the Soviet military delegation includes
Col. Gen. M. M. Kozlov, Air Force Col. Gen. A. P. Silantyev, and
Admiral V. S. Sysoyev. TANJUG reported that during their stay
in Yugoslavia the group would visit "certain towns, Yugoslav
people's army units, aid institutions." The presence of Admiral
Sysoyev in the group suggests that the deployment of U.S. and
Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean may be among the
subjects under discussion. Yugoslav media are on record with
recurrent complaints about the "increased deployment" by "the
major powers" in an area adjacent to Yugoslavia.
Evincing sensitivity to the notion that Moscow may use the
occasion to seek a new home port for its expanded Mediterranean
fleet in nonalined Yugoslavia, Radio Zagreb's chief political
commentator Milika Sundic, in a broadcast on the day Grechko
arrived, vigorously rejected speculation that the Soviet
defense minister will "allegedly ask fn- the establishment
of Soviet military bases on the Adriatic coast." Noting that
"such stories" have been spread in the past and have not
materialized, Sundic added: "They will not come true this
time either. There has been no change in the foreign policy
of our country, and it is therefore impossible to talk about
the acceptance of such a demand." Further assuring his
listeners that Yugoslavia is not moving into the Soviet orbit
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29 MARCH 1972
or abandoning its nonalined balancing net, Sundi.c stated again
that any speculation that Yugc tilavia is "reappraini.ng" :its
foreign policy is groundless. ale insisted that the Yugoslavs
"do not hesitate to cooperate with all countries In accordance
with the principles of peaceful coexistence, regardless of
differences in social. systems."
Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation, on the other hand, appears
to be on the upswing, unencumbered by the kinds of constraints
that operate on military cooperation. On the 27th Radio Moscow
reported the opening in the Soviet capital of a meeting of the
intergovernmental Soviet-Yugoslav committee for economic
cooperation, with delegations led by Soviet Deputy Premier
Novikov and Yugoslav Federal Executive Council member
Mirjana Kratinic. Radio Belgrade said on the same day that
the new round of talks will "concretize the fruitful and
interesting" economic talks held in Belgrade in early
December 1971 with Soviet Deputy Premier and planning chief
Baybakov. That visit resulted in the signing of a supplementary
trade protocol for 1972-1975 which, according to TANJUG at
the time, called for "an increase of 580 million dollars--
more than 50 percent canpared with the previous period."
TANJUG said on 10 December that both sides characterized those
talks as "a major step in the further expansion and promotion
of trade, industrial cooperation, scientific-technical
cooperation, and other forms of economic relations."
Commenting on the current Moscow session, Radio Belgrade
stated on 26 March that the two sides will now consider "tasks
not only up to 1975" but through the current decade. The
broadcast said "it is envisaged that the planning organs of
both countries will reach an agreement to establish permament
contacts which, in addition to existing channels, will insure
the continuity and long-term planning of the economic relations
of interest to both countries." It. is also expected, the radio
added, that the two sides will consider the formation of a
special commission for the machine-building industry and will
discuss scientific-technical cooperation.
In the area of industrial cooperation, the 26 March broadcast
said, the two countries will explore possibilities for the
participation of Yugoslav light LI.dustry--particularly the
leather and textile industries--in the reconstruction of
Soviet enterprises. Under this plan, the Yugoslav industry
involved would send workers and some technical equipment to
construct projects in the Soviet Union. On their part,
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29 MARCII 1972
according to the radio, "Soviet builders tire interested in the
construction of some projects in Yugoslavia, such as the
metropolitan underground railway system on whio1i they are
experts."
There has I'e.en no detail of this kind in Moscow media, and the
Belgrade broadcast made no mention of the possii?ility of
additional Soviet investment credits for Yugos1Avia--a likely
agenda topic in view of Belgrade's straitened economic situation
during a period of mutual interest in closer relations.
TIRANA WARNS BELGRADE OF MOTIVES BEHIND SOVIET OVERTURES
Albanian appreaensiveness over the developing Soviet-"Yugoslav
rapprochement was registered in a 29 March editorial in the
party daily ZERI I POPULLIT which attacked Grechko's Belgrade
visit as part of an "expansionist" Soviet strategy that could
damage Belgrade's interests, and by implication also 'Tirana's.
Tacitly addressing itself to the concurrent Soviet-Yugoslav
economic talks in Moscow, the editorial at the same time warned
the Yugoslavs against harboring an; notion that they could
exploit Soviet policy aims for their own economic advantage
without paying a price.
Entitled "Hands Off the Balkans," the editorial, as reported by
ATA, traced present Soviet interests in Yugoslavia chiefly to
that country's strategic position in the Mediterranean in a
period of rising Soviet stakes in the Middle East. Noting that
Grechko's arrival in Belgrade immediately followed his
participation in Soviet naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean
and visits to several Middle East countries, the paper
concluded that "Moscow views the Balkans with envy as a
road of passage or a bridge to this area and as a desirable
base for its expansionist plans in Europe and on other
continents."
ZERI I POPULLIT saw in frequent "friendly" calls of Soviet
as well as U.S. warships at Yugoslav ports "a seed of danger
not only to the peoples of Yugoslavia but to the countries
of the Adriatic area." Concern that such Soviet naval visits
might evolve into more frequent and more formalized calls at
Yugoslav ports, menacing Albania as well as Yugoslavia in the
post-Tito period, seemed to underlie the paper's elaborate
lecture to Belgrade on the magnitude of the alleged Soviet
threat and the dangers of becoming entangled with a country
bent on "subverting" Yugoslavia for larger strategic purposes.
CONFI ENTIAL
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29 MARCH .1.972
The paper drew Implicitly on Albania's view of Its own
experience with the Soviets in cautioning that "when Moscow
pledges friendship, it prepares to stab you in the back"
and "when it offers you aid, it thinks of how to strangle
you." While the Soviets may offer "arms at a cheap price,"
the lecture continued, the recipient becomes "a prisoner
dependent on the Soviet Union for spare parts, . . . and
it has been proven that such dependence means economic and
political dependence." In the same vein, the editorial warned
of the danger a country would court by allowing the Soviets a
physical presence on its territory: "Whenever the Soviet
Lavisionists have been able to get a foothold, either by
intrigues or by exploiting a troubled situation"--a clear
allusion to alleged Soviet efforts to capitalize on Yugoslavia's
current domestic troubles--"they do not easily depart."
ZERI I POPULLIT concluded that it would be "a grave error"
for any country to believe it can "exploit its relations with
the revisionists for its economic interests of the moment"
without damaging its own sovereignty and plrcing a heavy
"mortgage" on its future.
In the period following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia,
Albanian propaganda had sought to capitalize on heightened
Yugoslav suspicions of Soviet intentions, courting the
Yugoslavs with a portrayal of an Albanian-Yugoslav common
bond in the face of a shared danger. Now in effect reviving
the notion of Albanian-Yugoslav affinity with a different
thrust, ZERI I POPULLIT's lecture to F:1.grade underscores
concern lest Yugoslavia's r.ceptivity to Soviet overtures
reverse the gradual trend toward improvement in Belgrade-
Tirana relations and result in the further isolation of
Albania in the post-"ito period.
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-31.-
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
SHELEST GIVES DEMONSTRATION OF HIS POWER IN UKRAINE
In a recent flurry of activity seemingly designed to demonstrate
that he is still boss in the Ukraine, Ukrainian First Secretary
Shelest has ousted the leader of one oblast and made well-
publicized tours to several areas, haranguing local leaders on
the proper running of their affairs. Especially noteworthy is
the fact that Shelest appears to have taken personal charge of
ousti:g an oblast leader, in view of his apparent inability to
control top personnel decisions in 1970-71 when several proteges
of his rivals were placed in key positions. His moves appear
to be aimed indirectly at members of rival factions.
KHMELNITSKIY Shelest's personal role was highlighted in the
PURGE Ukrainian press reporting of the 14 Marcie
Khmelnitskiy obkom plenum. Instead of the usual
brief, unelaborated report of an obkom leadership change carried
on page two or the bottom of page one, a lengthy account was
carried by all Ukrainian Central Committee papers at the top of
page one under the heading "Improve Leadership of Primary Party
Organizations." Rather than simply noting at the end that Shelest,
or another republic leader, had participated in the plenum--as is
customary--the account featured Shelest's role and included a
summary of his speech, with indications that he had criticized
the oblast leadership, especially regarding cadre work. The
plenum was attended by no other Ukrainian leaders--even leaders
of the Ukrainian Central Committee's cadre section, proteges of
Shelest's rivals in Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe, were absent--
and thus no collective aura surrounded Shelest's moves.
T.G. Lisovoy, the new Khmelnitskiy first secretary installed by
Shelest, appears to be one of his old proteges. Lisovoy rose
through the Kiev obl3st organization, where Shelest was first
secretary 1957-62. Appointed first secretary of one of Kiev
oblast's leading rayons in the mid 1960's, Lisovoy was singled
out for special favoritism in 1966 when he was made a full member
of the Ukrainian Central Committee (apparently the only Kiev
raykom secretary so favored). In March 1970 he was transferred
to Khmelnitskiy to replace retiring executive committee chairman
I.F. Levchenko.
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Khmelnitskiy ubkom's cadre work has been less than satisfactory
in recent years, and the recent plenum bore the earmarks of a
minor purge In a March 1972 PARTY LIFE (No. 5) article on cadre
work, Ukrainian Seccnd Secretary I.K. Lutak criticized the cadre
work of Khmolnitskiy obkom and revealed that sometime during the
past three years it had been required to report to the Ukrainian
Central Committee on its cadre work. Second secretary M.I. Mekheda
(as second secretary, in charge of cadre work) was removed in
August 1970 and replaced with obkom secretary 0.1. Tovstanovskiy,
who had been raised from a raykom secretary to obkom secretary
only months earlier.
The newspaper account of the 14 March plenum noted that party
organizational work had improved but added that shortcomings
remain. Shelest spoke on fulfillment of the decisions of the
June 1971 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on improving the
leadership of primary party organizations. First secretary
N.D. Bubnovskiy d-J.d not speak, and the report on the obkom's
leadership of primary party organizations was delivered by
second secretary Tovstanovskiy. The 62-year old Bubnovskiy,
once one of the Ukraine's top leaders as Central Committee agri-
culture secretary 1954-63, was retired on pension, while
Tovstanovskiy was transferred to the office of executive
committee chairman. Bypassing the other obkom secretaries,
the plenum elected local raykom secretary M.I. Pochinok as
obkom second secretary. (Pochinok, though only a raykom secre-
tary, had spoken for Khmelnitskiy oblast at the 24 June 1971
Ukrainian Central Committee plenum on leadership of primary
party organizations.)
Shelest's complaints against cadre work in Khmelnitskiy may also
be indirectly aimed at his apparent foe, Dnepropetrovsk first
secretary A,F. Vatchenko. The leader most directly responsible
for the cadre shortcomings in recent years would have been
second secretary Mekheda, who supervised this work for the
1960-1970 period--and Mekheda was Vatchenko's top deputy for
three years, while Vatchenko was Khmelnitskiy first secretary,
from 1959 to 1963. Mekheda has disappeared since his August
1970 removal.
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SHELEST While in Khmelnitskiy Shelest visited several kolkhozes
TOURS and plants, pointing out to the Oblast leaders examples
of good local leadersh p to be emulated. Moving on to
neighboring Ternopol Oblast, Shelest met with the obkom bureau on
raising the effectiveness of industrial and agricultural production
and correctly selecting leading cadres. Sheles?. pointed out to
them that they had insufficiently used local reserves for raising
agricultural production and had paid insufficient attention to
raising farming efficiency. His Khmelnitskiy and Ternopol lectures
were reported by Ukrainian papers on 18 March in lengthy articles
on page one entitled "Raise the Responsibility of Cadres in Each
Sector."
The 14 March Khmelnitskiy plenum followed by only a few days
another apparent demonstration of personal authority by Shelest.
Under the title "Constantly Raise the Effectiveness of Agricultural
Production," Ukrainian papers on 5 March featured a long report on
Shelest's visit to several rayons in southern and eastern parts of
Kiev oblast. Shelest delivered harsh lectures to local farm
leaders and especially members of the Volodarskiy raykom bureau
on the need to correct shortcomings and improve their agricultural
production. Shelest was dutifully accompanied on his rounds by
Kiev obkom first secretary V.M. Tsybulko; a close protege of
Shelest's apparent rival, Ukrainian President A.P. .Lyashko.
Tsybulko's obkom had been severely censured by Shelest at the
February 1971 Kiev oblast party conference for its poor leadership
of agriculture.
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29 MARCH 1972
CHINA
HEILUNGKIANG PARTY PLENUM REFLECTS ARMY-CIVILIAN TENSIONS
A second, enlarged plenum of the Heilungkiang provincial party
committee was held from 28 February to 20 March, according to
a Harbin radio report of 27 March. A total of 83 full and
alternate committee members were among the 945 persons in
attendance; 109 members were elected to the committee at the
party congress last August. The total attendance of 945
persons is close to the figure of 998 congress delegates who
elected Heilungkiang's new party committee last August. In
the case of the other enlarged provincial party plenums held
since Lin Piao's overthrow, and for which data is available--
Anhwei, Shansi, and Liaoning--the relative proportions are far
different. Liaoning's second plenum was the largest in relation
to its congress; but even so delegates to the plenum were only
30 percent as numerous as delegates to the congress.
The Harbin report indicated that denunciation of the Lin Piao
affair at the plenum was a formal process structured around
discussions of "important documents" criticizing "swindlers"--
codeword for Lin and his followers--for "maintaining illi':it
relations with foreign countries . . . and vainly attemptin8
to change the party's basic line and policies."
In contrast with other recent party plenums, the report on the
Heilungkiang gathering localized the struggle against the still
unnamed "swindlers" by emphasizing the need to intensify struggle
against "their agents in the province." Unlike most other
provinces, however, Heilungkiang had previously indicated that
local "swindlers," apparently former provincial chief Pan
Fu-sheng among them, were guilty of serious leftist deviations.
Several broadcast articles in late September and October noted
that the provincial struggle "has not come to an end," and
claimed that the "opportunist line which is 'left' in form
but right in essence has hurt our cause."
The plenum's stress on struggling against Lin's agents in
Heilungkiang suggests continued instability among the provincial
leadership. Problems within the provincial hierarchy may, in
fact, have influenced the decision not to identify those top
party leaders taking part in the plenum. The report merely
indicated that "the principal responsible comrades of the
provincial CCP committee separately reported on the work of
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
29 MARCH 1972
the provincial CCP committee" since its formation last August.
Four of the five Heilungkiang secretaries have appeared publicly
during the past two months. First Secretary Wang Chia-tao has
not made a publ-').c appearance since last August, before the Lin
affair, when he attended the first plenum of the new provincial
party committee. On 29 and 30 December, Harbin radio explained
that Wang had been absent from two separate provincial work
conferences because he was "out of town"; in each case it was
carefully noted that instructions were issued to the conferences
in Wang's name. The report on the just concluded second party
plenum, however, makes no mention of Wang.
Wang's current eclipse from public view may reflect continued
struggle over the PLA's dominant role in the reconstructed party
apparatus--possibly one of the issues involved in the purge of
Lin and several other top military leaders last fall. Wang,
veteran commander of the Heilungkiang Military District, replaced
Pan Fu-sheng, the ousted civilian chairman of the provincial
revolutionary committee, as province chief when he emerged as
first secretary of the new provincial committee eight months
ago. Wang has not, however, been publicly named as chairman
of the provincial revolutionary committee.
Judging by the Harbin report itself, a realignment of certain
military-civilian roles was discussed at the plenum. A greater
role for party-controlled civilian security organs--a relatively
new theme in PRC propaganda--was sounded by the plenum, which
took note of the security organs' role in building up border
defenses. Underscoring the apparent disengagement of the PLA
from public security functions, a specific call was made to
strengthen "social security measures" by "strengthening the
building of the rank and file of public security police and
constantly striving to improve their polit.Lcal quality and
operational ability." Calls to strengthen militia building
and "civil air defense work" were also issued at the plenum.
Asserting that "we are still not developing fast enough to meet
the demands of the party and the state and to keep pace with
the situation in the entire nation," the plenum called on
cadres to make a clear distinction "between what helps strengthen
party leadership and what weakens or rejects it." Cadres
throughout the province were enjoined to "uphold the principle
of the party assuming leadership over everything" in order "to
strengthen party unity and disciplinary control, and to intensify
education in discipline in order to tighten up the party's
discipline."
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29 MARCH 1972
TOPIC IN BRIEF
HAVANA. MOSCOW ON ITT-CIA "PLOT" IN CHILE
Cuban and Soviet Tredia have devoted limited daily reportorial
coverage, along with some comment, to developments surrounding the
allegations of syndicated columnist Jack Anderson about a "plot"
involving the CIA, International Telephone and Telegraph, former
Chilean President Eduardo Frei, the Chilean right wing, and the
U.S. Embassy in Santiago to block President Allende's inauguration
in late 1970. The Soviet and Cuban reports have both pointed up
allegations that U.S. Ambassador Korry had full authorization
from the White House to move against Allende. Both have given
cons. lerable space to Chilean reaction, with Havana taking
particular note of calls for the "immediate seizure" of ITT's
Chilean subsidiary.
Both Havana and Moscow have pictured the alleged 1970 machinations
as only one episode in a constant, continuing threat to the Allende
regime that requires unabated Chilean vigilance. But their
portrayals of the nature of the threat have different shadings.
Thus Havana has played the incident in terms of the staple Cuban
propaganda theme that progressive regimes in the hemisphere
face an ever-present threat of sabotage from the right, aided
and abetted from Washington. Moscow's propaganda, chiefly in
the form of Santiago-datelined TASS dispatches and radio comment
beamed to Latin America, has put heavy emphasis on the CIA as
the principal villain. The first and to date only Soviet central
press article on the subject, by V. Borovskiy in PRAVDA on
25 March, is entitled "CIA Plot Against Chile."
Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050013-6